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Students Make Change: How Authoritarian Governments Respond to Student Protesters

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An abstract of

a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences

of Emory University in partial fulfillment

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Political Science

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Abstract

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This thesis aims to answer the question of if student involvement in pro-democracy protests changes the final outcome of the campaign. Using linear regressions, matching, and three case studies, I evaluate the relationship between student involvement and domestic support, international pressure, and defections on success of a protest—as in if a formal democratic government was created as a direct result of the protest campaign. Using Chenoweth and Stephen's Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes dataset (2022), Dahlum's Student Protest dataset (2019), and original coding for campaigns in the years 2006-2013, 396 protest campaigns were analyzed to understand the significance student involvement can have on a campaign movement. In addition, case studies of South Korea in the 1980s, Yugoslavia in 1968, and Bahrain in 2011 were used to further understand how each variable can and does interact with each other. Taking into consideration both methods of analysis, it was found that student involvement does have a statistically significant, positive relation with success. In addition, the case studies have revealed that student involvement interacting with domestic support, international pressure, and defections can only increase these odds. These findings support the idea that students who protest nonviolently are significantly more likely to succeed as well as nonviolent protests in general having higher rates of success than violent protests.

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Acknowledgements

I will be eternally grateful for the knowledge, guidance, and encouragement given to me by Dr. Sun. Her consistent support was the greatest piece of motivation that pushed me to keep going. I am also deeply grateful for Dr. Jung's willingness to guide me through parts of this thesis that were completely foreign and new to me. I would also like to thank Dr. Tworzecki for keeping me engaged in the part of the thesis that was my initial reason for why I wanted to write one. Finally, I would like to thank my family. My Grandma, Mom, and Dad have always encouraged me to discover what truly inspires me in this world and to pursue every opportunity that will get me closer to it. My sister, Laurine, has been my closest friend for the entirety of my life and her unfaltering belief in me is the reason why I was able to persist. With the support of everyone around me, I am given endless opportunities to ask questions about the world and test myself to find the answers. It is due to them that I am proud of the person I am today.

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I. Introduction

Why are some protests successful and others not? Does the answer lie within the country? Or the type of protestor? Or maybe even the time of day a protest is held? Czechoslovakia—while now split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia—was previously a communist country which peacefully transitioned into a democracy. The Velvet Revolution gathered hundreds of thousands of people to peacefully walk the streets and definitively show their government that a transition to democracy was what they wanted (International Center on Nonviolent Conflict). On the other hand, Rwanda—while technically labels itself as democratic—has a leader who has been in power since the start of the twenty-first century and frequently represses opposition parties. From the Rwandan Revolution in 1959 to the Rwandan Patriotic Front violently taking control in the late 1990's, Rwanda has consistently been in a period of political unrest (Freedom House; Reed, 1996). Both Czechoslovakia and Rwanda were authoritarian at the start of the twentieth century, but by the end Czechoslovakia had democratized with free and fair elections while Rwanda is still troubled with unfair elections. They both saw mass protests with the same goals. So, what led to the difference? Why did one protest succeed while the other failed?

Current literature largely focuses on violent or nonviolent protest being the deciding factor of a successful movement and when considering the type of actor, the working class is the principal focus. It is largely agreed upon that nonviolent resistance is more successful than violent protest due to lower barriers to participation, diverse participants, and is also more conducive to a long-lasting democracy (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Public reception is also oftentimes much more favorable towards a movement if it is nonviolent (Wasow, 2020).

However, both Czechoslovakia and Rwanda included elements of nonviolent protest. The difference lies in the actor who participated in protest movements. Some argue that industrial

workers and the middle class are most likely to see success. Industrial workers and the middle class have leverage in the form of economic pressure by withholding work and numbers such that both groups have a higher capacity to organize (Dahlum, Knutsen, Wig, 2019).

I theorize that students are the key actors for a successful protest movement. Rather than analyzing students as an economic group, I analyze them as a social group. Students attend classes with many of the same people, lead organizations and clubs with those of similar interests, and even live within close proximity of each other. By themselves, students can include thousands of people and are mostly of similar age and ideology. This all factors into a strong capacity to organize themselves.

In addition to greater organizational capacity of students, I argue that there is an additional step that is required for success of a movement and it involves coordinating with a third party to grow their movement past students. This secondary mechanism includes domestic support, international pressure, and defections from either security forces or state officials. Domestic support refers to the idea that, for example, after violent repression from the government, protest movements grow as the domestic populace sympathizes with protesters. International pressure can mean anything from formal condemnation to the imposing of economic sanctions. Finally, state and security forces defecting refers to those officials who are part of the repressive apparatus siding with protesters and leaving their post. I theorize that in order for a protest movement to be successful—in addition to students dominating the movement—some combination of domestic support, international support, or state and security forces defecting must exist. These mechanisms all greaten the attention and numbers a protest movement is able to attract (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Wasow, 2020; Nespstad, 2013). This thesis will aim to understand which combination of what is the most powerful.

To understand the effectiveness of this theory, a mixed methods approach will be used. The quantitative analysis will use the NAVCO 2.1 dataset and Dahlum's Student Protest dataset. The Student Protest dataset uses NAVCO 1.0 which dates range from 1906-2006 while NAVCO 2.1 covers years 1946-2013. I opted to use NAVCO 2.1—as opposed to NAVCO 1.0—because it includes variables related to domestic support, international pressure, and defections. Specifically, the variables included are condemnation from domestic actors, the effect of repression on campaign size, international condemnation, international material repercussions, security forces defecting, and state actors defecting. The final dataset uses all campaign movements in NAVCO 2.1 which includes all cases from Student Protest as well as original coding for the 150 cases that do not overlap. In total, the dataset includes 396 cases between the years 1946 to 2013. This dataset will be used to run multiple regressions as well as a matching test for causal considerations.

The qualitative analysis uses three case studies to understand how the *organizer* mechanism—student involvement—and *coordination* mechanisms—domestic support, international pressure, and defections—interact with each other. The first case study is South Korea and will serve as the representative case for post-Cold War democratization. This case includes both the *organizer* mechanism and the *coordination* mechanisms. Yugoslavia in 1968 will be used as the second case and shows an instance of strong student involvement but weak contributions from the *coordinator* mechanisms. Finally, Bahrain during the Arab Spring in 2011 will be used as the final case and looked at as a critical case. Having elements of both the *organizer* and *coordinator* mechanisms, the main question asked is why Bahrain's protest movement ended in failure.

The question of how receptive governments are to students protesting for democracy feeds into the larger question of why some protest movements are successful and others are not. Heroic stories across all of history are shared of how masses of people organized to stand up to their governments to force change and progress. However, littered amongst them are stories of deep tragedy and death when governments refuse to change. Within all of these stories, students are consistent actors and are oftentimes significant players. How students can move protest movements towards success or failure is a necessary question to ask and will shed light on what makes a protest successful.

II. Literature Review

1. Literature on Authoritarian Regimes

For the purposes of this thesis, an authoritarian regime is defined as one with an active dictatorship where free and fair elections are limited or nonexistent. Decisions, actions, and the survivability of authoritarian regimes has an abundant literature. Some authoritarian regimes are more robust than others and patterns are seen by type of government, region of the world, and the civilian perception of the government (Geddes, 1999; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014; Bellin, 2004; Slater, 2009).

Geddes argues that personalist, military, and single-party governments, while all classified as authoritarian regimes, behave differently when faced with a mass protest movement (1999). Personalist regimes are led by a single person and are not likely to survive after the ousting of that one person or their death. In the case of South Korea, after the assassination of Park Chung Hee, his Yushin dictatorship did not survive. Military regimes are even more delicate in that it was found that they prioritize the unity of the military over maintaining their own power. Single-party regimes proved to be the most robust in that as a party, they are able to

weather the death of a leader and can guarantee loyalty from party members by giving them government posts and advantages (Geddes, 1999).

While some types of autocratic governments are more easily able to weather protests, this pattern does not necessarily correspond with which governments are more likely to see protest. Rather than a certain type of rule being the determining factor, certain situations within each government is what determines the likelihood of a protest happening. For example, governments with weak judiciaries, a leader that is not likely to step down, and international obligations to human rights are more likely to see protests because the domestic populace has deemed that no domestic institution will address the human rights violations within an authoritarian government (Ritter and Conrad, 2016). Furthermore, the economic health of a given authoritarian government is also argued to be a determining factor on whether or not people feel the need to protest. Authoritarian countries with bad economic health are more likely to see pro-democracy protests as opposed to countries with good economic health (Brancati, 2014).

Some scholars have also considered if the region of the world matters for the robustness of authoritarian regimes against protests. The Middle East, for example, seems to be a homeland for robust authoritarian regimes. It poses the question of if religion, civil society, or even the physical distance to a hub of democracies is the reason for the high concentration of autocracies. However, Bellin identifies that it has more to do with continued foreign aid—and in significant amounts—as the main reason for the durability of authoritarian regimes, rather than any region-specific element. One example is that the United States continues to financially support some middle eastern regimes regardless of their form of government or human rights abuses (Bellin, 2004). However, this idea has largely shifted with the events of Arab Spring and the robustness of a regime rests on if state security forces are willing to shoot at protestors. States

essentially only have one method to disperse crowds of protesters so if that one method fails, there is nothing a state can do to deter protests from growing larger (Bellin, 2012).

Furthermore, the way a government is perceived by their domestic population is significant to whether or not a population that rises against it will succeed. Slater uses the idea of symbolic legitimacy to explain the success of some protests over others (2009). Symbolic legitimacy is the idea that the values of a certain country—such as religion, nationalism, or even hopes for the future—are seen to be held by a certain group. That group is then highly effective at encouraging engagement and attention because the domestic populace holds their views at a high level of significance. As an example of this, Slater uses the case of Vietnam where their government held all forms of symbolic legitimacy, so no outside group was able to encourage participation. This ultimately led to a failed protest movement (Slater, 2009). On the other hand, Philippines' protests were supported by the country's religious faction that held a significant amount of symbolic power which was separate from what the government held. Calls from the Catholic church mobilized greater numbers of people and encouraged defections from security forces and effectively helped overcome collective action problems (Slater, 2009).

Authoritarian regimes, while all have an interest in maintaining their grip on society, are not equally strong against protest movements. The type of regime—military, personalist, or single-party—can be a significant factor on survivability and the state of a government—human rights obligations or economic health—can determine if citizens feel the need to mobilize. International support of such regimes or the symbolic legitimacy of the target regime are both significant factors to the success of a protest movement against autocracies. Protest movements that are able to exploit these differences may be more successful than others at forcing change.

2. Literature on Protest Movements

There is an immense literature on protest movements and what about them specifically—regardless of the authoritarian regime they are targeting—makes some more successful than others. It was previously held that violent resistance was the mode of protest that was most successful. It was able to capture the attention of governments more easily than nonviolent protest and posed a greater global threat (Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013). However, literature has now moved to support that nonviolent protest is more effective. There are several theories that support this idea. The first is that nonviolent resistance largely eliminates many obstacles that bar people from joining a protest movement. Violent resistance requires a base level of physicality and those that do not have those qualities will not be able to participate. Furthermore, the fear of being seriously injured or killed is the most significant deterrence to joining a violent movement. Nonviolent protest overall is a much smaller commitment. This means that nonviolent protests were more often larger than their violent counterparts. Larger protests are more diverse in thought and method which increases the likelihood of success (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Referring back to Geddes's theory of the type of regime signifying robustness against a protest movement, violent resistance was found to consistently hurt the chances of success regardless of regime type (Geddes, 1999; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014).

Furthermore, democracies that are somehow created under violent protests have a much lower likelihood of surviving and are more prone to democratic backsliding as it disrupts the economic and social health of a country so much so that it cannot recover. Davenport presents two sides to the argument (2019). The first argues that democracies born of violence are naturally undemocratic as there exists a hesitancy to congregating in one place—such as to

vote—in fear of sparking violent retaliation. In addition, an exclusionary tactic is adopted to favor only those that took the risk of participating in violent protest. However, the second side argues that democracies fought for violently see higher rates of political participation and senses of altruism. The data supporting the latter argument has seen limited replication. However, the belief that violent action results in a decrease in GDP growth—thus supporting the first argument—has been replicated and is directly tied back to violence (Davenport et al. 2019). In addition, it was found that democracies that arose out of nonviolent resistance will more than likely last upwards of forty years longer than those that arose from violent protest or no resistance at all (Bayer, Bethke, and Lambach, 2016).

Aside from just the method of resistance, there are a number of elements that can make one movement successful while the other ends in failure. For one, international pressure on governments can be the cause for decisions made one way or the other. Through naming and shaming—an act where third-party actors name and shame certain governments or groups for actions that have been committed against their populace—foreign entities are able to exert pressure by a simple phone call or by releasing a statement. It was found that specifically for countries that have ratified human rights treaties, naming and shaming does work (Hafner-Burton, 2008). Furthermore, countries that are considered world powers and have significant capital—such as the United States—are able to threaten withdrawal of aid or action to force countries to act in certain ways. For example, during South Korea's transition, the United States made it clear that military intervention should not be used, and this eventually served as the final push for the success of the democratic movement (Park, 138).

Domestic pressure is also an incredibly powerful tool to weigh the odds in favor of whichever side it is on. Sympathy is a key factor in winning over the domestic populace. If

protest movements are committed to nonviolence—including denouncing violent members—it is more likely to be seen as credible by the public and will garner more sympathy and support (Turner, 1969). Regarding the Civil Rights movement of the 1960's in the United States, protests that were nonviolent saw news headlines that were more *rights* focused rather than *riot* focused. This subsequently led to certain policies being passed and some even argue that if during the 1968 elections violent protests did not occur, votes would have swung in favor of Humphrey who had authored the Civil Rights bill (Wasow, 2020).

Changes in the ideology of the military can also bolster a protest movement. If militaries see that repressing protest movements is an easy process and there is more to lose if the regime changes, there will be significantly less defections. However, protesters can raise the costs of repressing movements by demonstrating that they are shooting their peers, partners, or even their children. This feeds even more to the point that larger movements—those that encompass a more diverse array of people—are more likely to be successful, especially since they are the ones most likely to see military defections (Nespstad, 2013).

