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The Unity of the *Philebus*:
Continuity in Plato's Philosophy

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The Unity of the *Philebus*: Continuity in Plato's Philosophy

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An abstract of
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Abstract

The Unity of the *Philebus*:
Continuity in Plato's Philosophy
By Jong Hwan Lee

The *Philebus* is Plato's answer to the question what the human good is. In my dissertation I maintain that this dialogue is a part of his grand philosophical picture. In the middle dialogues, Plato shows the way up to Forms, which is the foundation of knowledge for human beings living in the physical and sensible world. After the critical stage of his philosophy, Plato in the *Philebus* wants to return to the Cave, where ordinary people live their daily lives and tries to give an account of the good life there upon the firm foundation, forms. The main thesis of my dissertation is to show the consistency of the structure in the *Philebus* and to suggest a comprehensive interpretation of the *Philebus* with a perspective: ethic, especially Socratic question and answer, is the main theme. Understanding this dialogue in line with Socratic dialogues, and furthermore, interpretation on this dialogue upon an assumption that all Plato's dialogues are actually Plato's answer to Socrates' question, "how to live a good life?" will open another look on the *Philebus* with a more smooth and unifying presentation. Puzzling metaphysical account in the middle of the dialogue is indeed the necessary foundation for the ethical conclusion, that is an answer to Socrates' question raised mainly in the Socratic dialogues. My interpretation of this dialogue suggests that Plato never has given up the main claim of the middle dialogues, the separate forms and the two-world structure of beings. At the same time, however, this interpretation proposes that he does not remain at the unsolved metaphysical questions but progresses while answering the questions, which were raised against the theory of Forms. The *Philebus* is a philosopher's story of coming down to a daily shadowy life from the reality. In other words, this dialogue is a possible suggestion to find a way from a theoretical life to a practical life for the good to be realized on the earth as it is in the world of Forms.

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CONTENTS

List of Figures

Introduction

1. Hard Questions of The *Philebus*

The *Philebus*[1] is regarded as one of Plato's last dialogues, perhaps later than all but the unfinished and longest work, the *Laws*. At the same time it may be the one of Plato's least read dialogues because of its complicated structure and puzzling metaphysical and epistemological inquiries.

There are several interesting points in the *Philebus*. Most of all, Socrates is back in the dialogue with his old questions and topics as well as his old method.[2] As is well known, Socrates in Plato's later dialogues plays a less important role than he did in the earlier ones. In the *Parmenides*, he is described mostly as a rather young, immature or inexperienced person, who makes bold claims and asks daring questions of the master Parmenides. Socrates in the *Sophist* as well as in the *Statesman* is not even a main character at all.[3] What he does in these dialogues is merely to introduce the interlocutors and sit back and listen to their conversation. In the *Philebus*, however, the character Socrates is a main speaker once again. He is not, as in the *Parmenides*, a young student, who is ready to explain what he firmly believes and is also very vulnerable to critics. Instead, an old and wise Socrates is back, one who has an easy and composed attitude, and who is able to control conversations by handling the discussion skillfully. In other

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[1] Unless I indicate otherwise, in this dissertation I use Dorothea Frede's English translation (1993) of the *Philebus* and the translations of other Platonic dialogues in Cooper's complete works (1997).

[2] The point that Socrates is back with his old method is one of the proposals I would like to make here. Obviously D. Frede, who is one of the best translators and commentators on the *Philebus,* does not agree with me. I will give some account on this topic later in this introduction.

[3] At *Sophist* 218c and *Statesman* 257c, however, Socrates introduces Theaetetus and Young Socrates to others so that they can lead the discussions and then he sits back. Socrates' role in most of the 'later and critical dialogues' is much smaller than he had in the Socratic dialogues.

words, he is just like the Socrates portrayed in the *Apology* and other 'Socratic' dialogues.

Furthermore, the theme of the dialogue is somewhat reminiscent of Plato's Socratic dialogues. The subtitle of the *Philebus*, which is given not by Plato himself but by later commentators, is *'On Pleasure.'* The topic that the Socrates in the Socratic dialogues has fought against as the candidate of the good is back on the table in the *Philebus*. Moreover, the good was the one of the main themes in the *Republic*, especially in book V-VII, as the object of the greatest teaching (*to megiston mathema*). This question, namely, what is the good for man, is the main theme of the *Philebus*. And knowledge and pleasure are competing as the best answer to this question. The problem of the good returns to the center stage in Plato's philosophy after he has gone through many difficulties in the Later dialogues. Two candidates—the longtime rivals, knowledge and pleasure—compete again in the *Philebus,* but now in a different manner than before.

Due to these interesting characteristics of the *Philebus*, much ink has been spilt on the following questions: first, what roles do the metaphysical and epistemological considerations in the *Philebus* play? It is somewhat extraordinary that Plato deals with complicated metaphysical accounts in a dialogue, which mainly discusses ethics. Secondly, how are we to understand the author's intention in introducing these new problems and concepts? These are the main questions I will consider in this dissertation in order to understand this dialogue thoroughly.

Many commentators and scholars have been especially troubled by the perplexing metaphysical accounts throughout this dialogue, especially at the middle part

of it. Both the so-called 'heavenly tradition,'[4] which suggests a solution to the one-many problem, and 'the four-fold division,'[5] which divides all beings into four distinct categories, are raised in the quest for finding the top prize of the good in human lives. Such crucial accounts appearing in the *Philebus*, however, have not been introduced in other dialogues of Plato. Moreover, these metaphysical accounts are somewhat similar to what Aristotle attributes to Plato in the *Metaphysics*.[6] Many scholars have tried to explain such unique aspects of the *Philebus*. And on the basis of their accounts they have shown the continuity or discontinuity between the *Philebus* and Plato's philosophy from other dialogues, especially the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, where the theory of the Forms is intensively considered.

On the one hand, many contemporary interpretators who try to see the philosophical similarity between Plato and Aristotle argue that the questions raised in the first part of the *Parmenides* ultimately lead Plato to reject and discard the 'theory of the Forms' in his 'Later' dialogues. According to their claim, Plato had to give up the idea of the 'separateness' of the Forms. These so-called revisionists[7] maintain that the one and many question in the earlier part of the *Philebus* hints at the change in Plato's perspective on the status of the Forms. They also hold that in the process of inquiring into the puzzle of one and many Plato began to explain the cosmos by means of the four-fold distinction, which introduces two distinct mathematical concepts, limit and the unlimited. These notions were possibly influenced by the Pythagorean tradition, but

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[4] Gosling (1975), p. 153.
[5] Frede (1993), xxxiii.
[6] At the Chapter six of *Metaphysics* A, Aristotle reports that Plato assumed two basic principles, the one and an indefinite duality, and these principles are said to be the elements of the Forms as well as of all sensible counterparts. Mathematical objects are between sensible and the Forms, but the one is the ultimate cause of all Forms and of all goodness.
[7] Chappell (2004) p. 16-21.

they are not found in Plato's previous dialogues. On the other hand, the so-called Unitarians suggest another interpretation, according to which Plato never has discarded his genuine theory of the "two worlds," the world of the Forms and another world of the sensible. They maintain that there is no change at all on this central point of Plato's account, which was the main theme of not only the Socratic dialogues but also all other dialogues, and is at least reflected—if not expressly affirmed—in the *Philebus*.

2. The Human Good: A Mixture of Pleasure and Knowledge

Why then did Plato write a dialogue at almost the end of his career about pleasure and knowledge with Socrates as his chief interlocutor? Plato seems to argue strongly against pleasure, especially in the *Gorgias*, where he promotes the superiority of knowledge and the vanity of pleasure against Callicles, one of the most persistent characters in Plato's dialogues. If so, why is pleasure reconsidered in one of the latest dialogues, the *Philebus*, after so many philosophical struggles and inquiries? In this dissertation I will maintain that it is because of the awkward position that a human being holds. Knowledge is the good for the divine life as pleasure is for animals. Plato recognizes, however, the human condition, which cannot be characterized simply as either divine or animal. Therefore, he comes to think that pleasure—along with reason—should be a part of the good for man, who lives on the earth.

Benardete rightly points out that there are two beginnings of philosophy, especially in the early development of Greek philosophy:[8] One is the cosmological beginning. Many pre-socratic philosophers devoted their efforts to addressing cosmological problems, such as the ultimate principles of the world. The other is the

[8] Benardete (1993), p. 88.

beginning from the human perspective. Sophists were well known for turning their interests from heaven to earth. They were concerned with human matters without taking as much interest in the cosmos as their predecessors did. Socrates was on the same track as they were, although his approach was not the same as theirs. A natural conclusion sometimes drawn from cosmological principles is that there is a law that binds the life of an individual or community to the nature of the cosmos. On the one hand, understanding the cosmos will result in producing or understanding the law of nature, which is then to be applied to human lives in the same fashion as it is to everything else in the cosmos. Therefore, the life of knowledge or reason is closely related to this sort of inquiry on nature. On the other hand, if we begin our philosophical inquiries from the fact that we are human beings, we may conclude that we are free to overcome these constraining laws so that we will be able to enjoy the pleasure that comes from freedom from impediments. However, we do not just begin from the perspective of being human beings pursuing pleasure only. Rather, we formulate our principles on the basis that we are human beings while using cosmological principles as our foundation.

Why should both knowledge and pleasure be admitted into the good as a balanced mixture? It is because man is standing somewhere in between gods and other living things on the earth. The Socrates of the *Philebus* says that the life of knowledge is divine and good for gods alone. Since they do not need anything else, *i.e.,* since they have complete sufficiency with knowledge alone, pleasure does not have any place in a divine life. Man, however, cannot lead such a life because he is always in need of something. On the contrary, Philebus' position, introduced at the very beginning of the dialogue, is that pleasure is good not only for man but also for all earthly creatures (11b).

Man has both natures, that is, divinity and animality. It is possible for him to be wise and rational and at the same time to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. It is impossible, however, to define human beings solely from one or the other perspective. Since man is neither a god nor an animal but he is a sort of mixture of the two, the good should be mixed somehow to satisfy those two conditions of being a human. When Plato fully acknowledged these conditions of being human, which come from his two-fold view of the world, he also recognized that the final good for man could not be limited to either knowledge or pleasure. It should be something mixed, just as the human condition is.

I will maintain that Plato has never lost this tension throughout his philosophical career. He is always concerned with how such an "intermediate" being as man is to live a good life even at the beginning of his philosophy. The Socrates he uses in the Socratic dialogues is looking for the definitions of moral concepts, such as courage, temperance, wisdom, or justice. And Socrates' ultimate concern is finding the way to live a good life here on earth. Many people portrayed in the dialogues assert that they have their own answers, and Socrates wants to examine them in order to see whether those answers would apply satisfactorily to anyone else who wanted to live a good life. But the "refutational" Socrates never finds a satisfactory answer. Plato wants to complete what Socrates of the "Socratic" (*aporetic*) dialogues left incomplete. Finding the way to live a good life was always the fundamental aim of Plato's philosophical inquires. As written in *Seventh Letter* Plato wants to realize his philosophical examination in the practical life and the real city.[9]

[9] 327e-328c. Plato says 'if anyone ever was to attempt to realize these principles of law and government, now was the time to try, since it was only necessary to win over a single man and I should have accomplished all the good I dreamed of. This, then, was the bold purpose I had in setting forth from home.' Of course the authenticity of the Letter is much disputed. Although I like to think it is either

Ethics and politics are two distinct ways to complete human lives. There may not be as clear a distinction between the two in Plato's philosophy is as in Aristotle's.[10] Nevertheless, we can still see the division between them. On the one hand, ethics and morality apply to an individual man's action and behavior. On the other hand, politics is for guiding a community in the right direction so that people in it can live a good and harmonious life. In the *Republic*, Plato shows the parallel between an individual soul and a city: Justice is found both in a fine soul and a fine city. The theory of the Forms is introduced in this dialogue as a method for realizing the fine and ideal city. The paradigm or the model of the ideal city does not belong to this world. At the same time this ideal city cannot belong to this world, since this world is changing. It should be located in the world of the Forms, which is different from the sensible world. Glaucon takes the account in *Republic* IV of the Fine City skeptically and asks Socrates how this fine city is possible. Socrates answers that when a philosopher becomes a king or a king becomes a philosopher, we will be able to find a fine city, where everyone "does and has his/hers own (jobs)" so that the whole city is just.[11] The condition that a philosopher should meet is to have knowledge of what really is and of the good. A philosopher, who has climbed up out of the Cave and seen the Sun, eventually comes down to the Cave to lead the people to live a good and harmonized life. Even though people in the Cave are not happy with him, and even they would try to kill him, it is a philosopher's duty to go

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written by Plato or by someone who knew what he was talking about, nothing I want to argue here depends on the contents of *Epistle* VII.

