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Jacob Robert Brown April 17, 2012

Wait your turn! Black-Brown conflict and political action against Latinos

by

Jacob Robert Brown

Dr. Michael Leo Owens
Adviser

Political Science Department

Dr. Michael Leo Owens

Adviser

Dr. Beth Reingold

Committee Member

Dr. Irene Browne

Committee Member

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Jacob Robert Brown

Dr. Michael Leo Owens

Adviser

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Abstract

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The increasing presence of Latinos in the Sun Belt region of the United States raises questions on how these new residents will fit into the political framework of the region. Scholarly research suggests that new racial groups are often met with concern and hostility, as they are viewed as threatening political and economic competition. This study examines the political responses to the increasing presence of Latinos in the Sun Belt. Specifically, it analyzes whether group threat theory in the context of Black-Brown relations can be applied to explain political action against Latinos at the county level. This article tests the hypothesis that the increasing presence of Latinos will heighten perceptions of group threat among Blacks, so therefore there will be a greater likelihood of the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances in counties with competing Black and Latino populations. The presence of anti-immigrant ordinances is tested against population and economic variables in order to comprehensively examine group threat's effect in this specific racial context. The results provide evidence that counties with sizable Black and Latino populations are more likely to consider anti-immigrant ordinances. Other results are inconclusive but provide a jumping off point for a larger discussion of group conflict and the political responses to Latinos in the United States.

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I also wish to thank my parents for their love and support.

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Time and time again, when Blacks and Latinos come together, the result is more frequently competition (conflict) than cooperation.

Nicholas Vaca, *The Presumed Alliance*

The start of the 21st century brought racial change to the United States. In 2001, the number of Latinos in the United States surpassed the total number of Blacks, making Latinos the largest minority group in the country (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2003). As the racial makeup of the United States continues to changes, political scientists and other scholars are increasingly interested in the racial politics associated with the changes, especially the political relationships between Latinos[1] and Blacks. At first glance, it appears that these two groups should be inclined to cooperate, seeing each other as political allies. Both groups have been marginalized - albeit in different ways - in the United States. Moreover, their overlapping interests in social equality, economic progress, and political influence should lead them to form coalitions. In the past, "Black and Brown" coalitions have been formed to advance common interests on issues such as civil rights, poverty, and inner-city education (Estrada, Garcia, and Marcias 1992). These "rainbow coalitions" have been documented by scholars as examples of intra-minority political cooperation (Henry 1980, Sonenshein 1990, Saito 1993). These political alliances have been successful in electing minority political officials in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Denver, and other cities (Piatt 1997). Intra-minority coalitions of Latinos and Blacks could be even more powerful politically in the future as both groups grow to comprise a larger proportion of the country's population, perhaps even turning the United States into a majority-minority nation.

Yet, numerous moments of conflict between Blacks and Latinos stand in contrast to these instances of cooperation. For instance, the two groups clashed when Latinos pressed for the

[1] By Latino, I mean a person whose ancestors originate from a Spanish-speaking Central American, South American country or Mexico.

repeal of employer sanctions enacted in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Vaca 2004). Other studies report political competition between the two groups in regards to the election of descriptive representatives from each group (McClain and Karnig 1990).

Research points to several factors that may prevent the formation of long-term Black-Latino political cooperation. Specifically, there is fear and resentment among Blacks over Latino immigration, which Blacks associate with (a) job displacement and losses for their group, (b) the reallocation of public resources to Latinos, especially Latinos who may be unauthorized immigrants, (c) neighborhood change and competition for housing fueled by Latino population growth, and (d) Latino access to a greater share of affirmative action benefits (Rocha 2007). Additionally, Latinos may be disinclined to form coalitions with Blacks because they view themselves as a group as more similar with Whites than Blacks and because there is a perception among Latinos that Blacks expect Latinos to "wait their turn" for political progress (Dzidzienyo and Oboler 2005; McClain 2006).

Whether Blacks and Latinos can overcome, or just reduce, these barriers to cooperation is important, especially given that the increasing presence of Latinos in the United States, particularly in the Sun Belt region, inclusive of the South and the Southwest, raises questions of how Latinos will fit into and reshape the political framework of the country. The literature on group threat theory suggests that we should expect competition over cooperation between Latinos and Blacks in the future as the Latino population continues to grow.

Group threat theory posits that inter-group hostility and prejudice are reactions to perceived threats from other groups (Quillian 1995). This theory suggests that new and/or growing groups (racial, ethnic, or otherwise) are often met with concern and hostility by older and/or shrinking groups. The older and shrinking groups view the newer and growing groups as political and

economic competitors, as well as threats to social order and status (Blumer 1958). Scholars refer to such intergroup hostility as group conflict (Freud 1930).

Scholarly research focusing on intergroup relations has tended to focus on the individual level, conducting attitudinal surveys to determine how individual members of racial groups, for instance, view each other (Siegelman and Welch 1993; McClain et al. 2006; Fernandez and Neiman 2010). In my research, I will shed new light on this area of political science and build on previous research by analyzing the political consequences of intergroup hostility in the context of the Sun Belt. Specifically, I will study the aggregate rather than individual level to determine whether the alleged hostile attitudes between groups result in political action by one of the groups against the other group, focusing on Latinos and Blacks, emphasizing the potential for political action against the former by the latter.

Research on group threat theory traditionally has focused on group conflict between the dominant group and various subordinate groups. In the United States, this research has most frequently looked at Whites as the dominant group and Blacks as the subordinate group. I am interested, however, in how this theory applies to intergroup relations between Blacks and Latinos. I want to study not only what fosters political action against Latinos but whether the hostility of Blacks towards Latinos is a causal factor for it. This will take the group threat literature a step further because it will examine if there are clear political actions that can be described as reactions to group threat.

Politics in the South, more so than any other political region of the United States, have been historically race-driven (Key 1949). The passage of the Jim Crow laws after Reconstruction, for example, was an instance of White political action in reaction to the perceived threat of Black political presence. During the first half of the 20th century up until the

passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Whites in the South excluded Blacks from voting, employing poll taxes, literacy tests, registration and residency requirements, and violence (Black and Black 1987). The literature on racial threat continues to find that it is more significant in the South than other regions of the country (Miller 2010).

Political reactions to the influx of Latinos in this region are frequently hostile. In Georgia, the state with the ninth fastest growing Latino population in the country, the legislative reaction to Latino migration has been increasingly antagonistic (Sabia 2010). This reaction is echoed in Alabama, where a recent immigration law imposed harsh regulations cracking down on Latino immigrants, including immigration-status verification during routine traffic stops and immigration-status checks of students entering public schools (Robertson 2011).

My original intention was to examine the political reactions of Blacks to Latinos solely within the South. However, given the limited instances of anti-Latino ordinances throughout the United States, I expanded my focus to the Sun Belt. This region offers the best area to study group threat as it applies to Latinos because this is the region with the largest numbers of Latinos and because it is the region where Latinos are most rapidly settling (Winders 2005). For example, from 1990 to 2000 the Latino populations in Tennessee, Georgia, Arkansas, and North Carolina have doubled (Haymes and Kilty 2007). This Latino population growth within the Sun Belt can be partially attributed to the emergence of a new service economy in the region (Haymes and Kilty 2007). I limit my research to essentially two regions (the South and the Southwest) research has shown that racial threat's impact on attitudes towards immigrants varies by region (Fernandez and Neiman 2010). Furthermore, focusing on just the Sun Belt limits contextual effects that may vary drastically by region. Environmental context must be understood in order to understand the political opinions and behavior of individuals in a given

area (Huckfeldt 1986). It is true that the racial political climate of the South is different than the Southwest, since Latinos have such a larger, longer-tenured presence in the latter region and a relatively new presence in the South. However, by focusing on the Sun Belt I am able to examine a region of the United States that offers both a significant and increasing presence of Latinos as well as (specifically in the South) relatively high levels of Black political incorporation. By focusing on the political reaction to Latinos in this region I will most effectively examine the political consequence of intergroup competition between Blacks and Latinos. My findings can contribute to an ongoing policy debate as well to the academic literature on Sun Belt politics, immigration, racial threat, and group threat theory in the context Latino politics in the United States.

Blacks have experienced a history of alienation and disenfranchisement in the United States, and especially in the Sun Belt and Southern states. Despite this history, the South contains high concentrations of Blacks. After a long struggle for political and civil rights, we now see high levels of Black political incorporation in the region (Browning, Marschall and Tabb 1997). Increased migration to the South, especially in the form of Latino migration, is changing the region's racial makeup. The increasing presence of Latinos may foreshadow a weakening of Black political presence and incorporation. Along this line of thinking, I theorize that to the degree to which Blacks in the Sun Belt are likely to view the growing Latino population as a threat, then it is more likely that there will be instances of anti-Latino policies in areas with significant Black and Latino populations. However, this greater prevalence of political action against Latinos is more likely if the Black population translates its resources into actual political power and if Black-White power sharing is present. Scholarly literature supports this theory, but in my research I want to examine if there exists a causal relationship between the

presence of political action against Latinos and the presence of "competing" Black and Latino groups.

