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The Corner at the Center: Migrant Labor, Difference, Relationality and the Making of Berlin

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An abstract of
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Abstract

The Corner at the Center: Migrant Labor, Difference, Relationality and the Making of Berlin
By
Anlam Filiz

Turks in Germany find themselves at the intersection of two seemingly contradictory globally rising phenomena: anti-migrant sentiments and pro-diversity discourses. Turkish migrants are seen simultaneously as "Muslim outsiders" and as faces of celebrated "cultural diversity." Either way, Turks seem to be "culturally different" from the rest of the German society. The fact that Turkey increasingly appears as an authoritarian Islamic country outside of Europe enhances this overwhelming perception.

This dissertation analyzes the ways in which Turkish business owners and workers challenge and rework their assumed "cultural difference" in Germany through "culture work" in Berlin's corner shops (*spätis*). Culture work entails material and non-material exchanges, affective labor, aesthetic labor, social labor and the labor of Berlin's presumed neighborhood culture. These performances *simultaneously* nationalize, culturalize and ethnicize these shops as Turkish/foreign *as well as* local/quintessentially Berliner. Turkish business owners and workers also accumulate different forms of "diversity capital" (linguistic and sensory capital) which mark Berlin as a "cosmopolitan" and "hip" city.

Together, these processes demonstrate that migrants' frequently presumed difference from their "host cultures" is produced *in* their host countries. Also, these migrants' diversity and culture work help mark them *simultaneously* as outsiders and as insiders. Thus, this dissertation helps shed light on how migrants not only respond to the changing ways "cultural difference" is defined and experienced but also participate in these transformations.

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Ch. 1 – Introduction

Due to copyright regulations, lyrics are not included.[1]

Mc Fitti, 2013, "*Späti*"

This German rap song illustrates the popularity of Berlin's corner shops among the youth of Berlin. As their local name *späti*—a short and cute version of *spätverkaufsstelle* (literally late shop)—suggests, these shops are open longer than most others in addition to on Sundays and holidays, which are legal rest days in Germany. The young and old meet at the tables in front of these shops, drink Turkish tea, coffee and beer, and chat and watch people. These "hip" shops are central to the ways Berliners imagine and experience their city. *Spätis* are a signifier of the presumed relaxed lifestyle of Berlin where drinking on the street is allowed, spontaneous joy is always to be found and every subculture can, ostensibly, thrive. These infamous "relaxed" and "colorful" Berlin scenes are made by unexpected figures: mostly-migrant-run businesses and their owners and workers.

That migrants are protagonists of these pleasant scenes at the heart of Germany raises a curious question: How are migrant-run shops so fundamental to the German capital when xenophobia is on the rise in Germany (Deutsche Welle 2016b)? The question is ever more puzzling because many of these migrants are from Turkey, an increasingly Islamizing country seen by many Europeans as antithetical to Europe. In January 2018, for example, the French President Emmanuel Macron told the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that "there [was] no chance of progress towards Turkey joining the European Union at present" (BBC News 2018). What is more, Germany, unlike the USA, did not perceive itself as an

[1] The song, "*Späti*" by Mc Fitti can be accessed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AQa2j2MnnRw. Last retrieved on 26 June 2018.

immigration country until 2005 when its first-ever "official integration programs" started (Asiye Kaya 2017, 58) even though Turks have settled in Germany in large numbers since the 1960s.

Parallel to this only slowly changing political and legal framework, immigrants in Germany still tend to be understood as marginal to their "host society." Opinions suggesting the difficulty (if not the impossibility) of integrating (especially Muslim) immigrants into Germany and Europe have become even more prominent following the arrival of almost a million Syrian asylum applicants to Europe between 2011 and 2018.[2] Events such as the sexual attacks against German women allegedly by North African men on New Year's Eve, 2015 in Cologne contributed to these anti-Muslim opinions (Der Spiegel 2016).

At the same time, this overwhelmingly anti-immigrant atmosphere confronts its opposite: discourses that "welcome refugees" and praise "multiculturalism." In the German case, countering nativist nationalism appears as a duty to many who perceive xenophobic sentiments as the resurgence of Germany's National Socialist past. Aydan Özoguz, Germany's Commissioner for Immigration, Refugees and Integration, for example, released an expert report in 2017 challenging the prevalent anti-migration discourses and calling for improvements to immigrant rights (Chase 2017). Challenging such anti-immigrant sentiments is especially important to those such as German chancellor Angela Merkel who understand Germany as a European leader with the responsibility to solve global humanitarian issues. Merkel's half-congratulatory–half-cautionary speech after Donald Trump's election in 2016 further showed that the chancellor imagined Germany as a country respectful to its minorities. Merkel warned Donald Trump whose campaign speeches were filled with anti-migration and anti-Muslim statements: "Germany and the USA are bound together by values: democracy, freedom, respect of law, respect of people *regardless of their origin, the color of their skin,*

[2] 996,204 Syrians applied for asylum in Europe between April 2014 and October 2017—518, 326 of whom applied in Germany, the largest number compared to any other country in Europe (UNHCR n.d.).

their religion, gender, sexual orientation or their political beliefs" (Faiola 2016, emphasis added).

While these contradictory discourses prevail, Turks are increasingly seen as "culturally different" from Germans: either as Muslim outsiders "incapable of integrating" or as sources of "cultural diversity" to be celebrated. No matter how they are viewed, they are considered culturally different either way. This pronounced understanding of "cultural difference" emerged out of Germany's recent history. While the Third Reich organized German society along biological and racial differences that eventually resulted in the ethnic cleansing of Jews as well as Roma and Sinti, "the category of 'race'" was abandoned and even became taboo in post–World War II West Germany (Chin 2009, 81). While West Germans dropped the word "race" and discussions about biological differences from their public discourse, differences continue to be understood as essential disparities, this time with reference to "culture" (Chin 2009, 81–82).

As this dissertation will show, Turkish migrants challenge, rework and reinforce this dominant emphasis on "cultural difference" through their "culture work." Culture work, in this sense, refers to performances of attributes that are assumed to belong to a culture such as friendliness and spontaneity. Through these performances cultural particularities come into existence and the idea of preexisting differences between cultures is reinforced.

Such cultural labor is central to global divisions of labor. Certain kinds of work are attributed to certain genders, nations, ethnicities and races. Thus, different groups are understood to be naturally inclined to certain kinds of jobs. Nail salon work in the United States, for example, is ascribed to Asian women (Kang 2010). This assumed naturalness makes the labor that goes into this culture work seem invisible.

These cultural ascriptions and the accompanying invisibility of certain kinds of labor have been central to recent changes in labor patterns worldwide. For example, global companies have moved their operations overseas to employ the cheap "'young and malleable'

docile girl[s]" of "the developing world" (Freeman 2000, 102). On the other hand, women from countries associated with docility such as the Philippines have migrated to the USA and Europe to work as caregivers—namely because middle-class women in these "developed nations" increasingly have taken white collar jobs, thus no longer having time to care for the young and the elderly (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002). Sociologist Pei-Chia Lan further shows that such cultural ascriptions create "a stratified labor market" "in the migrant domestic service sector in Taiwan" divided along "nationality-based ethnic categorization[s]" (Lan 2006, 68). To illustrate, while Indonesian care workers in Taiwan are stereotyped as "dutiful, loyal and accommodating" and are hired to care for "the elderly and the ill," Filipina workers are understood to be "better educated, more civilized and thus more capable of taking care of Taiwanese children" (Lan 2006, 78). Taiwanese employers see Filipina nannies as inherently "affectionate" and "loving" and thus "'culturally suited' to care work" (Lan 2006, 115). While employers might claim that these jobs have gendered and national essences, scholars have shown that these "essences" are actually molded and extracted from these workers through culturalized labor (Freeman 2000; Hochschild 2002; Kang 2010; Lan 2006).

In *Entrepreneurial Selves*, Carla Freeman (2014) adds to this scholarship by examining Barbadian entrepreneurs who design and mold their own selfhoods in accordance with gendered and culturalized expectations about service work. Barbadian entrepreneurs in the service industry do perform emotional labor even though their labor is not coerced by their employers as in the case of migrant domestic workers in Taiwan (Freeman 2014, 142). They do so rather "because [they are] aware that [their] own reputation and the success of [their] enterprise are enhanced through such modes of rapport" (Freeman 2014, 142). In this sense, the Barbadian entrepreneur exemplifies "self-regulation of emotional labor" in the global neoliberal economy where labor does not only produce economic value but also communicates one's selfhood (Freeman 2014, 142).

Labor performed in *spätis* also has consequences that go beyond the shop counter. These shops are mostly migrant-run. Among these migrant owners and workers, Turks are a visible majority. With culture work in *spätis*, Turkish migrants own their marginality but not at face value; they re-define the terms of their difference in relation to assumed elements of their "host cultures." Turks in *spätis selectively* perform German stereotypes about "Turkish culture" such as disorderliness, sociability and hospitality as well as stereotypes of Berlin such as spontaneity (overlapping with the Turkish stereotype of disorderliness) and "neighborhood culture" (*kiezkultur*) (usually expressed through the diversity of people living in the same neighborhood, some of whom regularly meet in local spaces like pubs). By selectively reworking mainstream discourses, Turkish migrants carve out spaces that are central to the understandings and experiences of their social and urban surroundings not only for themselves but also for other "locals" and visitors. In this sense, through reshaping their assumed difference as a key element of the "charmingly chaotic" and "cosmopolitan" Berlin, Turks not only claim a belonging to Berlin but also take up key roles in the workings of the city, thus bridging the assumed differences between "insiders" and "outsiders." "Cosmopolitan," in this sense, refers to Berlin's marketed image as a city of ethnically and culturally diverse people and those who appreciate this diversity. Turks' cultural difference contributes to this self-image of Berlin as a diverse city, thus creating economic and symbolic value for the German capital.

In these Turkish-run shops, a Berlin that appears to be specifically "Turkish" and a Turkishness that is specific to Berlin emerge. These Turkish-Berliner spaces are "*secular*" ones challenging mainstream discourses that situate Turks as "*Muslim* outsiders." Here, I do not use "secular" to mean "fundamentally against religion." I also do not focus on states' involvement in regulating public appearances of religions as the concept of "secular" is

mostly discussed in the literature[3]. I rather use "secular" to mean "not necessarily religious" (as a more stylistic alternative). That is to say, religiosity might or might not exist in *spätis*. My point is rather that religiosity is not central to the workings of these spaces even though the people who run them are overwhelmingly defined through their difference in religion and are seen as Muslims. In *Can Islam Be French?* (2010), anthropologist John Bowen examines the ways in which Muslims in France negotiate their religion with French secularism. This process creates a "French Islamic landscape" (Bowen 2010, 23). On other hand, in the case of Berlin's Turkish-run *spätis,* a "double-secularness" derives out of negotiations with both German and Turkish religiosity and secularism. Firstly, the selling and consumption of alcohol mark these spaces as outside of Muslim religiosity. This practice is in line with not only German but also Turkish secularism because alcohol has been consumed in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic despite state regulations (Evered and Evered 2016). On the other hand, the opening of *spätis* on Sundays mark these spaces as non-Christian (See Chapter 4 for a discussion of shop opening hours). As a result, contrary to European economies of identification monopolized by (imagined and real) religious differences, these shops crop up as not-necessarily-religious spaces of socialization—outside of not only Islam but also Christianity. This double-secularness of these spaces helps make them consumable for a wide range of people including, for example, people who drink alcohol and those who want to spontaneously shop on Sundays.

As this dissertation will demonstrate, with the consumption of this "secular Turkish-Berlinness," *spätis* become key to rebranding Berlin as a diverse, young, relaxed and hip city (See Chapter 2 for a discussion of how Berlin's rebranded self-image emerged in the last decades). Owners and workers' *selective* culture work—which, for example, maintains the

[3] For excellent discussions of state management of religion in Europe and Turkey as well as European and Turkish public secularisms, see Asad 2003; Bowen 2007, 2010; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Özyürek 2005; Scott 2007; Tuğal 2009; Turam 2004, 2007, 2012.

assumed hospitality and casualness but not the religiosity of Turkishness—reinforces this image in two ways. Firstly, these workers and owners are (quite literally) the faces of Berlin's presumed "diversity." Secondly, the "laid-backness" Germans attribute to Berlin overlaps with the unhurried and easygoing culture they also attribute to "Turkishness." As what is rebranded as "Berlin" overlaps with what is stereotyped "Turkish," these shops emerge as producing simultaneously Turks' cultural difference from "Germanness" and their inclusion in the German capital.

Throughout the dissertation, I explore how Turks negotiate difference from and oneness with Germans. I am particularly interested in how they strategically take up or challenge cultural stereotypes. I show that the commercial and non-commercial exchanges taking place in *spätis* and the cultural labor performed by Turkish *späti* owners and workers during these exchanges are crucial building blocks of Berlin's rebranded cosmopolitan identity and "neighborhood culture"—a reputation that increasingly attracts human and financial capital to Berlin. In this sense, these spaces are not only economic but also cultural institutions. *Spätis* not only serve immigrants and Berlin's self-image, but they also establish the relationality between an assumed "Turkish culture" and the German capital aspiring to be a global capital. In other words, *spätis* do not only generate basic economic livelihood and social value for immigrants (as "migrant businesses" are conventionally understood) but also cultural value for the city of Berlin as it struggles to transcend its national boundaries in a time of increasing nationalist nativism.

Moreover, *spätis* work in accordance with the yearly, weekly and daily rhythms of work and leisure in Berlin and visitor flow to the city. This synchronization helps further establish these shops as vital to various understandings and experiences of the city not only for Turks and Germans settled in Berlin but also for Berlin's increasing national and international short- and long-term visitors. This relation between *spätis* and Berlin as a city aspiring to be an international cultural center obliges us to revise how we understand migrants

and their businesses—namely, because migrants are usually understood as marginal and obscure figures rather than central to the workings of their cities.

Although the academic literature on migration often assumes a priori that migrants and their businesses are "ethnic groups" and "ethnic enterprises" respectively—categories that are assumed to be peripheral to the mainstream—I use *spätis* as an example to show that migrants utilize their assumed marginality and make themselves and their businesses indispensable through this very marginality. Contrary to received wisdom, what appear as their "ethnicity," "nationality" and "culture" are not given but are produced through their culture work.

In this sense, this dissertation demonstrates the production of cultural difference and relationality in economic realms. Throughout this dissertation, I demonstrate the ways owners, workers as well as customers understand these businesses and act in these spaces. These understandings and actions *simultaneously* nationalize, culturalize and ethnicize these shops as "Turkish" and "migrant" *as well as* "local" and "quintessentially Berliner." That is to say, the discourses about and practices occurring in these shops produce the "ethnic" and "local" characteristics of these spaces. The Turkish owners and workers of *spätis* enact the cultural stereotypes that situate them as different and not only claim a *belonging* to the German capital through their *difference* but also establish themselves as *fundamental* to this city at the *center* of Europe in a time when their perceived difference signifies them as *marginal*.

Migrant Businesses

Many migrants choose to run their own shops because, as outsiders and usually as non-speakers of local languages, they are marginalized and discriminated against in the job market. Examples include Korean food, clothing and video stores in Chicago (In-Jin Yoo 1995, 319), Dominican *bodegas* in New York City (Krohn-Hansen 2013), Chinese laundry shops in St. Louis (Ling 2004) and Hispanic supermarket chains in Miami (Portes 1987).

Migrant businesses offer migrants key resources—especially in the absence of state support and social welfare—to find jobs, gain certain skills and provide them a stable income that helps younger generations get an education and become upwardly mobile. Migrant businesses enable social integration into host societies as well as economic integration into local markets (eg. Mushaben 2006; Zhou and Cho 2010).

Migrant businesses are also fundamental to the creation of ethnic neighborhoods which provide migrants with support that enhances their well-being in their "host countries" (Marcuse 1997; Wilson and Portes 1980). These ethnic spaces give migrants a sense of community and identity. Ethnic businesses can maintain ethnic communities even when people are not clustered spatially in ethnic neighborhoods. For example, in Washington, D.C., immigrants live in various districts but come together in visually identifiable "ethnic commercial centers" (Benton-Short and Price 2008, 20). Geographers Lisa Benton-Short, Marie Price and Elizabeth Chacko identify this phenomenon as "*sociocommerscapes*" (Benton-Short and Price 2008; Chacko 2008).

The idea of "being your own boss" encourages immigrant entrepreneurship even though scholars still debate whether migrant business owners earn more than they would as employees in the mainstream economy (Alba and Foner 2015, 64). Turkish business owners I spoke to in Germany also present the flexibility and independence that marks the trope of today's neoliberal entrepreneur as the upside of their jobs. Long working hours, self-exploitation as well as exploitation of family members and ethnic acquaintances are big drawbacks, however. Opening a business is also risky; rates of failure among migrant entrepreneurs are high (Alba and Foner 2015, 64–65).

Despite such downsides, Turks have initiated successful ethnic enterprises in various European countries. As Turks started to cluster in certain European neighborhoods starting in the 1960s, recent migrants as well as second and third generations with few employment opportunities were able to start profitable businesses to serve these communities (Abadan-

Unat 2011, 149). In the German case, the erasure of blue collar jobs and the emergence of high-tech industries gave rise to widespread unemployment; thus, self-employment became popular among Turks (Abadan-Unat 2011, 150). Turks were estimated to own 80 000 businesses in Germany and 6 000 businesses in Berlin in 2008 (Zentrum für Türkeistudien 2005 as cited in Pécoud 2017, 38).

Political scientist Nermin Abadan-Unat states that although these ventures started "as a result of economic necessity and discrimination," they maintain other cultural functions as well (Abadan-Unat 2011, 148–49). For example, they enable migrants to sustain their cultural practices, identities and networks (Abadan-Unat 2011, 149). Like in many other migrant enterprises, Turkish shops provide immigrants with culturally specific goods and services such as food and clothing. For example, businesses that specialize in wedding dresses provide Turks with garments that they cannot find in regular shops (as Turkish weddings usually consist of three separate nights, each requiring different, specific attire). Turkish businesses also provide migrants with specialty products and services that cater to transnational needs such as *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca) and funeral services (to transport the dead to be buried in Turkey). Some Turkish businesses have been very successful in creating transnational economic ties as well. For example, some businesses born in the Netherlands and Germany have established factories in Turkey (Abadan-Unat 2011, 155).

Ethnic businesses have attracted scholars' attention due to their richness as economic, social and cultural phenomena. Researchers have contributed invaluable examinations of the sources and consequences of minorities' entrepreneurial motivations (eg. Light and Gold 2000), factors involved in minorities' success such as inter-ethnic solidarity (eg. Bonacich 1973; Masurel et al. 2002) and geographical concentrations of different migrant businesses (Wilson and Portes 1980).

Such studies have contributed to our understanding of urban inequalities, migrants' networks, senses of belonging and strategies for survival in new economies. However,

scholars such as Kwong (1997) and Ülker (2016) have criticized the research on ethnic businesses and enclaves and argued that such work reifies "migrants" as bounded groups that are essentially different from the rest of the society. They take issue with the assumption that migrants' primary characteristic is "ethnic." Building on these critiques, I concentrate on the *creation* and *reinforcement* of these ethnic characteristics rather than taking them as a priori realities.

What is a *Späti*?

During my two years of ethnographic fieldwork between 2014 and 2016 as well as my pilot research in 2013 and follow-up visit in 2017, I was able to examine *spätis* from multiple perspectives via participant observation, interviews and media research. An insight that arose from all of these diverse methods and modes of engagement was that these shops were indispensable for Berliners and integral to the fabric of Berlin itself.

These mostly-migrant-run shops are central to the ways a wide range of Berlin residents talk about and experience the German capital as a "*multikulti*," "hip" and "neighborly" city echoing the way the city markets itself. *Spätis* are crucial for Berliners for two interrelated reasons. Firstly, they are open when most other shops are closed. This temporal flexibility is important in Germany because most German shops are forbidden by law to be open on holidays and on Sundays. Many also close early in the evening voluntarily. This temporal regime limits the time intervals people can shop and urges them to plan ahead. Thanks to *spätis,* people can be more spontaneous. Secondly, many people see *spätis* as a microcosm of alluring Berliner disorder at the center of a country stereotypically known for its Weberian culture of precision and formality, distanced human relations and orderliness. As a Huffington Post article on *spätis* suggests: "The long opening hours are a slice of freedom. And they make up part of the friendly Berlin anarchy, which has become the brand essence of

the city in the past 20 years" (Christ 2015).[4] This "Berlin anarchy" contrasts the stereotypical German (especially Bavarian) and West European order, where life is supposedly predictable and shops close at 10 pm at the latest.

Stereotypes about Germany are almost caricatured versions of Max Weber's analysis of the Protestant Ethic. Many Turks, for example, perceive Germans as "efficient," "rational" and "calculating." Berlin is, however, *stereotypically* pretty much the reverse; stereotyped as "inefficient," "chaotic" and "spontaneous." In contrast to the stereotypically always on time German trains, for example, Berlin's inner-city rail system is supposedly "never on time," the topic of frequent complaint among my friends in Berlin[5].

For many Berliners, another expression of *spätis'* charming disorderliness is found in their variety. "Is there any shop in Berlin that is not a *späti*?", my roommate Ceren[6] half-jokingly asked me during one of our daily chats over coffee. I was telling her about all the unexpected tasks *späti* owners and workers did—things that one would not expect to observe in corner-stores—such as renting bikes and holding un-delivered postal packages for their customers. What Ceren said had a lot of truth in it. It was difficult to define what a *späti* was simply by its products, services or appearances because each looked different and they all had differing business operations.

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[4] All translations are mine.

[5] Of course, attributes like "German order" and "Berliner disorder" are stereotypes. Their meanings also change from person to person and are constructs relative to imagined "orders" and "disorders." My German friends in Berlin, for example, frequently complained about the unpredictability of Berlin's transportation system. I have also been late to appointments because of my over-trust in "the German system." In 2016, for example, Berlin's transportation company BVG was once again criticized because the inner-city trains could not meet the aspired percentage of punctuality for 96 percent. "Only" 94.2 percent of the trains came on time (rbb 24 2017). Although this disparity seems minor, the binary opposition of German punctuality and Berliner unpredictability stand still.

[6] All names are pseudonyms.



Figure 1: An advertisement for a *späti* renting bikes near Berlin's *Landwehrkanal*, a popular destination for tourists. The ad is written in English as international tourists are the main target in this case.

Small businesses that are run by migrants in Berlin combine various business models to differentiate themselves from others and to maximize their earnings. Some *spätis*, for instance, use some of their spaces as a video store, an art gallery, a bookshop or a restaurant (Klier 2013, 66–69). In general, the most common types are "classical *spätis"* (small stores with a small selection of convenience goods and various kinds of beer), "*tele-spätis"* (those with computers used for Internet surfing and computer games), and "bakery-*spätis"* (those that sell baked goods with more comfortable seating and better coffee compared to other kinds of *spätis*) (Klier 2013, 28–35). They all tend to have outdoor and/or indoor seating, ranging from proper wooden tables and chairs to a coffee table with a bunch of plastic chairs or a bench.

Figure 2: The seating area in front of a *späti* with a table, two benches and a chair.

Overall, a *späti* can be any shop that fulfills a convenience function. This convenience function is both spatial and temporal. They are akin to corner shops all over the world as they sell small articles such as beer, coffee, snacks, cigarettes, as well as flour, eggs and milk. At *spätis*, one can get these products without having to walk or drive to big grocery stores. In addition to the spatial centrality of these shops, their long opening hours and speed of service also save time. These "late shops," as their name literally translates, are open longer than most others in addition to on Sundays and holidays when most other shops are closed. Their hours of operation vary greatly as owners and workers observe the customer flow in their environments and decide on optimal times that fit the pace of life on their streets and in their neighborhoods. Some are open 24 hours a day. Shops that close early, for example at 10 pm, usually have early opening times in the morning such as 5 am. Some open later around 10 am and close late at night around 3 am. Many owners told me that they decided their closing times almost on a daily basis. They observe the street crowd each day and shift their

schedules accordingly. The temporal flexibility of these shops challenges the assumed "German regularity and precision" and cement the assumed "Berliner spontaneity" and "Turkish disorderliness." The owners and workers of *spätis* work for very long hours—up to 8-10 hours a day, sometimes 7 days a week—to maintain this rhythm that solidifies these shops' convenience function.

Besides the spatio-temporal convenience these shops generate for their customers, their aesthetically pleasing interiors are another reason for their popularity. People can find anything they can possibly imagine in this ordered chaos. The selection includes everything a customer might ever need: from baby powder and toilet paper to headphones, postcards and camp stoves. The product variety shows that they cater to a diversity of people including the young adults who might spontaneously decide to go camping and tourists who might buy a Berlin postcard as they walk by. The insides of the stores are very colorful thanks to this product variety. These goods are sometimes placed neatly onto shelves in bulk or stand on their own on top of a pile of other products. When the space permits, boxes full of different brands of beer are lined up in the middle. A few green bottles of Danish beer, for instance, might lie on top of yellow and silver Bavarian beers sitting next to a group of *Berliners* in red and yellow. When the piles start to deplete, workers put more bottles on the top from the random beer packs that have recently arrived. This common practice serendipitously creates an alluring beer bouquet. The multi-colored banners that come as commercial gifts from different wholesalers dangle from ceilings above the piles of beer. This apparent carelessness and coincidence dress up a scene glorifying capitalism that even the most heated capitalist could not design on purpose. At the same time, this spectacle acts like a metaphor for how Berlin presents itself: as pleasantly spontaneous, coincidental, diverse and genuinely colorful.

This chaotic image contrasts most big grocery stores. In a German market chain, for example, products tend to be arranged in a more orderly manner; not only according to long-standing marketing rules such as "flowers should always be at the entrance next to produce

for a fresh ambiance" but also so that products are properly categorized and easily found eliminating the need of personnel guidance. Thus, toilet papers tend to not be placed next to coffee and salamis (which can be the case in *spätis*). In the famous and successful German discount chains, on the other hand, there is some disorder but not an aesthetically pleasing one like in *spätis*. In these markets, products are supplied usually in large sizes and are placed in bulks sometimes in their half-cut boxes. These markets are a lot cheaper than *spätis*. As plastic and paper bags are not given for free in these stores, unlike in the USA for example, sometimes people grab these half-cut boxes and use them to carry what they buy. Thus, the need for labor to take products out of boxes and place them neatly on shelves is largely eliminated.

Figure 3: The colorful beer-scape in a *späti.*

Product variety, relatively cheap prices, long opening hours and a variety of consumption options such as being able to grab a coffee or beer to go and being able to stay and enjoy a sunny day or vivid night outside at the tables in front of shops attract a variety of people to *spätis*. Depending on the *späti,* customers range from German seniors who come in the mornings and start their day with a cheap Turkish tea or beer at *späti* tables to young

white-collar workers and students who grab a coffee on their way to their destinations in the city. German and international young adults also drop by at *spätis* on their way home from university or work to get their *Feierabendbierchen* (after-work beer). When their schedule allows for a night out, they "pre-game" here on their way to one of Berlin's famous techno clubs. People sit at the tables, smoke, drink, eat, watch people, make friends, meet acquaintances and chat with others including *späti* workers and owners.

Different *spätis* attract different customers. For example, young boys frequently go to *spätis* with computers and play video games. Clubbers usually go to *spätis* that are conveniently located and have a large beer collection. Customers in bakery-*spätis* are "more mixed" than for example, in smaller *spätis* which carry a large variety of beer (Klier 2013, 31). Sometimes, the same customer goes to different *spätis* based on their locations, the time of the day and the products they carry.

Nevertheless, overall, a variety of people come to *spätis* and sit side by side more than in most other contexts. *Spätis* are pleasant alternatives to a variety of places frequented by a variety of peoples. For example, elderly people could go to cafes inside supermarkets for their morning coffee but the *späti* scene is usually more pleasant. Young adults also go to regular cafes but *spätis* are cheaper. Nightlife enthusiasts and people who want to drink alcohol could alternatively go to bars but bars are more expensive. Some people alternatively go to public parks and canals to drink as public drinking is allowed in Berlin but they usually get their beer from *spätis* anyway and as a plus, many *spätis* have toilets. Moreover, the migrant population in these shops are higher than in most of these alternatives because many Turkish acquaintances, friends and kin of owners come to these shops specifically because they know the owners and the staff. Thus, these shops are more inclusive than many others, creating social spaces that appear to be "diverse."

Elements of these shops are not entirely unique to Berlin. In Germany, similar shops can be found, for example, in Hamburg under the name "*kiosk*"[7] and in Cologne under the name "*büdchen."* They can be compared to *bodegas* and Korean groceries in New York City as they fulfill a convenience function, are run by migrants and are colorful and hip places. They can also be compared to 7/11s anywhere in the USA because of their long opening hours, to Chinese and Italian restaurants in San Francisco and New York City because they are run by migrants and to similar corner stores in some other big European cities such as Brussels and London.

However, in Berlin, many people see these shops as a crucial part of the city for their social, cultural as well as commercial value. The stories owners tell about the history of these shops also connect these spaces directly to Berlin's and migrants' histories. While there is no official history explaining how these shops emerged, some suggest that similar shops existed in East Berlin. On the other hand, some others claim that Turks brought this model of relaxed socializing spaces and the "small business culture" of friendliness (*esnaf kültürü*) from Turkey. Thus, Turks situate these shops at the intersection of an imagined (and possibly real) Berliner history and an assumed "Turkish culture."

Berlin's youths, expats and tourists admire these shops because they reinforce "diversity" and make Berlin "colorful." These stores are also seen as amplifying a neighborly chaos, which is seen as a Berliner quality. Such factors make these shops beloved especially among Berlin's young adults and international populations. Also, these shops are quite ubiquitous in Berlin. They are almost at every corner on busy streets, especially in central neighborhoods where expats, young people, migrants and working classes live such as Friedrichschain, Kreuzberg, Neukölln and Wedding. There are no official statistics as to the exact number of *spätis* in Berlin but members of the Späti Organization Berlin (*Berliner Späti*

[7] While in English, "kiosk" refers to small structures customers cannot enter, in German, "kiosk" can refer to buildings where one can enter and hang out like *spätis*.

e.V.) to whom I talked stated that there were around 1,000-1,500 serving a population of approximately 3.5 million.

Who are *Späti* Owners?

Migrants dominate the profession of *späti* ownership. Most migrant *späti* owners are people from Turkey although, for example, I did meet a *späti* owner from Sri Lanka in the "Turkish" neighborhood of Kreuzberg. Turks dominate the profession especially in the central, hip, newly gentrified neighborhoods of Neukölln and Kreuzberg where many young people—major customers of *spätis*—reside, shop and entertain. A founding member of the Berlin Späti Organization confirmed this observation and told me that around ninety percent of *späti* owners were Turkish. Another founding member of the organization likewise stated that non-Turks were very rare in the *späti* business. The Berlin Späti Organization had around 60 members before their official opening. Only one of these members was German and the rest were Turkish. A Turkish distributor of phone cards who serves all of Berlin also commented on the ethnic division of labor. He stated that Arabs were dominant in the phone business while *späti* owners were predominantly Turks. The distributor also commented that most of these owners were men. These informants' comments were generalizing as there are *späti* owners of various ethnic and national origins including Germans, Indians and Arabic-speakers. Thus, it would be misleading to name *späti* business as a Turkish profession. Nevertheless, informants' remarks show that Turkish business owners tend to see the *späti* profession as a "Turkish" one and that Turks are visibly dominant in the profession.

Accordingly, my interviewees were exclusively Turkish *späti* owners. I interviewed 18 owners including Azad, the owner of the shop where I conducted participant observation. Three of these owners were in a liminal owner-worker position. Two told me that they were "workers" in their son's shops as on paper, the shop belonged to their sons. The third owner's

shop belonged to his wife on paper and his brother-in-law introduced him to me as a "worker."

The demographics varied although almost all were men. Only one of the owners I spoke to was a woman. She managed a *späti* with her husband. They hired one male worker. 15 of the owners were born in Turkey whereas three were born in Berlin. Seven of the first-generation migrants came to Germany to join their families; four owners came specifically through marriage. One owner came through his wife's connection to Germany but was undocumented. Two Kurdish owners stated that they came undocumented specifically for political reasons. One of them got asylum. One owner stated that he came to Germany when he was in his late teens because the place where he lived in Turkey was boring. He first came to Frankfurt and later moved to Berlin because he thought Berlin was more fun. 13 are married, three are divorced or separated, and two are single. Their education levels vary from primary school drop outs to vocational school and university graduates. Finally, those who do not hire workers (7 out of 18) work very long hours up to 16 hours a day whereas owners of multiple shops (4 out of 18), all of whom are first-generation migrants, mention working much less (only 4 –5 hours a day, according to one owner).

The umbrella concept of "Turkish migrant" runs the risk of obscuring the diversity among these *späti* owners and workers. While acknowledging this risk, I use the concept "Turkish migrant" for brevity and hope that this dissertation will make the problems with the concept evident. I do not use the concept to refer to an ethnicity but rather to refer to *späti* owners and workers who have personal or family histories of migration connected to Turkey—histories that influence the way they live their lives and are perceived by others. As I demonstrate, these migrants are key figures and their businesses are key institutions in the daily life of Berlin and in the dominant profile of "Berliner culture." This insight necessitates a revision of the literature on migration, which tends to consider migrants as external or, at best, peripheral to their societies. As such, this case raises the more general question about the

relation between "migrants" and places and disrupts the binary opposition of "insiders" versus "outsiders." In what follows, I share the stories of the *späti* owners and workers whom I mention in multiple chapters of this dissertation to depict this plurality.

Azad

Azad was the Kurdish owner of the shop where I worked, which I will call Nanpej.[8] He was born in the mid-1970s in a village in Eastern Turkey to a farmer family. The family moved when he was two years old to a nearby town. He was very successful in primary school. Thus, his family sent him to a high school in a bigger municipal area where he had relatives. In this high school in a city with only a small Kurdish population, Azad was discriminated and politicized. Thus, he started spending less time on his schoolwork and his grades dropped. Later, his family moved to a more diverse city where he joined them. He was accepted to a university even though he was not as successful in school as once before.

Azad came to Germany in the mid-1990s undocumented and applied for political asylum as he was active in the Kurdish movement in Turkey. Later, he married his cousin, dropped the asylum case and got his residency through his marriage. Yet, the couple could not get along well and soon broke up. He later married a Kurdish woman in Turkey, and they moved to Germany together.

He worked in different jobs, including construction work and later an internship with a Kurdish TV channel. When his wife first accompanied him to Germany, they came across a small shop and decided to lease it. The shop was a bakery run by a Turkish man and was not very profitable. The couple developed the shop "by being nice to people" (*insanlara iyi davranarak*), Azad says, and by redecorating the place and introducing new products such as alcohol. At first, he and his wife ran the shop alone and worked in shifts. He recalls working at the shop from 3 am to 9 pm at least once. As the shop became profitable, they started hiring workers. One worker refused to continue working because they sold alcohol and she was

[8] *Nanpej* means bakery in Kurdish, Azad's native tongue.

religious. After divorcing his wife in 2014, he started working less at the shop. He now relies heavily on workers. He also has recurring illnesses and back pain that prevents him from working efficiently.

Azad had twins from his second wife, one girl and one boy. At the time of my research, the twins were attending a kindergarten where Kurdish, Turkish as well as German were spoken. The children were to start primary school around the time I left Berlin in 2016. Azad registered them in a private Protestant school. He explained that he avoided schools with "Muslim children." He said that he visited the public school close to his home, and here he encountered screams, curses and fights. He did not want his children to grow up in such an atmosphere. When he went to the Protestant school, the students were well organized and guided the visitors. He liked this atmosphere. He told me that the people at the school asked him why they chose this school. He told them that he did so because they were not Muslim.

After he told me this anecdote with a humorous tone, he stated that they taught about all religions at this Protestant school. He confirmed, though, that they would naturally be closer to Protestantism: "My children, I say this openly, shall become Christian rather than Muslim." Azad is Alevi by origin but is Atheist (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of Alevism in Germany). He associates Islam with gender inequality and said that he did not want his children to grow up thinking women were inferior.

As Azad and I talked about going back to Turkey, he compared the discrimination he faced in Turkey as a Kurdish man and in Germany as a foreigner. He stated that he did not want to go back especially because he did not want his children to experience discriminatory practices similar to what he faced in Turkey. Yet, he stated that he also did not feel that he belonged in Germany. He exemplified this in stories about him trying to get into discos and being rejected because of being a foreigner. Once, a bouncer even told him and his friends that they did not accept foreigners.

Selim

Selim is a Kurdish *späti* owner who came to Berlin in 2011. He was born in the mid-1980s in a southeastern city in Turkey. When I interviewed him in 2016, he was married and had two children; one was eight years old, the other was four. He worked as a porter for a while in a Turkish metropolis and later switched to trading goods. His wife was born in southern Germany although her parents were from Turkey. They met when she was on holiday in Turkey, got married and had a daughter. They stayed in Turkey for three years. His wife suggested that they settle in Germany as otherwise he would have to do his mandatory military service in Turkey. He agreed and came to Germany undocumented. His son was born in Germany. When he faced deportation, he got his residency through his German citizen child.

At first, he worked at his father-in-law's *späti*. What he earned as a *späti* worker was not enough to support his family, so he decided to open his own shop. He borrowed money from his relatives and leased his current *späti* one and a half years ago from a fellow countryman. He told me that he is now happy to be his own boss. However, one downside of Berlin, according to Selim, pertained to child rearing. He said he wished he could take his children to Turkey and raise them there, suggesting that "the culture is different here" in Germany. His observations of cultural differences between Turkey and Germany pertained to discipline and beating. He stated that his daughter's teachers asked her whether her parents beat her. The teachers told her to report them if this did happen. According to Selim, in the case that children confirmed they were beaten, they were taken away from their parents. He also suggested that children were prepared for German culture at school. Thus, he saw schools as institutions that rip Turkish children away from their parents literally as well as culturally.

Hasan

Selim referred Hasan to me as an interviewee. Hasan was born in an eastern city in Turkey in the early 1970s. He came to Germany in the mid-1990s through marriage. As

Hasan stated, conditions for foreigners were much worse when he first came. He had to wait for years to get a work permit. He worked as a cook for a while. He was not very happy with this job because the working hours were very long. Therefore, he happily accepted when his *kirve*[9] bought a *späti* in 2003 and asked Hasan to work with him. He took over the shop in 2011. He now manages his *späti* with two workers.

Hasan has three children. The eldest is an accountant in her early twenties. During our interview, Hasan stated being proud of her, adding that she already earned more than he did. His second born was doing her *abitur,* a high school qualification that enables students to study at university.[10] The smallest was in 6th grade at the time of our interview in 2016. Like many other migrants from Turkey whom I met in Germany, Hasan saw education as a very important asset. This is expectable as education is highly valued in Germany. It is the main tool for upward mobility.

Hasan is a primary school dropout and started working as a farmhand when he was a teenager. He uttered a common Turkish phrase showing his support for his children's education: "My father could not send me to school but I will send mine!" Yet, like many other Turkish fathers, he perceived the education system in Germany as less disciplined than in Turkey. This, for him, was proof that the Turkish system was better.

Nazim

Nazim manages a *späti* with his family but stated that he did not own the shop (which was in his son's name). Nazim and his son and wife worked at the *späti* together; they did not hire other workers. Nazim was born in the mid-1950s in a conservative eastern Turkish city. He is a warm-hearted Alevi man and stated that he faced discrimination in Turkey because of

[9] *Kirves* are like circumcision godfathers especially among Kurds. A *kirve* sponsors the circumcision of a male child. The child and his *kirve* develop a father-son-like fictional kinship.

[10] The German education system is very stratified. The type of high school a student graduates from determines whether she will be able to apply for universities. After finishing less competitive high school-level institutions, students are directed to vocational schools. Thus, having an *abitur* is a high achievement especially for minority children.

being Alevi. Nazim was frequently beaten by friends during his youth because he did not go to the mosque with them (Alevis have their own religious institutions called *cemevi*).

Nazim calls himself a "literature teacher" even though he could not officially finish his degree in Turkey as he married and came to Germany right before the 1980 coup in his last year in college. He was convinced that he would have been arrested if he stayed because he was quite active in the leftist political movement in Turkey at the time. For Nazim, being a *späti* owner-worker who often discussed current events with customers was what sustained his desire to speak about social and political issues. When I interviewed him, his German had flaws although he spoke fluently. When he first came to Germany, he had to wait five years to get a work permit. He perceived this as a wrongful German policy as the state failed to integrate people into the workforce. At the time, he was a stay-at-home dad. Later, he worked for about 15 years in a cigarette factory as a machine operator.

Nazim saw the family shop as an investment for their 26-year-old son. Nazim also stated that the shop helped him keep his son in sight and therefore out of trouble. He stated that children got influenced by the culture outside their families especially after they turned 18. He observed that many migrant children ended up addicted to drugs or in jail because of this influence. Thus, the *späti* helped keep his son off the streets.

Cihan

Cihan was born in Berlin in the early 1970s. He has lived in Berlin all his life, not even moving from the borough in which he was born, although he has moved between apartments. Cihan lives in a non-central neighborhood with a lot of green areas. In our interview, Cihan admitted to liking that there were not too many foreigners (meaning, for example, Turks) in his area. His shop was in a more central neighborhood also without a "Turkish population." In addition to his ethnic characterization of neighborhoods of Berlin, Cihan also made a political characterization: He stated that a majority of the people in his "work neighborhood" were left-leaning people who were sympathetic to foreigners. He

commented that racists would avoid these areas just as he avoided going to neighborhoods known to house racists.

Upon graduating from high school, Cihan pursued and received a vocational degree in textiles. He is married with two children. At the time of our interview, his daughter was 19 years old and was studying banking; his son was 12 years old. Cihan hoped that his son would be qualified to study at *gymnasium* (the highest-ranked high school in Germany after which students can attend university). Cihan is a Turkish citizen. He commented that he preferred Turkish citizenship because he wanted to be able to retire in Turkey. The retirement age is 60 in Turkey and 65 in Germany (Axelrad and Mahoney 2017, 58–59), which makes Turkish pensions attractive. Cihan also stated that he found peace when he went to Turkey's southwestern coast on holidays (where they have a summer house), although he was troubled by the chaos of big Turkish cities like Istanbul. He thought of moving to the Turkish coast after retirement.

Cihan liked doing sports in his free time. He especially liked walking and running in the mornings. He also went to an indoor pool whenever he could. He also rode his bike at times. He stated that he enjoyed playing soccer but avoided it because he was afraid that he could get seriously injured. This would mean that he would not be able to work in his shop, which entailed physical work such as carrying heavy boxes. Thus, he avoided sports such as soccer and ice-skating that could get him injured while he did lighter sports that kept him fit and healthy for work.

Who are *Späti* Workers?

Many *spätis* are family-run. Owners who did not hire workers suggested that they avoided the added cost. One owner, for example, suggested that the shop made enough money only for his family. Those who hired workers usually refrained from hiring people they did not have kinship ties with or did not know closely. A main reason was fear of theft. Owners

commented that profit margins were so low even a small theft would make hiring workers meaningless. Men are preferred as workers because the stereotype is that women would have trouble dealing with drunkards and other dangers at night. Women usually work in their families' businesses, in bakery-*spätis* and in the morning-shifts.

I interviewed nine workers, including my co-workers in Nanpej. Six were women and three were men. Seven of these workers were born in Turkey; one was born in Amsterdam to Dutch-Turkish workers and one was born in Berlin. Three interviewees suggested that they were not *späti* workers by profession but were helping out a *späti* owner they knew from before. One of them, a female worker stated that she and a friend owned a bakery previously, but the landlord did not extend the lease so they closed up shop. Another male worker commented that his business was outcompeted, thus forcing him to seek employment at another shop. Five of these workers were married; three were separated or divorced and one of them was single.

Sevgi

Sevgi, a Turkish citizen, was one of my female co-workers in Nanpej. Sevgi was born in the early 1980s in an eastern Turkish city. She migrated to a city on the western coast of Turkey with her family when she was four years old. She moved to Berlin in the mid-2000s upon marrying a Germany-born Turkish man. She narrated her spatial and temporal migration story quite poetically: "I was born in E-town, grew up in W-city and aged in Berlin." Sevgi and her husband are both Alevi. She met him through a relative. She saw his photograph on a chat program and liked his looks. He later came to Turkey a couple of times to meet her, and, a few months later, they got married. Sevgi's husband worked as a driver "with papers" (meaning he was a legal, full-time worker with social security benefits).

Sevgi frequently told me about how difficult her first few years in Berlin were. While she had kin in Germany, her parents were in Turkey. Her relatives in Germany did not help her adjust to her new home; as a matter of fact, they did not even bother to call her during her

first few years in Berlin. The couple's first years were also marked with financial difficulties. They did not even have a single piece of furniture in their apartment at first and thus slept on the floor. They did not get financial support from her in-laws even though it is traditional in Turkish marriages for parents to set up the apartment for the couple. Sevgi did not know the language or the people in Berlin. Thus, her first years in Germany were full of despair and longing for her family in Turkey.

Sevgi's relationship to Germany started to change after her daughter was born. Sevgi's nuclear family and her daughter are the center of her life now. Sevgi spent most of her time outside Nanpej doing chores at her home and taking care of her daughter. Sevgi told me that she would not return to Turkey and that she grew to like it in Berlin. She associated Berlin with a sense of security and freedom. In Berlin, as Sevgi stated, nobody cared about what other people did (for example, at what time they were outside). She also felt that she grew apart from her family and friends in Turkey over the years. She stated that working conditions were also harsher in Turkey. Sevgi knows the labor conditions in Turkey well because she started working in Turkey when she was only 15 years old. Her first job in Turkey was in a textile factory. This manual work was very hard and she could not take it for long. After various low-skilled jobs in Turkey and Germany, Sevgi started working in Nanpej. One reason she liked working in Nanpej was that she could adjust her shifts to fit her daughter's and husband's schedules. One of her biggest complaints, on the other hand, was "Arab customers" who tried to flirt with her. As she stated, German customers rarely did such things. Yet, she was confident that she was able to brush off impertinent clients. She was also glad that Azad told her to report to him if there was a disrespectful customer she could not deal with. She was one of the most diligent and tidy people I have ever known. Sevgi was also very outspoken and warm-hearted. She was my sharp-tongued and simultaneously compassionate and humorous mentor at Nanpej.

Ayse

Ayse was a headscarved, soft-spoken woman with two kids. She was a Turkish citizen. She was usually the one to open the shop at 3 am. She had pepper spray to defend herself, which was hidden from sight behind a delivery note next to the cash register. She was very religious and tied to her Sunni beliefs. Some of her friends were from the mosque she frequented. Ayse was born in the mid-1980s in a southern Turkish city. After primary school, Ayse entered an exam to study at a boarding school. She passed the exam but decided to drop out against her father's will. She worked for a while in a factory in her hometown. She came to Berlin after marrying her aunt's son who lived in Berlin and whom she had not met until she was 17. Her husband had moved to Berlin at a very young age (his mother remarried after her first husband passed away and moved to Berlin). Ayse and her fiancé married two years after they met. Thus, Ayse moved to Berlin. Her husband worked very hard—up to 20 hours a day—in her first few years in Berlin. They did not get welfare support from the state so that Ayse could continue to stay in Germany as her husband's dependent. At first, her husband worked very hard and could be home only up to five hours each day.

For Ayse, the fact that she did not have close relatives in Berlin but her husband's close kin were here meant that her troubles were doubled. For example, when she first came to Germany, Ayse worked at her sister-in-law's bakery for free. She told me that her husband's family expected her to be mature even though she was very young—barely in her twenties. Her mother-in-law always sided with her husband and others in her family. She felt completely alone in this country where she did not have friends or know the language.

After around ten years, her sister-in-law started another bakery where Ayse, her husband, and the sister-in-law all worked together. This time the sister-in-law paid Ayse, but Ayse also had to cook for and look after her own two kids as well as her sister's three children especially in the evenings. She also took German classes at the time. She could not stand this hectic pace of life and, after a year, stopped working despite the dissatisfaction of her

husband's family. She became very depressed at that time. After a while, she started working in Nanpej. Getting away from the family and being on her feet was a relief for her. She worked at the same time intervals as her husband, which was the job's biggest plus for her. However, Ayse stated that she did not earn her labor's worth, thus making the job more difficult than it should be.

Sultan

Sultan was one of my Turkish co-workers in Nanpej. She was born in the early 1970s in Western Thrace of Greece (where Turks are a sizable minority) and had Greek citizenship. She was divorced and had two children: a daughter in her mid-twenties who was trained as a doctor's helper and a son in high school who wanted to become a train conductor.

In Greece, Sultan started working on farms planting tobacco; she was only seven years old when she started. She got married in her late teens. The tedious work she did in the fields became even harsher when she started laboring on her husband's family's field. She came to Berlin in the early 1990s with her ex-husband and firstborn to seek work. They used to live with her mother-in-law who came to Berlin a few years before them. She thought that things would get better here, but that was not the case. Her husband did not hold jobs and gambled away their money. Her mother-in-law also did not contribute much to housework. She got rid of her "psychopathic" husband when he did not pay his debt to a member of "the mafia," as Sultan puts it, and had to leave Berlin.