[10] Aristotle distinguishes *phronesis* into different kinds in accordance with its concerns: First, if *phronesis* is concerned with an individual, it is practical wisdom, which is closely related to ethics. Second, if it is concerned with family, it is household management, and thirdly, if it is concerned with deliberative or judicial matters, it is called politics. (*EN*, VI. 8, *EE*, I.8)

[11] 473c-d, and also *Republic* VI, 499b-c and 501e. Plato says the same at the *Seventh Letter* 326a-b

back to the community to which he belongs in order to pay back the debt he owes to the community.[12]

Thus, metaphysics in Plato's philosophy, which is usually represented by the theory of the Forms, takes its place in Plato's philosophy for the sake of practical concerns, *i.e.,* enabling a city or an individual to live a good life. Metaphysics itself was not the final aim of Plato's philosophy, even though metaphysics becomes the firm ground upon which ethics and politics should be established. By positing the Forms, we come to have the fact that there really exist absolute standards of good and bad. The *Republic*, however, does not provide a detailed account of how to apply knowledge of the Forms, and especially of the Good, to a practical human life. Plato could show that a philosopher king should have such knowledge. Nonetheless it is not evident how he can apply the knowledge, which he acquired after climbing up out of the Cave to his own people when he returns to the Cave. The sketch in *Republic* VII portrays the fate of a philosopher king, who might even be killed by the remaining prisoners in the Cave. Plato argues that those who have knowledge of both lives would be able to lead the people in the Cave to a fine and good life.[13] It is unclear, however, how the analogy between the two worlds is established or how a philosopher king connects these two worlds by employing his familiarity with both. What Plato simply says in the *Republic* is that Forms play a role as the paradigm or "model" of the sensible world, which

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[12] *Republic* VII, 520 b. The debt that a philosopher owes to his city is for his upbringing. Since nothing grows of its own accord, according to Plato's assumption, Plato's philosopher comes to be what he is not only by himself but also by his community.

[13] "You are better and more completely educated than the others and are better able to share in both types of life. Therefore each of you in turn must go down to live in the common dwelling place of the others and grow accustomed to seeing in the dark. When you are used to it, you will see vastly better than the people there. And because you have seen the truth about fine, just and good things, you will know each image for what it is and also that of which it is the image. Thus, for you and for us, the city will be governed, not like the majority of cities nowadays" (*Republic* VII, 520c-d). Plato suggests that this coming back to the dwellings and ruling there is a way to pay the debt back to the city he was raised.

"imitates" or "is an image of" the intelligible Forms. Unfortunately he does not provide a more concrete explanation of how the Forms serve as paradigms—of how they are to be applied in real-life situations.

I maintain that Plato does not abandon his philosophical focus on ethics, *i.e.,* living a good life, even in the later stage of his philosophical career. Throughout the process of developing some important new ideas in the *Philebus* Plato comes back to the original project. And eventually at the conclusion of the *Philebus* he is able to give a list of the goods in a human life. They are elements that make an individual man's life good and fine. Furthermore, the following but unfinished work, the *Laws,* is about the legislation needed to realize the fine city in our sensible world. These were the two aspects of justice—in individual souls and in society—which Plato investigated in the *Republic*. He now finalizes what he initiated with his character Socrates. In order to answer the question of the good life on the basis of his metaphysics, he wrote these two works at the last stage of his career. On the one hand, he dedicates the *Philebus* to Socrates by portraying him as an old and wise man. Unlike other 'Later' dialogues, such as the *Sophist* or *Statesman*, in which Socrates is characterized as a young man and does not have a leading role in the discussions, this old and wise figure, who was the Socrates of the earlier dialogues, returns in the *Philebus*. The good life for a human being, who is neither a god nor a mere animal, is a mixed life of knowledge and pleasure. The mean (*metron*) is what a philosopher should look for and realize so that man can live such a life. This life is what Socrates had been looking for, which Plato now can explain and put on a firm foundation.

Plato goes further to the question of a communal life. As he has shown in the *Republic*, there is a parallel between an individual soul and a community. On the ground

of the analysis of the good life in the *Philebus*, Plato investigates in greater depth the issue of legislation in the *Laws* in order to establish a fine city for realizing the good life on the community level. In sum, one might say that Plato focuses on the way going up (*anabasis*)[14] to the Forms of the *Republic* and on coming down (*katabasis*)[15] to the earth, to the daily lives of men, in the *Philebus* and the *Laws*.[16]

3. The Structure of This Dissertation

On the basis of what has been discussed in the previous section, let us go back to the two lines of interpretation of the *Philebus* I introduced in the first section. I will present a third interpretation of this dialogue, which takes neither the path of the revisionists—Plato dramatically changed his philosophy at a certain point of his career—nor that of the Unitarians—Plato has never changed his philosophy in any significant respect at all, but sees the continuity and development of Plato's philosophy with respect to his firm and central concern, living a good life. The revisionist argues that there are clear dissimilarities between Plato's metaphysics and methods of the middle dialogues and of the later dialogues. They hold that after being critically examined in the *Parmenides* Plato has rejected the two separate worlds, which is the basic foundation of the account for reality in the *Republic*. Forms have come to be imminent in particulars (like Aristotelian universals), and so are not separated from our sensible world. The method of division and collection, which is fully employed in the *Sophist* and the

[14] *Republic* VII, 517b.
[15] *Republic* VII, 519d.
[16] However, this dissertation mainly deals with the topics in the *Philebus*. The *Laws* will be one of my future projects.

Statesman, is Plato's new investigative instrument; it is quite different from what he used in the earlier dialogues, elenchus and the method of hypothesis.[17]

I will maintain that we do not find convincing evidence in the *Philebus* that Plato has rejected the theory of the Forms, and that the metaphysical passages in the *Philebus* can be better understood on the basis of the "separate Forms," or "two-world" view of the middle dialogues. At the same time, I argue that the allegedly sharp distinction between Plato's 'old' and 'new' method is not as clear as some assume. Therefore, the *new* method does not explain some passages in the *Philebus,* which suggest the separation of the Forms. While on the other, Plato did not have a finalized version of his philosophy even at the beginning of his career, unlike the Unitarians hold. I argue that Plato has developed his philosophy throughout his career in order to achieve the goal: to answer the question of the good human life. And the *Philebus* is a sort of completion of his philosophy. By portraying two interlocutors in the dialogue, Socrates and Protarchus, differently from other characters in the Socratic dialogues, Plato shows that he has progressed from the earlier philosophical accounts, which he mainly presented by the character Socrates in the Socratic dialogues.

With this thesis, I will analyze the *Philebus* and show how the ideal pursuit of philosophy should be done. I will argue that three philosophical topics in this dialogue—characters (Chapter 1), methods (Chapter 2 and 3), and metaphysics (Chapter 4)—are ideal enough to make this dialogue ideal. And after evaluating two essential elements of human life—knowledge and pleasure, we will finally see how Socrates and Protarchus working together come up with a list of the human goods in Chapter 5 and 6.

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[17] D. Frede claims that the tools Socrates uses in the *Philebus* are not Socrates'. Rather, in this dialogue, Plato is dealing with a Socratic question with a Socratic partner with the aid of Platonic tools, *i.e.,* the method of division and collection, or dialectic. (p. lxxi)

3. 1. Characters in the *Philebus* (Chapter 1)

An interesting relationship between interlocutors is observed in the *Philebus*. There is no violent confrontation between them as we have often seen between Socrates and other advocators of pleasure, *i.e.,* Callicles, Protagoras or even Thrasymachus in Plato's other dialogues. At the same time their relationship to Socrates is not similar to that of interlocutors who did not accept the fact that they have to give up what they have believed, such as Euthyphro. What we have in the *Philebus* is a pair of interlocutors who are not only cooperative rather than confrontational but also a pair who compete, even battle, spiritedly and with perseverance, not for a personal victory but for the victory of the truth.

The personal battle is described as *agon*, a heroic theme in Greek culture and literature. Socrates seems to be a heroic character as well in Plato's dialogues, especially in the *Republic*. After suggesting many important analogies, giving an account of the theory of the Forms, and narrating the conclusive myth in this long dialogue, Socrates is like a victor who wins all the battles in the field of metaphysics and epistemology. Of course, Socrates always claims that he is pursuing the truth not defeating his interlocutors. Since his opponents did not share the same goal of inquiry, however, he had no other choice but to defeat them. If they concede their defeat, Socrates might get them to join the quest for the truth after giving up their previous convictions. Nonetheless, since his interlocutors view the discussions only from the respect of *agon*, a verbal battle, they simply believe that they have been bested by Socrates in some competition. This does not necessarily lead them to abandon what they had believed. They thought that they just failed to defeat Socrates and nothing more than that. They

do not want to go along with Socrates and they do not even think that they need to do so. Truth is not their concern as long as it is all about battling and winning.

Protarchus in the *Philebus* is a unique figure, considered from that perspective. Unlike many key characters of Plato's other dialogues, he is concerned with the truth as to what will take the first or the second prize of the Good. Not being a hardcore hedonist like Philebus, who won't abandon his own position, Protarchus has his own opinion and conviction. Nevertheless, he is willing to give up not only Philebus' position but also his own as well in order to reach the truth.[18] But he is not a passive yes-sayer. He is engaging in philosophizing and pursuing the truth actively.

How did this happen? Most importantly, Socrates and Protarchus arrive at a positive answer because of Protarchus' attitude in the *Philebus*. Socrates in the earlier dialogues has been always trying to find the truth by cleansing the interlocutors' minds of false beliefs. The first and main function of elenchus is to see if there is any inconsistency or falsity in a partner's thoughts and beliefs. Protarchus changed his position from being a hardcore hedonist, which Philebus is, to that of a moderate hedonist, who accepts that pleasure is not the sole condition for living a good human life. This he does after being refuted by the argument that there should be some rational elements among the good, such as memory, anticipation, and so forth (21d). In contrast to other characters of Plato's dialogues, *e.g.*, Callicles or Euthyphro, Protarchus alters his position in response to Socratic refutation. This is exactly what the Socrates of the Socratic dialogues hoped for and intended as the result of asking and answering questions.

[18] Frede (1994) points out this in her introductory essay to the English translation. p.lxix.

But of course it is Plato as author who gives such a character to Protarchus, who plays a central role in the dialogue. Why then did Plato make Protarchus such a cooperative character? Or why did Plato not give Socrates' interlocutors in the earlier dialogues, especially the ethical ones, the same cooperative character as Protarchus has? Why were their attitudes so hostile to Socrates? Why were they trying to defeat Socrates instead of pursuing the truth?