To address this issue, I will look at the county level and measure the passage of anti-Latino ordinances against several contextual variables. The immigration debate in the United States is racialized to the point where in many people's minds immigrants equal Latinos and vice versa (Johnson 1998). Therefore, in this analysis I use the terms "anti-immigrant" and "anti-Latino" interchangeably to describe the ordinances of interest. Specifically, I empirically answer four key research questions. First, is there a greater likelihood of the proposal of anti-Latino ordinances in counties with sizable Black and Latino populations? Second, is there a greater probability of the proposal of anti-Latino ordinances in counties with sizable Black populations and higher levels of Latino median household income? Third, are we more likely to see anti-Latino ordinances proposed in counties with sizable Black populations where the median household income of Latinos is close to or greater than that of Blacks? Fourth, are anti-Latino ordinances more likely to be proposed in counties with sizable Black populations that have seen a recent increase in the Latino population? Each of these questions deals with a different set of conditional effects that may influence political reactions by the Black population. I predict that there will be a backlash among the Black population under certain conditions. Based on my theory, I expect to see a causal link between the proposal of anti-Latino ordinances and Black political presence (measured by population size) in areas with sizable, increasing, and/or economically competitive Latino populations.

The Politics of Group Competition: A review of the literature

Racial threat fuels group conflict. Key (1949) theorized that individual behavior is affected by the perceived threat of a proximate and growing racial group. Numerous scholars have built

on this concept, developing group threat theory. In the context of race relations, group threat theory asserts that intergroup hostility is a result of perceived racial threat (King and Wheelock 2007). The key claim of group threat theory is that perceived racial threat will be greater, and hostility towards the threatening group will be greater, the larger the relative population of the group in question (Quillian 1995). But what influences this perception of racial threat? Herbert Blumer (1958) introduced the theory that racial hostility is influenced by perceived group position relative to each other instead of individual prejudice. This new approach to studying racial prejudice emphasized the relationships between racial groups. Micheal Giles and Arthur Evans (1986) describe group threat theory as the "power approach," positing that intergroup hostility results from competition among groups for status, power, and advantage. Giles and Evans find evidence, for instance, that White opposition to government policies seen as favorable to Blacks is a reaction to the supposed loss of benefits for Whites resulting from government policies benefiting Blacks. Thus, group threat can be predicated on the fear of the disruption of the economic, political, or social status of a group relative to other groups (Cooper, Haspel, and Knotts 2007). Applied to Latinos, anti-Latino political action could be caused by groups fearing competition from them.

Key (1949) spoke in terms of Blacks and Whites when he wrote about racial threat, and much of the early literature on group threat (Key 1949, Blalock 1967, Giles 1977) focuses on the dominant group's perception of and reaction to a subordinate group. In the context of the Sun Belt, however, both Blacks and Latinos are minority groups competing in a largely conservative White political environment. Lawrence Bobo and Vincent Hutchings (1996) expand on Blumer's theory of group position and apply it to a multiracial social context by analyzing data on perceptions of threat between groups from the 1992 Los Angeles County Social Survey.

They find that a group's negative perceptions of other racial groups are fueled by a sense of racial alienation within the society. Racial alienation in this context is measured along a spectrum where a sense of group enfranchisement and entitlement represents low alienation and a sense of group disenfranchisement and grievance marks high alienation. Basically, alienated groups are more likely to view themselves as involved in zero-sum competition between racial groups. Karen Kaufmann (2002) elaborates on this perception of zero-sum competition by analyzing the barriers to Black and Latino political coalitions in urban areas. She uses a multi-city study of urban inequality to examine how individuals' beliefs and objective status influence their zero-sum orientation. She finds that although Blacks hold more negative opinions of Latino advancement than Latinos hold toward Black advancement, both groups hold negative opinions toward the advancement of the other group. Her work also provides evidence that racial alienation is particularly influential in explaining the negative feelings of Blacks towards other groups. Perhaps Blacks have experienced great degrees of political alienation and therefore are inclined to view other racial groups as competitors for status and privilege. This could explain the existence of political action against Latinos in areas with competing Black and Latino populations.

Other research focuses on the effects of politics and economics on intergroup hostility. There is evidence that Blacks harbor more negative feelings toward Latinos in areas where Latinos are economically advantaged relative to Blacks (Gay 2006). In such areas Blacks are more likely to view Black and Latino political and economic interests as incompatible (Kaufmann 2002). McClain and Karing (1990) find that Hispanics fair less well economically and politically in cities with Black majorities or pluralities. Also, they report that in cities with Black majorities Latinos are less likely to form political coalitions with Blacks. This has clear

implications for possibility of intergroup conflict between Blacks and Latinos in heavily Black populated regions of the Sun Belt.

Other scholars find that the level of scarcity of the resources in question determines whether Blacks and Latinos clash or cooperate (Meier, et al. 2004). When scarcity is a factor, gains for one group can result in losses for the other. This indicates that if scarcity is not a factor Black and Latino cooperation is more likely. Competition for scarce resources especially applies to economics, which Blacks tend to view as a zero-sum competition (Kaufmann 2002). Latino economic success may heighten perceptions of racial threat, and thus increase the punitive actions against Latinos.

The contemporary discussion of group threat and racial threat is continued in the study of attitudes towards immigrants (often Latino) in the United States[2]. A key tenet of group threat theory is that recent growth of a subordinate group's population heightens the perception of that group as a threat and leads to greater hostility towards that group (Quillian 1995). This effect of growth on the perceived racial threat is compounded because growth not only increases the relative size of the subordinate group, it fuels the perception that the group is growing and its power is increasing.

Recent literature finds that modern attitudes towards immigrants are more negative when the immigrants are Latinos instead of Europeans (Brader, Valentino Suhay 2008). Europeans are generally White and thus are not immediately viewed in the United States as a separate racial group. Latinos, on the other hand, are more easily identified and are much more easily categorized. In this sense Latinos (as well as the general debate over immigration) have been

[2] It is important to keep the immigration factor in mind when studying group threat for Latinos. This is especially true in the South, given that Latinos are a rapidly growing demographic in the area and many of the new Latinos in the region are recent immigrants. Latinos are beginning to more rapidly settle in new immigrant destinations, and Sun Belt Southern states comprise the majority of these new destinations (McClain, et al. 2006).

racialized (Omi and Winant 1994). These findings indicate that racial threat fuels anti-immigration fervor against Latinos but not necessarily against other immigrant groups.

Another explanation is that anti-immigrant fervor is directed against groups perceived as most threatening. In the United States, Latinos may be viewed as threatening because they are the fastest growing minority in the country and a large portion of them are thought to be unauthorized immigrants. The perception that unauthorized immigrants take jobs away from other groups because they work for below minimum wage might add to this perceived threat. This relates to literature reporting that one determinant of anti-immigrant attitudes is the competition over scarce resources, which ties directly to group threat theory (Esses, Jackson and Armstrong 1998).

Further research on attitudes towards immigration suggests that the desire to maintain economic discrepancies between immigrants and native populations undermines support for empowering immigrants (Jackson and Esses 2000). Also, economic insecurity among groups is found to increase prejudicial stereotypes and foster more negative views on immigration (Burns and Gimpel 2000). Research shows that an increase in the immigrant population leads to lower employment opportunities for working-class Blacks (Waldinger 1997). Furthermore, a poll by the Pew Research Center finds that half of Blacks say that immigrants reduce job opportunities for Blacks (Morin 2008). Adding to this perception of threat from Latino immigrants, studies show that employers view Latino immigrants as more desirable employees than Blacks because they think they have a greater work ethic and because they see them as more amenable workers (Waldinger 1997). Since these factors heighten the perception of threat that immigrants pose, anti-immigration sentiment can be viewed in the same theoretical context of group threat theory as other group conflict.

There is an alternative theory in regards to interethnic relations that contradicts group threat theory. Contact theory is originally defined ambiguously: depending on whether contact between groups is positive or negative, hostility either increases or decreases with increased contact (Forbes 1997; Hajnal 2007). Robert Putnam (2007) describes how this works when he writes "contact theory suggests that diversity erodes the in-group-out-group distinction and enhances out-group solidarity or bridging social capital, thus lowering ethnocentrism." Research on contact theory in relation to race relations states that animosity between racial groups decreases over time as the groups come in contact with one another and interact (Sigelman and Welch 1993). Some of the recent literature on contact theory argues against the principles of my theory and finds that larger Black populations lead to a softening of White attitudes in regards to Blacks (Giles 1977, Sigelman and Welch 1993, Hjerm 2007). Other literature even asserts that racial threat is only effective in describing the behavior of the dominant group whereas contact theory is more effective in describing the behavior of the subordinate group (Cooper et al. 2007).