There are four clear components that greatly affect success rates of a protest movement. The first is the method of protest and the literature makes clear that nonviolent protests are much more effective (Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). The second component is international pressure in the form of naming and shaming or the threat to withhold aid. These methods are incredibly effective especially in cases of countries that lack international legitimacy or the capital to support themselves (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Park, 138). The third element is domestic support which can come in the form of sympathy or added participation from groups that otherwise would not participate (Turner, 1969). Finally, the fourth component is

defection from state officials or security members due to their role in suppressing protest movements (Nespstad, 2013).

3. Student Protest Movements

While the literature on specifically student protests is limited, the available text supports the idea that students are most often going to protest nonviolently which thus leads to higher success rates. (Dahlum, Knutsen, and Wig, 2019). Even those students who are not in university or college lead nonviolent protests that have proven to be highly effective. In the case of Thailand, the White Ribbon movement of 2020 was led by high school students creating a network of people amongst several high schools. Thousands of students took part in a movement that called for constitutional reform, resignation of the Prime Minister, and changes to the Thai monarchy (Lertchoosakul, 2021). While Thailand still does not have extensive free and fair elections, the student movement is an incredibly significant moment in history that shows the collective capabilities of students.

Student protesters may also attract those who previously did not participate to join in on protests and bolster their numbers. In Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement, students fought for a representative democracy and were met with violent retaliation from security forces. However, this attracted even more people to protest and reached a peak membership of upwards of a million people (Ortmann, 2015). This may have been due to the symbolic nature students carry in some countries which allows them to garner greater sympathy than other groups prone to protesting. Aung San was a student leader in the Burmese protests for democracy and although the movement was unsuccessful, much of the group's legitimacy came from the symbolic power students held in the country (Slater, 2009). Similar to the Thailand case, neither the Hong Kong

or Burmese movements ended in success, nevertheless the significance of students cannot be diminished.

Some protests are successful while others are not. The current literature outlines that nonviolent protest with large numbers of participants is the first and most necessary step to creating a successful movement. From there, international pressure, domestic support, shifts in the military, even the symbolic nature of the protester can all be factors that determine whether or not a protest is successful or not.

III. Theory

The two players of interest in this setting are the government and student protestors. It is assumed that governments want to stay in power and so authoritarian governments have an interest in suppressing pro-democracy movements. Since they have state security forces at their disposal they have the strong capability to deter potential protestors with the threat of violent retaliation. However, governments are not free to use their security forces at will. All countries will face some sort of audience cost from their domestic populace or the international audience. Audience costs refers to potential consequences that a government can face from certain decisions and the Fearon Model states that leaders in democracies face higher audience costs because their power relies on the domestic audience wanting to keep the leader in power (Tomz, 2007). However, audience costs still exist in authoritarian regimes

For the student protester, their goal is to see regime change. Their biggest advantage is the potential they have to organize large masses of people. As the literature states, protests are significantly more likely to succeed with larger numbers. However, organizing is also a steep obstacle in that if this is not achieved a protest movement cannot materialize. Furthermore, for all protesters the potential for the government to react violently is always present and is a strong

deterrence for participation. The government holds a monopoly on violence and if protestors do show up armed to protect themselves, that may send the message that they were the ones to be violent from the onset and subsequently brand the whole movement as violent. Similar to how the capacity for violence is an advantage for the government, it is a weakness for student protesters.

1. Organizational Capacity

Understanding the roles of the government and the protester creates four causal mechanisms. The first is the organizational capacities of students. Organizational capacity refers to the ability for someone or some group to be able to attract and organize a large enough group of people to stage a protest. Students—defined here as current university students—attend class in a relatively closed network, are part of organizations with each other, live within close vicinity of each other, are of a similar age, and most share like ideologies. The largest obstacle is overcoming collective action problems. A collective action problem occurs when individuals choose actions that maximize their own short-term benefits rather than thinking about the larger outcome encompassing all of society (Ostrom, 2010). In the context of protests, society as a whole will benefit if everyone participates, but most will consider their short-term gains and decide not to. However, I theorize that students are more easily able to overcome these problems than other social groups prone to protesting. The literature makes clear that protest attendance is one of the most important, if not the most important, element to a successful protest. It is the entire reason behind the higher success rate of nonviolent protest as opposed to violent protest. That said, students—the group I theorize is most effective at organizing large numbers—are more likely to lead protest movements with greater numbers which in turn are more likely to succeed. This creates the first causal mechanism:

CM 1: Students are part of a high-contact, closed network of people which makes it easier to overcome collective action problems which then leads to a higher degree of organization.

2. Domestic Support

The second causal mechanism utilizes the opinions of the domestic populace. Undoubtedly, audience costs—consequences that the government incurs from onlookers, such as civilians—will be tremendously high if governments decide to violently repress nonviolent student protestors. Especially in the case of students, their parents, teachers, or student peers who previously did not participate in the movement may now have a personal connection to it and feel motivated to participate. But then the argument can be made that even with the added personal stake, violent retaliation is too strong of a deterrence for people to join in. However, current literature does support that as numbers grow the will of the government to repress is virtually diminished (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2014). The second half of this mechanism is how to send the message out that students are actively protesting and are at times being violently repressed. For recent protests, social media plays a growing role in sending the message out. During the Arab Spring, ideas of democracy flooded the region starting in Tunisia. A significant portion of this mass information movement can be credited to social media and students sharing ideas across country borders (Howard, 2011). Even before the invention of social media, students have been particularly savvy in their methods to share information and news. In South Korea's student protests, students would place thousands of leaflets on top of buses so that when it drives off it scatters the leaflets all over the streets (Park, 134). This presents the second causal mechanism:

CM 2: The domestic audience siding with protestors leads to an increased likelihood for a successful protest movement.

3. International pressure

The third causal mechanism involves foreign judgment. As previously stated in the literature review, there is not much support for the effectiveness of naming and shaming, especially in the context of non-governmental actors. However, autocrats who lead governments that are not recognized by the international stage have the goal to legitimize themselves and force others to take them seriously. One method of doing this is by following international treaties of human rights and show that they are a government that values the livelihood of their citizens. This is one case where naming and shaming can be effective. Furthermore, if countries that provide a significant amount of financial aid or military aid to countries voice their support of protestors or formally condemn oppressive regimes, it will act as an added pressure on those regimes. Therefore, foreign governments or NGOs—especially those of significant international standing—siding with peaceful protesters may turn the tide of a movement against the authoritarian regime. I theorize that students are more easily able to invoke this mechanism for one main reason. Students—with their younger age—may inspire sympathy from populations abroad—such as other students—who are able to call attention to the issue and force the hand of their government. This presents the third causal mechanism:

CM 3: Foreign governments or NGOs naming and shaming or threatening the continuation of financial or military aid adds pressure to the oppressive regime and increases the likelihood of a movement being successful.

4. Defections from the state and security forces

The fourth causal mechanism involves the ideologies of the state and security forces. Here, state security forces will refer to the police, branches of the military, and any other institution with the legal right to carry out violence. Security forces serve a significant role in that it is effectively the only instrument a government has to enforce conformity. The threat of violent retaliation to any protest movement is always present and is a pretty effective deterrence for people who would otherwise participate. Therefore, if state security forces either defect to join the protests or if there are institutional fractures within, it poses a significant problem for the government. Essentially, a divergence in thought between security forces and the government could jeopardize the most significant advantage the government holds against protestors.

This divergence can be caused by a multitude of reasons. In this case, since protesters are students, security forces may be posed with a moral dilemma that is difficult to overcome. For example, during the Philippine's "people power" movement, a vast majority of security forces defected as costs for staying was extraordinarily high after Catholic bishops encouraged defections and pushed for nonviolent reform. The peak of defections was reached when priests and nuns physically placed themselves in between protesters and tanks (Lee, 2009). I theorize that this effect is even greater with students who are oftentimes seen as children and the future of civilization. In addition, if there are fractures with the institution itself, such as the military or within a police force, the sacrifice of leaving behind a well-supported, stable career may not be as high. Regardless of the reason, a split in ideologies between security forces and the government is an early sign of a successful protest. This presents the fourth causal mechanism:

CM 4: State officials and, or security forces defecting will result in a weakened security apparatus for the government which will result in a higher likelihood of success.

These four causal mechanisms can be best explained through an *organizing* and *coordinating* model. Students who are able to organize will need to coordinate with third parties—domestic citizens, international community, and state officials and security members—in order for a protest movement to be successful. Students on their own will not be enough to coerce a government, but I theorize that students have an advantage over other social groups because they are able to coordinate with those outside their own group.

The table below shows the anticipated events following the student's involvement with each causal mechanism.

	Domestic support	International pressure	Defections
Students	Protests include non-student participants and are on-average larger	Gains the attention of international media, may even spark protests in other countries	The increased moral dilemma encourages defections
No students	Protests are limited to just the student population	The government continues with violent repression with no threat from outside countries	The government is able to maintain control of security forces and continue violent repression

IV. Hypotheses

I argue that students have the ability to collectively organize more effectively than other groups of "traditional" protesters such as unionized workers or the middle class.

Therefore, if students are not dominating or organizing the movement it is less likely to be successful. However, this alone is not enough to explain why students are more successful. The *organizer* mechanism must be met with some combination of the *coordination* mechanisms for a movement to be successful. While organizing mass numbers of people is the most significant part, some protests see the inclusion of outside social groups joining the movement or pressuring the government in support of protesters. This addresses the theory that protest movements of greater numbers are more likely to be successful than those that are smaller. This creates the first hypothesis:

> H1: Nonviolent, student protests that invoke one method from the coordination mechanism are more likely to succeed.

However, it is possible for more than just one element of the coordination mechanism to be present. Multiple protests have used both domestic support and defections or any other combination to succeed. Some protests even use all three elements. This presents the second hypothesis:

> H2: Nonviolent, student protests that invoke a combination of multiple or all elements of the coordination mechanisms are more likely to succeed.

The null hypothesis reads as:

> H3: Nonviolent, student protests that invoke any elements of the coordination mechanism are no more likely to succeed than protests that do not include students or any elements of the coordination mechanism.

V. Research Design

1. Rationale for Mixed Methods

This thesis will largely follow the nested analysis procedure laid out by Lieberman (2005). A nested analysis involves a preliminary large-N analysis and small-N analysis that complement each other and develop a full picture describing the accuracy of any given theory. The large-N analysis mostly serves to establish whether or not the theory is robust or if a separate rival explanation should be pursued. This step in the analysis serves to give some initial estimates of predicted outcomes which can then be further scrutinized in the small-N analysis.

The small-N analysis is used to answer questions, often individual case-level questions, that are left unanswered by the large-N analysis. Control variables are reintroduced and discussion points relating to the country, time period, or social groups involved can all be used to understand particular "puzzles" and why outcomes are what they are. This discussion will ultimately work to prove that the hypothesis, ideally proven robust by the large-N analysis, actually "works" and is applicable to several cases (Liberman, 2005).

As opposed to strictly quantitative or qualitative studies, a mixed methods approach allows both methods to complement each other and achieve a much fuller picture. While the large-N analysis will provide a larger idea of whether or not hypotheses are robust, the case studies will provide an in-depth dive into specific countries and protest campaigns, addressing the role of individual people and their shared communities. In the study of political science, where we aim to understand why people make the decisions they do, it is necessary to include a qualitative discussion of people's behaviors, and this becomes even more effective when it is done under the guidance of a larger quantitative analysis.

2. Quantitative Analysis

The large-n, quantitative analysis analyzes data from Dahlum's (2019) Student Protest dataset, Chenoweth and Shay's Nonviolent and Violent Campaign Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset, the Varieties of Democracy dataset (V-Dem), as well as original coding to supplement the student protest dataset.

The quantitative analysis proceeds in two parts. First, an initial examination of empirical support. Second, exploration of the causal relationship using matching. Simply defined, "matched sampling is a method for selecting treatment units and control units with similar values of matching variables" (Rubin, 1980). This thesis will use a Mahalanobis-Metric matching design as pioneered by Rubin (1980).

3. Qualitative Analysis

The second, qualitative, method of analysis will be in the form of three case studies. Case studies were chosen with the aim of generalizing the theory across three different considerations. First, time period is considered. Huntington's *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* famously identified three waves of democratization. Waves are defined as "a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction" (Huntington, 1993). Huntington identifies dates for each of these waves as:

First wave: 1828-1926

First wave, reversed: 1922-1942

Second wave: 1943-1962

Second wave, reversed: 1958-1975

Third wave: 1974-Present

In addition, the Arab Spring movement in the 2010s have also triggered a discussion of a fourth wave of democratization. Citing its late start and unique characteristic of social media use, some scholars argue that the Arab Spring is indeed a separate wave of democratization (Abushouk, 2016). While this thesis cannot cover a case in each of these periods, the cases chosen still come from separate waves.

The second consideration is region. The Middle East has often been singled out as a unique region when it comes to democratization studies. Literature cites reasons of culture, forced fragmentation weakening national identity, and continued international aid regardless of government type as the reason for why the Middle East has been resistant to democracy (Hinnebusch, 2006; Bellin, 2004). Another region to consider is Southeast and East Asia where starting in the 1980s, seven autocratic governments transitioned to democracies (Shin, 2012). Finally, Eastern Europe post-World War Two has also been a center for democratization analyses (Glen, 2003).

The third and final consideration was the *coordinator* mechanism. The quantitative analysis uses a dataset with limited variance in the three parts that make up the *coordinator* mechanism—domestic support, international attention, and defections—so the case studies were used to interact student involvement with each of the *coordinator* mechanisms with the aim of understanding whether or not a single part or combination of a few can result in a higher chance of success.

With these considerations in mind, the first case study is of South Korea during the 1980s protesting against the Chun Doo Hwan military regime. This case study is from East Asia's wave of democracy and shows evidence of the *organizer* mechanism as well as all three parts of the

coordinator mechanism. This campaign movement starts immediately after the end of the Park Chung Hee military regime and witnesses massacres, tortures, and persecutions of student demonstrators. At the end, a moving scene of an entire nation standing up in protest of a dictatorship and in support of students results in complete concessions and the first free and fair election in South Korea's history (Lakey, 2009).

