**Chapter 4**

**Sakalava Expansion, c. 1730-1800**

Sakalava leaders monopolized exports of food and slaves from western Madagascar throughout the eighteenth century. Obtaining these supplies required the expansion of Sakalava commercial influence within Madagascar. European demands for food and labor increased during the eighteenth century, due in part to the increasing presence of the English and French in the Indian Ocean. European ships stopped more frequently in Sakalava ports and their captains purchased large amounts of food to feed their sailors and soldiers. To supply European merchants, Sakalava leaders tried to secure new sources for commodities and expand their reach into the more fertile regions of the island. They used the threat of force to forge alliances with groups to the north and east of Sakalava territories. These alliances contributed to the commercial integration of communities in Madagascar.[[1]](#footnote-1)

After the Sakalava seized control of the northwestern ports and created the Volamena dynasty by the early eighteenth century, they began to look eastward to expand their influence over trading networks in the interior of Madagascar. The ports in the northwest, including Massaliege, Boina, and Majunga, had been entrepôts for trade with Arab and Swahili merchants prior to the eighteenth century, but there were also similar ports located along the north and northeast coast of Madagascar, the most important being Vohémar and Irodo.[[2]](#footnote-2) Archeologists have shown that merchants in these ports exchanged commodities from eastern Madagascar with traders from East Africa and the northern Indian Ocean.[[3]](#footnote-3) As a result, commercial networks probably linked the ports on both sides of the island prior to the eighteenth century. These networks may have prompted Sakalava leaders to target these ports when they decided to extend their commercial influence in Madagascar.[[4]](#footnote-4) Regions in the east coast, including areas around Antongil Bay and Tamatave, supplied the northeastern ports with slaves, rice, and luxury items such as amber gris. It seems that, after gaining control of the northern and northeastern ports, the Sakalava then focused their efforts on gaining direct access to these sources of slaves and rice on the east coast.

Sakalava rulers focused on expanding their commercial influence in regions already connected by trade networks. The Sakalava forced states in the north and east to become tributaries and, in so doing, gained direct access to supplies from these regions. After attacking these states, the Sakalava formed alliances with the defeated rulers. These leaders formalized their inclusion into the Sakalava Empire through the *fati-dra* ceremony.[[5]](#footnote-5) Following the completion of this ceremony, rulers throughout the north and east were related to the Sakalava rulers on the west coast. This alliance allowed for the cessation of warfare and the resumption of peaceful trading between the Sakalava and their newly conquered subjects.

Few European sources described the spread of Sakalava influence throughout the north and northeast of the island. Europeans rarely visited these ports, so we have few records of how the Sakalava established alliances with groups across the island. Europeans that visited the east and west coasts, however, cited an increase in Sakalava military activity during the eighteenth century. It is helpful to compare the expansion of warfare in eighteenth century Madagascar with similar developments elsewhere in Africa. Some historians studying the trans-Atlantic slave trade have found that the growing demand for slaves during this century resulted in a dramatic increase in prices of slaves.[[6]](#footnote-6) Many scholars argue that, thanks to this price increase, Africans attempted to sell more slaves to Europeans and they obtained these slaves through warfare. The expansion of warfare destabilized many African communities. This instability sparked famines and more conflict in these communities.[[7]](#footnote-7)

The demand for slaves from Madagascar, however, probably did not increase over the course of the eighteenth century. Slaves were exported from Sakalava ports, at times in relatively large numbers, during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.[[8]](#footnote-8) The Sakalava acquired these slaves through short-term military campaigns and through purchases of slaves from other regions of the island.[[9]](#footnote-9) After about 1720, the demand for Malagasy slaves declined dramatically, as did the supplies of the slaves on the west coast of the island. When English East India Company ships tried to buy slaves from the Sakalava after 1760, they usually failed to purchase more than a hundred slaves on each voyage.[[10]](#footnote-10) Even on the east coast of the island, frequented by traders from the Mascarenes, only small numbers of slaves were bought, usually with larger cargoes of food.[[11]](#footnote-11) By the late eighteenth century, instead of purchasing slaves in Madagascar, the French bought them on the East African coast where supplies were more plentiful.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Europeans bought slaves with guns, yet the increased availability of firearms does not explain the increase in violence in Madagascar. Historian John Thornton has argued that the expansion of warfare and slave trading in Africa was not caused by an increase in firearm imports.[[13]](#footnote-13) He concluded that warfare in Africa occurred for a wide variety of reasons, but to obtain slaves for the purchase of guns was not one of these reasons.[[14]](#footnote-14) The expansion of several powerful and violent states in Madagascar during the eighteenth century, despite the absence of widespread slave trading, supports Thornton’s argument. Furthermore, the Sakalava rarely used guns in battle. Instead, they used guns in royal ceremonies, for announcing the king's arrival or his death.[[15]](#footnote-15) The possession of guns was largely symbolic.[[16]](#footnote-16)

Perhaps the incidence of warfare in Madagascar was actually lower than reported by Europeans. Sakalava may have rarely resorted to direct violence to obtain supplies. Warfare may have been a characteristic of increased commercial contact between the Sakalava and other groups in Madagascar and the trade in food, no slaves, fueled this commerce. Rather than directly controlling other groups on the island, the Sakalava sought to dominate exchanges between the Malagasy and European traders. Possessing a powerful military was only one component in Sakalava commercial dominance in Madagascar.[[17]](#footnote-17) The Sakalava sought to ensure the movement of commodities across long distances in the island. Sakalava leaders lacked a permanent standing army but were able to recruit a large number of subjects that they could use to assert their control over trading networks. Sakalava soldiers may have been protecting long-distance traders against hostile groups throughout the island. Commercial exchanges may have only occasionally erupted into violence, perhaps in times of food insecurity.

The Sakalava, despite their military strength, could not sustain continual military campaigns without diminishing the commodities they could acquire from other communities in Madagascar. For these reasons, Europeans sources probably overemphasized the incidence of violence within Madagascar, as trade appears to have continued to increase throughout the eighteenth century.[[18]](#footnote-18) By concluding alliances with their enemies, the Sakalava could ensure the smooth functioning of trade routes across the island and, as a result, the Sakalava likely reduced their reliance on direct military force to acquire commodities.

Food was crucial in the expansion of Sakalava commercial influence, especially as it became more valuable to Europeans. This ever-increasing need for food and labor meant that the Sakalava Empire was always growing and searching for new allies and trading partners. TheSakalava Empire benefited from an emerging market economy on the island, in part due to the development of other centralized states on Madagascar in the highlands and on the east coast.[[19]](#footnote-19) As these states grew more powerful, however, they began to restrict exports to the Sakalava. Many of these leaders retained slaves as laborers within their states or for sale to Europeans visiting the eastern ports of Madagascar. Despite the early alliances between these states, the competition for resources increased. The expansion of the Merina Empire in Madagascar and European empires in the Indian Ocean eventually threatened Sakalava domination over western Madagascar.[[20]](#footnote-20)

**Sakalava Warriors**

 The French described the disorder caused by Sakalava violence in eastern Madagascar, a region the French visited frequently. French traders routinely purchased food from there for the Mascarene Islands.[[21]](#footnote-21) A long history of trade allowed them to develop lasting relationships with the leaders of the villages that dotted the coast. Leaders around Antongil Bay, for instance, sold rice and slaves to the French annually. The only resource the people in this region lacked was cattle, which the French bought in Fort Dauphin. The French colonists on the nearby Mascarene Islands required frequent imports of food, as the islands failed to produce enough to support their populations. The French also bought slaves from the east coast and these slaves provided the labor required to develop farms and plantations on the Mascarenes.[[22]](#footnote-22)

 Several French ships arrived in Antongil Bay in November 1734.[[23]](#footnote-23) When the captains sent their boats to shore, the local chiefs informed the French traders that there was no rice for sale along the coast. The French visited more coastal villages but received the same answer. The kings apologized for the lack of supplies and explained that many people on the east coast were starving. The Malagasy seemed more eager to buy guns than usual, but had no rice with which to purchase firearms. They begged the French to buy their slaves, especially old female slaves. The slaves were perhaps dependents that the kings could no longer feed. The captains, however, did not purchase the slaves, being unable to feed them. Finding this lack of rice but surplus of slaves “very ridiculous,” the ship's captain decided to sail to the west coast of Madagascar in search of food.[[24]](#footnote-24)

 The French voyage to eastern Madagascar had been a failure. French colonial officers had ordered the traders to purchase 2,400 measures of rice on this voyage but they returned with only 200 measures.[[25]](#footnote-25) French rarely had difficulties in purchasing rice from communities around Antongil Bay. In previous years, villages in this region had plentiful supplies of rice carried from rice fields located not far from the shores of the bay. Rulers in Antongil Bay frequently exported large quantities of rice when they had supplies in excess of what their communities could consume.[[26]](#footnote-26)

 After questioning various chiefs, the French discovered the cause of this shortage. The “king of Massaly,” the Sakalava ruler living on the northwest coast of Madagascar, had recently pillaged their stores.[[27]](#footnote-27) He had sent hundreds of soldiers to the east coast to attack the coastal villages around the bay earlier that year. News of the Sakalava army reached the communities before the soldiers. In advance of their arrival, the kings and their followers fled their towns, leaving behind only the rice, slaves, and cattle they could not take with them.[[28]](#footnote-28) The Sakalava army seized the food items and took the people who remained captive. Following this attack, the people of Antongil Bay returned to their land and found it burnt and stripped of food. When French trading ships arrived, the Malagasy were attempting to survive until the next harvest came.