When Sultan first came to Berlin, she worked as a cleaner for long hours. She would leave home for work at around 3 am, come home to check up on her kids around noon, go back to work again, and then come back home around 9 pm. During this period, this woman of five foot three dropped to 88 pounds. She was hospitalized for a while where the doctor told her that part of the problem was homesickness. Her father came to Berlin and took her back home. She later came back to Berlin and worked in various service jobs, including as a cleaner in a Turkish grocery store where she also worked in the cheese department. When her

employer in this shop learned that she had broken up with her husband, he sexually assaulted her. She got rid of him by discharging a whole container of pepper spray on him. She later worked at a bakery-café with predominantly German customers in the eastern part of the city. As she told me, she was very lively (*fikir fikir)* at the time. Her Turkish female boss in this shop wanted her to put her lively personality to use and to be more engaged with customers. Sultan told this anecdote proudly.

Sultan did not wear a headscarf but was a practicing Sunni Muslim. She married her current boyfriend through an Islamic ritual, but he did not agree to an official marriage. She cared greatly about her looks. She always wore makeup. Sultan was vivacious, deft and outspoken. As Sevgi once said, Sultan would have become the chancellor of Germany if only her German were better. As someone who had various health issues and who worked in various tedious jobs in the past, Sultan was conscious about her body's resistance to work in Nanpej. She frequently had migraines and had to stay home, which posed a "critique of work discipline" (Ong 2009, 35).

Gabriela

Gabriela was another female co-worker of mine. She was born in the early 1980s in Bulgaria and was a Bulgarian citizen; she had no relatives in Germany. She was an attractive university graduate who begrudged working in a job for which she was overqualified. She took German classes sponsored by the German state. She was working in a bank in Bulgaria when she got married to a Turkish man she met on the Internet. She had formed a connection with Turkey when she opened a small shop in Bulgaria and imported goods from Istanbul's Merter neighborhood, a bargain-shopping area. Her Turkish improved when she married the Turkish man she met on the Internet. She was fluent in conversational Turkish by the time I had met her.

Her Turkish husband's sister lived in Berlin. Gabriela followed her husband to Berlin to find work; the couple stayed with the sister for a while. She thought that this was a bad

decision because she was very successful in her banking job where she worked in the small credits section. She lost many of her class privileges when she came to Berlin as she did not know the language. Her husband was a gambler like Sultan's husband. He worked in a *doner* shop. She was still married at the time of this research, although they were separated. She lived alone while her son from her previous marriage attended university in Bulgaria.

Gabriela told me that her first few years in Berlin were very difficult. Not knowing the language or how to navigate the tedious German bureaucracy and complicated housing market were major drawbacks of her life in Berlin. She commented that she had not yet seen "the nice side of Berlin" because she had to continuously struggle. "Whatever you do," she continued, "you will remain a foreigner here." She compared her life in Berlin with her life at home. She stated that she could do various kinds of jobs at home, but in Berlin she was "like a robot." She commented that she slept, went to work, went to her German classes and that that was all; in Bulgaria, she had her weekends for herself. She frequently expressed her dissatisfaction with her downward mobility.

What is *Späti* Work?

Späti work entails physical and service work. The physical work involves, for example, carrying boxes of bottled drinks and other goods to be sold. Owners and workers carry these boxes from interior spaces designated as storerooms to the fridges and displays in the public parts of the shop. Then they place these goods on the shelves. In Nanpej, this was mostly the job of workers as Azad usually complained about back pain. Other workers also had such issues but did not have the luxury to refrain from performing the work. Such physical work also involves carrying patio tables and chairs inside if they are prone to theft. Taking out the trash is another task that also involves heavy lifting.

Another physically exhausting task is cleaning. In Nanpej, cleaning was also the job of the female workers. In addition to mopping the floors, dusting products on display and

scrubbing the toilet, cleaning work also included emptying ashtrays and anything left by customers on tables. As Nanpej was self-service, customers were supposed to bring their dishes to a designated area but sometimes did not do so. Workers had to take these dishes and put them in the dishwasher.

Another daily task is unofficial inventory count and checking whether something needs to be bought. Owners and workers do this by "just looking," which means that they are very familiar with what the shop carries and how it is organized. They call the wholesalers if something needs to be replaced. In bakery-*spätis*, this involves making food items that need to be replaced or baking frozen goods. Many also drive and buy goods from big supermarkets. This entails following the sales and promotions of different markets across the city. In Nanpej, Azad did the shopping that entailed driving to far parts of town. Workers walked to a nearby discount store and a Turkish market to buy things they needed for preparing food.

In Nanpej, other daily tasks included answering the phone, which usually involved calls in German from various bureaucratic institutions. Either Azad answered these calls or workers told the caller to phone again to talk to Azad. The job also entailed managing technical problems given that not only the photocopy machine but also the computer that supplied the Wi-Fi connection and music in Nanpej were not really state-of-the-art. Despite the technological glitches, workers and Azad photocopied and faxed documents for the customers.

As Nanpej was also a bakery, the first shift involved heating frozen baked goods. Later, various kinds of munchies were made including salads, cakes, *gozleme* and sandwiches. In the meantime, workers served customers too. This involved exchanging money with goods they wanted to buy and making coffee as well as breakfast items such as scrambled eggs.

Späti work entails service work because interaction with customers is key to the job. One *späti* owner who has two cafes and two *spätis* stated that people come to *spätis* only if they are happy there. The service part of the job involves smiling, greeting customers, and

doing small talk about weather or chatting about more serious matters such as illnesses. Sometimes answering questions from people (even though they might not buy things) is also necessary. The job also involved boundary work especially for the female workers of Nanpej who communicated with some customers that their flirting was uncalled for.

Subjection

My understanding of *späti* owners and workers' selective affirmation of and in turn reification of their difference builds on Judith Butler's critique of Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault's theories of subjection. In *The Psychic Life of Power (1997)*, Butler turns her attention to the process of becoming agential through subjection, a process not mapped out in detail by either Althusser or Foucault. As I show in the dissertation, Turkish owners and workers become subjects and thus, agents, by selecting which cultural stereotypes they will affirm. For example, while Turks are simultaneously addressed as Islamic and warm, Azad (the owner of the shop where I worked) does not present himself as a Muslim but he does present himself as humorous and friendly. This selective affirmation confirms some cultural stereotypes but not others. Thus, Azad chooses *in which ways* he is different.

In *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (2004), Althusser explains his theory of interpellation whereby an individual becomes a subject through the metaphor of turning. As Althusser's story goes, a police officer calls to a person on the street. The person turns around and looks back at the officer. Thus, he recognizes that he was indeed the one being hailed. His turning makes him "a subject" (Althusser 2004, 699–700). In other words, by responding and thus, recognizing the authority of the police officer, one becomes a citizen that is subject to rule. According to Althusser, this is how ideology interpellates us. In other words, the discourses that attempt to define us work only because we affirm these discourses and only by affirming these discourses we gain our identities.

Althusser's theory negates understandings of ideology that assume there is an outside to power. The street where the hailing takes place, for example, might seem "outside ideology," but it actually is not, as affirmed by the man's turning (Althusser 2004, 700). While hailing and turning are sequential in the story, there is no temporal divide between them: "The existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing;" in other words, "*individuals are always-already subjects*" (Althusser 2004, 700 emphasis in original). In this sense, for Althusser, ideology is omnipresent.

Butler takes issue with the sovereignty of the hailer in Althusser's theory and the not-so-apparent reason why this sovereign authority is recognized in the first place. As Butler states, "Althusser does not offer a clue as to why that individual turns around, accepting the voice as being addressed to him or her, and accepting the subordination and normalization effected by that voice" (Butler 1997, 5). Althusser actually finds it "strange" that the individual turns to the police officer; his turning is in fact so strange that it "cannot be explained solely by 'guilt feelings'" (Althusser 2004, 699). Nevertheless, Butler is right in that Althusser does not delve into why exactly the turning takes place; he only declares that the individual almost always turns. For Butler, the inner workings of this "turning" are too crucial to be left unexplored because by turning one becomes a subject in both senses of the term: being subordinated to ideology and, potentially, becoming agential.

Foucault agrees with Althusser that "there is a founding subordination in the process of *assujettissement*" [subjection] although, for Foucault, productive power and discourse are "neither singular nor sovereign" (as is the case for Althusser) (Butler 1997, 5). However, just like Althusser, Foucault does not explore "the specific mechanisms of how the subject is formed in submission" (Butler 1997, 2). In this sense, both Althusser and Foucault leave unexplored the puzzle of agency whereby "the subject" is both "the condition for and

instrument of agency," and "at the same time the effect of subordination, understood as the deprivation of agency" (Butler 1997, 10).

Butler offers a thought-provoking reading of this puzzle and differentiates between two moments of subjection: firstly, the moment whereby power is "a condition of agency" and secondly, the moment when power becomes one's "'own' agency" (Butler 1997, 12). According to Butler, power might alter during this process of becoming (Butler 1997, 13). After all, power is not a fixed entity (Butler 1997, 13); as Foucault famously suggests, power is rather relational. This transformation of power is not a radical break from its previous form, however. As Butler states, "where conditions of subordination make possible the assumption of power, the power assumed remains tied to those conditions, but in an ambivalent way; in fact, the power assumed may at once retain and resist that subordination" (Butler 1997, 13). In this sense, one's submission to power and opposition to it are concurrent.

I understand Turks' relationship with mainstream discourses circulating in Germany in a similar way. Throughout the dissertation, I show examples where Turks challenge, affirm and rework discourses that describe them as different from Germans. These discourses are multiple and interpellate Turks in diverse ways: for example, as Islamic, violent, disorderly, caring and dexterous. If we were to adapt Althusser's example of hailing to the situation of Turks in Germany, there would be multiple police officers each addressing the person with a different name. The man would not acknowledge all of these names but rather turn selectively. Through this *selective turn*, the man does subordinate himself to discourses that cast him as different but is, nevertheless, agential in the sense that he chooses *in which sense* he is different. Also, the affect of turning is not necessarily a negative one such as guilt; it can be positive, for example, a desire to belong, a pride in Turkish affiliation or a longing for one's hometown. What is more, by affirming the discourses that *cast them out* of German culture, Turks also *relate themselves to* the German capital. Within this process, not only Turkishness but also Berlin-ness is reformulated as connected to one another.

Migrants and their "Host Societies"

Unlike in countries that have long defined themselves as "immigrant nations" such as the USA and Canada, (especially Muslim) migrants in Germany tend to be understood as culturally outside the nation (See Chapter 2). As anthropologist Steven Vertovec argues, such contrasting of migrant and host cultures relies on "reified, static, and homogenous" understandings of culture (Vertovec 2011, 241). Partly because of this "culturalism" (Vertovec 2011), labels such as migrant seem to stick even after one obtains citizenship and becomes fluent in the language, which are often defined as major tools and goals of incorporation. For instance, the German Federal Statistical Office considers a German citizen who speaks German fluently and has always worked and lived in the country as a person with a "migration background" if he or she has a parent who was born without a German citizenship.[11] Thus, escaping this category is quite difficult.

Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002, 2003) note that the understanding of migrants as outsiders is an extension of the assumption that there is a natural connection between lands and the people living on them and that these people share common cultures. Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002) define the tendency in social sciences to take nation states as tacit units of analysis and migrants as the oddity in these coherent wholes as "methodological nationalism." Within this framework, ethnicity frequently appears as the quintessential binding feature of every migrant group.

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[11] The German Federal Statistical Office has been using the term people with a "migration background" (*Migrationshintergrund*) to describe all those without a German citizenship and "all Germans who immigrated to the area today known as the Federal Republic of Germany after 1955 and all Germans with at least one parent who immigrated to the area of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1955" (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013, 25). The term is supposedly a politically correct alternative to more degrading ones. It was introduced to address the problems immigrants face but has been criticized for being marginalizing. The Federal Statistical Office has recently changed the definition of the concept to people who are not born with a German citizenship and those who have "at least one parent who did not have German citizenship at birth" (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017, 4).

Anthropologists have been at the forefront of efforts to challenge static understandings of ethnicity as ideas, practices and traditions that migrants bring with them to their host countries. Ethnographers have demonstrated that ethnic identities develop in dynamic negotiation in *migration contexts* rather than merely being imported from "home" (Glick-Schiller 1977; Gonzalez and McCommon 1989; Lessinger 1995; Rouse 1995; Soysal 2001; Stafford 1987). To overcome the tendency to see things as inherently "ethnic," Glick Schiller and Çağlar (2013) promote research on non-ethnic aspects of migrant businesses such as their roles in migrant incorporation and rapid urban restructuring. Glick-Schiller and colleagues (2006) likewise explore how African migrants build networks in Germany and the USA not through ethnic communities but rather through their connections to born-again churches where mostly white Christians go. Migrants whom the authors have interviewed are settled in two slightly marginal cities: Halle in Germany and Manchester in the USA. These cities do not have large national and ethnic communities that would help migrants incorporate into their new contexts. Therefore, migrants in Halle and Manchester mobilize non-ethnic resources such as those of transnational religious communities. Migrants provide locals with transnational religious connections and a feeling of a global religious community while locals provide them with other resources such as bureaucratic assistance and business networks (Glick Schiller, Çaglar, and Guldbrandsen 2006, 624). As such, migrants connect local populations in disparate cities with people and cultural meanings that go beyond regional and national borders. Migrants shape their urban environments in more central cities as well. Krohn-Hansen (2012), for example, shows that Dominican immigrants have changed the economic and social landscape of New York City through the cab, bodega and supermarket industries they work in. My research builds on this literature which discusses how migrants and their host societies transform each other in dynamic transnational relations.

Transnational Political Context

Relations between Turkey and Germany and the changing political climate of each country influence Turkish migrants' daily lives in Germany. Recently, Germany and Turkey have become a center of debate on the global politics of migration. While Germany opened its borders to Syrian refugees in 2015, the right-wing group PEGIDA (*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*) organized demonstrations against refugees and migrants in different cities of the country. These protests showed that a growing part of the public was unhappy with Angela Merkel's migration and asylum politics while some others celebrated her pro-refugee stance. For example, in 2015, the German popular magazine *Der Spiegel* called Germany's chancellor Angela Merkel "mother Angela" (*Mutter Angela*) comparing her refugee politics to Mother Theresa's missionary activities (*Der Spiegel* 2015). Anti-migration groups, on the other hand, reinterpreted Merkel's picture with Mother Theresa's head cover and covered Merkel with Islamic hijabs. People in various European countries supported these demonstrations and at times organized their own. The growing unrest in Germany became apparent when the right-wing AFD (*Alternative für Deutschland)* entered parliament in the federal elections in September 2017. Germany became the symbol of both pro- and anti-migration politics.

Meanwhile, Europe and Turkey increasingly depended on each other in their attempts to control "the Refugee Crisis." In March 2016, the European Union (EU) and Turkey made an agreement which came to be known as the "EU–Turkey Refugee Deal." The deal aimed at guaranteeing that Europe would not receive any more asylum seekers by keeping them in Turkey. Turkey was to receive financial support and visa liberalizations in return. Since then, Turkey has become the host of the largest number of refugees in the world. While many in Europe saw this deal as proof of Turkey's being a good ally, the Turkish state has actually threatened to break the deal several times whenever there was a conflict between European countries and Turkey. These threats gradually strained Turkey's relations with Europe and

especially Germany. German suspicion against the current Turkish government grew with the growing unrest in Turkey, the failed coup in July 2016, the Turkish Constitutional Referendum to change the current parliamentary system into a presidential one (held under a state of emergency in 2017) and Turkish politicians' attempts to hold pro-Erdogan campaigns in Europe (See Chapter 2 for a discussion of how these developments tightened Turkey-EU relations).

Such events reflect much more than an abstract international business between elite bureaucrats and politicians: they influence the way Turks are seen and treated in Europe. In this polarized political atmosphere, Turks became even more central to the debates about Islam, the future of Europe and EU's migration politics. For some groups in Europe, these events signaled that Turkish and other Muslim populations could not be integrated. For some others, it showed that half of the Turkish population had already aligned themselves with Europe and thus should be welcomed.

To illustrate, in June 2013, the popular German magazine *Der Spiegel* published a bi-lingual German and Turkish issue dedicated to the Gezi Protests, which broke out after the Turkish state attempted to demolish a public park in Istanbul. The small-scale protests grew rapidly when the police evicted protestors violently. Turkey-wide protests were held against growing authoritarianism, Islamization, militarization of the police and restrictions on freedom of speech. The articles in the *Der Spiegel* issue stated that Turkish youth were increasingly orienting themselves towards the West (*Der Spiegel* 2013). This orientation proved that Turkey or at least its younger generations were European Union material after all.

These reactions changed when more than half of the Turks in Germany voted for a constitution change in 2017, which gave Turkey's president Erdogan more power. For Alice Weidel, a board member of the far right-wing AFD, such strong support for Erdogan was proof of the Turkish population's loyalty to Islam and to other "Turkish values" and not to European ones such as democracy and freedom. Weidel concluded from this inference that

their German citizenship should be revoked and that they should be sent "where they obviously like best"—to Turkey (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2017). The 2017 Federal Elections of Germany further brought Turkey to the core of German political debates. In a TV debate between heads of two of the strongest German political parties, Angela Merkel of CDU (Christian Democratic Union) and Martin Schulz of SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany), a main topic of discussion was whether the EU accession negotiations with Turkey should be ended.

Such suspicions about Turks' loyalty to Germany are embedded in German history. These suspicions present parallels with historical anxieties about Jews' transnational connections (Mandel 2008, 131–33). As anthropologist Ruth Mandel states, the ambivalent insider-outsider status of Jews—just like Turks today—was a major threat for "Nazi propagandists;" Jews were supposedly faking to be Germans (Mandel 2008, 131). Likewise, for German nationalists in the AFD, some Turks might have German citizenship but this legal status only hides their loyalty to Turkey. Therefore, the narrative goes, Turkey might be an EU candidate but German-Turks' loyalty to non-European "Turkish values" demonstrates their outsider status.

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These developments, contradictions and conflicts proved Germany, its capital and its Turkish population to be ideally suited to study the controversies surrounding the growing migrant and Muslim populations in majority Christian countries as well as migrants' relationship with their "host" societies and cities. Despite the high numbers of Syrian refugees fleeing to Germany, Turks continue to be the quintessential Muslim Other in Germany. Turks are the largest minority at 16.7% of 17.1 million people with migration backgrounds of the 81.4 million people living in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017, 7). Their continuous high numbers combined with the fact that Turks have historically been Oriental outsiders for

Germany (Ewing 2008) perpetuate their centrality to Germany's migration and identity debates.

Berlin, the capital and most populous city of Germany with 3.5 million people (Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2016), is a microcosm of the greater Turkish presence in Germany. It famously houses the largest number of Turks in the country. Berlin is frequently referred to as the biggest Turkish city outside of Turkey, which is a truthful joke among Turks and a sign of doomsday for German nationalists. Moreover, Turks are the largest minority in Berlin. According to the Berlin–Brandenburg Statistics Bureau, there were 231,000 people with a Turkish background in Berlin in 2015 followed only by 80,000 Poles (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2017). Turkish populations in other German metropoles are far behind Berlin's: 93,874 people with a Turkish background live in Cologne (Die Oberbürgermeisterin Stadt Köln 2017, 1); 45,080 Turkish citizens live in Hamburg (Statistisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein 2017, 4); 39,011 Turkish citizens live in Munich (Statistisches Amt München n.d.); and 26,735 in Frankfurt (Stadt Frankfurt am Main Bürgeramt, Statistik und Wahlen 2017, 3). In the Ruhr Area, the largest metropolitan area of Germany which includes big cities like Dortmund, Essen and Duisburg, 207,200 Turkish citizens lived in 2016 making up the largest foreigner population in this urban area (Regionalverband Ruhr 2016).

Unlike many other German cities, though, Berlin's international population is a defining feature of the capital according to the administrators of the city as well as many Berliners. Berlin continues to receive increasing numbers of migrants not only from Turkey but also from many other European and non-European countries. According to Berlin's official portal, between 2014 and 2015 Berlin's population rose by 50,000 thanks to about 46,000 people who came from outside of Germany. Berlin's student population also keeps rising thanks to foreigners and those from other German cities coming here to study (Berlin.de 2017). In fact, 38% of all students who registered for their first semesters in 2015 came from outside of Berlin (Berlin.de 2017). Moreover, according to statistics from July 30,

2016, approximately 250,000 (38.5%) of the nearly 660,000 foreigners in Berlin were from other European Union member states, with Poland, Italy and Bulgaria being the leading countries of origin (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2016, 10, 6). This was a relatively young population as more than half of these people were between ages 15 and 45 (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2016, 10).

Berlin's multinational and young foreign population is indispensable to the workings of the city not only as consumers and taste-setters but also as the faces of Berlin's re-branded "diversity." Members of this significantly-sized population not only transform the human landscape of the city, but also influence its identity. The Berlin administration has rebranded the city as an open-minded global urban center—a supposedly well-deserved capital of Germany, which has positioned itself more broadly as a leader of "European values" such as human rights and tolerance especially since Angela Merkel assumed office in 2005. This positioning is in agreement with the search for a novel identity under what anthropologist Nitzan Shoshan calls "a post-reunification project of German nationhood" and the threat of a potential National Socialist resurgence (Shoshan 2016, 5). Although some people were discontented with these pro-migration viewpoints[12], many Berliners reacted to these re-branding attempts in affirmative ways. For example, many supported the emerging idea of a German "welcoming culture" (*Willkommenskultur*) and took to the streets to welcome refugees. They organized campaigns in various neighborhoods to help asylum seekers find rooms for rent, get access to healthcare, register for social benefits and learn German. Many donated articles from diapers and clothes to books and furniture. Berliners' readiness for volunteering during the recent "Refugee Crisis" was depicted in the media as evidence of their progressiveness, while Munich, ostensibly Berlin's opposite, built a 4.5-meter wall

[12] Anti-migration sentiments among Germans became evident by the success of the newly-formed far-right political party AFD in recent years. They entered the State Parliament of Berlin (*Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin*) in the elections of September 2016 and won third place in the federal elections of September 2017.

around a refugee home to protect locals from the noise pollution that was expected to be caused by refugee children (Oberhuber 2016).

Although Berlin has long been known as a "cosmopolitan" city, this emerging diverse and open-minded identity that has given rise to the popularity of migrant-run corner shops amongst modern-day Berliners is specifically situated in Berlin's Cold War past. As I discuss further in Chapter Two, Berlin has been struggling financially since the end of the Cold War and the German Reunification of 1990. The city is de-industrialized and went almost bankrupt in 2001. To overcome this financial disaster, Klaus Wowereit, the Berlin mayor between 2001 and 2014, and his team promoted Berlin as a creative city aiming at attracting "creative industries." This marketing strategy that aimed to attract creative global industries was a policy shift implemented in many cities worldwide after the 1990s. Aihwa Ong (2006), for example, observes a similar process in Singapore whereby the city-state presents itself as a global center of scientific industries. Currently, Berlin's largest employers are mostly in service and research business. The German railway company Deutsche Bahn, Berlin's largest employer, is followed by the university hospital Charité and other health, research and development and service companies. According to a report by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Berlin, in 2015, 38,896 new start-ups emerged in Berlin's supposedly innovation-friendly economy (CCI Berlin 2016).

As the economic effects of the "creative city" image are yet to be seen, this discourse made diversity and tolerance an even more central part of Berlin's identity. In this process, Berlin solidified its place as an affordable European capital for techno parties, social and sexual freedom, and political progress—a mecca for youthful international creativity in all its forms. These newcomers are some of the main customers of *spätis* today. My ethnographic research shows that the daily exchanges between migrant owners, workers and customers in these shops help remake Berlin into a "spontaneous," "hip" and "diverse" metropolis while

Berlin remakes Turkish migrants into entrepreneurs who create spaces that both emphasize and bridge their assumed difference from assumed characteristics of "Germanness."

Methodology and a Turkish Researcher in Germany

I combined four methods on which I will further elaborate in what follows: participant observation by working in a shop that combined the business models of a *späti,* bakery and café (January-July 2016)*,* semi-structured interviews (37 in total including 18 *späti* owners and 9 *späti* workers) with business owners, workers, customers and an NGO executive, participant observation by living in two different migrant neighborhoods with high concentration of *spätis* and a survey of online and printed materials on *spätis*.

As a native Turkish speaker from Turkey, I fit the conventional definitions of a "native anthropologist" for this study. When I told other scholars that I was doing research on businesses run by Turks, some saw me as an insider of the people I was to study. What my colleagues were missing, though, was that Turkey was a country of about 80 million people, larger than most European countries. These 80 million people spoke various languages. They also had divergent affiliations and political viewpoints. Moreover, Turks' identities and loyalties constantly changed according to continuously shifting political, religious, class and ethnic divisions in the country and the region. In this sense, I could not imagine being a native anthropologist of Turkey as a whole, let alone a native anthropologist of Turkish migrants in Berlin.

By emphasizing my *not* being "a native anthropologist," I do not mean to demonstrate my objectivity or my distance to the subject. I indeed benefited greatly from speaking Turkish and being from Turkey while studying predominantly Turkish-run shops in Germany. I also do not mean to argue that none of the migrants I talked to identified with Turks or Turkey as an imagined, monolithic whole. I did meet Turkish nationalists whose identities were formed around pan-Turkic ideas. By providing the details of various uncertainties and ambivalences

that Turks like me face in Germany when meeting others from Turkey, I rather hope that the idea of the "monolithic migrant community" gets shattered.

Adding to this variety of Turkish experiences is my own rather unusual migration story—a story which highlights my not-so-nativeness. I conducted my research as a relatively young, Turkish, unmarried female doctoral student coming from an American university. That was not a figure that my later-to-be friends and interviewees were generally used to. This intersection was a source of curiosity, admiration as well as confusion. This became evident to me when a Turkish woman that I had met at a demonstration told me about a television program she had watched the previous evening. She was enthusiastically describing a charismatic, male sociologist on that Turkish-speaking TV channel. His passionate defense of his opinions, which were in alignment with her own political views, had captivated her. I asked her who he was in order to see if I knew him. She paused, could not remember his name and looked at me for a while. Then, she placed her hand gently on my back and said: "He was one of those Turkish sociologists, looking messy, with the beard and everything, unlike you, you know, white, neat and clean (*akca pakca)*." I did not know what to think about her juxtaposition of me as the tidy, feminized woman with the enthusiastic and charismatic intellectual man. Later, when a Turkish man I knew from an NGO meeting jokingly called me "the American" as he asked me questions about American politics, I realized that different parts of my story mattered more in different cases. However, I still was not sure whether I had indeed become a discreet and tidy "American intellectual." A better question was, probably, whether I was ever a masculine and assertive academic and whether I could have ever become one if I had stayed in Turkey. Although being a courteous, soft-spoken woman probably created this image of a not-so-Turkish social scientist, it also granted me many people's affinities and friendships in Berlin.

For example, my receiving scholarships in the USA and a research grant in Germany reassured many that I was a neat, hardworking student—a quality that many declared that

they wanted to see in their fellow countrymen and women. My education story increased many people's affection for me. For example, Cihan, a Berlin-born *späti* owner, saw me as an industrious younger sister of Turkey. When I visited him during my follow-up research in June 2017, he told me that he saw my Facebook photos with my Emory friends, followed my activities in the USA and that he was very proud that I was getting higher education in that far away and admirable land. To him, I was a positive example of "the Turkish youth" of whom he considered himself to be an older brother.

On the other hand, for many, I was Turkish but a bit different than they were. The way I spoke Turkish as well as the content of my sentences revealed that I was not from Berlin and was rather "Turkey Turkish." I discovered this when my being from Turkey sabotaged my ordering of a *döner* kebab in a Turkish shop in Berlin. On one of my very first days in Berlin in 2014, I went to a small restaurant in the migrant neighborhood of Neukölln. It was very crowded, with multiple lines of people ordering and receiving food at the same time in front of an open food preparation counter. The restaurant was famous for its *döner* so I decided to wait and try my chances to get one. Being a small woman, I struggled immensely to be seen and heard ordering my *"pide döner"* from behind other customers. I finally got one of the workers' attention and managed to put my hand on the countertop to claim my right to food. However, the task proved more difficult than I had originally thought. The worker asked me twice what exactly I wanted: Did I want a *döner,* a *pide* or both? I was confused too. I explained that I wanted *döner i*n a *pide* bread. Another worker who was listening to our dead-end conversation while putting sauce on a half open bread gently smiled and clarified: "She wants a *döner.* You just came from Turkey, right?" As I learned from him, I was supposed to ask for "a *döner" (bir/ein döner).* I apologized and explained the reasons behind my over-the-top precision with what the *döner* would come in. Heavily encultured in the Turkish fast food scene during my eight years studying in Istanbul, I was accustomed to choosing from various *döner*-related menu items such as *dürüm döner, tombik döner* and *pide döner* named after the

bread the *döner* was served in. Therefore, I had thought that I was saving the employee's time with my precise order. The worker said "Yes, right! This is how it is in Turkey. They order it like this here, though, simpler." As he perfectly put it, this simplified practice of ordering *döner* had emerged in Berlin. I did not yet speak the language of Berlin's *döner* business. As many say, *döner* was invented in its current form in Berlin and not in Turkey anyway.

Moreover, being from Turkey in Berlin triggered different reactions as migrants I talked to had their own stereotypes about the people of Turkey and about what someone from Turkey would think of them. Many asked me whether I was "indeed from Istanbul" *(Istanbul'dansiniz herhalde?).* Some were excited to speak to me and asked continuous questions about how Istanbul neighborhoods they were familiar with had changed in recent years. For others, Istanbul was the epitome of affluence and power. A woman from Istanbul was supposedly wealthy and, therefore, able to travel internationally as she wished. I answered their questions about my connections to Istanbul by telling them my own story. I had studied in Istanbul but I was born and raised in a small city on the Western coast of Anatolia. I also shared stories about my relatives who had come to Germany as workers in the 1960s and 1970s. My connections to Anatolia and the Turkish guest workers of Germany convinced many of my humbleness and relatability. As I maintained a soft-spoken attitude, they were convinced that I was not a pretentious youngster from the mainland but a curious student-researcher eager to learn and a bit marginal like themselves.

On the other hand, my Turkish passport created a problem on the side of the German state while I was looking for a shop to work and conduct participant observation. Shop owners usually rejected me, stating that if a state officer saw an extra person in the shop—and God forbid if this extra person were Turkish like I was—we would have trouble. According the business owners, various German institutions monitored closely the stores that are known to be "Turkish shops." They looked for discrepancies to penalize the Turkish owners. As the owners told me, for the officers, catching someone who was not a worker on paper at the

counter (or at an area that customers were not allowed such as the cooking counter) would be a perfect scenario. Business owners named a long list of state departments–*amt* in German– *Finanzamt* (Tax Office), *Ordnungsamt (*Code Enforcement Office), *Landesämter* (various kinds of regional state authorities) as potential killjoys. When convincing me that state officers would definitely not believe our claim that I was a researcher at the shop, the owners quoted the men in uniform: "We know all your tricks." The officers would insist that my "posing as a researcher" was another Turkish trick because I, as a Turkish woman, would seem like an "illegal worker" rather than a researcher.

As they told me, previously they had had officers come to their shops. The officials fined them because some of their relatives who were not full-time employees on paper helped them in their shops. As they said, the fact that these people were kin had not changed the officers' opinion. Some of the owners told me that they could only let me do research in their shops if I worked full-time and if they had me as a full-time worker on their papers. I had to decline these offers as my visa did not allow full-time work.

My gender was also an obstacle against my working at a *späti* because especially *spätis* with internet-café sections mostly employ men. Many *späti* owners told me that "the *späti* job was not for women." They cited the late hours *spätis* opened and closed at as well as their drunk customers as major reasons why this job was not for women. A merchandiser who delivered goods to various *spätis* in Berlin told me that there were isolated cases of women owning and managing *spätis* but one could not do so if she were a womanly woman (*bayan gibi bayan*). She had to be a manly woman (*erkek gibi*).

After a long search because of my Turkish passport and my being a not-so-manly woman, I saw a piece of computer paper that read "*Praktikantin Gesucht* !!!!!!!!" (female intern wanted !!!!!!!!) taped to the window of a shop whose sign read "*Späti Bäckerei Café" (*Späti Bakery Café). The shop was next to a subway station on a busy street in a migrant and working-class neighborhood that was newly gentrified. I went in and approached the woman

at the counter, Sultan Abla whom I would come to befriend. I asked her about the posting on the window. She told me that I had to speak to her *chef* (boss) and that he would be coming soon. Shortly after I sat down at a table, listening to the cash register rapidly open and close and watching people come and go as I waited, Azad, the owner of the shop, came over. I explained my research to him and we chatted for a while. He was very interested in social issues and social sciences. That day he told me the first of many more stories to come—the story of his dropping out of college in Turkey.

As he requested, I came back on a later day. We signed an internship agreement that we thought would protect us from the men in uniform, should they choose to appear. It indicated that I would not receive money and that I would work there on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays between 8 am and 12 pm, which Azad said were the busiest times when he would appreciate an extra hand. I also got a letter from Humboldt University of Berlin, which I was I affiliated to, that indicated my student status and doing research in this shop. I conducted my participant observation in this shop (Nanpej) between January, 2016 and July, 2016. After my official residency there, I hung out at the shop at different times until I left for Atlanta in September, 2016. My life in this shop and my relationship with the people there constituted the main pillar of this research. Working with Azad and my five other co-workers at this shop enabled me to gain first-hand experience of *späti* labor and observe the exchanges and relations between customers, workers and owners. It is quite unsettling to call this experience "participant observation," though. The people who worked (and some of whom continue to work) there became my friends with whom I shared and laughed.

Nanpej was a *späti,* bakery and a self-service café. This meant that there was no table service. We had a computer and a printer like many *spätis*. Here, customers had their (mostly official) documents copied and faxed. We sold convenience goods that *spätis* usually carry such as tobacco, lighters, beer, wine, vodka (even though customers were not allowed to drink in Nanpej), milk, eggs, vacuum-packed coffee and newspapers. We also had pastries. If there

was something to be prepared, customers had to come and get it from the counter. Our gastronomic repertoire was not limited to "Turkish cuisine." We had different kinds of baked goods: varieties of German bread rolls such as white, cheese and poppy seed; Turkish bagels; French baguettes; as well as different kinds of croissants such as butter, nougat and chocolate. The breads, bread rolls and most other pastries came to Nanpej frozen just like they did to most other bakery-*spätis*. The worker in the first shift heated them in the oven. When needed, we put more frozen bread rolls and croissants in the oven during the day.

Our bakery selection was larger than that of most other bakery-*spätis.* Ayse and Gulazer Abla took turns taking the early morning shift and making from scratch a special pastry from Azad's hometown as well as Turkish *gözleme* (stuffed flatbread). We also served breakfast including *menemen* (Turkish scrambled eggs with vegetables and spices), muesli to go, cakes (some of which Sultan Abla made) and fruit salads. We made these ready-to-go items by mixing ingredients we bought from grocery stores. Occasionally, a Turkish woman brought in a tray of baklava (in exchange for some tens of Euros) that we sold both in single pieces and by weight.

We had tables and benches outside as well as an indoor seating section where customers could sit, eat, drink, surf the Internet, meet and watch people. Most other *spätis* that have indoor seating use these spaces as Internet cafés and sometimes as small pubs in the winter. These tables and chairs are crucial for Nanpej and many other *spätis* because this is where people like to spend time, meet others, discuss politics and share their daily stories as well as the latest gossip in the neighborhood.

Nanpej was open between 3 am and 8 pm every day, including Sundays and federal holidays such as New Year's Eve and May Day. As Azad told me, they had tried closing the shop later but it was not profitable so they decided on these precise hours. The period between 3 am and 6 am was usually for getting the shop ready for the day and for people who worked late or spent their night outside. They dropped by to get alcohol, coffee and cigarettes. In the

cold, dark mornings of Berlin, grim-faced locals who were on their way to work and school dropped by at Nanpej and got a quick breakfast and coffee. There were usually lines at the counter in the mornings. The German as well as Turkish elderly came in the mornings and during the day. Many hung out for hours at the shop, sometimes buying only one cup of tea. Some met their friends. Some sat alone and did not talk to anyone. Road workers and people working nearby came during their lunch breaks, got a sandwich, coffee or beer. Students came to study on their laptops as we had wi-fi unlike many places with indoor seating. Although this is slowly changing, businesses usually refrain from providing free wi-fi in Berlin because the German law holds business owners responsible for actions carried out on their Internet connections. Under these circumstances, *spätis* like Nanpej that provide wi-fi or computers to access the Internet are like havens for people who are travelling or do not have Internet connections in their homes. In the evening around 7 pm, the customer load usually dropped exponentially. The late shift worker tidied up the shop and closed it. Azad was also usually around at closing to lock up the tables and benches outside the shop.

The burden of the work in Nanpej was shouldered by Azad[13] and his five female workers: Ayse, Gabriela, Gulazer Abla, Sevgi and Sultan Abla[14]. They were all first-generation migrants. They worked in shifts although the shift they took changed frequently because they periodically had appointments at state institutions, their children's schools and the doctor's. Such appointments were a part of many people's routines in Berlin and an expected part of people's daily lives.

As I have previously mentioned, many colleagues had assumed that my Turkishness would naturally reveal the German–Turkish experience to me. My Turkishness did open many doors for me including being able to conduct participant observation in Nanpej.

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[13] I, Sevgi and Ayse refer to Azad as "Azad *Abi*" (older brother). Gulazer Abla and Sultan Abla refer to him as "Azad" as he is younger than them. For the sake of uniformity, I use "Azad" throughout the dissertation.

[14] *Abla* means older sister in Turkish. This is how we all—including Azad—address Gulazer and Sultan.

However, other aspects of my identity came to be more important at times. Although my co-workers in Nanpej were very interested in and excited about my research, they initially perceived my being a student as a boundary between us. They said that other students that had previously worked in Nanpej were a bit arrogant despite being uneducated in the crafts important for this job such as dexterity and perseverance. Thanks to two incidents, my co-workers came to recognize me as an ally sharing similar experiences rather than one of those presumptuous but inept students.

My first initiation moment occurred on the morning of one of my earlier days in Nanpej. This event helped my co-workers see me as a friend but with a toolset different from theirs. Ayse, Sevgi and I were working together that morning. That day after work, Ayse was going to go to the job center for an appointment to discuss the renewal of her social benefits. It was another busy morning. We took turns taking care of customers while the other two had breakfast composed of coffee, a quick salad and the *peynirli gözleme* (Turkish flatbread stuffed with cheese) Ayse had just made. We ate standing at the small food preparation counter next to the vegetable sink which was hidden from the eyes of most customers.

I heard a middle-aged man's "*morgen*!" (morning!) and left our little breakfast corner with a cheese slice in my mouth. After giving this customer a small regular coffee to go and a *schokocroissant* (pain au chocolat), I returned to my co-workers. They were talking about a document Ayse had trouble editing the previous night. It was her resume that she had to take to her appointment after leaving the shop. However, the resume was outdated lacking the details of her life in the last couple of years including her work in Nanpej. After digging into why she could not edit the document, I realized it was probably in pdf format. As the one with the highest knowledge of computers, I volunteered to solve the problem. Ayse brought her USB drive after we quickly ate the last slices of her delicious *gözleme*. I stuck the USB in the desktop computer which was, as usual, playing a pop song on Berlin's local *Radio Berlin*. I checked to see if she had the Word version of the document in the drive so that I could

quickly edit it but she did not. As my limited computer knowledge could not generate any other solutions, I offered to re-write the resume. It would be ready before the end of her shift. Ayse did not believe that I could finish it but she agreed. I sat on the tall stool in front of the computer and started re-writing the resume occasionally going back and reading from the pdf open in the background. Ayse and Sevgi were taking care of the customers as I entered Ayse's information shocked at all the details expected in a German CV such as birthplace, marital status and the number of children one has. As the white screen got quickly filled with black letters, I heard Sevgi say to Ayse: "Of course, she can. She is schooled (*okumus*)."

I was proud of myself having impressed my co-workers with my ability to work on Word, something that otherwise seemed so petty. While I was enjoying myself doing something I knew well, I heard the door cling and saw our boss come in. I panicked as I thought that he would at least be upset to see me "playing on the computer." As I turned anxiously away from the computer to step down, Sevgi touched my back gently while holding a tong in her other hand which she used for picking up baked goods: "We're taking care of customers. You are fine, don't worry." Only half believing what she said, I continued as Azad approached. He greeted me and asked whether something was wrong with the computer. This subtle questioning but kind attitude was typical of him. Sevgi jumped in and said: "She is writing Ayse's CV. She needs it for her appointment." Azad replied with an approving but critical nod and went to the cash register. He pressed a button and had the register open. He took some of the money from the register and left to go to the bank. I was almost done with the document. I called Ayse in and asked how the resume looked. She was happy. I printed the document. She put it in her bag and got ready to leave. While Sevgi updated the shopping list, checking what we were lacking, I went back to the counter to wait for customers proud of my otherwise humble computer skills.

Ayse approached me with her coat on, thanked me a couple of times and offered a gift in return: "You know, Anlam, I can sew your pants' hems inside. I see that you always fold

them outside. I seriously can. I have a sewing machine at home." I was surprised and heartened. Ayse was delighted and wanted to show it to me. At the same time, for her, my style decision, which I thought fit perfectly with Berliner informality, was something to be fixed. I sincerely smiled and thanked her but told her that I did not want to create any trouble. From that day on, both Ayse and Sevgi mentioned my being a student only as a favorable matter and saw me as a well-meaning, albeit different sister who had different skills as well as things to learn and to be fixed.

The second turning point in my relationship with my co-workers in Nanpej occurred thanks to a difficult customer. I met this client on a morning when things were already not going very well. I had been to a grocery store nearby, walking through the drizzling rain with our old and ripped shopping trolley to get ingredients for what was to be prepared that day. I walked back half-soaked and angry at myself for having fallen for that deceptively light rain referred to as "that which wets the foolish" (*ahmak islatan*) in Turkish. I was convinced that I should have taken an umbrella. I opened the door of Nanpej by pushing it with my back and trying to lift the trolley in one piece over the slightly tilted mini step at the entrance. Sevgi was serving a young German-Turkish man who came to Nanpej occasionally. I had never served him; by chance, I was never at the counter whenever he came to the shop. I went to the cooking counter and took out the vegetables lying disorderly on the upper part of the trolley until Sevgi came and took over the task. I took out my coat, hung it and went to the counter. As I served the customers, Sultan Abla came in to make cakes even though her shift would not start for another couple of hours. She took out the ingredients and prepared the counter for making the pastries. I freshened the Turkish tea as Sevgi started to wipe the floors.

Then, the man whom Sevgi had served some time ago approached the counter again. He leaned to the display window where some sweets, *gözleme* and unsold goods from the previous day were presented to the hungry eye. He ordered mumbling in German and Turkish. At the same time, he made comments about Sevgi's supposedly poor success in wiping the

floor and showed her where she should be wiping with comments such as “look, look, there is something left here.” Then, he turned back to me and made me pick up a *gözleme* and then decided not to get it. He later decided to get a *börek* (filled pastry) but could not be sure which one he wanted: “no, the other one,” “what is in it?” “no, the other,” “no, no, the other one,” “don’t you understand German?” He ended up deciding on a discounted day-old croissant. Annoyed at me for not understanding which one he wanted, he was the dark, thorny crown on an otherwise ordinary but bleak Berlin day. He told me to put the pastry in a bag; I did as he wished. He asked me, “how much?” I inquired about what he had gotten before in order to calculate his debt. His answer, with a grin on his face, was: “I had whatever you saw me have.” Annoyed at the rudeness of this man who was treating me discourteously just because he could, I felt my face getting warmer as a ball of fire impatiently pressed my pharynx to be released. Sevgi was listening to our conversation and quickly reclined the mop against the drink shelf and said, “let me calculate it, I was the one who served you.”

As Sevgi approached the counter, I heard Sultan Abla call my name. Her summoning me was my second ticket out of this unpleasant situation. She calmed me affirming how irritating this guy always was and how annoying many customers indeed were. She whisperingly told me a story of her breaking a beer bottle on a male client, going on trial and getting cleared eventually. She was helping me compose myself by justifying my feelings. I believe this was a crucial moment when she started seeing me as susceptible to the troubles of the labor we were performing. It became evident to her that I was at times humiliated, admonished, teased and irritated just like she sometimes was. We shared an emotional sphere. After that day, she was much more affectionate and caring to me. She frequently fed me her freshly made cakes with her hands and came up to me and said: “I got stories for you to write!” As I overcame the limitations that my being a student created, I was able to observe and discuss the daily life in Nanpej with my co-workers to its deepest.

To add to my own observations, I also gathered the viewpoints of the people of *spätis*. For this, I conducted semi-structured interviews, which constituted the second pillar of my research. Through my interviews, I captured my informants' own understandings of their businesses, work and daily lives. I conducted 37 tape-recorded interviews in total. I interviewed the owner and five workers and two customers of Nanpej. I also interviewed 17 other *späti* owners and four *späti* workers in Berlin. (See sections Who are *Späti* Owners? and Who are *Späti* Workers?) I conducted these interviews using heterogeneous purposive sampling, making sure that I talked to a variety of people from different genders, ages, migration backgrounds and boroughs. I interviewed people working and living in different neighborhoods of Berlin, including East Berlin boroughs such as Lichtenberg that are known to house Neo-Nazis, areas known as migrant neighborhoods such as Neukölln, and boroughs where mostly affluent Germans live such as Charlottenburg. The variation of these contexts enabled me to make comparisons between boroughs and see the specificities of each district. I also used snowball sampling. Some *späti* owners and workers suggested that I talk to other owners and workers they knew. Sometimes, friends I knew from elsewhere directed me to business owners they knew at their *spätis* of choice. I also interviewed a *döner* wholesaler, a restaurant owner and an NGO executive, all of whom were Turkish, to see their points of view on issues related to migration and migrant businesses.

Additionally, I visited Hamburg, which is often compared with Berlin as a similarly lively but richer city, and Munich, which is opposed to Berlin as the traditional and affluent Bavarian capital. I interviewed Turkish workers of two corner shops in Hamburg; in Munich, where similar corner shops open late hours do not exist, I interviewed migrant owners of an export shop, a grocery store and a chicken vendor. The differences and similarities between these cities and Berlin helped me analyze what was unique to the federal capital.

All the people I talked to spoke German at least at a basic level. This proficiency made it possible for them to converse with customers. Those who were born in Germany spoke

German fluently. Some of the German-born Turkish owners and workers actually spoke German more fluently than they spoke Turkish. Some could also speak English which helped them converse with tourists and international clients.

I conducted my interviews in Turkish except for one German interview with a German customer. German words and phrases frequently popped up in these otherwise Turkish conversations. I carried out the interviews myself. I conducted the interviews in people's workplaces except for one for which we met in a café and another one which we did in a restaurant. Conducting the interviews in people's workplaces had three advantages: Firstly, I knew that most of my interviewees worked for 8–10 hours a day sometimes 7 days a week. With sparkling eyes, many saw the end of their work days as heavenly relief. These were the times when they could finally spend some time with their families and friends. In the case of most women and some men, these times were also their time to clean their houses, cook and shop for their homes. Therefore, I did not want to steal from their scarce free time. Secondly, being at their workplaces generated a casual atmosphere and helped interviewees feel "at home." Owners and workers sometimes gave real-time examples from their immediate environment about the labor processes we were talking about. Thirdly, doing the interviews in people's workplaces helped create a comfortable atmosphere that was protected against potential gender-related tensions between me and the (male) owners and workers and their families. Wives of some of the business owners and workers saw my presence and my conversations with their husbands as a potential threat. As a 30-year-old, unmarried Turkish woman, I was of a potential competition rather than one of a researcher in some of their eyes. It was in my and owners and workers' best interest to meet in their public workplaces so that we did not raise any unnecessary suspicions.

My third method is participant observation, having lived in two gentrifying neighborhoods that are still known as "migrant neighborhoods" thanks to their persistent migrant populations. I stayed in four different apartments in these two boroughs, Neukölln

and Kreuzberg. At the beginning of my pilot study in June 2013, I rented a room from a woman of Turkish and German descent who was living with her two daughters near the border of Neukölln and Kreuzberg. When I came back for my long-term fieldwork in 2014, I stayed for a month with a German translator in her twenties, Isabel, who later became a close friend. Our apartment was in the same borough as my pilot research residence, about a ten-minute bike ride away. After this initial month, I moved to an apartment which I shared with Ceren (a Turkish video artist), her then German boyfriend now husband Michael, and their friend Baris, a German-Turkish student. We lived together for a bit longer than a year until Ceren and Michael decided to get married and move. After that, I sublet a room in Kreuzberg from a friend of Baris'. Staying in Neukölln and Kreuzberg over a three-year period let me observe the gentrification-related changes in the daily lives of these neighborhoods as well as the transformations in social relations and conduct among the residents of these boroughs.

Additionally, living in these migrant neighborhoods enabled me to easily learn about various events organized by Turkish migrants such as get-togethers, press statements and demonstrations. I attended various events held in these neighborhoods. A few days after I arrived in Berlin for my pilot study in 2013, what came to be known as the "Gezi Park Protests" started in Turkey. The Gezi Protests and the reactions it generated sparked various gatherings, which were usually held in Kreuzberg. Turkish migrants and various German activists, organizations and political parties participated in these meetings. I met many Germans as well as migrants with different migration stories during these get-togethers. Some of the migrants were young professionals who had studied in German schools in Turkey and migrated to Berlin for their graduate studies and for work. Some were political refugees, who had migrated to Germany after the 1980 coup while some were children of the so-called guest workers. These interactions with a variety of people let me observe how events in Turkey travelled to Germany and the reactions to them among Turks and Germans from different backgrounds. I deepened my observations during my long-term fieldwork by continuing to

attend gatherings about local and global politics as well as meetings about the problems Turkish migrants and refugees often faced. In addition to participating in these structured gatherings, I also had informal chats with various business owners and workers as well as with other Berliners.