The second case study will be of former Yugoslavia in 1968. Students organized and protested in huge numbers demanding the release of students arrested and free and fair elections. Students across several cities within Yugoslavia all stood up to protest while facing constant violent repression from the government. However, this movement ultimately ended in failure as President Tito publicly announced his support but did not take any measures to address demands and instead gradually repressed the entire student movement (Gonzales, 2013). This case will show how only having components of the *organizer* mechanism is not enough for success.

The final case study will be of Bahrain during the larger Arab Spring movement in 2011 and will serve as a critical case. No pro-democracy literature would be complete without a discussion of the Arab Spring movement. Since this campaign took place in more modern times, factors such as mass media and social media can be addressed and analyzed for how they affect both causal mechanisms. The Arab Spring movement in particular attracted immense levels of international attention and thus parts of the *coordinator* mechanism are fulfilled. In addition, the February 14th Youth movement was a significant faction of demonstrators and protests took place on university campuses, thus fulfilling the *organizer* mechanism. However, this movement still ended in a complete failure. The purpose of this case study is to answer why the campaign outcome is what it is and if certain *coordinator* mechanisms carry more significance than others (Dreyfuss, 2015). Table 1 shows briefly which considerations each case studies satisfy.

Table 1: Considerations for case selection

	Case Studies		
	South Korea	*Yugoslavia*	*Bahrain (critical case)*
Time Period	Third wave	Second wave reversal	Fourth wave
Region	East Asia	Eastern Europe	Middle East
Causal Mechanism	*Organizer* and *coordinator* mechanisms present	*Organizer* mechanism present	*Organizer* and *coordinator* mechanisms present

4. Measurement and Data

Key Concepts and Variables

The *organizer* mechanism requires some measurement of student involvement. A dataset—referred to as Student Protest—for this was already created by Dahlum (2019). Dahlum measures student involvement at three levels: students organizing a protest, students dominating a protest, and students participating in a protest (2019). Since this thesis only analyzes protest movements where students occupy a significant position, the measure of students participating is omitted from the final dataset and only measures of organizing and dominating are retained.

The *coordinator* mechanism requires several variables as domestic support, international attention, and defections all need to be measured in some way. Chenoweth's Nonviolent and Violent Campaign Outcomes Dataset 2.1—referred to as NAVCO—includes several variables that can measure all three parts of this mechanism. For domestic support, NAVCO has variables for governments facing backlash from domestic organizations and campaigns growing after

violent repression from the government. For international attention, NAVCO measures for international aid being suspended and international organizations condemning the repressing government. Finally for defections, NAVCO includes variables for state officials defecting and security officials defecting (Chenoweth and Shay, 2019). These six variables were retained in the final dataset to measure for the *coordinator* mechanism.

The outcome variable will be the success variable included in NAVCO. Success is defined as "campaign's maximalist goal ultimately achieved as a direct result of the campaign" (Chenoweth and Shay, 2019). A progress variable is also included in NAVCO which measures how much of a protest's demands were met, however that variable was not used in this thesis since the hypotheses are mainly concerned with full success or failure of a campaign.

Lastly, variables for matching were decided on to address possible threats due to selection bias or endogeneity. As the regressions below will show, variables that are being matched onto have strong, positive correlations with success. Therefore, matching onto rule of law, polity, and GDP will allow me to sidestep problems of endogeneity.

Dataset Construction

Student Protest uses campaigns identified in NAVCO 1.0 which means that the unit of analysis was the campaign unit and the timeframe only extends from 1946 to 2006 (Dahlum, 2019). However, NAVCO uses a timeframe of 1946 to 2013 with the campaign-year as the unit of analysis (Chenoweth and Shay). First, to fit NAVCO's larger timeline, I extended Student Protest and added values for campaigns in 2006 to 2013 totaling to 150 campaigns. In addition, the way individual campaigns were labeled in both datasets were not identical so some renaming and breaking up needed to be done so the campaign names were uniform. Lastly, the unit of analysis was kept as the campaign movement rather than the campaign year since this thesis is

concerned with students having either an organizing role or dominating role which is most likely to have a lasting effect throughout a campaign. Therefore, it was reasoned that it was not necessary to gather data at the campaign-year level. With this editing and extending, the dataset ended with 396 campaign movements between the years 1946 and 2013.

For the campaigns that I coded, I created a coding scheme that resembles Dahlum's so as to keep the method of data collection relatively constant. Dahlum defines students as "individuals enrolled in and actively studying in an accredited tertiary education institution, including all universities and colleges, regardless of the type of education offered" (Dahlum, 2019). I follow this same definition and scrutinized sources as much as possible to confirm that participants were indeed college-level students.

When gathering her data, Dahlum cites the Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNVAD) (Swarthmore, 2015), UNHCR, Freedom House, and various articles and journals. Overall, Dahlum made a point to always consult multiple sources when gathering data. Modeling this, the coding scheme this thesis uses is a 4-step process and uses the campaign as the unit of analysis. First, the Mass Mobilization dataset covers all protest events between the years 1990 and 2020. For campaigns that fall within this period, Mass Mobilization was used to identify relevant protest events and which social groups participated (Clark and Regan, 2016). For example, Iran's Green Revolution started in 2009 and Mass Mobilization documents three protest events that involve students and are a part of the greater Green Revolution campaign. From here, the second step is to consult GNVAD for further details on protest events and participant identification. "Iranians protest election results, 2009" is the name of the relevant case study and identifies students as leaders since a significant portion of the campaign originated from Tehran University. In addition, seeing the treatment of students by security

forces, university professors also resigned in support (Hirshel-Burns, 2015). For even more confirmation, the third step utilizes ProQuest, a large database of newspapers going back decades. This source is used to gather news clippings of protest events throughout the campaign and to assess and confirm the level of student involvement. One headline from the London Evening Standard reads "Iran cracks down on student protest" and details police surrounding Tehran University to suppress student demonstrations. The Christian Science Monitor's headline reads "Amid student protests, Iran widens net against opposition" and mentions that the launch of fresh protests by students has resulted in greater police activity. Lastly, a Washington Post headline reads "Skirmishes erupt at funeral of student killed during protests in Iran" which details students attending the funeral of a killed student protester clashing with police near the College of Fine Arts in Tehran. These headlines all confirm that students not only held a dominating presence in protests, but also had a hand in organizing parts of the campaign as many of the protests happened on a university campus. Finally, the fourth step is to do a general search in google scholar to identify scholarly journals written about this campaign movement. Published in *The Whole World is Texting,* chapter "Student Activism, Social Media, and Authoritarian Rule in Iran" details how students used social media as a venue to express political beliefs and organize (Golklar, 2015).

Moving on—as mentioned in the Key Concepts and Variables sections—measures for the *coordinator* mechanism were retrieved from NAVCO. Since the unit of analysis is the campaign-year in NAVCO, these variables were transformed in two ways to make the unit of analysis the campaign. The first way was by taking an average of their values throughout the campaign. The second way they were transformed was by keeping them on a dichotomous scale

and assigning a 1 value if a 1 was coded ever during the entirety of the campaign. The outcome variable of success was transformed in the same way.

Variables of GDP per capita, rule of law, and polity were also averaged across the years of campaign activity and were assigned categorical values by rounding to the nearest number. For example, Mexico had an average polity score of 2.13 between the years 1987 and 2000 so its categorical value is 2.

Limitations

There are several limitations to the dataset that must be addressed. Firstly, while most sources of information are good at identifying students as *college* students or identifying the location of a protest as a university hinting at a protester's identity, some sources may use *student* as an umbrella term which can refer to students who are not in college such as high schoolers or even middle schoolers. Each data source was scrutinized heavily to confirm that a protester was indeed a college student, however there may be a couple cases where this distinction was not clear, and student domination or organization is coded as a 1 when it should have been coded as a 0 because participation came from non-college students.

In addition, since my data collection was to supplement an already existing database, although I tried to remain as consistent as possible, there may exist disagreements between my coding decisions and Dahlum's if she were to code the missing cases. This largely falls on the subjective nature of gathering data since multiple sources are essentially judged on whether or not students are described as a significant player.

Finally, the dataset is limited in its time frame. Ending the dataset at 2013 means post 2013 protests are not included. Significant, contemporary democracy movements such as Hong Kong's Umbrella movement, Sudan's pro-democracy campaign, and a second wave of protests in

the Middle East are not included in the dataset. Ideally, the finalized dataset would include all of these campaign movements and more, but due to many restrictions, it was decided that the dataset would end in 2013.

VI. Quantitative Analysis

1. Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Success	385	0.384	0.487	0	1
Primary Method	385	0.478	0.500	0	1
Students Dominate	273	0.132	0.339	0	1
Students Organize	274	0.201	0.401	0	1
Campaign Growth	385	0.670	0.471	0	1
Domestic Backlash	327	0.578	0.495	0	1
International Backlash	327	0.664	0.473	0	1
International Material Backlash	327	0.309	0.463	0	1
Security Defections	373	0.424	0.495	0	1
State Defections	376	0.354	0.479	0	1
Duration	398	5.229	8.638	0	65

Table 1 shows a glimpse of the key variables and concepts relating to both causal mechanisms. Briefly, protests that are dominated or organized by students are in the minority. Success outcomes are similarly in the minority. However, it seems that instances of the *coordinator* mechanism are more frequent. Protests that include campaigns growing after repression, domestic backlash, or international backlash are actually in the majority. Finally, the average duration of a campaign movement is around 5 years with the shortest lasting less than a year and the longest lasting 65 years.

2. Regressions

Table 2 shows logistic regressions for each mechanism calculated separately against success—as a dichotomous variable—as the dependent variable with GDP per capita, polity score, and rule of law being held constant. This initial test shows that most mechanisms have both a statistically significant and positive relation with success. The only exceptions are models 5, 7, and 8 where they are still positively related, but are not statistically significant.

Table 2: Logit Estimates *Organizer* and *Coordinator* Mechanisms on Success

Mechanisms Separate with Controls Logit

	Dependent variable:											
	success											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Students Dominate	0.956**											
	(0.399)											
Students Organize		0.972***										
		(0.342)										
Any Student Involvement			0.976***									
			(0.328)									
Campaign Growth				1.301***								
				(0.286)								
Domestic Backlash					0.445							
					(0.273)							
Any Domestic Support						1.451***						
						(0.434)						
International Backlash							0.539*					
							(0.296)					
International Material Backlash								0.381				
								(0.278)				
Any International Pressure									0.598**			
									(0.302)			
Defections from the State										1.038***		
										(0.255)		
Defections from Security Forces											0.972***	
											(0.255)	
Any Defections												1.101***
												(0.267)
GDP per capita	-0.038	-0.034	-0.038	-0.039	-0.040	-0.039	-0.037	-0.029	-0.036	-0.028	-0.032	-0.029
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Polity Score	0.042	0.042	0.040	0.031	0.025	0.031	0.021	0.026	0.022	0.038	0.042	0.040
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Rule of Law	0.206	0.265	0.195	0.061	-0.256	-0.213	-0.149	-0.216	-0.148	0.068	0.075	0.079
	(0.327)	(0.327)	(0.330)	(0.307)	(0.332)	(0.318)	(0.335)	(0.332)	(0.335)	(0.305)	(0.309)	(0.311)
Constant	-0.249	-0.342	-0.342	-1.201***	-0.495**	-1.495***	-0.653**	-0.409*	-0.707**	-0.743***	-0.772***	-1.005***
	(0.229)	(0.235)	(0.236)	(0.289)	(0.250)	(0.431)	(0.296)	(0.230)	(0.305)	(0.231)	(0.242)	(0.272)
Observations	227	228	227	299	254	275	254	254	254	291	290	291
Log Likelihood	-150.348	-149.954	-148.770	-185.674	-166.042	-174.158	-165.681	-166.454	-165.360	-184.514	-184.524	-183.342
Akaike Inf. Crit.	310.696	309.907	307.540	381.347	342.084	358.316	341.362	342.908	340.720	379.028	379.047	376.683

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3 estimates the effect of the *organizer* measures in various specifications with measures of the *coordinator* mechanism being held constant. All models in Table 3 are logistic regressions, in all specifications, controls include GDP per capita, polity score, and rule of law. In Table 3 we see that students dominating and organizing a protest remain statistically significant and positively associated with campaign success across all variables held constant. Holding constant the *coordinator* mechanisms is a more robust test than the previous table since holding constant certain variables reduces endogeneity and shows the variance in the statistical significance of student involvement. For example, Model 1 estimates that students dominate is significant at the 0.01 level when campaign growth is held constant, but when defections from the state is held constant, students dominate is only significant at the 0.1 level.