Hypotheses

Based on this theory of racial group threat, I hypothesize that *we are more likely to observe political action against Latinos in counties with sizable Black and Latino populations*. Group threat theory posits that the attitude of one group towards another group are more negative the larger the threat of the latter group, so the communities or polities must have a sizable Latino population to fuel the group threat that spurs the political action against Latinos. A significant Black population could possess the necessary political resources to influence the enactment of this legislation. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that a larger group population represents greater political power (latent or otherwise) for that group. In this way the demographic variables in my analysis are proxy measures for political action (representation,

voting, etc.). Therefore I predict that political action against Latinos will be greater in polities with sizable Black and Latino populations.

In areas with growing numbers of Latino-owned businesses, the economic and political threat of Latinos may appear more concrete. Political action against Latinos can be viewed as a measure to limit, even roll back, the further political and economic empowerment of Latinos. Therefore, I hypothesize that *in counties with significant Black populations that have more prosperous Latino households, political action against Latinos should be greater*. Greater economic success could lead to Latinos exerting more political power and reducing the political and economic status of Blacks. This threat of greater political power by Latinos should increase punitive actions by non-Latinos against Latinos in polities were Latino economic progress is growing. My hypothesis for the third research question is based on the same theory of economic threat as for the second hypothesis. Thus, I hypothesize *that there is a greater probability of political action against Latinos in polities with sizable Black populations where Latino prosperity is close to or greater than that of Blacks*.

I posit that Latinos are perceived as threats in polities where Latino immigration is increasing. High population growth rates of Latinos in an area heighten concerns about immigration, heightening group fears towards Latinos. I, therefore, hypothesize *that there will be a greater likelihood of political actions against Latinos in counties that have experienced greater growth in their Latino populations than those with lesser growth*.

Given that contact theory and its mechanisms may better explain interethnic interactions than group threat theory, I include four alternative hypotheses (one for each research question and corresponding hypothesis). My first alternative hypothesis is that, all else being equal, there will be a lower probability of political action against Latinos in places with significant Black and

Latino populations. This could be because contact, between the groups, softens group threat and racial prejudices. Also, due to the White majority, Blacks and Latinos may form political coalitions to counter the majority group. This would lead us to observe lower degrees of political action against Latinos.

The corresponding alternative hypothesis for the second research question on how Latino economic success affects political action against Latinos is that we will observe a smaller likelihood of political action against Latinos in polities with sizable Black populations and more prosperous Latino households. Likewise, the alternative hypothesis for the third research question - how the difference between the median household incomes of Blacks and Latinos affects the presence of this legislation – political action against Latinos should be less likely in polities with sizable Black populations where the economic prosperity of Latinos is close to or greater than that of Blacks. This may be the case because greater Latino economic success (e.g. higher levels of Latino median household income) may lead to greater political power for Latinos, preventing political action against Latinos. Economic success may be a conditional effect where the impact of the size or growth of the Latino population depends on economic success of Latinos. Therefore, Latino populations with greater economic success may be more effective in, for example, blocking the passage of anti-Latino legislation.

We may observe a less political action against Latinos where Latinos are more economically prosperous for a different reason. Lower Latino economic success may heighten perceptions of group threat because Latinos are perceived as competing with other groups for working-class jobs. If working-class Latinos are seen as a greater threat to Black employment than more economically successful Latinos, then we may observe that places with sizable Black

populations and higher levels of Latino economic success may have a lower probability of political action against Latinos.

My fourth alternative hypothesis relates to the question of immigration and population growth: In places with large increases in their Latino populations the probability of political action against Latinos is lower, net other factors. It is less likely that contact theory would apply because the influx of new Latinos suggests that the group has not had enough time interacting with the Black population in a place for the mechanism of contact theory to occur. However, this alternative hypothesis could be explained by political representatives' responses to a new voting demographic, seeking to incorporate them instead of alienate them.

The racial configuration of political power in places may also account for the degrees of political action against Latinos. The influence of factors (e.g. Black and Latino populations, Latino population growth, and Latino economic success) may depend on the levels of Latino and Black political incorporation. Places with more Latino political officials, for example, would be less likely to witness political action against Latinos. Blacks' feelings of group threat towards Latinos may be more likely to result in political action against Latinos in polities with Black political representation.

A plausible explanation for the null hypotheses that there is no effect of Black population, Latino population growth, or Latino economic success on the presence of political action against Latinos is that the effect of White population in the polities on the presence of political action against Latinos is too great and blunts the Black population's effect. Much has been published on racial threat as it applies to Whites' views on minority populations (Key 1949, Giles 1986, Browning 1997), showing that group threat theory best applies in the context of examining this group's racial attitudes. My work focuses less on the effects of White population

on political action against Latinos and instead tests to see if the size of the Black population has a separate effect on the presence of political action against Latinos to explain what the observed results (whatever they may be) mean in terms of interethnic relations in the Sun Belt.

Data and Methods

I focus on political action against Latinos. My dependent variable is the proposal of "anti-Latino" ordinances or policies, measured at the county level. This term overlaps with the term "anti-immigration" ordinances, which is broadly defined as "policies intended to limit immigration, illegal immigration, or limit the impact that either has on a local area through anti-immigration or restrictive measures" (O'Neil 2010, 3). In the context of the relevant literature, these common terms encompass several types of legislation. Wayne Santoro (1999) and Robert R. Preuhs (2005) look at the Latino struggle against English-only laws as an example of legislation that severely encumbers Latinos. Also, policies limiting bilingual education in public schools for English as a Second Language students are another example of policies that carry anti-Latino implications (Gutierrez et al. 2000). Other examples of anti-immigrant legislation include residential occupancy zoning regulations (Esbenshade 2007). Such ordinances limit the number of people who can reside in a domicile (targeted at relatively larger Latino families) and prohibit renting to undocumented immigrants. Other anti-immigration policies include deputizing state and local police to enforce federal immigration law by requesting immigration-status from detainees (O'Neil 2010). Day laborer regulations are another form of anti-Latino ordinances because they target migrant workers, who are often unauthorized Latino immigrants. These regulations prohibit the solicitation of employment on public roadways in order to restrict immigrant day laborers. Many of the aforementioned ordinances appear group-neutral but they are known as "coded codes," targeting specific communities (Martos 2010). The map shown

below offers further examples of anti-Latino policies enacted at the local level. I will use these anti-immigrant policies and the ones listed above in my definition of my dependent variable.

(insert map 1 here.)

In my analysis, I focus on counties within Sun Belt states. I define the Sun Belt as encompassing the Southern states Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma as well as the Southwestern states Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and California. These sixteen states are either states with already large numbers of Latinos or are emerging new destinations for Latinos (McClain et al. 2006, 571). From 1970 to 1990, the two main regions comprising the Sun Belt, the South and the Southwest, grew in population by 36 percent and 51 percent, respectively (Encyclopedia Britannica 2012). The Latino population in four Sun Belt states doubled in the past decade and in New Mexico, California, and Texas Latinos are moving closer to becoming the majority group in their state (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2011). This population growth is a result of large in-migration in general and has contributed to the economic growth of the area.

I focus my research on the county level to most precisely take into account the contextual variables at work in the interactions between Blacks and Latinos. I focus on counties rather than municipalities because counties provide us with larger populations from which to examine our demographic variables while still keeping the focus on the local level. The state level would not provide enough cases to study and the county level provides me with a large sample of localities with significant legislative capabilities. Studying the local level is advantageous because racial minorities may have more political influence at the local-level than at the state-level, since the

smaller areas provide the potential for minorities to comprise larger proportions of the population. Minorities may also be able to exert greater political power at the local level because over the past decade Republicans (who traditionally stand in opposition to minority interests) have gained increased control over state government in the South and other parts of the Sun Belt (Goodman 2010). Currently, there is an ongoing debate over the role that localities and states should play in relation to the federal government in terms of immigration policy as local governments become more active and assertive on these issues (Martos 2010). It includes the question of whether or not the political actions against Latinos[3] are group-motivated.

The key dependent variable for each of my four research questions is the proposal of anti-immigrant legislation at the county level. I expect such proposals to be relatively rare. Therefore, I will use a dichotomous variable measuring whether or not an anti-immigrant ordinance was proposed in a county between the years 2000 and 2006. My data are drawn from the 1,342 counties within the 16 Sun Belt states on which I am focusing my analysis[4]. The data on the dependent variable (i.e. the consideration or passage of an anti-immigrant ordinance, was originally collected by Daniel J. Hopkins for his 2010 *American Political Science Review* article "Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition." Hopkins collected data on localities that had passed or proposed anti-immigrant ordinances between the years 2000 and 2006. He identified these localities by searching the LexisNexis database for the joint appearance of "local" and "anti-immigrant" in articles in 258 different regional newspapers. He also conducted a different search for the appearance of "English only" in the headline or lead paragraph of articles. The search results were then skimmed to find anti-immigrant proposals. Hopkins identified 52 Census-designated localities that had considered an

[3] Also referred to by supporting legislators as "quality of life" policies.
[4] I also run regression models for all counties in the United States but do not include the results in the analysis because they were not statistically significant.

anti-immigrant ordinance during the selected time period. He also obtained a second list of 76 different localities that had proposed anti-immigrant ordinances from the Fair Immigration Reform Movement. Hopkins was gracious enough to make his data available for public download.