Additionally, another key character in the *Philebus*, namely, Socrates is also an ideal 'co-pursuer' of knowledge. He is neither just an examiner of other's belief nor a teacher, who instructs his students. The Socrates of the *Philebus* has an initial belief, just as Protarchus does. His thesis goes through an examination, is refuted, and finally rejected. Both Socrates and Protarchus arrive at the same stage, in that they are shown to be ignorant of the matter that they thought they had known. When both of them come to an impasse, they are ready to launch a new investigation. Unlike any other dialogue, the *Philebus* describes the dual examination of these two interlocutors' initial theses, dual-refutation, and then a joint investigation arriving finally at a positive result—which is exactly how philosophical pursuit is supposed to be executed.

3.2. Methods Used in the *Philebus* (Chapter 2 and 3)

Elenchus was known as the main method the historical Socrates liked to use and/or Plato employed in the Socratic dialogues. This method has been regarded as a tool to examine whether there is any inconsistency in one's set of beliefs. If one passes this consistency test, what he believes should be accepted as knowledge.[19] This is not to

[19] Vlastos, 'The Socratic Elenchus: Method is All', in Vlastos (1994*)*. He discusses this point especially at p.25-8.

say that consistency implies truth. Gregory Vlastos argues, however, that an innate knowledge of the good allows us to use *elenchus* to support positive conviction, since there will be always a contradiction between our innate knowledge of the good and any mistaken belief people hold. Therefore, the mistaken and false belief cannot be part of a consistent belief system. And since *elenchus* will eventually show the inconsistency between our correct innate belief about the good and any false belief we have about the good, it will allow us to arrive by elimination at positive moral conclusions.

The revisionists, who maintain that the metaphysics of Plato's philosophy in the later dialogues, especially in the *Philebus*, involves not separate forms but immanent universals, hold that Plato begins to employ a different method in the later dialogues. They assume that inquiring into different kind of entity requires a distinct method. They see the method of division and collection, which is fully employed in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, as showing that Plato has changed his position on metaphysics by altering its object from separate Forms to immanent universals. This is why Dorothea Frede argues that Plato is utilizing his own method rather than Socrates' in this dialogue, even though the *Philebus* is about the same Socratic topic as the earlier dialogues.[20] She argues for the immanent Forms, and says that the 'divine method' is Plato's (not Socrates') way to close the gap between the Forms and the sensible objects. If the method being used is the same at that used in dialogues postulating separate forms, however, we do not have to accept Frede's argument for thinking Plato has given up on separate Forms in favor of immanent universals.

I will suggest that the method Plato uses in the *Philebus* is not entirely different from what he practiced in the previous dialogues. First, the method of division and

[20] Refer the footnote 13.

collection is initially introduced in the *Gorgias*, and also analyzed in the *Phaedrus* in detail, is fully employed in the *Philebus*. Second, *elenchus*, which is usually regarded as the method of the Socrates of the Socratic dialogues, are also used in the *Philebus*. Frede argues that there is only one instance of *elenchus* in the *Philebus* when Protarchus has to accept that a pleasant life should have a rational element, such as memory, and becomes absolutely speechless for the moment (21d). Nevertheless, as Richard Patterson argues,[21] if the essential character of this method, *elenchus*, is to test or "cross-examine" statements put forth by an interlocutor, then the same process of examination is incorporated into collection and division insofar as any proposed step in the division process is put to the test. (In practice, this sometimes happens, but not always.) This is what allows collection and division to serve as a critical method rather than just as a method for spelling out someone's opinion. I intend to demonstrate that the division and collection in the *Philebus* incorporates *elenchus* and that these two methods are not absolutely different from each other. The familiar Socratic methodical element is still at work while Socrates and Protarchus are criticizing the nature of pleasure and knowledge in the middle part of the dialogue in order to reveal the nature of true and false pleasure and knowledge. This investigation of the method in the *Philebus* will lead to the conclusion that Plato's object of metaphysical inquiry has not been changed, that is, the separate Forms are still presumed in the later dialogues, especially in the *Philebus*.

Furthermore, I will hold that the method of division and collection is employed in the *Philebus* as an ideal philosophical tool so that not only the interlocutors but also the readers of the *Philebus* come to grasp a positive knowledge. This method, which is an advanced form of Socratic method, helps one investigate, learn, teach, and apply

[21] Patterson (2010).

knowledge—especially on ethical matters. With this method Socrates and Protarchus in the *Philebus* can do all these things—investigating, learning, teaching each other, and finally applying the theoretical knowledge they acquire so as to generate a practical outcome—the list of the human goods. We will see how this ideal method lets two ideal interlocutors arrive at the list of the human goods at the end of the dialogue.

3.3. Metaphysics in the *Philebus* (Chapter 4)

In contrast to some arguments of the revisionists, who maintain that Plato abandoned the two-world view and that the *Philebus* is simply concerned with more practical or "down to earth" matters, I hold that Plato did not give up the metaphysical position he suggested in order to present his ethical claims in the *Philebus*. In other words, Plato is still arguing for the two-world view as the perfect paradigm and model of a good life on the earth.

Why do I propose the two-world view as the best reading of the *Philebus*? Much textual evidence in the *Philebus* suggests that Plato seems to endorse the metaphysical structure of the two worlds strongly in the *Philebus*, especially where he explains the difference between a human life and a divine life. The divine life lacks pleasure, since reason is the sole condition for gods to live a good life. However, man needs pleasure in addition to knowledge. Because of this, man requires more than simply knowledge. In addition to the knowledge of Forms, other kinds of practical knowledge and right opinions are needed to make a human life good. Furthermore, Socrates agrees with Protarchus, who ridicules the position of the man having only divine kinds of knowledge, while admitting the necessity of all other kinds of knowledge and opinions, on the condition that they are grounded on the highest kind of knowledge (62b-c). Such

a distinction between knowledge and opinion as well as between the divine life and human life is almost identical to the structure of the theory of the Forms and epistemology of the middle dialogues. The revisionists, such as D. Frede,[22] would argue that Plato's two separate worlds should be rejected so that the ground for the practical knowledge for 'the human good' is clearly different from the 'divine good'. But actually a philosopher, who tries to make his community a good one to live in, needs features of both lives to have a good (sufficient, complete, and choiceworthy) life, and a two-world structure still gives a satisfactory framework for answering the question of 'the human good.'

Therefore, there is no clear evidence that Plato has rejected what he maintained earlier. It is obvious that the question has been raised against the separateness of the Forms in the *Parmenides*. Some will argue that metaphysical examinations in the *Philebus* show that Plato has changed his explanation of the Forms from separated beings to immanent ones. Nonetheless, there is no obvious evidence that Plato has abandoned this essential character of the Forms in the classical theory of the Forms. I will try to show that two major problems for understanding Plato's metaphysics, one-many problem and the four-fold distinction are well explained in the *Philebus* from the same perspective of the separated Forms of the middle dialogues in different ways.

My claim is that two metaphysical problems in the *Philebus*, one-many question and four-fold distinction are introduced not in order to reject Plato's previous theory but in order to exemplify the investigation Socrates and Protarchus have launched. Then what is it that we, human beings, should realize? In order to answer this question, it is important to read the *Philebus* in light of the *Timaeus*, since they present similar

[22] Frede (1994), lxx.

metaphysical accounts. I maintain in the Chapter 4 that the latter, on the one hand, is about the Demiurge's composition of the Universe, but the former, on the other hand, is about humans' returning to the Good. This is how metaphysics in the *Philebus,* which is grounded upon Plato's metaphysics and ontology, especially the theory of the Forms, is in fact a stepping-stone for ethics. In answering Socrates' ultimate question, namely, how to live a good life, Plato's metaphysics gives a new perspective.

My view fits nicely into the basic metaphysical framework of my reading of Plato's ethics (especially in the *Philebus*). Hence, there is no reason to give up the separate Forms in the *Philebus*. And the main reason for keeping separate Forms in Plato's philosophy is that they are presupposed by his conviction that there are eternal, immutable, natures and standards of goodness. These are never affected in any way by what happens in the perceivable world, which is constrained by space and time, or by whether humans happen to know them. This reason for the separate Forms is the same in the *Philebus* as it always was in the *Republic*, *Timaeus*, and Plato's other dialogues.

3.4. The Human Goods—Knowledge and True Pleasure (Chapter 5 and 6)

Because of the human condition—living between animals and gods, pleasures are necessary in a good human life. Therefore, it is important to find good pleasure to live a good life. The ideal characters evaluate both pleasure and knowledge with their new method of division and collection in order to categorize many classes of pleasure into various kinds with several levels. After their investigation, only pure pleasure is proven to be good enough to be admitted to the human goods, yet these are not as good as other goods to be achieved in human life. On the other hand, knowledge is accepted as being valuable in constituent of the good life for humans not because of its benefit or

usefulness but because of its certainty, truth, purity, or precision. Furthermore, true opinions and knacks (*e.g.*, confectionery, popular rhetoric, cosmetics), which were rejected by Plato's other dialogues, will be included in the human goods, insofar as *pursuing* the highest goal, *i.e.*, truth, precision, clarity, and purity. Additionally, the mixture of knowledge and true pleasure will enable both Socrates and Protarchus in the *Philebus* to generate a list of the human goods, which also functions as the criteria for evaluating human goods. According to this list at the end of the *Philebus*, ordinary people will be able to live happily while examining the goods in their lives.

My three interpretations suggested in this dissertation, namely, metaphysics, method, and characters in the *Philebus*, are closely related to each other. These elements lead not only Socrates and Protarchus but also readers of the dialogue to find out what is a good life, here and now. The *Philebus* is an account of coming down to a daily life from the philosopher's reality. This dialogue is a possible suggestion to find a way from a theoretical life to a practical life for the good to be realized on the earth as it is in the world of the Forms.

Chapter 1: Socratic Characters in the *Philebus*: The Ideal Conversation

1.1. Dramatic Characteristic of the *Philebus*

My investigation of the *Philebus* will begin with a close look at the dramatic setting of the dialogue, especially at the characters and their conversation. This dialogue is extremely hard to understand; especially given the complex metaphysical account in the middle of the dialogue, which can distract the readers from reading the work as a dialogue. Few scholars have paid much attention to its dramatic settings and characters, focusing on instead the complicated philosophical accounts in the middle of the dialogue. Nonetheless, such a reading of the dialogue without considering its dramatic elements, I think, misses the author's intention in writing the *Philebus* in dialogue form. Plato has written many of his works in the form of dialogue, a real life conversation between men. He believes philosophy should be done in the process of philosophizing among inquirers after truth, and that a dramatic format will convey this pursuit most vividly. Furthermore, the *Philebus* is more like a dialogue than other late dialogues, among which the *Philebus* belongs.[23] Therefore, I propose to read this work as indeed a dialogue, and argue that this approach best reveals Plato's philosophical intention in writing it. Consequently, before considering certain difficult metaphysical and other issues, I will address the dramatic setting and the characters of the *Philebus*.

In Chapter 1, I will argue that the *Philebus* is an ideal dialogue, that is, a good example of how Socratic philosophy, described in the Socratic dialogues, is supposed to

[23] I will discuss this question soon: which group of Plato's dialogues does the *Philebus* belong to and what does distinguish the *Philebus* from other dialogues.

be done. Surprisingly, Plato's Socratic dialogues do not as a rule depict such conversations. Consequently, Plato's *Philebus* serves as a kind of literary and philosophical fulfillment of Socrates' conception of philosophy in the early dialogues.[24]

Even though the *Philebus* was written at the last stage of Plato's philosophical career, this dialogue has both characteristics of Plato's early Socratic dialogues: Socrates is the main character, and he leads an ethical and philosophical inquiry. However, the *Philebus* has a combination of three features not found in any other Platonic dialogues: A positive conclusion, engaging characters, and a refutation of Socrates' initial thesis. These features are intended to show in the *Philebus* how a philosophical inquiry is supposed to be executed: interlocutors who genuinely do not possess knowledge engage each other seriously, and rejecting false opinions and cooperating to construct a true account, arrive finally at positive agreement.