Table 3: Logit estimates of *Organizer* on Success Holding *Coordinator* Constant

Mechanisms Held Constant with Controls Logit

	Dependent variable:														
	success														
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Students Dominate	1.175***	1.120**				1.151**	1.154**				0.957**	0.794*			
	(0.431)	(0.472)				(0.469)	(0.467)				(0.425)	(0.409)			
Students Organize			0.955***	0.915**				0.964***	0.955***				0.932***	0.784**	
			(0.360)	(0.373)				(0.368)	(0.366)				(0.359)	(0.351)	
Campaign Growth	1.593***		1.445***												
	(0.330)		(0.320)												
Domestic Backlash		0.202		0.156											
		(0.323)		(0.327)											
Any Student Involvement					0.931***					1.055***					0.841**
					(0.355)					(0.365)					(0.338)
Any Domestic Support					1.193**										
					(0.496)										
International Backlash						0.461		0.496							
						(0.338)		(0.338)							
International Material Backlash							0.285		0.305						
							(0.319)		(0.320)						
Any International Pressure										0.573*					
										(0.347)					
Defections from Security Forces											1.175***		1.149***		
											(0.295)		(0.297)		
Defections from the State												0.876***		0.847***	
												(0.288)		(0.288)	
Any Defections															1.003***
															(0.302)
GDP per capita	-0.045	-0.032	-0.038	-0.034	-0.039	-0.028	-0.024	-0.031	-0.027	-0.028	-0.031	-0.040	-0.031	-0.035	-0.031
	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Polity Score	0.037	0.035	0.037	0.029	0.029	0.032	0.037	0.025	0.031	0.025	0.046	0.042	0.045	0.041	0.041
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Rule of Law	0.462	0.079	0.508	0.079	0.131	0.170	0.119	0.171	0.119	0.165	0.449	0.328	0.469	0.374	0.353
	(0.353)	(0.367)	(0.351)	(0.369)	(0.355)	(0.370)	(0.366)	(0.372)	(0.368)	(0.374)	(0.346)	(0.336)	(0.349)	(0.335)	(0.343)
Constant	-1.377***	-0.391	-1.336***	-0.419	-1.328***	-0.638*	-0.408	-0.722**	-0.470	-0.830**	-0.884***	-0.635**	-0.942***	-0.694**	-1.007***
	(0.347)	(0.294)	(0.339)	(0.296)	(0.498)	(0.357)	(0.282)	(0.365)	(0.289)	(0.376)	(0.287)	(0.266)	(0.292)	(0.270)	(0.315)
Observations	227	190	228	190	204	190	190	190	190	190	225	225	225	226	226
Log Likelihood	-136.995	-125.177	-138.636	-125.083	-131.161	-124.427	-124.973	-124.102	-124.741	-122.863	-140.294	-144.218	-139.479	-144.613	-142.012
Akaike Inf. Crit.	285.990	262.354	289.272	262.166	274.323	260.855	261.947	260.205	261.482	257.725	292.589	300.435	290.957	301.226	296.024

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4 shows each *coordinator* mechanism being interacted with each *organizer* mechanism. Unlike the results from tables 2 and 3, table 4 shows several negative and non-significant relations. First, the only significant, positive relation is any student involvement with any international pressure (Model 10). This is an interesting finding considering international pressure showed no statistical significance in any model in either Table 1 or 2. This may be because unlike the previous two models, these estimates interact each variable, meaning statistical significance with the outcome is judged on whether or not both measures exist. Second, students dominating interacting with campaign growth, domestic backlash, international backlash, and international material backlash (Models 1, 2, 6, and 7) all have a negative relation with success. Students organizing has a negative relation with success when interacting with domestic backlash, international backlash, international material backlash, and defections from security forces (Models 4, 8, 9, and 13).

Table 4: Logit estimates of *Organizer* and *Coordinator* interacting on Success

Mechanisms Interact with Controls Logit

	Dependent variable:														
	success														
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Students Dominate	1.351**	2.034*				1.515	1.184**				-0.015	0.746			
	(0.649)	(1.153)				(0.924)	(0.588)				(0.650)	(0.628)			
Students Organize			0.750	0.915**				1.316*	1.187***				0.580	0.881*	
			(0.640)	(0.373)				(0.679)	(0.458)				(0.521)	(0.512)	
Campaign Growth	1.647***		1.381***												
	(0.364)		(0.358)												
Domestic Backlash		0.292		0.156											
		(0.338)		(0.327)											
Any Student Involvement					1.544					1.189*					0.499
					(1.147)					(0.701)					(0.638)
Any Domestic Support					1.339**										
					(0.577)										
International Backlash						0.518		0.612							
						(0.361)		(0.391)							
International Material Backlash							0.295		0.451						
							(0.341)		(0.360)						
Any International Pressure										0.616					
										(0.399)					
Defections from Security Forces											0.944***		1.013***		
											(0.311)		(0.329)		
Defections from the State												0.865***		0.885***	
												(0.310)		(0.323)	
Any Defections															0.910***
															(0.333)
GDP per capita	-0.043	-0.030	-0.039	-0.034	-0.037	-0.027	-0.024	-0.032	-0.028	-0.028	-0.026	-0.039	-0.031	-0.036	-0.029
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Polity Score	0.037	0.037	0.038	0.029	0.029	0.031	0.036	0.024	0.028	0.024	0.047	0.042	0.046	0.040	0.043
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Rule of Law	0.463	0.050	0.502	0.079	0.122	0.174	0.119	0.186	0.148	0.170	0.460	0.328	0.458	0.372	0.358
	(0.354)	(0.370)	(0.351)	(0.369)	(0.356)	(0.371)	(0.366)	(0.374)	(0.370)	(0.374)	(0.344)	(0.336)	(0.348)	(0.336)	(0.343)

Students Dominate: Campagin Growth	-0.312														
	(0.857)														
Students Dominate: Domestic Backlash		-1.153													
		(1.267)													
Students Organize: Campaign Growth			0.303												
			(0.777)												
Students Organize: Domestic Backlash					-0.678										
					(1.207)										
Any Student Inovlvement: Any Domestic Support						-0.496									
						(1.068)									
Students Dominate: International Backlash							-0.083								
							(0.974)								
Students Dominate: International Material Backlash								-0.499							
								(0.804)							
Students Organize: Internaitonal Backlash									-0.671						
									(0.770)						
Students Organize: International Material Backlash										-0.183					
										(0.819)					
Any Student Invovlvement: Any International Pressure											2.103**				
											(1.022)				
Students Dominate: Defections from Security Forces												0.086			
												(0.847)			
Students Dominate: Defections from the State													0.691		
													(0.739)		
Students Organize: Defections from Security Forces														-0.185	
														(0.706)	
Students Organize: Defections from the State															0.486
															(0.763)
Any Student Inovlvent: Any Defections	-1.425***	-0.442	-1.284***	-0.419	-1.465**	-0.681*	-0.413	-0.806**	-0.530*	-0.862**	-0.804***	-0.632**	-0.878***	-0.706**	-0.965***
	(0.373)	(0.300)	(0.361)	(0.296)	(0.571)	(0.371)	(0.287)	(0.394)	(0.298)	(0.404)	(0.287)	(0.266)	(0.298)	(0.275)	(0.320)
Observations	227	190	228	190	204	190	190	190	190	190	225	225	225	226	226
Log Likelihood	-136.929	-124.713	-138.559	-125.083	-131.004	-124.318	-124.970	-123.908	-124.364	-122.838	-137.805	-144.213	-139.031	-144.579	-141.807
Akaike Inf. Crit.	287.859	263.425	291.119	262.166	276.008	262.635	263.939	261.817	262.729	259.675	289.610	302.425	292.062	303.157	297.614

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Moving on, Table 5 transitions to use success as a continuous variable which was calculated by finding the average of the success variable across the years a protest lasted for. A note here is that this average value speaks more on the length of a campaign rather than "how" successful it was. Table 2—Table 5's counterpart when using success as a dichotomous variable—showed more significant relations with success. Instead, table 4, while still reporting positive values—Model 8—only shows significance with Models 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, and 12. All of these models report similar success rates with the highest being 17.6% from Model 11 and the lowest being 10.6% from Model 10.

Table 5: Linear Model Estimates of *Organizer* and *Coordinator* on Success

Mechanisms Separate with Control lm

	Dependent variable:											
	success_avg											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Students Dominate	0.164**											
	(0.069)											
Students Organize		0.140**										
		(0.059)										
Any Student Involvement			0.130**									
			(0.057)									
Campaign Growth				0.113***								
				(0.043)								
Domestic Backlash					0.008							
					(0.045)							
Any Domestic Support						0.093						
						(0.057)						
International Backlash							0.023					
							(0.048)					
International Material Backlash								-0.039				
								(0.047)				
Any International Pressure									0.015			
									(0.049)			
Defections from the State										0.106**		
										(0.043)		
Defections from Security Forces											0.176***	
											(0.042)	
Any Defections												0.164***
												(0.042)
GDP per capita	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Polity Score	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.011***	0.010**	0.011**	0.010**	0.010**	0.010**	0.012***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Rule of Law	0.068	0.080	0.064	0.034	-0.013	0.003	-0.009	-0.013	-0.010	0.040	0.047	0.043
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Constant	0.249***	0.239***	0.243***	0.160***	0.227***	0.155***	0.215***	0.244***	0.220***	0.187***	0.149***	0.133***
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Observations	227	228	227	299	254	275	254	254	254	291	290	291
R^2	0.070	0.072	0.068	0.053	0.020	0.033	0.021	0.023	0.021	0.055	0.089	0.081
Adjusted R^2	0.053	0.055	0.051	0.041	0.005	0.019	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.042	0.076	0.068
Residual Std. Error	0.360 (df = 222)	0.362 (df = 223)	0.360 (df = 222)	0.354 (df = 294)	0.349 (df = 249)	0.353 (df = 270)	0.349 (df = 249)	0.349 (df = 249)	0.349 (df = 249)	0.354 (df = 286)	0.348 (df = 285)	0.349 (df = 286)
F Statistic	4.174*** (df = 4; 222)	4.311*** (df = 4; 223)	4.045*** (df = 4; 222)	4.151*** (df = 4; 294)	1.298 (df = 4; 249)	2.310* (df = 4; 270)	1.348 (df = 4; 249)	1.459 (df = 4; 249)	1.314 (df = 4; 249)	4.158*** (df = 4; 286)	6.932*** (df = 4; 285)	6.306*** (df = 4; 286)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6 continues to use success as a continuous variable and instead holds *coordinator* mechanisms constant. This estimate shows that measures for student involvement have both statistical significance and a positive relation with success—the one exception is model 14. This fits the estimates made in Table 7 and also shows the variance that student involvement has when *coordinator* mechanisms are held constant. For example, Model 3 shows that students organizing is statistically significant and positively related to success when holding campaign growth constant, however Model 14 shows that it is not statistically significant when holding defections from the state constant.

Table 6: Linear Model Estimates of *Organizer* on Success Holding *Coordinator* constant

Mechanisms Held Constant with Control lm

	Dependent variable:														
	success_avg														
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Students Dominate	0.171**	0.169**				0.159**	0.162**				0.146**	0.146**			
	(0.068)	(0.078)				(0.078)	(0.077)				(0.068)	(0.069)			
Students Organize			0.129**	0.143**				0.132**	0.132**				0.117**	0.107*	
			(0.059)	(0.064)				(0.063)	(0.062)				(0.058)	(0.060)	
Campaign Growth	0.151***		0.130***												
	(0.049)		(0.049)												
Domestic Backlash		-0.039		-0.047											
		(0.055)		(0.056)											
Any Student Involvement					0.099					0.123**					0.100*
					(0.062)					(0.062)					(0.057)
Any Domestic Support					0.051										
					(0.074)										
International Backlash						0.009		0.014							
						(0.056)		(0.056)							
International Material Backlash							-0.048		-0.046						
							(0.055)		(0.055)						
Any International Pressure										0.003					
										(0.057)					
Defections from Security Forces											0.205***		0.202***		
											(0.048)		(0.048)		
Defections from the State												0.093*		0.091*	
												(0.049)		(0.049)	
Any Defections															0.158***
															(0.049)
GDP per capita	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Polity Score	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**	0.011**	0.012**	0.011**	0.011**	0.010*	0.010**	0.010**	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Rule of Law	0.089	0.043	0.098*	0.043	0.060	0.039	0.035	0.039	0.034	0.035	0.105*	0.082	0.106*	0.092	0.086
	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Constant	0.149***	0.260***	0.155***	0.255***	0.201***	0.235***	0.260***	0.224***	0.252***	0.233***	0.143***	0.206***	0.140***	0.201***	0.145***
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.074)	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.061)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.050)
Observations	227	190	228	190	204	190	190	190	190	190	225	225	225	226	226
R^2	0.108	0.054	0.100	0.056	0.053	0.052	0.056	0.053	0.056	0.050	0.145	0.088	0.143	0.083	0.111
Adjusted R^2	0.088	0.029	0.080	0.031	0.029	0.026	0.030	0.027	0.031	0.025	0.125	0.067	0.123	0.062	0.091
Residual Std. Error	0.353 (df = 221)	0.353 (df = 184)	0.357 (df = 222)	0.352 (df = 184)	0.363 (df = 198)	0.353 (df = 184)	0.352 (df = 184)	0.353 (df = 184)	0.352 (df = 184)	0.353 (df = 184)	0.347 (df = 219)	0.355 (df = 219)	0.347 (df = 219)	0.359 (df = 220)	0.353 (df = 220)
F Statistic	5.359*** (df = 5; 221)	2.114* (df = 5; 184)	4.925*** (df = 5; 222)	2.193* (df = 5; 184)	2.227* (df = 5; 198)	2.012* (df = 5; 184)	2.172* (df = 5; 184)	2.057* (df = 5; 184)	2.196* (df = 5; 184)	1.953* (df = 5; 184)	7.415*** (df = 5; 219)	4.226*** (df = 5; 219)	7.285*** (df = 5; 219)	3.976*** (df = 5; 220)	5.501*** (df = 5; 220)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7 again uses success as a continuous variable, but interacts the *organizer* and *coordinator* mechanisms. This estimate requires both measures to exist when judging on success and thus answers the question if two mechanisms existing simultaneously has an impact on success. This estimate, unlike Tables 5 and 6, show no statistical significance and even a couple negative relations are shown. For example, Model 7 interacts students dominate with international backlash and estimates no statistical significance and a negative relation with success. A possible explanation can be that governments tend to take stronger action when mechanisms exist with each other leading to greater repression that is not seen in other circumstances. In addition, the dataset itself may not have many cases where more than one mechanism exists simultaneously meaning that there are just not enough observations to estimate statistical significance.

In summary, both students dominate and students organize are statistically significant, and positive when tested against success as both a dichotomous variable and a continuous variable. However, this does not necessarily hold up when the student measures are interacted with the *coordinator* mechanisms. This may be because there are not enough observations in the dataset where multiple independent variables are interacting. This gap in the quantitative analysis will be covered in the qualitative analysis.