Since Hopkins unit of analysis was towns and not counties, I transformed his data so that the number of anti-immigrant proposals was sorted by county. Thus, I translated his 108 instances of a locality proposing an anti-immigrant ordinance to reflect that 79 different counties in the United States had proposed 108 different anti-immigrant ordinances from 2000 to 2006. The map below illustrates the distribution of these ordinances. The majority of proposed ordinances occurred in counties in the Sun Belt. We also see a fairly large concentration in the Northeast.

(Insert map 2 here.)

Since my analysis focuses solely on the Sun Belt region, my final dataset contains 1,342 counties from sixteen states. Of these counties, 37 counties have proposed 49 separate anti-immigrant ordinances. This method of data collection undoubtedly had some human bias. It is impossible to account for all anti-immigrant ordinances using these criteria, since Hopkins' criteria may not have been all encompassing. Given the lack of data on this variable at the county-level, however, this data collection strategy was the best and most unbiased method available.

Essential to my analysis is the independent variable data on the number of Latinos and Blacks within each county. Distinguishing between these two groups can be difficult, since

Latino is considered an ethnicity while Black or African-American is considered a race. For the purposes of my analysis, a Latino is defined as a person of Hispanic ethnicity who is non-Black and a Black person is defined as a person of African descent and non-Hispanic.

For the first research question regarding whether or not counties with sizable Black and Latino populations are more likely to propose anti-Latino legislation, my key independent variables are the size of the Black population and the size of the Latino population of the county. Both variables will be continuous, measured as a proportion of the total county population. The conditional effects of the interaction between the sizes of the Black and Latino populations are integral to my research question. Group threat theory posits that the greater the population of the minority group, the greater the perceived threat of this group by other groups. Therefore, the size of the Latino population should have a direct effect on the impact of the Black population in regards to anti-Latino legislation. The greater the Latino population, the more threatening it may appear to the Black population. To account for the interaction between the Black and Latino populations, I include an interaction term for the two independent variables.

Since the White population in the counties will be directly proportional to the size of the Black and Latino populations, I do not need to control directly for White population. This population is important to consider because it is entirely possible that the White population will have the dominant effect on the presence of anti-Latino legislation.

Additionally, I control for the percent of Latinos in the county who are non-citizens. Although some non-citizens may vote in a few local jurisdictions, most non-citizens cannot vote (Song 2009). Latinos in a county that is comprised of a greater proportion of non-citizens would wield less political power than Latinos in a county composed of a greater proportion of citizens.

This control variable, therefore, accounts for the potential political power of Latinos at the local level.

I intended to include a number of other control variables in my regressions. But, due to time constraints in my data collection, I was unable to include them in my analysis. Specifically, I would have controlled for Black and Latino political incorporation. I thought of including two control variables, one measuring the proportion of Black political officials on county legislatures and the other measuring the proportion of Latinos on county legislatures. More Black political officials could increase the political influence of the Black population, just as more Latino political officials could increase the political influence of the Latino population. I also wanted to control for the political party affiliation within the county by measuring the proportion of county commissioners who are Republican. Immigration is an issue split along political party lines, so it makes sense to control for partisanship at the county level (Neiman, Johnson and Bowler 2006)). I aimed to compile the data on my control variables by determining the partisan and racial makeup of the county boards based on individual county websites. Considering that my analysis covers 1,342 counties, however, this task proved too monumental to complete, given constraints of writing and defending this thesis. Generally, however, Black and Latino population sizes correlate highly with Black and Latino political incorporation. Therefore, the impact of these omitted variables may be already accounted for in my analysis.

In order to more thoroughly test the dynamics of group threat in regards to economic competition, I include in my analysis two different measures of the economic competition: median household incomes of Latinos in the county and the difference between Black and Latino median household income in the county. Strong arguments can be made for both as the more appropriate measure for the independent variable to best test the nature of economic group threat

on the presence of anti-Latino ordinances. It is possible that greater Latino economic success in general (as measured by Latino median household income) might fuel greater perceptions of threat towards the group. On the other hand, it makes sense that this threat might only exist if the level of economic success is close to or greater than that of the Black community (thus the measure of the difference in median household incomes of the two groups). I test both measures in separate regressions in order to more thoroughly examine group threat as it applies to economic competition between these two groups.

Black population and Latino economic incorporation are the key independent variables for the second research question of whether or not it is more likely that anti-Latino ordinances are proposed in counties with sizable Black populations and higher levels of Latino median household income. I use the same measure for Black population as for the previous research question. Latino economic incorporation is measured as a continuous variable that represents the median household income of Latino-headed households. I also include an interaction variable of these two independent variables to account for their conditional effects on each other. It is expected that the higher the Latino median household income, the harsher the political reaction on the part of the Black population. The control variables for this statistical analysis are the same as for the previous two questions.

For the third research question of whether or not there is a greater probability of anti-Latino ordinances being proposed in counties with sizable Black populations and where the median household income of Latinos is close to or greater than that of Blacks, Black population and Latino economic incorporation remain the key independent variables. However, Latino economic incorporation is measured in relation to Black economic incorporation. It is the difference between Black median household income and Latino median household income at the

county level. Included in the regression is an interaction variable between Black population and the difference between Black and Latino median household income. This interaction variable is included because the effect of Black population on the presence of anti-Latino ordinances should change based on how close Latino economic success is to Black economic success.

For the fourth research question - whether or not there is a greater likelihood of the proposal anti-Latino ordinances in counties with sizable Black populations that have experienced recent growth in their Latino populations - the key independent variables are Latino population growth and the size of the Black population. Latino immigration and new Latino migration to the Sun Belt can be most easily measured by the growth in the Latino population. Latino population growth is a continuous variable measuring the percent change in the Latino population in the county between 1990 and 2000, drawn from the Census. It will again be necessary to include an interaction variable between Latino population growth and Black population because the reaction of the Black population should be more dramatic the greater the increase in Latino population. The control variables in this case will be the same as the ones for the analysis of the first research question.

The Census is the most reliable assessment of population for regions in the United States and is thus the most appropriate source to draw my demographic data from. County-level socioeconomic demographic data for my independent variables come from the 2000 Census. I use the 1990 census to calculate the ten-year growth rate of county Latino populations from 1990 to 2000. In his analysis, Hopkins uses demographic data from 2000 to go along with his dependent variable data collected between 2000 and 2006. I use the same years for my data.

One weakness of the Census is that minorities are underrepresented in the decennial counts (Stout 1998). This may cause the measures of Latino population and Black population to

be slightly inaccurate. The Census also under represents noncitizens, especially illegal immigrants who may be hesitant to answer the survey questions (Park 2010). This may further skew my data on the Latino populations, as well as the control variable of the percentage of Latinos who are non-citizens. Despite these weaknesses, the Census is still the most accurate source of information for population and demographic data, especially since its information is provided at the county-level. Also, if the underrepresentation of minorities and undocumented immigrants is constant across counties, then my causal inferences are not harmed.

The four hypotheses will be statistically tested with logistic regression models to predict the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. For the regression corresponding to the first research question, the equation for the logit is:

$$Y_1 = c + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_3 + B_4X_4$$

In this equation, c represents the constant, X_1 represents the proportion of the county population that is Black, X_2 the proportion that is Latino. X_3 is the interaction variable between the Black and Latino populations ($X_3 = X_1X_2$). X_4 is the percent of the county's Latino population that are non-citizens. The corresponding B_i coefficients represent the effect of each variable on the dependent variable Y_1. Y_1 represents the logit of the logistic model, the total contribution of all independent variables in the model to the effect on the logarithmic odds of the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance (Hosmer 2000).

The independent variables of interest in my analysis are Black population (X_1), Latino population (X_2), and their interaction variable (X_3). B_1 represents the effect of the Black population on anti-Latino legislation if the Latino population is zero. B_2 represents the effect of the Latino population on anti-Latino legislation if the Black population is zero. My theory predicts that Black impact on anti-Latino legislation is a reaction to a sizable (and thus perceived

as threatening) Latino population in the county. I therefore expect that B_1 will be close to zero, since if the Latino population is zero then the Black population will not have any reason to support anti-Latino legislation. I expect that B_2 will be positive, since a larger Latino population could still spur negative political reactions from a threatened White population even if the Black population is zero. The falsification of my hypothesis hinges on the results of the interaction variable. I hypothesize that given the conditional effect of a large Latino population, a larger Black population is more likely to be associated with more anti-Latino legislation. A statistically significant B_3 value that is positive will support this hypothesis. A B_3 value that is negative or zero will falsify this hypothesis (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). A B_3 coefficient that is zero would indicate that the Black population has no effect on the presence of anti-immigrant ordinances, no matter the size of Latino population in the county. A B_3 negative coefficient would point to the opposite effect, that a larger Black population leads to less anti-Latino legislation as the percent of the county's population that is Latino rises. Furthermore, a negative coefficient may mean that larger Black populations lessen the effects of larger Latino populations.