In order to prove my main thesis, this chapter will be structured in the following order: In Section 1.2, I will present a general account of three grouping of Plato's dialogues. I will show how the *Philebus* does not fit into the characteristics of the late dialogues. Also, I will maintain that Plato, as an author of the *Philebus,* engages with his own philosophical problem in this dialogue as well as suggests his own answers to his readers so that they also participate in Plato's philosophy. In Section 1.3, I will answer possible objections to my claim, especially possible counter examples from Plato's other dialogues. Comparing other characters from those dialogues with Socrates and Protarchus in the *Philebus*, I will show how the characters in this dialogue are different

[24] I am sympathetic to the account that the Socrates in the Socratic dialogues is similar to the historical Socrates. In other words, Plato, as the author of Socratic dialogues, describes the Socrates in these dialogues as true as possible to his teacher. At least in this dissertation, however, I do not argue that Plato wants to realize the historical Socrates' philosophy in the *Philebus*. Rather, the Socrates and his philosophy in the *Philebus* is Plato's philosophical realization of the Socrates' philosophy in Socratic dialogues.

from any other of Plato's characters and how Plato uses them to depict ideal characters, engaged in proper philosophical discussion.

1.2. Plato's Dialogues and the *Philebus*

1.2.1. Three Thematic Groupings of Plato's Dialogues

There are three thematic groupings of Plato's dialogues, which are usually categorized as Socratic (or Early), Middle, and Late (or Critical) dialogues. The *Philebus* is regarded as one of the latest ones, probably the latest except the *Laws*. Since the *Laws* was never completed by Plato, however, probably the *Philebus* is the last one among the finished dialogues.[25] Therefore it is usually considered to belong to the late dialogue group of Plato's dialogues.

In the *early* or *Socratic* dialogues,[26] Socrates the main character in these dialogues is described as engaging in ethical inquiries, especially a search after universal

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[25] In the *Seventh Letter*, of course its authenticity is not agreed by all, Plato says that it is impossible to discuss directly on the good unlike the obvious direct discussion and definition of the good in the *Philebus*. Also he uses logos as the definition (341c) as he does in the *Philebus*. This shows that this dialogue was written late than the seventh letter, which was written when Plato was around 73 or 74 years old.

[26] Although I do not accept the 'chronology' of Plato's dialogues in this project, it would be helpful to overview what the discussion of the chronology of Plato's dialogues among scholars has been like. Through the stylometric and linguistic tests beginning from 19th century's scholars like Campbell and Lutoslawski, scholars have reached a consensus concerning the general order of the dialogues, though this grouping is under heavy attack from scholars like Kahn. According to Conford's chronological grouping [quoted by Guthrie (1990)], this is the *generally* accepted chronological grouping of Socrates' dialogues.

Early: *Apology, Crito, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor (and also Major), Protagoras, Gorgias, Ion*, (Thrashymachus)
Middle: *Meno, Phaedo, Republic, Symposium, Phaedrus, Euthydemus, Menexenus, Cratylus, Theaetetus*
Late: *Parmenides, Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus, Critias, Philebus, Laws*

The stylometric or linguistic, and computing method has helped to divide first the 'late' group of Plato's dialogues from others. It should be remembered that not theme but Plato's writing style distinguishes this group from others. Then, there are a group of dialogues, which present a sort of portrait of the historical Socrates—teaching young men by challenging them to examine their own beliefs, pursuing the moral knowledge while disavowing his own, and being moral exemplar with a high command of philosophical dialectic. Because of the character Socrates' similarity to the historical Socrates, this group is usually

definitions of ethical terms. He meets anyone who claims that he has knowledge on such a subject and sees if this man truly possesses such knowledge. An examination of such a man always fails to show that he has knowledge and the dialogues of this period usually end without yielding any further knowledge than the fact that the interlocutors actually did not have the knowledge they claimed. Plato's Socrates in these *early* dialogues raises questions, investigates, but fails to gain knowledge. Some scholars like Guthrie, Conford or Vlastos consider that the role Socrates plays in these dialogues is a fair description of the historical Socrates, although this claim has been widely attacked.[27]

In these middle dialogues, Socrates, still remaining the main character just as he was in the Socratic dialogues, speaks more than before and seldom examines his interlocutors. Socrates in the middle dialogues is like a teacher with a positive and strong doctrine, and no longer the moral gadfly who disavows all knowledge and confines himself almost exclusively to ethical questions. He has been gradually changed into a sage-like philosopher in possession of a great deal of positive knowledge which covers not only ethical matters but also other branches of philosophy, which he is eager to impart to others. On the contrary, other characters in the dialogues of this period

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named 'Socratic' or 'Early' dialogues. And there are other dialogues, which do not directly belong to the Socratic or late dialogues. While these dialogues develop the positive philosophical theories in ethics, politics, and metaphysics, but it is hard to find a unifying similarity among these dialogues. This last group is called 'middle' dialogues, but this does not necessarily mean that the dialogues in this group were written temporally between the Socratic dialogues and late dialogues due to lack of sufficient historical and textual evidences. Thus, Cooper (1997) says "I urge readers not to undertake the study of Plato's works holding in mind the customary chronological groupings of 'early' 'middle,' and 'late' dialogues. It is safe to recognize only the group of six late dialogues. Even for these, it is better to relegate thoughts about chronology to the secondary position they desrtve and to concentrate on the literary and philosophical content of the word, taken on their own and in relation to others... chronological hypotheses must not preclude the independent interpretation and evaluation of the philosophical arguments the dialogues contain; so far as possible the individual texts must be allowed to speak for themselves" (xiv). For more detailed discussions on the grouping of Plato's dialogues, refer Cooper's introduction to his collection (1997), xii-vii, Ross (1951) p. 1-10, Guthrie (1990) vol. 4, p. 39-56, Robinson (1985), O'Brien (1967) 83, Young (1994) p. 227-50, Kahn (1996), p. 42-48, Annas (2003) and Frede's comment (2003) on Annas.

[27] Especially Cooper (1997) or Kahn (1995).

mostly listen and learn from him.[28] Unlike many interlocutors of the early dialogues, who are active, engaging, recalcitrant, unwilling to be persuaded, and occasionally hostile, those in these dialogues are somewhat passive, cooperative, persuadable and attentive to Socrates. Just as Glaucon in the *Republic* or Cebes in the *Phaedo* they are ready to accept Socrates' account and willing to hear and learn from him, sometimes having questions and doubts about his accounts (not as strong objections but as a way to clarify what their master really means). Also the conclusions of dialogues in this period are more positive and direct, and presented as something endorsed by Socrates.

In the *Late* or *Critical* dialogues such as *Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus, Critias, Philebus,* and *Laws* —they are proven to be written in the late period of Plato's career[29]—Plato seems to criticize his positive argument and doctrine, that is, the main theme of the middle dialogues. The way Plato approaches his own position from the middle period is the reason many scholars also categorize these dialogues as 'critical' ones. We also come across somewhat different atmosphere and characters in terms of dramatic setting. Socrates is rather young and a little diffident, and sometimes at a loss without knowing what to answer to crucial questions posed against himself. Furthermore, his role in the discussions becomes smaller and smaller. He does not say much, even stays aside after introducing main speakers into the scene.[30] Usually it is not Socrates but other characters, such as Theaetetus, Timaeus, and "Eleatic visitor" who speak. Finally in *Laws*, the last dialogue Plato ever wrote, Socrates disappears from Plato's work, while an unknown visitor to Athens is playing his character of the middle

[28] Since most of Plato's dialogues have a dramatic style in which the key characters, especially Socrates, still are engaging in conversations, this 'listening and learning' part for the other characters does not mean that they are not like passive students, who are waiting to be informed by their student.
[29] Copper (1996) xiv.
[30] *E.g.*, *Timaeus*, *Sophist* or *Stateman*.

or early dialogues. And even fewer attempts to preserve a "dialogue" style are observed. The style of the dialogues is drier than before; the characters, who are conversing there, are not as active as ones in the early dialogues in terms of dramatic style, and the ethical topics no longer hold center stage. Metaphysical, ontological and cosmological inquiries are the main themes of the discourses in the critical dialogues, but seldom do we see any character in those dialogues discuss ethical questions.

Due to their common stylistic features the *Philebus* is certainly regarded as one of the 'late' dialogues written with *Timaeus, Sophist, Statesman, Critias*. However, the *Philebus* is similar to the Socratic dialogues with respect to the characters and its theme. First, Socrates comes back and leads the conversation with his interlocutor, Protarchus. Socrates talks to Protarchus just as the Socrates in the *Laches* or *Charmides*. Second, the topic of this dialogue is pleasure, knowledge and the good life, which were the main themes of the *Gorgias, Protagoras*, and many other early dialogues. In other words, this dialogue directly deals with a Socratic question of Socratic dialogues, the nature of the good life for humans. These distinctive features of the dialogue have drawn many scholars' attention.[31] Why does the Socrates of the Socratic dialogues come back to Plato's *Philebus* with the old problem?

The *Philebus* is notorious for its interpretive difficulties. Frede even says, "a unifying interpretation may be grossly misleading, since it will present the dialogue as something it is not."[32] However, my claim in this dissertation is that it is possible to suggest a unified interpretation of the *Philebus*, as an ideal answer to the Socratic problem. And we can see this point when reading this work in relation to Plato's other

[31] Davidson (1993) p. 193, Frede (1993) lxvii-lxviii.
[32] Frede (1993) xv.

dialogues. There are generally two camps of scholars who put much importance on the relationship among Plato's dialogues. On the one hand, Revisionists maintain that the Plato ultimately rejects and discards the 'theory of Forms' in the later dialogues. On the other hands, Unitarians argue that there is no change at all on the central point in Plato's philosophy, namely, the theory of Forms. My interpretation of Plato's *Philebus* is neither Unitarian nor Revisionist. I am taking a middle way, namely a developmental approach, that Plato writes dialogues in order to solve problems for himself and to announce his answers to the readers.

1.2.2. The *Philebus* as An Unusual Late Dialogue

1.2.2.1. Similarities with the Socratic Dialogues

Upon this general account of the thematic groupings of Plato's dialogues and also the characteristics of each period, especially in terms of dramatic setting, such as characters and contents of dialogues, my initial project, an examination of the *Philebus* and its unity, begins.

At the first glance, the *Philebus* is somewhat familiar to readers of Plato's early dialogues. The sly old Socrates meets other Athenian citizens on the corner of the streets of Athens. He is conversing and examining them on a certain puzzling topic, while refuting and disclosing their ignorance on the subject matter that they claim to have knowledge of. The character Socrates in this *late* dialogue is just as he was in the Socratic dialogues. Unlike Socrates in the late dialogues, Socrates in this dialogue does not hide himself and then keep quiet.

Both participants in the conversation, Socrates and Protarchus, and also Philebus, as in the case of many early dialogues, reach an impasse without knowing

where they should go further to acquire the knowledge on what they originally thought that they knew. Many readers of Plato's dialogues, especially the so-called 'Socratic' or 'early', or even 'ethical' dialogues, would see this dialogue—up to this point—is very similar to what they have read. Socrates has always been looking for the universal definitions of ethical terms. Socrates is willing to meet anyone who claims to have knowledge of ethical concepts in order to gain knowledge of them. He examines these men's claim and belief on the subject to see if what they believe is actually what Socrates is looking for. Many times in Plato's early dialogues, the interlocutors are unable to provide Socrates with a sufficient ground of what they know. But they show the inconsistency of their belief sets: what they think they know does not go along with what they really believe deep in their hearts and minds. Through ongoing exchanges of short questions and answers their lack of knowledge is revealed and the original definition or belief on the subject matter*, i.e.,* ethical concepts, are refuted. Then the interlocutors are usually at a loss without knowing how to further answer Socrates. It is Socrates who at this moment urges them not to give up but to pursue the inquiry based on whatever they claimed to have knowledge but now are shown to be ignorant of.