By using the term "Berliner," I do not mean to make a nativist claim about who belongs to Berlin. On the contrary, I use it as an inclusionary umbrella term to refer to those who consider themselves as being from and/or living in Berlin, regardless of where they were born or how long they have been in Berlin. This definition emphasizes that Berlin's short- and long-term residents and *späti* customers are multi-national and multi-ethnic. With Berliners, I chatted in English, German and Turkish about matters ranging from Germany's refugee politics to music and weather; drank beer and Turkish tea at *spätis*; grabbed beer from *spätis* and walked on streets and had picnics in parks; and watched soccer matches at *spätis*. With the residents of Berlin, I celebrated two May Days and New Year's Eves; looked for a place to hold their wedding celebration; sorted clothes for a charity; joined them as they took their kids to theatre practice; went to government offices and to the doctor's; waited in Berlin's famous club lines, was rejected, and also got lucky and was admitted; participated in demonstrations about matters of migrants, Berlin, Germany and Turkey among many other things. Navigating Berlin with its residents let me observe how they experienced the city and the role of migrant shops in their daily lives.

My fourth method was a survey of online and printed materials. Reviewing these materials, I was not only able to comprehend popular understandings of the city in the eyes of locals but also to grasp how the reputation of Berlin circulated locally, regionally and globally. Additionally, I followed online and printed media closely. I watched carefully how the German and Berlin media handled the "Refugee Crisis" as well as Turkish politics and Turkey–Europe relations. I also followed videos and urban blog posts on Berlin, its neighborhoods and *spätis* and read political party programs especially during the campaigns

for the local elections of 2016. Following this media helped me discern popular understandings and representations of *spätis,* Germany's migrant populations and migration-related politics.

Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of eight chapters including the introduction and the conclusion. The second, third and fourth chapters describe the historical, political and urban contexts that generate various understandings and experiences of difference and relationality in Germany, Turkey and Europe. The second chapter entitled "Nationhood, Migration and Difference at Europe's Centers and Corners" historically contextualizes my discussion in the coming chapters. Here, I discuss the history of Turkish-European relations, Turkish migration to Germany and immigration policies in Germany. I show how understandings of difference came to focus on "cultural differences" in Europe. I also demonstrate that Berlin's identity has been rebranded as a "cosmopolitan" and "creative city" to cope with financial crisis and attract international people and capital after the German Reunification in 1990. The third chapter builds on this history and analyzes contemporary negotiations of difference in German society. I show that Turks' difference from "Germans" is created in dynamic tensions in Germany rather than being imported from "home." Chapter Four closes this section by discussing how Turkish migrants' symbolic value increased with recent urban struggles in Berlin.

The second section of the dissertation demonstrates the creation of Turkish and Berliner cultures in *spätis* and the social effects of *späti* work. Chapter Five introduces this labor section. In this chapter, I show how *späti* workers and owners negotiate social and political relations through their affective and social labor. While this labor is inherent to *späti* work, workers and owners have flexibility as to how they perform it. Different performances have different social effects. The next chapter "Exchanging Berlin," shows that certain

commercial and non-commercial exchanges in Berlin's corner shops constitute Berlin's identity as a relaxed, diverse and neighborly city. These exchanges range from leaving keys and packages for friends to pick up to getting advice on where to have your washing machine fixed and on how to deal with a difficult landlord. The last ethnographic chapter "Making a Migrant Shop, Making Berlin" shows that the labor performed in *spätis* is nationalized as "Turkish" (i.e. foreign) and localized as "Berliner" at the same time. Workers and owners see their labor as part of their *culture* while Berliners relate this same labor to the identity of Berlin as a neighborly, diverse city. I show that this creation of culture depends on the accumulation of various kinds of capital including linguistic and sensory capital and different kinds of labor such as aesthetic labor. The conclusion ties these insights together and suggests that Turkish migrants in Germany are simultaneously included and excluded and that they mobilize their culture work to selectively reappropriate discourses about their difference to claim a belonging to Germany.

Ch. 2 – Nationhood, Migration and Difference at Europe's Centers and Corners

Turkish immigrants in Germany highlight the tensions within Europe as a continent in the making. For decades, like other foreign-labor-receiving countries, Germany denied the existence of its practically permanent immigrants. While this country at the center of Europe admitted to being an "immigration country" in 2005, its Muslim migrants have been defined as fundamental outsiders and even antithetical to Europe to date. As sociologists Korteweg and Yurdakul rightfully argue, "*real* heterogeneities" within nations in Europe are overshadowed by an emphasis on immigrants' difference from the "imagined homogeneity" of the European continent (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014, 4 emphasis added). The language of difference in contemporary Europe involves a "cultural" vocabulary that emphasizes Islam's difference from "European culture." At the same time, Turks and other immigrants are occasionally admitted to the European picture as faces of diversity to attract expats, tourists and capital as in the case of post-2000 Berlin.

In this chapter, I use "Europe" to refer to a real and imagined economic, political and cultural territory. The boundaries of this territory depend not only on who is included but also on who is excluded. As historian Rita Chin states, "the very idea of 'Europe' (and a distinctive European culture)" historically developed as Europe faced its "Others" (Chin 2017, 2). Various historical developments including the Medieval Crusades to reclaim the Holy Land from Muslims and fights against the Ottomans to preserve the control of Eastern Europe helped generate the idea of "Europe" as a united front (Chin 2017, 2). However, as political scientist Anthony Pagden states, the two world wars and the growing immigration into Europe during the twentieth century challenged the assumed unity of the continent and thus increased the stakes of drawing the cultural boundaries of "Europe" (Pagden 2002, 1).

This historical chapter is the first among three that focus on the political and urban context of Turkish immigrants' lives in Germany and thus in Europe. The history in this

chapter contextualizes my discussion in the coming chapters on contemporary negotiations of "difference" in German society (Chapter 3) and Turkish immigrants' place in contemporary struggles to define "to whom Berlin belongs" (Chapter 4). I begin by discussing the history of the ambivalent and unequal relationship between Turkey and Europe and how the old continent and its Muslim neighbor have constructed their identities in relation to each other. I analyze Turkey's EU accession process within this framework. Then, I turn the lens to Germany's histories of diversity and show that Germany has a mostly overlooked history of ethnic and religious diversity contrary to claims of and (at many times violent) policies to establish homogeneity. Turks are the current faces of heterogeneity in Germany not only because they are the largest national minority but also because many define themselves as Muslims. I discuss the history of Turks' and many other immigrants' interpellation as "Muslims" and the abjection of Islam from the European imaginary. Within this framework, the concept of "culture" signifies unbridgeable differences between (especially Muslim) "immigrants" and "native Europeans." This exclusionary logic is reflected in how German laws regarding foreigners excluded Turks from the German imaginary until only very recently. Even the recent seemingly welcoming migration policies implemented during Angela Merkel's chancellorship have wavered. I concentrate on the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany (informally known as West Germany) and not the laws of German Democratic Republic (informally known as East Germany) as Turks migrated to the Federal Republic as guest workers.

While the discussion thus far goes back more than a century ago, I start my discussion on Berlin with the end of the Cold War and the Reunification of Berlin and Germany in 1990 because this rupture presented a big challenge to Berlin and its immigrants. Berlin has since then been in financial troubles and has been rebranded as a "creative city" to overcome this challenge; such rebranding has benefited and harmed Turks at the same time. Starting with

the end of the Cold War and German Reunification, issues of racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia have also risen in Germany and Europe.

Turkey: The "Corner" of Europe

Many of West European countries' Muslim labor migrants were from former colonies as in the case of Pakistani workers in Britain and Algerians in France. These migrants usually arrived without the need for a visa and to a certain extent knew "the metropolitan language, customs and values" (Chin 2007, 26–27). Turkey was, however, never a colony of Germany or the other European countries it sent workers to. Turkey was indeed intermittently bound to European countries since the late Ottoman period through sporadically taken debts. This economic dependence can be understood as a semi-colonial relationship. However, the lack of an explicit colonial history differentiates Turkish migrants' relationship to Europe and Germany from many other Muslim workers in Europe. Turkey and Europe have a co-dependent, although unequal, relationship to each other.

Turkey and Europe are close geographically but distant politically. As anthropologist Ruth Mandel states, Turkey is "Europe's quintessentially unpopular second-class neighbor" (Mandel 2013, 66). Turkey and Europe are also central to each other's identities. For Turkey, this identification involves an ambivalent desire to be "European" while also possessing the consciousness of an "outsider." Anthropologist Zeynep Gürsel describes the ambivalent characteristics of Turkey's identity very well: "Turkey is always already almost European" (Gürsel 2016, 237). In other words, put blatantly, Turkey is sort of part of Europe but not quite.

European maps depict this situation of Turkey's liminal status well. Most of them include (usually a portion of) Turkey at their margins. Such cartographic representations show this outsider's symbolic and physical closeness to the old continent: its exclusion from as well as occasional admittance to the "European picture." The Wikipedia map of Europe's

Economic and Monetary Union in Figure 4 illustrates this partial inclusion and exclusion. More than half of Turkey is in the European map, because it has to include Cyprus, a member of the EU and the Eurozone, which is located just south of and parallel to Turkey.



Figure 4: A map of Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union where Turkey seems to have managed to visually "sneak into" the European picture from the southeast. Source: "Economic and Monetary Union, map en" by San Jose (18 June 2006). Licensed under CC 3.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en) and GNU Free Documentation License, version 1.2 (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:GNU_Free_Documentation_License,_version_1.2). Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:European_union_emu_map_en.png. Last accessed on 7 January 2018.

European and Turkish identities have long been constitutive of each other—at least ever since Turks settled at Europe's eastern edge at the end of the Middle Ages. Ottomans (predecessors of the current Turkish Republic) ruled parts of Eastern Europe for more than 400 years as well as parts of central Europe for over a century. In the sixteenth-century European imaginary, the Muslim Turk was perceived as "the barbarian" at central Europe's door, "barely pushed back from Austria during the Siege of Vienna in 1529" (Ewing 2008, 34). As literary scholar Lisa Lowe suggests, seventeenth-century English travel writers helped reproduce the "barbaric" image of Turks (Lowe 1991, 37 as cited in Ewing 2008, 35). In the nineteenth century, Europeans called the economically and politically distressed Ottoman Empire "the sick man of Europe" (Ewing 2008, 35). German travel accounts also depicted Turkish men as "lazy" and "violent," thus equating the weakening Ottoman Empire with the supposed "character of its men" (Ewing 2008, 38). For Europeans at the time and many historians to come later, Turks' declining empire came to denote the fall of Islamic civilization (Ewing 2008, 35) and relatedly the rise of Europe.

Anthropologist Katherine Ewing's (2008) examples also demonstrate a European fascination with and exoticization of Ottomans. As Ewing argues, this is evident, for example, in European writings on Ottoman women (see Ewing 2008, 39–44). Male writers tended to represent Ottomans through "fantasies of the harem and Ottoman male sexuality" (Ewing 2008, 40). Many female writers, on the other hand, perceived Ottoman women as enjoying freedoms their European counterparts did not—for example, free access to public spaces provided by the veil and a right to privacy through the designated feminized space of the harem (Ewing 2008, 40).

The Turkish imagination of Europe has also been ambivalent. While religion has been a source of perceived difference since the beginning of Ottoman–European relations, early Ottoman sultans employed Europeans as statesmen and saw their young state as the successor of the Christian Byzantine Empire (Keyder 2006, 72). Moreover, the Ottoman Empire

adopted various European-inspired reforms starting in the nineteenth century ranging from restructuring schools to recognizing all citizens as equal regardless of their religion (inspired by the French Revolution's principle of equality before the law). These reforms initiated a process of "Turkish modernization" and "Westernization."[15]

"Turkish Westernization" intensified with the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923. In the early years of the Republic, various European-inspired policies and practices were established. These reforms included implementing "Western-style" clothing and "banning the fez"[16] (as it was associated with "the Orient"), "abolishing the caliphate, changing the orthography from Arabic to Latin, introducing universal literacy, female education and women's suffrage," as well as "the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code and Italy's Penal Code in 1926" (Mandel 2013, 68). Although there was a practical continuity between Ottoman modernization reforms and their Turkish counterparts, the new Republic designated the Ottoman Empire as its Other and Western civilization as its future. Atatürk and the Republican cadres introduced these reforms as a radical rupture from their predecessors towards "Western civilization."

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[15] These concepts sometimes collapse and are used interchangeably although both are highly contested and have their own genealogies. Sociologist Caglar Keyder (2011), for example, discusses different approaches to Turkish modernization and argues that modernization is inseparably attached to European Enlightenment (Keyder 2011, 37–38). On the other hand, sociologist Nilufer Göle points out the possibility of alternative forms of modernity that are not necessarily "Western." Göle has analyzed various Turkish Islamic identities as alternatively modern (Göle 1996, 2000b, 2000a). Political scientist Ayhan Kaya (2013) also differentiates the related term Europeanization from EU-ization. While Europeanization means "a long-standing transformation process on the societal level in terms of the transformation of values," EU-ization (European Unionization) refers to "the technical and structural transformation of political and legal systems in terms of the implementation of the *acquis* [European Union Law]" (Ayhan Kaya 2013, 3).

[16] The fez is a red Moroccan cap. Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II, sometimes regarded as the father of Turkish modernization, introduced the fez in 1832 as a unifying headwear for all Ottoman men to eliminate symbolic differences between different religious groups. As historian Selim Deringil argues, wearing the fez was an "invented tradition" which ironically came to represent "Turkishness" for Westerners (Deringil 1993, 8–9). In 1925, the Turkish Republic banned the fez "as a symbol of Ottoman decadence" (Deringil 1993, 9 n. 25).

Sociologist Meltem Ahiska (2003) points out the temporal dimension of Turkey's national-identity-building process. In this framework, which Ahiska conceptualizes as "Occidentalism," Turkey is to leave the "backwardness" of the East and move forward—towards the advanced "West." Zeynep Gürsel suggests that this progression sometimes crystalizes in the ideal of a long-desired EU membership; "those identifying with the Kemalist secularist tradition," for example, perceive accession to the EU as the teleological next step in Turkish modernization (as cited in Mandel 2013, 74).

Turkey's process of becoming in the space-time between "the backwards East" and "the advanced West" at Europe's corner does not only entail a pure longing for "development" but also a struggle to make sense of its "in-betweenness." For example, sociologist Gül Özyegin (2015) shows that Turkish youths negotiate and bring together seemingly contradictory Western-inspired sexualities and Muslim beliefs and practices. As Ahiska (2003) also shows, Turkey's process of "becoming European" is weaved with ambivalent feelings such as internalized inferiority, desire, anxiety and threat. Turkey's never-ending European Union accession process makes the ambivalent, affective and close-but-far-away relations between Europe and Turkey evident.

Turkey and the EU

The European Union's predecessor, European Economic Community (EEC) (or Common Market), was formed in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome. The original members of the EEC were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany. The community gradually expanded with the joining of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland in 1973; Greece in 1981; and Portugal and Spain in 1986. In 1991, in the aftermath of the Cold War, European nations came together in Maastricht, the Netherlands, to discuss the outlines of a "new Europe" (Özyürek 2005). The decision was to

transform the community from an economic union into a political one (Özyürek 2005, 509). Thus, the European Union was founded, and the EEC was absorbed into the union.

In 1959, Turkey applied to join the newly established EEC. Turkey and members of the EEC signed an agreement in 1963 whereby Turkey became "an associate member" (Akçay and Yilmaz 2012, 10). Turkey's position as "Europe's quintessentially unpopular second-class neighbor" (Mandel 2013, 66) was reaffirmed; it was not completely rejected but also not accepted as a primary member. Following the 1971 and 1980 military coups in Turkey, the European Community declared that they would not continue their relationship with Turkey until Turkish authorities improved their human rights policies (Akçay and Yilmaz 2012, 11). Turkey's membership application was rejected in 1987 while countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain—all of which had recent histories of authoritarian regimes as well as failed and successful military coups—joined the EC rather easily and quickly (Akçay and Yilmaz 2012, 11).

Following the 1997 Luxembourg EU Summit, where Turkey was denied candidacy status whereas ten Eastern European countries as well as Cyprus were granted candidacy, Turkey froze all negotiations with the EU (Akçay and Yilmaz 2012, 13). Mesut Yilmaz, the Turkish prime minister at the time, even declared that the EU "attempt[ed] to construct a new cultural 'Berlin Wall' to discriminate against Muslim Turkey" (New York Times 1997 as cited in Akçay and Yilmaz 2012, 13–14). Following this diplomatic maneuver, Turkey became a membership candidate in 1999.

In 2001, the EU declared its demands of Turkey in "Turkey's first Accession Partnership document" (Akçay and Yilmaz 2012, 16). Many of these demands pertained to controversial issues such as Kurds' linguistic rights (Akçay and Yilmaz 2012, 16–17). Meanwhile, in Turkey's 2002 national election, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's newly founded AKP (Justice and Development Party) won the majority of seats in parliament and formed a single-

party government. Thus, this Islamic party ironically became the main figure to carry Turkey towards Europe.

In 2005, during Recep Tayyip Erdogan's prime ministry, negotiations for accession began. Since then, Turkey has adopted various legal reforms required for EU accession such as abolishing capital punishment and ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights (Mandel 2013, 69). Despite these efforts, Turkey continues to be Europe's "perennial Other" (Mandel 2013, 72). Recent restrictions on freedom of speech in Turkey, such as the arrests of human rights activists and journalists with terrorism allegations including Deniz Yucel, a German journalist of Turkish descent, further strengthen the opinion among Europeans that differences between Turkey and Europe are unbridgeable.

On the other side, many politicians and individuals in Turkey are also EU-skeptics—mistrusting EU-directed policies and EU-mandated reforms (Ayhan Kaya 2013, 207). Turkey's president Erdogan even suggested in October 2017 that Turkey did not "need EU membership anymore" but would "not be the side which gives up [the negotiations]" (Deutsche Welle 2017a). Erdogan accused Europeans of not cooperating with Turkey to "fight against terrorism" and of allowing terrorists to "move around freely and carry out all kinds of activity against Turkey's legitimate administration" (Deutsche Welle 2017a).

Turkey's EU candidacy is a platform for European conservatives as well as leftists to re-construct European cultural and political identity as opposing Turkey. For example, Joschka Fischer, former German foreign minister (1998–2005) from the left-wing Green Party, likened the difficulty of a possible Turkish EU membership to a fictional American inclusion of Mexico "as a fifty-first state" (cited in Mandel 2013, 70). Likewise, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the former French President and head of "the convention responsible for writing the new EU constitution," equated Turkey's hypothetical EU admission to "the end of Europe" because Turkey ostensibly has "a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life" (as cited in Özyürek 2005, 510). Pope Benedict XVI also suggested that Turkey

was “always in contrast with Europe”; therefore, this Muslim country had better join an “Arab (i.e., Muslim) block” rather than the EU (as cited in Özyürek 2005, 510). As these examples show, powerful EU politicians and religious figures have suggested repeatedly that Turkey is culturally “too different” to be European—reflecting the opinions of many Europeans in the mainstream as well as those who march with PEGIDA against “the Islamization of Europe.”

German Histories of Diversity

As historian Rita Chin states in her comparative study of multiculturalism in Germany, France and Britain, mainstream narratives about German and European diversities claim that European countries and Europe as a continent were homogenous prior to the Second World War (Chin 2017, 23). This narrative suggests that the arrival of guest workers (as in the case of Germany) and individuals from colonies (as in the case of Britain) troubled this “homogeneity” (Chin 2017, 23). Fitting with this narrative, Germany did not accept that it was “an immigration country” until 2005 despite its persistent “foreigner” population and a long history of internal and external migration. Finally, in 2005, the German state officially declared itself as an immigration country by introducing programs promoting migrant integration (Asiye Kaya 2017, 58). Despite this late avowal, the “dominant image of European homogeneity was largely a myth” (Chin 2017, 24). Germany’s population has historically been ethnically diverse (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 5) and fluctuated with internal and external migration waves and changing borders.

Starting in the late nineteenth century, expanding opportunities in agriculture and emerging industries initiated internal migration of ethnic minorities from the east to the west as well as external migration of foreign European workers to Germany (see Herbert 1990 for an extensive historical discussion of “foreign labor in Germany”). For example, Poles from the eastern provinces of the German Empire migrated to work in mining and steel industries in the Ruhr Region (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 6) while Polish speakers from other

countries immigrated to work especially in Prussian agriculture (Bade 1987, 68). Right before the First World War, there were about one million foreign workers in the federal state of Prussia alone (Bade 1987, 64). Later, Germany became a (not long-lasting) refuge to 70,000 European Orthodox Jews and 200,000 people fleeing the 1917 Russian Revolution and its turbulent aftermath (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 6).

During the First World War, more than one million prisoners of war were employed in various German industries including mining, iron and agriculture (Herbert 1990, 90–91). Nazi Germany also infamously utilized forced labor of more than twenty million people during the Second World War (Project "Forced Labor 1939-1945" 2008). These forced laborers included "prisoners of war, Sinti and Roma, political prisoners, Jews, as well as foreign born civilians" (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 8). National Socialists called the labor force from outside of Germany "foreign workers" (*Fremdarbeiter*). Civilian forced laborers from the Soviet Union were named "Eastern workers" (*Ostarbeiter*) (Herbert 1990, 146).

The Nazi Era (1933–1945) was marked by hyper-racialized regulation of not only the labor force but virtually all spheres of life. The Nazi ideology relied on the idea of Germanness as a superior, pure race of Aryan ancestry that needed to be cleansed of its defectors. Persecution of Jews, Roma, Sinti, the disabled, homosexuals, communists and other minorities under this ideology was institutionalized through a series of laws and decrees.

The 1935 "Nuremberg Laws"—namely, the Reich Citizenship Law and the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor—issued during the annual rallies of the Nazi Party were significant steps in institutionalizing racism in Germany. The 1935 Reich Citizenship Law defined German citizenship in biological as well as political terms. According to this law, German citizens are persons "of German or kindred stock and who have proved by their conduct that they are willing and fit loyally to serve the German people and Reich" (HeinOnline 1948). Thus, German citizenship excluded political dissidents and all

those who were not of German descent. The main target was Jews, while the laws were used to torment "gypsies and blacks" as well (Milton 1990, 271).

The Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor, on the other hand, prohibited marriages as well as "non-marital sexual intercourse" between "Jews and citizens of German or kindred stock" (Pollock 1937, xix). The law also banned Jews from employing in their homes "female citizens of German or kindred stock under 45 years of age" (Pollock 1937, xix). This clause aimed to prevent German women from getting pregnant by Jewish men. Such racialized framing of Germanness showed that Nazis were on a "quest for a biologically homogeneous society" (Milton 1990, 270).

After the Second World War and the defeat of Axis Powers, Germany received migrant laborers in large numbers to energize the rebuilding of the country. As I discuss in the "Turkish migration to Germany" section below, the first large post-war migration wave to Germany started with "*gastarbeiter*" (guest worker) agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and other nations starting with Italy in 1955. The German Democratic Republic (i.e. East Germany) also recruited "guest workers" but from socialist countries such as Mozambique, China and Vietnam (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 67–68). In 1989, there were about 100,000 workers in the GDR from countries outside the Soviet Union (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 69).

Following German Reunification and the dissolution of the GDR, most of these workers were either deported or "voluntarily" left because they lost their jobs or were subject to persecution (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 69). At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union initiated a new migration wave to the now-reunified Germany. "Ethnic Germans"[17] from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union migrated to Germany as the

[17] "Ethnic Germans" (*Volksdeutsche*) refer to peoples of "German descent." "Ethnic Germans" who move to Germany are usually referred to as "*Aussiedler*" meaning "re-settler." They are referred to as "*Spätaussiedler*" (meaning "late re-settler") if they came after the

conservative Helmut Kohl administration promised them citizenship "whether or not they had any practical, linguistic, or emotional ties to Germany" (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 14).

Germany's history of diversity involves selective inclusions and violent exclusions. Ethnic minorities in the German Empire, for example, faced various forms of persecution as Germany struggled to stabilize and gain strength as a recently established nation-state. The Prussian state, for instance, monitored Poles closely to prohibit a Polish nationalist revival and to assure their "Germanization" (Bade 1987, 66). Otto von Bismarck, first Chancellor of the German Empire, likewise surveilled the Catholic community (Chin 2017, 25) as the power struggle between the Roman Catholic Church and the newly founded German state continued to grow. Moreover, already existing anti-Semitism grew enormously after the First World War and the Great Depression, which resulted in the mass murder of six million European Jews during the Holocaust.

German history from the nineteenth century to the aftermath of the Cold War clearly demonstrates that ethnic and religious differences have long existed in Germany. This diversity was mostly accompanied by continuing struggles to "deal with" these differences. In the case of the Third Reich, differences were violently eliminated. Historians Rita Chin and Heide Fehrenbach (2009) see parallels between the Third Reich and today in the way difference is understood in Germany. To illustrate, Germans historically perceived Judaism as "misguided" whereas it is Islam, today, that is perceived as the "crucial explanation for [Turks'] incompatibility [with Germans]" (Chin and Fehrenbach 2009, 11). Furthermore, just as Jews were pushed to assimilate during Jewish emancipation, Turks today are pressured to integrate (Chin and Fehrenbach 2009, 12). The current Turkish (Islamic) and Jewish populations in Germany face similar challenges regarding their belonging to Germany. For

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reform of the Federal Expellees Act (*Bundesvertriebenengesetz*) in 1992 (University of Oldenburg 2017).

example, in 2012, a court in the city of Cologne ruled that male circumcision created "bodily harm" to children (Yurdakul 2016, 77). In 2015, "on the third anniversary of the Court decision," a demonstration for "genital autonomy" was held in Cologne which pushed for banning male circumcision, which would prohibit this ritual performed both by Jews and Muslims (Yurdakul 2016, 77).

As these examples show, the dual reality of existing and suppressed heterogeneity in Germany continues to be so. As can be seen in Table 1 below, 20 percent of Germany's population (as of 2016) has "a migration background." Twelve percent of the population, on the other hand, does not have a German passport. Turks are the largest group among them, making up 1.5 Million of Germany's "foreigners." This diversity has increased with the arrival of Syrian asylum seekers in Germany especially between 2014 and 2016. In 2016, there were 1.6 million asylum seekers in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt n.d.).

Population Statistics of Germany in 2016	
Total Population	82.5 Million
Population with "Migration Background"	18.6 Million (20% of total population)
Foreigner Population (people who do not have German citizenship)	10 Million (12% of total population)
Within the Foreigner Population	
Turkey	1.5 Million
Poland	783,085
Syria	637,845
Italy	611,450
Romania	533,660
Greece	348,475

Table 1: Population Statistics of Germany in 2016. Source: *Statistisches Bundesamt* (Federal Office of Statistics) 2016.[18]

[18] Gathered from https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/AuslaendischeBevolkerung/Tabellen/Geschlecht.html, https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/MigrationIntegration.html#Tabellen and https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2018/01/PD18_019_12411.html (Last accessed on 6 April 2018).

Turkish Migration to Germany

Although Turks had emigrated to Germany in smaller amounts previously—for example, as apprentices and short-term skilled laborers in the 1950s (Abadan-Unat 2011, 9–10)—Turkish mass migration to the Federal Republic of Germany started only in the 1960s. The Turkish population in Germany initially consisted mostly of "guest workers" (*gastarbeiter*). These guest workers were more diverse than the umbrella term "guest worker" implies, however; they possessed different identities and migration motives (Hunn 2005, 71). This population diversified even further as workers' families migrated to Germany starting in the 1970s and asylum seekers arrived following the 1980 coup and escalating civil war in Kurdish regions of Turkey in the 1990s.

Mass labor migration from Turkey to Federal Germany began when the two countries signed a labor treaty titled "Recruitment and Procurement of Foreign Workers" *(Anwerbung und Vermittlung Ausländischer Arbeitnehmer*) in 1961 (Yurdakul 2009, 25). Germany signed similar treaties with other countries to manage its labor shortage as well: with Italy in 1955; Spain and Greece in 1960; Morocco in 1963; Portugal in 1964; Tunisia in 1965; and Yugoslavia in 1968 (Hunn 2005, 29). Germany's post-war population decline and booming heavy industries and mining initiated this shortage. The erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the tightening of the East–West German border regime further increased labor demand by hindering the recruitment of East Germans (Herbert 1990, 209).

On the other side of Europe, Turkish society was also in flux at the time. "Mechanization of agriculture" had initiated a large rural to urban migration (Hunn 2005, 33). Following a coup in 1960, the military government maintained that the economy had been mismanaged and founded a "State Planning Agency" (*Devlet Planlama Teskilati*) to encourage and regulate Turkey's "economic and social development" (Hunn 2005, 34). The first five-year development plan implemented by this state agency put forth "labor export" as

a major economic goal (Abadan-Unat 2011, 12). As prominent political scientist Nermin Abadan-Unat states, this policy assumed that workers would come back to Turkey with the necessary industrial know-how to support Turkey's development (Abadan-Unat 2011, 12). Turkish and German politicians also expressed desires to revive the "Turkish–German friendship," which dates back to the nineteenth century (Hunn 2005, 33–34).

Thus, the German–Turkish guest worker program would kill a handful of birds with one stone. German–Turkish political relations would be strengthened. Unemployment rates in Turkey would fall. Turkish workers would send remittances to their families. Workers would shortly return home with technical experience from Europe's rising industrial power. Last but not least, West German post-war reconstruction, supported by the United States, Britain and France, would continue without interruption (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 9). All of this would occur without Germany assuming the long-term responsibilities of the foreign workforce actualizing "the German economic miracle" (*deutsches Wirtschaftswunder*).

These expectations, however, had to be revised when "guest workers" became long-term residents. The initial German–Turkish labor treaty, signed under these expectations, was based on a rotation principle (*Rotationsprinzip*): workers would go back to Turkey after about two years and new workers would be employed in place of them (Kosnick 2007, 7–8). However, recruiting new workers in such short periods of time was not profitable for factories; therefore, the rotation principle was repealed when the treaty was renewed in 1964 (Kosnick 2007, 8). This decision initiated the long-term stay of Turkish workers in Germany. In 1973, Federal Germany put a halt to the guest worker program as a response to the global oil crisis and the following recession. By the mid-1970s, 2.6 million guest workers were in Germany—605,000 of whom were Turks, making up the largest minority at 23 percent of all noncitizens in Germany (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 11).

Until the 1970s, the growing foreign population in Germany and in other European countries was more or less seen as temporary. Only in the 1970s did European countries as

well as Turkey first start realizing the impacts of immigrant laborers on "sending" and "receiving" societies and begin implementing social policies to address them (Abadan-Unat 2011, 14–16). For example, Federal Germany passed a family unification law in 1973 enabling workers' families to join them in Germany. With the influx of workers' spouses and children, the population of non-German citizens grew to 4.4 million by 1980 (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 11).

As historian Karin Hunn argues, migrant Turkish workers were diverse even before their families arrived although the umbrella term "guest worker" creates the image of a homogeneous "rural, backward, poor, uneducated and low-brow" population (Hunn 2005, 71). For example, while the dominant narrative suggests that almost all of these workers emigrated from Anatolian villages, many actually came from large cities, especially Istanbul (Hunn 2005, 71). Moreover, many were "skilled and semi-skilled workers" with some work experience (Yurdakul 2009, 26).

The distribution of these diverse characteristics changed over time. For example, although initial guest workers were mostly men, a recession in 1966–1967 changed this trend (Abadan-Unat 1977, 31). The recession limited the demand in industries where male workers were employed, but the demand in industries employing female workers remained high (Abadan-Unat 1977, 31). After 1966, Turkish men, especially in rural Turkey, encouraged their wives and daughters to respond to this demand and migrate to Germany with the expectation that their male kin would follow (Abadan-Unat 1977, 32). Thus, the proportion of women among Turkish workers in Germany grew from 6.7 percent in 1961 to 26 percent in 1975 (Abadan-Unat 1977, 33). Initially, education levels among women were higher than that of men. For example, Abadan-Unat's 1963 survey shows that only 3 percent of male Turkish workers had senior high school diplomas compared to 10 percent of women (Abadan-Unat 1977, 35). Female workers' education levels decreased with the 1966–1967 recession after which more female workers were recruited from rural areas (Abadan-Unat 1977, 35).

The Turkish population in Germany became even more diverse starting in the 1980s when many came as asylum seekers after the 1980 coup and the escalating civil war in Kurdish regions during the late 80s and 90s. For example, Yezidis—a religious and ethnic minority mostly living in the Kurdish regions—were given "collective asylum on the grounds of religious persecution" (Schiffauer 2005, 1131). Asylum applications on the grounds of ethnic and political persecution are also at new highs as of 2018 especially following the continuous state of emergency and crackdown on dissidents in Turkey since 2016. In the first nine months of 2017, for example, 4,700 Turkish citizens applied for asylum in Germany although most of these applications were rejected (Deutsche Welle 2017e). The Turkish population in Germany continues to diversify as students, journalists, academics and qualified workers migrate to Germany for varied reasons including an assumed better quality of life in Germany.

Islam in Germany and Europe

As the Turkish case illustrates, following the Second World War, Western European countries like France, Britain, the Netherlands and Germany received large numbers of immigrants who made up the able-bodied labor force needed to reconstruct these devastated countries (Chin 2017, 5). Many of those peoples came from Muslim-majority countries. Rita Chin argues (specifically with respect to the 1960s and 70s) that these immigrants in Western Europe were mostly understood as "different" because of their "national (and legal status)" (Chin 2017, 3–4). In the 80s, however, Western European public realized that immigrant workers were there to stay; thus, cultural difference became a priority (Chin 2017, 4). Immigrants were now regarded as belonging to "alien cultures" "inassimilable to the nation" (Chin 2017, 6). Two events established Islam as a fundamental part of immigrants' supposedly "inassimilable cultures:" firstly, the aftermath of Salman Rushdie's publishing of *The Satanic Verses* in 1988 and secondly, the French state's banishing of headscarved girls

from schools in 2004 (Chin 2017, 6). The murder of Theo van Gogh (a Dutch public critic of Islam) by a Dutch-born Muslim man in 2004 also contributed to understandings of Islam as incompatible with "European values" such as "freedom of expression."

These events and the understanding of otherwise diverse immigrants as a monolithic Islamic community (Chin 2017, 6) have resonated in the ways immigrants identify themselves as well. To illustrate, sociologist Gökçe Yurdakul shows that the ways Turks politically organized in Germany changed in the 1990s parallel to the changes in the socio-political context (Yurdakul 2009). Yurdakul's book title perfectly summarizes this change: Turks transformed "from guest workers into Muslims" (Yurdakul 2009). Yurdakul (2009) demonstrates that Turks were initially perceived as guest workers and organized mostly in labor unions. Turks did not only join German labor unions but also formed their own workers' federation, the DIDF (*Demokratik Isci Dernekleri Federasyonu* [Federation of Democratic Workers Association]). Starting in the 1990s, however, leftist labor-oriented immigrant associations began to weaken throughout Germany (Yurdakul 2009, 67). Turks started to organize more and more in religious and ethnic-based organizations, reflecting the global and national shift from "workers' rights" to "citizens' rights" politics (See Chapter 4 in Yurdakul 2009). Two trends emerged in German-Turkish immigrants' political organizations—one that is social-democratic and secular-oriented and another that is religious- and nationalist-oriented (See Chapter 5 in Yurdakul 2009 for a discussion of two Turkish organizations in Germany). Especially after the Islamic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the already popular Islamic organizations in Germany became ever more popular among Turks while the German media and state explicitly stigmatized Muslims (Yurdakul 2009, 87).

Scholars have shown that stigmatization and exclusion of Muslims from Western identity have helped constitute European national identities (eg. Bowen 2010; Ewing 2008; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014; Scott 2007; Yurdakul and Korteweg 2013). For example, according to anthropologist Katherine Ewing (2008), Turkish masculinities are central to the

construction of Germanness. As Ewing (2008) argues, the German imaginary does not only exclude Muslim men from German nationhood but more importantly constitutes the Turkish/Muslim man as the fundamental Other of German identity. In other words, for Ewing (2008), abjecting this Muslim Other is essential to the formation of Germanness. Employing Judith Butler's theory of abjection, Ewing argues that "the Turkish/Muslim man" occupies a "zone of uninhabitability" for German identity (Butler 1993, 243 n.2 as cited in Ewing 2008, 3). In this framework, Germanness is defined by not being in this "zone of uninhabitability" where, for example, oppression of women and honor killings are ostensibly situated (Ewing 2008, 3). Therefore, as Ewing (2008) argues, German identity cannot be the "civilized," "progressive" and "gender equal" one that it claims to be without its Other: the "violent," "oppressive" and "gender unequal" "Muslim man."

Ewing's analysis of the abjected "Turkish Muslim man" illustrates that assumed differences between "the Muslim immigrant" and "the European native" are gendered. A visual symbol of this gendered distinction central to European identity building is the headscarf. Headscarves have been central to "national belonging" debates in countries with Muslim minority and majority populations like France, Germany, the Netherlands as well as Turkey (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014).

In the German case, debates about Islam's place in the public space started to focus on the headscarf heavily after a Stuttgart school rejected a headscarved Afghani teacher's job application in 2003 (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014, 137). Germany's constitutional court ruled that the school could not deny the headscarved teacher a position. As Korteweg and Yurdakul note, however, the court also communicated concerns about the headscarf as a fundamentalist symbol, hence a threat to Germany's national education policies (2014, 137). The constitutional court eventually gave state-level institutions support in making their own decisions regarding whether headscarves shall be allowed at schools (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014, 137).

Following this suggestion, the state of Berlin, for example, issued its own neutrality law (*Neutralitätsgesetz*) in 2005 which bans all visible religious symbols for teachers at schools (Berlin.de 2005). This law is controversial as many suggest that it is directed towards Muslim women. For example, recently Berlin's Green Party condemned this law. The Greens declared that they were against religious manipulation at schools but that they supported headscarved teachers (Die Welt 2017). Bettina Jarasch, the former state chairwoman and current Berlin State Parliament representative for the Greens, stated that the regulations in place were "a culture war against the headscarf" rather than effective adjustments to prohibit "religious manipulation" in schools (Die Welt 2017).

These examples show that Islam is central to how immigrants are understood in Germany and in Europe at large. As Ewing's analysis demonstrates, Islam is also central to constructions of European identities as Europe's fundamental Other. Regardless of whether Islam is excluded from national and post-national imaginaries or included in *multikulti* celebrations, it is conceptualized as "different." This difference is articulated mostly in gendered terms as in the case of debates about headscarves.

"Cultural Differences" in Europe

The concept of "culture" is commonly deployed in European immigration debates. "Culture" frequently connotes distinctive and unbridgeable differences between European "natives" and (mostly Muslim) "immigrants" (Chin 2017; Chin and Fehrenbach 2009; Eley 2009). This is the case with Turks in Germany as well. Historians Rita Chin and Heide Fehrenbach (2009) argue that conceptualizations of Islam and "Turkish culture" as coherent entities fundamentally different from "German culture" reflect racialized understandings of difference in Germany. Their argument is provocative because racism is frequently assumed to have ended in Germany with the fall of the "hyperracialized" Third Reich (Chin and Fehrenbach 2009, 5). A supposed reflection of this "post-racial era" is the renouncement of

the German word for race, "*Rasse*" (Chin and Fehrenbach 2009, 3). German-speaking peoples refrain from using this word when referring to humans because of the word's Nazi legacy. Today, the word "*Rasse*" is only used in public when, for example, referring to animal breeds. However, despite the vanishing of the word "*Rasse,*" as Chin and Fehrenbach perfectly put it, "social ideologies and behaviors that look an awful lot like racism" are ubiquitous in contemporary Germany (Chin and Fehrenbach 2009, 3).

Historian Geoff Eley (2009) shows that other West European nations have also largely abandoned the word "race" after the Second World War. European politicians, media and the public rather use the word "culture" to address what they used to refer to as "race"—hierarchical and supposedly unbridgeable differences—not only excluding Muslims from the European imaginary but also solidifying Europe as a unified non-Muslim place (Eley 2009, 178–81). Eley explains:

> In this "new racism," differences of cultural identity have notably replaced biologically founded inequalities as the main building block of racist thought. […] In the language deployed by right-wing populists, cultural identity has become central to how the alienness of "immigrants" can be publicly rationalized: such intruders are people who share neither a national heritage nor "European civilization," who do not belong, who are foreign to the way "we" live, who lack "our" cultural and moral values (Eley 2009, 178–79).

"This new 'culturalized' racism" continues to shape understandings of difference among the rising European Far Right *as well as* the mainstream (Eley 2009, 179). As such, Europe is increasingly defined "against Islam," which is ostensibly incompatible with "European" values like "individual emancipation" and "freedoms of conscience and speech" (Eley 2009, 180).

In the German case, discussions about supposedly incompatible "culture(s)" became even more ferocious when Friedrich Merz, a former chair of the conservative

CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group, suggested in 2000 that immigrants should comply with "German *Leitkultur*" (leading/guiding culture) to be able to stay in Germany permanently (Ewing 2008, 212). Merz's introduction of this phrase provoked apprehension not only among Muslims and pro-immigration circles but also among Germany's Jewish population (Ewing 2008, 212). Although the concept of *Kultur* had originally emerged out of "a pluralistic notion of cultures" and founded the German tradition of "interpretive cultural anthropology," National Socialists utilized the concept to endorse the notion of a superior "German *Volk* (ethnic people)" (Ewing 2008, 212–13). This history makes the use of the word even more controversial.

In April 2017, Thomas de Maizière, the German federal interior minister of Merkel's CDU, once again supported the idea of "leading German culture" in an interview for the German tabloid newspaper *Bild* (as cited in Bierbach 2017). Juxtaposing Germanness with Islam, de Maizière even declared: "We [Germans] show our faces. We are not the Burqa" (cited in Bierbach 2017). Heated debates followed de Maizière's provocative statements. Political parties on the left suggested that the concept of *Leitkultur* only promotes hatred; the far-right populist party AFD endorsed the concept and argued that a common "leading culture" would prevent the formation of "parallel societies" while many other groups argued that immigrants should sustain their cultural identities as part of a multicultural society (Bierbach 2017).

To sum up, "culture" is seen as a major source of difference in contemporary Europe and Germany. This concept, widely debated and even castigated in anthropology, has become a folk term in Europe. *Leitkultur* debates show that the concept is deployed not only to articulate assumed and real differences especially between "Muslim immigrants" and "European natives" but also to express an assumed hierarchy relying on the notion of a superior German culture. Such uses of the term refrain debaters from discussing the multiple facets of issues such as "integration."

West German Laws Regarding "Foreigners" after World War II

West German immigration and citizenship laws have been largely exclusionary and have continued to ignore the existence of a practically permanent "immigrant" community until almost the early 2000s. As Rogers Brubaker argues, German citizenship has been "based exclusively on *jus sanguinis* or descent" (Brubaker 1992, 52). This meant that (until very recently) one had to have German parents and therefore a blood-related "ethnic" connection to the German nation to have citizenship rights. Through a series of reforms starting in 1999, however, conceptualizations of Germanhood have begun to shift to a "civic rights-based citizenship (*jus soli*)" (Asiye Kaya 2017, 65). In 2005, Germany also admitted that it is a country of immigration and initiated much-debated integration programs (Asiye Kaya 2017, 58).

Federal Germany passed its first post–World War II law regarding immigrants titled "Foreigner Law" (*Ausländergesetz*) in 1965. While citizens of the European Economic Community (EEC) had similar labor rights as German citizens, the "Foreigner Law" specified that non-EEC citizens could stay and work in Germany only as long as their residence fit "the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany" (Chin 2007, 50). Conservatives from the CDU as well as left-wing politicians from SPD presented this law as a progressive one replacing the previous Third Reich version (Schönwälder, "Ist nur Liberalisierung Fortschritt?" as cited in Chin 2007, 51 n. 61). Contrary to these claims, the new law was not necessarily progressive; the binding of immigrants' residency to German interests consolidated the temporary and outsider status of guest workers (Chin 2007, 51–52). The political rhetoric and the legal framework did not reflect the lived realities of guest workers, whose residence permits continued to get extended making them long-term residents in practice (Chin 2007, 52).

The next crucial act for immigrants was the passing of the Family Reunification Law of 1973, which enabled migrants to bring their spouses and children to Germany. Behind this

law was the hope that having their families with them would help migrants integrate into German society (Herbert 1990 as cited in Yurdakul 2009, 31–32). Later, in the early 1980s, the Kohl administration urged migrants and their families to go back by offering them monetary compensation; however, few left the lives they had built in Germany (Yurdakul 2009, 38). Although decades-long Turkish and other "foreigner" presence in Germany challenged the temporary conceptualization of guest workers' place in the German imaginary, German citizenship laws continued to exclude them from the nation until the early 2000s.

The strictly descent-based legal framework of German citizenship partly changed when Germany passed a new citizenship law (*Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*) in 1999 which took effect in 2000 (Mushaben 2017, 255–56). The new law granted the option to have German citizenship to children born in Germany to parents who legally resided in Germany for at least eight years (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 152). Between the ages of 18 and 23, however, the dual citizen would have to decide whether she wanted to keep her German citizenship or her parents' citizenship (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration 2000 as cited in Yurdakul 2008, 42). This necessity to choose relied on the idea that one could not be both German and "something else." This obligation was repealed in 2014; currently, children born in Germany to non-Germans can obtain dual citizenship (Asiye Kaya 2017, 65).

In 2004, Germany's first ever Immigration Law (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*) also passed marking another step in improving immigrants' rights in Germany. The passing of this law was an important gesture meaning that Germany finally admitted being "an immigration country." The law implements some integration policies such as regulated language courses but also further regulates labor migration privileging highly skilled workers ("Gesetz Über Den Aufenthalt, Die Erwerbstätigkeit Und Die Integration von Ausländern Im Bundesgebiet" 2004). In this sense, the new act did not fully or equally address Germany's migrant populations' needs.

The Merkel Era

Despite having famously said in 2010 that multiculturalism was dead, Germany's current chancellor Angela Merkel became the face of Germany's efforts to establish itself as a non-xenophobic country that is welcoming of diversity. To illustrate, in her party's migration conference in 2014, Merkel compared the challenges of integrating immigrants with the challenges Eastern and Western Germans faced during Reunification and declared that integration was doable. Merkel even presented herself, an Eastern German who became chancellor, as a positive example to encourage migrants to "pursue their goals" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2014). Later, in 2015, Merkel famously declared that Germany could manage "the Refugee Crisis" and opened Germany's borders to asylum seekers. Merkel has also tried to establish a "welcoming culture" in state institutions promoting the idea that difference is to be regarded as an asset rather than a problem (Mushaben 2017, 277). However, Merkel's policies have also received backlash especially regarding her acceptance of Syrian refugees.

As political scientist and gender studies scholar Joyce Mushaben states, when Merkel assumed office in 2005, there was political demand from within Europe for immigration reform (Mushaben 2017, 259). For example, in 1999 and onwards, EU councils had been pushing member states to adopt "civic citizenship"—increasing migrant rights, "social cohesion" and integration (Mushaben 2017, 259–60). Germany was one of those countries on the radar as it did not have a good record of naturalization and social inclusion of long-term immigrants (Mushaben 2017, 259). Merkel has negotiated with such pressures from inside Germany and the EU and has worked on developing not only national but also European-level migration policies.

Migration policies Merkel's governments implemented have not always been sufficient to address migrants' problems, however. For example, the 2014 reform enabling

double citizenship does not comply with European standards because it restricts the number of years adolescents can live outside of Germany if they want to be German citizens (Mushaben 2017, 270). Recent German policies on immigration have sometimes even been hostile to migrants. For example, Germany recently included "Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia" in its "safe countries" list and debated considering "Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro" as "safe" as well (Knight 2015). Asylum applications from "safe country" citizens are almost always rejected with the assumption that these people are free to return to their countries of origin. Thus, they are seen as "economic migrants" pretending to be "refugees." In addition to creating a hierarchical binary between "deserving refugees" and "undeserving economic migrants," this list is controversial also because it includes countries with bad human rights records; for example, Roma and Sinti are persecuted in Kosovo despite the claims of German authorities (Knight 2015).

Merkel's policies are also not necessarily popular—as was the case with widespread protests against her welcoming Syrian refugees. Mainstream uneasiness with "foreigners" increased even further when men reportedly "from North African and Arab countries" (Diehl et al. 2016) assaulted numerous women during 2015 New Year's Eve in Cologne. Europe-wide anti-refugee protests as well as reactions from politicians in Merkel's own center-right party CDU and its even more conservative sister party CSU pushed Merkel to reconsider her "welcoming" policies.