The equation of logit for the second research question is:

$$Y_2 = c + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_3 + B_4X_4$$

In this equation, the variables are the same except that X_2 represents the median household income of Latino-headed households in the county and B_3 is the interaction variable between X_1 (Black population) and X_2. Once again, I expect B_1 to be close to zero and I expect B_2 to be positive since greater economic incorporation of Latinos could cause the White population to be threatened and respond negatively regardless of the size of the Black population. A statistically significant and positive B_3 would support my hypothesis the effect of the Black population on

anti-Latino legislation increases the greater the level of Latino economic incorporation. If B_3 were zero, indicating no conditional relationship, or negative, indicating that a larger Black population decreases the likelihood of anti-Latino legislation (or simply mitigates the effects of greater Latino economic success), then my hypothesis would have to be rejected.

The equation of the logit of logistic regression for the third research question is:

$$Y_3 = c + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_3 + B_4X_4$$

The symbols in this equation are the same as the previous one except that B_2 is the difference between Black median household income and Latino median household income in the county. Similar to the previous two equations, I expect B_1 to be close to zero and for B_2 to be positive because the greater the level of Latino economic incorporation (whether it is less than or greater than the level of Black economic incorporation) the greater the perceived threat the group poses. In order to accept my hypothesis that the effect of the Black population on anti-Latino ordinances increases the smaller the difference between Black and Latino median household income, B_3 must be positive and statistically significant. A negative B_3 would mean that a larger Black population decreases the likelihood of anti-Latino ordinances and a B_3 that is zero indicates that there is no conditional relationship between the two variables. Both of these results would cause me to reject my hypothesis.

The equation for the logit corresponding to the fourth research question is:

$$Y_4 = c + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_3 + B_4X_4$$

The symbols in the equation represent the same variables as the previous equation except for B_2, which represents the percent change in the Latino population in the county from 2000 to 2010, and X_3, which is the interaction variable between X_1 (percent Black population) and X_2. The variables of interest are X_1, X_2, and X_3. Based on my theory, I once again expect B_1 to be close

to zero. I expect B_2 to be positive on the basis that the White population would react negatively to higher Latino growth in the county. Similar to the previous regression, this regression's most important parameter in terms of falsifying the corresponding hypothesis is B_3. To support the hypothesis B_3 must be statistically significant and positive. This result would indicate that the Black population correlates more strongly with the presence of anti-Latino ordinances the larger the rate of Latino population growth, and that this relationship itself increases the larger the size of the Black population. A B_3 that is negative or zero would falsify my hypothesis and indicate that either the Black population has no effect (if $B_1 = 0$) on the presence of anti-Latino legislation, regardless of the Latino population growth rate, or that the pattern is actually the opposite of what I expected (if $B_1 < 0$) and a larger Black population results in less anti-Latino legislation as the growth of the Latino population increases. Additionally, this may indicate that larger Black populations mitigate the effects of Latino population growth.

Results

All but one of the regressions failed to yield statistically significant coefficients on the variables of interest, specifically the interaction variables. Model 1 (found in the Appendix) shows the statistical results for the first regression measuring the probability of observing the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance in counties with sizable Black population and sizable Latino populations. The coefficient for the percent Black county population independent variable is -0.0486499. This indicates that as the Black population increases the likelihood of observing the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance decreases. This is not in keeping with the prediction that the impact of the size of the Black population would be negligible when the size of the Latino population is not taken into account. Using the standard alpha-level of 0.05, the low p-value of 0.005 means that this coefficient is statistically significant. The 95 percent confidence

interval for the parameter ranges from -0.0823265 to -0.014973. Therefore, we can be 95 percent certain that the true value is between these two numbers. This confidence interval is important because zero is not contained within the range of values. This indicates that the relationship between Black population and the probability of an anti-immigrant ordinance being proposed is most likely negative, which is contrary to expectations. This finding is interesting because it suggests that there may be potential for Black-Latino cooperation since (at least before the size Latino population is factored into the equation) Black population is negatively correlated with the probability of the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance.

The parameter for the percent Latino variable is statistically insignificant, since the p-value of 0.705 is much higher than the alpha-level of 0.05. Consequentially, we cannot draw conclusions based on the regression results for this variable. Based on the theory of group threat, it is expected that as Latino population increases the likelihood of seeing the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances will also increase. However, it the linear relationship may also be U-shaped[5]. An increasing Latino population may increase the likelihood of the proposal of an anti-immigrant until it hits a threshold at which the relationship changes because Latino political presence is great enough to impede the consideration of such ordinances. The coefficient in this case is actually negative, but since the p-value is too high and the results are thus not statistically significant, definite conclusions cannot be drawn based on this coefficient.

The regression results for the interaction variable between the Black and Hispanic county populations support the hypothesis that a larger Black population will more greatly increase the probability of the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance as the Latino population increases. At 0.0058173 and with a p-value of 0.000, this coefficient is statistically significant and indicates

[5] I decided not to include the nonlinear effect in my analysis because it would make the interaction difficult to interpret.

that as both populations increase and interact the likelihood of an anti-immigrant ordinance being proposed increases. The 95 percent confidence interval for this parameter ranges from 0.0209612 to 0.06004, meaning that we are 95 percent sure that the true value is contained within that range. Since the interval contains only positive values, it is safe to assume that the true value of the parameter is positive. This further supports the hypothesis since it was predicted that the interaction variable coefficient would be positive.

Based on the statistical results for these three key independent variables, we fail to reject the hypothesis that counties with sizable Black populations and sizable Latino populations are more likely to consider anti-immigrant ordinances. The interaction variable between the Black and Hispanic county populations supports the argument that as the Latino population increases the positive effect of the Black population on the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances will increase. Even though the percent Black population variable coefficient was negative (contrary to our predictions) this regression still provides evidence that group threat can explain the proposal of anti-Latino ordinances in counties with sizable Black and Latino populations. The pseudo R-squared is 0.1187, which means that 11.87 percent of the variation in the data is accounted for by this model. This is a notable proportion given the complex and numerous political dynamics that influence legislation in local politics.

The logistic regressions corresponding to the other three research questions do not offer us the opportunity to draw sound conclusions from the results. As shown in Model 2, none of the three key independent variables are statistically significant, at the conventional level of 0.05, in the logistic regression measuring the likelihood of an anti-immigrant ordinance being proposed against the percent Black population in the county, the median household income of Latino-led households, and their interaction variable. Again, the percent Black population

coefficient is negative, contrary to expectations. Its p-value of 0.267, however, is well above the alpha-level of 0.05, yielding non-statistically significant results. The p-value for Latino median household income is 0.055, just shy of the alpha-level. The coefficient for this variable is positive but extremely low, at 0.0000233. For the interaction variable, the p-value is exceptionally high (0.977) and the results are not statistically significant. The pseudo R-squared of 0.0803 means that 8.03 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by this model, but since all the key parameters are statistically insignificant not much stock can put into this value. Therefore, no definite conclusions can be drawn in relation to the hypothesis that there is a greater likelihood of an anti-immigrant ordinance being proposed in counties with sizable Black populations and high median household incomes of households headed by Latinos.

For the regression for the third research question - testing whether there is a greater likelihood of an anti-immigrant ordinance being proposed in a counties with sizable Black populations and where the Latino median household income is close to or greater than the Black median household income - once again none of the three key independent variables are statistically significant. As shown in Model 3, the p-value for the percent Black population variable is 0.101. This p-value is too high to claim statistical significance at the designated alpha-level. Likewise, the coefficient of the variable measuring the difference between Black and Latino household incomes in the county is not statistically significant (p-value 0.799). The interaction variable's coefficient is also not statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.409. The pseudo R-squared is 0.0686, meaning that 6.86 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by this model. The results, however, are again not statistically significant, hindering definite conclusions.

The final regression tests the hypothesis that there will be a greater probability of the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance in counties with sizable Black populations that have recently experience sizable growth in their Latino population, also yields no statistically significant coefficients for the three key independent variables. Model 4 illustrates the high p-values associated with these three parameters. The coefficient for percent Black county population has a p-value of 0.212. It is thus not statistically significant. The p-values for the Hispanic county population growth coefficient and the interaction variable coefficient are 0.513 and 0.560, respectively. The pseudo R-squared is 0.0704. Thus, this model accounts for 7.04 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. Since the parameters are not statistically significant, we once again cannot draw definite conclusions about how these variables influence the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances.

It should be noted that in each of the four logistic regressions, the control variable measuring the percentage of Latinos in the county who are noncitizens had the largest coefficient of the four variables included in the regressions and in each of the regressions the parameter was highly statistically significant (i.e. all p-values were 0.000). This indicates that the percentage of Latino noncitizens in a county is a much stronger predictor of political actions against Latinos and that as the percentage of Latino noncitizens increases the likelihood of anti-immigrant ordinances being proposed also increases. This is one of the few concrete conclusions that can be drawn from the four regression results and the only pattern that can be observed in all four regressions. This pattern is a function of the limited political power that noncitizens possess. They are in a less advantaged position to combat punitive political action. This relationship also might be observed because a Latino population with a large proportion of noncitizens is perceived as more threatening due to immigration-related fears and prejudice.