 At first glance, this story is difficult to believe. Why did the Sakalava king, based in northwestern Madagascar, lead hundreds of soldiers more than a hundred miles across the island, across mountainous terrain, to seize rice and slaves? Merchants frequently travelled between the coasts by following rivers and mountains in the interior, but leading hundreds of soldiers would be far more difficult.[[29]](#footnote-29) If long-distance trade in Madagascar had been peaceful, why would the Sakalava king alter this arrangement and assert his power hundreds of miles from his territory?

 There are some strong reasons, however, to believe that these attacks occurred, perhaps repeatedly. Evidence from other French traders supports these reports of Sakalava attacks. About year earlier, in August 1733, French merchants visited Madagascar in search of rice and slaves.[[30]](#footnote-30) In a break with usual practice, the captain instructed his ship to sail to the west coast of Madagascar. He visited Massaly and Morondava, the trading centers of the northwestern and west-central Sakalava kingdoms.[[31]](#footnote-31) After the French ship sailed into the Morondava River, the captain wanted to purchase a large quantity of rice to feed the 368 slaves he had purchased in Mozambique. The Sakalava king agreed to these demands.

 A few days after the French ship arrived, the king arrived with his trading goods. Accompanied by five or six hundred armed men, he marched up the river and approached the French ship. The soldiers and their slaves brought with them rice, a large herd of cattle, and other food. The traders purchased only forty slaves from the king but acquired 12,000 measures of rice (the traders on the east coast only bought a few hundred measures). The traders never inquired of the source of this rice and soon set sail with their slaves and food for Île de France.

 The descriptions provided by these French traders visiting the east and west coasts of Madagascar may simply be a coincidence, although they suggest that Sakalava power extended across broad stretches of the island by the 1730s.There is no proof that the Sakalava had seized this rice on the east coast of Madagascar, before selling it to the French merchants.[[32]](#footnote-32) The timing of this trade, however, is suggestive. The surplus of rice on the west coast occurred within twelve months of reports of starvation on the east coast.[[33]](#footnote-33) Additionally, the Sakalava king had an army numbering in the hundreds. Even if the French exaggerated the size of this force, the Sakalava king clearly commanded a large number of armed men and was capable of sending these soldiers across the island.

**Sakalava Expansion**

Judging by European trading accounts such as these, it appears that the Sakalava had access to large supplies of food throughout the eighteenth century and at least some of these supplies were acquired through warfare.[[34]](#footnote-34) Sakalava wars of expansion began during the seventeenth century when the Sakalava seized control of Tulear and Boina. Following these military victories, however, Sakalava rulers relied upon a strategy of incorporation for expanding the boundaries of their rule and transforming enemies into allies. The threat of force, however, preceded this transformation.

 Despite the diffusion of power throughout the empire, as various rulers alternately fought and cooperated, the recognition of the political supremacy of the royal line allowed for the peaceful movement of traders throughout the entire region ruled by the Sakalava.[[35]](#footnote-35) The two kings, based in Morondava and Boina, commanded imperial armies, collected tribute, and made crucial decisions about war and peace. Allied with these kings were provincial leaders who became relatives of the Sakalava monarchs following the conclusion of a fati-dra. They oversaw trade at port cities, protected the populations of these cities, and ensured the flow of goods from the interior into their ports. The princes gathered strong armies for their protection but also for military raids inland, as the necessity arose.

 Based on scattered European observations, it appears that leaders in Madagascar prior to the rise of the Sakalava did not command large armies. This is not to say that violent clashes between groups on the island were uncommon. Wars provided an outlet for addressing social wrongs and rebalancing the wealth within a region. Chiefs began wars when they were seeking revenge or food supplies for their dependents.[[36]](#footnote-36) Clashes were primarily between close neighbors. When men were not attacking enemy communities or protecting their own, they were cattle-herders, farmers, or traders. Most (non-slave) men possessed a spear, or possibly a gun, but chiefs lacked the resources to create a large army.[[37]](#footnote-37) People fought over access to limited resources throughout the seventeenth century, but these struggles were rarely a result of European trading demands.[[38]](#footnote-38)

 Seventeenth-century European descriptions of warfare on opposite sides of Madagascar demonstrate how the Sakalava expanded upon military strategies of groups elsewhere on the island. The governor of the seventeenth-century French colony, Étienne de Flacourt, described the brutality of attacks between communities living near the southeastern port of Fort Dauphin.[[39]](#footnote-39) In this region, leadership was divided among several strong big men, or “grands,” as the French referred to them.[[40]](#footnote-40) People lived in villages and relied upon their chiefs for protection, although all free men used their spears to guard their families and cattle herds.

 Many leaders preferred to avoid conflict because wars halted agricultural activities and prevented the movements of commodities across long-distance trade routes.[[41]](#footnote-41) In times of crisis, such as famines or droughts, chiefs were pushed to fight their neighbors for resources. Chiefs led raids on neighboring villages. Some of these raiding forces consisted of hundreds or thousands of men, but more often, chiefs sent much smaller armies to pillage neighboring villages. In these raids, the invaders would seize and enslave women and children.[[42]](#footnote-42) During these attacks, women remained behind with their children and food stores.[[43]](#footnote-43) The ability to attack villages successfully represented the power of the headman and his people. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century, no single leader appeared to dominate the region.[[44]](#footnote-44) Several powerful men sold cattle and some slaves to European slave traders, but relatively few in comparison with the numbers sold from Sakalava ports.[[45]](#footnote-45) For this reason, it appears that the exchange of slaves for guns with Europeans did not fundamentally change power struggles in southern Madagascar.

 On the opposite side of the island, an English observer made similar comments about warfare there. The sailor, Robert Everard, claimed to have spent “three years suffering... upon the coast of Assada near Madagascar,” between 1690 and 1694, before being rescued.[[46]](#footnote-46) The captain of Everard’s ship wanted to purchase slaves in the northwestern port of Assada, near present-day Nosy Be. After unloading guns and other trading goods on the shore, the Malagasy suddenly, without provocation, killed most of the Europeans on the ship and on shore. Following the massacre of his crewmates, Everard was enslaved by the king of Assada.[[47]](#footnote-47) While on the island, he accompanied the king on several military expeditions. The king paraded Everard through his villages as proof of his superiority over Europeans.

 During these trips, Everard gained first-hand knowledge of the functioning of this pre-Sakalava state. According to Everard, the king and his army marched to a new town within his territory every day and recruited men from each town. In the towns, “as soon as the women saw the king and his army coming, they got their sticks and came dancing for joy of his arrival.”[[48]](#footnote-48) The women smeared a white paste on the king's face and planned a feast for the king's army.[[49]](#footnote-49) The king described his military plans to listening villagers and repeated the news of their past victories. Following a celebration in honor of the king, men in the town joined the king's march towards the enemy’s territory.

 After six or seven weeks of marching, the army arrived at the enemy's village.[[50]](#footnote-50) The king's soldiers fired their muskets and struck with their lances. The enemies tried to flee, but the soldiers took as many people hostage as possible, including the wives of the great men. The soldiers pillaged bark cloth and food from the houses. The next day, the army moved further into enemy territory and continued fighting. The battles continued for “about a month in this manner.” The enemy’s soldiers were largely unsuccessful at defeating the invaders and they only killed about twenty men. The king's army, on the other hand, took a hundred prisoners, abandoning and killing the children not worth enslaving.

 The army returned to the coastal city of Assada, escorting the slaves and carrying the food. The trip back to the king's village took longer, as the slaves were “troublesome, especially the women with their young children at their backs, and the men were laden with rice and other provisions for the army.”[[51]](#footnote-51) After they finally reached their own territory, the army celebrated with a great feast of rice and fish at every town. During the feasts, the soldiers reenacted the battle to a rapt audience. Upon reaching the coastal capital, the king sold the captured slaves to “Arabian” traders at anchor off Assada.[[52]](#footnote-52)

 Everard's description highlighted the impromptu quality of battles in northwest Madagascar before the arrival of the Sakalava. Although communities in Madagascar occasionally engaged in offensive and defensive military engagements during the seventeenth century, these clashes tended to be local. Leaders focused their attacks on nearby villages. The purpose of these raids appears to have been to assert power and seize food and slaves. Communities frequently fled in the face of such attacks. These raids were not intended for the permanent seizure of land or the extension of a leader’s political power.