Table 7: Linear Model Estimates of *Organizer* interacted with *Coordinator* on Success

Mechanisms Interact with Control lm

	Dependent variable:														
	success_avg														
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Students Dominate	0.222**	0.243				0.313**	0.216**				0.034	0.145			
	(0.107)	(0.165)				(0.152)	(0.098)				(0.101)	(0.109)			
Students Organize			0.119	0.143**				0.134	0.208***				0.095	0.138	
			(0.105)	(0.064)				(0.115)	(0.077)				(0.087)	(0.089)	
Campaign Growth	0.163***		0.127**												
	(0.053)		(0.055)												
Domestic Backlash		-0.031		-0.047											
		(0.058)		(0.056)											
Any Student Inovlvement					0.125					0.127					0.091
					(0.196)					(0.120)					(0.107)
Any Domestic Support					0.055										
					(0.080)										
International Backlash						0.033		0.015							
						(0.060)		(0.064)							
International Material Backlash							-0.029		0.002						
							(0.059)		(0.062)						
Any International Pressure										0.004					
										(0.065)					
Defections from Security Forces											0.178***		0.194***		
											(0.051)		(0.054)		
Defections from the State												0.092*		0.103*	
												(0.053)		(0.055)	
Any Defections															0.156***
															(0.054)
GDP per capita	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.004	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Polity Score	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**	0.011**	0.012**	0.011**	0.010*	0.010*	0.010*	0.010**	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)

Polity Score	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**	0.011**	0.012**	0.011**	0.010*	0.010*	0.010*	0.010**	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Rule of Law	0.089	0.040	0.098*	0.043	0.060	0.041	0.033	0.039	0.044	0.035	0.106*	0.082	0.105*	0.091	0.086
	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Students Dominate: Campaign Growth	-0.084														
	(0.139)														
Students Dominate: Domestic Backlash		-0.096													
		(0.187)													
Students Organize: Campaign Growth			0.014												
			(0.127)												
Students Organize: Domestic Backlash					-0.029										
					(0.207)										
Any Student Invovlement: Any Domestic Support						-0.207									
						(0.177)									
Students Dominate: International Backlash							-0.148								
							(0.163)								
Students Organize: International Material Backlash										-0.006					
										(0.140)					
Any Student Invovlement: Any International Pressure											0.199				
											(0.136)				
Students Dominate: Defections from Security Forces												0.003			
												(0.144)			
Students Dominate: Defections from the State													0.041		
													(0.117)		

Students Organize: Defections from Security Forces														-0.058	
														(0.122)	
Students Organize: Defections from the State															0.013
															(0.127)
Any Student Involvement: Any Defections	0.140***	0.255***	0.157***	0.255***	0.197**	0.218***	0.251***	0.224***	0.233***	0.232***	0.152***	0.206***	0.144***	0.198***	0.145***
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.079)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.051)
Observations	227	190	228	190	204	190	190	190	190	190	225	225	225	226	226
R^2	0.110	0.056	0.100	0.056	0.053	0.059	0.060	0.053	0.070	0.050	0.153	0.088	0.143	0.084	0.111
Adjusted R^2	0.085	0.025	0.075	0.031	0.024	0.028	0.029	0.022	0.040	0.019	0.130	0.063	0.120	0.059	0.087
Residual Std. Error	0.354 (df = 220)	0.353 (df = 183)	0.358 (df = 221)	0.352 (df = 184)	0.364 (df = 197)	0.353 (df = 183)	0.353 (df = 183)	0.354 (df = 183)	0.351 (df = 183)	0.354 (df = 183)	0.346 (df = 218)	0.356 (df = 218)	0.348 (df = 218)	0.359 (df = 219)	0.354 (df = 219)
F Statistic	4.514*** (df = 6; 220)	1.798 (df = 6; 183)	4.088*** (df = 6; 221)	2.193* (df = 5; 184)	1.850* (df = 6; 197)	1.909* (df = 6; 183)	1.946* (df = 6; 183)	1.705 (df = 6; 183)	2.310** (df = 6; 183)	1.619 (df = 6; 183)	6.571*** (df = 6; 218)	3.505*** (df = 6; 218)	6.067*** (df = 6; 218)	3.339*** (df = 6; 219)	4.565*** (df = 6; 219)
Note:															*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

3. Causal Considerations

All tests up to this point simply show correlation. We now move to consider causal relationships. To do this, as briefly mentioned early, a matching technique will be used to push as close to causal inference as possible. When running regressions, controls of GDP per capita, polity score, and rule of law were used. These variables were chosen because they are often the markers that show significant, fundamental differences between countries. For example, a student protest succeeding in Spain cannot be properly compared to a student protest not succeeding in Myanmar. In 2013, Spain had a recorded GDP per capita that was more than seven times greater than that of Myanmar in 2013. Furthermore, Spain had a polity score of 10—meaning a full democracy—while Myanmar had a score of -3. Finally, on a scale of 0 to 1, 1 meaning full transparency of legal proceedings, Spain received a score of 0.97 while Myanmar only scored a 0.357. These figures show that the environment for a protest is completely different between Spain and Myanmar and thus should not be compared regardless of the existence of *organizer* or *coordinator* mechanisms. Instead, these variables should be matched so that country environments are not a factor in the outcome of a protest.

The treatment used here will be students dominate rather than students organize or any student involvement. This decision was informed by the regressions earlier. Throughout all models, students dominate was the one that carried the most significant and seemed the most robust against all controls. In addition, while GDP per capita, polity score, and rule of law were used in the regressions, it does not create enough matched cases to develop an accurate picture so GDP per capita and polity are used as they provide the most matched cases with 127 observations.

Table 8: Matched Model

	Naive	Matched
(Intercept)	0.110	0.128
	(0.040)	(0.056)
assigned_treatment	0.038	0.020
	(0.054)	(0.068)
Num.Obs.	161	127
R2	0.003	0.001
R2 Adj.	−0.003	−0.007
AIC	111.9	98.8
BIC	121.2	107.3
Log.Lik.	−52.973	−46.390
RMSE	0.34	0.35

Table 8 compares different models of the matched method. The first model is a "naive" model, which is just a simple linear model using the matched data. The "matched" model uses the matching technique and is closer to a causal link. While both models are positively related with success, neither are statistically significant. One reason for this may be that the matched data is much more limited than the dataset the previous regressions used. The larger dataset has close to 400 observations, but the matched data is less than half that size. In addition, the matched results only take into consideration student involvement and success. The regressions interacted and held constant *coordinator* mechanism variables and thus showed that while some relations remained non-statistically significant, others were. Therefore, the results of the regressions cannot be ignored and will be further explored in the following case studies.

While the matching results do not support a causal relationship, the robustness of the regressions show that causality cannot be entirely ruled out. The following case studies will describe in depth how each mechanism interacts with each other and may cause success in a movement.

VII. Case Studies

1. The South Korea Case

South Korea offers a case from the third wave of democratization during and after the Cold War. It gives an excellent example of student engagement and involvement right from the conception of the democracy movement to the successful instatement of free and fair elections. Specifically, the sporadic protests against Chun Do Hwan throughout the 1980s serve as an excellent example of how effective students dominating and organizing protests can be. Their efforts to bring out a diverse array of social groups and sharing of information and ideologies all factored into the domestic support, international pressure, and feelings of defection that helped them succeed in protesting for democracy. This case study will lay out exactly why, which events, and how students mobilized and coordinated with other key groups. Furthermore, since the dataset has few cases with evidence of both student involvement and the coordinator mechanism, this case study will serve to bolster the quantitative analysis.

A Brief Historical Context

Before South Korea and North Korea were South Korea and North Korea, the Korean peninsula was a unified territory governed by either a monarchy or a colonial power. For much of history prior to 1910, Korea was a monarchy consistently fighting off Mongolian, Chinese, and Japanese threats. After 1910, Korea was a colony of neighboring Japan, but as a result of their loss in World War Two, the peninsula was taken from them and divided into North and South Korea. North Korea was taken under Soviet occupation and South Korea, American occupation. Once American occupation ended in 1948 at the onset of the Korean War, Syngman Rhee, the first president of South Korea took power and continuously extended his terms through

1960 (Timelines). However, while the Korean people did get to experience democracy for a short blip afterward, another dictator, Park Chung Hee, staged a military coup and established his Yushin system. South Korea experienced a rapid period of industrialization, so a previously agricultural-reliant country was now a developed economy. However, the speed to which this happened created massive levels of income inequality and widespread suffering which only heightened the desire for democracy. This period lasted from 1960 until 1979 with Park Chung Hee's assassination on October 26th, 1979 (Timelines).

For six days after, there was hope that systemic change would follow Park's assassination, but on the sixth day, Chun Doo Hwan staged a military coup and established himself as dictator and remained in power from 1979 to 1987 (Timelines). This time period proves to be unique in that South Korea would come to host both the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympic games in 1988 meaning that there was a higher-than-normal amount of international attention on the Chun regime. This period will be the focus of this case study.

South Korea was ruled by dictatorship after dictatorship which was finally overthrown for a participatory democracy in 1987 (Timelines). During this period of political turmoil, there was always a sense that a foreign power—whether it be the U.S., Japan, or a dictatorship—was in power and the actual Korean people had no place or say in the governing of their own country.

Student Participation

The student protesters that largely made up the campaign against Chun Doo Hwan's regime grew up and were educated under the Yushin system. The Yushin system, led by President Park, created a fast-growing economy and lifted a country that was largely agrarian to an industrialized powerhouse (Lee, 1980). However, this came with several side effects. Since the economy was heavily focused on exports, low labor wages were maintained, and labor

movements were thus repressed. In addition, because exports were increased so rapidly, by 24-fold within a decade, inflation ran rampant and the average living cost grew significantly and the rise of wages did not keep up (Lee, 1980).

As a result, there was much social unrest, but in 1975 President Park passed emergency decree number 9, criminalizing any criticisms against the Yushin constitution (Lee, 1980). Even during this time, college students across the country organized to make their grievances against the government heard. The largest incident was in the city of Busan where thousands of students protested and created ripple effects that reached other cities. In response, President Park placed Busan under military control and hundreds were arrested (Lee, 1980).

This period of heavy repression and censorship was when most of the student protesters during Chun's regime grew up. Referred to as the "386" generation, these students were in their 30s in the 1990s, participated in the 1980s protests, and were born in the 1960s. Some argue that a sense of rebellion against authority was created—as a result of growing up during the Yushin system—and erupted in the 1980s against the Chun regime (Park, 81). The spark was the Gwangju massacre of 1979.

Just six days after the assassination of Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan led a military coup to claim a dictatorship for himself. Students—enraged that all their hopes for democracy were essentially stripped away—organized a protest in the city of Gwangju. While similar protests happened all over the country, Chun chose Gwangju to make an example of and hundreds were killed, arrested, or forced into hiding (Lee, 177). This marked the start and defined the atmosphere and norms of the Chun dictatorship.

Throughout Chun's dictatorship protesters were repressed both at the site of a demonstration and systemically. Participants were making themselves vulnerable to be fired from their job,

prosecution, brainwashing, harsher working conditions, and many more methods to try to force compliance. Students were exposed to similar methods in addition to being expelled from school or schools in their entirety being shut down (Shin et al., 85). In addition, Chun was quick to use the National Security Law to brand protesters as criminals in the name of "national security." In extreme cases, protesters were given life sentences or even the death penalty (Shin et al. 91).

However, this did not kill the student movement, but it instead further mobilized students to participate, if anything, to avenge their fallen peers. As soon as students entered universities, the will and need to fight for justice and democracy were so pervasive that no student could withstand it regardless of how much they isolated themselves or faced repression from the government (Park, 112). Messaging around the Gwangju massacre from the government consistently pushed that the student protesters were the ones who were violent rather than state security forces. Therefore, students would enter university with this understanding, but the burgeoning speed to which older students would share their ideologies with incoming students made it so that by the end, all students shared a common set of beliefs. One student shared that they "found out the *truth* soon after [entering] university" (Park, 78).

Many aspects of Korean University culture facilitate collective action. Part of why beliefs became so uniform is because of the *sunabe-hubae* relationship that is a significant part of Korean culture. While this relationship exists outside of a school environment, it is significantly heightened within because of the clear markers of age through their school years. The *sunbae* is an older student and the *hubae* is the younger one who sees the older student as a mentor and a strict sense of hierarchy and respect is built. These relationships were what introduced all incoming students to the world of protests and inspired them to participate (Lee, 161).

In addition, several on-campus organizations served as a front for organizing. Nightly study group sessions would instead be meetings of organizers discussing protest tactics from different countries and how they can be applied to the Korean setting (Park, 123). As a true tribute to participatory democracy, thousands of students participated in these meetings and shared their opinions. These meetings are also where the system for sharing goals and ideologies with those living in rural areas was born (Park, 124). A deeper discussion of this will be included in the section on domestic support.

The sharing of ideologies, strict hierarchy, and formal organizations to discuss protest tactics all withstood the government's attempts to close universities. In just the year 1985, it was estimated that 500,000 students had participated in over two thousand protests all while being violently repressed by security forces (Park, 130). This was only possible through institutions already created through a school system.

Domestic Support

The protests against President Rhee in 1960 is an earlier instance of mass civil disobedience. This movement also included heavy engagement from students, even high schoolers in some instances, but the direct coordination between students and third parties was not seen. Instead, multiple social groups organized separately to voice their distaste for President Rhee (Kim, 1996). Students directly coordinating with the domestic population was a much more significant effect in the 1987 protests against Chun Doo Hwan since students had around a decade to prepare.

Students were quite savvy when it came to quickly disseminating information and encouraging domestic support. While protests during more modern times, such as the ones included in the Arab Spring, are able to take advantage of the internet and social media, protests

during the 80s did not have this advantage. However, Korean university students invented alternatives. For example, before a bus would drive off, students would place hundreds of leaflets on the roof of the bus so that it would fly off once it drove off, sprinkling the streets with their messages of democracy and change (Park, 134).

A more direct and investment-heavy way students were able to incur domestic support was when they would travel to rural areas and to factories to work and share their beliefs and hopes for the future. The night study groups would often meet to discuss strategies to engage social groups because they recognized the need to grow past just students. One strategy was to encourage students to travel to factories and surrounding rural areas to work, share, and to also get a sense of what the everyday citizen experienced (Park, 124-126).