Discussion

The statistical results of these four regressions are curious, but they do not necessarily mean that group threat theory does not apply in this context. The results for the first regression actually lend credence to the argument that the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances can be partially explained by group threat as it applies to political interactions between Blacks and Latinos. The results indicate that as the size of the Latino population increases at the county level, the positive relationship between the size of the Black population at the county level and the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances strengthens. Therefore, the larger the population of Latinos at the county level, the greater the likelihood that a larger Black population will increase the likelihood of the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance. This statistical relationship indicates that the larger Latino population increases Blacks perception of Latinos as threatening, and therefore counties with larger Black populations (and thus greater Black political power within the county) and sizable Latino populations are more likely to propose anti-Latino ordinances.

These findings have considerable implications for racial politics within (and perhaps beyond) the Sun Belt. If group threat between Blacks and Latinos is one of the factors in the proposal of punitive political action against Latinos, then that weakens potential for political coalitions against the dominant White group. The evidence from the first regression indicates that Blacks may view Latinos as competition and not as potential allies and therefore support punitive actions against Latinos. Furthermore, McClain et al. (2006) report that Latino immigrants hold negative stereotypes of Blacks and see themselves as more similar to Whites than to Blacks. The disassociation of Latinos from Blacks further discourages political alliances between the two groups. Therefore, it may be more likely that both of these groups attempt to

forge political coalitions with Whites than with each other. For example, as recorded in the documentary *The Garden*, Whites and Blacks allied against Latinos in the struggle for the land on which Latinos had developed a community garden. Also, if Blacks believe that Latinos are uninterested in allying politically with Blacks, then Blacks may be even more likely to view Latinos as potential competitors for political power (Vaca 2004). The result is a cyclical process wherein the fact that Blacks and Latinos view political alliances between the groups as an impossibility leads to greater perceptions of group threat, which in turn makes the prospect of forming political coalitions even more unlikely.

Since the Sun Belt contains relatively high concentrations of Blacks, primarily due to levels in the Deep South, as well as the areas with the highest concentrations of Hispanics in the country, these social cleavages will be particularly pronounced and consequential for the political and racial atmosphere in the region. The Sun Belt is a historical stronghold of conservative politics (Schulman 1993), and conservatives often take the hard line on immigration issues. Blacks tend to be liberal (Tate 2006), and often clash with the conservative political party (currently the Republican party). The results suggest that these traditional political divisions between Blacks and Whites may not apply when it comes to the issue of immigration and anti-Latino ordinances. This is supported by research that finds Blacks are generally in opposition to unauthorized immigration (Fernandez and Neiman 2010). Will the mutual threat of Latino immigration bind conservatives and Blacks together into political alliances?

Latinos are the fastest growing ethnic group in the United States, and Blacks and Whites may form coalitions in reaction to this fast growing demographic. This could result in more meaningful coalitions that result in the greater Black political incorporation and access to resources and political decision-making. On the contrary, will the influx of a new and

increasingly large minority group into the region serve as another barrier to the political empowerment of Blacks? Latinos are generally more conservative than Blacks (Abrajano 2010), and conservative Whites may be more inclined to court Latino votes than Black votes. White-Latino political alliances would result in the further marginalization of Blacks. Thus, given the findings of my study, anti-immigrant ordinances can be viewed as pre-emptive measures to preserve the political power of Blacks.

Given the tremendous growth rates of Latinos in the Sun Belt, it may become advantageous for political parties to appeal to Latino voters. The demographic changes could provide an opening for the Democratic Party in a region that is traditionally a stronghold of Republican electoral and governmental power. As mentioned before, the Republican Party takes a hard line against immigration. This stance makes it difficult to appeal to Latino voters. The Democratic Party could capitalize on this to attract this increasingly large voting demographic. My study's findings, however, suggest that Blacks view Latinos as a threat and that political action against Latinos, especially anti-immigrant ordinances, is more likely to exist in counties with considerable populations of both groups. The Democratic Party, therefore, may not be able to reach out to Latino voters without alienating Black voters. This group divide creates a complicated political context within the region, a political context that is in a period of transition as the group makeup of the Sun Belt changes.

Whatever the implications of the findings from the first regression, they provide evidence that group threat plays at a least a partial role in the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances. The other three regressions do not provide such evidence. Unfortunately, neither of the two regressions on economic group threat nor the regression testing the effects of Latino population growth yielded statistically significant results. These findings should not necessarily be taken to

mean that group threat theory in the specific contexts does not apply. There are a number of issues with the study itself that could account for the lack of statistically significant results.

The number of instances in which anti-immigrant ordinances were actually proposed is small. The dependent variable was collected by looking for the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances between the years 2000 and 2006. This resulted in 108 separate proposals of anti-immigrant ordinances in the entire country. These 108 proposals occurred in just 79 out of the 3,223 counties in the United States. This means that just 2% of counties have considered the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances. Once my results were limited to the Sun Belt region, there were just 49 separate proposals in only 37 different counties out of the 1,342 counties in the dataset. This limited number of nonzero cases in the dependent variable may have contributed to the lack of statistically significant results.

There are several reasons why the dataset contains so few counties where an anti-immigrant ordinance was proposed. First, Hopkins' method for collecting data on the dependent variable may have missed potential anti-Latino legislation that was not publicized in the regional newspapers or catalogued by the Fair Immigrant Reform Movement. Hopkins' method is limited because it relied on searching directly for the term "anti-immigrant." This method requires that the media identify the proposed ordinance in question as an anti-immigrant ordinance. Many of the ordinances that fall under the definition of anti-immigrant legislation, however, are not directly aimed at immigrants. Often such legislation appears to be unrelated to ethnic or immigrant status, even when it disproportionately affects Latinos and Latino immigrants (Martos 2010). It is not initially obvious that an ordinance is an anti-immigrant one. Therefore, the newspapers may fail to report it as such. In this case the ordinance may not be counted by Hopkins' data collection method.

Second, the data includes ordinances that were proposed between the years 2000 and 2006, with 58 percent of the proposed anti-immigrant ordinances in Hopkins data set being reported in regional newspapers during 2006 (Hopkins 2010), a year when immigration emerged as a national political issue. Hopkins notes that this emergence on the national political scene caused not only more of such ordinances to be proposed, but also caused the regional newspapers to more comprehensively report them. Based off of this assertion, it seems likely that extending Hopkins method through 2012 would yield many more instances of the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances. The period from 2007 to 2012 would probably contain significantly more proposals of the ordinances than the six-year period on which this study focuses. Either way, increasing the time period of the study would no doubt increase the total number of nonzero dependent variable cases in the data. As stated before, my original intention was to extend Hopkins' data collection method to include the years 2007 through 2012. This extension was not possible within the timeframe of this project. Future studies, however, should extend Hopkins' data, and build on his methods, to better analyze the relationship between group threat and anti-immigrant ordinances.

Another reason for the limited number of cases of anti-immigrant ordinances is that there may simply not be large amounts of these ordinances proposed at the county level. A large amount of media attention is given to this type legislation because immigration is such a contentious national issue. Media coverage of anti-immigrant ordinances, however, seems to misportray their prevalence (or lack thereof) at the local level.

This raises the more general question of why, considering the wave of anti-immigrant fervor in parts of the United States, particularly in some areas of the Sun Belt, more anti-immigrant ordinances are not proposed at the local level. Perhaps anti-immigrant fervor is not as

widespread as the media suggests, or maybe it does not translate directly into political action against Latinos. The actual proposal of anti-Latino legislation may be further towards the extreme of the spectrum of political action against Latinos. Also, most anti-immigrant action may take place in the social and economic arenas rather than the political arena. These actions could include housing and employment discrimination, businesses not making accommodations for Spanish-speaking customers, exclusion of Latinos from various social clubs, anti-immigrant protests, and self-segregation. These actions may be more common because they do not demand the significant amount of political capital that is required to introduce legislation.

It is possible that the media exaggerates political action against Latinos at the local level when it is, in fact, the state level where these punitive actions occur. Immigration is a partisan issue, and party politics play a greater role in state politics than in politics at the local level (Hershey 1995; Neiman, Johnson and Bowler 2006). Therefore, we may see greater degrees of political action against Latinos enacted by state legislatures than at the local level.

The contentious nature of the immigration debate in the United States could also factor into the low number of anti-immigrant ordinances proposed at the local level. The political support for anti-immigrant ordinances may face counter-mobilization against them. Anti-immigrant ordinances draw a lot of media attention and national scrutiny. Although these ordinances apply at the local level, the debate surrounding them is not so contained. Hazelton, Pennsylvania, for example, passed a law in 2006 that fined business owners and landlords who employ or house illegal immigrants and requires city documents to be in English ("Pennsylvania Town Passes Illegal Immigration Law" 2006). This law was met with both praise and criticism from across the country. Before the law became official, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a legal challenge to it. Plus, immigration is a controversial issue split along political party

lines (Neiman, Johnson, and Bowler 2006), and the national uproar that ensues once one of these local ordinances is brought to national attention might discourage the proposal of the legislation in the first place.