From the beginning, the Sakalava strategy of asserting permanent commercial dominance over large areas of land differed from the practices of other groups in Madagascar. The establishment of tributary relationships throughout the west coast encouraged the transformation of the Sakalava Empire into the expansive confederation it became during the eighteenth century. Despite possessing trading ports, the empire still did not enclose many agricultural or well-populated regions. To gain access to sources of food and labor, Sakalava representatives travelled across the island. This necessitated the development of large mobile armies.[[53]](#footnote-53) During trips, the Sakalava king ordered villages to provide warriors with provisions with the help of local people.[[54]](#footnote-54) Outside of Sakalava territory, the soldiers probably seized their own food items.

The Sakalava leaders did not order these soldiers to destroy communities, but instead instructed them to steal valuable commodities. Later, Sakalava leaders tried to establish trading relations with their former enemies, probably because warfare did not assure steady supplies of food or slaves.[[55]](#footnote-55) As the European traders discovered, supplies varied along the coast, Sakalava expeditions frequently returned empty-handed.[[56]](#footnote-56) For instance, in 1737, King Baba told the French captain to be patient in waiting for rice. He explained that in order to obtain rice, he needed to pillage villages far into the interior and transport the rice to the coast.[[57]](#footnote-57) Sometimes trade representatives told the Europeans that they had captured a large number of slaves in wars, but even these supplies were slow in coming.[[58]](#footnote-58)

**Linking the Military and Commercial**

 The supply problem became more pressing as the eighteenth century progressed and more ships traded along the west coast. By the middle of the century, English ships regularly punctuated their journey to India with stops at St. Augustine's Bay and Anjouan. Europeans obtained comparatively large supplies of slaves, rice, and cattle from Sakalava ports, even while the people elsewhere on the island lacked food.[[59]](#footnote-59) During this time, non-European traders continued to visit the northwestern ports of Madagascar that were under Sakalava control. Merchants, sailing on dhows to locations throughout the Indian Ocean such as Surat, bought between fifty and a hundred slaves on the coast along with cloth, silver or firearms.[[60]](#footnote-60) Without direct evidence, it is hard to discern the extent of this trade but the fact that it continued uninterrupted during the eighteenth century implies the Sakalava had steady supplies of food and other commodities for export to both European and non-European traders.

With the conquest of much of the west and north completed, however, there were few adversaries for Sakalava soldiers to enslave. Additionally, the Sakalava practice of intimidating neighbors to gain allies within the empire failed when the Sakalava encountered other strong expansionist military states. For these reasons, the Sakalava developed (usually) peaceful trading relations with the leaders of these states, namely the Betsimisaraka of the east coast and the Merina of the highlands.[[61]](#footnote-61) From the available sources, we can surmise that the first encounters between the Sakalava and these states may have been violent. These leaders, however, were quick to respond and formed alliances with the Sakalava.

The French, frequent visitors to the east coast, were the first to make note of political transformations occurring in this region. Their descriptions also link the development of centralized states to the expansion of Sakalava commercial and political influence. When French leaders in the Mascarene Islands attempted to establish a trading settlement on the east coast of Madagascar in 1732, they focused their attention on Antongil Bay.[[62]](#footnote-62) The governors decided to place the settlement on a small island called Île Marotte. They described it as a rocky piece of land near the mouth of the bay.[[63]](#footnote-63) The French dreamed of renaming this island Île d'Anjou and developing a permanent presence on the east coast of Madagascar. The presence of this colony would allow ships to visit and quickly load rice before returning to the Mascarenes.

The following year, the French governors put soldiers on two ships that carried trading supplies and sent the ships to Antongil Bay. They instructed the soldiers to construct a fort on the island and begin stockpiling goods for export to the Mascarenes. Curiously, the governors simultaneously dispatched several ships to the port of Massaly on the northwest coast of Madagascar. They ordered the captains of these ships to conclude a treaty with the Sakalava king. French purchased the island of Marotte, located in Antongil Bay from the king. The Sakalava king readily granted the French permission to found a colony in the bay.[[64]](#footnote-64) In return, the French gave the king some knives, several guns, and pieces of decorated cloth.[[65]](#footnote-65) He also agreed to let the French purchase 400-500 slaves from the shores of Antongil Bay and gave the French permission to trade in the Sakalava-controlled ports of the west coast.[[66]](#footnote-66) He promised to maintain peaceful trading relationships with the new colonists. The French negotiations with the king of Massaly for Île Marotte provide the first hint of Sakalava influence on the east coast of the island, but there is little explanation of why the French believed the Sakalava king had control over the bay or the island, both located over a hundred miles from his capital on the opposite coast.

 Despite these promises, the French colony quickly failed. Upon assuming control of the island at the end of 1732, supply problems hampered the French expedition.[[67]](#footnote-67) The man intended to lead the colony died en route to Île Marotte. The soldiers and traders failed to secure sufficient numbers of cattle or slaves to export on French ships. The officers and their thirty soldiers spent a few months on the island and discovered that this “paradis terrestre” was actually uninhabitable. The soldiers traded guns and cloth for slaves, but they spent most of their trading goods purchasing food needed for their own survival. Their supplies of firearms were quickly “dissipated,” with only a single gun remaining for trading.[[68]](#footnote-68) A few months after the French had founded the colony, a French ship sailed from Île Marotte with all the surviving soldiers on board.[[69]](#footnote-69)

 Even after this failure, the French continued to establish trading posts on the east coast of Madagascar. As French merchants and colonists visited the east coast more frequently during the eighteenth century, French officials and merchants recorded more incidents of Sakalava aggression on the coast.[[70]](#footnote-70) French frequently complained of “guerre entre les negres,” war between the blacks, in eastern Madagascar. As described above, the soldiers of the king of Massaly pillaged the region around 1732. Following these attacks, several leaders within Antongil Bay developed protective alliances against future incursions. Kings who traced their ancestry to pirates (the *zana-malata*, or children of mulattos) joined in a federation against the Sakalava and other groups on the east coast.[[71]](#footnote-71) The king Ratsimilaho (Tamsimalo, Tom Similahoe) of Foulpointe led the confederation. He and his allies assisted each other against Sakalava attacks.[[72]](#footnote-72) The allies created the *Betsimisaraka* (the many who will not be separated) Confederation and reasserted their strength within the region. When the Sakalava attacked again in 1736, soldiers on the east coast forced the Sakalava to retreat.[[73]](#footnote-73) Ratsimilaho sent thirty armed canoes to Antongil Bay to help his allies Baldriche and de la Re (residing at Pointe de la Re).[[74]](#footnote-74) Even though the Sakalava possessed an unusually large army with experienced soldiers, the members of the Betsimisaraka confederation ensured the raids stopped.

 In 1739, French traders met with a chief named “Chimelef” in Antongil Bay who offered three hundred cattle for sale to the traders and stated he had many “captif” (slaves) for sale.[[75]](#footnote-75) The French also found plentiful rice within Antongil Bay communities during this trading excursion and they had no trouble purchasing commodities, unlike earlier in the decade. The local traders told the French of the Sakalava defeat in Antongil Bay by the Betsimisaraka leaders, Ratsimilaho and Baldriche, both referred to as the “mulâtres.” In the aftermath of the attack, these leaders asserted themselves within the region by pillaging other communities. The confederation of kings seized enough rice and slaves to ensure the viability of their communities, although at the expense of other groups in the region.[[76]](#footnote-76)

 After dispelling the invaders, the Betsimisaraka kings negotiated with the Sakalava and became their allies. They concluded a treaty with the Sakalava in which the Sakalava of Boina agreed to provide the east coast rulers with a steady source of cattle in return for the Betsimisaraka sending other trading items to the west. Perhaps obtaining just such a trading relationship had always been the goal of Sakalava warriors.[[77]](#footnote-77) Ratsimilaho became part of the Sakalava dynasty following the fati-dra ceremony. He also reportedly married the daughter of the Sakalava king.[[78]](#footnote-78)

 The Betsimisaraka Confederation was never as powerful as the Sakalava Empire and its leaders failed to create stable trading networks on the east coast of Madagascar.[[79]](#footnote-79) In 1743, French traders complained of poor trading in Antongil Bay after rival factions fought for the control of coastal towns.[[80]](#footnote-80) Again, in 1754, the French described frequent warfare on the coast. None of these accounts described the warriors as Sakalava.[[81]](#footnote-81) Ratsimilaho's descendent was murdered by a relative (who was, according to one report, his son). The murderer, Jean Hare (Hard), assumed control of Foulpointe but he constantly battled to maintain control of the port throughout the 1760s.[[82]](#footnote-82)