Responding to these pressures, Germany and the EU sought alternative solutions to "the Refugee Crisis." Thus, the EU made an agreement with Turkey in March 2016 which obliged Turkey to take back refugees if they arrive in Greece undocumented (Collett 2016). In return, the EU would give Turkey liberties on visa regulations and financial support in hosting refugees. Critics deemed this "deal" to be a dirty one wherein Europe does not only sacrifice "its values" but also becomes subject to Turkey's "blackmailing" (Hewitt 2016). Germany's steps back in "welcoming refugees" along with its problematic "safe countries" list show the

contingencies of implementing supposedly European values such as “human rights,” one of which is the right to asylum according to Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 2015).

Berlin’s Financial Troubles

German Reunification marks an important juncture for Berlin. After Reunification, the capital city of the Federal Republic of Germany gradually moved from Bonn to Berlin. East Berlin dissolved as the capital and economic and administrative hub of the GDR. The fall of the Wall and the dissolution of the GDR brought about financial troubles to the newly unified German capital including enormous public debt and high levels of unemployment among migrants as well as citizens of East Berlin. As urban researchers Bernt, Grell and Holm state, Reunification was followed by disappearing government jobs as well as privatization and closing of GDR-era factories in East Berlin (Bernt, Grell, and Holm 2013b, 15). As of December 2017, after almost 30 years since the Reunification, unemployment in Berlin is at 8.4 percent (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2017b), still higher than the national average of 5.3 percent (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2017a).

Figure 5: Berlin (marked in red) as situated in Germany. Source: "Locator Map Berlin in Germany" By TUBS. Licensed under GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) and CC BY-SA 3.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved from https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c3/Locator_map_Berlin_in_Germany.svg . Last accessed on January 18, 2018.

Figure 6: Map of Berlin's official districts. Source: "Berlin Subdivisions" by TUBS. Licensed under GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html), CC BY 3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0), CC BY-SA 3.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0), CC0, Public domain, FAL or Attribution], via Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved from https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d8/Berlin_Subdivisions.svg. Last accessed on January 18, 2018.

However, economic troubles were not exactly on the horizon after the fall of the Wall. On the contrary, at the end of the Cold War, a trust in the capitalist system as well as a feeling of "idealism, euphoria and greed of building" prevailed in Berlin (Ward 2011, 286–87). In the 1990s, the recently unified capital, symbolizing the end of the polarized Cold War era, started to be rebuilt both literally and symbolically. The local government began supporting real estate developers through credits and tax advantages, and thus post–Cold War Berlin soon became the world's "largest building site" (Ward 2011, 286–87). For example, the historical neighborhoods of East Berlin such as Mitte and Prenzlauerberg were radically rebuilt and

gentrified (Holm 2013, 175–76). However, these investments and the real estate boom were not sustainable because the European and global demand for these new constructions was wishfully thought to exist but mostly did not (Ward 2011, 287).

Thus, the reunified Berlin, the symbol of the collapse of socialism, ironically became a showcase for the capitalist crisis of overproduction. Berlin was "overbuilt" and "over-renovated" (Ward 2011, 287). The financial effects thereof quickly became evident. The publicly owned bank *Bankgesellschaft Berlin,* which funded private real estate companies behind the boom and, thus, the crisis, went almost bankrupt in 2001 (Bernt, Grell, and Holm 2013a, 127). The federal government refused to help the city bail out the bank, which cost Berliners about "30 billion Euros" (Bernt, Grell, and Holm 2013a, 127). This development combined with the dissolution of East Berlin's economic institutions turned the German capital into a "metropolis of poverty" and initiated its "austerity politics" legitimizing the cutting of various social welfare programs such as "the funding of social housing" (Bernt, Grell, and Holm 2013b, 15–16).

Berlin, the capital city of one of the world's largest economies, is still known to be a financial burden. Unlike most European countries, Germany's gross domestic product per capita would be higher if it weren't for its capital (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln 2016). Many see Berlin as the poor, odd and embarrassing child of this influential country otherwise stereotyped as orderly, hard working and economically well-off. In 2014, Christopher Lauer, a former member of the state parliament of the city state of Berlin, wrote that Berlin suffered from € 63 billion of debt, poor administration and bureaucratic inefficiency and was in this sense "a third world city" at the center of one of the most developed nations:

> If one were to hear of such a state, one would think, through prejudice, that he was somewhere in the third world and that would be a "failed state," a structure that can no longer fulfill basic functions. But the state so described is not just anywhere, but in our

> economic wonderland: Germany. The description might sound even familiar to some: Yes, it is the capital of Germans, it is the land of Berlin (Lauer 2014).

As Lauer points out, the German capital is known for its financial and bureaucratic "incompetence" as opposed to the assumed German trait of "efficiency." The opening of the new € 5 billion Berlin-Brandenburg Airport, for example, has already been postponed multiple times due to a series of problems including a poorly prepared budget and failure to comply with fire protection requirements (See Chapter 3 for a discussion of Turks' reflections on Berlin's airport scandal). This infrastructure disaster even led to the resignation of Berlin's popular mayor Klaus Wowereit in 2014.

Rebranding Berlin as a "Creative City"

Klaus Wowereit, the Berlin mayor between 2001 and 2014, and his administration implemented various policies to deal with the financial crisis that they inherited. One of these policies was to aggressively rebrand Berlin as a global "cultural metropolis" and "creative city," which is a worldwide urban policy trend aimed at attracting "cultural industries" (Colomb 2012, 229–30). In addition to promoting more conventional cultural events such as operas and theatre plays, Berlin's "'off-beat cultures'—youth and club cultures in particular" were also utilized for what urban researcher Claire Colomb calls Berlin's "place-marketing" (Colomb 2012, 229–30). The "Berliner hype" became a product to be marketed to global capital, investors, "creative industries" as well as tourists. As Colomb illustrates, various "sub-culture(s)" became central to the city image, which painted a picture of "hipness," "creativity," "diversity" and "tolerance" (Colomb 2012, 239). Wowereit contributed to this image as the first openly gay mayor of the capital who famously described Berlin as "poor but sexy" (*arm, aber sexy*). The city's tourism campaigns combined this image of cosmopolitanism with Berlin's affordability (in comparison to most other global metropolises

as well as big cities in Western Europe and Germany) in slogans like "the only world city which doesn't cost the world" (BTM 2009 as cited in Colomb 2012, 237).

As anthropologist Ruth Mandel states, Berlin's idealized image as a "cosmopolitan" city mostly includes international, high culture figures such as "Sir Simon Rattle, the British Jewish conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic" and excludes immigrants (Mandel 2008, 319). However, Colomb observes that this logic started to change in the 2000s when "multicultural neighborhoods" and "immigrant cultures" became sites of touristic consumption (Colomb 2012, 248). According to Colomb, this shift stems from various factors including the ideological differences between Berlin's conservative government of the 1990s and the 2000s leftist coalition as well as the promotion of the city as a tolerant, diverse and international one starting in the 2000s (Colomb 2012, 248).

This policy shift did have an impact on the population of Berlin. Many international students, artists and entrepreneurs launching start-ups continue to respond to the call of the rebranded "cheap" yet (and possibly hence) "creative city." Especially since the beginning of the European debt crisis in 2009, young people from countries hit harshly by the crisis such as Greece, Portugal and Spain have taken advantage of the free EU mobility and come to this affordable European capital especially to study and seek jobs.

As I discuss in Chapter 4, the marketing of the city to internationals has not been popular to everyone as it has indirectly increased rents and initiated widespread displacements. This policy helped establish Berlin's current image, nevertheless. As political scientist Annika Hinze states, the capital is "known throughout Germany for its multicultural character and its large and quite visible Turkish immigrant community" (Hinze 2013, xxiv–xxv). Hinze's "hometown of Berlin" is today "Germany's hippest, largest and especially its most diverse city" (Hinze 2013, xv).

Turks in Post–Cold War Berlin

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 initiated important changes for Turks in Germany as they did for the city of Berlin. First of all, the divided city and country that Turks had originally come to were now (re)unified. As filmmaker and academic Can Candan (2000) shows in his documentary *Duvarlar-Mauern-Walls*, Turks initially shared the general euphoria about Reunification and celebrated this radical change. However, shortly after, Turks realized that they did not have the place they wished for in the new German imaginary that emerged from the ruins of the Wall (C. Candan 2000). The story of the Berlin Wall signified the separation and unification of "Germans," which apparently did not include Turks. This was the case even though Turks had witnessed the life and death of the Wall very closely; after all, many had come when the Wall was being built and lived in the neighborhoods next to it.

With the fall of the Wall, immigrant neighborhoods adjacent to it at the edge of West Berlin like Kreuzberg, Neukölln and Wedding became geographically, socially and symbolically central to the reunified capital. All of these neighborhoods are now regarded as "hip" while they house the city's poorest. Kreuzberg was actually popular even before Reunification among artists and visitors as "a hub for Berlin's alternative, multicultural and bohemian scenes" (Lang 1998 as cited in Colomb 2012, 245–46). The district is now visited by even a larger collection of peoples including international residents, tourists as well as German cosmopolitans.

The increasing popularity of these neighborhoods beginning in the 1990s had ambivalent effects on the immigrant populations living there. As I discuss in Chapter 4, for example, *späti* owners are generally happy with the tourist influx into these districts. However, these boroughs also went through "intensive processes of renewal" (Colomb 2012, 246) raising previously affordable rents. Immigrants still mostly reside in these edgy

neighborhoods, now close to the inner city (Hinze 2013, xx–xxi); however, many have been displaced from these districts where they have been living for decades.

The fall of the Wall proved to have had adverse effects for Turks when in the 1990s xenophobia, racism and Islamophobia increased sharply. Although there is continuing debate about the reasons for this increase, as German Studies scholar Andreas Huyssen states, the search for a national identity in the first united "sovereign [German] nation-state" to emerge after the Second World War, economic difficulties in former East German regions (including unemployment rates "as high as forty percent") and the reluctance of the police and legal authorities to prosecute racist attackers certainly contributed to the issue (Huyssen 1994, 8–9). As I illustrated previously in this chapter, Islam started to be seen as a fundamental outsider to Europe during this period. Many deadly attacks were carried out against refugees and migrants following Reunification. One of them, known widely in Turkey, was an arson attack in 1993 in the city of Solingen, where five Turks were killed in their homes. As scholars of German studies Gokturk, Gramling and Kaes state, Germans understood these kinds of racist violence as akin to "Nazi persecutions" (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 13). Millions held protests "to take a public stance against neo-Nazism and racist violence" (Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes 2007, 13). This was the case a decade later when anti-Muslim activists gathered under the name PEGIDA as well. As such, Turks in Berlin find themselves in the middle of increasing nativist nationalism as well as voices raised against this stance.

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This polarized position defines the circumstances of many immigrants' lives in contemporary Europe. European histories of diversity are accompanied by simultaneous inclusions and exclusions. In the case of Berlin since the 2000s, heterogeneity has become a product to sell as the German capital markets itself as an international metropolis. While everyone does not share this same vision, as I will discuss in Chapter 7, *späti* owners and workers reinforce Berlin's rebranded self-image as a laid-back and diverse city in order to

increase business and develop social relations. The next chapter builds on this chapter's argument that Turks' relationship with Europe has historically been ambivalent. They have been excluded and included in relation to changing local, national as well as global politics. The next chapter delves deeper into how differences are redefined, consumed and celebrated in contemporary Germany.

Ch. 3 – Ambivalent Inclusions: Stigmatizing, Celebrating and Consuming Differences in Germany

The previous chapter discussed historical constructions of Turkishness, Germanness and Europeanness through mutual inventions and re-articulations of difference and relationality. This chapter builds on this history and presents cases where various kinds of "difference" are constructed, articulated and negotiated in contemporary Berlin and Germany. Turks' cultural difference and relationality are reproduced and transformed in relation to changing local and transnational political and economic relations. The production of Turks' simultaneous insider-ness and outsider-ness in changing, multi-dimensional contexts demonstrates that migrants' "cultural differences" do not simply exist *a priori* and persist in their current form. These differences change and develop in their "host countries" to which they are commonly seen external.

I explore this ambivalent insider-outsider status through several interrelated themes: religion, transnational politics, space and ethnic diversity. Firstly, I discuss how different versions of Islam take shape in their Berliner and German contexts. I later show that Turkish business owners' relations with their customers are shaped by increasingly tense Turkish–European relations. For many Turks, increasing criticisms against Erdogan rearticulate Turks' stigmatization and Germans' perceptions of Turks as inferior. In addition to transnational politics, spatial divisions help articulate migrants' difference. "Migrant neighborhoods" are stigmatized not only by political actors but also by Turks from affluent neighborhoods. Ironically, these stigmatized spaces are consumed as "cosmopolitan" spaces of Berlin as a "diverse" city. Finally, I discuss how organizers of a *multikulti* Berliner carnival present this event as an urgently necessary reaction against Germany's rising far right.

European Islams

In Western European debates about immigration and multiculturalism, Islam is frequently discussed as a signifier of already-existing differences that need to be dealt with or

accommodated. Differences between "the Muslim community" and "secular Europe" are mostly framed as cultural ones that exist ahistorically and need to be resolved within the realm of integration policies. However, studies on European Muslims show that Muslims develop, interpret and embody religious identities in diverse and dynamic ways that are ultimately embedded in broader transnational sociopolitical contexts.

To illustrate, Turkish *Alevis*, an unrecognized religious minority in Turkey, first gained recognition in Europe via the German state (Özyürek 2009, 235). Alevism is mostly regarded as a sect of Shia Islam associated with Sufism and mysticism (Mandel 2008, 327). *Alevis* are Turkey's largest religious minority (Zirh 2012, 1764) and are estimated to comprise 10–30 percent of the Turkish population (Özyürek 2009, 237). They make up an even larger portion of migrants from Turkey in Germany (Mandel 2008, 327). The Turkish state does not recognize Alevism as a legitimate belief system nor does it regard *Alevi* religious centers, *cemevis,* as legitimate places of worship. This misrecognition means that *cemevis* do not receive state support such as the "free water and property tax breaks that mosques, churches, and synagogues receive" (Özyürek 2009, 237). As anthropologist Esra Özyürek (2009) shows, *Alevis* in Germany developed their identities by claiming that they are different from Sunni Muslims. The German legal system enabled this claims-making and recognized *Alevis* as a legitimate separate religious community (Özyürek 2009, 235). German *Alevis*, then, supported their Turkish counterparts politically and economically as they struggled for state recognition in Turkey (Özyürek 2009, 240).

As anthropologist Ruth Mandel states, the distinct differences between *Alevis* and other visibly Muslim communities helped to get *Alevis* "accepted by Germans" (Mandel 2008, 20). Many Alevi beliefs and practices differ from Turkish Sunni Islam as well as from mainstream Shi'ism. For example, *Alevis* do not go to mosques; rather, they gather in their own worship centers, *cemevis,* which do not have minarets, the archetypal signifier of Islam. Moreover, unlike their pious Shia and Sunni counterparts, Alevi women do not wear

headscarves, making them less visibly Muslim (Mandel 2008, 20). Also, *Alevis* take part in *cem*, a signature Alevi ritual involving both women and men (Mandel 2008, 252) unlike other Islamic rituals where women and men worship separately. To Europeans, these gender-equal practices signify Alevis' difference from Sunnis and Shias and hence their higher capacity to be integrated into Europe.

Like Alevism, Turkish Sunni Islam in Germany also emerges within its local sociopolitical context although Turkish Muslim men and women are presented in the mainstream European media as importing their "oppressive cultures" from their homelands. Between Neukölln's two popular recreational sites, a public pool and Tempelhof Field (a large public park), lies Berlin's largest Islamic worship center and Sunni mosque, Sehitlik Mosque. This Turkish mosque gets its name "*Sehitlik*" (Turkish for martyrdom) from the two-centuries-old graveyard next to it where some Ottoman ambassadors were buried. Later, the site grew when soldiers were brought to Germany for treatment during the First World War (when the Ottomans fought alongside the Germans) (Sehitlik Camii 2017). Now, the graveyard serves as a marker of the deep-rooted Turkish and Muslim presence in Germany—perennial relationships ironically symbolized in a cemetery.

Every Friday during the summertime, Muslim men and women exit the mosque after Friday prayer as children line up in front of the pool next door. Acquaintances converse in the mosque garden while curious passersby stop to admire the mosque's classical Ottoman architecture with all its curves and monumental cusps. Some worshippers carry their conversations further outside the garden and proudly light their cigarettes, a secular ritual marking the successful completion of a religious one.

Sehitlik Mosque's promised services go beyond providing Berlin's Muslim community with religious ceremonies like Friday prayer. The mosque signifies Berlin's identity as a diverse city. On travel blogs and Berlin's official tourist websites, this religious institution is advertised as a Berliner space worth visiting for its beauty and educational value;

it is labeled an important place to learn about Islam and Berlin's Muslim communities. One can even schedule a tour of the mosque in various languages including Arabic, English, German and Turkish. Fitting with the mosque's popular representation as a *multikulti* Berliner site, the city's official travel website "Visit Berlin" describes the institution as "a cultural and community centre" whose objectives are "to present Muslim life in Berlin, to encourage communities to get to know each other, and to break down prejudices" (visitBerlin.de n.d.).

In Moabit, half an hour bike ride north of Sehitlik, a self-defined "liberal mosque" contests this Sunni institution's (and many other Islamic institutions') claims to promote tolerance. In June 2017, Seyran Ates, a German-Turkish lawyer and feminist of Kurdish descent, established this mosque asserting that contemporary Islamic institutions did not accommodate differences among Muslims such as those of sexual difference. Seyran Ates has been a prominent critic of Islam, multiculturalism and "Turkish culture." As anthropologist Katherine Ewing states, Seyran Ates has appeared frequently in the German media, especially following the murder of a Turkish woman, Hatun Surucu, which was framed as an "honor killing" (Ewing 2008, 161–62). Ates accused German tolerance and multiculturalism of "contribut[ing] to the 'slavery' of Muslim women" and pushed the German government for implementing policies to save Muslim women (Ewing 2008, 162).

Ates' mosque is an unusual one. This Muslim institution is named Ibn Rushd–Goethe Mosque, combining the names of Andalusian Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd and German romanticist Johann Wolfgang von Goethe—both of whom are polymaths whose ideas have helped cultivate inter-religious affinities. The mosque operates on the property of a Protestant church. As Ates states in an interview on Aypa TV, a Berlin-based TV station, the church coincidentally offered this location to the mosque (AYPA TV 2017). This was no surprise to Ates because the church is part of an inter-religious organization planning to establish a multi-religious center (AYPA TV 2017). Secondly, Ates does not cover her hair, which is atypical of a female imam. Thirdly, in this mosque, women and men worship and pray together in the

same rows whereas traditionally women in Sunni and Shia Islam are supposed to line up at the back or at left. Ates' mosque does not abide by a single sect but is rather an inclusionary one welcoming all colors of Islam equally (Oltermann 2017). The only restriction is on *burqa* (clothing covering the body and the face) and *niqab* (veil covering the face except for the eyes), which Ates sees as a "political statement" (Oltermann 2017). Ates' statement about *burqa* and *niqab* uses the exact phraseology, "political statement," that Turkish politicians have deployed for decades to exclude headscarved women from public service and universities.

Egyptian and Turkish Islamic institutions condemned Ates' efforts to establish an unconventional Muslim institution with fatwas and other official statements. For example, Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi*)[19] suggested that this "fake Islam" was the work of Fethullah Gulen, the cleric allegedly behind the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey (Deutsche Welle 2017c). On the other hand, Germany's foreign ministry spokesperson, Martin Schäfer, reacted against Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs and declared that states are not supposed to decide where and how religion can be practiced (Deutsche Welle 2017d). Despite Schäfer's claim, however, religious matters historically have been (and continue to be) state affairs both in Germany and Turkey. As a matter of fact, faith-based matters are central to national identity formation in both countries like in most other European contexts as I discussed in Chapter Two (cf. Arat 2007; Bowen 2007, 2010; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009, 2014; Turam 2007).

Politicians frequently regard Islam as a unified "culture-religion" that needs to reconcile its inherent differences with European values. As such, Islam is mostly abjected from European identities (cf. Ewing 2008). Nevertheless, the aforementioned examples—

[19] *Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi* (DIB) was founded in 1924 right after the Turkish Republic was established. DIB funds and regulates mosques and their employees in Turkey. DIB also operates its own television and fatwa line where people can call to learn about religious affairs. Imams of many Turkish mosques in Germany are appointed by DIB and come from Turkey as well.

Alevis consolidating their identities in Europe; Sehitlik Mosque advertised as a Berliner space worthy of a visit; and the self-defined "liberal" mosque run by Seyran Ates—all claim a belonging to Europeanness and mostly successfully.

Transnational Politics of Difference

Increasingly strained European–Turkish relations produce novel conditions through which Turks experience, understand and articulate their difference in contemporary Germany. Mainstream German media present events in Turkey and Turks' support for Erdogan as proof of Turks' non-compliance with European and German values and, hence, their non-belonging to Europe and Germany. Erdogan supporters, however, perceive him as a paternal figure who stands up to the "Western oppressors." Therefore, they understand reactions coming from "the West" against Erdogan as aggression against the global Turkish community as a whole. In other words, the support for Erdogan emerges within the political context of Europe rather than outside of it. Tensions between Turkey and Europe further intensify this support.

Various events since the late 2000s have escalated the effects of European–Turkish relations on Turks' identities. An initial event that sparked debate was a speech Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then the Turkish prime minister, gave in Cologne, Germany in 2008. Erdogan urged Turks to resist "assimilation," which he described as "a crime against humanity" (Erdogan 2008 as cited in Hinze 2013, 23). Later in 2014—again, during a speech in Cologne—Erdogan condemned those who criticized his policies inside and outside Turkey (especially the German media) (Deutsche Welle 2014). These instances sparked debate about the loyalty of Turkish immigrants to "German values." Also up for debate was the issue of Turks' willingness to integrate and the extent to which Erdogan could influence Turks in Germany. In 2016, German authorities rejected Erdogan when he wanted to address the crowds in Cologne protesting the coup attempt in Turkey (Deutsche Welle 2016a). The tensions escalated even more when in 2017 the Netherlands did not allow the plane of Turkey's

foreign minister (who was campaigning for the Turkish constitutional referendum to change Turkey's parliamentary system into a presidential one giving the president extensive power) to land in the country (Özkan 2017a). The Netherlands even deported Turkey's Family and Social Policies minister who came for the same constitutional campaign (Özkan 2017b). As a reaction, Erdogan accused Dutch authorities of being "Nazi remnants" (Özkan 2017a).

Many Turkish immigrants, especially those who support Erdogan, feel close affinity with the Turkish state. They take critical statements and acts like Erdogan's banishment from addressing crowds in Germany not simply as an impersonal act against Turkish authorities. They rather take such statements as directed against themselves. Their jumpy conclusions should not simply be taken as the reaction of an inherently "resentful" national community that cannot take a joke, however. Their affective reactions stem from the ways they are interpellated as "Turks" (i.e. cultural and national outsiders) and from the fascination Turks have with Erdogan as an Islamic, masculine figure challenging "the West" on their behalf.

These reactions became pronounced in 2016 when the German media started to criticize Erdogan even more repeatedly and overtly. For example, the political satire program *Extra 3* aired a song titled "*Erdowie, Erdowo, Erdowahn*"[20] on March 17, 2016 which mockingly criticized Turkey's president Erdogan for his human rights and free speech violations. The video also criticized Angela Merkel for making a refugee deal with Turkey and leaving herself to Erdogan's mercy. As a reaction, the Turkish Foreign Ministry summoned the German ambassador to Turkey, Martin Erdmann, and asked the German state to ban the video. The German state did not comply with this request, declaring that the song is protected by press freedom in Germany.

[20] The title "*Erdowie, Erdowo, Erdowahn*" (Erdo-how, Erdo-where, Erdo-delusion) combines Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan's last name, Erdogan, and the lyrics to a 1980s German song "*irgendwie, irgendwo, irgendwann*" (somehow, somewhere, somewhen). In the satirical song, the word "*wahn*" (delusion) is used rather than the word in the original lyrics, "*wann*" (when). The video can be accessed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R2e2yHjc_mc. Last retrieved on January 14, 2018.

Debates about human rights and freedom of speech in Turkey and Germany and how much Erdogan can influence inner German politics took another turn when German satirist Jan Böhmermann read a vulgar poem about Erdogan on the German TV channel ZDF (*Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen*)[21] on March 31, 2016, two weeks after the "*Erdowie, Erdowo, Erdowahn*" crisis. In this clip, Böhmermann declares that what he does in this video, "abusive criticism," is against the law. Böhmermann reads a poem entitled "*Schmähkritik"* (a legal term for "abusive criticism" punishable by law in Germany) addressing Erdogan personally in front of an Erdogan portrait and an animated Turkish flag. Oriental tones humorously serve as background audio at times as Böhmermann reads the poem. The program is in German except for the poem, which is translated into Turkish via subtitles. The poem includes vulgar slurs against Erdogan and criticisms of his policies.

Erdogan quickly reacted against Böhmermann's intentional provocation and asked German authorities to prosecute the satirist. German Chancellor Merkel apologized to Erdogan and agreed that the poem was intentionally offensive and allowed the case to be investigated under a long-forgotten law, which prohibits insulting foreign leaders. Following enormous backlash from the German media, Merkel stated that it was a mistake to apologize on behalf of Böhmermann and to not have stood with him since the beginning. Legal investigations on the issue were eventually dropped; Böhmermann was not prosecuted. In July 2017, the German *Bundesrat* (Federal Council) decided unanimously to abolish the ancient paragraph criminalizing insults against foreign leaders.

At the height of these debates in April 2016, two German friends of mine excitedly showed me a YouTube clip from a Turkish TV broadcast about these debates. My friends wanted me to confirm that the German subtitles were true to the Turkish script. They were

[21] The clip can be accessed here: https://vimeo.com/162455052. Last retrieved on December 30, 2017.

very curious to find out whether this widely shared video[22] was a joke or not. The clip is taken from a news program aired on the Turkish TV channel A-Haber. The news program aims to show that Germany does not have true free speech even though Germans accuse Turkey of the very same problem. The program supposedly demonstrates that these accusations against Turkey are not fair and that they reflect ZDF's animosity against Turks.

To prove these claims, a Turkish-speaking journalist reports from "in front of ZDF's headquarters." He states that ZDF does not want him to broadcast from there but he will nevertheless continue reporting "because," he sarcastically declares, "there is press freedom." Later, the journalist walks to two men standing in front of the building who seem to be talking amongst themselves. The two men seem to not take notice of the Turkish journalist and instead continue to converse. The Turkish reporter does not engage the two men either but talks about them to the camera while standing next to them. The journalist suggests that they are executives of ZDF and that their body language shows their inhospitality, impoliteness and irritation.

Later in the clip, the reporter interviews an elderly Turkish man, possibly in the city of Mainz where ZDF is based, near Germany's finance center, Frankfurt. The Turkish interviewee claims that Turkish success and prosperity bother ZDF and therefore ZDF depicts Turkey in a bad light. He states that this misrepresentation is nothing new and ZDF has always been against Turks. The interviewee exemplifies this ongoing attitude through the example of a TV program aired on ZDF where a Turkish woman was depicted as a prostitute. "Why does ZDF do this?" asks the journalist. The elderly man answers: "Because they do not want Turkey. They do not want the third bridge, the third airport at all because they think about Frankfurt [Airport].[23] They do this—always—knowingly." The reporter follows up by

[22] The clip can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rFSZ95nKzko. Last retrieved on December 30, 2017.

[23] Frankfurt Airport is Germany's busiest airport and a major European hub. It also serves as the headquarters of Germany's largest air travel company, Lufthansa. The interviewee

paraphrasing and reinterpreting the elderly man's statement: "So, is ZDF bothered by Turkey's development, growth rate and the investments [in Turkey]?" The interviewee continues: "Of course. It always bothers [them] because Germany's Berlin Airport can in no way be finished and it won't be. A tender was made three [or] four times. It still has not been finished; it won't be finished."[24] The journalist follows up: "This is why they target [Turkey's] government and Erdogan?" Answers the Turkish man: "They target Erdogan. They absolutely do not want Erdogan to prosper. They do not want Turkey to prosper." To the amusement of my two friends, I told them that the subtitles were indeed accurate and this clip was part of a program shown on Turkish TV. They found the claim that Germans were jealous of Turkey and that this jealousy was the source of criticisms against Turkey to be entertaining.

The interviewee's claims about European animosity and jealousy towards Turkey (which my friends did not get) are common among Turks—usually articulated as "foreign forces" (including not only Europe but also the USA) suppressing Turkish development. For many, even those who might not have voted for Erdogan, statements against him target Turkey and the Turkish nation as a transnational whole, and therefore, deductively, the Turkish people in Germany and themselves personally. The two airports the Turkish

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suggests that the soon to be finished third airport in Istanbul will be a major threat to Lufthansa and Frankfurt Airport. Istanbul's third airport is planned to open in 2018 as the world's largest airport.

The third bridge the interviewee mentions is the third bridge built on Istanbul's Bosphorus Strait. In addition to the airport, this bridge is also a source of materialistic fascination among Turks in Germany—a showcase of Turkey's economic development of which Germans are ostensibly jealous. For instance, a little while before my Nanpej co-worker Ayse visited Turkey with her family in the summer of 2016, her little son told me that he was excited to go to Istanbul because he would get to see the third bridge.

[24] The airport mentioned is the not-yet-opened Berlin-Brandenburg Willy Brandt Airport. The story of this airport exemplifies Berlin's stereotyped disorderliness opposing German stereotypes of orderliness and punctuality. The airport was initially planned to open in 2011. The opening of this airport has already been postponed multiple times since 2012 due to a series of problems including a poorly prepared budget, failure to comply with fire protection requirements and alleged corruption. The most updated prediction is that the airport will open in 2020, which will mean another almost one billion Euros in costs (Bild am Sonntag as cited in Martin 2018).

interviewee mentions exemplify for Turks (both in Turkey and in Germany) Europeans' uneasiness with Turkey as a growing power. As the narrative goes, Turkey's growing prosperity makes Europeans uncomfortable because they no longer can treat Turks as their inferiors. In this sense, Turks experience and understand their difference in Europe not only as "Muslims in Europe" but as members of a transnational community rooted in a nation-state constantly targeted by their "host societies."

This conflation of Erdogan with Turks as a nation is reflected in how some *späti* owners talk about their German customers—especially after the failed coup attempt in Turkey. The way Vahit, a bakery-*späti* owner, understands his relationship with his customers exemplifies this conflation. Vahit was previously an *ülkücü* (an ultranationalist pan-Turkish ideology rooted in Turkish-Islamist synthesis) and is now a heated Erdogan supporter. Vahit's customers' negative remarks about Turkey's president frustrate him deeply as he perceives these remarks as undermining their friendship. Vahit defines himself through his Turkishness and deeply longs for Turkey. He was born in the late 1960s in a central-Anatolian city. His parents moved to Berlin when he was a child. Thus, he traveled frequently between Germany and Turkey as a teenager. He was in his 20s when he first settled in Berlin. He has managed small businesses since then. His last shop was a newsstand, which he closed when his revenues dropped. He relates the decrease in his newspaper sales to people's switching to electronic sources.

In our interview, Vahit told me that he was content with managing his current bakery-*späti.* As he stated, he has fulfilled all his humble childhood dreams. He is married and has the sweetest outspoken daughter. When she is around, Vahit's smoky and authoritative voice shifts to a silvery affectionate one. In addition to his desire to have a family, all Vahit wished for as a child was a job, a car and an apartment. In Vahit's eyes, he has everything now. [25] His

[25] Vahit does not own but rather rents his apartment. He nevertheless considers himself as "having an apartment" as many others in this "renters' city" do.

only sorrow comes from living in Germany and being away from his homeland. Like many other Turks with whom I spoke, Vahit declared that he would return to Turkey instantly if he could. Like others who want to "go back," however, he asked me with a genuinely questioning voice, "but what would I do there?" As he declared, his savings in Germany would not let him build a life in Turkey where everything increasingly costs "an arm and a leg." He tells me that he cannot go back for good also because his wife (who was born in Turkey but came to Berlin at a very young age) suggests that Turkey is too hot for her and that it is impossible for her to live there. Vahit changes the subject to his discontent of living in Germany as we start talking about Germany's mostly unpleasant climate. Using climatic vocabulary, he emotionally and lyrically declares his dysphoria:

> Ice-cold! Ice-cold! Its [Germany's] people are cold. Thoughts are cold. Ideas are cold. […] I want to escape. I get distressed. I feel suffocated. Thoughts are cold. Brains are cold. Ideas are cold.

This statement shows Vahit's disappointment in his relationships with Germans. Vahit's indignation emerges out of quotidian reflections of international politics at his shop. Vahit's understanding of his situation in Germany and of his relations with his German customers are derivatives of Turkey's internal politics and how they get received by German politics and media (as was the case for many Turks during the Böhmermann debate). As this case shows, at a Berlin *späti* counter, Turkey's "internal" politics are far from being interior to a country at the fringes of Europe. They make, shake and break relations at the heart of the continent.

After declaring his honesty in expressing his feelings about people and his discontent of living in Germany, Vahit propounds the idea that his customers are not similarly consistent in how they think, act and speak. For Vahit, this inconsistency surfaces in his customers' attitudes about foreigners and Turkish politics. Vahit explains his perspective through two examples that seem to be distinct from each other: those of a "Neo-Nazi" client and his other

customers who are in the political mainstream. Vahit firstly describes the seemingly extreme example:

> Do you see that flag over there, the one that is like an *Adler* (eagle)? Look over there. Look at the window over there. There is an eagle picture. Do you know what it is? Nazi. The guy is truly a Nazi. He doesn't like *Ausländers* [foreigners in German, referring for example to Turks] but he comes here to sit and drink coffee. [Vahit laughs] Even in his car, he has an *Adler* picture. There is the old Hitler eagle. He really hangs it. He says, "This is who I am." Then, he comes and gets in-store credits. He chats with me too.

For Vahit, the main problem with his "Nazi" customer is not that he dislikes foreigners. The more important issue is that the customer's behavior is inconsistent with his ideology. As Vahit states, this client spends time in Vahit's shop although he hates foreigners. Vahit finds this discrepancy dishonest.

Vahit explains that he detects similar inconsistencies in many of his other customers—even among the liberal ones—who frequent his shop but speak ill of Erdogan. Their political expressions are far from those of the "Nazi" customer, but, according to Vahit, their inconsistency is similar to this right-wing extremist's. The problem for Vahit is that his customers' friendly demeanors are limited to quotidian issues. When it comes to Turkish politics, Vahit argues, these customers sacrifice their friendship. Vahit compares their critical comments about his beloved country and its current regime—a regime he perceives as advancing the Turkish nation—to the hypocrisy of "a person who does not want his friends to be better off." For Vahit, his customers' envy of Turkey's economic prosperity surfaces in their daily discussions about current politics. Vahit states:

> Especially now, he [Erdogan] will construct the world's biggest airport [Istanbul's third airport]. Therefore, Germans don't like [him]. Germans' economy will be ruined. Their Lufthansa's, etc.; all of them will go bankrupt. […] There are people who want

> their friends to prosper, and then there are people who do not want their friends to prosper. You see, these [Germans] are this kind of people. Do you understand? They do not want you to prosper. They want you always to be inferior. They want you to be lesser. Therefore, they do not like you at all.

Vahit experiences and articulates his identification with his nation and, as he puts it, "his governor" Erdogan affectively. His German customers' negative statements towards Erdogan escalate his attachment to Turkey and its president. Furthermore, unpleasant interactions with anti-Erdogan German customers add to the unhappiness he experiences living in Germany. Vahit explains:

> He [Erdogan] supports us very well. I mean, here [in Germany]. I swear, I remembered that I was Turkish only after 15 July [the attempted coup date]. Before that, was I Turkish? I didn't even know. I swear, now, my Turkishness has arisen again. I am proud of my Turkishness. Do you understand? Of being Turkish, I mean; there wasn't such an issue before. We were Turkish but we were like dead. The Americans came; they beat our brains; we kept quiet. The English came; they hit us; we kept quiet. Others came [and the same thing happened]. But now, there is no such thing. There is no silence. There are answers. There is speaking.

Vahit's strong fondness for Erdogan stems from his attachment to and identification with Turkey, which he sees as suppressed by international forces until the presidency of Erdogan. His identity completely overlaps with the body of the nation symbolized in the president. Thus, when he feels that his nation is no longer subservient, he feels relieved of this inferiority, he feels competent. When Germans criticize the man who, for Vahit, is the reason for this competency, he takes it as an attack on himself personally.

Vahit's perspective on Turks who speak out against Erdogan further shows how closely and affectively related Turkey's international politics are to his identity as a Turk in Germany:

> There are those [among Turks] who do not like Erdogan. But, brother, even if you don't like him, you should not show it on the outside. On the outside, you should show that you are a unity. Turks here discredit Erdogan too. They discredit him. Then, a German will of course discredit him. If you discredit your own citizen, your own president, [they will do the same]. […] They [his customers] probably think that I am one of them [Turks who criticize Erdogan]. When they come to me and tell me [negative things about Erdogan], I say: "I am for Erdogan."

Vahit's remarks remind me of a Turkish saying: *"kol kırılır yen içinde kalır,"* (literally "the arm that breaks stays within the sleeve"). The saying advises that unpleasant things that happen within a family, group or society should stay within the group. For Vahit, the Turkish nation is like the sleeve. According to Vahit, people should not make their criticisms known to outsiders. For Vahit, making these criticisms explicit gives these foreigners like Germans leverage as they look for ways to further oppress Turks.

Although many Turks, as Vahit also observes, criticize Erdogan, Vahit's story is not an isolated case. I heard similar statements from many Turks for whom daily discrimination, alienating local politics and the rising far-right were not even the main political issue affecting their daily lives. Such issues are quotidian, expected, almost habitual—not surprising at all. The new issue is rather their customers' and Germany's attacks on Turkey and its government. Thus, many Turks took Germans' criticisms quite personally—especially when coming from those they perceived as "their friends." The 15 July 2016 coup attempt and Germans' reactions against it, especially the claim that it was a staged coup, heightened this identification with Erdogan and subsequent tensions between Turks and Germans.

A Turkish business owner who joined my interview with an acquaintance of his, a mobile chicken vendor in Munich, further illustrated these tensions. He stated that his German friends made envious conspiracies about Erdogan, Turkey and the coup attempt. Their claims about the coup being a fake one undermined the very foundations of their friendships. For

him—just like for Vahit and many others—this was not what "real friends" would do. He ecstatically told the chicken vendor and me his dream where he killed Fethullah Gulen, the Islamic preacher living in Pennsylvania in the USA who was allegedly behind the coup attempt. This Turkish business owner's vivid dream—which he retold to us almost as epically as nationalist resurrection tales—disproved, for him, Germans' claims that the coup attempt was a fake one.

For many Turks in Germany, Erdogan is a masculine figure taking revenge on those who perceived the Turkish people as inferior for decades. For them, Erdogan disrupts the hierarchical relations central to their daily lives such as those of German citizen/Turkish migrant, German boss/Turkish worker and Turkish owner/German customer. The fact that he does so in Islamic tones is a plus for those who lead conservative lives, proving that their religion does not automatically make them inferior to others. As these examples show, the difference between Turks and Germans/Europeans emerges within the context of international politics and its effect on workers and owners' daily interactions with their customers.

Spatializing Differences

Turkish migrants' difference from Germans is frequently understood and produced spatially in Berlin. To illustrate, my second apartment in Berlin was in the northern part of Neukölln, a borough previously "known as a problem area, particularly in connection with failed immigrant integration" (Hinze 2013, 116). The district is still frequently referred to as a "migrant neighborhood" either with an exoticism or a disdain. In his study of East Berlin's "young right-extremists," anthropologist Nitzan Shoshan (2008), for example, finds that his informants understand and experience Berlin as a collection of sensual "landscapes" where they associate "migrant neighborhoods" like Neukölln with unbearable looks, smells and languages. One of Shoshan's informants, for example, states that she would never live in Neukölln because of the intolerable smell of the neighborhood (Shoshan 2008, 381).

Although the overtly racist language of right-wing extremism is frequently avoided in German mainstream debates, the neighborhood of North Neukölln has symbolized, until very recently, the unassimilability of Muslim immigrants. The neighborhood became central to nationwide integration debates when the teachers of Rütli-Schule, a secondary school in the neighborhood, wrote a letter to the Berlin Senate in 2006. The letter declared that the teachers could no longer teach at this school because of their "violent" students, most of whom were of Turkish and Arabic descent (Die Zeit 2006 as cited in Hinze 2013, 129). The media showed videos of "foreign students" at the school fighting, throwing stones, showing off with knives and assaulting journalists. Later, Brigitte Pick, a former principle of the school, gave an interview to the leftist newspaper TAZ (*Die Tageszeitung*) declaring that the media misrepresented and exaggerated the behavior of the students (Plarre 2006). Pick stated that journalists not only encouraged but also paid the children to act violently in front of the cameras (Plarre 2006). The school and Neukölln, nevertheless, continued to represent "the failed integration of immigrants" and "the formation of parallel societies" in Germany (Hinze 2013, 130).

After the nationally famous letter was sent to the Berlin Senate and these violent images widely circulated in the media, Rütli-Schule was reorganized as part of a larger school system and is now widely regarded as a successful integration project. Neukölln has also been gentrified since then; cosmopolitan cafes, restaurants and art spaces mushroom around the neighborhood (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of gentrification in Berlin). Nevertheless, Neukölln's persistent migrant populations, namely Turks and Arabs, are still seen as violent peoples turning their borough into spine-chilling spots.

For example, "4 Blocks," an ongoing TV series on Berlin's drug scene, is set in Neukölln and is frequently praised for being "authentic." Germany's international public broadcaster Deutsche Welle, for example, presents the series as "inspired by real events" and suggests that the series "takes place in an area known for foreign gangs, drugs and multiple

offenders who belong to several large criminal families" (Deutsche Welle 2017b). Berlin's local newspaper *Berliner Zeitung* also praises the series "for its 'realistic' portrayal of the Neukölln scene" (as cited in Deutsche Welle 2017b). The series narrates the story of a Lebanese ex-gang member whose dreams of becoming a good German-Lebanese father and husband fail when he is sucked up once again into the workings of his violent Lebanese gang clan.

Such violent depictions of immigrant neighborhoods are not confined to half-fictional media representations. Even a former Neukölln mayor, Heinz Buschkowsky, described his neighborhood as a trouble territory in his 2012 bestseller *Neukölln is Everywhere (Neukölln ist Überall).* The book gives Neukölln as an example of the lack of Muslim migrant integration which is ostensibly "everywhere" in Germany, hence the name of the book. Buschkowsky's book reflects his policies as a mayor between 2001 and 2015. As political scientist Annika Marlen Hinze states, Buschkowsky was praised nationwide as a successful policy maker; his integration program inspired other local administrators (Hinze 2013, 130–31). His policy framework, however, reproduced the idea that Muslims in his neighborhood were resistant to German values and were essentially different from the rest of German society (Hinze 2013, 131). For example, the first item in his "ten-point integration agenda" suggests that immigrants need to adopt Germany's "free democratic basic order" (Hinze 2013, 171). This item shows that Buschkowsky assumes that Neukölln's immigrants are not naturally inclined to abide by Germany's "free democratic basic order," hence the need to reiterate these words directly taken from the German Constitution (Hinze 2013, 185).

The fact that conceptions of difference, non-belonging and lack of integration are mapped spatially in Berlin first became evident to me on a plane from Istanbul to Berlin in 2015. During the flight, a young Turkish grandmother sitting next to me asked where I was from, a usual conversation-starter on planes from Turkey to Germany. After that, she inquired about where I lived in Berlin. My answer, "Neukölln" spread incredulity and terror in her

eyes. After I managed to ease her disbelief, she advised me, supposedly a "naïve" girl from the mainland: "Be careful. *We* would never go there."

Even though this conversation took place after Neukölln had already become a hipster magnet, the hazardous image of this immigrant neighborhood resonated in this immigrant woman's spatial imaginary. She proudly stated that she lived in the affluent district of Charlottenburg on Berlin's Western side. Her residence among upper-middle class Germans drew the boundaries of "we"—those who "would never go to Neukölln"— through class divisions mapped onto spatial ones. She distanced herself from her co-nationals living in "troubled Turkish neighborhoods" like Neukölln. This "we" brought her closer to state actors like Buschkowsky who denounce Muslim migrant neighborhoods (even those that they themselves govern) by culturalizing them as Islamic hubs of violent crimes. As my neighbor on the plane made it clear, she was definitely not one of *those* Turks.

Consuming Differences

Although mainstream media and mayors might concentrate on criminality in Neukölln, the district is also a mecca for "cosmopolitan" consumption. On a Sunday early afternoon, cafes and restaurants in Neukölln with names gravitating towards foreign languages swarm with clients. Indian, Peruvian, Turkish, Italian, Japanese and Vietnamese restaurants are within walking distance of each other. Customers enjoy the "diversity" brought by Neukölln's business scene where breakfasts from different continents intermingle. After brunch, some groups head to nearby parks or canals while others visit nearby art galleries. With this rich consumption palate, the same Neukölln where even some Turks declare they are afraid to go establishes Berlin as a culinary heaven.

Businesses that present themselves as cosmopolitan proliferate across Berlin. This change in the business landscape is no surprise because state institutions promote the city not only to Germans but also to foreign tourists and expats as a worldly capital (Colomb 2012). In

Neukölln, this branding goes hand in hand with the borough's "symbolic gentrification" (Holm 2013, 181) as urban blogs, tourist guides and other media increasingly construct the former "trouble" district as a hipster heaven. For example, an article entitled "Let's Move to Kreuzkölln" in the property section of the British newspaper *The Guardian* encourages readers to buy properties in this area at the crossroads of Neukölln and Kreuzberg (hence the unofficial name of the neighborhood Kreuzkölln). The author describes the neighborhood as the "epicentre of cool" with its "'just-gritty enough' apartment blocks, the canal for Sunday walks, streets filled with intimidatingly laid-back, artfully scruffy cafes and bars, and hordes of hipsters" (Dyckhoff 2011). Kreuzkölln's bedraggled aesthetics make it attractive to investors who seek bohemian spaces.

While many Turks are evicted and spatially excluded from Kreuzkölln (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of displacements in Berlin), ironically, Turkish marketplaces, restaurants, shops and *späti*s find a place here as consumable forms of cosmopolitanism. For example, Berlin's popular "Turkish market" is held here. Even though there are numerous markets held in Berlin's "Turkish districts," this one on the street of Maybachufer (Maybach Riverbank) is advertised as *the* "Turkish market" in tourist guides and urban blogs. On Tuesdays and Fridays, customers shop here for vintage leather bags, headscarves, belly dance costumes as well as fresh produce and Turkish coffeepots. Besides this product variety, the market's audial and visual atmospheres also attract people who want to experience "Berliner diversity," "laid-backness" and "friskiness" performed and materialized by stallholders in a "Turkish market."

The joyful scenes do not disappoint. Turkish speaking stallholders playfully exchange jokes with their co-workers on the other side of the crowd. Then, they turn their attention to shoppers, attracting them to their stalls with melodic exclamations such as "*Angebot! Angebot!*" (Bargain! Bargain!) and "*Ein Euro! Ein Euro!*" (One Euro! One Euro!). Tourists take photographs of the neatly arranged spices, dried fruits and unexpected co-existence of

openly exhibited bras and prayer rugs. After shopping, visitors grab freshly made *gözleme* and sit down on the deck right next to the bazaar entrance to listen to street musicians perform.

Berlin's official travel website visitBerlin.de advertises the Turkish market as possessing "multicultural diversity" and "giv[ing] the impression of a genuine oriental bazaar" (visitBerlin.de n.d.). Although Turkish nationality and ethnicity are indeed commodified in these bazaars (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 2009), Turkish identities and spaces are not merely co-opted into an already existing political-economic system of neoliberal cosmopolitanism. The performances and consumptions of Turkishness in these spaces actively produce Berliner and European "cosmopolitanism" not only as a sociopolitical reality but also as an economic one.

Figure 7: A stall at Berlin's Maybachufer "Turkish market" where a prayer rug, beaded belly dance belts and keffiyehs (associated with "Kurdishness" and "Palestinianness" in Turkey) are exhibited.

Figure 8: Stalls where underwear, bras and punctured leggings are exhibited at Berlin's Maybachufer "Turkish market."

"Consuming Diversity" as a Political Act?

A self-defined multicultural carnival further exemplifies not only the production and consumption of difference in the contemporary political context of Berlin but also the meanings these processes generate. Berlin's "Carnival of Cultures" (*Karneval der Kulturen*) held annually around the Christian holiday Pentecost claims to help sustain Berliner "diversity" against the rising far right. The carnival parade starts from Hermannplatz in Neukölln and ends in Kreuzberg, Berlin's two "*multikulti*" neighborhoods. On the event website, organizers suggest that the event grew out of the realities of Berlin, first of which was "the growing internationality of the city" in the 1990s (Karneval der Kulturen n.d.). The event website states that the carnival is "a four-day urban festival that reflects Berlin's many

faces." In other words, the carnival "celebrates diversity"—the diversity *of* Berlin (Karneval der Kulturen n.d.). Any careful observer would be skeptical of this claim, however. To illustrate, samba is the most heard genre during the carnival even though Brazilians are only a small minority among Berlin's migrants, most of whom are Turkish, East European and from the former Soviet Union (Knecht 2005, 14). The carnival does involve these minorities but caters to consumer desires. The consumers of the carnival include Germans from Berlin and other parts of Germany, international tourists who come specifically for this event as well as migrants and expats. My co-workers in Nanpej, for example, talked about the carnival with excitement. Sevgi, for instance, was especially fascinated with Samba dancers and their colorful costumes. Some of my expat and German friends participated in the event specifically to try the food from different parts of the world while some avoided it claiming it was "too touristy."