The nature of group threat theory, too, may help explain the scarcity of local anti-immigrant ordinances. Group threat posits that the greater the population of the subordinate group, the greater the perceived threat the group poses. Thus, certain levels of Latino county population are required for group threat to exist. Although Latinos are the fastest growing demographic in the country, their numbers in most areas, even with the Sun Belt, are still quite small, possibly too small to provoke sufficient feelings of group threat for punitive political action.

Even though the number of anti-immigrant ordinances is small, the number of ordinances proposed has increased over the past decade as the immigration issue gains national prominence (Hopkins 2010). Future studies will have to devise ways to overcome the limited number of such ordinances in order to effectively examine what factors contribute to their presence at the local level. Whatever the reason for the low number of anti-immigrant ordinances in the dataset, the low number of nonzero cases of the dependent variable most likely contributes to the lack of statistically significant results in three out of the four regressions.

Another potential reason that the results were not statistically significant may relate to the validity of the measures used for the independent variables. Perhaps Latino median household income is a weak measure of economic prosperity in relation to group threat. After all, fluctuations in the variable are not necessarily apparent to other groups. Economic prosperity must be obvious to competing groups in order for the perception of group threat to be heightened. It is easier to see that there are a large number of Latino owned-businesses in a

community than it is to discern the median household income of Latinos in the county, making economic prosperity more readily visible and thus more likely to trigger heightened perceptions of threat. Initially, my intention was to use the Census data on the percentage of Latino-owned businesses in each county as a measure of economic incorporation. Unfortunately, if the number of businesses owned by Latinos in the count was below 100 then the Census coded it as 'Not Available." Due to this coding method, I was not able to use this measure because too many counties did not have available statistics. Another measure of economic competition that may be more appropriate is the unemployment rates of Blacks and Latinos. Greater perceptions of threat might be derived from the fear that one group has taken jobs away from the other group. In this sense unemployment rates could be more effective than median household income in measuring how economic competition factors into group threat as an explanation for the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances.

Omitted variables may also account for the limited set of statistically significant results. As mentioned before, the original intention was to include several control variables (such as the proportion of Black political officials on county governing board, proportion of Latino political officials on county governing board, and the proportion of people in a county who are Republican). This inclusion would have controlled for other political factors and better isolated the effect of the key independent variables on the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances. Future studies should incorporate these omitted variables to more effectively examine the relationship between anti-immigrant ordinances and group threat.

Additionally, there may be alternative explanations for why anti-immigrant laws are proposed. Group threat may still affect the presence of these ordinances, but it may only apply to the relationship between Whites and Latinos. To test this idea, I ran a logistic regression

testing the probability of the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance in Sun Belt counties against percent White population, percent Latino population, and their corresponding interaction variable. The results were not statistically significant, but it may be that group threat between two minority groups does not translate into political action and that group threat theory is a better predictor when it is analyzed in the relationship between a dominant and a subordinate group.

Alternatively, Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010) find that demographic factors are not as important as political factors in explaining the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances. They observed that partisanship plays a major role, with Republican areas twice as likely to propose anti-immigrant ordinances as Democratic areas. Furthermore, they find that growth in the Latino population (and the number of Spanish-speaking households in the locality) is not associated with a greater probability of the proposal of the ordinances, which fits my findings. Also, Hopkins (2010) asserts that national rhetoric on immigration affects whether or not anti-immigrant ordinances are proposed. Other work finds that economic conditions affect the reception of immigrants in a community: If economic conditions are good, support for immigrants increases and if economic conditions are poor, support for immigrants decreases (Deufel 2006). Furthermore, a sense of national identity shapes attitudes towards immigrants and that immigration related policies are observed primarily in civically engaged communities that can mobilize their civic resources for political action (Deufel 2006). These alternative explanations for the presence of anti-immigrant legislation may be more applicable than group threat and racial threat theory, explaining why we generally failed to observe statistically significant results.

Still, the problems may not lie in the research design or execution of this study. It may be the case that my hypotheses are incorrect and that group threat theory truly does not apply.

Latino economic success, for instance, may not have any effect on whether or not other groups perceive Latinos as threatening. Racial threat may be a more relevant in this context than economic threat. It could be that it is the large population of Latinos that matters, and how much money they make does not add to the population's effect. Likewise, the growth of the Latino population may not have any affect in itself beyond the fact that growth could lead to sizable enough Latino populations to spur perceptions of group threat. High growth rates in Latino populations might have little to no effect, if the overall Latino population is still a small percentage of county population. Similarly, if a Latino population is already large, then the Latino population's growth rate may have little effect whether it is low or high, since people already view the Latino population as significant. Other studies, for example, have found that Latino and/or immigrant population growth does not have an effect on the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010), and other scholars have observed that the effect of an influx of Latinos or immigrants into a community is based on the national debate surrounding immigration at that time (Hopkins 2010). Hence, Latino population growth alone seems to not prompt negative political reactions.

Finally, it is possible that we fail to see statistically significant results in the economic and population growth related regressions because there is a theoretical flaw in our extension of group threat theory to explain the relationship between these variables and the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances. Moreover, it is possible that group threat theory in the context of Black-Latino relations is not applicable to describe the presence of these ordinances. Blacks may actually not support anti-immigrant ordinances because the perceptions of group threat between these two minority groups are not high enough or because Blacks and Latinos may be more likely to view each other as political allies than competitors. McClain and Tauber (1998), in a

follow-up to their 1990 study that found a there to be political competition between Blacks and Latinos in cities where each group composed at least 10 percent of the population, found that a decade later the political competition had decreased and that it had been displaced by increased competition between Latinos and Whites.

Decreased political competition, if true, connects to the shared-interest hypothesis that Blacks and Latinos would find it to be in the interests their respective groups to support minority candidates regardless of race/ethnicity (Kaufmann 2003). The groups may have overlapping political agendas: economic investment in inner-city neighborhoods, greater educational opportunities for poor minority communities, greater oversight of local police, and less discrimination in employment and awarding of government contracts. Also, in many localities neither group possesses sizable enough populations to capture local political positions, and the benefits of minority empowerment such as economic uplift and increased government jobs may be shared between Latinos and Blacks (Kaufman 2003, 112). These overlapping interests may decrease the likelihood that Blacks view Latinos as political competition. If this is the case, then group threat theory would not apply and Blacks would be disinclined to support anti-immigrant ordinances. This would be in keeping with findings that group threat theory is only appropriate to describe the relationship between a dominant group and a subordinate group and that other theories such as contact theory more readily apply to relations between different minority groups (Cooper et al. 2007).

The ambiguity of my results presents numerous openings for future literature to build upon this research to more effectively examine the factors that account for anti-immigrant or anti-Latino ordinances. My specific research design could be improved upon in a number of ways. First, extending the data collection through to the present would increase the number of

nonzero cases in the dependent variable, which would increase the statistical reliability of the analysis. Second, future work could develop more comprehensive methods for collecting data on the dependent variable. My initial intention was to identify common language in ordinances that have been defined as "anti-immigrant" or "anti-Latino" and to read through county legal code identifying these ordinances based on their content. This data collection method would require considerable more time and manpower than was available for this project, but it could yield a more accurate representation of the number of local ordinances that are directed at or disproportionately affect Latinos and immigrants. Third, the inclusion of the omitted control variables would increase the validity of the experiment and better isolate the effects of the key independent variables on the probability of the proposal of an anti-immigrant ordinance in a county. Lastly, the study could have utilized more effective measures of economic competition (percentage of businesses owned by Latinos or Latino employment rates) to more effectively capture this concept as it applies to group threat and the presence of anti-immigrant ordinances. All of these improvements would increase the validity of the study so that it would yield less ambiguous results.

Future literature could expand on our understanding of the economic aspects of group threat in relation to these ordinances by examining the relationship between the economic incorporation of other groups (Blacks or Whites) against the presence of anti-Latino ordinances. This work would provide insight into what economic factors make a group more likely to support punitive measures against another group. Future scholars can extend this idea beyond economic indicators to include other group characteristics that would make the group more likely to support restrictive group-specific ordinances. The socioeconomic status of the Blacks may be more accountable for the proposal of anti-immigrant ordinances than is the socioeconomic and

demographic characteristics of Latinos. This research could examine the problem from a different angle, looking at not what makes a group appear threatening but instead at what makes other groups more susceptible to view other groups as threatening. This perspective is especially interesting because it frames the cause of the problem as lying not in the oppressed group but in the oppressors.

Conclusion

My study contributes to the broader discussion of political actions against Latinos. Complicating this discussion is the reality that Latinos as a group are composed of people with origins in a wide range of countries. The term "Latino" is an umbrella term to describe people of different ethnicities and cultures connected by a common language. It is not a term derived from the people within the group but rather forced upon them by other groups. Punitive responses to Latinos do not need to take into account the differences between Latinos. In order to effectively and positively respond to Latinos, however, political institutions must understand how separate ethnicities within the "Latino group" differ. This issue will become even more relevant as the proportion of the country's Latino population continues to grow.