Furthermore, the topic of the *Philebus* is quite surprising for a late dialogue. On the one hand, just as other late dialogues, the *Philebus* is full of heavy and serious metaphysical doctrines and discussions. On the other hand, those stories and theories on the metaphysical topics are not discussed for their own sake. Rather, they are introduced in the process of finding the answer to the initial ethical question. In other words, the metaphysical accounts are investigated as a stage, which prepares the interlocutors to find an answer to another and more fundamental question. Unlike other dialogues of the late period, where all ethical problems seem to disappear from Plato's

philosophical inquiries, the main theme of this dialogue is ethics, that is, how to live a good life as man.

Such a big ethical question, namely whether pleasure is good or not in human lives, was the main topic of the earlier dialogues, especially the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias*. And in the *Philebus* Philebus and his companion, Protarchus, bring this topic back to the discussion. It is suggested that, on the one hand, they think pleasure is the human good all should pursue. But on the other hand, Socrates suggests another candidate for the human good, that is, knowledge. They investigate together what the human goods are while examining these candidates. Pleasure, knowledge, and the good, these are the most important topic that the character Socrates in the early dialogue was concerned with, unlike Plato's critical dialogues, which are mainly on metaphysics.

1.2.2.2. Differences from the Socratic Dialogues: Three Distinctive Features

Even though the *Philebus* has some similarities with the early dialogues, it seems to be somewhat strange to readers of Plato's early dialogues. It is mainly because of this dialogue's three distinctive features: a positive conclusion, supportive characters, and joint investigations.

1) Both Socrates and Protarchus come to arrive at an impasse, where they do not know how to continue their inquiry. They are at a loss how to continue their investigation, since their original positions on the concept of the Good, or the question what is good are rejected through dual cross-examinations on each person's position.[33] In most early dialogues, since interlocutors at this stage of a conversation do not know how to answer, some of them try to run away without saying much (Euthyphro), some

[33] Actually they are not the same questions. I will show how they are different in Chapter 6.

get mad and yell at Socrates and take off (Callicles) embarrassed to talk more (Protagoras), and some of them accuse Socrates of being like a broad torpedo fish, who makes anyone who comes close and touches him numb (Meno). Many early dialogues end at the moment where the opponents become speechless, as long as Socrates examines the interlocutor's belief in the conversations. Thus, reader do not find any positive conclusion from such dialogues, because their inquiries do not go further but stop in the middle of the process.

In the *Philebus*, however, even though their original positions are refuted, both Socrates and Protarchus do not give up their investigation on what is good for human lives. Arriving at an impasse, a point where they recognize their ignorance, Protarchus and Socrates do not get mad, nor yell, nor leave, nor run away. Unlike many interlocutors of the early dialogues, they begin a fresh new start on the inquiry of what is good. Furthermore, Protarchus, is willing to participate in the examination with Socrates in search of the human goods. In addition, Socrates and Protarchus arrive at a certain positive conclusion together, that is, the list of goods in human lives. In other words, they succeed in acquiring knowledge, of which they were ignorant. We hardly see such a successful investigation in the early dialogues.

2) The characters, especially Protarchus, are somewhat different from those of other dialogues. As I have maintained in the previous section, Protarchus is not like a Callicles-type aggressive character. Since Socrates' sole goal is to find truth, especially the universal definitions of ethical terms in hope of applying such definitions to any cases of human lives, his attitude would be shown as something hostile to those like sophists, who brag about their knowledge and even advertise themselves as teachers of such moral matters. The way Socrates conducts a conversation with them in fact

destroys their fame and reputation. Therefore, they did not understand Socrates' intention to find the truth and regard him as something dangerous to them. Protarchus in the *Philebus,* however, is not such a character. At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates wants to make sure that the conversation between himself and Protarchus is not a verbal competition but a process to find the truth. Protarchus is also willing to pursue the truth and concede to participate in the discussion with the attitude Socrates asks for. This is why Protarchus did not show the same reaction to Socrates as other interlocutors of other dialogues with refuted claims, but admits his ignorance, opens his mind to the new possibility and examines pleasure and knowledge with Socrates. Most of all, Socrates wanted to find those who have knowledge. If he cannot find such a person with knowledge, he looks for those, who admit their ignorance and are ready to join Socrates in the search for the truth. Protarchus is such a supportive character, interested more in finding knowledge than in winning the verbal contest against Socrates. He is ready to converse with Socrates in the pursuit of knowledge. Plato, as an author, intentionally chooses Protarchus as Socrates' ideal interlocutor, who is still young, ready to learn more, not stubborn as he is not an expert in a certain area yet, but well educated.

Socrates also is an ideal character. Unlike the Socrates in the 'teacher mode' in the *Republic* or other middle dialogues, Socrates in the *Philebus* is still a knowledge pursuer. He does not want to become involved in verbal disputes, as Philebus was trying to make him. Rather, he investigates with a supportive character like Protarchus so that both of them would reach a positive conclusion. The key character of the *Philebus*, Socrates, himself is not described as a knower, either, just like Protarchus does not have knowledge. Socrates' own initial claim, knowledge is the human good, is refuted in the

Philebus. Unlike the Socrates in early dialogues, Socrates in the *Philebus* had his own initial idea and after an investigation he is proven to be wrong.

Nevertheless, the fact that Socrates in this dialogue is not a knower does not mean that the author of the dialogue, Plato, does not have adequate knowledge, either. I maintain that Plato wants to use the character Socrates in order to present how philosophy is possible in the way the Socrates of the early dialogues would have wanted to execute an investigation. At the same time, the readers of the dialogue can engage in the investigation that the two key interlocutors are executing.[34] Plato has these intentions when he describes Socrates as a knowledge-pursuer, not a teacher as he is described in some middle dialogues. Plato's intention in writing this ideal dialogue will be the main thesis in the following section.

3) As I previously argued, both characters do not stop here at an impasse, where their initial claims are mutually rejected. From the point where both of them turn out to be ignorant of the topic, what is the human good, they start a new investigation. This investigation is not between a teacher and a student, because both of them do not have knowledge of this matter, namely, the human good. Since both initial suggestions from

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[34] Another possible interpretation is that Socrates intentionally hides his knowledge (in fact, the author, Plato describe Socrates in such a way) in order to make Protarchus remain in the investigation. In other words, Socrates is in fact like a teacher but does not reveal it, and as a result, Protarchus can take him as an equal partner in the pursuit of the human goods. However, I do not think this was the author's intention, because of these two reasons:
First, hiding Socrates knowledge means that he is not telling the truth in the conversation with Protarchus. There are some instances where Socrates does not seem to be sincere. For example, Socrates in the *Protagoras* does not seem to be fully serious about his claim in the dialogue, since he denies the unity of virtue, which the historical Socrates is said to uphold. However, one of the goals of the Protagoras is to expose who sophists are, and therefore, the character Socrates has to play some game with the master sophist, Protagoras in the *Protagoras*. On the contrary, the *Philebus* has a different aim: presenting the ideal conversation how a philosophical pursuit is possible. If this is true, the key character Socrates does not have to hide his knowledge from Protarchus. As a sincere pursuer interested in finding knowledge, Socrates is a perfect partner for Protarchus in the investigation of the human goods.
Second, not revealing who Socrates is in the conversation may help Protarchus but will not do any good to the readers of the dialogue. If Plato's intention were making his readers engaging in Socrates and Protarchus' philosophy, describing Socrates as someone who hides his knowledge would not be the best way to write a dialogue about a genuine philosophical investigation.

the two interlocutors are rejected, they are ready to begin a new investigation *together*. A true example of joint investigation is presented in the *Philebus*.

Some would raise a doubt regarding my claim that both Socrates and Protarchus are executing a 'joint investigation' unlike the Socrates in the middle or late dialogues does. In fact, later in the *Philebus*, Socrates seems to be in a 'teacher mode'—taking the lead in the conversation on the division and collection of pleasure and knowledge. However, I do not think Socrates is teaching Protarchus. Socrates does not seem to know all the joints of divisions of pleasure and knowledge. For example in the fourfold divisions of the universe, Socrates provisionally divides all things into four (23d). When Protarchus asks, "Might you not also be in need of a fifth kind that provides for their separation?" Socrates answers "Perhaps, but I do not think so, at least for now. But if it turns out that I need it, I gather you will bear with me if I should search for a fifth kind." Socrates executes the joint investigation with Protarchus by positing a hypothesis first, and then examining and confirming it. After finishing these procedures, he moves onto the next step and hypothesis and repeats the same investigation. I will discuss his way of investigation in Chapter 2. Additionally in Chapter 6, I will show how Socrates in the *Philebus* is not a teacher but a seeker unlike the Socrates in other middle or late dialogues.

1.2.3. Interpreting Plato's Intention in the *Philebus*

I maintain that the dramatic element of the *Philebus* shows his intention in writing such a unique dialogue at his last stage of his career. Primarily I take Plato's dialogues as essays or treatises that present what Plato is concerned with at the moment of writing. As he writes a dialogue, he presents his own answer to the readers so that

they can engage the same philosophical problems together. Secondarily, he chooses the dramatic format as his writing style so that the readers can see how Plato philosophizes the problem and also participate in Plato's philosophy. As an author, Plato had these two concerns while writing dialogues. And there is an order of priority: first he wants to philosophize for himself with the material he is writing, and then his is concerned about presenting his philosophy in a dialogue setting for the sake of his readers' benefit.

The *Philebus*, which was written at the end of Plato's career, is an ideal dialogue that describes the ideal conversation in which the Socrates of the early dialogues would have wanted to engage. And the three distinctive features of the *Philebus*, a positive conclusion, a supportive interlocutor, and a joint investigation, are actually what the character Socrates in the Socratic dialogues was looking for. Therefore it is important to see Plato's role as an author in writing this dialogue.

There are also other scholars who hold the importance of Plato's intention in writing dialogues. Famously, Kahn argues that the dramatic elements in Plato's works should be seriously considered. He maintains that Plato, as an author of the Socratic dialogues, uses the historical characters to speak for Plato's philosophy. Basically taking the Unitarian position,[35] Kahn argues that Plato carefully organized the early dialogues in order to present his big picture of philosophy from several different perspectives. Plato's dialogues are written for the sake of readers, who want to learn more about Plato's philosophy. Therefore, he thinks the developmental approach that I take has at least two major problems: 1) this position underestimates Plato's cunning as an author. The prepositions of the developmental reading of Plato's dialogues are that Plato must say in each dialogue everything he thought at the time and also that Socrates in the

[35] Kahn (1996) xiv.

dialogues is Plato's spokesman. 2) The developmental view assumes that Plato writes dialogues in order to solve the problem he is facing and also to present his own answer to the problem.

I do agree with his position, insofar as he is arguing about the early dialogues. Plato may have a big plan when he was using the Socrates in the Socratic dialogues for presenting his philosophy and for preparing his readers for the huge philosophical theme in the middle dialogues, namely the theory of Forms. However, I would like to focus only on the *Philebus*. As he points out, Plato, as an author, says in the *Philebus* everything he thought at the time of writing in order to answer the question he has been pursuing. Second, also as he suggests, in the *Philebus* Plato is trying to solve the philosophical problem and to suggest his own answer to his readers. Even though there are many elements of the early dialogues in the *Philebus*, this dialogue was certainly written at the *very* late period of Plato's philosophical career. No matter how Plato wrote the early dialogues, Plato writes the *Philebus* as a philosopher, who is still philosophizing, and also an author, who wants to present his own position to his readers so that they also join his philosophy.