Despite the imbalance between Berlin's actual population and its representation, carnival organizers present celebrating Berlin's "diversity" in their event as a necessary political act. According to the event website, the second Berliner reality out of which the carnival grew was "the nationalism and racism that grew in the 90s in Germany" (Karneval der Kulturen n.d.). That is to say, carnival organizers present performances and celebrations of Berlin's diversity as antidotes against the increasing animosity against minorities, migrants and refugees at the time. In the 1990s, several deadly arson attacks were carried out against immigrants and refugees in addition to various other kinds of persecutions. Such attacks especially against refugee hostels revived following the arrival of Syrian refugees in 2015. Today, this "nationalism and racism" which, for the carnival organizers, is threatening the *multikulti* aura of the city is even more pronounced: AFD, an extreme right-wing party, entered the Berlin House of Representatives as well as the German Parliament in 2016, for the first time since the Second World War.

When the carnival's financing was not cleared in 2015, carnival organizers used the perceived threat the rising far right posed to Berlin's cosmopolitan spirit to keep the carnival going. Berliners started a petition and urged politicians to "save the carnival" (Ottmüller 2015). Over forty thousand people signed this online petition which claims that the carnival is essential to sustaining Berlin's diversity. On their change.org webpage, petition organizers visualized this claim with a colorful festival photograph with the words written on it "diversity instead of intolerance" (*Vielfalt statt Intoleranz*). The petition explains the political importance of the carnival in "diverse languages:" German, English, Spanish and French (curiously not in Turkish, Arabic or Russian):

> At the moment the carnival of cultures is more important than ever. The most vital event for a multicultural society shouldn't be in danger while ten[s of] thousands of people with right wing tendencies are demonstrating all over Germany. We call upon all politicians to stand up for the carnival of cultures and to ensure yet again this month that the unique festival of diversity will take place also in 2015 (Ottmüller 2015).

The petition, which framed the carnival as a necessary and timely political event, was successful. The Berlin Senate continued to cover the unexpected costs of the festival. The event has been uninterrupted since then.

Carnival of Cultures exemplifies the production of Berliner cosmopolitanism at the intersection of economy and politics. Anthropologist Levent Soysal reads the carnival as "a spectacle of identity" (Soysal, 1993 as cited in Soysal 2005, 272) through which Berlin becomes a stage where various "identity groups" "perform their 'cultural specificities' within an 'imagination of diversity'" (Soysal 2005, 272). These performances produce and commodify this imagined and selective diversity. Festival organizers present these performances and the "celebration of diversity" as political statements against German nationalism.

***

In this chapter, I have discussed how various kinds of differences between Turks and Germans as well as amongst Turks are produced, reproduced and transformed. I also discussed how meanings and consequences of these processes emerge within local, national and transnational contexts. Examples of European-Turkish Islams show how differences are produced in Europe and are contested among Muslims themselves. On the other hand, Turks' reactions against German criticisms of Erdogan demonstrate that understandings of relationality can be altered by increasing tensions in international relations. The example of Neukölln demonstrates how political authorities and the media stigmatize and criminalize "migrant spaces." Ironically, the increasing "hipness" of this same neighborhood exemplifies how the same neighborhood is simultaneously celebrated and consumed while also marked as a potential site of threat and terrorism. Finally, the example of the carnival demonstrates that differences are not only produced, reproduced and consumed but are also presented as part of political claims.

Ch. 4 – Turkish Migrants and Berlin's Urban Struggles

In Berlin, issues of migration, urban transformation, temporal arrangements of daily life and conflicting efforts to claim ownership to the city are intertwined. In this chapter, I turn to examples revealing the intersection of these four key themes in order to understand the novel roles Turks and their *spätis* take up in efforts to conserve and transform the German capital. Questions central to this contention include: Who can live in Berlin and in which parts of the city, what can people do in Berlin at different times and, finally, what do the answers to these questions mean for Berlin's identity? The aim of this chapter is not to answer these questions per se but to show firstly the pronounced struggle centered around such questions to determine "the conditions of Berlin" and, secondly, to demonstrate the miscellaneous and seemingly contradictory positions migrants and their shops take up under these contentions and how these positions enhance migrants' symbolic value for Berlin. These novel roles and their impact on how Turks are perceived show that Turks form their identities as they cultivate claims of economic, social and symbolic significance to their localities.

Berlin, like many metropoles, markets itself as a "cosmopolitan" city. People from various countries settle here and enhance this marketed identity by diversifying Berlin's human landscape. This colorful image in turn encourages further immigration to this metropolis. As a result of this positive feedback loop, the German capital consolidates its place as a city preferred by expatriates. However, this self-reinforcing cycle and these happy expat stories are not praised by every Berliner. This is because the city's rapidly increasing international population combined with the low housing supply has triggered widespread rent increases. Inflated costs of living displace residents especially in central boroughs including those where migrants live overwhelmingly. As houses gain value (particularly in "Turkish neighborhoods"), many more migrants are being displaced. At the same time, ironically, migrant *späti* owners and workers embrace Berlin's international population as valuable customers. When officials try to limit the operating hours of *spätis*, owners respond by

defining *späti*s as "tourist shops" that should be open week-round. As Berlin's inner-city population changes (sometimes coercively through forced evictions), debates about "to whom Berlin belongs"[26] and how Berlin should be experienced escalate. As this chapter shows, Turkish migrants are central to these processes not only as evicted renters (and thus, "victims of gentrification") but also as celebrated figures of diversity as well as businesspeople who serve Berlin's new international population.

In this chapter, firstly, I examine efforts to determine the temporal conditions of Berlin. I analyze Code Enforcement Offices' pressures on *spätis* to close on Sundays and the reactions against this regulation as part of the struggle to define what Berlin stands for and how it should be experienced. I show that a prominent strategy *späti* owners used to counter Code Enforcement Offices was to define themselves as "tourist shops" despite the growing animosity against tourists. The support among Berliners and politicians for *spätis* further show that these migrant-run shops are key to the struggle to define Berlin's "real owners." *Spätis* gain even more symbolic value within this process where migrants and their shops provide symbolic resources for political rivals. After examining the political struggles centered around this temporal dimension of life in Berlin, I exemplify Berlin's changing socio-spatial organization. I survey the trend of rising rents and displacements in Berlin and the backlash against this development. Berlin's increasing tourist and international population has been regarded as worsening the already severe housing problem. This position, however, did not find resonance among *späti* owners although they mostly live and work in neighborhoods where rent has increased. Owners rather regard Berlin's changing population as a positive development bringing them revenue.

[26] "To whom does the city belong?" (*Wem gehört die Stadt*?) is a motto frequently used in demonstrations against rising rents and forced evictions in Berlin and other German cities.

The Curious Case of Sunday Bans

In 2015, Code Enforcement Offices in certain Berlin neighborhoods—especially in northern parts of Neukölln known for both sizable migrant populations and rent increases—started to enforce a previously ignored law that forbade *spätis* from opening on Sundays. This law entitled "Berlin Shop Opening Law" (*Berliner Ladenöffnungsgesetz*) regulates businesses' operating hours. As the law states, "sale points are allowed to be open from 0:00 to 24:00 on workdays." However, there are restrictions for Sundays and federal holidays: "sales points must be closed unless otherwise is stated in the paragraphs 4 to 6" (Berlin.de 2006). This code means that shops can be open from Monday to Saturday around the clock (although most grocery stores and other businesses close around 8–10 pm in the evening on these six business days), but they are generally not allowed to open on Sundays and holidays.

Some exceptions are noted in the fourth paragraph of the law: "sale points whose offerings consist solely of one or more of the [following] product groups: flowers and plants, newspapers and magazines, pastries and confectioneries, [and] milk and milk products" can be open on Sundays "from 7:00 to 16:00" (Berlin.de 2006). The exception enables some shops like bakeries, flower shops and newspaper stands to be open but they need to restrict their sales to these products. Another exception is given to "tourist shops:" "sale points that offer [products] for tourists' needs, exclusively, souvenirs, street maps, city maps, guidebooks, tobacco products, consumables for film and photographic purposes, commodities for immediate consumption as well as groceries and luxury products [drinks and tobacco] for immediate consumption" can be open from 13:00 to 20:00 on Sundays and holidays (Berlin.de 2006).

Until very recently, officials had not enforced this law for *spätis*. In fact, the *späti* business model relies on having the liberty to be open around the clock, week and year-round. Shop owners flexibly determine their own operating hours depending on hourly workflows (See Chapter 6 for a discussion of synchronizing with customer flows). Many owners I talked

to stated that they were not even aware of this law. Many were shocked at Code Enforcement Offices' sudden decision to enforce it.

Haldun is one of those shop owners fined for being open on a Sunday. His fine surprised me because his shop combines the business models of a bakery and a *späti,* and bakeries generally open on Sundays. Haldun commented that they opened the shop from 7 in the morning to 4 in the afternoon, just like bakeries did; however, after 4 o'clock, officers enforced the law.

Haldun retold the very first day they were penalized for opening their shop on a Sunday:

> I was playing football [soccer] when my wife called me. It was around 5 in the evening. She said, "the police came." I said, "why did they come?" "We need to close [the shop]" [as the police officers told my wife]. I said, "where did this come from? I don't know anything about that. I'm coming to check this out." Apparently, my wife was selling something [when the police came], so they wrote us a ticket for that as well [in addition to the ticket for opening the shop on a Sunday]. The police were, of course, gone when I came […] We researched [the issue]. The law was always there. We have been doing this for 16 years. Since the year 2000, we have been doing this. As I said, until two years ago, there was nothing like that.

Most other *späti* owners I talked to likewise stated that they were taken by surprise when officers appeared at their door to fine them. Many also stated that the practice was quite arbitrary. Haldun, for example, commented that *spätis* in other boroughs were not controlled as strictly as the shops in his neighborhood. As many *späti* owners reported, officers also discriminated between *spätis* in the same neighborhood. For example, if neighbors complained about noise in a *späti*, the shop was put on law enforcement's radar; officers then extended their monitoring of the offending *späti* to opening-hours surveillance as well.

Späti owners told peculiar yet common stories about officers bothering them. Although it is hard to pinpoint the exact reasons why Code Enforcement Offices started to enforce this law (and this is not my focus here), I encountered various scenarios. Many *späti* owners and workers told me that gas station managers had pressured state institutions to enforce the law because nobody bothered to get a beer or pack of cigarettes from these stores when they could do so for much cheaper at *spätis* right on the corner. Some stated that this was purely racism as most *späti* workers and owners were migrants from Turkey. Along those lines, some also argued that closing alcohol-selling shops on Sundays was a "Christian thing" to do—a statement that this was indeed not a country for Muslims. There were also rumors that a police chief had relocated from Munich to Berlin and decided to enforce this quite "Bavarian law." While I was skeptical at first that a single person could have started all this fuss, I did look up a video of this chief police commissioner after a *späti* owner told me about him. The video is from a meeting of politicians and *späti* owners discussing the problem and possible solutions. The police officer who "is responsible for all of this" (as the Berlin House of Representatives member Anja Kofbinger from the Green Party puts it jokingly in the video) is also present in the meeting. The officer states that he "only looks after compliance with laws and does not do politics" (Kamau 2016). Whatever the reasons for the sudden legal enforcement were, its implementation triggered backlash.

Spätis **as "Tourist Shops"**

In response to the Sunday bans, *späti* owners established a professional society under the name *Berliner Späti e.V* (Berlin Späti Organization). The group started their operations when the Sunday bans intensified in 2015 and had their official opening after the local elections in September 2016. Members of the organization and other *späti* owners came up with a couple of possible solutions to the Sunday bans. One was giving *spätis* a special status

just like gas stations so that they could be open every day year-round. A second solution suggested that *spätis* should be recognized as "tourist stores."

As of fall 2016, the organization has succeeded in achieving the right to open *spätis* until 8 pm on Sundays even though they cannot sell goods that are not for immediate consumption such as pasta and toilet paper. According to *späti* owners, the fact that tourists frequent their neighborhoods and shops is obvious. Therefore, they find it only natural that their businesses be treated as shops for tourists. As the fight for the right to sell everything at every hour continues, members of Berlin Späti Organization situate themselves as indispensable to Berlin by claiming that they produce value for Berlin as "tourist shops."

Selim, for example, suggested that he served tourists frequently and therefore contributed to Berlin's economy. He compared his neighborhood to boroughs that were known to be tourist areas to make his point that his shop is indeed a "tourist shop":

> Most of our customers are German, Italian, Spanish, English. This street is a tourist area. Here, there are neither Turks nor Arabs. *They are not here*. All [of our customers] are foreigners, tourists. They say that Ku'damm[27] is a tourist area, Warschauer[28] is a tourist area. Then what is this place? There are more tourists here. […] A beer in Warschauer costs two Euros, here [it costs] 1.50. There is a difference.

By stating that his customers were not Turks or Arabs, Selim disputed the claim that businesses owned by migrants were inevitably *for* migrants. He insisted that his shop (like many others in his neighborhood) served Germans and international customers. His emphasis on the cheaper beer he offered (compared to Warschauer Street *spätis*) pointed to an emerging type of international *späti* customer: the newcomer on a tight budget who wants to experience

[27] Ku'damm is a short version of Kurfürstendamm, an upscale shopping boulevard. Various luxury boutiques, expensive cafes and theatres are located here. Wealthy foreigners as well as Germans come here to shop. Breitscheidplatz, where a truck drew into a crowded Christmas market killing and injuring many in 2016, is also adjacent to this avenue.

[28] Warschauer refers to a street (Warschauerstraße) and its surrounding area close to East Side Gallery (the Berlin Wall memorial with famous graffiti by artists around the world). The area is famous for its nightclubs.

the re-branded "hip" yet affordable Berlin. For Selim, these customers are in this sense different than those who visit and stay in expensive boroughs such as Berlin's Mitte. *Spätis* like Selim's appear as quintessential spaces embodying this chic identity that especially appeals to foreigners on a budget.

Many owners I talked to perceive their job of serving tourists as proof that they serve Berlin. They understand and present *spätis* as contributing to Berlin's economy and also to its image as an affordable, convenient European city. Hasan, for example, stated that tourists were some of his most valuable customers. According to Hasan, serving tourists when other shops are closed and delivering tourists goods and services that they cannot get elsewhere in Berlin benefits the German capital. For him, these contributions mark *spätis*' value for the city. Even though his *späti* is not in a conventionally "touristic" neighborhood such as the ones around Berlin's famous landmarks like Brandenburg Gate, he claimed that he still contributed to Berlin's tourism economy:

> Tourists come and get *stadtplans* (city maps). They buy stamps. They buy Berlin postcards. Let me explain, Berlin is not only Brandenburg Gate or Ku'Damm. […] When they [customers] ask us for an address, we explain it with great comfort. […] There is a world of difference between small business owners in Brandenburg Gate and us because the business owners [there] do not need customers. They just say, "go from here, go there." […] But because small business owners on the outside [of Berlin's touristic center] need customers—because the issue is our means of existence—we say, when a guy comes here, "he might talk about me differently elsewhere [put in a good word for me]." Because I serve him differently [in a positive way], this guy surely talks about Berlin in a good way. […] I think Berlin benefits from this.

My observations in other boroughs and conversations with other *späti* owners and workers in various parts of Berlin confirmed that tourists are a large part of the *späti* customer base

throughout Berlin. More important than this factual information is possibly owners' reactions to legal restrictions and namely their attempts to define their stores as "tourist shops serving Berlin." A major case in point was Berlin Späti Organization's attempts to define these stores as tourist shops so that they could be open on Sundays. Through this reaction, *späti* owners assert that they produce economic and symbolic value for Berlin and accordingly belong to the city. A query into Berliners' reactions to Sunday bans show that many agree with owners about these shops' significance for Berlin.

"Save the *Spätis*!"

After the Sunday bans were implemented in 2015, a German copywriter organized a petition to protect these shops. The petition, which was signed by more than 38,000 people, suggested that these shops needed to be saved because they were a microcosm of Berlin's "neighborhood culture." These were welcoming spaces where diverse people including "young and old, locals and travelers" met daily. If these shops were closed, Berlin would become "the new Munich," supposedly a boring, dull and conservative city. The petition text reads, somewhat poetically:

> ***Spätis* [are] in danger!**
>
> **Save Berlin's unique neighborhood culture!**
>
> On Sunday quickly to the *spätkauf* you trust?
>
> Actually the most normal thing on Earth.
>
> But politics are thwarting our plans again. […]
>
> **One asks himself: Where am I really? In Berlin or in Munich?** (Jurgeit 2015b, emphasis in original)

The petition accuses the Sunday bans of interrupting the supposedly natural way of life in Berlin—that is, a "neighborhood culture" enhanced with spontaneous interactions at the corner store. Berlin, ostensibly unlike Munich, is supposed to be "free" and temporally

unregulated. As the argument goes, the removal of these businesses would mean that Berlin would lose its character. Therefore, the petition argues, *spätis*, backbones of this temporal freedom, shall not be closed. In this way, petitioners place *spätis*' migrant owners and workers at the center of Berlin's identity and call for their protection.

Although Munich is a lively, vibrant city with a diverse population (unlike its portrayal in the petition suggests), there is some truth behind Berlin's juxtaposition with Munich regarding shop opening hours. Bavaria and its capital Munich follow the restrictive federal law as opposed to Berlin, which issued its own law in 2006. The federal law is ironically called the "Shop Closing Law" (*Ladenschlussgesetz*) as opposed to Berlin's "Shop Opening Law" *(Ladenöffnungsgesetz*).[29]

The federal law, first issued in 1956 and last modified in 2015, is quite restrictive. As it indicates, "sale points (stores of all kinds as well as miscellaneous sale stands) must be closed on Sundays and holidays and from Mondays to Saturdays until 6:00 and after 20:00 [from 8 pm till 6 am]." (Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, Familie und Integration n.d.). However, like Berlin's Shop Opening Law, the federal version enumerates various exceptions. For example, exceptional opening hours may be applicable if one serves in "certain industries" (such as gas stations and pharmacies) and sells primarily "certain goods" (such as confectionery, bakery and milk products) (Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, Familie und Integration n.d.). Although the law authorizes such exceptions to regular operating hours, ultimately it immensely restricts when people can conduct business. As one would expect, shops that are temporally similar to *spätis* are rare in Munich. Kiosks and small shops where newspapers, cigarettes and convenience goods are sold tend to be closed late hours and on Sundays.

[29] Before passing their own law, the Land of Berlin solicited changes in the federal law in 1999. Part of the proposition was to change the name of the law from "Shop Closing Law" to "Shop Opening Law" (Halsall 2001, 206).

This issue might seem petty to a foreigner but there is more to hours of operation than meets the eye. The underlying issue is, rather, allowable state control and how it impacts daily lives and identities in Germany and in Berlin. The Berlin petition against Sunday bans criticizes state involvement in regulating what can be purchased when. The manifesto gives examples of previous resistance efforts that successfully disrupted Berlin authorities' bothering attempts to intervene in the social life of Berlin. The petition celebrates Tempelhof Field's remaining a public park[30] and the continuing of Carnival of Cultures[31] as examples of such public support against politicians' and bureaucrats' attempts to regulate life in Berlin. These examples show that *spätis* not only should but also *could* be "saved" (Jurgeit 2015b).

The text continues to argue that Berliners should actualize this possibility and protect *spätis* to conserve the city's identity. Saving Berlin's identity is ostensibly only possible if the public supports these shops against the political "nonsense" of opening hour regulations: "*Spätis* have contributed immensely to neighborhood culture throughout the past decades. If we can show politics that Berliners and all friends of Berlin are united behind *späti* culture, we can give this project the public momentum that it so desperately needs. **Berlin stays Berlin!**[32]" (Jurgeit 2015b, emphasis in original)**.**

This glorification of resistance against state control—in this case, against regulation of shop opening hours—is central to Germany's post-reunification identity formation (Halsall 1997, 2001). Shop opening hours were discussed starting in the 1990s as a sub-heading under a larger debate about whether Germany was going to be a "social market economy" that favors workers' rights or a deregulated market where consumer is king (Halsall 1997). As part

[30] Tempelhof Airport remained a public park after Berliners voted decisively against opening it to construction.

[31] In 2015, politicians debated whether Berlin's Carnival of Cultures (*Karneval der Kulturen*) should be cancelled. After a backlash from the public and a Change.org petition that was signed by more than 40,000 people (Ottmüller 2015), the carnival did take place (See Chapter 3).

[32] The petition text is published in three languages: English, German and Turkish (c.f. Jurgeit 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). I prefer to translate from the German version. The German version is longer and more substantive than both other versions.

of this discussion in 1996, the German Parliament heatedly debated a change in the 1956 federal law. The original law permitted shops to be open only from seven in the morning until six-thirty in the evening on weekdays. On Saturdays, they could be open until two in the afternoon (Halsall 1997, 221). The reform would enable shops to be open one and a half hours longer on weekdays and "until 4 pm on Saturdays" (Halsall 1997, 220). The debate over this seemingly petty matter was so fiery and extended that Günter Rexrodt (Germany's liberal economics minister at the time) once stated in parliament that "the subject of shop opening hours has become of symbolic significance. You all know that people abroad are laughing at us" (Rexrodt 1996 cited in Halsall 1997, 220). The reform passed following heated discussions where the real question was much bigger than shop hours. The real debate was about the identity of reunified Germany and whether it was a "social market economy" or a deregulated market (Halsall 1997).

Another fiery debate emerged in 1999 following waves of "civil disobedience" where various shops, including big stores, especially in former Eastern German cities opened illegally. Some state institutions indirectly endorsed the disobedience. For example, while the Ministry of Economics of Saxony declared certain shops to be "touristic," Mecklenburg-Vorpommern's ministry declared certain areas as "touristic" to make it possible for shops to remain open all week (Halsall 2001, 196–99). As the communication scholar Robert Halsall (2001) states, the debate was again beyond the seemingly unimportant issue of shopping hours. This time, the issue at stake included the role of churches in determining daily life and whether the supposedly backward and communist East Germans were actually more suitable for a deregulated free capitalistic economy than their Western counterparts (Halsall 2001). Ongoing debates show that the issue of how and when people can work and shop in Germany has implications beyond these shops such as the post-reunification German identity.

As the backlash against *späti* opening hour regulations accumulated between 2015 and 2016, political parties started to get involved in the matter. Various *späti* owners told me that

the Green Party (*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*) were engaged with the issue early on. Fitting with these testimonies, the Greens included *spätis* in their program for Berlin's local elections in 2016. As the economic section of their program states, "*späti* culture" belongs to "the openness and economic diversity of Berlin" (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2016, 19). The Greens state that about 20 percent of all entrepreneurs in Berlin have a migration background. As they declare, this large segment of the population (which most *späti* owners belong to) should not be discriminated against (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2016, 19).

Figure 9: A sticker of the Green Party on a gutter in Neukölln. The link printed at the bottom of the sticker leads to the Berlin House of Representatives member Georg Kössler's website. On his webpage, Kössler writes that *spätis* are very valuable for Berlin and that he only realized "what really typical [of Berlin] was" once he lived elsewhere. Berlin's typical feature, he discovered, was *spätis* (Kössler n.d.).

Likewise, in its local Berlin party program, Angela Merkel's CDU (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*) reserved a separate section to "protecting *spätis*." CDU states that "*spätis* belong to Berlin like *Currywurst* and Brandenburg Gate; they are a Berlin institution." While Christian Democrats are against a complete liberation of Sunday working

hours for all businesses, they would like to find a solution regarding *späti* hours through a conversation between interested parties including churches (CDU Berlin 2016, 32). *Späti* owners welcomed petitioners' and politicians' efforts although they saw political parties' attention as a reflection of their interest in the migrant vote clustered around *späti* owners and their families. Sunday bans and the backlash against them push politicians to openly acknowledge the importance of migrant economies for Berlin. As the next section will show, this political support for migrant businesses came at a time when migrant neighborhoods were threatened by rent increases, displacements and gentrification.

Increasing Rents and Displacements in Post-2000 Berlin

Politicians, activists and academics tend to agree that Berlin has a housing problem. Rents increase rapidly because of increasing demand and privatization of previously state-subsidized housing. After 2005, Berlin's population started to grow steadily partly because the federal capital completely moved from Bonn to Berlin in 2004 (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2015, 16). Meanwhile, more than half of Berlin's social housing units were sold when the city experienced a budget crisis (Holm 2013, 172) partly caused by post-Reunification federal subsidy cuts (Bockmeyer 2006, 53). The problem is urgent because as a state report entitled "*Berlin – wohnenswerte Stadt*" (Berlin – the city worth living in) states, "Berlin is a renters' city;" that is to say, "around 86 percent of Berlin's housing stock (around 1.63 million flats) are rented apartments" (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2011, 2). Since most people do not own their apartments but rather lease them, privatization of the housing stock, property handovers and rental increases have destructive effects for most Berliners. In fact, more than 5 percent of all movers in 2011 did so because of evictions (Holm 2014, 10, 11 as cited in Vasudevan 2017, 193).

My previous roommate, Ceren, clearly remembers the times when living in Berlin was "cheap." She had come to the German capital first as an exchange student in 2007 and later

for her master's studies in 2010. She has lived in Berlin since then. When she started her master's degree, she paid around 170 Euros including utilities for a room in a flat in Wedding (a northern neighborhood now regarded as Berlin's "new hot spot"), which she shared with three other people. When we lived together in a similar situation starting in 2014 in Neukölln (Berlin's previous "problem district" increasingly marked nowadays by its chicness), her housing costs had risen almost 65 percent compared to only a few years before.

After Ceren and her German fiancé got married in late 2015, the couple started looking for an apartment. Ceren complains that they had to keep applying for months to numerous apartments in various districts before finally finding their place in Neukölln. In one case, Ceren recalls, they had to wait outside an apartment complex for what felt like hours to be let in to see the place. An attendant stood in front of the door deciding when and who got in. Ceren likened this man to the infamous bouncers of Berghain, Berlin's famously inaccessible yet popular techno club. To Ceren, this long wait revealed the inflated demand for housing in this Berliner neighborhood regarded as both "Turkish" and "hip" (See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the miscellaneous meanings attached to Neukölln).

Confirming Ceren's observation, rents have particularly increased in Berlin's two "Turkish neighborhoods," Kreuzberg and Neukölln. Kreuzberg's gentrification was initiated by state supported projects entitled "careful urban renewal" (*behutsame Stadterneuerung*) programs (Holm 2013, 177). These projects, which were implemented in the 1980s and lasted until the 2000s, enabled working-class migrants to stay in renovated apartments.[33] However, rents rose exponentially when subsidy terms ended and rental ceilings were lifted (Holm 2013, 177–78). In the meantime, Kreuzberg became a geographically central borough of

[33] These socially conscious programs were implemented as a result of ongoing protests (including in the form of squatting) against previous urban renewal projects which would displace many of the neighborhood's residents. With these "careful urban renewal programs," planners kept original buildings rather than building new ones and aimed at protecting Kreuzberg's unique demographics; hence the "careful" in the renewal program name (Holm 2013, 177).

Berlin after its neighboring Berlin Wall was demolished and the city reunited. Now, the neighborhood increasingly houses international artists, students and others who are able and willing to pay high rents and/or share flats in this edgy district.

In northern parts of Neukölln, on the other hand, the district's changing image initiated its gentrification, a process Holm names "symbolic gentrification" (Holm 2013, 174, 181). North Neukölln has become a hip attraction appealing not only to Berliners and Germans but also to internationals looking to relocate to a fashionable, yet, affordable city. As a result, expats increasingly inhabit the previously cheap flats of Neukölln—an area which was previously associated with crime, unemployment and poverty and overwhelmingly housed Berlin's "migrants" (Holm 2013, 180–84). Even though this trend ends up displacing many Turkish migrants, an inquiry into the reactions against this trend shows that the problem inadvertently increases the symbolic value of migrants for Berlin as activists and figures of "diversity."

Berlin's Urban Social Movements

On an early evening in the fall of 2015, I met my language partner Bruno in Neukölln. Bruno was a German master's student learning Turkish. We met and talked about various topics ranging from the changing business landscape of Neukölln where Bruno is originally from to the best Turkish green bean recipes. On that evening, Bruno suggested that we sit outside and enjoy the warm weather (which we assumed to be the last of its kind until March). He wanted to go to Kreuzberg's *Admiralsbrücke,* one of the various bridges that connect the two sides of Berlin's Landwehr Canal where the forces of gentrification are felt strongly. People sit here to enjoy the beautiful view over the canal in the company of friends and strangers. In contrast to this pleasant picture, this cobblestone bridge has become a frequently cited symbol of Berlin's vexatious "invasion by hipsters and tourists."

Although stigma is attached to this place, locals, especially youths, still like going there—as is the case with Bruno. Many Berliners, especially young generations, happily participate in un-regulated public drinking in places like this bridge. They hang out in parks, bridges and waterfronts because they do not want to (or do not have the resources to) spend money in a bar, café or restaurant. For many, meeting friends outside with a beer bought from a *späti* is a modest and pleasant activity. At the same time, the vivid scenes people create lead these places to be considered "hip." This constructed and perceived chicness of the bridge circulates on the Internet through descriptions of Berlin as a trendy yet low-key European city. This image of free-of-charge sociality and amiability attracts more people to this neighborhood, including tourists, eventually increasing rents.

That evening, the charming scenery at the bridge was again a vivid endorsement of Berlin's re-branded image as a "hip city." The bridge swarmed with people and burst with sociability and joy. Men and women sat in circles chatting and laughing. Their chatter merged with street musicians' melodies spicing up the evening. Yet, soon we had to face the high price others pay for our participation in this low-cost production. A German-speaking man approached and handed us two self-printed papers. He explained that he lived in *Admiralstraße,* the street right across the bridge. He and his neighbors faced eviction. He wanted to raise our awareness and possibly recruit us as activists.

As he moved onto the next group, we examined the paper. It was plain and simple, printed in black and white. *Bizim Admiralstraße's* manifesto did not mention the tourists on the bridge as part of the problem. The problem was rather that their houses were going to be modernized. Their landlord wanted to pass the housing renewal costs on to the renters. This unwanted cost transfer would double current tenants' rents which would make it very difficult—if not impossible—for current renters to stay in their apartments. The text stated that Admiralstraße was not a singular case; evictions were a widespread issue in Berlin, in fact, happening on "every street corner."

The text asserted that Admiralstraße's "neighborhood community, which developed in [the last] 30 years" is very diverse. Currently, "self-employed [people] and taxi drivers, engineers and artists, healers and computer scientists" live on this street. They are single mothers, "families with children, pensioners, apartment sharing communities." Many of them "came from Turkey or [are] descendants of those from Turkey." The text asks whether this diversity is to be lost and Admiralstraße is to become "only for the well-to-do."

Fitting with the declaration that Turks are among the diverse groups living here, the activists called themselves: "*Bizim Admiralstraße*" (Our Admiral Street). They combined "*bizim*" meaning "our" in Turkish with the name of their street in German. This creative idea came from another urban social movement, namely "*Bizim Kiez*," which the author mentioned in the text as a successful resistance example. "*Bizim Kiez*" (combining the words "our" in Turkish and "neighborhood" in German) developed from a reaction against the eviction of Turkish-owned "*Bizim Bakkal*" (meaning "our grocery store" in Turkish). Bruno and I were happily surprised to see that the Turkish word "*bizim*" (our) had become a recurrent political motif in Berlin's urban movements.

Reactions to the trend of rising rent and renter displacement (in various forms including walkouts, symposia, graffiti and complaints in daily chats) make the housing issue in Berlin hard to miss. Graffiti, posters and flyers with slogans like "money can't buy Berlin" and "neighborhood instead of money" are all around the city, especially in central "migrant neighborhoods" which face Berlin's housing problem immensely. It is hard not to notice the call to "fight for [one's] neighborhood."

One feels the unrest and backlash strongly, for example, in Kreuzberg (where Admiralstraße is also located) not only because it is a "Turkish neighborhood" where rents have skyrocketed and many tenants have been displaced but also because it is a stronghold of leftist activism (although a weakened one). For instance, two of Berlin's strongest movements against displacement, Kotti & Co and Bizim Kiez are situated here. Graffiti and stickers with

unwelcoming messages (many written in English) such as “Berlin does not love you” (in reaction to “Berlin loves you” stickers which are also everywhere) and “Welcome to Berlin, now go home” plaster the sides of buildings from wall to wall. Even restrooms in cafes and restaurants in Kreuzberg are adorned with such slogans targeting Berlin’s international visitors. As these examples show, anti-gentrification discourses in Berlin differentiate between two “foreign” populations. Wealthy tourists and expats are designated as harmful to local diversity whereas migrants are perceived as essential to the local texture as the faces of a “diverse Berlin.” In other words, the wealthy foreigner appears to threaten the authenticity of Berlin as a *multikulti* city while the Turkish migrant is the very essence of these vital qualities of Berlin despite being a foreigner.

Figure 10: "Neighborhood instead of money" written on the side of an apartment building in North Neukölln.

Figure 11: "Fight for your neighborhood" written next to the anarchist symbol Circle-A on a wall on the Kreuzberg street Wrangelstraße. This is where the evicted Turkish grocery store Bizim Bakkal was located.

"Help, Tourists are Coming!"

Among many Berlin residents who perceive themselves to be locals, the perception that rent has increased because of growing numbers of well-off foreigners has sparked skepticism against tourism and tourists. This caution (if not animosity) against Berlin's international visitors has found resonance even among leftist politicians who otherwise tend to be more vigilant about speaking out against foreigners in whichever form they may come.

For example, Green Party organized a meeting entitled "*Hilfe, die Touris kommen!*" (Help, Tourists are Coming!) to address the issue as early as 2011 (n-tv 2011). Dirk Behrendt, a member of the Berlin House of Representatives serving as the event moderator, stated that although they "did not want to build a wall around Kreuzberg," they also did not

want the borough to become like "Oranienburger Street in Mitte"[34] (Rennefanz 2011). Instead they "want[ed] city-compatible tourism" (Rennefanz 2011). A journalistic article on the "Help, Tourists are Coming!" event shows that Behrendt's juxtaposition of Kreuzberg with Berlin's touristy neighborhoods resonated with the borough's residents (n-tv 2011). A young man, the article states, commented that Kreuzberg was not "a zoo" and that tourists should rather entertain themselves in "Ku'damm or Alex" (two places that are supposedly "touristy") (n-tv 2011).

In recent years, the trend of people renting out rooms and houses for high prices via sites such as Airbnb has led to even more heated debates about tourist short rentals and their role in worsening Berlin's housing shortage. In 2014, the city passed a law entitled *Zweckentfremdungsverbot* (Prohibition of Misuse) to put a stop to rental regulation violations and holiday housing (houses where owners reside only during holidays) (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Wohnen n.d.). The law took effect in May 2016. In general, owners can no longer rent whole flats and houses on Airbnb, which supposedly will limit the number of tourists coming to Berlin and give Berlin's living spaces back to their "real residents."

Residents and activists, of course, differ in their opinions about and reactions to Berlin's increasing rents and whether this has to do with tourism. For example, an article on the leftist website "Revolutionary Internationalist Organization" (*Revolutionären Internationalistischen Organisation*) criticizes the outburst against tourists. The article argues that capitalists and politicians (rather than tourists) are responsible "for [Berlin's] worsening

[34] The central and historical Oranienburger Street evolved as a lively street of underground culture, artists and leftist activists especially after the German Reunification in 1990. However, with the opening of the area to development starting in the 1990s, new businesses replaced old ones. Many individuals and small businesses including various artist studios were displaced whereas their "alternative cultures" continued to be marketed to attract visitors. Tourists now frequent Oranienburger Street. This process exemplifies not only the visitor boom in the 2000s and 2010s but also the selling of Berlin's alternative cultures and underground art scene as touristic attractions (cf. Dempsey 2007; Falconer 2013).

living conditions" (Klasse gegen Klasse n.d.). Likewise, Kotti und Co activists include tourists as potential collaborators in their call for action (Kottiundco 2012). An article in *The Guardian* points out the dissent among activists about anti-tourist sentiments. The article shows the inner workings of an "underground political movement" called *Hipster Antifa Neukölln*, which fights the rage against tourists (Stallwood 2012). Thus, the anti-tourism movement in Berlin faces its dissidents possibly because any aggression towards outsiders in Germany reopens the old wounds carved by the country's history of racism.

Späti Owners Embracing the Newcomers

Although Berlin's growing international population appears to cause rental increases predominantly in migrant neighborhoods, migrant *späti* owners welcome this international population with open arms. This is the case even when owners experience increasing rents firsthand. Many owners I talked to reside in Neukölln, Kreuzberg and other areas where international visitors and people from other parts of Germany rent rooms and apartments for short periods of time. The owners I spoke to are aware that many migrant renters are evicted not only from their homes but also from their businesses in these boroughs. Nonetheless, they highly value "tourists" as their customers.

It is, of course, hard to pinpoint who is a tourist and who is not. People come to Berlin with different intentions; they stay for different periods and they experience the city differently. Some leave, come back and consider multiple cities including Berlin their home. Nevertheless, "tourists" exist as an imagined classed and racialized category of relatively well-off, youth from Europe, the Americas and the English-speaking world. Language is a major marker of this privileged foreigner category. Turkish *späti* owners and workers tend to refer to people who fit this image and speak broken German or do not speak German at all as "tourists." They differentiate between these well-off youths from people who appear to be working class foreigners from the Middle East, Eastern Europe (especially the Roma) and

Africa. They refer to this second category as "*yabanci*" (foreigner). Turkish migrants, for example, fall under the "*yabanci"* category.

Ihsan, a Berlin-born *späti* owner in his mid-twenties, illustrates the widespread contentment with Berlin's "tourist population" among *späti* owners. As Ihsan told me during our interview, he opened his *späti* two years ago on a street frequented by international clientele. He is very happy with the workflow. He described his story of opening a *späti* as a consequence of his poor school performance (and therefore lacking a trajectory towards a successful job). He recalled that he was a very naughty student. As he put it, his "mind was always elsewhere" at school. Ihsan did not listen to the teacher in class as he was supposed to, but other students "listened to [him] instead." After high school, he received wholesaler training at a vocational school for three years. As he put it, he "hung out" for some time following his vocational studies. After this leisure period, it was time to plunge into work life. His father, a business owner as well, encouraged and supported him to open his own shop. Ihsan's *späti* was not always a *späti*; it was part of a larger space his father managed as a Turkish-style coffeehouse (*kahvehane*). Opening a *späti* seemed like a good option, especially at this location frequented by tourists. Therefore, they divided his father's shop into two. Now, next to Ihsan's *späti* is his father's coffee shop frequented by Turkish men.

The decision to open a *späti* on this "tourist street" turned out to be a good one. Ihsan commented that he made good earnings, so he wanted to stay in this profitable business for another five to ten years. As Ihsan stated, tourists are some of his best customers making his business thrive. As a matter of fact, he offers services specifically to attract tourists such as hourly and daily bike rentals. He communicates with his customers in English, German and Turkish, whichever works for that specific client. For him, tourists and the diversity they bring are some of the best aspects of his job, making it a "fun" one.

I asked Ihsan whether he was affected by rising rent to see if his story fit the general discomfort among Berliners. He did not complain about rising rent for either his shop or

family apartment in Kreuzberg. For him, the important change brought about by increasing rents was the increasing number of people living in the neighborhood. He interpreted middle-aged roommates as the odd (but profitable) consequence of rent increases: "Yes, there have been [effects]. For example, here they stay as 3-4 people. Apartments are 3-4 bedroom [apartments]. The guys are 30-35 years old. They each get a room. The rent they spend on a room, you used to get the [whole] apartment for that." For Ihsan, the increase in the number of people living in a single apartment was a positive development (although an eccentric one) because "more people automatically brought more work." As Ihsan stated, although the rent for his shop had indeed risen, his landlord could not increase the rent exponentially or evict them easily because they have been tenants for a long time. Therefore, for him, rent increases were a secondary issue. The primary point was that his business thrived thanks to Berlin's increasing foreign residents.

Similarly, another *späti* owner, Haldun stated that they did not have an urgent rent issue because they have been tenants for a long time. For him, his neighborhood's transformation was a positive one as well. Unlike Ihsan whose shop was frequented by many tourists because of its more central location and bicycle rental service, Haldun emphasized that his customers were now overwhelmingly young and mostly Germans. Like Ihsan's tourist customers, Haldun's young clients generated revenue which made him appreciate their increasing presence in the neighborhood.

Although they are both happy with recent developments in their neighborhoods, Haldun is of a different generation and has a different migration story than Ihsan. Haldun was born in Istanbul in the early 1960s. His mother came to Berlin as a worker when he was a child. She first brought Haldun's oldest and later his youngest sister whose leg was paralyzed because of polio. The family wanted to see if something could be done about her paralysis by taking her to German doctors. Haldun came to Berlin later with his father and middle sister at the age of twelve. He completed high school and later vocational training to become an

electrician in Berlin. He met his wife when he was on holiday in Turkey. They married, settled in Berlin and had two kids. After working as an electrician for about ten years, he opened his own business where he supplied electrician's services to construction companies. In the meantime, they moved to their current apartment "a stone's throw away" from the shop he would eventually come to own. Haldun's wife started shopping at this store and became a regular customer. She used to get newspapers and bread there. When the owners decided to sell the shop,[35] Haldun and his wife agreed to buy it after giving it some thought.

Haldun told me about his content with the neighborhood's transformation:

> The neighborhood changed a lot in the last 6-7 years. Before, all of these shops were empty, for example. Nobody would rent a shop here. Now, the [rents for these] stores are sky-high. They are unthinkable. Our income has, of course, changed a bit. It has risen a bit. Now, there are a lot of young people. They buy a lot of drinks. It wasn't like that before. […] Now that there are young people, both the variety and the amount of what we sell has expanded.

Moreover, even when rising rents affect *späti* owners directly and negatively, they still speak about the foreigner influx positively. This is also the case with Nanpej. Azad appreciated the business tourists brought although he received several letters from Nanpej's property management subtly threatening Nanpej with eviction. One letter, for example, indicated that Nanpej did not follow garbage collection rules such as sorting trash properly. Management declared that this would necessitate taking action. Azad thought of these letters as the property management making their way to evict Nanpej in order to re-lease this well-located shop for a much higher rent. Still, Azad appreciated his growing international customer profile just like many other *späti* owners did.

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[35] *Späti* owners tend not to own the shop space itself but the right to manage their shops and the goods inside. They rent the space. They say that they "bought" a shop when the rights to manage the shop are transferred to them.

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Since the end of the Cold War and the Reunification of Germany in 1990, Berlin has gone through various transformations. For example, as re-unified Berlin became the capital of re-unified capitalist Germany, Berlin's housing structure has transformed into a market-friendly one. Within these transformations, state institutions, politicians and activists have tried to define the terms of how Berlin should be spatially and temporally organized. As this struggle continues, migrants have become central to debates about Berlin's spatial and temporal organization not only because many reside in boroughs exploited by Berlin's short rental market but also because their spaces enable the experience of the city as a "free" and "hip" one. While some of the areas most affected from rent increase are "migrant neighborhoods," ironically, the upscaling and internationalization of these districts increase Turks' symbolic value for Berlin as "faces of diversity," activists and owners and workers of "hip" corner shops. In return, *späti* owners embrace Berlin's international newcomers. When Code Enforcement Offices try to regulate *spätis*, owners declare that *spätis* are "tourist shops" and therefore are crucial for Berlin socially, economically and symbolically. Petitionists against these regulations as well as politicians both from the left and the right also claim that *spätis* are indispensable for Berlin's "culture" and therefore, they should be preserved.

Ch. 5 – *Späti* Labor as Productive Labor

Späti work entails sociality and amiability. Workers and owners smile, joke and chitchat with customers. They are masters of small talk and take conversations deep when customers are willing to do so. They give clients advice and laugh at their jokes. However, workers and owners do not splurge their sociability and friendliness indiscriminately. They rather perform these affective qualities differentially. In this chapter, I present data from my participant observation in Nanpej and interviews with two male *späti* owners and show that these nuanced performances of affective labor emerge out of the social, political and urban contexts in which such workers and owners are embedded. The social and affective labor expected of *späti* owners and workers puts them in a vulnerable position, as they need to be nice to clients in order to thrive. However, owners and workers also utilize the amiable nature of this labor to negotiate their social positions. Thus, the contextual performances of affective labor perpetuate, reappropriate and contest existing political and socioeconomic relations and help workers and owners establish boundaries between themselves and clients. In this sense, this *affective* labor is simultaneously *social* and *productive* labor.

In *Capital* and *Theories of Surplus Value*, Marx laid out his analysis of the productivity of labor (Gough 1972). Citing Marx, anthropologist Joseph Hankins (2014) illustrates this point and demonstrates that human labor is transformative. In his study of Buraku tannery workers in Japan, Hankins (2014) shows that Japanese multiculturalism and the Buraku identity, which is associated with certain kinds of stigmatized manual labor, are products of work by NGO activists as well as by laborers who make leather. Although Marx was especially interested in the surplus value manual laborers created for capitalists (Gough 1972) and not, for example, in how service labor helps people negotiate their positions in social spaces, the emerging meanings attached to the affective labor entailed in *späti*

interactions show that work, in a variety of forms, produces multiple kinds of value and creates a variety of social consequences.

I use "affective labor" as akin to philosophers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's use of the term (Hardt 1999; Hardt and Negri 2001) and emphasize its social qualities. As Hardt explains, affective labor is a form of "immaterial labor," which refers to "labor that produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge or communication" (Hardt 1999, 94). While emotions are located within individuals, affects travel "between bodies and objects" (Mankekar and Gupta 2016, 24) and affective labor stimulates sociality (Mankekar and Gupta 2016, 31). Affective labor is productive of capital as well as of life—"social networks, forms of community [and] biopower" (Hardt 1999, 96; Hardt and Negri 2001, 293).

Each section in this chapter illustrates a case that shows the differential deployment of affective labor in relation to its social context. Firstly, I show that workers can choose to *not perform* amiability in rare circumstances. Through the example of an absence of otherwise normalized courtesy, I demonstrate how one of my co-workers negotiates intergenerational roles and her own identity as a Turkish woman. Secondly, I demonstrate that owners and workers employ kinship terms contextually to communicate apologies, familiarity and situational kindred—for example, when Sevgi expresses gratitude by addressing a male customer she believes to be Arabic as "brother" in German. Thirdly, I illustrate how *späti* workers and owners' constant visual, vocal and social presence—thanks to the social and affective labor expected of them as well as the actual physical setup of *spätis*—makes them vulnerable to abuse. They negotiate these vulnerabilities in gendered ways. Finally, I show that nighttime is an affective temporal terrain marked as dangerous and risky for *späti* workers and owners. Workers and owners (mostly men) who work at night often recall their experiences in order to establish themselves as "mildly masculine" figures.

Withheld Amiabilities

A well-built young man occasionally meets an elderly woman in Nanpej, whom my co-workers assume to be his grandmother. This man comes to our shop a little bit earlier than his grandma and gets something to eat such as a *gözleme*. With his food, he orders a big glass of freshly squeezed orange juice. He always says that he will be paying later. He finishes as many glasses as possible during his time with the granny, hence his nickname among us: "the orange juice guy."

At first sight, the scene is a typical intergenerational portrait. The darling grandma is happy to meet her hungry grandson at a cheap neighborhood shop and treat him to fresh juice and baked goods. However, this scene really upsets my co-workers. One of my co-workers, for example, closely observes them each time they come. She finds the young man's demeanor disrespectful and exploitative and gets genuinely angry at him. Although I find her annoyance a bit excessive, I do see her point about this "indecent" grandson.

The young man's misbehavior and my co-worker's strong response were ever more pronounced on a spring morning in 2016. That late morning the orange juice guy came to Nanpej alone as usual. He got a big glass of orange juice and sat at a table next to the window with his back to the door. A skeptic would even think that he avoided facing the door because he did not want to greet his grandma and help her sit when she arrived. As he got halfway through his juice, his granny slowly approached the door from the side he had his back to. While the tall young man continued his drink, the tiny old woman haltingly opened the door and slowly walked in. He stood up as he drank off the juice expeditiously—but without forfeiting the savory moment. The small, hunched-over woman kindly rejected the young man's help signaled by his lowered open arms. Taking grandma's gesture at face value, he sat down as the slow-walking elderly woman approached her chair and leaned her walking stick against the table.

My co-worker and I watched them from behind the counter like a scene from a play. My co-worker took the act quite seriously, though. She was already bothered with the guy: “Look, look! Such a poser! He pretends to help her. Why doesn’t he meet her outside? He doesn’t even walk her to the table.” I had to agree with her that this stocky man looked like an ill-mannered teenager as the sweet elderly lady took a seat by herself. The young man instantaneously inquired about granny’s order, got money from her and came to the counter. He put his empty glass on the counter and requested a big glass of orange juice for himself and a cappuccino for his grandma. He paid for his current and previous orders before he returned to his seat.