The Census projects that by 2050 Latinos will compose 30 percent of the United States' population. In 2010, Latinos made up just 16 percent of the country's population. Blacks' proportion of the population, on the other hand, is project to barely increase from 12.9 percent in 2010 to just 13 percent in 2050. Latinos are the largest minority group in the United States and are growing at a significantly faster rate than other groups. Furthermore, the Census projects that immigrants and their children will compose 82 percent of the increase in the country's population from 2005 to 2050 (Garcia 2008).

These demographic trends will place immigration and Latino politics at the forefront of the American political environment in the coming decades. Ever increasing populations of Latinos may be met with similar ordinances as the ones examined in this study. This is partially dependent on how other groups respond to the emerging Latino presence in the country. Blacks and Latinos will continue to be the two largest minority groups in the United States, at least for the foreseeable future, and whether they compete or cooperate will have a major impact on the country's political and social environment. Group conflict between Blacks and Whites shaped the last century of American history. The emergence of Latinos as the largest minority group at the dawn of this century suggests that the next one hundred years may present a whole new set of challenges for an increasingly heterogeneous America.

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Appendix

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables

Variable	Description	Descriptive Statistics (Mean/St. Dev./Range)	Sources
Percent Black Population	Percent of the total a county population that is Black (2000)	17.2419/18.1182/0-86.5	American Fact Finder, U.S. Bureau of the Census
Percent Latino Population	Percent of the total county population that is Latino (2000)	9.87724/16.2567/.3-97.5	American Fact Finder, U.S. Bureau of the Census
Latino Median Household Income	Median household income of households in the county that are headed by Latino (2000)	30556.8/13385.1/0-175191	American Fact Finder, U.S. Bureau of the Census
Black-Latino Median Household Income Difference	Difference between the median income of households in the county that are headed by Blacks and the median income of household in the county that are headed by Latinos (2000)	-6789.12/15784.6/ -160269-151361	American Fact Finder, U.S. Bureau of the Census
Latino Population Growth	Percent increase in the county Latino population from 1990 to 2000	205.26/319.238/ -50.194553-6500	American Fact Finder, U.S. Bureau of the Census
Percent Latino Noncitizens	Percent of the county Latino population that are noncitizens (2000)	26.4514/17.9522/0-100	American Fact Finder, U.S. Bureau of the Census

Table 2. Determinants of Anti-Immigrant Ordinances at the County Level

Concept	Explanatory Variable	1. Demographic Model	2. Latino Prosperity Model	3. Latino Prosperity Model 2	4. Latino Growth Model
Population Threat	% Black Population	-.04865 (.01718)* [-.08233, -.01497]	-.02843 (.02559) [-.07857, .02172]	-.21113 (.01288) [-.04636, .04129]	-.02077 (.01663) [-.05336, .01182]
	% Latino Population	-.00578 (.01527) [-.03572, .02416]			
	% Latino Noncitizens	0.04050 (.00997)* [.02096, .06004]	.03949 (.00901)* [.02181, .05716]	.03975 (.00923)* [.02166, .05784]	.04864 (.01187)* [.02537, .07191]
	% Latino Population Growth				-.00514 (.00079) [-.00205, .00103]
	% Black Pop. x % Latino Pop.	.00582 (.00164)* [.0026, .00904]			
	% Black Pop. x % Latino Pop. Growth				-.00003 (.00004) [-.00011, .00006]
Economic Threat	Latino Median Household Income		.00002 (.00001) [-5.22e-07, .0005]		
	Difference (Black MHI – Latino MHI)			.00001 (.00001) [-.00002, .00003]	
	% Black Pop. x Latino MHI		.00001 (.00001) [-1.21e-06, 1.25e-06]		
	%Black Pop. x (Black MHI – Latino MHI)			.00001 (.00001) [-1.2e-06, 2.95e-06]	
Constant		-4.6647 (.49371)* [-5.6324, -3.6971]	-5.1951 (.57873)* [-6.3303, -4.0617]	-4.4357 (.39526)* [-5.2104, -3.6610]	-4.6159 (.42409) [-5.4471, -3.7847]
Number of counties		1339	1337	1332	1338
Pseudo-R^2		.1187	.0803	.0686	.0704

Standard errors in parentheses, Confidence intervals in brackets
*Denotes significance at the 0.05 level

Map 1


Ordinances that have been adopted within the last two years.
California
• Apple Valley: Employment
• Bakersfield: Resolution urging fed gov't to solve immigration issue
• Baldwin Park: Anti-Day Laborer
• Dana Point: Anti-Day Laborer
• Escondido: Resolution asking fed gov't permission to inquire into residents' immigration status and handle illegal imm problems locally, Illegal to Rent ordinance– litigated and struck down
• Lake Forest: Anti-Day Laborer
• Lancaster: Employment Restrictions
• Mission Viejo: Employment Restrictions
• Orange: Anti-Day Laborer
• Palmdale: Anti-Day Laborer
• San Mateo: Anti-Day Laborer
• Santa Clarita: Employment Restrictions
• Vista: Anti-Day Laborer
Colorado
• Aurora: Anti-Day Laborer
• Fort Collins: Anti-Day Laborer
Oklahoma
• Inola: Emp & Housing
• Oologah: Employment
• Tulsa: Employment
• Vinita: Employment
Pennsylvania
• Altoona: Emp & Housing
• Anthony Twp: English-Only
• Berwick: Housing
• Bridgeport: Emp & Housing
• Gilberton, Hazle Twp, Mahanoy City (not enforced), : Illegal to rent/ hire, English-Only (ord. based on Hazleton)
• Hazleton: Illegal Immigration Relief Ordinance—Illegal to rent/ hire, English-Only—litigated and barred, under appeal
• McAdoo: Illegal to Rent Ord
• Shenandoah: English-Only
• West Hazleton: Housing-registration of tenants
New Jersey
• Riverside: Emp & Housing—but rescinded due to lack of funds to defend in court
• Willingsboro Twp: Emp & Housing—but may not be enforced
Illinois
• Carpentersville: Traffic
• Hampshire: English-Only
• Elgin: Resolution faulting fed gov't for failing to secure borders & urging comprehensive imm reform
• Waukegan: Police enforcement of imm laws
Wisconsin
• Brown Cty: Emp
• Green Bay: Emp
Michigan
• Hazel Park: English-Only
Ohio
• Deerfield Twp: Emp
• Sycamore Twp: Emp
New York
• Suffolk Cty: Anti-day Laborer & Emp
• Westhampton: Housing
Massachusetts
• Barnstable Town: Housing
• Milford: Housing
Virginia
• Chesterfield Cty: Housing
• Chesapeake: Employment
• Culpepper: Anti-Crowding, English-Only
• Herndon: Employment
• Loudoun Cty: Denial of local services
• Manassas: Anti-crowding– repealed
• Prince William Cty: Hazleton-like ordinance
• Spotsylvania Cty: Housing & English-Only
Maryland
• Anne Arundel Cty: Emp
• Taneytown: English-Only
Delaware
• Elsmere: Vehicle
• Harrington: Emp & housing
South Carolina
• Aiken Cty: Emp
• Beaufort Cty: Emp
• Dorchester Cty: Emp
• Gaston: Emp & Housing
• Pickens Cty: Emp
Georgia
• Cherokee County: Housing
• Cobb County: Housing
• Lawrenceville: Anti-day laborer
• Gwinett County: Employment
Florida
• Cape Coral: English-only and Employment
• Lake Worth: Anti-day Laborer
• Suwanee County: English-only
Alabama
• Athens: Banning hiring undocumented immigrants for city work
• Gadsden: English only, anti-Day Laborer
• Hoover, Pelham, Northport: Maximum occupancy
Missouri
• Valley Park: Emp & Housing—in litigation
Texas
• Carrollton: English-Only
• Farmer's Branch : Bars apt landlords from renting to those who cannot show proof of citizenship or legal imm status, penalty of $500/day - Litigated & Struck down
• Houston: Anti-sanctuary, local enforcement of imm laws
• Oak Point: English-Only
Kansas
• Garden City: Traffic ordinance that imposes mandatory jail sentences for drivers repeatedly caught w/o license or insurance
Arizona
• Cave Creek: Banning loitering and drivers stopping on town roads
• Lake Havasu: Forcing city contractors to promise not to hire illegal immigrants
• Payson: Illegal to hire; employers must sign affidavit
• Prescott: Resolution asking federal gov't to "seal our borders against this flood of illegal immigrants"
Anti-Immigrant Local Ordinances
Prepared by Centro Legal, Inc.
Jess Riemer, Law Clerk
Gloria Contreras Edin, Executive Director
Last Updated : 3-17-06
Primary Source: www.maldef.org/publications Anti-Immigrant Ordinance Legislation

Map 2



Basic Theory



Theory in context of Black-Brown conflict