 These frequent struggles appeared to be for the control of coastal trading posts and the ability to sell commodities to the French. According to French observers, neighboring leaders wanted access to the firearms Jean Hare had gained through exports of slaves, rice, cattle, and fowl.[[83]](#footnote-83) Again, in 1772, war broke out between the people of Foulpointe, the center of Hare's dominions, and neighboring groups.[[84]](#footnote-84) In the following decade, the leader of Foulpointe, “Yavi” fought against a group described as the “Fariavas” for the control of trade from eastern Madagascar.[[85]](#footnote-85)

 Even in the midst of these constant struggles over trade and trade routes, leaders on the east coast maintained a commercial relationship with the Sakalava, although the inability of the Betsimisaraka confederation to dominate trade meant that this relationship was unstable. Throughout the eighteenth century, frequent trading convoys crossed the interior of the island, between the east and west coasts, as the east coast rulers sent regular supplies of slaves to the Sakalava. By 1780, the leader at Foulpointe, Yavi, sent a “levy” of slaves to Boina each year, in return for two hundred cattle from the west coast.[[86]](#footnote-86)

 The French had plans to control the trade routes crossing from the east to west coasts of Madagascar. In 1776, the French military commander, Maurice-Auguste Benyowsky, decided that the passage across the island could be controlled easily with “mediocre” forces.[[87]](#footnote-87) Benyowsky was determined to establish trading relations with the Sakalava of the west coast and redirect shipments of cattle and slaves to the east.[[88]](#footnote-88) The French intended to set up five small trading posts on the trade route towards the west.[[89]](#footnote-89) Unfortunately, the Sakalava were extremely displeased with the French presence in the east and the disruption of their trading there. Despite alliances formed between the French and several east coast leaders, including Yavi (“Hiavi”), the Sakalava were determined to avoid an alliance with the French colonists. The Sakalava leaders sent deputies to meet with the French, but refused to allow them to establish trading fortresses on Sakalava territory.[[90]](#footnote-90)

 The Sakalava reportedly tried to incite the people of Antongil Bay against the French. In 1774, after the French angered the Sakalava, the king of Boina dispatched 250 cattle to buy the assistance of a Sakalava-appointed chief near the bay.[[91]](#footnote-91) The Sakalava Empire also supposedly dispatched 40,000 warriors to the east coast. The French hired Malagasy men to defend the French colony and, after a few battles, managed to come to an uncertain peace with the Sakalava. Following the conclusion of the peace, Benyowsky dispatched traders to the Sakalava territory. They visited the Sakalava capital at “Maronvai” [Marovoay?], home to a market for the exchange of all sorts of goods, particularly with the visiting Comorian traders.[[92]](#footnote-92) The French visitors proposed to purchase Nosy Be, an island on the northwest coast, but the Sakalava representative refused.

**The Tributary North**

 Attempts of the French to extend their influence into northern Madagascar uncovered the extent of Sakalava control in this region. We have few details about how this expansion occurred, as Europeans largely avoided the rocky northern coast of Madagascar prior to the mid-eighteenth century. In 1665, for instance, a Dutch map plots, with some accuracy, the ports on the coast of Madagascar, except in the north. The mapmaker labeled this region “*pays incogneu*” or “unknown.”[[93]](#footnote-93) Europeans probably avoided the north because other locations were closer to their sailing routes that directed them around Madagascar and towards the more lucrative ports of India and Indonesia.

 Archeologists have shown that the northern part of the island was home to bustling ports prior to the eighteenth century. Islamized traders frequented these ports, which were located at the southern end of the monsoonal winds. They were home to the Antaloatra who provided merchants with food and slaves. Oral traditions describe the Sakalava as only controlling the northwestern ports of the island by the start of this century, but in subsequent years, they appeared to control the entire northern region.[[94]](#footnote-94) By the end of the century, the leaders of the major ports dotting the coastline, chiefly Nosy Be, Diego Suarez (Antsiranana) and Vohémar, all claimed to be blood relatives of the Sakalava ruler of Boina.[[95]](#footnote-95)

 In 1774, Benyowsky dispatched traders to meet with the chiefs of the north after he became aware of how influential they were in Malagasy commerce.[[96]](#footnote-96) He appears to have been ignorant of the ties between them and his enemy, the Sakalava of Boina. During his visit, his representative, Nicolas Mayeur, discovered that one Sakalava representative ruled over the northern province, stretching from the west coast to Vohémar in the east.[[97]](#footnote-97) The king lived to the west of the northern-most point of the island, near the location that French traders had visited about fifty years previously.[[98]](#footnote-98) The king, named Lamboine (L'Amboine, Lamboeny), ruled over some twenty local chiefs controlling smaller provinces.[[99]](#footnote-99) Chiefs sent Lamboine annual tributary payments in rice, cattle, and slaves. They ruled over smaller villages located along rivers, which they used for transporting trade items, and they grew crops on the riverbanks.[[100]](#footnote-100) During times of war and privation, Lamboine exempted the chiefs from the tributary payments until the next harvest.[[101]](#footnote-101) By 1780, the Sakalava also had a representative named “Raminti” ruling over the port of Vohémar, formerly an “Arab” Antaloatra trading port.[[102]](#footnote-102)

 Lamboine seems to have been subordinate to the Sakalava king based at the northwest port of Boina. The Sakalava ruler at Boina used these two rulers in the north and east to coordinate attacks, especially against the French. They also organized trade in the northern and northeastern regions of Madagascar. In 1774, Lamboine sent five hundred armed men to attack various villages in the north. His army raided and stole cattle from villages not already under his control.[[103]](#footnote-103) These military actions convinced these northern people to form commercial alliances with the Sakalava. By concluding a *serment*, or fati-dra, with the Sakalava, local rulers entered into inviolable alliances with the strong empire.[[104]](#footnote-104)

 With Sakalava rule over the northern province assured, the Sakalava queen of Boina began to keep her herds in the region.[[105]](#footnote-105) The queen reportedly owned over 10,000 cattle and she developed the northern Sakalava region into a major cattle-exporting center.[[106]](#footnote-106) When Benyowsky and Mayeur tried to negotiate for cheaper prices cattle from the people of the north and bypass the Sakalava traders at Boina, they discovered the extent of Sakalava control over northern Madagascar. The Sakalava forbade the people in the north to sell the cattle intended for export from Boina. The provincial Sakalava leaders appeared to have had little independence from the Sakalava ruler, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs.[[107]](#footnote-107) When the Sakalava went to war against the French in 1776, the Sakalava king forced Lamboine to end commerce with the Europeans.[[108]](#footnote-108)

Sakalava rulers had established a stable empire and consolidated control over the northern interior of the island. During the next century, leaders in the north in ports such as Vohémar and Diego Suarez identified themselves as “Sakalava.” The adoption of this identity would have important repercussions during the battles between the Sakalava and Merina in the coming years.[[109]](#footnote-109) By the end of the nineteenth century, a French observer complained, “Arabs and the Sakalava form the majority of the population of Vohémar,” the same “race” as those around Nosy Be. Rulers in these regions continually sought to “prevent the foreigners [such as the Merina] from gaining influence.”[[110]](#footnote-110)

**The Highlands**

 Throughout the eighteenth century, changes were brewing in the interior of Madagascar. Quietly, but steadily, leaders of this state had gathered strength, conquered other communities, and gained riches.[[111]](#footnote-111) During the seventeenth century, many highland kingdoms reportedly paid tribute to the Sakalava.[[112]](#footnote-112) Leaders began to unite these kingdoms during the following century, but civil wars periodically divided them until the end of the eighteenth century.[[113]](#footnote-113) The news of a strong state controlling this region leaked out to the coasts and the curious French sent representatives to meet with the king of the Hova (later known as the Merina) in 1777.[[114]](#footnote-114)

 Hova influence over the coastal trade of Madagascar began with their attempt at controlling exports to the east coast of the island during the mid-eighteenth century.[[115]](#footnote-115) The people of the east coast traded regularly with visiting French traders but required imports of slaves to sell to them. Groups in the highlands had exported slaves to the ports of the island for at least two centuries. In fact, these highland exports may have fueled much of the slave exports from Madagascar.[[116]](#footnote-116) Trading groups on the island relied upon supplies from the interior of the island and the Hova kingdom capitalized on this reliance. In return, the Sakalava provided them with cattle and probably firearms.[[117]](#footnote-117)