My co-worker stopped me as I took the empty glass to the washing machine. She said with a childlike mischief: “Don’t wash it yet. I’ll pour the orange juice in it. Then he will understand that he needs to treat his grandma better” and continued to grumble about the young man. I was not sure whether there was any slight chance that this man—one we deemed to be thoughtless—would understand the subtle reasoning behind the residual pulp on his glass. I doubted that he would even notice. If he did notice, he would probably judge Nanpej workers as incompetent and nothing more. Nevertheless, I gave my co-worker the dirty glass without disclosing my skepticism about her mission. As she placed it under the manual juice squeezer, I headed towards the coffee machine to make granny’s cappuccino.

As I made the coffee, I watched the two to see if my co-worker’s frustration with the grandson was well founded. While the grandma continuously talked, the young man’s attention stayed mostly elsewhere. He watched cars and pedestrians on the street go by with his head slightly turned to the window. He occasionally averted his eyes away from the street, nodded to his grandmother, uttered a few words and looked our direction to see if his order was ready. It was a clichéd scene of an old dear grumbling and a young person turning a deaf ear to the uninterrupted chatter. When their drinks were ready, he picked them up in a split second and went back to the table.

I lost interest in their seemingly unexciting exchange and started watching passersby on the street from behind the counter. In the meantime, my co-worker stood behind the pillar next to the counter checking her phone. After a while the orange juice guy looked in my direction as his grandma continued talking. My co-worker playfully summoned me to her side away from the customer's gaze. "Anlam, come, come! Don't look in his direction. He is trying to attract your attention," she explained. "He is even too lazy to come up here and order but he would drink all the juice in the world if he could." I looked at the guy from behind the pillar. He did seem like he was scanning our side of the shop. She was possibly right; he attempted to catch our eyes. My co-worker tried to keep her countenance as giggles and words spilled from her mouth simultaneously: "Look, look! Look at how bewildered he is!" She was overjoyed by the guy's vacuous stares. He finally stood up and came to the counter. I went to get his order, leaving my co-worker alone with her appeased gaiety behind the pillar.

The orange juice guy was not rude to any Nanpej worker (unlike many others who, as a consequence of their behavior, were provided only minimal service). Then why didn't he receive the same amiable and considerate service my co-worker generously offers most other customers? The short answer to this question is that she thought the young man did not possess the affectionate demeanor expected of him as "a grandson." She judged him because of his age and assumed kin relations to the old woman. Her refusal to perform amiability to this seemingly thoughtless and disrespectful German man constituted her as a thoughtful and respectful Turkish woman.

My co-worker's hostile reaction to this man is in line with her life outside the doors of Nanpej. She is a loving wife and mother. She sometimes bakes and cooks for her daughter's class during special occasions. Before the 2016 "*yumurta bayrami*" (literally "egg festival" in Turkish as my other co-workers call Easter), for example, she told me that she was going to bake a cake for her daughter's class. "They [German teachers] are exceedingly happy even with a potato salad," she commented. My co-worker takes pride in the Turkish cuisine. She

perceives it as a complex alternative (both in taste and in preparation) to the supposedly plain "German food." For her, cooking for her daughter's class is a pleasant way to show her being a responsible Turkish mother.

Turkish *späti* owners and workers frequently cite familial proximity as well as respect and love for the elderly and children as distinctive markers of Turkishness as opposed to Germans who ostensibly "abandon their children at the age of 18." When I heard such claims, I gave my roommate Michael as a counter-example whose close ties with his family always awed me. He and his wife Ceren received postcards from his family at various occasions from birthdays to Christian holidays. In return, the young couple always took the time to visit their elderly relatives. Turkish workers and owners usually discard my roommate as an exception to the rule.

Many Turkish migrants I talked to use intergenerational family ties not only as a point of cultural distinction but also as an institutional one to differentiate Turkey from Germany. Many Turkish young fathers I talked to argue that although Germany is more developed than Turkey in terms of its state support for families and child benefits, it lacks "the good education" Turkish culture and institutions provide. They cite lack of discipline and respect at school as markers that denounce "German education." These assertions can be interpreted as a form of protest among young male migrants who feel they have lost control over their children to the German education system. Anthropologists have interpreted similar instances of becoming more authoritative and violent as reflecting a crisis in migrant men's masculinity (for example among Cambodians in the USA (Ong 2003). Young fathers I spoke to utter a similar protest.

My co-worker's refusal to perform amiability makes a comparable point. Her not performing amiability to the young "disrespectful" German man constitutes her as a "virtuous" Turkish woman respectful of and kind to the elderly. The reason for the absence of her amiability is not the orange juice guy's perceived rudeness to Nanpej's workers as in the

case of most other mundane disputes. The reason is rather how this customer treats another person, supposedly his grandmother. In this sense, her withdrawal of the expected amiability finds its meaning within extended interrelations and transcultural meanings embedded in Turks' negotiations with the German state on "cultural issues" such as elderly care and childrearing.

Carla Freeman (2014) observes a similar trend in Barbados where public and private lives overlap. The work and private lives of Barbadian entrepreneurs are not only intertwined but affective engagements are mobilized in analogous ways at and outside work (Freeman 2014, 167–68). For example, as Freeman shows, child-rearing practices among Caribbean middle classes increasingly involve affective labor, which entrepreneurs perform in their work lives as well. To illustrate, Barbadian middle-class parents see their children as "projects" to be nurtured with neoliberal principles such as "individualism, expressiveness, flexibility, and adaptability" rather than as subjects to be disciplined (Freeman 2014, 162). Thus, Barbadian parents increasingly cultivate affective relationships *with* their children and raise them as competitive agents equipped with various skills to thrive in a neoliberal economy (Freeman 2014, 166–67). As Freeman shows, emotions and affective labor are not simply products of the private domain utilized by companies as scholars like Hochschild have argued. Rather, manifestations of affective labor emerge within the mutuality of work and non-work, private and public (Freeman 2014, 167–68).

At a *späti* counter, the intimate relations surrounding parenthood are not a matter of private life either. They influence the way workers such as my co-worker perceive their customers and perform their labor. My co-worker situates herself as an "affective figure," able to feel sympathy towards children and the elderly, as opposed to the supposedly cold young German man who did not feel the affection he was supposed to feel towards his grandmother. Thus, her identity as a "caring Turkish woman" fits the increasing global emphasis on emotions and affective relations both in and outside work (Freeman 2014) as

well as the positive stereotypes about Turks as "warm" and "affectionate" people. Her non-performance of amiability aimed at punishing the orange juice guy for not behaving in the affective ways he was supposed to.

Emotional and Affective Labor

In addition to showing the interconnectedness of workers' sense of self and life at and outside of work, my co-worker's hostility towards the orange juice guy also points out a contradiction: As a service worker, my co-worker is supposed to smile and be nice to her customers but she refuses to do so. In her seminal study of flight attendants and bill collectors entitled *The Managed Heart*, sociologist Arlie Hochschild shows that service workers' pleasant attitudes are not natural but entail labor. Hochschild defines this "emotional labor" as "the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display" (Hochschild 2012, 7).

According to Hochschild, the increasing prevalence of emotional labor demonstrates that emotions have become overt commodities exclusively under capitalism (Hochschild 2012, 186) although some "public-service jobs" involving emotional labor did exist previously (Hochschild 2012, 8). Under capitalist conditions, management of emotions is "socially engineered and thoroughly organized from the top" (Hochschild 2012, 8). Here, Hochschild enumerates the contemporary characteristics of emotional labor:

> First, they require face-to-face or voice-to-voice contact with the public. Second, they require the worker to produce an emotional state in another person—gratitude or fear, for example. Third, they allow the employer, through training and supervision, to exercise a degree of control over the emotional activities of employees (Hochschild 2012, 147).

For Hochschild, flight attendants and bill collectors exemplify this new tendency to regulate emotions under contemporary capitalism. While bill collectors dismay clients, flight

attendants put on friendly smiles and "enhance the status of the customer" (Hochschild 2012, 16). These two marginal examples constitute "the toe and the heel of capitalism" (Hochschild 2012, 16).

My co-worker bends capitalism's toe and heel and shows the plurality and differentiality of emotional labor when she withdraws amiability even though her job calls for friendliness. Her motivation in *withdrawing* the expected emotional labor is similar to that of bill collectors' when *performing* emotional labor. Like the bill collectors who "wrung [customers] dry of self-respect" (Hochschild 2012, 147) and thus guilted them into paying their debts, my co-worker wanted to make the orange juice guy feel bad. Yet, in her case, the contradiction between the nature of her job and her behavior generated the "bad feelings," unlike the bill collectors whose emotional labor calls for making clients "feel bad."

Since the publication of Hochschild's phenomenal study, scholars have demonstrated such complexities and contradictions of emotional labor in various other contexts. For example, in her study on waitresses in New Jersey, *Dishing It Out*, anthropologist Greta Paules (1991) shows that servers have some control over the tipping process and can negotiate with management regarding their labor processes. To illustrate, servers can threaten to leave their jobs and, thus, coerce managers into fulfilling their demands thanks to the labor shortage in the restaurant industry (Paules 1991, 172–73). Moreover, waitresses perform certain tip-generating practices even though these practices might be against company policies such as serving oversized portions (Paules 1991, 171). Also, in certain cases, waitresses openly oppose rude customers (Paules 1991, 174). Therefore, servers do not follow management demands blindly and can opt out of performing emotional labor even though their earnings are tied to the currency of smiles. Thus, as Paules (1991) shows, emotional workers can challenge the obedience and amiability expected of them. My co-worker's withdrawal of amiability is similar to that of the waitresses. However, her motivation is different in that her withdrawal

does not target the management or overtly abusive clients; she rather punishes the customer for his attitude towards an elderly woman.

While my co-worker's amiable labor helps cultivate social relationships with some of her other customers, this withdrawal situates her as a caring Turkish woman in opposition to the supposedly uncaring German man. Pointing out similar social consequences generating from affective labor, anthropologists Mankekar and Gupta examine how affective labor *makes* call center workers into "particular kinds of laboring subjects" (Mankekar and Gupta 2016, 25). The affective labor deployed in call centers in Bangalore helps employees assume certain dispositions. For example, agents learn to adopt British and American "modes of courtesy and friendliness" (Mankekar and Gupta 2016, 27).

Call center work also generates sociality between workers thanks to team-building events and agents' decreased sociality outside the workplace due to their unconventional work hours (Mankekar and Gupta 2016, 31). Moreover, call center jobs necessitate private dialogues and thus "intimate labor" as customers trust and share with agents confidential information ranging from "why they had credit card charges from a foreign country" to "who came to get them when their car broke down" (Mankekar and Gupta 2016, 34). In this sense, as Mankekar and Gupta show, the affective labor in call centers entails *and* produces multiple levels of sociality (Mankekar and Gupta 2016, 31).

The affective labor in *spätis* is likewise "predicated on" and "productive of sociality" (Mankekar and Gupta 2016, 31). Affective labor extracts sociality from owners and workers while generating social relations between workers, owners and customers and producing *spätis* as social spaces. My co-worker's withdrawal of the customary affectionate sociality demonstrates that workers can deploy affective labor in its various forms and degrees to negotiate not only their relationships with customers and managers (as is the case in Paules' study of waitresses in New Jersey) but also their place in social, affective hierarchies between "host" and "migrant cultures."

Fluid Kinship Terms

Kinship terms provide Turkish *späti* owners and workers with cultural resources to remold affective labor practices. *Späti* owners and workers embrace the possibilities kinship terms provide them to differentially establish, denote and alter their relations with customers. In this sense, these kinship terms have a social function and establish closeness and distance. These kinship terms also desexualize conversations between owners, workers and customers from opposite sex. Workers and owners use kinship terms for miscellaneous (and sometimes seemingly contradictory) purposes depending on the context. Kinship terms find their meanings contextually. These terms and their meanings establish proximity and distance between workers, owners and customers.

Turkish workers and owners use kinship terms especially when they speak to seniors. For example, Azad, the owner of Nanpej, addresses an old German woman whose husband died around the time I started working at Nanpej as "*tante*" (aunt in German). This elderly friend often drops by the shop to meet Azad. She drinks Turkish tea while Azad runs her errands such as photocopying her documents. The German kin term "*tante*" establishes the proximity between the old German woman and the Kurdish business owner. This kin address flatters the elderly and establishes Azad as "respectful." Workers and owners use kinship terms to soften conversations before mildly unpleasant things are said as well. The Turkish elderly tend to return such gestures by addressing workers and owners as "my daughter" (*kizim*) or "my son" (*oglum*), especially if they request something troublesome such as a recount of their change or a replacement of their cold coffee.

Workers and owners use Turkish kinship terms often with an apologetic tone. For example, they frequently use "*abicim*" and "*ablacim*" (respectively "my dear older brother" and "my dear older sister" in Turkish) to soften rejections. To illustrate, when customers inquire about items *spätis* do not carry, workers deploy these affectionate expressions instead

of a dry "sorry." Owners and workers, for example, say "*ablacim, o bizde yok*" (my dear older sister, we do not have it) to their Turkish customers instead of saying "sorry, we do not have it" which sounds more formal and apathetic. These kinship terms give customers the message that their relationships go beyond that of purely monetary ones. If customers insist on their impossible requests, workers usually intensify the address towards "*güzel abicim/ablacim*" (my beautiful darling older brother/sister), publicly declaring that they are growing impatient and that the customer should stop pleading.

While people of all ages can become a "brother" or a "sister" in such conversations, the meaning of these terms emerge within the moments they are uttered. For example, the same Turkish term *ablacim* (my older sister) not only conveys respect and annoyance, as described above, but also affection when uttered to an obviously younger person such as a child. Parties interpret these fluid terms with the insights of the past at the presence of others with whom they might have future relations.

Kinship terms can also help owners and workers navigate feelings of uncertainty and gratitude, which can emerge at moments of exchange with unclear results. To illustrate, one summer morning while working at Nanpej, I witnessed my co-worker Sevgi use a regular kinship term in an unusual situation. A young man with a blue denim jacket and a friendly appearance asked for a small coffee that morning. As Sevgi made this man's coffee, I attempted to break change for the twenty Euros he had given me; however, we were out of small banknotes and coins. I informed Sevgi of our problem in Turkish and inquired about what to do. She knew this customer from before as "a regular Arab customer who work[ed] at a gambling hall nearby" and decided to ask for his help.

For many people in Berlin, casinos are mysterious masculine spaces associated with crime. However, small business workers also know that they are god-sent money-changing sites solving this daily nettlesome problem. For those who exchange money the most, casinos are Berlin's small banknote and coin haven. For this reason, Sevgi told the gambling saloon

employee that we did not have enough change and asked him whether he could exchange money for us in his workplace. He gladly accepted to take a fifty Euro banknote and bring back smaller notes and coins. Sevgi was relieved and gave him the money gratefully with a "*danke schön, Bruder"* (thank you, brother).

This was the first time I ever heard a Turkish woman address a man as "brother" in German and it remains the last. Sevgi's unnaturally bass tone while calling this man "brother" made this kin address sound even more fabricated. Nevertheless, the "brother" kindly returned the amiability with a "you are welcome" and left the shop with the fifty Euro bill.

A little while after the brother's departure, Sevgi was half-seriously nervous: "Anlam, we called the man '*bruder*' but what if he doesn't come back? What if he runs away with the fifty Euros?" Although Sevgi asked this question in her humorous manner which I was used to, I knew well that fifty Euro banknotes were an anxiety source in most small businesses. They tend to be the largest notes customers exchange in small shops. Therefore, we had to make sure that we made the correct change and did not accept any counterfeits.[36] Therefore, I understood Sevgi's anxiety firstly because we would have an embarrassing time explaining to Azad why we had willingly handed a stranger fifty Euros and, secondly, because Sevgi would have to replace the missing money from her pocket.

Nevertheless, I reassured my co-worker that this was unlikely because the gambling hall employee was a regular customer. Moreover, he did not look suspicious at all. As a matter of fact, he looked trustworthy and seemed to have a dependable demeanor. Additionally, Sevgi had initiated the request so I did not see any reason to be doubtful of the man's intentions. Luckily and expectedly, he did bring back the money after about forty minutes. Sevgi thanked him twice with the same expression: "*danke schön, Bruder"* (thank

[36] For this, we marked banknotes with a special pen which painted fake bills a dark, blackish color making it obvious that they were not of cotton-fiber that central banks use. In one instance before I started my work in Nanpej, Ayse had accepted a fake banknote and had to replace it from her pocket.

you, brother). He generously smiled and asked her not to mention it. As a kind gesture, Sevgi asked him if he wanted something to drink. Responding to his request, I made him a free cup of coffee and put a little bit of warm milk on top as a bonus.

In this instance, the German kinship term "*bruder*" disclosed a non-native German speaker's gratitude to another. The term connected two immigrant workers with different ethnicities and genders. Sevgi felt gratitude for this customer simply because he had come back with the money. The gambling hall employee helped his fellow worker deal with the daily problems of her job. Otherwise she would not have change in the register, a taken for granted feature of small businesses. Moreover, if he had "run away with the money" as Sevgi jokingly suspected, her relationship to her boss would have been hurt.

Sevgi's deep alto tone, which made her sound masculine, demonstrated her ideas of gambling as a masculine practice and what she imagined to be the guy's habitus. Therefore, with her pronounced bass tone, Sevgi spoke "the casino dialect." Sevgi's manly mien carried her to the betting lands to which she had never been. This masculine tone also desexualized her interaction with this male stranger. Thus, this fabricated *affinity* with the customer downplayed her femininity and created a *boundary* between them.

Negotiating Gendered Vulnerabilities

Just like many other service jobs that require employees to wait for, greet and serve customers, *späti* work involves constant visual, audial and social presence. Moreover, the friendliness and affective labor assumed from *späti* workers and owners make them vulnerable to minor verbal abuse. Workers and owners develop strategies to partially counter these offenses, but they cannot return these acts with comparable intensity unless a customer is explicitly abusive, violent and dangerous.

In addition to the social nature of *späti* work, these shops' spatial patterns facilitate workers' visual exposure as well. The open physical structure of shop counters expose

workers visually even though most *spätis* have areas at the back where only a handful are allowed (namely wholesalers, owners, workers and on exceptional occasions their relatives and friends). Even though workers might take refuge in these supposedly hidden back-spaces, they are nevertheless almost always within the customer gaze.

In Nanpej, for example, this exposure was quite burdensome. To illustrate, customers occasionally approached me at the counter and asked where Azad or one of my co-workers was. "She is busy" or "He is working in the back" were usually not taken as legitimate answers. In such situations, customers scan the front and the back of the shop. They utter inviting commentary and pull Azad and his workers into conversations with reproaching statements like, "Now Mr. Azad, are you hiding from us?" and "Lady Gulazer, you make yourself scarce!" Some of these clients comment on workers' as well as Azad's job performance when they cannot get the response they hope for. For example, some accuse Azad of not standing watch over his shop. As *späti* work requires at least minimal sociability, they usually respond by blaming the workload. Azad, for example clarifies to customers the hustle and bustle of managing a shop, which requires him to travel constantly between various places such as wholesalers, banks, government offices and the accountant's. Azad patiently makes sure that his customers understand the demands of his job which deny him the chance to stand watch at the shop at all times.

On the other hand, female workers employ a few tricks to navigate the shop's visually and socially exposing landscapes. To illustrate, as the job calls for social closeness, female employees are constantly vigilant so as not to appear "sexually available" or romantically interested in customers. They try not to take money by hand but rather direct customers to place their money on the money tray.[37] They also employ a modest look with dark-colored,

[37] A female worker in another shop told me that having customers put their money on the tray helps when customers claim that they were shortchanged as well. Shop cameras record the money tray area. When customers allege that they were shortchanged, workers can suggest that they check the video recordings.

plain looking clothes. Moreover, they perform affective labor differentially. I learned these necessary tricks fairly soon.

On my very first day of work at Nanpej, Ayse, Sevgi and I worked the morning shift. When I arrived, Ayse was at the vegetable counter preparing small salads to be sold that day. Sevgi, who soon became my Nanpej mentor, was arranging baked goods to increase the seductiveness of the display case. I asked Sevgi what I should do to be useful. She told me to stay at the counter and serve customers. To teach me the job, she quickly showed me how the cash register worked and enumerated different kinds of coffee and their prices. She then looked briefly for a sheet of paper, which she found in the drawer below the cash register. The paper listed drink prices for soft drinks, various brands of beer and other alcoholic beverages. The list was in a half-torn plastic folder. From the file's unpresentable appearance and the fact that Sevgi had to search for it, I understood that the paper was long-forgotten. They probably put it into use only when there was a newbie in Nanpej like I was on that day. Sevgi said, "the rest is just easy." However, I soon learned that there was much more to the job than knowing product prices.

I had worked in different kinds of student service jobs during my undergraduate studies although this was my first time working at a shop counter. Remembering my previous work experience as well as the ethnographies I had read about service labor, I greeted each customer with a big smile on my face. To display congeniality, I deployed variations of the polite German phrase "*bitte*" (such as "*bitte sehr*" and "*bitte schön*") and its numerously courteous meanings (such as "you're welcome," "here you are" and "how may I help you?") in almost every sentence I uttered. Most customers seemed to be pleased with my politeness and echoed my demeanor.

As I was being my most polite and amiable self, a middle-aged man approached the counter with comparable affability. We both had big smiles on our faces. He ordered a small cup of coffee in broken German. As I prepared the coffee, he asked whether I was new there.

To avoid being rude and talking with my back to him, I turned half my body to face the customer. I zealously replied "yes, I am!" as I set up the coffee machine. I brought the coffee to the counter with a stubborn smile stuck on my face. The client accepted his coffee with a similar expression. From my short experience at the counter, I had assumed that he would pay and leave the shop at this point. Yet, he started to ramble about how nice I was while he looked for his money. He went on and on as the money seemed to have been sucked into a black hole in his pocket. I kept my polite facial expression because I did not know what else to do. Yet, both his rambling and my friendly countenance had already become dull—to say the least.

Ayse interrupted her work at the vegetable counter and intervened. She approached and warned me in Turkish, "Don't be so nice! He is a pervert!" Having heard Ayse's foreign utterance, the man turned to her and let her know of the seemingly exciting news that I was new there and that I was a "nice/sweet girl." Ayse repeated his expression with Turkish curse words attached to the end: "*ja, ja, süßes Mädchen, süßes Mädchen, sapik seni!* (yes, yes, sweet girl, sweet girl [in German], you pervert [in Turkish]!)" Inattentive to Ayse's hostile demeanor, he kept on talking with a smile on his face. As they continued their monologues, I stepped back. He finally pulled the money out of the black hole in his pocket, gave it to Ayse and took off.

After he left, Ayse and Sevgi warned me about this "insatiable flirter." This "Yugoslavian road worker," as my co-workers called him, came to the shop almost every day. He hit on all the female workers without exception. By "flirting" and "hitting on," my companions referred mainly to this man's (and others') continuous compliments. (Although as I mention later, customers' uncalled-for behavior often took physical form as well; for example, this customer tried to hold a co-worker's hand during New Year's Eve.) Throughout my time in Nanpej, I heard this client call my co-workers "sweet," "cute" and "nice." On my first day in Nanpej, I was ignorant of this pattern and the need to adjust my amiability

depending on the context. Therefore, according to Ayse, I had acted foolishly. She perceived my ignorant over-niceness as encouraging this customer's unjustified attitude not only to me but also to other workers; hence her urgent need to intervene. This was the first lesson in a series of many from which I learned that the pleasing, agreeable behavior that is essential to service work was to be deployed contextually.

As was the case in Nanpej, *späti* workers adjust their proximity, niceness and wittiness according to customers' behavior. Workers and owners' understandings of their duties at these shops, their relationships with their bosses, co-workers and customers and how they interpret clients' acts (for example as friendly vs. flirty) shape these adjustments. By adjusting their own behavior, workers and owners tame customers. For example, if a man consistently tried to flirt with a female worker openly in Nanpej, he no longer received smiles or jokes but only the basic service of being handed his coffee with a cold "*bitte schön*" (here you go). Workers told each other about customers' inappropriate acts. Clients usually learned their lesson and stopped their excessive attention to workers. However, as was the case with the road worker, some customers did not understand that their behavior would not be tolerated.

This customer's wrong behavior raised tension even between Azad and his workers. On a late morning in February 2016, two female workers were chatting about daily matters. A usual subject in these regular talks were inappropriate things customers say and do. For example, on that day, my co-workers were discussing the impertinence of the previously mentioned road worker known among Nanpej employees as "the pervert." A female worker had told the others that on New Year's Eve he had come to the shop drunk and tried to hold her hand as they exchanged money. After reviewing this story and agreeing that ill-mannered customers are the weightiest hardship of their work, they moved to other topics.

As the chat moved from one issue to another, Azad came in. We instantly tidied ourselves up; I moved to the counter. He greeted each of us and walked towards the glass display case declaring that he was very hungry. My co-workers continued to converse as they

unloaded the dishwasher. Azad got a sandwich from the case and poured himself a cup of Turkish tea. As he walked back towards my co-workers on his way out of the work area, one worker asked him whether he knew what happened on New Year's Eve. He did not know the answer to this vague question and inquired back to her. Thus, she told him about "the pervert's" attempt to hold a female co-worker's hand. Azad tried to brush the issue off with a warm and emphatic smile and a soft "*ja*" (yes) half-affirming that the female workers' frustration was justified. He possibly just wanted to sit down, eat and not be involved in the matter any further. Azad moved past them holding his sandwich plate in one hand and a cup of tea in the other. One of my co-workers was not satisfied with this answer and told him that this had indeed happened and that the guy was without a doubt "a pervert." Azad avoided having to respond and walked to a table quietly saying "yeah, you exaggerate everything." He sat down facing the street with his back to us.

My co-workers started joking around. Pretending to speak to Azad, one worker playfully said to the other: "Why are you defending him? Oh, maybe, you two are lovers." They quietly giggled blocking their mouths with their hands and leaning towards each other forming a jocular feminist defense zone. Azad could probably hear their giggles and what the worker had said. Nonetheless, they had contained their verbal exchange and hilarity so skillfully that it did not show. If it were pronounced, Azad would possibly have to engage with them, which might have created unnecessary tension in the shop. Thus, they avoided a dispute but made sure that Azad was aware of their troubles with this customer and that his indifference to their complaints was not fair.

Azad, in general is a careful analyzer of social issues and a passionate defender of the rights of the oppressed. However, at this instance, he did not respond to his workers' complaints or try to understand the vulnerabilities his workers' gender exposed them to. My co-workers did not let it go. They responded to their boss' failure to take notice of their gendered problem with a gendered wisecrack—challenging his masculinity through a

homophobic joke. As this example shows, the customary affective labor expected from workers makes them vulnerable to harassment. The female workers of Nanpej tried to negotiate sexualized vulnerabilities with various strategies such as telling the boss about abusing customers and challenging his authority when he did not acknowledge the gendered vulnerabilities their affective labor created.

The Dark Side

Späti owners and workers regard rude customers, petty thieves and burglars as the negative aspects of their jobs. Such problems are more pronounced during the nighttime, which night-shifters perceive as inherently eerie. Nights are imbued with fear as well as imagined and real uncertainties. This affective coat can fall onto Berlin as early as 4 pm thanks to its early winter sunsets. It thickens after 8 pm when most other shops close. Night-shifters expect unpleasant interactions to unfold after dark and regard it as part of the job.

This is evident, for example, in the way a male bakery-*späti* owner talked about two young men who tried to rob his shop—one of whom was armed with a knife. In our interview, the shop owner narrated this instance simply as an expected side effect of work done at night. He told me that he chased away the intruders and that they "ran away faster than their incoming speed." He declared without hesitation that "things like that happen." Many night-shifters told me similar stories of not only driving away troublemakers from their shops but also protecting German women customers from stalkers and other nocturnal dangers, thus defending their neighborhoods.

Such heroic stories of business owners purging intruders and safeguarding their spaces can be interpreted as masculinity performances staged for female researchers. This interpretation is, of course, partly true. Male Turkish owners and workers I spoke to possibly had estimates about what I, a female Turkish researcher, would expect of them and presented

me with such accounts. Nevertheless, just like amiable exchanges, violent stories (many of which are factual) are a trope in the *späti* genre.

To illustrate, a female daytime *späti* worker echoed male workers' accounts in our interview. She stated that *späti* businesses, while manageable during the day, were troublesome at night. As an example, she told me about an acquaintance whose *späti* was robbed. Just as the male business owner narrated his experience with the intruders, the female worker also described this robbery as the unfolding of an expected event. Unlike the male owner, however, she emphasized the emotionality of the experience and added that her friend managing the *späti* was "frightened to death."

Nazim, a middle-aged man who works in his son's shop, likewise told me about his son fighting with an intruder after sundown. Nazim was out when the intruder came on one of their first days managing their *späti.* The violent story was already unfolding when he got back:

> [The intruder] comes inside. He looks at the *regals* [shelves]. There is a *privat* [private] room at the back; he goes inside. My son warns him. […] He [my son] says this in German, of course, but we later learn that [the intruder] is Turkish. [My son says,] "Don't go there. It is our private place. What business do you have there?" [The intruder] says, "Who are you?"; he says in German, "This shop is mine. This bike is mine." [Nazim laughs.] He stakes a claim to everything. In the meantime, I came back from the bank over there, from that side [points]. I saw people bustling about. […] My wife was here as well. She had panicked or rather she was frightened. I came. I entered. Then, I understood that he [the intruder] was Turkish. He looked German though. [He was] blonde. I said, "come, get out." He didn't want to get out. He had [gotten] blood everywhere. There was blood everywhere in the shop. […] Then came the *Kripo* (short for *Kriminalpolizei* meaning criminal investigation police). They took it [the security camera video]. […] Nights have such a risk. Therefore, one needs to

> work with one or two people. My son works on his own. Sometimes, a friend of his comes. A German friend. He just comes and sits with him. They chat. It's good for him [the friend] too. In any case, the shop is not open for 24 hours. As I said, they close at 2 [am] and leave.

Nazim's example reveals an unpleasant interaction between co-nationals in their non-native German. As Nazim stated, they understood that the intruder was Turkish only later. After doing an Internet search on the young man after he was hospitalized from the fight inside the shop, Nazim learned that he was from a city in Turkey's Black Sea region. Nazim talked about this piece of information both as showing kindred between the intruder and his family and as demonstrating that his co-nationals engage in violence.

Nazim stated that they never had such problems with Germans but "only with foreigners (*yabancilar*): Africans, Arabs and Turks." Nazim's narrative of the intruder reaffirms discourses suggesting that "the migrant," especially "the Muslim migrant," is an emotionally unstable and violent subject. Yet, he also reappropriated these discourses to position himself and his son as a mild version of this figure. To illustrate, his son did mobilize his brute force and his fury—but only to defend their space. His rage was legitimized by the fact that German authorities found the intruder guilty. The fact that this instance happened at night, which is understood as imbued with anxiety, fear and violent dangers, further justifies Nazim's masculinity narrative. After all, fierce times call for fierce measures. As the narrative goes, Nazim's son was bold enough to mobilize his fury and take appropriate action, although one that hospitalized the intruder.

Night-shifters postulate nights as risky not only because of possible violence and the scarcity of people on the streets to whom one might turn for help. Nights are uncertain and bring about possibly annoying encounters also because of increased alcohol consumption. Night-shifters posit alcohol as blurring clients' judgement and eroding their decency. They

report annoying confrontations with intoxicated customers as regular, unpleasant occurrences at night.

Cihan, a male *späti* owner, for example, described "problem customers" as the personification of the blurry and dicey temporal terrain of "the night." Morning clients, on the other hand, were his favorite because, as he put it, they knew what they wanted and bought it without unnecessary quarrel. Cihan commented:

> After a certain hour—especially in the evenings [and] on weekends—among them can be aggressive people. […] A guy comes having drunk five beers elsewhere. [He asks,] "Why is beer 1 *Lira* [Euro] at yours'? I got it for 80 *kurus* [cents] there." Try to explain this at 12 o'clock at night—to a drunkard. What do I say? "Well, *döner* is not [does not cost] the same everywhere either. It is 3.90 over there. There, he sells it for 2.50, right?" […] They argue with you over every penny at 12 o'clock at night.

Alcohol—otherwise a major profit source for *späti* owners—appears to poison the friendly demeanor of *spätis* at nighttime.

Cihan's comments should not be understood as a Muslim's opposition to alcohol consumption. Cihan takes pride in being a secular Turk and drinks alcohol. He mentioned, for example, that occasionally his wife spontaneously decided to have a drink and asked him to grab a bottle of wine on his way home. Cihan was not against drinking but was genuinely frustrated with having to negotiate with intoxicated customers who frequently dropped by his shop during the night.

Cihan's and other shop owners' accounts display annoyances as well as perceived and real risks emerging after sundown. This alarmed affective atmosphere mediated by darkness give meaning to this temporal realm. Night-shifters decide the terms of their nocturnal labor according to this semblance as in the case of night-shifters' sustained guard exemplified by Nazim's son occasionally having a friend in the shop during the nighttime. In other words, the

weighty sinisterness that transmits between city-dwellers' bodies on hazy and cold Berlin nights resonates in the way workers and owners labor in *spätis*.

Annoying and sometimes violent instances occurring at night provide especially male *späti* workers and owners a possibility to position themselves as "protectors of their spaces" be it their shops or their neighborhoods. By positioning themselves as such, they reappropriate discourses about emotional and violent Muslim masculinities. They posit themselves as embodying a mild, domesticated Turkish masculinity: not violent for the sake of violence but vehement–ready to act forcefully when necessary.

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Although *späti* work entails amiable labor, owners and workers do not perform pleasing emotions indiscriminately. They rather selectively mobilize affective labor in various forms (such as smiles and jokes) to varying degrees (including the withdrawal of amiability). They do so by interpreting customers' actions and situating them within webs of relationality that are socially, geographically and temporally dispersed and yet interconnected. That is to say, characteristics and consequences of *späti* exchanges transcend the spaces and moments in which they take place. Therefore, affective labor does not only actualize *späti* workers' job descriptions but helps owners and workers negotiate the various social relations in which they and their shops are embedded. In this sense, *späti* labor is productive social labor.

What is more, this labor is rooted in gender discourses and debates about Turkishness and Germanness that otherwise seem to be external to these shops. This quality of *späti* labor which brings social relationships to shop counters is in line with the intertwinement of work and non-work Freeman observes in the Caribbean (Freeman 2014). Just as in the case of Barbadian entrepreneurs who actively *make* contemporary neoliberalism by performing affective labor at and outside work, *späti* owners and workers negotiate gendered, intergenerational and inter-ethnic relations through their labor.

Moreover, this affective labor involves creatively playing with varying stereotypes about Turkishness such as "violence," "warmth" and "friendliness." The fact that German stereotypes about Turkishness pertain to such affects enables workers and owners of *spätis* to situate their affective labor as a manifestation of their nationality. The next chapter builds on this idea and discusses how the performance of labor in *spätis* helps generate various kinds of exchanges through which these shops become "friendly" spots in the neighborhood.

Ch. 6 – Exchanging Berlin

Some of the assumed differences between Turkish and German culture concern sociality and temporality. While "Turkish culture" is stereotyped by Germans as hospitable, friendly, generous and disorderly, "German culture" is stereotyped by Turks as cold, rational, trustworthy and orderly. Ironically, "Berlin culture" is stereotyped to be disorderly, chaotic and temporally flexible—opposing Germanness and leaning towards Turkishness. Material and social exchanges in Berlin's Turkish-run *spätis* help bridge the binary opposition between Turkishness and Germanness by actualizing the stereotypes on both sides. The social and temporal qualities of these exchanges constitute the culture work that simultaneously materializes Turkishness and Berliner-ness in these spaces. Moreover, through this *social* and *temporal* culture work, migrant workers and owners connect to the *place* where they live and work (their immediate neighborhoods and the city) and thus participate in these places' production.

In this chapter, I present data from my participant observation in Nanpej, observations as a customer and interviews with three male *späti* owners and a *späti* owner who manages his son's shop. The two aims of this chapter are 1) to establish the claim that exchanges between migrant owners and workers and their customers are central to the workings of Berlin and 2) to show how *spätis'* temporal arrangements are key to this centrality. These insights demonstrate that the economic life of migrant businesses and, relatedly, the labor performed in these spaces and the social realm of migrants' "host countries" are co-constitutive. This relationship between the economic and the social relies on the synchronization of the labor pace in these shops with the changing rhythms of the city and the recurring social interactions taking place in these shops. These different temporal qualities *actualize* different stereotypes about Turkishness and Germanness. For example, Turkish workers and owners employ dexterity, memory and speed as they perform seemingly cold, rational and speedy interactions in rush hour. This speedy service, despite its distant and

calculable appearance, involves empathizing with customers and understanding their need to leave the shop immediately. In this sense, temporal qualities of *späti* exchanges bring together the social and the economic as well as the migrant and the native. Moreover, Turkish workers and owners present the exchanges they partake in as producing Berlin's neighborhood culture. Thus, they claim that their labor produces their locality.

Späti Exchanges

I came home earlier than usual on one of the first warm nights of April 2015. I was dying to get rid of all the fluffy garments inside my coat: a second sweater, a wooly shell and a vest. I had left early during the colder morning to meet a friend. I had not anticipated it to be such a lovely, warm day. Everyone in Berlin seemed to be out enjoying the warmth. I hurried in to change and join them as quickly as possible. My three roommates were sitting in our large living room—host to many inevitably indoor parties during the cold winter. Baris had his legs crossed on the coffee table, tired from his never-ending term papers for his law and philosophy courses. Michael, who was at the time working for the German Federal Foreign Office, was happy to be finally home feeling at ease after all the serious business he had to deal with at work. Ceren's face was illuminated by her bright MacBook light as she patiently entered the last details of upcoming films onto a movie database for her part-time job. Everybody was tired but we simply had to go outside to enjoy the warmth. The gift of nature could not be refused. Like the rest of Berlin, we were eager to enjoy this warm night outside.

After speaking with some friends on the phone, Baris suggested that we spend the night at the tables in front of a *späti*. Ceren was overjoyed as she had asthma and did not go to Berlin's smoky, indoor pubs unless she absolutely had to. I was also happy to be at a relaxed shop instead of a bar where I would struggle to order at the counter as a tiny, soft-spoken woman with a weird accent. As if this were not enough, I would also have to pay at least two Euros more for my drink and probably end up having a boring night constantly struggling to

hear my neighbor at the table. If I were bored at the *späti*, I could just watch the youth and those with young hearts fill the streets.

We all agreed on Baris' proposition and threw ourselves outside. The streets of Neukölln were blooming. The warm air beckoned and everyone rushed out like flocks of ladybugs to revive their energies after the long Berlin winter. As we walked down the streets, I heard chatter in Arabic, English, German, Spanish and Turkish among many other languages I could not identify. The famous, lively Berlin scenes were coming to life to cover our memories of the mostly indoor lives we had led in the last couple of months.

After about a 20-minute walk, we settled at a *späti* where two of Baris' friends were waiting for us. We got our beers while a part of the group remained outside and kept the two tables. I picked my usual from the fridge, a bottle of Zäpfle, and went to the counter to pay. As I put the beer on the counter and my hand in my purse to find cash, the young man at the register asked, in German, whether that was all I would be purchasing. I answered that it was. He offered to open the bottle with the communal bottle opener attached to the counter with a rope. I happily accepted. He pressed the buttons on the cash register and said "1,30." I gave him two Euros. He handed me my change. After he returned my "thank you" with "you're welcome," he swiveled his chair turning his body to his computer and at once clicked the mouse. As I walked outside, I heard a woman and a man speaking sweet nothings to each other in Turkish, in a TV series that the owner was watching.

That night, we sat outside this *späti* as an international group for a few hours. We chitchatted about this and that. Some used the toilet in the *späti* to be able to continue drinking. Some of Baris' friends dropped by for a few minutes, shared their plans for the night and left. Some joined us for a bit longer. As we sat there, international people—Germans, Turks, Brits and so on—mostly young, came in, went out, and passed by the *späti*. The only stable thing here was the recurring scene of the *späti* guy serving customers. Sometimes he was disinterested. Sometimes he laughed, exchanging jokes with his customers before turning

back to his Turkish TV series. Looking at the *späti* guy from behind the random packages covering half of the shop window next to our table, I could not be sure whether the service, small chats with customers, or watching TV was the primary thing he was doing. Either way, he let us be outside on that lovely night on our student, part-time and temporary-work budgets simply by sitting in his swivel chair and selling us beer after all other shops were closed.

Späti owners and workers are known to be affectionate people; or, as an urban blogger puts it, they "run their *späti* with true love and passion" (Hübers 2015). People of Berlin often cite this friendly image as a reason for their fondness for *spätis* (see Chapter 7). Nevertheless, even a rather disinterested *späti* owner—for instance, an owner who exchanges jokes with customers only during commercial breaks of his favorite TV show—is crucial to the workings of the shop and the city itself. They are such key figures because they take part in different kinds of exchange (both commercial exchanges like the trade of snacks for money and non-commercial exchanges such as giving advice) without which people could not experience Berlin in the way that they do now—as in the case of our spontaneous excursion that early spring night, drinking beer on a budget at the *späti.*

These exchanges can be monetary market exchanges—the exchange of a few Euros for coffee, beer and everything else that *spätis* sell. They can also be non-monetary but material exchanges such as holding onto people's keys for their friends to pick up. Thirdly, they can be non-monetary and non-material transactions such as giving advice about navigating the city. Exchange in this sense refers to giving anything tangible or intangible to another person in return of an immediate, postponed or imagined benefit. This benefit can be money, advice, a possible good word put in for the shop and the possibility of future exchanges. Anthropologist Jenny White (2004) observes a similar phenomenon in Turkey where people do not necessarily exchange goods and services for their immediate or postponed return. Rather, they engage in exchange (such as in-store credits) because exchange

constitutes and sustains social relationships based on "mutual indebtedness" (White 2004, 26).

These exchanges, despite seeming different in content and form, have two common features that make them essential for Berliners. Firstly, these transactions mediate people's daily journeys as they get to their destinations. This mediation helps people sustain their daily lives. Stopping by *spätis* to get a cup of coffee before catching the bus to work and to get a bottle of wine before going to a house party make the journey smoother. Secondly, the temporal rhythm of *späti* exchanges and, relatedly, the labor performed in *spätis* reflect some of the hourly, daily and seasonal rhythms of Berlin and the neighborhoods where specific *spätis* are situated.

Thanks to the intended overlap between the rhythms inside and outside *spätis*, these shops augment customers' spatial mobility. For instance, during rush hours, *späti* workers work faster. This speed helps customers quickly get out of these shops and get to work on time. This is of course not how everyone navigates Berlin. The rhythms I analyze below are also not the only rhythms that neighborhoods and Berlin go through. However, and importantly, migrants—those who are typically deemed marginal and incurably isolated—are key actors in the workings of some of these rhythms that make up what is imagined to be quintessentially Berliner.

Exchanges beyond Economy

Scholars have contributed invaluably to our understanding of how migrant businesses augment the non-economic realms of life. Studies have shown 1) that businesses help newcomers survive in brand-new environments where it is otherwise hard to find well-paid jobs (Wilson and Portes 1980) and 2) that migrant economies consolidate communal relationships among migrants (Ling 2004; Zhou and Cho 2010). Nevertheless, with few exceptions (cf. Krohn-Hansen 2013), these studies tend to focus on businesses' influence on

non-economic aspects of migrant communities and less on their impact on the rest of their host society. Therefore, the effects of migrants' economic activities in the social life of cities outside of migrant communities remain understudied.

The rich anthropological literature on commercial and non-commercial exchanges emerged from a sensible quest to show the intertwinement of the economic with the social. While early works proposed that economic institutions of non-capitalist communities were embedded in shared cultural meanings (Douglas 1963; Malinowski 1922; Mauss 1990), more recent studies show that economic activities in various contexts including France (Bourdieu 1984), the Horn of Africa (Little, Debsu, and Tiki 2014), Shanghai (Hertz 1998), South America (Taussig 1980), Chicago and London (Zaloom 2006) occur in close interaction with social and political institutions as well as local, national and global circulations of meanings.

This scholarship builds on Marcel Mauss' (1990 [1923-1924]) influential work on gift exchange in pre-capitalist societies. In his conclusion to *The Gift*, Mauss designates social democracy as a form of gift exchange—challenging the prevalent idea at the time that Western capitalist economies exclusively relied on pure commodity exchange defined by rational calculations. A large part of the economic anthropology literature following Mauss further indicates that the two forms of exchanges are intertwined. On the one hand, capitalist economic relations involve and incorporate social exchanges and gift giving. For example, internal migrant women producing textile goods for export in workshops and at their homes in Istanbul may work longer than full-time hours even though they understand their labor as part of kin relations and obligations and not necessarily as work (White 2004). On the other hand, gift giving is not simply altruistic as most early economic anthropology literature had assumed. It includes calculations and expectations about long-term benefits that are otherwise only attributed to commodity exchange (Appadurai 1986).

Likewise, the commodity exchanges in *spätis* involve caring for customers by, for instance, anticipating clients' needs and helping them get what they need quickly and be at

work on time. Correspondingly, non-commercial exchanges in *spätis* involve predicting the commercial outcomes of these transactions. For example, *späti* workers and owners understand that they turn people into regular customers by doing them favors such as holding keys and letters for their friends.

Arjun Appadurai further brings exchange to the center of the production of the social in his introduction to *The Social Life of Things* (1986). Following Georg Simmel, Appadurai states that "economic exchange creates value" (Appadurai 1986, 3). That is to say, goods do not have intrinsic values. Their values are also not determined by demand and supply as forces external to them and as preceding the exchange like most economists argue. Goods, rather, gain value through their exchange. In other words, "exchange is not a by-product of the mutual valuation of objects, but its source" (Appadurai 1986, 4). Therefore, the argument that economic exchanges are embedded in the social is not a new idea even though transnational migrants have not frequently appeared as main actors (or their businesses as sites for these exchanges) in these stories.

Appadurai acknowledges that the people engaging in exchanges might have different understandings of commodities' values and that the consistency between these valuations can be different in different contexts. This valuation process and its consequences might also depend on the commodity that is being exchanged. Since the goal of Appadurai's project is to follow products that are exchanged in order to unearth their otherwise obscured centrality to social and political processes, he does not assess how processes of exchange alter the subjects engaging in exchanges. Likewise, he does not explore how these transactions are crucial to maintaining the social contexts in which they happen. I propose that the alteration and the maintenance of the context in which exchanges in *spätis* happen are key to understanding why people come to these shops and engage in these economic activities in the first place. To illustrate, many people understand *spätis* as sites that solidify a neighborhood feeling—making Berlin a neighborly city. In her video about "her second home," i.e. the *späti* next

door, the French journalist, Prune Antoine, for example, states that she casually meets her neighbors, whom she otherwise does not speak to, in her *späti* (*Der Alltag: Der Späti - Karambolage - ARTE* 2016).

Furthermore, the temporal regimes in which these transactions occur and which they in turn facilitate are vital to the importance of *spätis* for Berliners. For instance, many people shop at *spätis* during rush hours because they are in a hurry and cannot sit down and enjoy a cup of coffee in a café or wait in long lines to get a pack of cigarettes from a grocery store. The speedy service in *spätis*, in turn, facilitates the accelerated lifestyle of these customers. In this sense, ironically, Turkish migrants, who are stereotyped to be "casual," "unhurried" and "leisurely," assist the speedy rhythm of the German capital.

Appadurai accentuates temporality as a determinant of commodification because whether and to what extent something is a commodity depends on whether the thing in question was exchangeable in the past, whether it is so today, and whether it will be exchangeable in the future (Appadurai 1986, 13). Appadurai's assessment builds on Bourdieu's reading of Marcel Mauss' *The Gift* (1990), where Mauss surmounts the divide between gift exchange and economic exchange. Bourdieu proposes that calculation, which is seen as the basis of economic exchange, is also inherent in gift exchange. However, this likeness is not crystal clear to the inattentive eye because the return in gift exchange is not immediate like it is in commercial exchange. The gift is returned at a point in the future (Bourdieu 1977, 171). In other words, while both involve calculation and thinking into the future, the time intervals between the transfers of the first and second parts of the transactions differentiate gift and commercial exchange. This temporal dissimilarity and distance obscure their likeness even though they work in similar ways in principle.

Building on this insight, Bourdieu establishes temporality as central to social action. As he states in *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, to understand practice accurately, we shall "reintroduce time into [its] theoretical representation" because practice is "temporally

structured" and is "intrinsically defined by its *tempo*" (Bourdieu 1977, 8 emphasis in original). In her study of taxi drivers and their business clients, Sarah Sharma also introduces temporality as key to understanding this service work. According to Sharma, cab drivers' main job is to adjust to their customers' rhythms and maintain these frequent travelers' "temporal well-being" (Sharma 2014, 56). Just like cab drivers, *späti* employees "[synchronize] to the time demands of other populations' temporalities" (Sharma 2014, 57). This arrangement is evident in the now commercialized International Workers' Day. The mostly migrant *späti* workers get even busier on that federal holiday celebrating workers and their labor. They serve those enjoying the famously festive Berlin May Days, which consist mostly of concerts and drinking on the streets. Thus, the temporal dynamics of *späti* labor are key to understanding the exchanges that maintain the busy lives as well as the leisure of *späti* customers. That Turkish migrants are the agents of this labor underlying Berlin's rhythms demonstrates the contradiction in the assumed differences between "German" and "Turkish" cultures.