These proved highly effective. Students would set up reading schools in villages with low literacy rates and would share different political theories through reading materials (Park, 124). For industrial workers specifically, student leaders could not ignore the fact that industrial workers proved to be a significant group prone to protesting in other countries. Therefore, another movement—the *yahak* movement—was organized to send students to work in factories and engage with the workers. In an interview, a former *yahak* activist recalled the intense training sessions, seminars, classes, and actual factory work they went through so as to become a *yahak* activist. This activist recalled teaching classes to 17 to 18-year-old female garment workers with only a sixth-grade education. Their focus was to recruit these workers to join the fight for democracy and these efforts had a significant part in creating a Garment Workers' Union (Park, 125).

Kwon Insuk, a student at Seoul National University, also took part in the *yahak* movement. Forgoing a college degree, she traveled to a factory to work, going through obtaining

a false identification, to do so (Lee, 214). However, what set Kwon apart from other student activists is that she also publicly sued a detective for sexually torturing her while she was detained for protesting. The state worked hard to tarnish her reputation and dispute her story, but statements from defense lawyers, court proceedings, and civilian newspapers spread across the country, contradicting state media (Lee, 213). Stories like Kwon's show both the dedication students had to full revolution as well as the cruelty of the Chun regime. The widespread use of physical, sexual, and mental violence on students would reach the ears of the general population and they too slowly learned and understood the viciousness of the Chun regime.

Subsequently, this is what motivated the largest form of domestic support. Students and the general population alike, some who previously had no intention of participating in democracy movements, only decided to because their peers had been killed or arrested by the government. The state's violence—which is their most significant method to repress—was what ultimately radicalized moderates (Park, 78). Students were incredibly effective at taking advantage of this. They focused on the brutality and the injustice of the government when sharing their messages and urged people to join them in their movements for their morality. They also targeted messages toward people who were directly impacted by the government because of policy choices not related to democracy or elections. For example, during most of the Chun regime, South Korea was preparing for and holding the Asian Games and Olympic Games. Chun decided to displace people in order to build stadiums and venues and students used those people's anger and desperation to grow their movement (Park, 132).

During the June 1987 protests, now at the peak of the democracy movement, a significant portion of the general public was sympathetic towards student protesters and moved from cheering on the sidelines to actively joining the protests (Park, 138; 141). In a tragic revelation

that a college student had been arrested, tortured, and killed by police in 1987 and just a few weeks later a second revelation that another student had been killed from fragments of a tear gas canister, domestic support exploded as the majority of the country now felt the same anger towards the government as students did for the past decade (Park, 139). This year saw a record number of protest participants at just over 6 million people participating (Shin et al., 2007). At the time South Korea's population was around 41.6 million people meaning that almost 15% of the population protested (World Bank).

While students were incredibly effective at mobilizing, the coordination they had with the domestic population—educating, sharing, and demonstrating their anguish—was ultimately what led to the democracy movement to grow to the immense scale that it did. By the end, students were able to convince an entire nation that they had the will and passion to achieve democracy and progress.

International Pressure

Prior to the 1980 protests, the United States was involved in South Korean politics in a way that drove many student protesters to be "anti-American" (Park, 89). A former Korean student activist explained that although the Korean people wanted unification with North Korea, the U.S. government blocked this from happening through their implanting of anti-communism ideology into Korean society. In addition, scholars argue that the Korean War was the direct result of U.S. military intervention in "indigenous democratic movements" (Park, 88). This all stood in contradiction to the supposed U.S. position of protecting "democracy against the Soviet and North Korea threat" (Lee, 115) which just further fueled anti-Americanism in South Korea.

Subsequently, the South Korean government held the United States' opinion in extremely high regard. As was made clear before, while the U.S. did not object to the use of violence

against protesters, their opinion shifted as time neared the climax of the democracy movement in 1987. As the international supporter of the South Korean government, the United States also had a reputation to upkeep and therefore pressured the Chun regime to refrain from using violent repression. While this did not prevent violent repression in its entirety, it was the final push for the Chun regime to give in to protesters (Park, 138). The sudden concessions made by the regime in 1987 mostly came from domestic protesters, but the added pressure from the US cannot be ignored.

Furthermore, at this time in history, following World War Two, human rights were at the forefront of international policy—especially for the US following President Jimmy Carter's tenure. For South Korea, during a heightened time of international attention due to the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympic Games, it was important that the Chun regime at least put on the appearance that no human rights were being violated. Repression of students was lessened as a result—though not completely gone—and student movements saw an upsurge (Lee, 178).

The New York Times headlines from that time show very clearly that the international audience was on the side of the students. Most articles were focused on the time of the Gwangju massacre at the start of the Chun regime and the June 1987 protests at the end. One headline in the New York Times from May 25th, 1980, reads, "30,000 in South Korea Continuing Kwangju Protests Despite Warning: 100 Deaths Reported So Far" along with a picture of riot police setting up barbed wire. One line from the article states "fear… that the thousands of troops ringing the capital of South Cholla would move soon to crush the eight-day uprising" clearly stating the expected and known violent nature of the Chun regime. On June 19th of 1987, another New York Times headline read as "Student Protests Gain in intensity in Center of Seoul: Police Control Slipping" and the article talked about the disorder in South Korea, how Seoul was turned into a

battleground, and that Chun insists on addressing issues once the Olympics ended. This emphasized the international attention on South Korea.

While students as a group are not able to directly affect headlines of foreign newspapers or speak directly with US presidents, they were able to capitalize off of international events to draw even more attention to their movement. It was an added bonus that foreign attention was in favor of protesters and was against the regime.

Defections

As a government's one method to deter protesters, security forces hold an incredibly significant role in the world of protests. Violent repression can both completely rid any idea of protesting, but it can also enrage and mobilize even more people. In the case of South Korea, the latter was true as evidenced by the protests following the Gwangju massacre and the killing and torture of college students (Park, 76; Park, 139). Paralleling the quantitative analysis, security forces and state officials as related to defections will be analyzed.

Before students were even on the scene, fractures started to develop between Chun Doo Hwan and his closest advisers. Half of the ruling elite wanted to establish a democracy, but the other half wanted to maintain repression and keep with the dictatorship (Park, 142). Military regimes tend to put unity and survival of their group above maintaining a dictatorship—as opposed to personalist or single-party regimes—so this internal fracture proved to be a dangerous weakness (Geddes, 1999). Furthermore, Chun Doo Hwan's faction of the military—Hanahoe—was just that, a faction, not encompassing the entirety of the military. Therefore, only a minority of officers stood to gain anything from Chun Doo Hwan's regime and the majority were victims of rigid favoritism (Croissant and Selge, 115). In addition, those military officers who were a part of Hanahoe understood that they may still be able to keep their

influence even if a democratic election were to be held. Two leaders of the student protest movement—Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung—would most likely split the vote meaning that Roh Tae Woo—the third candidate and member of Hanahoe—would be elected president (Croissant and Selge, 115). Skipping forward, this is exactly what happened and the Hanahoe rule only ended once Kim Young Sam was elected president in the 1990s. However, this case of military incohesion is not related to student protests. Rather, it set the stage for South Korea's transition towards democracy.

Evidence for security forces defecting is not robust. However, personal accounts of protesters facing security forces show at least hesitations from security force members. Considering that a significant portion of protesters are students—children—it poses a significant moral dilemma for individuals to show up to work every day just to go out and be ordered to shoot down protesters. In one personal account, a student saw a protest move past her school and immediately walked out of her class to join. Once the movement came face to face with security forces, protesters urged female students to move to the front so as to heighten this moral dilemma and protect other protesters. The student did so, and she looked directly into the eyes of a riot policeman who had tears in his eyes and was swallowed up in anguish (Park, 141). This story is to show that no matter how repressive a dictator hopes to be, they are not the ones with a gun in their hands. The people whose job is to hold the gun do not have the same loyalty to the government as a dictator does and thus defecting would be easier than remaining loyal.

As opposed to adults, students are often seen as children and by putting themselves in the line of fire, it increases the costs for a state security force member to follow orders and shoot. While this is not effective in completely ridding a movement of violent repression, even slight signs of defection can encourage others to defect and join the protest movement. As youths,

students are more effective at invoking this mechanism than most other social groups. However, this effect is not as prevalent in this case as the prior two mechanisms. Cases such as the democracy movement in the Philippines can only be said to say that defections are directly tied to success and in that case, religious factions—rather than students—were mainly responsible for encouraging a defection rate of up to 90% (Chenoweth and Stephen, 2011)

Analysis

The largest protest movement in 1987—the final year of Chun's dictatorship—saw participation from one million Korean citizens all demanding direct election of the president. Just three days later, Roh Tae Woo announced concessions, fully giving in to the demands of the protesters (Adesnik and Kim, 2008). This would not have been possible if all of the tactics previously laid out had not happened and did not interact with each other. Students first organized amongst themselves and exploited the already strict hierarchy within schools to ensure a continual growth of participants in the form of incoming students. Following my theory, with the organizing mechanism engaged I would expect to see growth in the movement from social groups outside students. This did happen. By teaching reading classes, working in factories, and spreading leaflets with a summary of their goals, students planted seeds of revolution all across the country amongst different groups of gender, socioeconomic class, religion, and more (Park, Lee). If students were not able to encourage participation from other groups, it would have been incredibly difficult to reach the numbers necessary to force the attention of the government.

Even without the massive nonviolent protests, there was already a significant amount of attention on South Korea. With the US' insistence for the Korean government not to use violence, and the global world staring down at them with the upcoming Olympics, Chun's only option was to limit violent repression. Following my theory, I would expect students to capitalize

on the international attention and target groups that are directly affected by such international affairs, therefore, again, growing the size of their movement. This is exactly what happened as Korean students sought out individuals who were removed from their homes or business demolished to make way for new Olympic stadiums. These efforts were successful in that the year before the 1988 Olympics was when Roh Tae Woo announced concessions.

Finally, while defections from state security forces were not significant enough to have an important effect on the outcome, the divisions within state officials cannot go ignored. Some of Chun Doo Hwan's closest peers and advisors—including Roh Tae Woo who authored and presented concessions—were on the side of the protesters in wanting free and fair elections. While students may not directly influence the thoughts of individual state officials, their organization of massive movements with representation from all sectors of society is ultimately the reason why the split in government persisted and was never resolved. A small movement that is easily squashed by the government has no way of having a similar effect.

Overall, the students' organizational capacity along with their coordination efforts specifically with the domestic population was what carried South Korea into their period of real democracy. Only with this coordination were they able to use existing international pressure and splits within state factions to their advantage.

Conclusion

Now, in 2022, South Korea is a full, consolidated democracy with a large global presence. Roh Tae Woo, although part of the military regime, was seen as the hero as he had written the concessions of 1987. Therefore, he was the first elected president using a fair and equal election system. However, he continued to use the National Security Law and the human rights of Korean citizens continued to get abused (Stanford report, 92). Following that, two

leaders of the protest movements, Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, would serve back-to-back terms. Kim Dae-Jung was the first president to be elected from an opposition party and would later go on to win the Nobel Peace Prize for promoting and safeguarding democracy in South Korea and East Asia as a whole (Cumings, *xii*).

The students who participated in South Korea's democracy movement constituted an entire generation. Having lived their formative years through an incredibly oppressive military dictatorship, they matured through their constant struggle for free and fair elections. Their passion and dedication are now looked back on as a moment of heroism in Korean history.

2. The Yugoslavia Case

In a pivotal year for civil unrest globally, Yugoslavia offers a case in Eastern Europe. Much like the South Korea case, Yugoslavia's protest movement is primarily led and dominated by students, however, the mechanisms of domestic support, international attention, and defections are not nearly as present, and this case study will aim to explain how that led to the protest movement ultimately ending in failure.

A Brief Historical Context

During World War 2, the Axis powers had taken over Yugoslavia and broke it up into several pieces (Singleton, 175). The territories were even further broken up to create space for German and Italian spheres of influence and would only be put together after the war in 1945 (Singleton, 176). The government of Tito-Subasic was created in March of 1945 to oversee post-war reconstruction (Singleton, 207). During this time Yugoslavia held a close partnership with the Soviet Union, but that would come to an end in 1948 after disagreements around economic, military, and foreign policies created friction (Singleton, 220).

Josip Broz Tito would come to hold great influence in Yugoslavia during this transition period and he would ultimately be named president in 1953 with the creation of the post—the only one since the post would die along with Tito in 1980 (Singleton, 229). Tito would oversee a five-year plan with the goal of raising the national income, production, exports, imports and personal consumption. Miraculously, Tito was able to meet all of its goals as well as exceed them (Singleton, 233). However, these steps only led to unbalanced economic growth and led to Tito abandoning the five-year plan three years in (Singleton, 240). This economic stage is ultimately the context students used to organize their campaign for true democracy and economic reform.

Student Involvement

The protest movement started with a simple theater performance. Originally created for an audience of 'Youth-Action' workers, student representatives asked if the performance could take place in a larger outdoor arena so that others can have the option to attend as well. However, "announcing that such free cultural events were the privilege of the Youth-Action only" authorities changed the location of the performance to a small indoor theater (Plamenic, 1969). In response, students still made their way to the theater and, overwhelming the security, tried to push their way in, but instead were greeted with violence from the police. (Plamenic, 1969).

In an interview given in 2018 by Dragonir Olujic, an active student protester, told of a scene of students seizing a firetruck, burning it, and ultimately running from the police and retreating back to their dorms. It was not until the next morning that the true organizational capacity of the students was shown. "A lot of our comrades and friends from different parts of Belgrade came down to join us…we agreed to organize a protest and after the protest to head to the Federal Parliament with our demands for the immediate resolution of key social, political, and of course, student and university problems" (Olujic, 2018). With that plan in mind, the next

day at 11am, students marched toward the center of Belgrade and were greeted by a large police presence. Several thousand students stood opposed to a thousand riot police, but in the midst of it, the President of the Parliament of Serbia and the President of the League of Communists extended an arm to students to come and negotiate with them (Plamenic, 1969). However, something went wrong and Olujic remembered a fight breaking out for some reason and police all of a sudden attacking students. At one point "even Milos Minic—the president of the Parliament of Serbia—was beat by police" (Olujic, 2018). The final scene was a mess of abandoned shoes, jackets, and bags and in the meantime "several hundred students occupied the Philosophy and Sociology Faculty of the University of Belgrade" (Plamenic, 1969). "And, that is how the 'student revolution' started!" (Olujic, 2018).