 Europeans traders visiting the coasts of Madagascar were largely unaware of the tumult occurring in the interior.[[118]](#footnote-118) On the east coast, however, the French noted a curious trend around 1754. Instead of firearms or gunpowder, the people of the east now demanded *piastres*, or Spanish silver dollars, in return for slaves in particular, but also for the purchase of cattle and rice.This demand echoed developments throughout the Indian Ocean by this time.[[119]](#footnote-119) The leaders from Antongil Bay, Foulpointe, and Île Sainte Marie accepted no other commodities for their supplies of slaves.[[120]](#footnote-120) Judging by frequency of French complaints about the usage of piastres, such demands were common and east coast rulers were inflexible with French negotiators.[[121]](#footnote-121) Even communities to the far southeast of the island, near Fort Dauphin, began asking for coins by 1768.[[122]](#footnote-122)

 The use of this currency linked the people of Madagascar to broader trade patterns, most visibly with the Comoro islands, but also with people living in East Africa.[[123]](#footnote-123) As early as 1700, European traders, primarily English and French, paid for goods on Anjouan using *piastres* or silver coins.[[124]](#footnote-124) Throughout the eighteenth century, Europeans could not purchase any commodities on the island without silver. Some French merchants recorded that, in Anjouan in 1767, a bull cost them 5 piastres, a goat, 1 piastre, and the small fowl were 30 to a single piastre.[[125]](#footnote-125) When east coast traders in Madagascar began demanding piastres in exchange for slaves, the French immediately assumed coins were being funneled to the northwestern Sakalava coast, where they were used to buy cloth or other goods from Arabian ships that stopped in the ports of the Comoros.[[126]](#footnote-126) The French governors of the Mascarenes complained constantly of the drain on their resources to export silver to Madagascar.[[127]](#footnote-127)

 This shift of using coins to trade in Madagascar ushered in an era of more expensive commodities, according to Europeans, and more extensive trade networks throughout the island. While Sakalava leaders still desired guns from Europeans, piastres propelled their participation in internal long-distance trade routes, particularly between the highlands and the west.[[128]](#footnote-128) On the Sakalava coast, guns and gunpowder were still the preferred trading good from Europeans, but piastres were used to trade with passing Arabs.[[129]](#footnote-129) The continued reliance of the Sakalava on guns says more about Sakalava military organization than economic imperatives.[[130]](#footnote-130) Sakalava rulers presumably obtained enough piastres from other regions in the island and relied upon Europeans for firearm imports.

 Without taking into account the intervention of the highland states in trade networks during the mid-eighteenth century, this shift to the demand for piastres appears inexplicable. Traders in the central Antananarivo market traded with pieces of silver coins by 1777.[[131]](#footnote-131) Payments in the market were made in “vakim-bola” or broken money, produced by the broken pieces of French silver pieces.[[132]](#footnote-132) For east coast rulers to gain access to slaves from the interior, they needed pieces of silver. Rather than reflecting a desire for these rulers to trade with “Arabs” by using silver coins, the trading shift reflected the growing economic integration of east coast communities with the Hova state.[[133]](#footnote-133)

 In 1777, when Mayeur visited the interior of Madagascar (“Pays d'Ancove”, home of the Hovas), he discovered an expansive, centralized state.[[134]](#footnote-134) The king commanded an army of 2,000-2,500 armed men who were prepared to pillage villages near the east coast of the island for slaves. When the Frenchman reached the capital, Antananarivo, he described how the people built large houses, wove silk, and stored large quantities of rice.[[135]](#footnote-135) Mayeur was impressed by the large weekly markets held in various villages and every Sunday in the capital. In the market, people from the provinces arrived to sell and buy a variety of commodities. The important trade was in slaves, although this trade may simply have been the most noteworthy to Mayeur, who was a French slave trader. The slaves were exported to both the east and west coasts. The Sakalava also traded for cattle with the highlanders. Mayeur states trading involved the use of pieces of silver weighed on scales. The Hova developed standardized weights for measuring goods and coins, weights being determined in amounts of rice grains or seeds.[[136]](#footnote-136)

The Hova king in 1777 was named Andrianamboatsimarofy.[[137]](#footnote-137) Tributes of labor, coins, and food made this king wealthy and powerful, prompting the leader to expand his control into land on the east coast. On a second voyage by Mayeur, in 1783, he noted the expansion of Hova warfare beyond highlands and towards the east.[[138]](#footnote-138) The army adopted similar tactics as the Sakalava. The king used military force to create tributaries on his borders. He also drew immense revenues from commerce and received half a piastre a head from his people annually as a form of taxation.[[139]](#footnote-139) The king did not limit his activities to commerce. He also enforced a labor corvée, using this labor to the benefit of the growth of the state, through an expansion of roads, irrigation ditches, and, most importantly, the military.[[140]](#footnote-140)

 Despite the constant wars fought by the Hovas in their attempts to expand eastwards towards Tamatave, the primary commodity traded in the capital was silver coins, not guns.[[141]](#footnote-141) While guns were still desired, piastres propelled internal long-distance trade routes, particularly between the highlands and the west coast.[[142]](#footnote-142) This period of increasing trade and consolidation of power within Madagascar was also a period of commercial integration. The Hova state coexisted fairly peacefully with the Sakalava empire for at least half a century, until their interests came into direct conflict.[[143]](#footnote-143) The dhow trade from Sakalava ports increased in importance during the latter half of the eighteenth century. The extension of large markets in the rich, fertile, and populous highlands of Madagascar fueled this expansion. The Hova state oversaw the creation of markets in which merchants from all corners of the island met and negotiated. These markets supported the growth of Sakalava and Hova commerce throughout the island.

**War and Trade**

 Economic changes within the island occurred concurrently with the expansion of European power in the Indian Ocean. By the end of the eighteenth century, Europeans proved more eager to invest large amounts of money into securing slaves and food from Madagascar, as the French and English increasingly relied upon the island for provisions. Understanding the internal politics and trading networks of Madagascar gave experienced European traders a significant advantage in within the Indian Ocean battles.

 An eighteenth-century French trader described his experience of purchasing slaves from Madagascar. His description illustrated the problems Europeans faced in attempting to understand the trade of Madagascar. In August 1774, the French sent a convoy, headed by Mayeur, to the Sakalava king in Bombetoc.[[144]](#footnote-144) French leaders were desperate to obtain slaves, which were in short supply on the east coast during this decade. Mayeur concluded a trading agreement with the Sakalava king, although the king's demands for guns as presents and payments far exceeded the supply of commodities Mayeur had on hand. Benyowsky sent a ship, commanded by Bérubé Dudemene, to the west coast with trading goods to finish acquiring the slaves.[[145]](#footnote-145) When Dudemene arrived, he referred to the agreement the king had made with Mayeur.[[146]](#footnote-146) The king continued to stress that he would only trade for guns, gunpowder, flints, or bullets.

 Before Dudemene, could even discuss trade, however, the king desired his “salam,” or present.[[147]](#footnote-147) After the king received two barrels of gunpowder, two cases of *eau de vie* alcohol, 2,000 flints, and 2,000 bullets, the king finally agreed to discuss prices. His prices were exorbitant to the Frenchman. The king demanded four bamboos (described as eight pounds each) of gunpowder, two guns, two hundred flints, and two hundred bullets for each “captive” or slave. Even more astonishingly, he demanded the same price for all slaves, even though women and children were usually cheaper than young men. The Sakalava king also demanded large amounts of gunpowder in return for rice and other foods.

 After some negotiation, Dudemene convinced the king to accept guns, flints, and bullets in return for rice and cattle, as he did not have the required amounts of gunpowder. The “Arab” navigator he hired also demanded gunpowder for payment, but he arranged for him to be paid in piastres instead. Local chiefs visited the ship and demanded large “salams.” The people on shore even requested gunpowder as payment for their labor in building the palisade, or factory, for the trading goods. The hired workers (*marmittes*) on shore wanted guns for their labor, as well as a bowl of rice a day.[[148]](#footnote-148)

 Just when the captain had thought he was ready to purchase slaves, a large Dutch ship entered the bay. Having sailed from the Cape of Good Hope, the Dutch ship was prepared for a two-month stay in the bay and had plenty of trading commodities. In response, the Sakalava traders increased the price, from four to six bamboos of powder, for each slave. Dudemene reminded them he had little gunpowder and he offered them piastres. After a long meeting (“gabare” or *kabary*), they let him pay twenty coins for each slave, but told him that, for other commodities, he had to pay as the Dutch did. The Dutch had come prepared, with 190 barrels of fine gunpowder and many boxes of guns, iron, cloth and other goods. They could pay 11 or 12 bamboos of powder for the slaves, all ages and genders, as well as powder for cattle, rice, fish, fowls, eggs, and milk. Dudemene offered more piastres for the slaves, but to little avail. Eventually he gave up and set sail again, having exhausted his stores of coins and gunpowder for only a few slaves.[[149]](#footnote-149)

 Military power enabled Sakalava growth, and vice versa. The Sakalava could demand imports of gunpowder from the French and refuse French prices when the Dutch presented more favorable terms. Despite the emphasis on gunpowder in the above account, the control of imports of guns and gunpowder was just one aspect of Sakalava control. Communities on the periphery of the Sakalava Empire found it in their interests to give the Sakalava favorable trading concessions, rather than fight against the Sakalava armies. More groups on the island acquiesced to Sakalava control by the end of the period and adopted the Sakalava identity.