Synchronizing with the Neighborhood

Many *späti* owners and workers indicate that their businesses are deeply connected to the characteristics of their neighborhoods and that they decide on their opening hours according to the rhythm of life in their neighborhoods and in Berlin. This tempo is determined by what *späti* customers do in different times of the day and the week as well as in different seasons and kinds of weather. Moreover, this rhythm changes when there is an important event such as a federal holiday when people spend more time outside, or a soccer match that *spätis* can screen.

The specific location of each *späti* determines how these factors impact the business flow. For example, celebrations like the May Day festivities are more concentrated in Kreuzberg, the central, hip, gentrified neighborhood of Berlin, which was previously known

(and to a certain extent still is known) as a "Turkish neighborhood." Although it is forbidden for *spätis* to open on federal holidays, of which the International Workers' Day on the 1st of May is one, most of the *spätis* in Kreuzberg are open on May Days. Customers line up in front of half-open metal shutters to get their beer from these shops on their way to parks and concert stands. I have even seen police officers with uniforms waiting in lines in front of these half-open doors—probably without the knowledge of their superiors.

Späti owners intentionally adjust their work hours according to the fluctuating temporal rhythms of life in Berlin. They constantly observe their surroundings and the work flow and detect when commercial exchange might happen more in the future. To illustrate, Cihan has owned his *späti* for 13 years, which is centrally located across a park. He knows the neighborhood where his shop is located very well even though he lives in another distant borough. He knows the inhabitants as well as the characteristics of the visitors in his work neighborhood. As Cihan told me in our interview, his customer profile has increasingly internationalized. Especially young Spanish groups who study and look for jobs in Berlin have been frequenting his shop recently. Many of his customers like to grab drinks and spend time in the park across the roadway. His shop is the only *späti* this close to that entrance of the park. The shop's proximity to this recreational site and the store's easy visibility from the road are major reasons why clients come to this shop rather than others on their way to the park. Many of his customers drop by at his store, get drinks, cigarettes and snacks. They go to the park where people might be doing anything that one can expect from Berliners' limitless creativity. They chill, sleep, jog, walk their dogs, barbecue, sunbathe, dance and make human sculptures.

Cihan explains that he decides on the shop's opening hours in relation to his customers' changing behavioral patterns:

> I open around 12–1 [pm] and at nights [close at] 11–12. It depends on the weather. When it is warm, I even stay until 3 in the morning. Business depends on the weather […] The weather is a big factor in Germany.

I ask: "So, we are not that lucky today, right?" because it is cold, grey and gruesome outside with occasional raindrops. Cihan answers:

> Yes, exactly. It was great yesterday. Otherwise? It [the business flow] falls one hundred percent. People do not go outside. Nobody is at the park. People retreat to their homes. Cafés, ice cream places are all empty. Because of this, we need to earn a lot in the summer so that we can be comfortable in the winter. We work seasonally. The weekdays. Mondays start light. With each day, if it is warm outside, [the business flow] increases. Fridays are the best. Saturdays and Sundays [are also very good] because everyone works. They get fed up with work and want to wander about. People want to drink. It starts at 5 [pm], when everyone is out of work. Until Sunday evening the business is good. People picnic at the park. They blow off steam. They come and get their drinks [here]. The park of course has an enormous role. Not everyone has a garden or a house [with a garden]. 6 months of winter in Germany is just too long. It is not like in Turkey. I went to Antalya last year in the first month [January]. It was 20 degrees [Celsius]. I went on the plane. It was minus 15 degrees [Celsius] here. It changes 35 degrees. Can you believe? People go to parks here. That is good.

As Cihan states, his *späti*'s location across from a park is key to his workflow. His main customers are the people who come and grab what they need for their time in the park. His business flourishes when the weather is nice because people spend more time at the park when it is warmer. He tells me that during late hours, holidays and Sundays his shop is a destination for people to get a cold beer or a pack of cigarettes spontaneously. His work is directly connected to the changes in temperature, the seasons and the way people experience this neighborhood and the park.

In other locations, *späti* work can be less dependent on the weather but still contingent upon the changes in the rhythm of life in *spätis*' surroundings. They can, for instance, be directly linked to the daily temporal patterns of customer behavior. To illustrate, Ahmet, a *späti* owner who managed his son's shop alone everyday between 5:30 am and 10 pm, explained his scheduling decision in relation to the surroundings of the shop and the schedules of his customers:

> The reason why I open the shop at 5:30 in the morning is that, here, everyone goes to work around 5:30–6:00 [am]—unlike in Turkey, where work starts at 9 [am]. If I do not start at 5:30 but rather at 6:30, I would not get a single customer until 9 [am]. Because then, everybody would already be at work. They [the customers] need to have their coffee, newspaper and cigarettes at this point. If I can't serve them coffee, cigarettes or their newspaper, they would go to that other place that is open every day. I would lose them. Then, I would have to wait for the noon customers: those who come, go, pass by. If I close at 1 pm, say, for lunch break, I would miss the 3 o'clock shift of the hospital across the street. If I close at 8:30 in the evening, I would miss the 9 o'clock shift of the hospital. When the 9 o'clock shift changes, those who leave and those who come to work come [to the shop]. The reason I come at 5:30 in the morning is that everyone comes here with their packages on their way to work. In the evening after 7:30, people come here to pick up or leave their packages[38]… You need to think

[38] Ahmet's *späti* has an agreement with the German Postal Service. When postal workers cannot find nearby residents at home, they leave their packages at Ahmet's *späti*. He has a mobile postal delivery device. He scans and hands customers their packages. German Postal Delivery workers might even have a preference to leave these packages at the shops. Otherwise, they need to ring bells, wait to be let in houses, try to find the right apartment and climb stairs to deliver packages. The German Postal Delivery Service is known for its low wages, high workloads and generally bad working conditions for its carriers. When I was in Berlin, the delivery workers went on strike and had various methods to cope with their working conditions. Many of my friends were aware of this because their packages were sometimes not delivered to their addresses even though they were at home. They felt lucky when the postal worker left their packages at a *späti* in the corner and not at the post office, which was generally far away and had shorter opening hours. Also, there were almost always

about all of this.

Ahmet told me that he carefully observes the needs of his customers and makes sure that he provides them with the goods and services they need on their way to and from work. His *späti* is in a relatively quiet street where mostly families and the elderly reside. Other people come here to go to the hospital nearby. He rightfully thinks that he works enough and chooses to close the shop at 10 pm to avoid noise complaints and, as he states, to counter the problems that might arise from people consuming alcohol on the premises.

However, some other *spätis* are in livelier parts of the city. Even though there might be noise complaints at times, a fair amount of exuberance is the name of the game in these neighborhoods. Customers of the shops on the lively streets of these boroughs tend to live in and demand a different rhythm compared to Ahmet's clients. The owners of these shops choose to open specifically at late hours because this is the busiest time of the day in their neighborhoods. Selim, for instance, owns a shop in a gentrified borough known for its young and international population. In our interview, he stated that the busiest times in his *späti* are weekends and nights. Moreover, unlike in Cihan's case, Selim told me that his *späti* works even better during the winter: "Our place is especially nice in the winter. They [customers] use the back of the shop [a small room at the back] as a bar. They say, I would rather be here than at a bar or at a *kneipe* (pub). On weekends in the winter, here it is like doomsday." Selim proudly showed me pictures of a famous Turkish actor posing inside the shop from his Facebook page. The artist had heard about Selim's *späti* from his friends who had visited it. The actor decided to come by Selim's shop during a trip to Berlin. He stayed there until 6 am

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long lines in these offices especially at hours after work when everyone else rushed to get their undelivered packages. Holding people's deliveries is increasingly becoming a side job of *spätis*. Many *späti* owners state that they do not earn anything [or at least much] from this service; however, when people drop by at the shop for a package, they also buy goods that they need such as a pack of cigarettes. Serving as a local postal delivery center also helps *späti* owners learn more about their customers such as their full names and addresses albeit unintentionally.

and partied with Berliners inside the shop.

Spätis' synchronization with their customers' lives might sound like a simple and expectable profit-driven business decision. *Späti* owners are indeed business people who are concerned about their earnings. They make their decisions accordingly. However, there is more to the relationship between these shops and their surroundings than meets the eye. The temporal availability of these shops enables unexpected and serendipitous exchanges. These exchanges produce social value for their customers. As in the case of the Turkish actor visiting Selim's shop, *spätis* can be famous for their vibes that are frequently cited as Berliner qualities. In these cases, international customers can visit them as Berliner destinations. Sometimes, as in the case of Cihan's and Ahmet's customers, the seemingly simple commercial exchanges in *spätis* connect people to other places in Berlin including parks, schools, workplaces as well as night clubs.

Speedy Exchanges

The second temporal quality of these shops that augments people's lives in Berlin (*spätis*' synchronization with the lives of customers being the first one) is the quickness of labor. Speedy *späti* labor is essential to commercial exchanges that link people to other places. *Spätis'* quick service differentiates them from many other, mostly bigger shops where one needs to search through various aisles to find the products they need and go through long lines to purchase them even though big shops are usually cheaper. *Spätis* are different also from cafés and bars where one not only needs to pay at least twice as much for a coffee or beer but also must usually stay on the premises to enjoy their drinks. These limitations hold many people back from frequenting these spaces especially when they are in a hurry. *Späti* owners and workers can serve more customers than employees in supermarkets do at similar amounts of time because these customers buy fewer things here than they usually do in bigger stores.

Späti workers and owners execute certain skills such as dexterity and memory to provide a quick service and offer almost instantaneous transactions even in morning rush hours when urban dwellers hurry to get to work, government offices and other destinations of the day. Quick *späti* service helps customers maintain their busy lives by getting them to their destinations promptly or at least without wasting time in long lines. Thanks to these qualities, *spätis* are pit stops where people grab multiple things at a time such as a pack of cigarettes, snacks and a cup of coffee [39] on their way to work, a drink to relax in the park on a weekend, or snacks for special events happening in the neighborhood, such as local festivals. In this sense, this seemingly cold speedy labor contributes to the social life outside these shops.

This was the case at Nanpej as well. The busy-ness of the outside hustled up the work on the inside. I used to arrive a few minutes before 8 am just like Azad had asked me to. This was when he really needed a hand—right before the rush hour started. Usually, Sevgi, Ayse and I worked at this slot until Ayse left around 9 am as she mostly worked the night shift. The busy morning hours started usually with one or two customers. Suddenly, around 8:15 each morning, people rushed into the shop and formed lines that appeared to go on forever. While one of us, usually Sevgi, made coffee, or packed a croissant, the other one, usually I, was at the cash register entering what customers got, telling them how much they owed, taking the money, giving them change and immediately greeting the next customer in line. Sometimes there were even three of us behind the counter, one of us at the cash register, one at the coffee machine and one packing food.

[39] It might not sound like a big deal to buy these things together. However, *spätis* are one of the rare places you can do so, especially early in the morning and late in the evening after grocery stores are closed. For example, it makes sense for a person going to work to drop by at a bakery-*späti* and get coffee, a croissant, and tobacco from there because regular bakeries do not sell cigarettes. There are some big grocery stores with bakery sections where one can also get coffee possibly for a cheaper price. However, even when these bigger shops are open and one can buy everything from that one place, *spätis* are more preferable because shopping at *spätis* is less time consuming. In these big shops, a customer would usually have to go through a second line to get cigarettes.

At these moments, Nanpej workers behaved like fast-food workers—like McDonald's employees—the embodiment of rationality par excellence. Each worker completed a different task and did so efficiently—without wasting time. Customers also behaved like in a fast-food chain. They came to the counter one by one, said what they wanted, were given what they asked for, paid and left. In this sense, Nanpej, a migrant-run shop in Berlin, was a showcase of Weberian rationality.

In his famous work, *The McDonaldization of Society*, sociologist George Ritzer (2004) builds on Max Weber's theory of rationality and suggests that rationality dominates all spheres of today's Western societies. While Weber focuses on bureaucratization as a reflection of rationalization, Ritzer (2004) observes that rationalization symbolized in the fast-food service industry dominates life under contemporary capitalism. Ritzer calls this phenomenon "McDonaldization" and defines it as "the process by which the principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as of the rest of the world" (Ritzer 2004, 1). Ritzer notices in McDonaldization the rationalized elements Weber observed in modern bureaucracies: namely efficiency, calculability, predictability and control (Ritzer 2004, 12–15). Under this system, workers do not make decisions but follow already-set rules and serve in predictable ways (Ritzer 2004, 13). Workers' efficiency is numerically measured through the number of products sold and the time it took to sell them (Ritzer 2004, 12–15). Confirming Ritzer's account, sociologist Robin Leidner suggests that even "interactive service work"—"jobs that require workers to interact directly with customers or clients"—can be routinized (Leidner 1993, 1). Standardization in service work can be achieved through various strategies ranging from pre-written scripts to personalized flattery (Leidner 1993, 33–35).

Turkish workers and owners in Berlin actualize this Weberian rationality examined by scholars like Weber, Ritzer and Leidner in Western contexts. By supplying speedy exchanges, Turkish *späti* workers and owners bring about this efficiency and calculability associated with

Western societies. These rationalized qualities are frequently stereotyped as belonging to a calculable and distant "German culture." Yet, in *spätis* these characteristics depend on the labor that produces them, that is the speedy labor Turkish workers and owners perform. Thus, *späti* exchanges as a form of labor bridges the assumed divisions between the "slow Turkish culture" and the "speedy German rationality."

Dexterity

Beginning on my first day, I learned that interactions we had with customers had to be speedy, especially during rush hours. Worried and anxious customers demanded quick service; they simply had to catch the next subway to work. Their tension reflected in the speedy movements of our bodies and hands as we moved quickly in all directions within the small space behind the counter. It sometimes felt like we were dancing a spontaneous quickstep—magically without bumping into each other.

The speedy service did not mean that the job was easy as long as we were quick. On the contrary, it was particularly difficult for me to make good-looking, tasty *lattes* during those accelerated moments in my first days. It was a fairly complicated procedure, which seemed to me like rocket science at the time. Making a foamy, good *latte* necessitated heating the milk up to a certain temperature while holding the metal pitcher at a certain angle. I felt that I simply did not have the time to pay attention to do so. I was relieved with everyone asking for a cup of coffee and upset with anyone who wanted a *latte*.

Yet, on the morning of one of my first days, a customer did ask for a *latte*. I was a bit upset and worried but was determined to succeed. I tried rather than asking my already busy coworker for help. With careful concentration to the rising temperature on my hand placed right below the pitcher, I succeeded; the milk in the pitcher was glowing with tiny bubbles. I was so proud of myself finally having made a foamy *caffè latte* to go, I did not realize Sevgi was behind me looking at the coffee cup from over my shoulder. I thought she would also be

proud of me; yet, she was rather stressed out as I was occupying the coffee machine while customers were waiting. She said: “This looks great but I wish it was also fast. This is not a fancy café; it doesn’t have to be perfect.”

To find the balance between executing dexterity and speed that would produce a good enough *latte* in the first few weeks of my tenure at Nanpej was one of the biggest challenges of my fieldwork, especially when there was a long line of customers waiting. Yet, this balance between dexterity and speed helped the rhythm of life in Berlin carry on—be it daily, weekly or yearly. People arrive at their destination faster when *späti* owners and workers act fast enough to produce quick, good enough *lattes*, find the short, semi-light version of a brand-new type of cigarettes without a hitch and deal with cash register idiosyncrasies dexterously.

Memory

In addition to dexterity which is a main source of the speedy *späti* labor, memory is another crucial skill for the quick *späti* worker. Memory is essential for speedy commercial exchanges that turn people into loyal patrons. This, again, I learned, at the very beginning of my tenure in Nanpej. Many customers, regardless of whether they were to grab a drink and leave instantly or spend hours in the shop, immediately noticed my lack of the supposedly tacit knowledge of what they liked to drink. Owners and workers in *spätis* learn people’s faces, habits and preferences. They know which cigarette some clients smoke, for instance. They know what kind of beer or coffee some customers drink and whether they take their coffee to go. This knowledge enables speedy service.

To illustrate, Azad and Nanpej workers had a tactic to speed up their service. During busy hours, when Ayse was packing a croissant for a customer, Sevgi sometimes made coffee for the third person in line even without asking them what they wanted. This struck me as peculiar. It seemed very unconventional as, I thought, people might desire different things on different days. What if the predictable *latte* person wanted a regular coffee one day? Yet, I

quickly realized that workers' attention to customers' habits creates a deep sense of familiarity for both sides. The expression of attention establishes workers as experts and old-timers of the shop. It also gives the other party the feeling of being a regular, respected customer as they usually smile and accept the coffee already made without exchanging words.

It took me about a month to memorize the preferences of regular customers. Knowing their habits gave me confidence both because this knowledge established me as a legitimate figure at the back of the counter rather than a clumsy amateur and because I felt that I was of use to Azad and the workers as well as the customers. One day, I and a middle-aged German woman said, "a big coffee in a cup and a nougat croissant" in unison, reiterating her usual order together. We immediately burst into laughter. Replicating Azad and Sevgi, I also made two cups of cappuccino for the price of one cappuccino and one cup of coffee every time I saw an old regular Turkish customer and his wife come inside for their morning routines. Through these gestures, which are at times non-verbal, workers make these shops regular stops for their customers and build relationships even with clients who use *spätis* as pit stops and engage only in commercial exchange (i.e. not in more evidently compassionate non-monetary exchanges).

I learned this in my first encounter with a middle-aged male customer who used to come to the counter almost every day to get a cup of coffee. The first time I encountered him, he looked at his phone right after saying "one coffee, please" and leaving the coins on the tray. He seemed to be in a hurry and uninterested in interacting with me. Previously, when people asked for an unspecified coffee, I followed up with clarifying questions such as "small or big?" and "for here or to go?" Many said "the regular" or "my usual," which obviously meant nothing to me as a newbie. Some responded, "I guess you are new" without answering my question. Observing how my co-workers dealt with unclear orders, I started to balance accuracy and speed by occasionally skipping these questions to keep the service quick. For the non-specifiers who seemed to be rather disinterested, I usually prepared small coffees to

go, which were, according to my observations, the most frequently demanded drinks. It always worked except for this one time. This customer, I thought, seemed not to want any interactions with me and did not care so much about the size of his coffee because he had already turned his back and was looking at the door as if he wanted to leave immediately. I also assumed that he would have said, "one *small* coffee to go, please" if he was a regular customer. However, this time, I was wrong. This man was a regular customer who was always served his usual order quickly, sometimes without even exchanging words.

Sevgi saw me preparing a small coffee for this client and warned me that he *always* drank a big one. I set the small coffee aside and made him a big one realizing that this seemingly easy job demanded various skills including a memory to remember regular customers' preferences even if they do not spend any time in the shop. I handed the man his coffee and changed his two Euros for 30 cents. He took the coins and left them in the tip box. I was confused even more as I had received my first tip although I had almost given my first tipper a wrong sized coffee.

Later, I realized, tips were not a reward for good service as they are in many other gastronomy jobs. In Nanpej, almost no one bothered to leave tips. This was not surprising because tipping is not common in Germany. Also, workers frequently used the coins in the tip box when there was no change left in the cash register. My first tip was not about my service; this customer always left the 30-cents change in the tip box. Perhaps, he did not like to carry coins. He always ordered "one coffee," gave two Euros and did not make much eye contact. He also avoided physical contact and always left the coins on the penny tray on the counter from a certain height. The coins falling onto the plastic Coca-Cola penny tray always made a clinging noise.

This rather cold encounter occurred repeatedly between him and me and other workers. On one of those days, while I was wiping the glass baked goods display, this same man approached the counter talking on his cellphone, seeming very busy as always. Sevgi

saw him approach and made his large coffee without exchanging any words. As expected, she put his coffee on the counter. The guy dropped the coins into Sevgi's palm while holding his phone to his ear with his other hand. Sevgi entered the amount, 1,70 on the cash register and pressed "cash." The register opened. She put the two Euros in the register, got the 30 cents change. Then, she inattentively dropped the coins in the tip box. Sevgi and the man stopped for a moment, looked at each other, and burst into laughter as they realized Sevgi had given herself the usual tip the guy used to give her. She offered to give him back the 30 cents by putting her hand in the tip box but he refused it with a gentle hand gesture. The seemingly cold, distanced and memorized sequence of ordering, preparing and handing coffee and putting the tip in the box was this time interrupted by the warmth of laughter.

As was the case with Sevgi and this customer, customers become regulars because they are provided what they need quickly and accurately. Moreover, a relationship between workers and clients forms even if customers and workers might not even need to engage in conversations. I do not argue that customers and workers all are confidants. Even though this can also be true (for example, my co-worker Sultan Abla was dating a former customer), my main argument here is different. I rather argue that the fact that customers can get what they need from these shops and move to their next stop easily and quickly opens a road for future visits to the shop and imminent monetary and non-monetary interactions.

This relationship can also be the other way around. Customers can frequent a place because they know people working there, benefit from the quick service provided and continue coming to these places. For example, as I was working in Nanpej, my roommate Baris occasionally dropped by and got something quick to eat on his way to the university or the library. He knew about this shop and had been to Nanpej before I started working there. Nevertheless, the fact that I was working there made him drop by even more frequently. He liked to grab a delicious baked good—something that is too complicated to make at home, especially for a busy person in his mid-twenties who never spends his days inside. Besides

being the social butterfly that he was, he studied at two departments at the same time and was a research assistant in the meanwhile. The occasional croissants and *pides* Baris got from Nanpej were periodic alternatives to his usual mixed juices accompanied by a bowl of muesli with yogurt that he prepared early in the morning around 7 am. He usually left the house after an hour of reading the news and chatting with Michael over morning coffee about a rap song he came across the other night, new racing bike frame models and whether Kant's moral law was applicable to the crazy story on the front-page of the newspaper. Unless the weather was gruesome, he biked to the university. If it was too rough to ride his bike, he took the subway, changing trains twice. After school, he usually had dinner with friends and did not come home until late evening. The speed of the service in Nanpej was key to Baris' occasional visits on weekday mornings as this dispatch assured that he would arrive at school on time. He got to see me and got something to eat which made his austere journey to the other side of the city more bearable if not pleasant.

As I have shown, monetary exchanges in *spätis* are key to people's speedy mobility in the city. In this sense, their effects go beyond profit-driven market transactions happening at these shops. Baris' casual visits to Nanpej, for example, meant that he did not need to spend time to prepare breakfast but could use this time to chat longer with Michael or to study. Non-monetary exchanges in *spätis* also have significant consequences for *späti* workers, customers and the city of Berlin that are not evident at first sight. Just like speedy monetary transactions, non-monetary exchanges help make people regular customers and help businesses flourish. What is more, the outcomes of these exchanges are not confined to those directly related to the workings of the shops. They are key to reinforcing the neighborly identity of Berlin and reproduce Berlin's self-proclaimed *multikulti* and lively characterization.

Exchanges with no Immediate Monetary Aspect

Fun times and friendly encounters occurring at *spätis* are repeatedly cited as an essential part of *kiezkultur* (neighborhood culture), which is understood as a Berlin specialty. Most of these exchanges depend on continuing interactions between *späti* customers, workers and owners. Through these persistent interactions, trust is built between the people of *spätis*. Although trusting relationships can form when people use *spätis* as pit stops, the times when customers mostly hang out at these shops are especially important for relationship building between customers and workers as well as among customers.

The hang-out mode in these shops usually occurs when rush hour dissipates. For example, after around 9:00 am on weekdays when rush hour customers were on their way to work or already at work, Nanpej switched to this hang-out mode. Workers were still busy and customers did keep coming; yet, they were no longer rushing to catch the subway or hurrying to work. The lines were usually shorter. Even if a customer arrived at the shop in a hurry, the air of urgency they brought did not continue for long. Customers took newspapers from the stand and read them as they sipped their coffees and teas. Some put the newspapers back in the stand after they were finished; some paid for the newspaper as they got their second drink. Many sat outside, smoked a cigarette, chatted with friends and watched people come and go. Some worked on their computers. This was when employees socialized more with customers as well. I observed this pattern in other *spätis* too. Especially *späti* owners who smoked got out of their stores at these moments and chatted with customers sitting at the tables in front of their shops. Non-monetary exchanges including these pleasant interactions and leaving house keys, packages, books, letters and even plant seeds at the shop for friends to pick up are frequently cited as reasons for people's frequenting *spätis* and evidence for *spätis*' centrality to neighborhoods. As these transactions are repeated over a period, they create long-term social effects such as developing friendships and trust between the people of *spätis*.

Figure 12: Plant seeds that a customer left in a shop for a friend to pick up.

Such material exchanges with no immediate monetary aspect provide an important layer for establishing relationships in these shops. For instance, in Nanpej, one of my co-workers and a taxi driver whom she called "older brother" (*abi*) often chatted back and forth about different Islamic figures. She was very curious about Imam Ali's daughter and asked the driver to bring her a book about this religious figure. In another instance, during the Ramadan Feast, we decorated the counter with Turkish cologne and candies, as is customary during Ramadan in Turkey. Our Muslim and non-Muslim customers happily participated in this representation of the giving tradition during this time in Turkey. Giving small gifts, such as chewing gum, especially to children, is a usual practice I witnessed also in other *spätis*.

Workers, owners and customers cultivate relationships based on trust through such favors. Giving in-store credit is a usual practice that validates this trust. By deferring payment, *späti* workers and owners show their customers that they trust them, and, conversely, by returning owed money, customers prove that they are trustworthy. Many owners see these kinds of trust-establishing practices as investments for the future both in monetary and non-monetary terms. For example, Nazim explained how his shop differs from shopping malls, big grocery markets and chain bakeries that do not have such an affectionate atmosphere. For him, giving customers in-store credits was one way of going beyond the purely material relationship. Nazim stated: "They [the customers] sometimes don't have money to pay. We give them credit and they pay at the end of the month. This culture doesn't exist in big businesses." *Späti* owners tend to refer to in-store credits as proof that earnings are not the only things they care about and that they are indeed deeply invested in building relationships with their customers and making life easier for them.

Hasan, one of the *späti* owners who suffered significantly from the Code Enforcement Office's pressures to close the shops on Sundays, further explained:

> You know, Berlin receives a lot of students. They live in *Wohngemeinschafts* (shared flats). When they don't have spare keys, they bring us the key. They put it in an envelope. We write who left the key [on the envelope]. The person who is picking it up must have an ID. We don't give it [to a person] without an ID. We don't want to betray their trust. A lot of –let me not say customers but rather a lot of friends – leave [their keys] here. A lot of friends come and say: "I don't have money." I give them, say, ten Liras [Euros]. Then, they do bring it back… There is a cash machine outside. If they withdraw from it, if they withdraw ten Liras, the machine takes five Liras from them. I say, no. There is this [established] trust between us. I say, take this. Then, they do bring it back. Or a lot of them want to pay with a card. I say, take it. You can bring it [the cash] later. When they bring it, there is always something in return. If they got something for one Lira, they sometimes leave two Liras. You can go to 1,000 *Zentrums* (shopping centers) or 1,000 big markets; not even one would do this.

Hasan gave me multiple examples. He told me about holding keys for customers, people who grab a lighter and bring it back later without paying for it as well as clients who get the milk and flour they urgently need from his shop even though they do not have cash at the time.

While Hasan was describing these favors and their returns, a woman entered the shop in a hurry. She got a snack but did not have enough change. She said, "I'll come back later," and left. Hasan got really excited: "See, you are experiencing this live. She is a flight attendant. [He knows her from before.] She does not have cash now. Nothing. [She did not need to say anything to explain why she could not pay], she just said 'I'm going.' You experienced it live. In which other shop can you do that?"

Hasan's examples demonstrate that such exchanges in *spätis*—monetary and non-monetary alike—enact the neighborly atmosphere and the laid-back culture that are seen as essential features of Berlin's identity. Thus, the exchange of *material* objects facilitated by Turkish migrants helps cultivate *social* relationships between diverse customers, owners and workers as well as *symbolic* value for the German capital.

Non-material and Non-monetary Exchanges

Spätis are also hubs for non-material and non-monetary exchanges. For example, at *spätis,* people get their information about neighborhoods and the city. Advice about the fastest way to travel to another part of the city, the location of other cheap shops, or what to do when a landlord creates trouble helps residents of Berlin navigate the complications of city life more easily. For instance, while I was talking to a male *späti* employee in his 20s who embraced the shop where he worked in as his own, a man came and inquired about a job. The employee later told me that he was a migrant from India who lived nearby and that they had talked about hiring him as a worker. The employee told the Indian man that there would not be a vacancy soon, but a kiosk owner in another district would need a worker and he was the top one on their list. As with this employee, *späti* workers as well as owners provide customers access to their networks, through which they gain information such as job opportunities that they would not know otherwise.

Späti owners and workers also help their customers at times when they need it, especially concerning products for sale in the shops. To illustrate, a lot of *spätis* sell prepaid phone cards. They usually have an account on dealers' websites and get a code for each prepaid phone credit purchase. Customers need to enter these codes in their phones to make them work. I have seen many (mostly old) customers whom *späti* owners and workers helped because they could not figure out how to enter these codes in their phones.

Spätis are also places to access service providers for those who do not know the neighborhood or Berlin very well. Pelin, a female Turkish doctoral student, for instance, told me she got all the information about maintaining her house, such as where to get cheap household tools and find a painter—information that she would get from her neighborhood corner store in Turkey—from her *späti*. Indeed, a customer in Nanpej had asked me whether I knew someone who could repair washing machines. I also translated a letter for a regular customer working at a nearby restaurant and told tourists how to go to Brandenburg Gate when the subway was not working. Another case in point happened as changes were made to the fees for not doing military service in Turkey. This was a major topic of discussion between workers and customers. One of my co-workers' husband had paid the discounted amount of 1,000 Euros. She suggested customers do it too.

It is important to note that such non-material exchanges do not only benefit the customers. Reciprocal relationships among the people of *spätis* are part of the treasured neighborhood culture that is attributed to Berlin. To illustrate, Gabriela, a female co-worker of mine in Nanpej, used to work at a bank before coming to Berlin from Bulgaria through marriage. Working at a shop where seemingly no qualifications are needed is hard for her. She yearns to find a higher status job preferably at an office. However, she sees her elementary German as an impassable obstacle although she can speak multiple languages, including English and Russian. She is anxious to speak German in official contexts as she thinks she speaks poorly even though she has other experience that makes her qualified for a white-collar job. Gabriela told me that it was a big help to her to receive German language assistance from an English friend who worked at an NGO for migrants. She got to know him as a customer in the shop. This friend helped Gabriela when she needed to deal with German bureaucracy by, for instance, giving her advice about where to get and how to fill out the necessary forms and even by accompanying her to government offices.

These reciprocal relations are sometimes described in kinship terms, which make the labor involved in these relations invisible. For instance, Nazim, who helps his son manage his *späti*, described how he and his customers shared their problems. For him, this was the importance of a *späti* for the *kiez* (neighborhood). He laughed and told me in German that they were now a family: "*Wir sind eine Familie*." Workers, owners and customers use these kinds of family and friendship metaphors while describing these spaces as central to the neighborhood culture in contrast to the anonymity of almost all cities. My Turkish friend Pelin, for example, was always eager to tell me about *her* previous *späti*, where the owner's eyes shone brighter with each beer she and her roommates bought. The owner, whom Pelin called "older brother," would occasionally join them drinking in front of the shop, chat about daily matters and give them advice.

As I discuss in the next chapter, the warm, welcoming and friendly feeling symbolized in these kin terms is part of the *späti* charm as opposed to the distant, cold and rational interactions in more formal shops. Berliners cite this feeling as fundamental to the character of their city while workers and owners present their labor, which produces this feeling, as essentially Turkish. As I will show in the next chapter, these characteristics and feelings are not natural qualities of Turks. Continuous labor and effort are imperative for Turkish-run *spätis* to cultivate and maintain their reputation of being quintessentially Berliner and Turkish spaces.

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Späti exchanges have social value. This is true both for commercial and non-commercial exchanges. This value derives from their temporal and social qualities. Customers see these Turkish-run shops as Berliner spaces because they are temporally flexible and because they facilitate sociality. Thus, they reinforce Berlin's image as a city of neighborhood culture and temporal freedom and liveliness (ostensibly unlike many other German cities where life on the streets supposedly ends a little after sunset). Quick commercial exchanges

combined with non-monetary, amiable exchanges make up the pleasant *späti* vibe that attracts people to these shops. The temporal regimes of these shops and the city are in this sense co-constitutive.

Späti owners and workers shape their labor in accordance with their immediate environment and the city as a whole. This work of shaping labor involves temporal arrangements such as changing hours of operation according to the rhythms of their neighborhood, events taking place nearby as well as the weather. In this way, these *temporal* adjustments tie Turkish workers and owners to their *place* of work. Moreover, the co-existing speed and sociality of *spätis* affirm and challenge cultural stereotypes about Turkishness and Germanness. This culture work helps bridge the boundaries between these two cultures assumed to be bounded wholes.

Ch. 7 – Making a Migrant Shop, Making Berlin: The Intertwined Work of Foreignness and Locality

Spätis are ethnicized, nationalized and culturalized as "Turkish"—and, relatedly, as "migrant" and "foreign"—while simultaneously being localized as "Berliner." Although these qualities can appear as inherent to these shops—happening naturally without effort and labor—they are, in fact, conditional and fragile. They need to be performed and re-performed on a daily basis. Even though these performances are not always conscious attempts to make such appearances, they create the effect of being seen as simultaneously foreign and local. The making and remaking of these shops are all at once practice and discourse based. That is to say, people carry out Turkish and Berliner identities through certain practices and talk about these spaces correspondingly.

In this chapter, I present data mainly from interviews with two male *späti* owners, my participant observation in Nanpej and observations as a customer in *spätis*. I argue that *späti* workers, owners and customers materialize discourses about "Turkish practices" and "the neighborhood culture of Berlin" simultaneously. They also *do* these "Turkish" and "Berliner practices" and act according to these discourses. In other words, they both reflect and create these Turkish-Berliner practices. This loop between *the discourses about practices* and *the practices of these discourses* eventually crystallize these practices as simultaneously Turkish and Berliner. The creation of Turkish-Berliner culture depends on these practices which I call "diversity work." Through this work, "diversity capital"[40] is accumulated in these shops. I define "diversity capital" as a collection of markers of difference that generate value. In the case of *spätis*, linguistic and sensory indicators constitute these shops as "foreign" and *thus,* Berlin as "diverse." This work involves aesthetic labor, social labor and labor that actualizes Berlin's "neighborhood culture." This "diversity work" creates a feeling of neighborhood

[40] Political scientist Blair Ruble (2005) defines "diversity capital" as "a city's capacity for urban social sustainability." I rather focus on the production of "diversity capital."

intimacy (entailing friendly encounters between diverse people) which appears to be naturally Berliner.

The first moment I realized the effort and labor through which the seemingly natural friendliness of *spätis* comes to life was when a German friend and I were walking on a summer night in Kreuzberg, now the hippest previously "migrant neighborhood" of Berlin. We went into a *späti* to get beer. This was an overwhelmingly colorful shop with neon lights on the outside, and almost as bright on the inside. The flashy packages of products you would see neatly organized into segments in a supermarket merged here in a 500-square-foot shop. The turquoise green of *Berliner Luft* (Berlin's peppermint liquor), purple of Swiss chocolate, yellow of toilet paper and the blue of the Turkish evil eye all created an oddly pleasant cacophony. As opposed to the vivid landscape and the happy pop song playing in the background, which is the usual *späti* ambiance, the *späti* worker was silently dusting the floor when we entered. Upon seeing us, he sighed and went to his seat at the back of the counter without responding to our enthusiastic "hi!" We did not debate about which beer to get and quickly picked up two Berliner *Kindls* as we felt the guy simply wanted to be left alone. He scanned the beer, said "*zwei vierzig, bitte*" (two forty, please) looking at the door behind us. We gave him the money and left.

The *naturally* welcoming image of the *späti* had collapsed. My friend said, "this is the saddest *späti* I have ever seen." It was the first *sad späti* I had ever encountered. Even the flashy decoration, upbeat music and our inclination to see *spätis* as happy spaces could not obscure the fact that the worker did not want to do emotional work. If the image of friendly *spätis* were to last, it had to be continuously actualized. In other words, the impression that these are essentially happy shops is a result of workers and owners' repetitive practicing of *spätis*' representations as happy places. In what follows, I analyze *späti* workers and owners' labor that create the cultural qualities of such spaces that make them simultaneously Turkish and Berliner.

Performativity of Migranthood and Locality

The labor needed to establish *spätis* as simultaneously "Turkish" and as "Berliner" show that these shops' being migrant and local spaces are contingent upon workers' performance. These cultural performances emerge out of the Turkish migration context. Research has shown that cultural identities emerge, develop and are negotiated in other migration contexts as well. For example, Glick-Schiller demonstrates that Haitians in New York City who do not necessarily share a culture come together for political interests because the New York City political system favors "ethnic label[s]" (Glick-Schiller 1977, 29). Ethnic and national identities are also not universal and can be formed when a group encounters institutions such as the state that understands them in identity-based terms (Rouse 1995). In her research on the development of Indian identity in New York City, Lessinger (1995) shows that ethnic identities can also form outside of institutional contexts. Indianness, for example, is created in this way, through consumption patterns and cultural and artistic products (Lessinger 1995). On the other hand, Stafford demonstrates that meanings of race and ethnicity are not static. For Haitians, these meanings are constantly changing. These changes reflect in the ways people behave and form relationships between and within groups (Stafford 1987). Soysal (2001), likewise, demonstrates that these transformations do not necessarily stem from a single identity but can form from a constellation of various sources of identification. To illustrate, the Turkish youth in Berlin do not simply belong to an Islamic or national group as they are depicted in most popular debates. On the contrary, they deploy various local, regional and global discourses and engage with numerous institutions such as local cultural projects to cultivate a migrant youth culture (Soysal 2001).

This chapter is situated in this literature and introduces migrants' businesses as significant spaces for these negotiations and performative actions. These processes are repeated continuously. The co-creation and resulting inextricability of Turkishness and Berlin-ness is a performative process. That is to say, the illusory naturalness of these

"Turkish" and "Berliner" shops is the resulting impression of various recurring acts such as repeated friendly labor. Performative in this sense does not simply refer to performances; this would entail already existing roles that people act up. I rather follow Judith Butler's (1999) understanding of performativity. She thinks of performativity as *effect* rather than display. In her phenomenal work, *Gender Trouble*, Butler takes issue with the conventional idea that gender is an identity reflecting one's innate characteristics. For her, this supposed naturalness constituting gender identity is the effect of certain repetitious acts. To illustrate, as I repeatedly act in certain gendered ways (for example, by wearing a skirt and sitting and walking in a certain way again and again), other people understand me as a woman. My reiterative performances create a feeling of consistency and naturalness and the effect that I am seen as a gender. Therefore, gender is not naturally static but is understood as such.

Repetition creates the impression that these acts naturally stem from an innate identity. This temporal dimension is key to gender's appearance as natural. Butler explains:

> Gender ought not be construed as a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a *stylized repetition of acts* [emphasis in original]. The effect of gender is produced through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and styles of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self. This formulation moves the conception of gender off the ground of a substantial model of identity to one that requires a conception of gender as a constituted *social temporality*" (Butler 1999, 179 emphasis in original).

Therefore, according to Butler, the answer to the conundrum of gender lies in what seems to be the ordinary and its repetition. As certain (mostly unremarkable) bodily expressions are repeated daily, they come to be perceived as part of a timeless "gendered self" (Butler 1999, 179).

The usually unquestioned impression that *spätis* are migrant and local shops comes into existence in a similar way. *Späti* workers and owners execute "a sustained set of acts" (Butler 1999, xv) on a daily basis such as chatting with customers and wearing modest clothes. These acts come to represent these shops and their simultaneous foreignness as well as localness. Although these qualities appear to be "an 'internal' feature" (Butler 1999, xv) of these shops, the people of *spätis* "anticipate and produce [them] through" (Butler 1999, xv) their labor. The repetition of these actions eventually creates a "hallucinatory effect of naturalized gestures" (Butler 1999, xv). Ethnographic attention to the daily life in *spätis* can help uncover this "hallucinatory effect" of what seems to be the ordinary (Butler 1999, xv).

Performing Labor, Accumulating Capital

In *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (1984), sociologist Pierre Bourdieu provides further insight into *why* people repeat taken-for-granted acts such as the reiterated gendered behavior Butler examines. For Bourdieu, seemingly implicit practices such as a confident body posture with shoulders pulled backward and taken-for-granted dispositions such as a taste for French impressionist art are social products that make a person part of a certain social class. These learned traits constitute and create different forms of capital, "understood as the set of actually usable resources and powers" (Bourdieu 1984, 114) that help draw class boundaries. Diverging from conventional understandings of capital that focus only on material resources such as monetary wealth, Bourdieu's theory lays out other forms of capital such as economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital.

While economic capital refers to financial and monetary resources, social capital consists of resources one obtains through being part of certain social groups. Cultural capital, on the other hand, "includes long-standing dispositions and habits acquired in the socialization process, the accumulation of valued cultural objects such as paintings, and formal educational qualifications and training" (Anheier, Gerhards, and Romo 1995, 862).

These different forms of capital can be converted into each other. Together they form one's habitus and reproduce the divisions between social classes.

Scholars have built on Bourdieu's influential work and have added to our knowledge other forms of capital. For example, sociologist Loïc Wacquant shows that boxers accumulate "pugilistic capital" to be successful within boxing culture (Wacquant 2006, 123). African American boxers in Chicago employ various strategies to accrue this bodily capital. These strategies include "wrapping their hands" in certain ways, wearing certain ointments and following a specific diet (Wacquant 2006, 128). As Wacquant (2006) shows, the bodily capital compiled through such practices and the continuous labor of training involved in accumulating bodily capital can eventually be converted into a victory in the boxing ring and thus, into monetary capital.

Sociologist and women's studies scholar Rhacel Salazar Parreñas (2001) further emphasizes the labor needed for cultivating capital. As Parreñas shows, Filipina hostesses in Japan accumulate bodily, emotional and cultural capital through "bodily labor, aesthetic labor, emotional labor, storytelling and acting" (Parreñas 2011, 98). For instance, some hostesses tell customers emotional stories about the economic difficulties they face in the Philippines and, thus, evoke pity (Parreñas 2011, 103–6). Parreñas understands the emotions induced in customers through this emotive work as "emotional capital" (Parreñas 2011, 103). This emotional capital is transformed into economic gain for hostesses as many customers end up helping them financially (Parreñas 2011, 106). Moreover, this emotional work also helps make customers into regulars and thus creates value for the hostess clubs (Parreñas 2011, 105–6). Different forms of labor performed in *spätis* and different kinds of capital accumulated in these shops generate value for shop owners, workers *and* Berlin in similar ways.

Linguistic Capital

Gabriela and I were working alone in Nanpej that late morning. I was wiping the tables with a wet cloth and collecting the empty cups and glasses left at the makeshift counter next to the column in the middle of the shop. Gabriela was at the counter serving customers and arranging baked goods once clients were gone and she was free. I saw a young man approach the counter and start talking to Gabriela. After some twenty seconds Gabriela called out to me. I approached the bench dividing Gabriela and the man who was showing her something on a page in a book. Guiding him towards me, Gabriela said in Turkish: "She shall help you. She is Turkish."

Gabriela left smiling, happy that she had transferred this task to me—a task that seemed too difficult to her. I was curious. The man who seemed to be in his early thirties turned the book's cover to me with his index finger still holding the page which he had shown Gabriela. It was Orhan Pamuk's *Benim Adim Kirmizi* (*My Name is Red*). He told me with a good Turkish grammar seasoned with a German accent: "I am reading this book but I cannot understand what it says here. What does '*kili kirk yarmak*' mean?" I stopped for a second and thought of easy words to explain this witty idiom to this German speaker who seemed to be an enthusiastic learner with a narrow vocabulary. It roughly meant that someone was going over something very carefully by comparing this action to dividing a hair into forty pieces. I tried explaining the nuances in German but he was determined to continue speaking Turkish. After he took some notes next to the idiom on this book which I thought was extremely difficult to read for a non-native speaker, we went through a few more words that he had underlined.

He thanked me after he was finished with his vocabulary check. He was more than welcome. Although a German person learning Turkish is not unheard of (most of my German friends knew at least a few Turkish words while some were almost fluent), I was impressed with him learning a foreign language this enthusiastically. After all, he had searched for

native speakers of Turkish in this German city to further his proficiency. Be that as it may, it did not seem like his search was that difficult. How had he known to look for Turkish speakers at Nanpej? In other words, how was it apparent that the people in this shop spoke Turkish? Why had he randomly approached a worker and assumed that she would be Turkish? I asked him how he had known. He thought for a few seconds as it probably seemed like a curious question without an easy answer and replied: "But this is a Turkish shop, isn't it? I don't know. I just knew."

I had previously heard many German friends loosely refer to a variety of shops and the people working in them as "Turkish." The seemingly tacit knowledge that these were "Turkish shops" puzzled me. I started a slightly modified Ship of Theseus thought experiment[41] in my mind. How did Nanpej maintain the image of a Turkish shop? Adding Gabriela, a Bulgarian woman, to our shop—to be called Ship of Azad[42]— (instead of the Ship of Theseus) for our logics experiment—had obviously not transformed it to a non-Turkish shop in the eyes of the young man. How about the fact that the owner, Azad, was ethnically not Turkish and, on the contrary, identified strongly as Kurdish? What were the planks of the Ship of Azad that made it a Turkish one?

I looked around to see if there were obvious signs making the shop a Turkish one. Everything including important messages such as "self-service" and "please return your dishes" were written in German. Unlike in many other shops where Turks are employed, there

[41] "Ship of Theseus" is a paradox frequently used in philosophy classes to discuss identity and change. As the story goes, Athenians were grateful to their founding hero, Theseus, so they kept and protected his ship to preserve his memory. However, they had to replace the ships' planks one by one because the pieces slowly decayed. After most of the planks were placed, the paradox emerged: Now that most of its pieces were different, could Athenians still consider this ship to be the Ship of Theseus? If one were to make another ship from the replaced planks, could that be considered the Ship of Theseus as well? The paradox raises the question: When does a ship (or an object, a person, an identity) ceases to be itself if its components are being replaced with others? What are the fundamental elements of that ship, person or identity without which that entity cannot to be itself?

[42] Azad is the name of the owner of Nanpej, and the Ship of Azad refers to Nanpej.

were no evil eyes[43] hanging on the walls of Nanpej either. Surely there were baked goods from Turkey but also from France and Germany. We sold Turkish newspapers next to German ones, but kiosks in subways and train stations did so as well. Similarly, we had "Turkish drinks" like *ayran,* but big chain grocery stores sold them too. There was even a small Santa Claus figurine sitting on the cash register greeting customers which could confuse them about the nationality of the shop, but obviously it had not worked.

Although many small businesses in Berlin are owned and managed by people from Turkey, the "nationality" of these businesses—however odd this concept might be—is not given. This image depends on the constellation of various qualities, including Turkish being the lingua franca of a shop. This "linguistic capital," accumulated through recurrent utterances in a specific language and its visual and audial presence (via signposts, menus, background music and so on), help give shops a cultural identity. This was the case in Nanpej. Even though our boss was Kurdish and one of our employees was Bulgarian, we spoke Turkish amongst ourselves. This practice combined with visual cues such as Turkish baked goods possibly led the Turkish-learning customer to "just know" that Nanpej was "a Turkish shop."

Azad and Gabriela also speak with customers from their ethnicities in their native languages, Kurdish and Bulgarian respectively. Another Kurdish *späti* owner that I interviewed also greets some of his German customers by saying "Rojbaş!"—a rather formal "hello" in his native tongue, Kurdish. He told me smiling: "I also teach them Kurdish." The linguistic capital accumulated in *spätis* thanks to the diverse ethnicities of *späti* workers and owners marks Berlin as a diverse, cosmopolitan city. This linguistic variety always includes German. Thus, linguistic difference does not mark these spaces as niche economies serving

[43] The evil eye charm (*nazar boncugu*) is believed to protect one from bad luck. People wear these little charms in miscellaneous ways, as bracelets, necklaces and earrings, and hang them in their homes and workplaces against adversities. Although it is usually associated with Turkey, it is used in many Middle Eastern and Mediterranean countries.

only migrants. This difference rather contributes to these spaces' appeal as consumable products of Berlin's diversity.

Sensory Capital

The diverse sensory capital accumulated in *spätis*, defined as visual and aural qualities convertible to economic capital, signify these spaces as belonging to Berliner diversity. The alluring sense-scapes of *spätis* are the product of constellations of migrants' personal histories, seductive capitalist marketing and serendipity. This capital contributes to the production of Berlin's cosmopolitan aura. This cosmopolitan appearance does not only attract customers to these shops but also makes Berlin an attractive, diverse city.

Figure 13: A *späti* decorated with items from a relative.

Owners' intentions to appeal to as many people as possible, from all genders, ethnicities and nations, contribute to this colorfulness. This contribution mainly comes from

the variety of packages placed on shelves as well as the gifts and stickers from companies that owners and workers place around their shops. To illustrate, one can see plastic *ayran* (Turkish yogurt drink) containers painted in white and blue placed on top of brown beer bottles next to a stylish green bottle of Polish Zubrówka. Newspaper stands featuring Berliner, German, Turkish and sometimes other international papers are frequently placed close to the door if not outside. This variety combined with evil eye charms, the most frequent signifier of foreignness in *spätis*, generate a joviality influenced by many nationalities.