With the university faculties occupied, students were now gathered and organized to create a small community within the university grounds. Olujic recollects "debates, discussions, many different activities were organized, mostly cultural and they lasted around the clock…all necessary "services"—from food provisioning, information, public debates, to security and "defense"—worked on the principle of self-management" (2018). Within this miniature society, "Students established committees for the elaboration of their demands, for political agitation and propaganda, and for the construction of student-worker unity" (Plamenic, 1969). Olujic describes a beautiful scene under "linen trees, in the most beautiful courtyard" where "everyone could speak" (2018). From this, demands created included a solution to the unemployment problem, suppression of inequality, establishment of real democracy, release of arrested students, and the resignation of the chief of police (Plamenic, 1969).

The occupation of the university lasted for seven days. On the seventh day, it was announced that President Tito would make an announcement the next day and surprisingly, he

came out in support of the students (Plamenic, 1969). Olujic recalls people dancing and returning to their normal business, but "some other faculties and academies" did not believe Tito (2018). Their reason for hesitancy turned out to be correct and many of the Philosophy and Sociology faculty were labeled as "extremists" and were kicked out of the League of Communists (Plamenic, 1969). When asked about the final result of the movement, Olujic argued that in the "short-term perspective, we won!" (2018). Space was made for "feminism, ecology, even conceptualism" (Olujic, 2018). However, in the longer-term, the more foundational policies were not changed, and everything is still currently a reality.

Yugoslavia's student protest is an incredible example of strong organization. From working with professors to write up demands to putting on cultural events and debates, students organized on multiple levels and were quite effective in maintaining it. In the face of constant police presence and a ruthless media, students were able to keep their momentum and lasted through what seemed like full concessions from President Tito.

Domestic Support

The students understood the importance of and wanted to gain the support of other working groups. In a comment made for the New York Times, a student protester stated, "Look at the Columbia University students. They showed their criticism of capitalist society in the strongest capitalist state. But they are helpless in the United States, lost in the desert and wilderness, because they don't have any meaningful support in the population" (Randal, 1968). Olujic talked about how himself and the other students "knew where we could get what we asked for, we knew which salespersons will give us what we need, often for free—and everyday this circle grew" (2018). Furthermore, he mentioned that a Zemun-based factory had even contributed 500,000 dinars "which was the amount of approximately fifty student loans" (2018).

However, this domestic support did not culminate into day-to-day citizens joining in on the protests. This was in part due to the intentional efforts by the state to isolate the students. By filling the streets with riot police, instructing stores and factories to halt all communication with students, and organizing workers militias in factories to act against protesters, students were shut out of society and could not gain the additional support necessary for a successful campaign (Palmenic, 1969). Olujic recalled coming into contact with one of these workers militias and how they "forcibly prevented contact between students and workers" (2018).

When asked about the student protesters, a person selling goods on the streets complained that "God knows my life is difficult enough without kids wrecking and tearing things up in the streets" and when workers were asked about joining in on the strike they said, "most of us could not last one week without pay" (Plamenic, 1969). Students, understanding the necessity of having workers on their side, wrote an open letter stating "we will not permit workers and students to be divided and turned one against the other. Your interests and our interests are the same, ours are the real interests of socialism" (Plamenic, 1969). This is another aspect of students being able to maintain a high level of organization, but it would fall short of radicalizing the working class.

In addition, it did not help that the media painted the students in an increasingly negative light throughout the seven-day occupation. On the second day of the occupation, police were closing in on the university and the media justified it by saying this was just one method to protect their democracy against "those who would impose their will by means of disorder in the street" (Plamenic, 1969). By the end, the newspapers were all reporting that the students should be dealt with harshly for all of the disorder that they had created.

Between the propaganda in the media and the deliberate attempts by the government to cut off contact between students and the outside world, the campaign was not able to get the support it needed from other groups. This mean that it would remain limited within students and professors and not gain the traction it needs to succeed.

International Pressure

1968 was an interesting year in global history as multiple countries across the globe were undergoing their own events of civil unrest. From the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements in the United States, France's May 68, to Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, most of the rest of the world was distracted and could not focus on similar civil unrest events in other countries.

Olujic explained that all of these events are connected to class struggles and was deeply understood by student protesters. He argued that problems of socialism and capitalism were moving from the West to the East and back, resulting in problems specific to one country growing to become global problems. As a result "the field of social struggles and workers' strikes converged in all countries" according to Olujic (2018).

Instead of specific international action altering the course of the student protest, international events and global trends of changing economies all influenced the Yugoslavia protest movement. However, this was not enough to overcome the absence of foreign intervention.

Defections

Not much can be said about defections In Yugoslavia. There was no defection from security forces as they were constantly used to close in on students and attack them. In one case,

police were even used to beat students who were protesting in solidarity with the Belgrade students (Plamenic, 1969).

Negotiations were an objective held by some state officials, but this was not done with the aim to oppose the government. Regardless, these negotiations would be interrupted because of clashes between the police and students (Plamenic, 1969).

Analysis

While students were able to organize incredibly effectively and create clear demands, what ultimately led the protest to die out was the absence of outside support. With a fleeting feeling of success after President Tito's announcement of support for the students, once he returned to repressing protesters, students were not able to organize at the same level and would ultimately lead to no concessions being made.

While students were able to see some level of domestic support, it was not at the level required to force the attention of the government. The South Korea case showed that students engaged tens of thousands of people in their final protest in June of 1987, but Yugoslvia was limited to just the student population. The day-to-day citizen either viewed the students as a menace or they could not risk the pay they would lose if they were to participate. Furthermore, the concerted effort by the government to isolate the students proved effective as they were also able to mobilize the media to spread propaganda against the students.

International attention was something that was out of the control of students. 1968 just happened to be the year of civil unrest where all four corners of the world seemingly underwent their own protest movements. This left the world distracted and thus Yugoslavia could not manipulate any form of outside attention.

Finally, while not a direct result of student intervention, South Korea's state officials defected in the climatic month of June 1987. This did not happen in Yugoslavia. Instead, the security forces were used at every step to repress students both during and after the campaign was over.

Conclusion

The failure of students to effect change can be tied back to their inability to coordinate with outside groups. Leaving their campaign in the hands of only themselves and professors proved to not be enough as they were quickly repressed following Tito's announcement which made a lot of students abandon their earlier organizational capacity. However, the extent to which they were able to create their own community within campus grounds and maintain high levels of participation within is a win of its own. This cannot be brushed aside regardless of protest outcome and can be used as a lesson in organizing and keeping momentum in a seemingly endless wave of repression and propaganda.

3. The Bahrain Case

Taking place during the 2010 Arab Spring movement, Bahrain offers a case from one of the most highly studied civil movement periods in modern history. While showing signs of both the *organizer* mechanism and the *coordinator* mechanism, no regime change occurred and instead the movement was brutally crushed. In this way, Bahrain works as a critical case and will be used to ask the question: do certain coordinator mechanisms hold more influence over the outcome of a movement than others? While students were not outright organizers unlike the South Korea and Yugoslavia cases, students still held a dominant position within the movement and encouraged participation from other social groups. In addition, the domestic and

international audience were supportive of the movement especially with the rise of social media being used to document events of military repression. The coordinator mechanism that was not present was defections from the military. Bahrain is a notorious case in brutal repression and military cohesion which survived due to robust and manipulative methods carried out by the ruling elite to guarantee unending loyalty. This one factor is seemingly the key difference that meant that Bahrain's civil movements would ultimately end in failure.

Similar to the South Korea case, Bahrain has evidence of multiple mechanisms which is a blind spot in the dataset. Furthermore, unlike the South Korea and Yugoslavia cases, Bahrain—having taken place in 2011—will see the use of social media as a method to mobilize masses of people. This is a factor that is not accounted for at all in the quantitative analysis.

A Brief Historical Context

The current ruling family of Bahrain—the Al Khalifa family—took power from Persia in 1783 and in 1861, Bahrain was turned into a British colonial protectorate. It was not until 1971 that Bahrain declared independence and a cabinet was formed. In 1973, the first election was held for Bahrain's National Assembly where only men over the age of 20 were allowed to vote. However, the national assembly would later be dissolved in 1975 and the Emir—Sheikh Isa Bin-Salman Al Khalifa—ruled by decree. In 1999, Sheikh Isa passed and was replaced by his eldest son, Sheikh Hamad who, in 2002, proclaimed himself King once Bahrain became a constitutional monarchy. However, political opposition leaders are arrested and charged with crimes of promoting violent protest, preventing them from running for office. This is ultimately the political context that leads to the Arab Spring movements of 2011 in Bahrain (BBC, 2018). Inspired by civil unrest all across the Middle East and North Africa, Bahrainis protested for the creation of a parliament where all members are elected fairly and a Prime Minister who executes

all executive power. Furthermore, protesters demanded that members of the Al Khalifa family should be barred from holding any leadership position in the three branches of government (Dreyfuss, 2015). The movement was able to gain wide attention due to the use of Facebook as a way to organize groups and send out mass messages of when and where the next protest would take place. This method was also used to share information with the international audience on how protesters were being treated by security forces (Dreyfuss, 2015).

However, the protest would ultimately be brutally repressed and the Pearl Roundabout—a symbolic monument that protesters rallied around—would be demolished by the government, erasing much of the hope Bahrainis had for true democracy (Dreyfuss, 2015).

Student Involvement

"We should be proud that our young people have not been ceased to dream of a more beautiful day than today… Inspired by the other Arab Spring uprisings, our youth proved its connections to the wider Arab nation and its determination to use peaceful protest to force the regime in comprehensive reform" is what Ibrahim Sharif—the General Secretary of the National Democratic Action Society—had to say for the youth participating in the movement to change their nation's form of government (Sharif, 44). Students, while may not have had a significant organizer role in the movement, still held a symbolic position of the nation's youth, the generation to move the country towards progress and they saw government reform as the first step towards change.

The first evidence of a desire for progress was with the February 14th Youth Movement when they gathered 6000 protesters and marched towards Pearl roundabout demanding the removal of the Al Khalifa monarchy. The February 14th Youth Movement is "decentralized, leaderless, and revolutionary in its demands" (Bhatia and Shehabi, 120). Having unified during

the Pearl roundabout movement, members are spread across several villages and rely heavily on social media sites such as Twitter to organize and mobilize. Frequent protests means that these youth are bumping with police on a daily basis and dozens of them have either been killed or arrested. Their method of organizing will be seen as a trend throughout Bahrain's Arab Spring (Bhatia and Shehabi, 120).

In *Bahrain's Uprising*, a chapter includes the recollections of a university professor witnessing the movement from his apartment window which overlooked all of Pearl roundabout. Tony Mitchell—an English professor at Bahrain Polytechnic—talks about his first brushes with the movement on February 14th when he noticed that a mass of people was occupying Pearl roundabout and police cars were slowly approaching (Mitchell, 69). As a university professor, his day-to-day interactions with students reveals how students played a dominating role in the protest movement. Some of Mitchell's students formed small organizations—the 'Catalysts' was one mentioned—with the aim of bringing "change as well as undertaking community projects and charity work" (Mitchell, 81). However, most of his interactions with students were not as hopeful for the future. At Bahrain Polytechnic, Mitchell taught two courses, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Students organized themselves in a pro-government morning class and pro-democracy afternoon class (Mitchell, 85). Mitchell was asked by the school to remain neutral in the classroom, but after failing to do so and letting his students know his political thoughts, his pro-government students took it upon themselves "to tell [him] not to be fooled by what I had hear or been told by people from the other side" and that "the protesters were liars and had faked their injuries" (Mitchell, 82). In Bahrain's case, the pro-government students were just as active and eager to state their political views as their pro-democracy counterparts.

On the other side, dozens of pro-democracy students were being arrested and or expelled. In one account, Mitchell explains that one of his former students was taken by authorities, along with four other students, for having been identified as a protester in a picture taken from Facebook. While Mitchell's former student was confused for another person, three of the students, all from the University of Bahrain, were driven away "never to be seen again" (Mitchell, 87). The education minister of Bahrain said that expelled students were allowed to apply to other schools, but students "have complained they were unable to get copies of their transcripts. They were also convinced no other local university would take on students expelled for protests" only proving that the government was systemically targeting students and their activities (Solomon, 2011).

The University of Bahrain was also the site of a 5000-person protest where students gathered in support of democracy but was under attack by both security forces and pro-government supporters who traveled just to attack these students (CNN, 2011).

Bahraini students, while cannot be seen as significant organizers of the protest—since it seems that most protests had no clear leadership and were mainly dictated by social media postings—still participated in a dominating fashion that led to security forces and the ruling government to feel threatened and launch an investigative effort to identify all students who had participated in protests. Their eagerness and stubbornness can only have a positive effect on other social groups maintaining their participation.

Domestic Support

A common form of domestic support is in the form of backlash against the government for using unrestrained violence against peaceful protesters. Unsurprisingly, this occurred during the Bahraini protests as well. During the protests on February 14th and 15th, two protesters were

killed by police. The reaction to this violence led to an upsurge in protest participants. "Ominously for the regime, the demonstrations quickly assumed popular overtones as Sunnis and Shia alike gathered in unprecedented numbers and chanted slogans such as 'No Shia, no Sunnis, only Bahrainis'" (Ulrichsen, 336). Overcoming religious divide, protesters organized together to stand in support of killed participants.