After his ignorance on the moral issue is revealed by self-examination, Socrates in the *Philebus* wanted to find the truth on the same topic by a joint investigation with his supportive interlocutors. Unfortunately, in Plato's dialogues Socrates seldom meets such a friendly person to talk with, though. For Plato as an author of his dialogues, historical events around Socrates were good materials for Plato to write his own philosophy. It does not mean that Plato's philosophy was disconnected from Socrates'. On the contrary, Plato's intention while philosophizing is to take over what he portrays his master, Socrates, as leaving unfinished and to develop it so that he can answer what his

master could not. Thus, Plato's philosophy in the early dialogues may reflect Socrates' philosophy and his failures in the early dialogues. After he has developed Socrates' methodology to the next level in the middle dialogues, his theme of philosophy seems to even switch to another direction, metaphysics. After he secured the foundation of his philosophy by inquiring into metaphysics and found the way to the unchanging world, however, Plato wants to come back to the original moral question with a positive answer. The way he gives account of the problem his master has spent his entire life on is to write a perfect form of the dialogue, that is, an ideal conversation Socrates would want to have.[36]

Plato chooses the conversational setting as seen in the early dialogues. It is because readers can relate to such a lively conversation more easily a lively conversation can relate to the readers more easily. As Kahn would agree, Plato, when he is writing dialogues, is very conscious of his readers. It was either to educate and prepare his readers for the bigger philosophical theme, or to present what he was dealing with as his own problems, Plato thinks that the conversational setting in the Early dialogues is a very effective format that can philosophically impact his readers. Taking this as the most effective setting, Plato brings back this conversational format with the characters from the early dialogues to the *Philebus* so that readers can engage with the problem that Plato is facing as well as the one Socrates had to deal with throughout his lifetime.

The author of the *Philebus*, Plato, has an intention primarily to philosophize what he has been struggling with. The biggest problem he has to solve was Socrates' moral 'intellectualism.' To summarize this problem: "Virtue is knowledge of (what is) good and

[36] Of course, Socrates leads the conversation, as Socrates in the *Republic* or *Phaedrus*. However, Socrates in the *Philebus* does not have concrete and firm knowledge as he does in other dialogues. I will discuss this point in detain in Chapter 3.

bad." Thus if you know all the goods and bads, you are completely virtuous.[37] Plato reintroduces the old, sly Socrates as the main speaker in his dialogue at the last stage of his career, probably because he finally has an answer to this Socrates' intellectualism. After presenting the theory of the Forms and critically evaluating his own position, Plato feels comfortable to answer the moral question on the basis of his metaphysics from the middle dialogues. Socrates, as the main character in the *Philebus*, just as in the early dialogues, would be the perfect person who can discuss the moral problem of knowledge and virtue.

Plato is not a historian but a philosopher, who was heavily influenced by Socrates. Not only does he want to answer what the Socrates of the Socratic dialogues left unanswered, but also he wants to complete the way his master inquired into the philosophical question that Socrates had. The topic as well as the format of the *Philebus* is ideally structured and examined in such a way that the Socrates of the early dialogue would follow.[38] By writing the *Philebus* with such characters and in this style with a positive answer to the moral question, Plato attributes his philosophy and its outcomes to Socrates, who inspired, influenced, and taught him. The *Philebus* is, at a glance, familiar to readers of Plato's dialogues. The extraordinariness permeated throughout the whole dialogue, however, is due to Plato's intention of writing this dialogue. He wants to finish his master's incomplete work and make it complete in every respect.

1.3. The *Philebus*: an Ideal Dialogue

[37] Mainly from the *Protagoras*.
[38] Maybe there is much room for Plato to revise this dialogue. At the same time, he may not have time to revise this dialogue in order to make it better structured. I do not mean the style or consistency of the dialogue here when I say this is an 'ideal' one.

1.3.1. A Positive Conclusion?

In this section by answering some possible objections I will present further explanation to support my claim that the *Philebus* is an ideal dialogue. Many scholars would probably argue that there are other dialogues that end with positive doctrines, such as the *Republic*, and that some characters like Crito or Glaucon, who are very supportive and want to learn the truth from Socrates. Furthermore, some readers of Plato's dialogue would dispute my claim that Socrates' claim is also examined and then refuted. It is because there are some occasions in which Socrates has a strong thesis as the Socrates in the *Gorgias* does

Although I agree with the scholars that there are some Platonic dialogues with a positive ending, I cannot fully embrace such an objection. It is because Plato's dialogues, which end with positive doctrines, mainly belong to the group of the middle dialogues. As discussed at Section 1.2., the middle dialogues are regarded as not Socratic but Platonic ones. Furthermore, the dramatic settings in the middle dialogues are unlike an investigation but similar to a teaching in engaging philosophical conversation between teacher and students. My point of raising the characteristic of the *Philebus* with respect to the conclusion, however, is that this work has the strong doctrine, *i.e.*, the list of the goods for human beings, at the end of the dialogue as the conclusion of Socrates and Protarchus' *joint* investigation. The *Philebus* has a Socratic structure and characters like the early dialogues with a very active and lively conversation; it has a more subtle dramatic setting that leads to a positive conclusion. Socrates examines his interlocutor's position in order to reject it, and from there both Socrates and Protarchus reach something concrete and positive from their search. At least, those dialogues, which are

considered as Socratic and more true to the historical Socrates, do not have such a positive answer to moral questions. Probably that is because those dialogues are quite accurate accounts of what Socrates actually did. The Socrates of the Socratic dialogues always has been searching for truth but never succeeded, but Socrates finds a certain positive answer at the end of the *Philebus*. This suggests that this dialogue is not as historically realistic as other Socratic dialogues, but closer to the ideal Socrates that Plato wanted to execute and describe. In sum, the positive conclusion of the *Philebus* distinguishes itself not from all of Plato's dialogue but only from Socratic ones.[39]

1.3.2. Engaging Characters—Crito in the *Crito*?

I will refute the objection that Protarchus is not as ideal as I argue in the similar way I rejected the doubt against my claim that the *Philebus* is the only Socratic dialogue with a positive conclusion. As I have surveyed in the previous section, many characters in the early dialogues, on the one hand, are mostly provocative and concerned with winning a verbal competition against Socrates, but on the other hand, those who listen to Socrates in the middle dialogues are more like Socrates' disciples, who may ask some hard questions but mostly want to learn some positive doctrine from their master Socrates.[40] Therefore, the characteristic of the *Philebus* with respect to the main character, in other words, Protarchus' willingness to search for the truth and his being

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[39] Also the fact that the *Philebus* belongs to the group of late dialogues should be noticed. Unlike other dialogues in this period, it is similar to the Socratic ones. I have dealt with this point in the second section of this chapter.

[40] For example, Adeimantus in *Republic* II says, "I want to hear the opposite [from Thrasymachus' argument] from you (Socrates) that I speak with all the force I can muster. So don't merely give us a theoretical argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but tell us what each itself does, because of its own powers, to someone who possesses it, that makes injustice bad and justice good" (367b). Socrates answers this question by explaining how justice exists both in an individual and a city throughout Book II-IV, and VIII-X. Also at the beginning of *Republic* V, Adeimantus asks again Socrates to clarity the manner how wives, children and the possessions of friends should be held in common (449c). To meet Adeimantus' request, Socrates gives a metaphysical account in Book V-VII.

supportive is quite unheard-of in the early dialogues. Furthermore, Protarchus is different from the characters of the middle dialogues, as well. He has a certain belief and wants to see it examined in order to find truth. Unlike Glaucon or Cebes, who have merely some doubt against the master's claim, Protarchus is more true to his belief, whereas he is ready to reject it if it does not meet the criteria he believes.

Against my interpretation of the characters of Plato's dialogues Crito is a problematic character from the early dialogue with respect to the fact that he is somehow helping Socrates to lead the conversation between themselves. In other words, Crito does not seem to be too tough as other characters of the early dialogues. Though I concede that Socrates is still concerned with finding a better principle than he has,[41] I still maintain that the two characters in this dialogue are somewhat atypical among those characters of the early dialogues. First, it is because the *Crito* does not deal with the same themes—ethics—that other Socratic dialogues do. The *Crito* is rather Socrates' apology concerning why he should stay in the prison. This dialogue is not primarily about an individual's personal and good life. Rather the Crito deals with bigger issues like justice, that is, the relationship between an individual and a community. Second, in consequence, Crito is described in a similar way to those who appear in the middle dialogues. Even though at the beginning of the dialogue Crito challenges Socrates' belief so that Socrates can run away from the prison, this dialogue is not about refuting one's false belief in order to search for a true one as many early dialogues are. Rather, Socrates seems to have true belief—or Crito could not refute Socrates' belief. And the dramatic setting of the *Crito* shows that the conversation between Socrates and Crito is not really an examination but a persuasion, or a teaching, which usually occur in the

[41] *Crito* 46c.

middle dialogues. Even though he came to persuade Socrates to get out of the prison, it is he who is persuaded in the conversation. He does not have a strong belief but is just concerned with Socrates himself and his life.[42] The initial reason why they began the conversation was not in order to find the truth about the law and citizen's duty to obey it. Rather, a practical concern—persuade Socrates to break away from the prison—was Crito's primary reason to come to talk to Socrates. Therefore, the end of the story, that is, the answer to the question why keeping law is important, is a secondary result from their original conversation that Socrates would stay in the prison and wait for his own sentence. Socrates had to lead their talk into the law in order not to leave the prison as Crito tried to persuade. The truth about the law, the main thesis of the Crito, is needed for Socrates to support his point—not leaving the prison.

1.3.3. Socrates' Own Thesis and Its Refutation—Only in the *Philebus*?

Now I have to answer the hardest objection to my claim that only in the *Philebus* Socrates seems to possess some opinion on a subject, to get refuted by his own method, that is, *elenchus*, and then to turn out to be ignorant. There are three elements that make Socrates in the *Philebus* special: 1) He has a belief, 2) His initial belief is refuted, and then 3) He begins to search for an answer other than the belief he had but rejected. I maintain that no other character in Plato's dialogues has these three elements. Only in

[42] Crito suggest at least seven reasons why Socrates has to break the prison: 1) Crito will lose the best friend (44b-c). 2) Crito is worried about a bad reputation that he is interested more in money than friends (45b-c). 3) Socrates does not have to worry about his friends' financial damage (44e-45b). 4) Socrates will be welcomed in other cities (45b-c). 5) Giving up when he can save himself is not just (45c). 6) Facing the death sentence is deserting Socrates' children (45c-d). 7) People will think that both Socrates and his friends are not courageous enough (45d-e). Especially first two reasons show what Crito is mostly concerned with. Throughout the dialogue, Socrates keeps telling Crito that he will stand by his principle—live a just life. And he asks Crito to refute his principle, if Crito think that Socrates' principle is not good enough (48b, 48e, 54d). However, Crito wants to reconsider this matter more *practically* (48d).

the *Philebus*, I argue, Socrates shows these three points, and that makes the Socrates in the *Philebus* ideal. In order to maintain my claim, I will go through Plato's two dialogues with similar characters and themes, that is, the *Gorigas*, and *Protargoras,* and show that Socrates in these dialogues does not possess these three elements that a philosopher should have.