 The growth of European power in the Indian Ocean, however, prevented the consolidation of the Sakalava Empire. European forces in the Indian Ocean faced similar demands for supplies of food and labor. European monopoly companies needed to send warships and soldiers in large numbers to the Indian Ocean to secure trading privileges. English and French naval commanders increasingly relied upon supplies from the ports of Madagascar for food and labor during the three Carnatic Wars of the eighteenth century. The expansion of European power in the Indian Ocean and the demands this expansion made on the trading supplies of Madagascar conflicted with Sakalava imperial growth. The creation of multiple expansive military empires led to a collision on the shores of Madagascar.

1. Pier Larson and Gwyn Campbell hint at this economic coordination in their publications. As they study the trade of the Merina kingdom primary, however, they do not focus on the role of the Sakalava in the economic integration of communities in Madagascar. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Tibbetts lists the ports in Madagascar that were mentioned by ibn Majid during the fifteenth century. Several of them were located on the north and northeast coast of the island: Ahmad ibn Majid al-Najdi, *Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean before the Coming of the Portuguese,* ed. G. R. Tibbetts (London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1972), 432-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Pierre Vérin, *The History of Civilisation in North Madagascar*, trans. David Smith (Rotterdam: A. A. Balkema, 1986), 142-156, 209-280. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. One of the trademarks of Sakalava rule was the assertion of blood relations between rulers across the island. It is possible that the articulation of kinship ties represented already present linkages between the coasts and laid the groundwork for Sakalava expansion. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. For details of this ceremony, see Chapter 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. For one example, see Joseph Miller, “Slave Prices in the Portuguese southern Atlantic, 1600-1830,” in *Africans in Bondage: Studies in Slavery and the Slave Trade: Essays in Honor of Philip D. Curtin on the Occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of African Studies at the University of Wisconsin*, eds. Philip D. Curtin and Paul E. Lovejoy (Madison: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1986). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See for instance Boubacar Barry, *Senegambia and the Atlantic slave trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 107-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. On the slave trade from Madagascar to the Americas, see The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces (accessed November 14, 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. As in West Africa, the wars that produced captives were “caused by local political, economic, or religious conflict among competing people.” Herbert S. Klein, *The Atlantic Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. For instance, see the ship journal of the Diligent, 1761, “IOR/L/MAR/B/320 E”; the ship journal of the Prince Henry, 1761, “IOR/L/MAR/B/325 G”; the ship journal of the Beckenham, 1764, “IOR/L/MAR/B/561 A.” The Dutch also did not seem to purchase large numbers of slaves from western Madagascar during this period. See also the following ship journals: dagregister gehou aan boord die Schujlenburgh, 1755, “C 2248” and “C 2249”; dagregister gehou aan boord die Neptunus, 1760, “C 2251”; skeepsjoernaal van die Zon, 1774, “C 2254”; dagregister van koopman PJ Truter (the Zon?), 1775-6, “C 2255.” These sources are all found in the Western Cape Archives, Cape Town, South Africa. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. For details, see Chapter 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Richard B. Allen, “The Constant Demand of the French: The Mascarene Slave Trade and the Worlds of the Indian Ocean and Atlantic During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” *Journal of African History* 49, no. (2008): 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. John Thornton, *Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800* (London: Routledge, 1999), 4-5. On Thornton’s take on trade and warfare, see 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Thornton is arguing strongly against Robin Law. His argument is in many of his works, including: Robin Law, *The Oyo Empire, c.1600-c.1836: a West African Imperialism in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). Another example of this viewpoint: Ray A. Kea, *Settlements, Trade, and Polities in the seventeenth-century Gold Coast* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. For an explanation of this in the Merina highlands, see Gerald M. Berg, “The Sacred Musket. Tactics, Technology, and Power in Eighteenth-Century Madagascar,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 27, no. 2 (1985): 272-4. Sakalava rulers demanded European ships greet them with a firing of canons, sometimes on multiple occasions. See chapter 3 for details. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Berg has made this point with respect to the Merina: Ibid. Drury observed the link between firearms and royalty in Madagascar, in the southeast near Fort Dauphin and in the west, among the Sakalava. Drury, *The Adventures of Robert Drury*, 33-4. The Malagasy used a combination of spears and guns in warfare, including against Europeans: see the ship journal of the Prince Henry, 1761, “IOR/L/MAR/B/325 G.” [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. The British enforcing the abolition of the slave trade, for instance, was another instance of a state using military force to (attempt to) create a commercially prosperous and stable zone for exchanges. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Drury, for instance, referred to warfare as “The epidemical evil of this island” which resulted in so many slaves being sold to European. Drury, *The Adventures of Robert Drury,* 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Stephen Ellis, "Tom and Toakafo: The Betsimisaraka Kingdom and State Formation in Madagascar, 1715-1750," *Journal of African History* 48, no. (2007); Conrad P. Kottak, "The Process of State Formation in Madagascar," *American Ethnologist* 4, no. 1 (1977). As a result, by the close of the eighteenth century, Sakalava rulers were importing slaves from East Africa for use within their territory and for sale to the foreign slave traders visiting their ports. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. In writing of warfare and enslavement, the work of Larson, focusing on later developments in Madagascar, is useful for understanding the impact of enslavement on Malagasy individuals. See Pier Martin Larson, *History and Memory in the Age of Enslavement: Becoming Merina in Highland Madagascar, 1770-1822* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2000), 13-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. The following comes primarily from the ship journal of the Astree, 1734, “MAR 4 JJ/86.” [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. On the contribution of Malagasy slaves in the early history of the Mascarenes, see Pier Larson, *Ocean of Letters; Language and Creolization in an Indian Ocean Diaspora* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. The ship journal of the Astree, 1734, “MAR 4 JJ/86.” [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. The “measures” are hard to keep track of, as they usually referred to a “gamelle,” “panier,” or sack of rice, or to the amount Europeans could purchase for an amount of gunpowder. The amount included in a measure had to be agreed during each trading venture. See various voyages on measuring trading goods: Bérubé Dudemene, letter on trade in Madagascar, 1774, “COL C/5A/5”; “Notes on trade with Madagascar,” n.d, “COL C/5A/9”; f. 115; “Orders and instructions given by the Court of Directors of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies,” orders given to Capt George Bagwell, Commander and Henry Wilson, chief mate of the Resolution,” 1737, in “IOR/E/3/107, Letterbook,” f. 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. On the long history of this trade, see François Martin, “Memoires sur l'ile de Madagascar,” 1665-1668, COACM, 9:466. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. The ship journal of the Astree, 1734. Massaly may have been the same as Massaliege. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Drury describes similar circumstances in which warriors left most of their belongings behind in fear of attack, sending the women and children a distance away from the villages. After the battle, they returned to find all the “plantations” and storehouses “reduced to ashes.” Drury, *The Adventures of Robert Drury,* 132-3, 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. On this passage, see the voyage of Mayeur to the north of Madagascar, 1774, “Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,” ed. B. de Froberville, “Add. Ms. 18128-18129,”British Library, 1: 10-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. The ship journal of the Hirondelle, 1732-3, “MAR 4 JJ/86.” [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Additionally, since the raiders were reportedly from Massaly, not Morondava, the rice was either exported from Massaly to the southern port of Morondava or, more likely, the king of Morondava had unleashed his own raids on the interior of the Madagascar. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. These reports of low rice supplies were from the northeastern region around Antongil Bay, as well as further south, closer to Fort Dauphin. See the ship journal of the Astree, 1734. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. See, for instance, the ship journal of the Dragon, 1753, “IOR/L/MAR/B/598D.” [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. See Chapter 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Drury, *The Adventures of Robert Drury*, 120-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Although Drury describes a thousand-man army in the south: Drury, *The Adventures of Robert Drury,* 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Walter Hamond, *Madagascar, the Richest and Most Fruitful Island in the World* (London: Nicholas Bourne, 1643), 7. For an early description, see Richard Boothby, *A Briefe Discovery or Description of the most Famous Island of Madagascar or St. Laurence in Asia neare unto East-India* (London: E.G. for John Hardesty, 1646), 11. For more details, see chapter 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Etienne de Flacourt, *Histoire de la grande isle Madagascar,* ed. Claude Allibert (Paris: INALCO: Karthala, 1995), 185-6. See similar descriptions of warfare in southern Madagascar from Modave's eighteenth century colony in Fort Dauphin, journal, 1768-70, “COL C/5A/2.” Drury emphasized the frequency of violence in the south and described battle tactics: Drury, *The adventures of Robert Drury*, 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Traders at Fort Dauphin describe arranging for trade with multiple kings: the ship journal of the Harrington, 1736, “IOR/L/MAR/B/654B.” [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. On the deliberations that preceded wars, see Drury, *The Adventures of Robert Drury,*146. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. The spoils were divided among the victorious soldiers, with the headmen getting more than ordinary warriors. Drury, *The Adventures of Robert Drury,* 154. In the east coast as well, people rarely sold slaves to Europeans. In one engagement around 1759, the Malagasy on the east coast reportedly captured 2,000 prisoners, but only sold 250 of these as slaves. The rest were ransomed or used locally. See “Notes et éclaircissements,” 1774, in *“Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,”* 1: 62.