Some *späti* decorations also contribute to a feeling of coolness with their internationality. For example, the shop in Figure 14 was deliberately decorated with colored stickers, an orange guitar hanging on the window as well as black and white pictures of famous international figures such as Mother Teresa, The Doors, Jack Nicholson and Johann Sebastian Bach. The owner told me that the previous proprietor had designed the shop this way. He realized that customers really liked it so he did not change it much after he took over the store.

On the other hand, some of the *späti* decorations that make the stores unique in accordance with Berliner colorfulness are serendipitous purchases or contributions from kin and friends. To illustrate, a *späti* owner who spoke proudly of decorating the shop himself did not think of buying foreign symbols like evil eyes, but, for him, a clean and neat look was the most important thing. The most notable foreign signifiers in his shop were paintings on the walls that featured agricultural landscapes and a young girl with a loose rural headscarf. The owner had bought these during a charity sale of a prison to help the imprisoned. The owner of the store in Figure 13 told me that the model ship sitting proudly on top of his drink shelves came from his aunt. It was not a gift, though. His aunt was deep cleaning her house and decided to throw away this ship which she thought was ugly. He thought otherwise and put it in his shop's seat of honor.

In addition to the visual richness, the soundscapes of these shops also contribute to their being seen as joyful Berliner spaces. While in some *spätis* Turkish, Kurdish as well as American music is played, Azad made sure that the local, rather light *Radio Berlin,* which mostly featured pop songs and Berlin news, was always on in Nanpej. This was more than trivial to our customers. One day when the Internet stopped working, a German regular made this clear when he inquired impatiently about when the radio program was coming back.

Figure 14: Black and white pictures of various famous figures on top of multicolored drink bottles in a *späti.*

Figure 15: The Turkish evil eye on top of multicolored German candies on a *späti* wall.

Aesthetic Labor

On an early afternoon in April 2016 a tall, young, blonde woman with short hair entered Nanpej. She was wearing head-to-toe black. Under her extra-long, stylish trench coat was a mock-turtleneck pullover. The coat belt hanging from the sides almost reached the top of her Chelsea-shaped ankle boots. She looked like she had just gotten out of a Berliner techno club, where black was the semi-official color. While I was helplessly admiring her, she approached the counter. I said "*bitte schön*" (yes, please) just like I would say to anyone when I was not sure whether they spoke Turkish, in which case I would say the same words in Turkish. She told me in broken German that she had come to ask if there was a vacancy. I was surprised as I had thought that she was probably there to get a coffee to help her wake up from her long weekend of partying. Although shocked, I told her that she needed to talk to our boss. I showed her the table on the corner where Azad was sitting with a few friends.

She walked away from the counter and approached the men who were talking heatedly. After turning his attention to her and talking for about a minute, Azad stood up, came to the counter and asked for his phone which he had left around somewhere. I started looking for it. He had probably sensed my curiosity about the woman as he said: "She is Swedish. She wants to work here." He was confident that she could not understand Turkish. I asked whether they had agreed on a starting date. He chuckled quietly, "she is too much of an intellectual for us."

What did this mean? I was not sure whether I was to be happy to have made it to the counter unlike this woman who could not or whether I was supposed to be offended because I did not seem intellectual enough for Azad to reject me as a worker. I restrained my emotions and asked him what he meant by that. Azad answered: "You know, with the hair and everything (*saci basi*). She wouldn't fit in here. Our customers would find it strange (*müsteriler garipser*). I am going to call Nedim to see if he has an opening." Nedim was a Kurdish friend of Azad's who managed a hip café themed around fancy, expensive coffee

with cakes, bagels and pastel-colored cushions on distressed wooden benches. According to Azad, the Swedish girl with short hair and a nose piercing did not fit the aesthetic needs of our shop but would supposedly fit the hipster café's.

Azad's rejecting this job candidate was not about her not *being* Turkish but because Azad thought that her *looks* did not fit the shop. This rejection was not an isolated case. A German friend of mine in her mid-twenties, had previously told me that she had applied for a job in a Turkish grocery store a few years ago. Although pretty confident that she would get the position because it did not require any qualifications, she got rejected. The manager had told her that she could not get hired there because she did not speak Turkish. She later found a very similar job at a hip bakery. I could not be sure whether her language palette or the way she looked (her sartorial practices were very close to the Swedish woman's) was the reason for her being rejected; it was probably both.

Bourdieu states that the body is not a natural entity but rather "a social product" (Bourdieu 1984, 192). It is "sign-bearing, sign-wearing" as well as "a producer of signs" (Bourdieu 1984, 192). That is to say, the way bodies appear (beautiful, aggressive, well-built), what they carry (clothes, accessories, piercings) and the way they are held (through posture, gestures, body language) not only reflect the social group one belongs to but also constitute the essence of the social group itself. Bourdieu explains:

> Strictly biological differences are underlined and symbolically accentuated by differences in bearing, differences in gesture, posture and behavior which express a whole relationship to the social world. To these are added all the deliberate modifications of appearance, especially by use of the set of marks—cosmetic (hairstyle, make-up, beard, moustache, whiskers etc.) or vestimentary—which, because they depend on the economic and cultural means that can be invested in them, function as social markers deriving their meaning and value from their position in the

system of distinctive signs which they constitute and which is itself homologous with the system of social positions" (Bourdieu 1984, 192).

Scholars have built on Bourdieu's work on the direct relationship between people's sartorial and bodily practices and their social class and further demonstrated the labor needed to sustain these aesthetic images. The aesthetic image of businesses, for example, depends on the labor performed by workers. Witz and colleagues conceptualize this labor as "aesthetic labor" through which workers display and make an organization's image (Witz, Warhurst, and Nickson 2003, 33). Rhacel Parreñas also shows that Filipino hostesses in Japanese night clubs display their bodies in certain ways so that they correspond to different clubs' aesthetic codes (Parreñas 2011, 99). To illustrate, hostesses control their "weight, skin tone and physical appearance" and dress either modestly or provocatively depending on the club (Parreñas 2011, 99). Sociologists Christine L. Williams and Catherine Connell, on the other hand, suggest that upscale retailing companies employ workers who are already prosperous and can invest money in their middle-class looks (Williams and Connell 2010, 350). As Williams and Connell argue, the brand images of these upscale companies rely on the aesthetic labor of these workers including their "deportment, style, accent, voice, and attractiveness" (Williams and Connell 2010, 350). In other words, the bodies of these white, female middle-class workers help constitute the aesthetics of their workplaces.

Like the middle-class salespeople of expensive department stores who produce the upscale image of these shops, the sartorial practices of the workers in Nanpej helped make the shop both "migrant" and "Berliner." These practices were gendered, practical and more or less harmonious. They usually wore dark-colored jeans, cardigans and short- or three-quarter–sleeved t-shirts. Long sleeves caught dirt. Therefore, workers usually rolled up their cardigan sleeves. The dark colors created a reserved look while hiding stains. If my co-workers were preparing food, they also wore a black half apron. Ayse was religious and dressed more conservatively than the others. She always wore a headscarf and a short black t-shirt on top of

a sweatshirt. On the other hand, Sultan Abla and Gabriela were a bit more experimental in their clothing selections. Fitting with their frisky personalities, they sometimes wore slightly colored (such as dark red) mildly laced blouses and ballerina shoes with little heels whereas the others wore sneakers and sometimes slippers. Everyone wore eyeliner, albeit mostly unnoticeably. Sultan Abla and Gabriela sometimes had a little face powder and lip gloss on, especially if they came to work after being elsewhere such as a bank, the doctor's or more frequently a government office. Despite some variation, workers' clothing reflected the needs of the job.

I thought of my attire in Nanpej as practical as well. I wore sneakers at first and changed to professional slippers that chefs and nurses also wear with the suggestion of my orthopedist after I developed foot pain from standing for long periods of time. Although Sevgi told me that she wore my slippers when I was not around one day and that they were unbelievably heavy, I was happy with my unaesthetic work shoes. I designated two cardigans (one short grey and one long patterned chestnut), three baggy t-shirts (two black and one grey) and two jeans (one black and one grey) as my work clothes. I did not wear these garments elsewhere as they absorbed all the odors in the shop and gave back a dreadful, rancid smell that I could not completely get rid of even after rigorous washing. This stench was a leader in complaints that I heard from many friends who worked in places where things were baked, cooked, brewed or where cigarettes were smoked. The workers of Nanpej were no exception. Sevgi and Ayse agitatedly agreed when I first complained about the persistent pungent smell of my coat not going away despite pertinacious airing. This was why they only wore their old clothes to work. They advised me to do so as well. One co-worker used to even jokingly say that her husband could not get near her if they met right after work. Getting these clothes to smell at least neutral if not fragrant after a rigorous day at work was a challenging issue for all of us.

These garments were designated, expendable clothes containing the acrid odors of work. Workers chose these old garments as work clothes also because of their obscure dark colors and mostly plain designs. The dullness helped create a modest look. One reason for the pursuit of this timid display was to avoid sexual assault. This cautious appearance fit with the aesthetics perceived as Islamic, conservative, Turkish and relatedly migrant-like. Workers did not necessarily have the same style outside of work. On the contrary, they usually dressed up. For example, Sevgi used wax and gel to treat her hair and followed the wet hair trend on her naturally curly hair.

Workers' simple, practical clothes aided in their attempts to balance their emotional labor with a guarded look. Sultan Abla linked her sartorial choices to Nanpej's being "a Turkish shop" where the risk of sexual assault from customers (and potentially owners and other workers although this was not the case in Nanpej) is high. She had previously worked in various other shops managed and frequented by Turks as well as Germans. To her, sartorial practices were a big factor that differentiated "German" and "Turkish businesses" from each other. She told me several times that she could even wear miniskirts in her "German workplaces" (referring to shops owned by Germans as well as those frequented by Germans). As she commented on the reasons for her "brave outfit," she recognized that "she was young back then" but, more importantly, her attire did not impact either customers' or owners' attitudes towards her. She loved to dress up at the workplace. However, she discontinued to do so. Sultan Abla stated that if she put on similar clothes in a "Turkish shop," she would not be able to survive a day without being sexually assaulted. She told me stories about being sexually assaulted by shop owners and warned me multiple times that not every business owner was like Azad who would never do such a thing. Azad had even cautioned her on one of her first days in the shop. He had told her that their foreigner (*yabanci*)[44] customers simply

[44]*Späti* workers, owners and many Turkish migrants use the word *yabanci* as a generic term to refer to all non-Germans excluding expats. It translates to the controversial German word

were not used to women with risqué clothes serving them in a store. They would have other expectations. Sultan Abla understood this as Azad's brotherly care rather than him governing her as a boss.

Shops like Nanpej which rely heavily on the selling of baked goods employ women who appear modest. Some of these women like Ayse dress religiously but religious attire is not a requirement. Men employed in *spätis* wear t-shirts, shirts and jeans just like women workers of Nanpej. However, men usually do not comment that they contemplate deeply about their attire and dress in relation to what they perceive as the requirements of their Turkish/Berliner workplaces. A *späti* owner once commented, though, that he was happy to live in Germany because he could wear anything he liked unlike in Turkey, where all eyes turned to him if he wore shorts.

People's sartorial decisions derive from multiple factors as was the case with women workers in Nanpej. In the workplace, these include the needs and requirements of the job and of the institution as well as what workers expect from their work. In turn, dress patterns can give people an identity and the institution a character that distinguish them from others. For example, as Freeman (2000) shows, data entry operators in Barbados embody professionalism and a middle-class identity through their fashionable dress patterns. These "pink-collar" women's "enactment of conformity and style" also distinguishes the informatics sector from other industries such as manufacturing where more relaxed clothing is seen as fitting (Freeman 2000, 214). Likewise, as Peletz demonstrates, black business suits of the high status personnel in Malaysian courts create the feeling of a professional atmosphere while most dominant narratives portray Malay courts as Islamizing and returning back to tradition (Peletz 2013). Moreover, as Chio's study on rural ethnic tourism in China shows, these sartorial practices can stem from the expectations of consumers as well as the way the job is

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Ausländer meaning "foreigner." The word signifies Turks and the people from the Middle East in general as well as Eastern European Roma. This racialized word is used especially when *yabancis* are to be criticized.

understood and constructed as in the case of ethnic attire being used by performers in tourist towns (Chio 2014).

Similarly, Azad chose workers whom he perceived as dressing in ways that fit Nanpej. The relatively reserved attires of Sultan Abla and other women workers derived from a variety of factors including what they perceived to be the conditions of the workplace: wearing t-shirts and jeans to be able to move easily and as a way to deal with foreseen problems such as issues of sexual harassment. This continuous contemplation demonstrates that aesthetic labor emerges from a careful study of the requirements of the job, expectations of owners, customers, and co-workers and anticipations about the effects of certain attires. Nanpej's female workers' aesthetic labor in turn created the culturalized image that this shop was indeed Turkish.

Social Labor

In addition to aesthetic labor, social labor that is culturalized as "Turkish" also materialize understandings of Turkishness in *spätis*. Social labor refers to the cultivation of sociality between workers, owners and customers.[45] Turkish owners and workers present their social labor as deeply connected to their being from Turkey. These purportedly Turkish qualities are mostly social and emotional traits such as friendliness and warmth. They use these supposedly "Turkish characteristics" of their social labor to differentiate their businesses from other shops.

Scholars have shown that discourses about Germanness, Turkishness, Islam and the Orient structure the way Turkish migrants understand and represent themselves. For example, in *Stolen Honor*, Ewing (2008) demonstrates that the contemporary democratic and gender equal German identity is built on the abjection of Muslim men as violent, gender unequal and

[45] Marx introduces the concept of social labor to emphasize the social nature of work *as* a human activity. I rather use the term to emphasize that sociality is both necessitated by and a product of workers' labor.

disrespectful to human rights. She provides a case study of the honor killing controversy in Germany and how stigmatizing discourses about Islam and Turkish culture helped shape how Turkish young men thought of themselves and reacted to such instances. For example, she reads the widely-circulated comments of some Turkish school boys (about a Turkish woman purportedly "deserving" her murder) as being shaped by the institutions that marginalize them. She suggests that stigmatizing discourses are taken up by Muslim Turkish men and become a marker of their identity. In this sense, their words and actions are influenced by the daily discrimination they face (Ewing 2008, 179). Ewing rightfully argues that the totalizing and disgracing discourses about Turkishness create the conditions in which Turks represent themselves. However, Turks also take up positive qualities assumed to belong to "Turkish culture." One of Ewing's German–Turkish interviewees, for example, suggests that he combines the traits of Turkish "hospitality," "friendliness" and "helpfulness" with German temporal order in his hybrid identity (Ewing 2008, 114). *Späti* workers and owners' bringing together sociality and speed (see Chapter 6) likewise bridges the assumed binary opposition between "German" and "Turkish" cultures.

Turkish business owners and workers deploy such traits as readily available positive attributes. *Späti* workers and owners appropriate these discourses that paint Turkishness as hospitable, generous and cordial to prove the importance of their shops for Berlin. They also perform these traits, thus realizing this reputation and creating the effect that the Turkish culture is such. Hasan is a great example. For Hasan, the pleasant interactions between customers and workers are possible thanks to the social qualities of *späti* labor, which he relates to workers and owners' being Turkish. For him, "Turkish" refers to anyone coming from Turkey:

> As we are a society on the side of friendship, I do not discriminate in terms of identity – [I mean] *we,* as a society [anyone from Turkey] … Friendships were born here [in these shops]. When friendships are born, trust is born […] For example, there are two

> Italian women living in this building right across. They come in the middle of the night and say "I need this." This has to have a foundation. You cannot go and ask for help for no reason. You cannot ask for something from someone for no reason. There has to be a foundation, and the foundation of this is friendship. It is tolerance. And our society has all of this. I think that we slowly and calmly transferred this to the German society. Were we aware of this? No, we really succeeded in that without realizing it.

In our interview, Hasan emphasized multiple times that trust was the basis of his relationship with his customers. For him, this trust stems from the friendliness of the people from Turkey. Hasan specifically talked about *spätis* and their work as cultivating relations and trust between them and the residents of Berlin. This quality differentiates them from bigger stores that, according to him and many other business owners, do not value trust and friendship. According to Hasan, due to this lack, they supposedly cannot provide the neighborhood feeling that *spätis* provide:

> My customers come and leave their keys. They say, "my friend is at work." Or they come and go, leave a note. We have earned the trust of 90 percent of the people on the streets, people living in the neighborhood […] Who could go and leave their keys at a big shopping center? Or when you are short of one Lira [Euro] change, I don't think that they would give you anything at a gas station. We do and it comes back to us […] If one hundred customers come and get a lighter, ninety-nine of them come back. Since we have established such beautiful relationships, we have provided such a beautiful atmosphere […] As we do this [our jobs], we don't hurt anyone's feelings. For example, if you go to a big shopping center, if you don't have money the answer that they give you, I am sure, offends a lot of people. We don't do this […] Of course, we also have problems. It sometimes happens. We take a hard line with customers but they understand us.

Hasan's claim is not an isolated case. I have heard such claims from many owners and workers who connected Turkey with interactions in their Berliner shops. For example, Selim, likewise, related these practices to Turkey's small business culture *(esnaf kültürü)*. According to him, small business owners need to establish themselves as trustful figures to be able to continue this culture. As he told me, like in many other *spätis*, his customers also leave him their house keys for their friends to pick up. For Selim, this established trust demonstrates that he has successfully proven himself to be a fitting small business owner (*esnaf*).

Customers' and workers and owners' sustained pleasant exposures to each other make such mutual trust possible. Workers, owners and customers get to know each other when clients frequent these spaces over long periods of time. As I have discussed in Chapter 6, "Exchanging Berlin," trust is essential especially for the in-store credits that customers get in *spätis*. Such exchanges are key to the neighborhood feeling owners, workers and customers enjoy and declare as a Berlin quality. What is more crucial for my argument here is that Hasan and many other owners present in-store credits without interest (*veresiye*) as a practice introduced to Germany by Turks. As Hasan comments on the relations between him and his customers and the distinctiveness of in-store credits, he further associates these credits with his identity as a Turkish migrant in Germany:

> How should we call this? Customer relations? Friendship? Trust? We, as a society [do this], be sure, this is not only me. Most of my colleagues do this [give in-store credits] as well. Most of my friends do it. I think that this brings our identity to the front. I really don't think that there was anything like in-store credits (*yazdirma*) in the German society 10–20 years before.

Hasan's words show that he understands his social labor (culturalized as Turkish) as serving Germany. This form of postponing payments for regular customers of which Hasan speaks is indeed commonplace in Turkey. During my time growing up in a small Turkish city in the 1990s, small business owners had credit notebooks (*veresiye defteri*) where they noted

customers' debts. The word Hasan uses for these credits "*yazdirma,"* meaning dictation, gets its name from this practice where clients have store owners write their debts on these notebooks. People with low-paying and irregular jobs depended on this practice.

Nevertheless, not all business owners were fond of giving these credits. Many store proprietors also hung a famous picture jokingly indicating the risks involved in *veresiye*. This illustration had two men in it. The one on the left was a worried looking skinny business owner with torn clothes and the other was a chubby man with a fancy suit whose full safe-deposit openly showed that he was much better off than his colleague who gave people credits. The picture divided into two read "one who sells *veresiye*, one who sells cash" (*veresiye satan, pesin satan*).

Despite being a contradictory practice among the businesspeople who are themselves not necessarily well-off, *veresiye* is a common practice especially among Turkey's working classes. Many scholars have shown that these credits without interest help the urban poor get by in Turkish metropoles. For example, as Özyegin observes in her seminal work on the doorkeepers and maids in Turkey, internal migrants with irregular incomes frequently open credits in neighborhood stores. One of Özyegin's informants, Nermin, for example, depends on credits to purchase food for her family of six (Özyegin 2001, 185). In their insightful work on the co-existing neoliberal forms of urban wealth and poverty, Candan and Kolluoğlu describe *veresiye* as an economic practice "based primarily on trust and negotiation" as well as "personal and informal networks and relations" (A. B. Candan and Kolluoğlu 2008, 23 n. 40). Continuous positive interactions create trust. Owners presume that patrons will pay their debts on time. Customers believe that owners will continue giving credits. Otherwise, they would have to look for other stores that work with credits. Candan and Kolluoğlu (2008) show that especially since the early 2000s, lower-class neighborhoods, where close relations between people could persist, disintegrated due to the involuntary relocation of the poor to insular housing projects. Long-term connections could not easily form in these new

settlements and the ethnic tensions between Kurds and Turks residing in these areas rose. As a result, *veresiye*, the economic practice essential to the survival of urban low-incomers, deteriorated (A. B. Candan and Kolluoğlu 2008, 23).

These particularities and changes show that this practice emerges out of a need, and its continuity is conditional upon social relations formed as a result of spatial closeness and long-term interactions. Furthermore, these credits are contested among small business owners as is reflected in the witty pictures showing the unpleasant results of giving credits without interest hanging in many shops. I have even seen one in a Berliner *späti* albeit only as a joke. Moreover, similar practices of delayed payments occur in various other countries too (Fafchamps 1992).

In this sense, these in-store credits are not unique to Turkey or universally practiced there. Nevertheless, Turkish owners and workers frequently cite *veresiye* as a Turkish practice. Business owners are of course aware of the complexities of this practice. Their intention is not to misrepresent the reality but they deploy this association of trust-establishing practices with Turkishness to claim a "migrant space" in the German capital. That is to say, the association of their shops with this identity gives business owners legitimacy as "ethnic shop owners" in the Berlin economy of beer, coffee, Turkish tea and other pleasantries. The reiteration and sustained performance of these discourses in return solidify the idea that these practices indeed belong to Turkish culture and that Turkish shops are spaces where this culture is manifested.

Hasan further represented his social labor—caring for customers, chatting with them and eventually building connections—as establishing an accurate picture of Turkishness and as eliminating prejudices against Turkish migrants. For him, this transformation is possible because workers and owners form relationships with the residents of Berlin. He explains:

> There used to be prejudices. There was prejudice against our society, against us. Many of these prejudices, for example, were overcome thanks to us [*späti* workers and

> owners]. We have great contacts with Germans, the French, Italians and with the English now. For example, I went on a holiday, I left the shop to a Brazilian woman. She was my customer. She managed the shop [...] You would not hand your belongings to someone you just saw. I have known this woman for a long time. Because she comes here and shops here frequently. If there was no trust, would you leave someone the key to your apartment?

For Hasan, the trust formed between him and his customers (as in the example of his Brazilian client) alters the relations between Turks and other groups and the way others perceive Turks. As he states: "We, the Turkish society, were maybe, long ago, a society treated as second or third class. Be sure that thanks to these businesses, maybe it is not reflected [in the media and political debates] as much but we became a society that is appreciated." Thus, for Hasan, the interactions in *spätis* do not only represent Turkishness but also bring about positive attitudes towards Turks and transform the relations between Berlin's diverse groups.

The Labor of Berlin's Neighborhood Culture

Späti customers, workers and owners continuously state that *spätis* are central to Berlin and its neighborhood life. A *späti* owner once jokingly told me that he was the headman (*muhtar*) of his neighborhood and that he knew every single person living nearby. Likewise, customers see *spätis* as spaces constitutive of a Berliner serendipity through which the stranger in the neighborhood becomes familiar in a casual fashion. For instance, in the culture/lifestyle section of an Amsterdam-based urban blog, Stefanie Hübers writes:

> It ["a visit to your local *späti"*] is almost a family visit. […] The special thing about [a *späti*] is that people from all backgrounds in the *kiez* are enjoying each other's company. A *späti* functions as a living room for the neighborhood (Hübers 2015).

The family metaphors used in this blog entry suggest that the labor of Berlin's neighborhood culture is usually unrecognized. This invisible labor provides customers a new sense of neighborhood intimacy without having to give up the comfort of anonymity in a metropolis.

Theodor, an old German customer of Nanpej whom the employees referred to as "the uncle" felt this neighborliness as well. He came to Nanpej almost every day and spent hours there. He had breakfast, drank coffee and met with his friends. Azad talked to him frequently asking how he was, sharing his joyful celebration of the coming of the spring as well as his complaints about the cold winter and apprehension of the rising far right in Germany. Although Nanpej was a self-service shop, we occasionally brought his coffee and eggs to his table as he plugged in his cellphone and started reading the news.

On a late morning in September 2016, Theodor came to the shop with a suitcase. This made me curious about whether he was going somewhere. When I brought him what he had ordered, I asked about his bag which he had placed neatly between the cold drinks fridge and his table. He said that he had been in the hospital for a small heart surgery and that he had just come back. I was quite shocked and asked, "so, you came directly here?" He laughed and responded, "where else would I go?" Later that day, I interviewed him and asked why he preferred to come to this shop and not to others. His answer was: "*Die nette Leute"* (the nice people). Theodor felt that he was treated well in this cozy shop in his neighborhood.

Similarly, in her online news article titled "The *Späti*-man is the Most Important Person in Your Life," Jessica Wagener (2016) writes about the ways in which the workers look after their customers. Her examples range from having a variety of products that customers may need after a sad breakup or catching "the man flu," giving advice about how to choose wine, to letting customers take a shower on the premises. As Wagener states: "More care is only available at mommy's." Wagener summarizes the place of the "*späti*-guy" in customers' lives: "The family lives somewhere else, friends or affairs come and go. One of

the few that always stay: Your *späti*-man. […] Hardly anyone loves you like your *späti*-man. At least until your next move" (Wagener 2016).

It appears that the transactions through which one becomes convinced that the *späti*-guy loves them are not idiosyncratic qualities specific to one or two *spätis*, but rather are part of the business model applied in each *späti*. Even if you move to another neighborhood, you will find a *späti* where you can get similar care. This assertion is an exaggeration but nevertheless, many share the feeling. One of the factors that my Berliner friends pointed out as a reason why they liked going to *spätis*—a reason that is emphasized in Wagener's account (2016)—is that "hardly anyone goes into a *späti* sad and comes out just as sad."

Spätis are colorful and fun—fitting with Berlin's image as a diverse metropolis full of life. However, the labor that goes into maintaining this image goes mostly unrecognized. This was what I and my German friend realized in our excursion to the "sad *späti"* that did not fit our assumption about *spätis'* being artlessly happy spaces: heavens of abundant amiability. Even though the *happiness* of *spätis* seems to be a natural quality, a deliberate recurrent labor goes into maintaining this affective image. Nazim, for example, states that chatting with customers and making them feel good is a usual part of the job that his clients appreciate a lot:

> [I discuss with customers] politics, family, problems. Some customers tell me, for example—I am actually a good philosopher—"you are giving me therapy. You reassure me. You listen to my troubles." In some tourist places in Turkey, there is a sign: "Troubles will be shared (*dert dinlenir*)" [...] This [*späti* work] is something like that.

Although Nazim and many others enjoy chatting with people, not every *späti* worker or owner is so enthusiastic about socializing with customers. Some workers and owners indicate that having to talk to customers is the biggest challenge of the job. But even they perform a healthy amount of amiability that they see as a necessary component of the job.

Späti owners and workers, whether they like it or not, take care of customers through verbal and nonverbal interactions. Customers kindly accept and reciprocate the amiability. No customer is "free to refuse the present that is offered" (Mauss 1990, 19), which is, in this case, care and pleasantries. Many *späti* owners, indeed, told me about rude, trouble-making customers who were unofficially banned from the premises, in addition to Neo-Nazis who freely hang out in their shops as long as they *behave*. In this sense, the neighborly Berlin culture is maintained by *späti* owners and workers and customers as they act in accordance with what is expected of them.

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"Diversity capital" and "diversity labor" make *spätis* appear simultaneously Turkish, foreign and migrant *as well as* Berliner, cosmopolitan and local. This capital and labor include the ways *späti* workers look, the sociability performed in these shops as well as the ways these shops are decorated. Labor involving friendliness and trustful relations can all signify Turkishness and thus, a diverse Berlin. Turkish workers and owners deploy these meanings when necessary. Workers and owners' reiteration and practicing these discourses endorse the significance of their shops for their neighborhoods, Berlin and, thus, Germany.

These processes do not naturally occur but are the results of deep contemplation and negotiation as in the case of women workers' clothing as well as serendipity as in the case of items that end up decorating *spätis*. Various understandings of what Turkish and Berliner refer to materialize in these features and performances. I believe that this was also the reason why the Turkish-learning young man confidently approached Gabriela to ask her the difficult Turkish phrases from his Orhan Pamuk book. Although Gabriela was not Turkish or fluent enough in Turkish to read this sophisticated book and left me the translation work, the young man was right to come to us. The job was done at the end. The Ship of Nanpej successfully maintained its quality to be a Turkish one.

Ch. 8 – Conclusion: Relationality through Difference

On a February night in 2015 at around 11 PM, I walked down a main street in Neukölln. I habitually walked alone at different times of the day and night to observe changing patterns of sociality on the streets. That night, the biting cold had forced people into their apartments; the streets were mostly empty. The only open places were *spätis*, casinos and some fast food shops. Workers in these places got ready to close their shops or killed time on their phones or watched TV. Another regular day was ending.

The quietude was interrupted by footsteps approaching from behind. At another time, I would not have noticed, but that night the street was deserted, at least until that moment. A male voice joined the footsteps as they came closer. I was not sure if the man was talking to me, to someone else or to himself. From his punctuated and stumbling sentences, I assumed that he was drunk. These moments developed as a pretty usual Neuköllner scene until he moved to my left, walked at my pace and grumbled his incomprehensible words out of which I only got: "*Ausländer*!" (foreigner). This word appeared pretty clear to me not only because as a migration researcher I was biased with my selective perception but also because he yelled it at my face, twice. In return, I smiled, twice. He continued his angry talk, walking away from me.

I felt silly that I had smiled to this man although my out-of-place expression seemed to have confused and repelled him. I was also puzzled about how he could have noticed that I was indeed an "*Ausländer*." The only things he could observe about me were my clothing and bodily movements. My Turkish friends in Berlin who speak German and do not wear headscarves are quite confident that they easily blend into Berlin's human landscape. I had also assumed that I did not particularly appear "Turkish" or foreign for that matter. In *Techniques of the Body*, Marcel Mauss suggests that there is "an education in walking" through which one can distinguish different habitus (Mauss 1973, 72–73). Was it the way that

I walked that night that made me appear as an "*Ausländer*" to this man? Or was it the fact that we were in a "migrant neighborhood?" It was possibly both, as well as other markers that I could not deduce from my experience. The stalker's ability to correctly identify me as a foreigner indicates that categories such as *Ausländer* are multifaceted: they include visual, spatial, linguistic and bureaucratic markers. They are also subtle and possibly unconscious, surprising me that I was identified as a foreigner even though I thought I did not visually present myself as one.

I went home puzzled. I told Baris and Isabel what had happened. They both found it bizarre and upsetting. Nevertheless, for Baris, the oddity was not that this strange incident had happened in the first place or that I had appeared as a stranger to this man. Rather, he was dismayed that it had happened in Neukölln, a hub of Muslim immigrants as well as cosmopolitanism in Germany. Baris asked, "so, now, can this happen in Neukölln too?!" The incident made it clear that *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* (xenophobia) was not confined to the "extreme." It could even appear in a hip migrant neighborhood.

A little more than a year later when the far-right AFD entered the Berlin parliament, I asked a *späti* owner who had been active in politics what he thought of the AFD's victory. He told me that this could be a good thing to push center-right parties to implement progressive policies to differentiate themselves from the AFD. What he hoped for has not really happened. Nevertheless, both Baris' and the *späti* owner's comments show that they were very much aware of the existence of the German far right. While the rise of anti-foreigner sentiments is upsetting for migrants, this has been going on for decades—long before PEGIDA rallies and openly articulated anti-immigrant stances in parliament.

I started this dissertation with a happy hip-hop song whose video clip is set in a *späti* run by a Kurdish man. The song articulates the singer's fondness for *spätis*. I end, however,

with an unpleasant and bizarre encounter of mine with *Ausländerfeindlichkeit*[46] in a migrant neighborhood. With this progression from a happy introduction to an upsetting conclusion, I do not mean to suggest a rupture or a transformation marked in time. Rather, the introduction and the conclusion point out parts of the same phenomenon: that is, current constructions, understandings and experiences of difference.

Figure 16: "Turks Out"

[46] I choose to use the word "*Ausländerfeindlichkeit*" rather than the English translation "xenophobia." The German word literally translates to "hatred of foreigners," which socializes the phenomenon if we take hatred as an affect that is produced between subjects unlike "phobia" which individualizes and psychologizes experiences. Another similar German word is *Fremdenfeindlichkeit*, which translates to "hatred of strangers/foreigners."

Figure 17: "Stop Nazis" by Jusos, a faction of Germany's social democratic SPD. Such stickers with competing messages can be found on walls, bus stops and signboards.

Anthropologist Nitzan Shoshan (2016) has brilliantly shown that what seems to be *extreme* right-wing politics in Germany is actually produced by *mainstream* politics of nationalism married with neoliberal socioeconomic restructuring. I also suggest the co-existence of realities that otherwise seem to be distinct: I argue that Turks in Germany encounter discrimination, exclusion as well as inclusion simultaneously. In this dissertation, I have shown how Turks creatively reinterpret such discourses suggesting their insider-ness, outsiderness as well as exoticness. I have demonstrated how Turks in Berlin simultaneously pose claims of difference from "German culture" and relatedness to their own "culture" as well as to the place they live in.

Currently, Turks in Europe find themselves to be Muslim cultural outsiders in two ways: Firstly, they are increasingly interpellated as Muslim Others, defined as fundamentally diverging from their "host cultures." Many are indeed practicing Muslims and/or present themselves as Muslims. Their interpellation and self-presentation create a self-fulfilling circle through which their "Muslimness" solidifies. Secondly, Turkey, where these immigrants are assumed to belong, appears to Europeans as increasingly Islamic and thus outside Europe.

Europeans perceive the Turkish state and the Turkish president Erdogan as increasingly authoritarian and, hence, antithetical to Europe. Within this framework, Europe appears as a community assumed to be unified around values such as freedom and human rights, which are frequently presented as the opposite of Islam. Violence by groups and people who define themselves and their actions as Islamic such as the Charlie Hebdo shooting in Paris in 2015 and the Christmas Market attack in Berlin in 2016 feed into this system. As a result, Islam and religion stiffen as dominant markers of difference in contemporary Europe.

While Islam exceedingly defines Turkishness for Europeans, *spätis* appear as spaces where an alternative, secular Turkishness is recreated. Alcohol sold in these Muslim-run shops is the main marker of this non-religiosity. Secular Turkishness disrupts various dominant binaries such as "Muslim Turks" and "secular Germans" as well as "European culture" and "Muslim culture." However, these spaces should not be understood as emerging counter to or outside of mainstream discourses which define Turks and Germans as binary opposites. Rather, these spaces emerge from the very discourses that situate Turks as outside of Germanness because some of the practices that make *spätis* "Berliner spaces" affirm Turks' difference from Germans. However, Turks only *selectively* reaffirm these discourses. In other words, in these spaces, some qualities stereotyped as Turkish are enacted (especially those that define Turkishness for workers and owners and those that generate economic and social benefits) and some are not. Ambivalences and multiplicities of discourse enable this selectiveness. For example, Turks are stereotyped not only as Islamic and lazy but also as disorderly and sociable. Practices in *spätis* enact disorderliness and sociableness and not necessarily religiosity and laziness. These enacted traits tie into the assumed Berliner vibe and cherished Berliner values such as messiness and spontaneity through which both Turks and Berlin differentiate themselves from German stereotypes. Therefore, these "Turkish spaces" emerge out of the German context and feed from the fact that not only Turks but also Berlin are perceived as culturally different in Germany. The particularities of this cultural difference

are selectively enacted. In this sense, these spaces are simultaneously (and selectively) "Turkish" and "German."

The "*Germanness*" of this "*Turkishness*" is locally (i.e. Berlin-) specific. The performed cultural qualities of "Turkishness" in these spaces overlap with some of the stereotypes about Berlin—especially those that are related to sociability such as "neighborhood culture" (*kiezkultur*), temporality such as a relaxed and flexible arrangement of time (exemplified in *spätis'* Sunday openings) as well as diversity. This is evident, for example, when Hasan emphasizes that *spätis* are Berliner spaces and contribute to the city's appeal to tourists and that *späti* owners and workers help create a friendly, sociable atmosphere with the Turkish cultural practice of "*veresiye*" (in-store credits without interest). The laid-backness of this Berliner Turkishness opposes some of the stereotypes associated with Germanness such as orderliness and distant human relations. In this sense, these spaces produce a kind of Turkish-Berliner-Germanness that selectively reaffirms and subverts various cultural stereotypes.

Qualities stereotyped as Turkish and Berliner are mobilized through what I call "performative culture work." "Culture work" in the case of *spätis* involves performing the above-mentioned qualities stereotyped as "Turkish" and "Berliner." Some of these performances, indeed, contrast some other stereotypes about Berlin such as Berliners' being rude. The city of Berlin even started a campaign in 2009 to change this image of "rudeness." Berlin's service workers were encouraged to be nice and friendly. However, Berlin's bus drivers, for example, generally rejected this call and refused to perform this emotional labor and maintained their unapologetically impolite attitudes (Pitu 2011). Turkish *späti* owners and workers, on the other hand, continuously perform "friendliness"—a quality desired by the city's marketing department if not by Berlin's bus drivers.

Within this framework, *spätis* become microcosms of Berlin as the city tries to transcend cultural stereotypes not only about Germany but also about itself. As a result of

these efforts and *späti* workers' culture work, new understandings of "Turkish culture" and "Berlin culture" that are derivatives of mainstream discourses emerge. These versions then have lives of their own that signify a "Turkishness" and "Berlin-ness" that do not exist in isolation of each other.

Certain historical forces that have been shaping understandings of difference in Germany are essential to this formation. To illustrate, when Nazi Germany was defeated in the Second World War, the country was not only left with almost-completely-destroyed urban infrastructures but also an identity crisis left by this devastating defeat following decade-long efforts to define Germanness through a homogenous, biological understanding of a "superior German race." When Turkish guest workers came to the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin starting in the 1960s, they helped physically rebuild this divided country. Later, foreigners' established presence in Germany became an issue especially after the German Reunification in 1990 when the two Germanys came together and had to find common ground to establish a unified German identity (Huyssen 1994, 8–9). Turks' outsider status became even more pronounced after the Reunification because their presence blurred the already-foggy scene of national identity formation. At the same time, hate crimes against Turks and other minorities generated fears about the comeback of the Nazi past against which the current German identity was defined.

Anxieties about the resurgence of Germany's Nazi past surface in miscellaneous ways today. Scholars who find similarities in the ways Jews were treated in the Third Reich and the manner in which Turks are treated today often spark controversy. A quick look at the Amazon reviews of anthropologist Ruth Mandel's *Cosmopolitan Anxieties*: *Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany* (2008), which won the 2009 William A Douglas Prize, reveals how high the stakes are in this division between Germany's past and present. One reviewer, Melih (a Turkish male name), was bothered by the connections Mandel proposed between the ways Jews and Turks have been treated in Germany: "The writer [Ruth

Mandel] tries to build connections between Germany's relationship to minorities during WW2 and today. This is clearly not a helpful standpoint to adopt while studying the Turkish communities—a forced and unhealthy perspective" (Melih 2015). Another reviewer, Silke (a German female name), took issue with parallels Mandel saw between Nazi obsessions with racial purity and the way a Turkish woman was treated on the subway (See Mandel 2008, 209–10 for a discussion of this event). Silke states: "But as always when the grievances of our Turkish co-citizens are aired, they [Turks] and those who speak for them are under no obligation to have a closer look but are perfectly within their right to put always the worst imaginable label on it [Nazism]" (Silke 2012). As these examples show, the "specter of nationalism" (Shoshan 2016, 3) from Germany's past still haunts the German present.

Adding to this anxiety-bearing relationship with the past, Berlin's post-reunification financial troubles further generate locally specific expressions and understandings of difference where Turks' "cultural difference" becomes an asset. Starting in the 2000s, Berlin's administration promoted the city as a "cosmopolitan," "international," "diverse" and "creative city." In this process, the city's "multicultural, multiethnic districts" were advertised as "new destinations for leisure and tourism" (Colomb 2012, 248). Thus, predominantly Turkish neighborhoods suddenly became desirable locations of youthful, trendy consumption. This emphasis on Berlin's diversity and its importance for Berlin's economy enables Turkish business owners to claim their indispensability to the cosmopolitan texture of the German capital.

Additionally, the ways the productive nature of labor takes shape in Berlin's *spätis* facilitate the specific ways Turks negotiate their place in Germany today. As the literature has shown, both the ways labor is organized locally and globally and the ways individuals perform bodily, emotional and affective labor produce workers as certain kinds of subjects (eg. Freeman 2000, 2014; Hankins 2014; Hochschild 2012; Kang 2010; Lan 2006; Mankekar and Gupta 2016; Mirchandani 2012; Parreñas 2011). In the case of minority workers, labor

also becomes a central medium through which people negotiate their place in local hierarchies of difference (eg. Hankins 2014). After all, multiculturalism and diversity do not happen to exist by accident; defining, marking and negotiating identities take work.

The case of Turkish *späti* owners and workers adds to this literature by showing the specificities service labor (and the affective labor it entails) brings to the picture of "the labor of multiculturalism" (Hankins 2014, 1). In this case, *späti* owners extract sociability and amiability of service labor from themselves and, thus, negotiate their place in Berlin. As Freeman (2014) argues, affective labor is hailed globally in all spheres of life today, and this labor takes locally specific meanings and forms. Confirming this insight Freeman derives from the Barbadian case, Turkish *späti* owners and workers create value for Berlin by actualizing the self-marketed image of the German capital as a "diverse" and "hip" city with "neighborhood culture" in post-reunification Berlin.

What political conclusions can we draw from the insight that Berlin's rebranded image is (re)produced in these migrant-run shops? Does the co-production of Turkish and Berliner identities show that Berlin is a haven for immigrants? Was Merkel wrong in announcing the "death of multiculturalism" after all? Such a conclusion would, unfortunately, be overlooking the continuous and tedious labor needed to produce multiculturalism as well as the (self-) exploitative qualities of this service work. This inference would also miss the contextual specificity of the case in hand. Germany's and Berlin's post-cold War political and financial histories and Berlin's special place in the German imaginary enable the wide acceptance of Turkish-run *spätis* in Berlin. However, this acceptance is not omnipresent in all areas of German society or Berlin. In fact, pluralism is contested in Germany, as anti-migrant rallies illustrate.

Anthropologist Michael Peletz (2009) demonstrates similar historical and social contingencies of diversity acceptance in his comprehensive study of "difference, legitimacy and pluralism" in Southeast Asia. To illustrate, in various Southeast Asian societies, "gender-

transgressive" acts were not only "legitimate" but also "sanctified" in the 15th and 16th centuries (Peletz 2009: 36). However, in the following period, diverse sexual acts and various gender plural practices (such as women's inclusion in politics) declined because of various historical developments such as colonialism (Peletz 2009: 84-85).

Building on Max Weber's work on "legitimacy," Peletz differentiates between the mere existence of diversity, its tolerance, and the accordance of legitimacy to diverse ways of being (Peletz 2009: 1-2). Contrary to popular opinion, tolerance, meaning "at least partial (or passive) acceptance of difference," does not necessarily generate "multicultural or pluralistic societies" (Peletz 2009: 1). People desire to be given "legitimacy" and, thus, to feel that they are treasured members of their societies (Peletz 2009: 1).

Many Turkish *späti* workers and owners feel their centrality to the daily life of their ethnically diverse customers and to the city of Berlin. Yet, this feeling of "legitimacy" is not prevalent in many other cultural and political domains in Germany. If migrants' legitimacy as *späti* workers and owners could be multiplied, they might feel their belonging to their "host" society more strongly and, thus, become more productive citizens of Germany even at a time when anti-migrant discourses prevail.

Throughout this dissertation I have shown that Turks creatively engage with discourses that identify their difference. Turkish *späti* workers and owners reaffirm the discourses that present Turks in positive ways, for example as "helping" and "hospitable." They choose to perform these qualities that give them "legitimacy." Performing these *Turkish* qualities helps these migrants claim a belonging to Berlin as owners and workers of these *Berliner* shops. Thus, the discourses that highlight Turks' difference from Germans also enable Turks to claim centrality to the German capital. In other words, "the agency" of Turkish *späti* workers and owners is "an effect of [their] subordination" (Butler 1997: 12). Yet, by enacting their agency, Turks reaffirm their difference and thus "reproduce the conditions of [their] own subordination" (Butler 1997:12). This co-production of agency and

subordination illustrates *subjection* in an economic context. Thus, this case also provides a materially contextualized example to discourse-focused theories of subjection and can initiate discussions about economic, political and social conditions under which migrants can exercise agency.

I have discussed the production of difference in Germany and culture work in *spätis* that affirm and challenge these understandings of difference in order to demonstrate this mutual formation of "Turkishness" and "Berlin-ness." Firstly, I have shown that Turkey and Europe have historically constructed their identities in relation to each other. Therefore, the fact that Turkishness and Berlin-ness are currently co-produced is not radically new but rather follows a historical pattern. As the second chapter has shown, the specificities of this co-production, however, are embedded in Berlin's recent history of reunification and subsequent financial troubles. In the second chapter, I also demonstrate that Germany has historically been ethnically and religiously diverse. While the end of the Second World War signifies a break in efforts to eliminate this diversity, German laws and mainstream political discourses nevertheless continued to deny the heterogeneity of Germany's population until very recently. Islam and "Turkish culture" have come to signify a quintessential difference in Germany. Nevertheless, as this dissertation shows, Turks creatively and selectively reappropriate this emphasis on cultural difference as it provides them social, symbolic and economic capital.

Later, in Chapter 3, I discussed contemporary manifestations of Turks' difference in Berlin and Germany, for example, as Muslims, as faces of diversity and as residents of dangerous, isolated neigborhoods. These manifestations are ambivalent. Turks are both insiders and outsiders. I showed how this insider-outsider status is negotiated in religious, political, spatial and consumption-related realms. Turks' cultural difference is at the same time produced, stigmatized and consumed in relation to changing local, national and transnational politics. Turks' assumed difference is also celebrated as a reflection of Berlin's diversity. This insight demonstrates that migrants' cultural difference from their "host

societies" is not inherent to their cultures but rather emerges in the very contexts to which migrants are assumed to be external.

In Chapter 4, I discussed the struggles to determine the spatial and temporal specificities of life in Berlin in relation to *spätis*. I have shown that contentions over housing (especially in migrant neighborhoods) and over the operation hours of *spätis* increase the symbolic value of these shops for Berlin as they present diversity and temporal freedom as assumed Berliner values. This housing situation shows another ambivalence in how Germans receive migrants and how migrants claim belonging to Germany. For example, some politicians and activists blame tourists and Berlin's increasing international population for the displacement threat and rent increases that Turkish migrants (and many other Berliners) presently face. However, Turkish *späti* owners praise their international customers. As a reaction to Code Enforcement Offices trying to regulate their opening hours, *späti* owners have even reframed their businesses as tourist shops indispensable to Berlin. Activists supported *spätis* in their struggle to stay open declaring that they were essential to Berlin's neighborhood culture and that politicians should not intervene in the way Berlin is temporally experienced.

In the last three ethnographic chapters, I demonstrated how Turks' ambivalent difference and relationality are produced in *spätis*. The fifth chapter specifically focuses on the productivity of *späti* labor. *Späti* labor entails affective labor but workers and owners do not perform this labor in the same way in every interaction. Sometimes, they do not perform the amiability expected from them at all. They evaluate their relationships with customers and customize their performance. Affective labor helps construct friendships, relationships as well as boundaries. In this sense, affective labor in *spätis* is a resource that workers can mobilize. The sixth and seventh chapters demonstrate the consequences of this productivity. In the sixth chapter, I show that commercial and non-commercial exchanges happening in *spätis* tie *späti* workers and owners to their neighborhoods and to Berlin. Migrant workers and owners'

connection to their *place* of work and life is sustained by the *temporal* and *social* dimensions of these exchanges. The temporal and social aspects of *späti* labor, such as synchronizing with the rhythm of life on the streets and creating social bonds, bring together cultural stereotypes about Turkishness such as hospitality, Germanness such as efficiency and Berlin-ness such as temporal freedom. The seventh chapter shows that through different kinds of capital and labor, Turkishness and Berlin-ness are co-produced in *spätis*. This diversity work involves the accumulation of different kinds of capital and the performance of various kinds of labor. For example, diversity work includes accumulating linguistic capital by employing people who speak Turkish and performing aesthetic labor by dressing modestly. This capital and labor do not only generate economic value but also affirm Turks' difference and relationality to Berlin.

Tied together, these insights show that Turkish migrants' cultural difference is not simply imported from their "home country" but is produced in their "host country" within changing local, national and transnational relations. Turks make use of the global tendency to "see culture everywhere" (Breidenbach and Nyiri 2009) and carve out spaces where they produce a culture that is locally specific and embedded in regional and transnational circulations of meaning. In return, this migrant culture contributes to Berlin's self-marketing as a diverse city. This creation of a "migrant culture" does not take place in isolation. It emerges from mainstream discourses that simultaneously cast migrants out and celebrate them as sources of cultural diversity. As such, contemporary manifestations of Turks' marginalization and inclusion in Germany may provide a framework to understand the ambivalence of migrants' reception and agency not only in Europe but also globally.

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