1.3.3.1. Socrates in the *Gorgias*—A Strong Belief without Refutation

Just as Socrates in the *Philebus* does at the beginning of the story, Socrates in the *Gorgias* has his own position. And throughout the conversations with three interlocutors, Gorgias, Polus and Callicles, Socrates does not abandon his initial belief,[43] as Socrates of the *Philebus* does. The *Gorgias* is usually categorized as one of the Socratic dialogues or early Middle dialogues.[44] At the first part of the dialogue, where Socrates challenges Gorgias about the nature of rhetoric, Socrates does not express what he really thinks of rhetoric but just shows the inconsistency of Gorgias' argument. As a result, either Gorgias has to admit that the good orator lacks knowledge of justice or he falls into impasse.[45] When a typical *aporetic* dialogue between the interlocutors ends, Polus challenges Socrates by asking what Socrates really thinks. Their conversation leads to the point where Socrates says doing injustice is bad, and doing injustice but not getting punished is worse than merely doing it (479d), and that rhetoric is useful to make one get punished for what he has done wrong (480d). As Polus fails to reject

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[43] Especially at the end of the conversation with Polus 480e-481b. Also after the verbal dispute with Callicles, 521b-522e. I will discuss this later in this chapter.
[44] Dodds (1990), p. 23.
[45] When Socrates leads a conversation with Gorgias, he does not say what he believes but only examines Gorgias' position. Probably it is because Gorgias is a well-recognized teacher and sophist, who is supposed to have knowledge on rhetoric. However, as he moves onto Polus and Callicles, he says what he believes and is challenged by them.

Socrates' position, Callicles becomes furious and points out that Polus should not agree with Socrates that one who did injustice is shameful when he did not get punished. His thesis is that the stronger is not different from the better, and the better, *i.e.*, the stronger, should rule the weaker, since they are the worse. Since Socrates believes still that the good is closely related to soul not to physical or political power, he cannot agree with Callicles. Since then, the conversation between Socrates and Callicles does not reach any further agreement, while Callicles has to admit that pleasure and the good are different from each other.

In the *Gorgias*, Socrates is very persistent with his own position: one should do justice and if he did something unjust, he should get punished in order to become just again. Throughout the dialogues with Polus and Callicles, he does not abandon this initial belief, and furthermore, strongly maintains that his position alone will survive many refutations and remain steady (*Gorgias* 527c). That is because he believes that what is true is never refuted (473c). In this dialogue, Socrates in fact says that his claim is very strong.[46] On the contrary, he has a strong conviction and that leads him to confront one of the strongest verbal rivals among the characters of Plato's dialogues. And as long as his claim is not refuted, he strongly believes that what he thinks and believes is true. This robust statement from Socrates would surprise many of Plato's readers, especially those who have read the early dialogues.

Since Socrates has his own belief at the beginning of the conversation in the *Gorgias,* Socrates in this dialogue is not a counter example of my thesis, that is, the *Philebus* is a unique dialogue. The point I made, when I say the *Philebus* is an ideal

[46] In the *Gorgias* 508e-509a, Socrates says that "these conclusions, at which we arrived earlier in our previous discussions are, I'd say, held down and bound by arguments of iron and adamant, even if it's rather rude to say so."

dialogue, is that Plato has intentionally written it to show that Socrates' belief is refuted throughout *elenchus*. Yes, Socrates in the *Gorgias* has a strong belief, but no, he still sticks to his belief.[47]

Socrates in the *Gorgias* holds onto his initial true belief, while Socrates's belief in the *Philebus* is rejected. Socrates in both dialogues has initial beliefs and both go through examinations by the interlocutors. In the former dialogue, on the one hand, probably the most notorious characters in the dialogues, Polus and Callicles, who do really want to win the verbal battle and have a strong hedonistic view, tried and challenged Socrates aggressively. Yet, Socrates remains consistent, while winning them one by one without changing his position. In the latter dialogue, on the other hand, Socrates, at least at the beginning of the dialogue, where he just stopped debating against Philebus, does not seem to hold his position as strongly as he did in the *Gorgias*. Furthermore, his position turns out to be not true enough to fulfill the conditions for the human good. Socrates has to reject his own position and to look for another candidate of the human good other than pleasure or reason exclusively. Unlike Socrates in the *Gorgias*, Socrates in the *Philebus* turns out to be ignorant as much as Protarchus is.

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[47] Plato did not want to directly discuss Socrates' disavowal of knowledge in the *Philebus* as we may see in the early dialogues. It would require further discussion of what level of knowledge Socrates means when he disavows knowledge. For now, however, it would be enough to settle that when he means he does not know that does not necessarily mean that he does not have any knowledge or belief at all. On the contrary, he says in the *Apology* that he has human wisdom[47]. What he means when he claims his ignorance is probably that he does not have a positive way to prove whatever he thinks true. When Socrates says in the *Gorgias* that what he believes, doing injustice is bad and doing injustice and not punished is worse, is true and will remain steady throughout all refutation, probably he intended to hold that what he argues stays probably at the level of true belief, but still needs to be tied down by the power of logos (*aitias logismos*: *Meno*). He knows that his claim would not be refuted by anyone, but he does not know how to prove this statement directly. Showing what he thinks true will not be refuted would not have the same meaning value as proving the statement logically and reasonably. In other words, showing his thesis is not refuted does not prove anything concrete. Therefore, even though Socrates argues something strongly in the *Gorgias*, his claim does not necessarily mean that he has a positive knowledge. I will discuss this thesis in detail in Chapter 3 with a passage from the *Meno* that saying knowledge is different than showing it. C.f. Vlastos (1991) p. 119-120. Some problems in Greek mathematics admit of no arithmetical solution, while they do admit of a geometrical one.

The *Philebus* is unique, not only because Socrates has some belief but also because his belief was not strong enough to endure the examination and was refuted. The *Gorgias* is not an ideal dialogue that Plato had in mind. As a matter of fact, Socrates in this dialogue conforms to the Socrates of the Apology, which may be most similar to a portrait of the historical Socrates. Many of Socrates' interlocutors he met on the street, at the market place, by the gymnasium, were trying to beat Socrates and tried to fail him with hard questions. And Socrates was at least able to show them the good life by example. Nevertheless, he did not have a method or theory to prove what he believes directly. And this is why he was looking for someone who can show his knowledge to him more positively. Socrates examines their so-called 'knowledge' and shows their inconsistency. In terms of intellectual capacity, however, they were at the lower level compared to Socrates as Protarchus is: Socrates did not at least have a way to directly show what he believes, even though what he believes is actually consistent. Additionally, he acknowledges the brute fact about himself that he cannot prove it. On the contrary, other people who claim knowledge not only did not know how to prove their knowledge directly but also did not know that their convictions are inconsistent. Truly Socrates is wiser than anyone else, as Apollo says.[48] The *Gorgias* describes this Socrates—and other people he would really meet on the street of Athens.

1.3.2.2. Socrates in the *Protagoras*—Is He Serious?

There is one instance among Plato's dialogues where Socrates has a belief and his verbal opponents refute his claim. In the *Protagoras*, one of the most superb works of

[48] *Apology* 21a. Xenophon's record in his *Apology* is different from Plato's, though. Xenophon writes, "Apollo answered that no man was more free than I [Socrates], or more just, or more prudent." (*Apology*, 14).

literature among Plato's dialogues, Socrates challenges the most popular sophist, Protagoras, who happened to visit his town, Protagoras. Since Protagoras is a prominent teacher, especially of virtue according to himself, Socrates begins his day by having a conversation with him. Protagoras praises his own skill and promises that he will be able to make anyone who comes to him become better every day. This brings up a question for Socrates: If better, then better at what? Protagoras answers that he can impart skill or virtue in politics and citizenship (322d-323a), but this response makes Socrates become more interested. Since he did not think this kind of virtue was anything that could be passed on by instruction or training, he asks Protagoras if he can demonstrate that virtue can really be taught. At this point of the *Protagoras*, Socrates believes that virtue is not teachable but Protagoras holds the opposite view. As they go through examination of these beliefs and reach a conclusion, they seem to change their places with each other. Socrates, who did not think that virtue could be taught, has done his best throughout the conversation to prove it to be knowledge, which is indeed the proper object of teaching, whereas Protagoras, who claims that it is teachable, was reluctant to equate it with knowledge.[49] What has happened here? It is not the case that Socrates had a belief and this belief is refuted so that he has to admit virtue is knowledge? Is this not exactly what I have argued previously as something so unique about the *Philebus*? A closer look at some arguments of the *Protagoras* will answer this objection.

Protagoras initially thinks that virtue is teachable, because he himself is a teacher of virtue. Socrates, however, thinks that virtue is not teachable: First, there is no expert

[49] Especially at 330a Protagoras says "having knowledge is the most important part of all [virtues], and each ne of them is something quite distinct from the others."

of this unlike other arts. Even Protagoras said that Zeus has imparted civic virtues to all men[50]. Second, many good and virtuous people were not able to raise their own children to be like them. If they are truly virtuous and also know how to teach virtue, why did they not teach their own children before they impart their virtue to anyone else (325b)? This leads Socrates to believe that virtue is something not to be taught. The way Socrates holds this conviction is similar to Socrates' attitude regarding justice in the *Gorgias* or regarding the jailbreak in the *Crito*. It is not a direct proof but a sort of inductive way of thinking. Until you have a strong counter argument that will reject Socrates' initial claim, this will be regarded true. But as soon as Socrates finds out a counter-example of what he believes, he would be ready to change his opinion.[51] The critical problem, which forces both of them to change their own positions, is whether virtue is one or not (329c-d). Although Protagoras sounded like he was saying all virtues are the same, he wants to argue that there are some parts that cannot be identical to other parts. For example, courage cannot be equated to knowledge. In other words, he thinks virtue in terms of parts and the whole, *i.e.*, he equivocates what he means by virtue talking about it as parts and as a whole.

The problem with Socrates is that his set of beliefs is not consistent: Since he thinks all virtues should be somehow related to knowledge, virtue should be something teachable. However, he initially argued from his two pieces of evidence[52] that virtue is

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[50] And at least Socrates does not dismiss Proragoras' myth directly in the *Protagoras* (cf. 328e-329a).
[51] C.f. *Crito* 54d-e. In his final words to Crito, Socrates says, "As far as my present beliefs go, if you speak in opposition to them, you will speak in vain. However, if you think you can accomplish anything, speak." Crito had nothing to say, and therefore Socrates chooses to stay in the prison saying that "this is the way the god is leading" them.
[52] Socrates points to the fact that while in matters concerning specialized labor one would only take advice from the appropriate specialist, like for example builders about construction, in matters of state everyone's opinions is considered, which proves that political virtue is within everyone, or that at least that is what Athenians in their democratic ideals believe. Another example is that Pericles did not manage to impart his wisdom to his sons (319e).

not teachable. At the same time, Protagoras' position is also contradictory in the same fashion but with an opposing direction. The examination in the *Protagoras,* however, is focused on *only* Protagoras' thesis. Their discourse is primary on refuting the claim—all virtues are not identical—by pointing out the fact that they are connected to knowledge. They do not examine directly whether all virtues are really linked to knowledge. All they look into is that Protagoras' thesis, all virtues are not related, is not strong enough.