The French slave traders on the east coast referred to the slaves they bought as “captifs” because the slaves were captured in small-scale raids or warfare. Examples of the use of the term “captifs”: Letter of D’Hermitte, 1733, “COL C/3/7”; the ship journal of the Amphititre,1739, “MAR 4 JJ/76”; instructions for the ship La Paix, 1750, “COL C/4/6.” [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. As did sometimes the slaves: see Drury, *The Adventures of Robert Drury*, 82. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. On the continuation of these wars, see Modave's journal, 1768-70, “COL C/5A/2.” [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. See a similar description given by an English observer: “The island is divided, it is said by the inhabitants, into seven distinct kingdoms, each governed by its own king, who enjoys his authority and title by inheritance. These princes commit hostilities in proper form; but it consists in plundering and carrying off the horned cattle, and the prisoners are sold to the French and Dutch traders as slaves.” William MacIntosh, *Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa*, 2 vols. (London: J. Murray, 1781), 395. Drury describes his agricultural and herding work as a slave in southern Madagascar. Drury, *The Adventures of Robert Drury,* 68-9, 110-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Robert Everard, “A Relation of Three Years Sufferings of Robert Everard, Upon the coast of Assada near Madagascar in a Voyage to India in the Year 1686 and of his Wonderful Preservation and Deliverance, and Arrival at London, Anno 1693,” in *A Collection of Voyages and Travels*, eds, A. and J. Churchill, vol. VI (London: Printed by assignment from Messrs Churchill, 1732), 259-82. As the Sakalava were encroaching on this territory by this time, the dates of his narrative may be questionable. There is enough detail that it appears that this narrative was, at least in part, based on other travelers' stories of northwest Madagascar, if it was not truly a first-hand account. There is certainly no evidence that the king described in Everard’s narrative was Sakalava. More likely, his observations date pre-1690. The account is also dissimilar enough from Drury’s that it seems unlikely the same author wrote them both. To see the arguments about the authenticity of Everard's account: COACM, 3: 395, where the editors describe the narrative as “completely fantastic”; Anne Molet-Sauvaget, “La ‘Relation de Robert Everard’, ébauche probable du ‘Journal de Robert Drury’ de Daniel Defoe,” *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*, no. 241 (1986): 1-28. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Everard, “A Relation,” 265. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Ibid., 265. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Women in northwest Madagascar still put a white paste on their faces to protect them from sun. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Ibid., 265. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Ibid., 265-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Ibid., 268. These “Arab” traders may have been Swahili. Everard eventually gained passage on a dhow carrying slaves. The dhow stopped at one of the Comoro Islands and then travelled to Pate on the East African coast. He then sailed to Muscat and Surat, before gaining passage back to English on a trading ship there. Ibid., 269-72. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. The Merina further refined such strategies, most notably in the development of obligatory work for the state, the *fanompoana*. See Chapter 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Ibid., f. 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. In 1758, an English captain was told that the “king had lately come from the wars and had taken a great number of prisoners and that he would supply us with many slaves.”Despite the promises, they only were able to purchase 15 slaves: the ship journal of the Dragon, 1758, “IOR/L/MAR/B/598 E.” The king of Tulear had to go inland to get rice for trading to the French in 1735: the ship journal of the Jupiter, 1735, “MAR 4 JJ/76.” See also the report of the De Brack, COACM, 6: 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. The ship journal of the Swift, 1742, “IOR/L/MAR/B/616 A.” [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. The ship journal of the Astree, 1737, “MAR 4JJ/86.” [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. The ship journal of the Dragon, 1758, “IOR/L/MAR/B/598 E.” On these trading representatives, see Chapter 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. For instance, for food shortages around Fort Dauphin, see the ship journal of the Griffon, 1735, “MAR 4 JJ/144 C.” [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. On European observations of this slave trade, see the ship journal of the Diligent, “IOR/L/MAR/B/320 E”; the ship journal of the Fly, 1763, “IOR/L/MAR/B/597 C”; the ship journal of the Conde, 1733, “MAR 4 JJ/97.” [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Randrianja and Ellis, *Madagascar*, 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. The first mention was in a letter from Île Bourbon, 1732, “COL C/3/6.” [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. A reference to this island: the ship journal of the Amphititre, 1740, “MAR 4 JJ/76.” [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. A description of this voyage can be found in the ship journal of the Hirondelle, 1732, “MAR 4 JJ/86”; see also letter, 5 January 1733, “COL C/3/7”; letter to the king of Massaly from the captain D’Hermitte, 23 October 1732, “COL C/4/1.” [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. “Memoire de ce qui est necessaire pour le roi de Madagascar,” 1733, “COL C/3/7.” [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Letter, 20 Dec 1732, reporting the taking possession of the island, “COL C/4/1.” [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. See description from various letters from January 1733, in “COL C/3/7.” [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Describing the impact of this failure, see “Projet d'establissement a Madagascar,” 1749, in “COL C/5A/1.” [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. It should be noted that the presence of European pirates on the east coast, particularly at Île Sainte Marie, through the 1720s caused considerable unrest within this region as well as focusing French attention on trading with the coast. For details, see Chapter 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. On the *zana-malata*, see Yvette Sylla, “Les Malata: cohésion et disparité d'un ‘groupe,’” *Omaly sy anio*  21/22, (1985): 19-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. For more details on the role of Ratsimilaho and his life, see Ellis, "Tom and Toakafo: The Betsimisaraka Kingdom and State Formation in Madagascar, 1715-1750." Most histories of Ratsimilahoe rely upon the French translator and slave trader Mayeur's “Histoire de Ratismilahoe, roi de Foulpointe et de Bet-tsimiscaracs,” found in BL, “Add. Ms. 18128-1812,” *“*Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,” vol. 2, pp. 183-300. See also Dalrymple, “Add. 33,765,” f. 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. The ship journal of the Duc d’Anjou, 1736, “MAR 4 JJ/76.” [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Baldriche took his name from a European pirate who lived in eastern Madagascar during the late seventeenth century. For more details on Baldridge, the pirate, see Records of the High Court of Admiralty and colonial Vice-Admiralty courts, National Archives, Kew, UK (henceforth HCA), “HCA 1/98.” [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. The ship journal of the Amphitrite, 1739, Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. In 1738, Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Sources imply ties between Ratsimalaho and the Sakalava empire as early as 1715: Stephen Ellis, “Tom and Toakafo: The Betsimisaraka Kingdom and State Formation in Madagascar, 1715-1750,” *Journal of African History* 48, no. (2007): 451-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. “Histoire de Ratismilahoe, f. 297. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Included in the unrest: an attack in 1740 on French ships in Antongil. Letter, 18 December 1739, “COL C/4/3”; 28 April 1740, “COL C/4/4.” [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. “Remarques et observations de M Joannis sur l'isle de Madagascar et le Canal de Mozambique,” 1743, “MAR 4 JJ/74.” [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Letter, 10 January 1754, “COL C/4/8.” These invaders may have been from the highlands. See Chapter 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Dumas to Poivre, Letter, 11 May 1768, “COL C/5A/2.” [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. The ship journal of the Illustre, 1762 , “MAR 4 JJ/105.” [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Maillart, letter, 4 November 1772, “COL C/5A/2.” [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Maurice-Auguste Benyowsky, *Voyages et Memoirs de Maurice-Auguste, Comte de Benyowsky*, 2 vols. (Paris: F. Buisson, 1791), 2:247. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Mayeur, 1774, “Voyage au pays des Seclaves, côte ouest de Madagascar,” in “notes et éclaircissements,”*“*Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,” 1:98. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Benyowsky, memoire on the establishment, September 1776,” in *Series ancienne, Mélanges*, “M 1031,” French National Archives, Paris. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. See memoire on Ste Marie, n.d, in “XVII/memoires/88,”*Fonds ministériels, Dépôt fortifications colonial, Sainte Marie de Madagascar*, Centre des Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Benyowsky, memoire on the establishment, September 1776, “M 1031.” [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Benyowsky, *Voyages et Memoirs*¸ 2:266. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Ibid., 2: 280. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Ibid., 2: 387. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Joan Blaeu, map of “Isula S. Laurentii, vulgo Madagascar,” 1665, Amsterdam, found online at Northwestern University Library, map collection:

< http://hdl.library.northwestern.edu/2166.DL/inu-afrmap-4264860-recto-ah > <accessed 3 March 2010>. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Oral traditions barely mention the development of Sakalava control over the north and east, for instance see Charles Guillain, *Documents sur l'histoire, la geographie et le commerce de la partie occidentale de Madagascar* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1845). [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. See, for instance, the letter on the succession to the Sakalava throne on Ratsimilaho, who desired Sakalava blood in his lineage: Mayeur, *“*Voyage au pays des Seclaves, côte ouest de Madagascar,” April 1774, *“*Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,” 1:127. See also Chapter 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Mayeur, 1774, trip to the north of the island, “Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,” 1:10. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. On Mayeur: Solofo Randrianja and Stephen Ellis, *Madagascar: A Short History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 114-5; Pier Martin Larson, History *and Memory in the Age of Enslavement: Becoming Merina in Highland Madagascar, 1770-1822* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2000), 1-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. The ruler here was a relative of the Sakalava king of Boina and sold slaves to Arabs. The ship journals of the Charles and Elisabeth, 1742-3, “MAR 4 JJ/144/D.” [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Dumaine, voyage to the west coast of Madagascar, 1793, in “Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,”1:296. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Ibid., 1;294. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Benyowsky, memoir on the establishment, 1776, “M 1031.” [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Mayeur, 1774, trip to the north of the island, “Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,” 1:29. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Mayeur, 1774, trip to the north of the island, “Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,” 1: 28-36. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Benyowsky, *Voyages et Memoirs*¸ 2: 269. The French frequently referred to the fati-dra as a serment. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Mayeur, “Voyage au pays Seclaves,” 1774, “Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,”1: 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. As it was during the nineteenth century: W. F. W. Owen, *Narrative of Voyages to Explore the Shores of Africa, Arabia, and Madagascar* (London: Richard Bentley, 1833), 35-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Dumaine, voyage to the west coast of Madagascar, 1793, “Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,” 1: 294-6; Desroches, “Notes sur Madagascar,” March 15 1816, in “Pieces Diverses Relatives à Madagascar,” ed. M. de Froberville, “Add. 18135,” British Library, f. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Benyowsky, memoir on the establishment, 1776, “M 1031.” [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Descriptions of the Sakalava in the north, 1843, in*Fonds ministériels, série géographique, Madagascar*, Centre des Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France”MAD14/28-29”; M Goudon, “Naturalisés sur Madagascar”, 183, in “MAD15/30,” *Fonds ministériels, série géographique, Madagascar*, Centre des Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Buisson, 22 November 1880, notes on Vohémar, in *Fonds de la Marine, Séries modernes, Service Hydrographique,* “MAR 3 JJ/351,” French National Archives, Paris. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Conrad P. Kottak, “The Process of State Formation in Madagascar,” *American Ethnologist* 4, no. 1 (1977): 146-151. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Randrianja and Ellis, *Madagascar*, 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. On the development of a centralized state in the highland, see Ibid., 114-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Mayeur, “Voyage au Pays d'Ancove,” 1777, in “Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,” 1:149. During the eighteenth century, “The mass of the people in the central highlands seems to have been known by the word *hova* from an early period, while being divided in numerous polities.” Mayeur refers to the state as “Ancove,” or kingdom of the Hovas, and this kingdom became Merina under the rule of Andrianampoinimerina who ruled the kingdom after 1795. Ellis and Randrianja, *Madagascar,* 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Ibid., 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Benyowsky, memoir on the establishment, 1776, “M 1031”; Ellis, 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Memoir, n. d, “Pieces Diverses,’ f. 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Merina traditions record the development of the kingdom. See François Callet, *Histoire des rois, traduction du Tantaran'ny andriana*, 5 vols. (Tananarive: Éditions de la Librairie de Madagascar, 1953). [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. On early coin usage in the Indian Ocean, see Genevieve Bouchon and Denys Lombard, “The Indian Ocean in the Fifteenth Century,” in *India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800,* ed. Ashin Das Gupta and Michael Naylor Pearson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. The ship journal of the Duc de Chartres, visiting Foulpoint in 1754,”MAR 4 JJ/144/B.” For complaints about Foulpointe, see letter, 8 November 1768, “COL C/4/21”; see also Modave’s description of the use of piastres in Fort Dauphin, 1768, “COL C/5A/2.” [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Letter, 25 October 1768, “COL C/4/22”; memoir on the use of currency in Madagascar, 1773, “COL C/4/34.” Then, in 1774, Benyowsky’s letter to Île de France, “COL C/4/37.” [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Modave, journal, 1768-70, “COL C/5A/2.” [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. This practice is described in Jean Martin, *Comores: quatre Île s entre pirates et planteurs*, 2 vols. (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1983), 1: 32-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. The ship journal of the Deux Couronner, 1715, “MAR 4 JJ/111”; the ship journal of the Duc de Chartres, 1734, “MAR 4 JJ/89”; the ship journal of the London, 1750, “IOR/L/MAR/B/313 J”; the ship journal of the Warren, 1749, “IOR/L/MAR/B/571 A.” [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. The ship journal of the Paix? (unlabeled), 1767, “MAR 4 JJ/107.” [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. From observations of Benyowsky, 1775, “COL C/5A/5.” [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Benyowsky, memoir on the establishment, 1776, “M 1031.” [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Callet, *Histoire des rois,* 2: 404. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Coins took on a role in ceremonies: Michael Lambek, "The Value of Coins in a Sakalava Polity: Money, Death, and Historicity in Mahajanga, Madagascar," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43, no. 4 (2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. The ship journal of the Hector, 1761, “IOR/L/MAR/B/486 A”; MacIntosh, *Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa*, 394. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Mayeur, “Voyage au Pays d'Ancove,” 1777, in”Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,” 1: 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Richard Temple, *The administrative value of anthropology* (Bombay: British India Press, 1913), 1-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. On the Merina role in this slave trade, see Randrianja and Ellis, *Madagascar*, 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Mayeur, “Voyage au Pays d'Ancove,” 1777, in “Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,” 1: 149-87. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. The expansion of riziculture was especially important in the formation of the Merina Empire. Gerald M. Berg, “Riziculture and the Founding of Monarchy in Imerina,” *The Journal of African History* 22, no. 3 (1981). [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Temple, *The Administrative Value of Anthropology*, 4. For the myth on the development of this usage, see Callet, *Histoire des rois*, 2: 48-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Campbell, *An Economic History*, 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Mayeur, second “Voyage au Pays d’Ancove,” 1783, “Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,” 1: 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Mayeur, “Voyauge au Pays d’Ancove,” 1777, Ibid., 1: 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. find source [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Randrianja and Ellis, *Madagascar,* 116-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Callet, *Histoire des rois*, 1: 594. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. Example: Ibid., 2: 72. Even an alliance between them: Randrianja and Ellis, *Madagascar,* 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. Mayeur, “Voyage au pays Seclave,” 1774, “Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar,”1:109. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. This name is very hard to read and may be incorrect. Bérubé Dudemene, letter, October 1775, “COL C/5a/5.” [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. Ibid. “Salama” is a greeting in Madagascar, which means “healthy” in Malagasy. In Arabic, *Salām* means peace, but is also used in the greeting *As-Salāmu `Alaykum*. This document appears to describe the Malagasy referring “salam” as a present, a usage of the term not found in other sources. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. Ibid. Mayeur defines marmittes: “On appelle Marmittes ceux des naturels de Madagascar qui habitant sur les bords de la mer, s'offrent aux europeenes a leur arrive, pour commissaires, pour guides, pour pilotes, pour la traite, la conduite, et le soin des boeufs, tant a terre qu'a bord des vaisseaux et pour toutes les affaires en un mot dans lesquelles leurs ministere peut-etre utile a un etranger.” In effect, the French on the east coast came to refer to hired labor as marmittes (usually through a chief or big man hiring out his slaves/workers). “Notes et éclaircissements,” 1774, “Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de L'isle de Madagascar ,” 1:60. The marmittes may have been derived from the term *maromiton*, French for servant. Drury referred to them as the “maurominters.” Drury, *The Adventures of Robert Drury,* 103. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. Dudemene, letter, 1775, “COL C/5a/5.” [↑](#footnote-ref-149)