However, what sets Bahrain apart from South Korea and Yugoslavia is the use of social media. While it did not exist in the 1960s or the 1980s, it did in the 2010s and was a significant player in both spreading political ideology and organizing dates and locations for protests. Returning to Tony Mitchell's personal account of the Bahrain movement, Mitchell initially heard of the Pearl roundabout protest happening through Facebook (Mitchell, 69). Looking forward to the events that would unfold, Mitchell readied his camcorder, taped footage, and uploaded everything to YouTube. Afterwards, he would monitor Facebook to view other videos and read comments to learn more about the situation. Mitchell uploaded videos of "people hurrying away to their cars…the police chasing them… [and] a few defiant protesters [trying] to stand their ground but were overcome by the fumes and eventually retreated." (Mitchell, 72). His videos gained much attention and Mitchell was surprised to learn that many of his students had already viewed it and was even more shocked when CNN and BBC reached out asking his permission to use his videos in a news article (Mitchell, 72;73).

The government, knowing the increasing harm continued use of social media would do for their authority, deployed security forces to try to intimidate people into giving up their footage. Mitchell, after getting footage of a police officer shooting a fleeing protester in the back, was approached by security asking him to stop filming. At first Mitchell ignored him, and simply went back upstairs to his apartment to upload the footage to YouTube. However, his landlord

somehow was told of the events, and she was the one who called Mitchell telling him that he must go see the security officers in the garage downstairs. All in all, Mitchell was intimidated into deleting all of his footage and giving up his camcorder in an effort to make the security officials believe that he would stop recording the events at Pearl roundabout (Mitchell, 78-80).

Student activists who have been dismissed for similarly posting videos of or participating in protests now are only more invigorated by the prospects of change. “I don’t have class; I don’t have work. So, I work for the revolution. They stole my rights, my future, I will fight back” is what Mohammed, an expelled student activist, had to say when asked about his plans now that school was no longer an option (Solomon, 2011). With his time, Mohammed has upped his activist responsibilities and drives around finding protests and meeting with other protesters.

Social media was seen as a threat to the regime because they were unfiltered thoughts and videos that were being shared to the entire nation. Videos plainly showing protesters being shot and killed were posted online and used globally as a way to shame the Al Khalifa regime. Rather than introducing reforms and sharing power, the Bahraini government decided instead to mark those individuals sharing videos and opposing political ideologies as targets. The unnecessary violence on the government’s side trying to clamp down a social movement that was using social media to their advantage only created even more hostility against the regime and attracted more participants towards protesting.

International Pressure

Historically, the MENA region saw heavy intervention from Western countries whether it is through aid or direct military interventions. For example, Bahrain houses the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet which the U.S. “claims… is in a strategic location to block Iran’s nuclear ambitions” (Joyce, 118). International attention only heightened with the start of the Arab spring and pitted a

nation's strategic interests against values such as human rights and democracy. Students across the world also organized protests in solidarity with students in Bahrain. For example, Rashad, a Bahraini student studying in the United Kingdom, had attended a protest in Manchester and as a result had his government-sponsored scholarship stripped and his Mom begging him to come home, but also worried that if he were to return that we would be arrested (Booth and Sheffer, 2011). In response, Catherine Ashton, the foreign affairs representative for the EU had called for the release of all protesters from arrest echoing many other national leaders who had expressed their concerns over how Bahrain was treating dissenters (Booth and Sheffer, 2011).

However, Bahrain was able to maintain their violent repression in part because Saudi Arabia intervened on behalf of the Bahraini government. The Gulf Cooperation Council consists of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman and was created to "defend against external threats" (Mitchell, 84). However, it was now being used against unarmed civilians because Saudi Arabia did not want "Iran 14 miles off our coast" (Joyce, 118). Iran was mentioned in this context because they are a majority Shia Muslim population while the Bahrain royal family are Sunni Muslims. Once the Saudi military intervened the Pearl roundabout—which stood as a symbol for progress and change for protesters—was demolished (Mitchell, 84).

In addition, it did not help that the U.S. hesitated in their response to the civil unrest in Bahrain. As Saudi Arabia was worried about greater Iranian influence in Bahrain, America saw the mostly Shia uprising and also grew worried about the root cause of the protests (Quandt, 426). It would only be in the late 2011 period—Bahrain's Arab Spring started in early 2011—when America would release a formal call for reform (Qunadt, 427).

Defections

What makes Bahrain an important case when attempting to understand social unrest is how the government was able to maintain strict loyalty from their military. As seen in the South Korea case, the individual soldier is the one who carries the gun and is tasked with shooting down protesters, not the military elite. The Bahrain government was able to maintain loyalty through structural decisions that student protesters could not overcome. These decisions included everything between simple threats to emotional manipulation to guarantee that soldiers understood that their priority is to put the interests of the military elite and the royal family above maybe even their own beliefs.

One argument for Bahrain's military cohesion is religious identity. Bellin argues that since most of the military—the rank and file—identify as Sunni Muslims while most of the demonstrators are Shia Muslims (Ohl, 133). However, when asked "If a BDF officer is Sunni and injures a Shiite demonstrator, does he do that because of his religious beliefs or because he wishes to maintain his privileged place in society?" many soldiers responded by saying that their salary is a larger motivator to stay loyal rather than their religious affiliation (Ohl, 158). This can mean that the divide in religious identity between the military and demonstrators is simply an observation and does not carry any causal explanation with a soldier's responsibilities.

Another argument is the institutional design of the Bahrain military. Most of the military elite positions were occupied by royal family members and each unit contained intelligence agents that had the right to see the contents of any soldier's phone (Ohl, 158;160). If anything incriminating were to be found they could face imprisonment (Ohl, 160). In addition, if a soldier were to exhibit questionable behavior and family members were serving at the same time, "that

soldier…will receive a phone call not from an Al-Khalifa member but instead from his own family member advising him to modify his behavior" (Ohl, 160).

A more systematic method the government uses is hiring nonnatives and essentially making them dependent on the government. Through methods such as road shows in foreign countries to recruit nonnatives, a significant portion of the Bahraini government is not Bahraini by ethnicity. The benefits for these "mercenaries"—as Bahrainis call them—include between 500 and 700 Bahraini dollars, overtime pay, free housing, and financial compensation to their families if they were to die while serving (Ohl, 162). In addition, nonnative soldiers are able to gain citizenship if they can move their families to Bahrain for just a couple months (Ohl, 162). While this may seem to harm a military's cohesion, some argue that the government of Bahrain introduced expatriates into their armed services to prevent collective action between native Bahrainis (Ohl, 160). Furthermore, this mixed composition also helps keep nonnatives in check as was told in an interview with a defense lawyer. They claim that "Pakistanis would not use torture against prisoners unless Bahraini supervisors were in the room monitoring them" (Ohl, 160).

These systemic methods in which the Bahraini government both keeps cohesion high and prevents collective action was how they were able to maintain a military that was loyal enough to the royal family—or to their own freedom and salary—that they were willing to shoot at peaceful protesters. The pattern between the three case studies seems that military defections cannot seem to be encouraged by student protesters. While individual soldiers may sympathize, it is not enough to outweigh the potential losses associated with defecting

Analysis

While Bahrain shows evidence of the organizer mechanism and parts of the coordinator mechanism. The unyielding violent repression from the government seems to be the missing piece that resulted in Bahrain's failure to make reform happen. Students, while not significant organizers, dominated protests through their social media postings and mass mobilization, enough so that it posed a threat to the government. Students were targeted and faced expulsion, got tearful calls from their family, and in severe cases taken away and never seen again.

Students were able to garner domestic support in ways, although not as organized as South Korea or Yugoslavia, that encouraged participation from other social groups. Students dismissed from school would focus their energy on protests, both attending and drawing attention to them. This similar pattern of greater participation post repression is seen when Bahraini citizens came out to protest in greater numbers after two participants were killed by security forces.

International pressure was something that was largely uncontrolled by students. While students may have supported international media by recording videos and allowing them to be shared globally, most of the international attention the Arab Spring was getting as a whole was due to the simple fact that a wave of democratization protests was hitting a largely authoritarian region. In addition, state repression on recording events was so intense that if students were to have shared videos, they would have faced various levels of threats that would sometimes lead to them giving up the practice entirely.

Finally, defection was a variable that Bahraini students could not change. Just as individual citizens were being threatened by the government, so were soldiers and they also had a desire to protect themselves and their family. From frequent phone searches to family members

telling soldiers to correct their behavior, any form of defection would be instantly detected and altered. In addition, since most of the elite were made up of Al-Khalifa family members, there was a slim chance that state officials would defect. These conditions made it nearly impossible for students and other protesters to encourage defections and protect defectors

The Bahraini protests for democracy may have ended in failure because of several reasons. The first reason is that students were unable to encourage defections. Bellin argues that military defection—the loyalty to the coercive apparatus—has proved to be central in the events of the Arab Spring as well as the survival of authoritarian regimes (2012). A second reason could be that each of the organizer and coordinator mechanisms did not interact with each other but rather grew separately. Students in the South Korea and Yugoslavia cases were significant organizers and created avenues in which to gather more support, however, this did not happen as effectively in the Bahrain case as domestic support—while in part could have been affected by student participation—was not a direct result of student intervention.

Conclusion

Bahrain offers an incredibly perplexing critical case of student involvement in a democracy movement. While on the surface it seems that every mechanism is present, the key absence of defections and direct interactions between each mechanism seems to have been detrimental to the greater movement. However, in the face of stringent repression, students and other protesters alike still carried on and continued to protest in hopes of democracy for the future. That in its own right is a success regardless of the protest outcome.

VIII. Empirical Analysis

This thesis started with a quantitative analysis consisting of several regressions and a matched test. The regressions tested the main independent variable—student involvement—against success while both holding constant and interacting the *coordinator* mechanisms. In addition, these same tests were repeated with success measured as a continuous variable. This section revealed one major finding. Student involvement does have a significant relationship with success across multiple specifications.

Following, case studies of South Korea, Yugoslavia, and Bahrain were used to understand at the single campaign level how the *organizer* and *coordinator* mechanisms interact with each other. South Korea revealed that students organizing led to intentional efforts to draw out the domestic population that was impacted by both the home government and international events. In addition, the added international pressure due to the upcoming Olympics and a pre-existing faultline within the ruling administration were added weak points that students could exploit. This led to an incredible pro-democracy movement, dominated by students, that led to full concessions. Yugoslavia shared a case of incredible student organization, but weak engagement from any of the *coordinator* mechanisms. This meant that while students organized effectively, it fell on deaf ears and they were not able to gain the support necessary to continue the protest against the Tito government. Finally, Bahrain gave a critical case where all mechanisms were present. However, the key point here is that interaction was not visible. Students dominated protests and dedicated their whole lives to it, but the intentional organization and drawing out support was not seen. In addition, the robustness to the military cohesion seen in Bahrain cannot be ignored as a critical factor as to possibly why this protest movement ended in success.

Understanding these two methods of analyses together, hypothesis 2—Nonviolent, student protests that invoke a combination of multiple or all elements of the coordination mechanisms are more likely to succeed—is supported. However, several limitations in both the quantitative and qualitative sections means that further research is necessary. The quantitative section—specifically the matched test—requires stronger measurement that allows for a larger N. The matched data used only contains less than half of the full dataset that the regression was able to use. The diminished size can be due to the coarse way the matched variables were averaged across the years of a campaign to fit the unit of analysis. In addition, the case studies can show greater depth with more detailed work that was not done for this thesis. This thesis largely depended on interviews available online and books containing first person accounts of participants. Personal interviews or archival work was not done and may mean that portions of the event were overlooked.

With this, future research can focus on refining the dataset as well as including more measures for different social actors. One way to refine the dataset will be to shrink the timeframe to focus on a specific era of protests. This thesis used Yugoslavia in 1968 as one of its case studies which takes place during a particularly eventful year for the entire world. Several datasets can be created to center around different high points of protest. 1968 is one example as the baby boomer generation is in their college years and another example is the Arab Spring movement in the early 2010s. Focusing datasets on a certain time frame can reveal time specific considerations that would otherwise not be revealed in a larger dataset. Another consideration for altering the time frame is the rise of social media in the early 21st century. Focusing the period of analysis to 2000 to 2013 would allow for a more fair comparison since all protest movements would have had an equal chance to use social media to further organize. A variable can be added to measure

the extent of social media use for each protest movement, although measuring this may prove to be difficult.

These changes in the empirical analysis can then impact the theoretical part of this thesis. Questions of how social media can change the way to which an organized group interacts with the domestic and international audience can be answered or how during certain time periods, was there an influx of international pressure as human rights makes a rise in geopolitical issues. This thesis' current mechanisms can change so as to reflect the time period's context.

In addition, measures for other social groups can be introduced to understand if students hold an edge to historically well-organized groups. The current literature focuses on industrial workers who—similar to students—are concentrated in high-density cities where many of them work in close vicinity to one another. Theoretically, the causal mechanisms introduced in this thesis could be applicable to such a group. Since most of this thesis' theory rests on the idea of a higher capability to organize, theoretically, any group that is able to achieve similar levels of collective action as compared to students could see similar rates of success. Therefore, introducing additional variables for different social groups can allow for a more robust analysis that can attempt at answering the question of if the actor matters for protest outcome.

IX. Concluding Remarks

Due to a student's capacity to organize, this thesis argues that as long as they are able to coordinate with domestic and international audiences and defectors from the state or security forces, they are more likely to lead a protest movement that ends in success. The quantitative section supports that student involvement and success have a significant, positive relationship across multiple specifications and the case studies further support this and show that

coordination can only help. These two methods of analysis together support the idea that student-led protests are more likely to succeed.

The success of a protest has seen much attention and rightfully so. Protests succeeding can decide the fate of millions of citizens as it determines the form of government civilians are subject to. Living in a democracy allows individuals to voice their opinions on their next leader which means greater representation of ideas and can ultimately lead to greater respect of individual rights. This thesis revealed that students can be a key figure in moving a country towards democracy. With their organizational capacity, students can dominate protest movements and encourage action from domestic populations, incur international attention, and support defections so that a government is forced to listen and change. The first step to creating a government that listens to its citizens is to object loud enough for the current government to hear. Students have this ability as well as the courage to demand it of those around them.

X. Works Cited

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