Socrates is not examined directly as *elenchus* is supposed to do, while Protagoras' argument is thoroughly examined. Socrates changes his claim, not because he did not endure all questions against his position but because his beliefs were not strong enough anyway. He had to give up his initial belief at the beginning of the discourse. Furthermore, he might have known the limit of his position already. In other words, he is not adamant enough about holding on to his suggested theses as he is in the *Gorgias*. He abandons what he believes even before they question it. While examining Protagoras, he finds his own contradiction. He turns out to be wrong, but not by *elenchus*. His thesis was weak already at the beginning. He did not even say that his position is true, as he said to Callicles in the *Gorgias* that his belief would endure all refutations. Additionally, Socrates' claim is not directly examined. An assumption between Protagoras and Socrates seems to be: Since their theses are opposing each other, one should be taken if the other is rejected. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be fair, either. Socrates also needs to go through a close refutation just as Protagoras did, primarily because there is a difference between contradiction and opposition. If there would be something in between, rejecting one does not guarantee the other's truth. And

also as was said in the *Parmenides*, a certain claim should be examined in every respect.[53]

Why then in the *Protagoras* does Socrates not let his argument be thoroughly examined? Just as Socrates in the *Philebus*, Socrates in the *Protagoras* has initially a belief and is at a loss after finding contradiction in his belief. The examination of his position in the *Protagoras*, however, is not direct but done for the sake of refuting Protagoras. It is a part of *elenchus* of Protagoras but not a direct *elenchus* of Socrates himself. He is not being adequately sincere when he argues the teachability of virtue or the unity of virtue. He may have brought up these contradicting theses only in order to refute Protagoras. In other words, the (hidden) ultimate goal that Socrates in the *Protagoras* has is not finding the truth of whether virtue is teacheable or not. Instead, Socrates wants to challenge the great teacher and show who Protargoras really is.[54] Of course, if Protagoras were willing, Socrates could work together with him in search of the truth. Considering who Protagoras is, however, it is hardly plausible.

In sum, Socrates in the *Protagoras* indeed argues something positive and his initial claim—that virtue is not to be taught—is examined. And his original claim is proven to be inconsistent with the conclusion reached by both Socrates and Protagoras, namely, the unity of virtue. This conversation in the Protagoras, however, was not done in the same way an ideal examination or *elenchus* is supposed to be done: the purpose of

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[53] *Parmenides*, 136 a-c.

[54] Hearing Protagoras is in town, Hippocrates was excited to see him and asked Socrates to join the visit. Before they leave to meet Protagoras, Socrates asks a few questions to get a clear idea of Hippocrates' plan, namely, going and seeing Protagoras, and paying him to learn (311b). After the conversation, Socrates joins Hippocrates to see and see what the man is and has to say (314b). He wants to examine Protagoras to see what kind of profession he has and what he can teach to young people like Hippocrates (318a), and to see if Protagoras is qualified to help young men make names for themselves in the city (316b-c). The deep reason Socrates wants to see Protagoras is not 'finding' knowledge but to evaluate him. Furthermore, Socrates had the suspicion that Protagoras wanted to show off (*kallopisastai:* 317c) in front of other intellectuals, and wanted to reveal who Protagoras is in front of others.

which is to prove one's ignorance so that he will begin another pursuit for the truth.[55] Socrates in the *Protagoras* does have a belief, and also this belief is refuted, but he does not begin a new inquiry after the refutation. This does not happen in the *Protagoras* as it does in the *Philebus*. Therefore, a perfect instance of a Socratic philosopher—having a belief that is to be refuted later, and again pursing knowledge—is not found in any other any other dialogue of Plato but the *Philebus*. This makes the *Philebus* as an ideal example of Socrates' and also Plato's philosophy.

1.4. An Ideal Example of Plato's Philosophical Investigations

In summary, I have maintained in this chapter that the *Philebus* is an ideal dialogue. This ideal dialogue presents how a perfect philosophical investigation, which the character Socrates in the Socratic dialogues wanted to achieve in those dialogues, is possible. Plato, however, is now able to make this drama, *i.e.*, the *Philebus*, a success story: A joint inquiry of two (or more) ignorant men finally comes to succeed. It describes how the joint project toward truth, especially on ethical issues, should be. Ultimately, this dialogue presents how Socratic philosophy is supposed to be done.

The dramatic settings and the characters of the *Philebus* are indeed Socratic. Plato, however, does not stop here; taking over Socrates' philosophy and completing it, Plato, while writing the *Philebus,* uses and develops his teacher's philosophical method, *elenchus*. It seems to be a device that does more than refute an opponent's belief. As Plato shows in the *Philebus* how engaging interlocutors reach a positive conclusion, he also presents how in such an inquiry Socrates' philosophical method works successfully.

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[55] This topic will be the main thesis in Chapter 2.

Therefore, the *Philebus* is the most Socratic dialogue unlike other "Socratic dialogues." Maybe the *Philebus* is not fully true to the historical records on Socrates; it is Plato's idealized version of Socrates' philosophical journey.

In the following two chapters I will examine the method Plato uses in the *Philebus*. As Plato takes over his teacher's way of philosophical inquiries, he employs and advances *elenchus* so that he produces an ideal example of his philosophical investigations.

Chapter 2: Dual Cross-Examination in the Philebus

2.1. *Elenchus* in the Ideal Conversation

As an ethical dialogue, the *Philebus* has a unique structure: after a long inquiry—not lecturing—the key characters of the *Philebus*, Socrates and Protarchus, arrive at a positive ending—the ranking of the human goods. However, before they begin their full-scale investigation, they examine their primary positions and see if their positions are good enough to be taken as the answer to their initial questions, 'what are the human goods?' This scene—Socrates examining his interlocutor's claim and shows its inconsistency—is familiar to the readers of Plato's early dialogues. However, the examination between Socrates and Protarchus is not exactly the same as the early dialogues. Here both Socrates and Protarchus have their own theses; the dual cross-examination shows the inconsistencies in both claims. Socrates in the *Philebus* has his own belief about the human goods, and his belief turns out to be false by elenchus, the method Socrates uses to refute his interlocutors' claims. Interestingly enough, the dual-examination of Socrates' and his interlocutor's claim is hardly ever found in Plato's dialogues. Why does Plato describe such an extraordinary conversation at the beginning of the *Philebus*?

The lively conversation between the ideal characters in this dialogue reintroduces the well-known Socrates' method, *i.e., elenchus*. The dual cross-examinations, which in this dialogue evaluate Socrates' and Protarchus' initial propositions one by one, are hardly observed in Plato's dialogues, especially those that belong to the later period. It is

commonly agreed that Socrates as the main speaker in the *Philebus* is the best fit for the revived ethical inquiry. As I suggested in the previous chapter, many later dialogues treat metaphysical, epistemological, or cosmological questions. And in these later dialogues Plato did not use Socrates as the main speaker of these dialogues. In the *Philebus,* however, Socrates' initial question, how to live a good life, returns as the main thesis of Plato's philosophical discussion. Who else but Socrates, then, would be the best person to discuss this problem?

I will argue in this chapter that Socrates in the *Philebus* launches a new systematic investigation and the rejection of false positions is one of the first necessary steps to be taken. I will also maintain that Socrates' *elenchus*, which is mostly used in the dual examination, is in fact a part of Plato's larger method of investigation.

This chapter will function as a preparation for Chapter 3, where I will discuss Plato's ideal method in the *Philebus*. After presenting the context of the dual examinations, I will suggest that the popular interpretations of the passage and Socrates' method are inadequate to capture Plato's philosophy in the *Philebus*. To present the structure of Chapter 2: Before I discuss the dual examination in the *Philebus*, I will argue in Section 2.2. that the notorious metaphysical problem of the one-many question at the beginning of the *Philebus* is merely an example of the method that Socrates is going to use. In section 2.3., I will summarize how the dual examination of the initial claims of both Socrates and Protarchus are rejected. In Section 2.4., the nature of a systematic investigation in the *Philebus* will be discussed. After that, I will present in Section 2.5. two major interpretations of *elenchus* in the *Philebus* and try to show the limits of these suggestions. Then we will be ready to proceed to the discussion of chapter 3.

2.2. The Metaphysical Example at 15b and the Nature of Socrates' Method

2.2.1. The Controversial Interpretations of *Philebus* 15b

Even though the *Philebus* is primarily on the moral question, what the human goods are, the beginning of the dialogue presents a difficult metaphysical problem of the relationship between the one and the many. What is the purpose of the 'metaphysical' passage 15a-c? Many Platonic scholars have been trying to figure out what the role of the example of the one-many question is at this juncture of the dialogue. However, these trials divert their attention from the main question of the dialogue to a metaphysical puzzle. Before I suggest a full-scale account of the investigation of the human goods in the *Philebus*, I will present my own interpretation of the metaphysical passage. I will argue that this metaphysical question itself is not directly relevant to the structured procedure of the scientific investigation that Socrates presents here. Rather, I maintain that this metaphysical account is in fact a good example that introduces the method that will be employed in this dialogue in finding the human good. I argue, therefore, the metaphysical implication of this passage should not be given too much attention.

Here is the passage to be deciphered.

> "πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν
> ἀληθῶς οὔσας; εἶτα πῶς αὖ ταύτας, μίαν ἑκάστην οὖσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε ὄλεθρον
> προσδεχομένην, **ὅμως** εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην; μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγονυῖαν

θετέον, εἴθ᾽ ὅλην αὐτὴν αὑτῆς χωρίς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον
φαίνοιτ᾽ἄν, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἅμα ἐν ἑνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι."[56]

The most controversial question regarding this passage is, first of all, how many questions there are in the presentation of the example Socrates raises here. There are, generally, two groups of scholars: the first group of scholars suggests that there are two questions.[57] After modifying a few words in the OCT, their interpretation goes like this:

1) Whether one ought to suppose that there are any such unities truly in existence. Then (*eita*) and so (*au*), how they are supposed to be: whether each one of them is always (*holos*) one and the same, admitting neither of generation nor of destruction.
2) And then (*meta de touto*), whether it remains most definitely one and the same, even though it is afterwards found again among the things that come to be and are unlimited, so that it finds itself as one and the same in one and many things at the same time.

The second group translates *eita* as 'next', *au* as 'in turn' and reads '*homos'* as OCT does.[58] Then, there seems to be three questions at this passage:

1) Whether there are any such unities truly in existence.
2) Next (*eita*), in turn (*au*), how these unities, each of which is one, always the same, and admitting neither generation nor destruction, can nevertheless (*homos*) be permanently this one unity?
3) And then, how are they remaining one and the same among many things?

[56] *Philebus,* 15b. OCT. Emphasis is mine.
[57] Especially Frede (1993) xxi.
[58] According to the punctuation in the Oxford edition, there are three questions.

The second group divides the first part of the passage into two: the first question is about the existence of the one, while the second question is about the quality of the one, that is, such entity really exists. While the first question is about the existence of such entities, the second question is about the relationship among the individual forms, especially on the problem of the way they participate in each other. Then, the third problem is about another kind of participation between things that come to be and perish and the Forms.

The second interpretation's advantage over the first one is that you do not need to amend anything in the text but keep the punctuation of the OCT. There is no need to change *homos* into *holos* in order to make sense of the passage, as the scholars of the first interpretation should do. The method of collection and division, which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 3, works not only in between Forms and things that exists in the world but between the individual Forms and the highest one, as Plato discussed in the *Sophist* or *Statesman*. This method, therefore, can explain the relationships among Forms just as it does the connection between changeable things and unchanging Forms. Nevertheless, this interpretation has a serious shortfall: on the one hand, Socrates' example of the one, such as man, ox, the beautiful, or the good (15a) in the *Philebus* are like the Forms we encounter in the middle dialogues, *e.g*., the *Republic*. On the other hand, when Plato discusses the participation between the Forms in the *Sophist*, the Forms are of different nature, such as being, the same, the difference, and so forth. In other words, the examples from the *Sophist* correspond to the perfect ideas of *quality*, while the example in the *Philebus* is equivalent to the perfect form of things that exist in the perceptible world. Therefore, it is unclear whether in the *Philebus* Plato wants to

revive the same inquiry that he conducted in the *Sophist* or *Statesman* while introducing the great difficulty of the one and many problem.

The first group of scholars claims that there are only two questions in the passage: 1) The question concerning the existence of Forms, 2) the question concerning the participation of things that come to be and perish. This interpretation easily explains why Socrates uses such examples like the good or man, because this position goes along well with "the so-called the theory" of the Forms of the middle dialogues. Furthermore, according to this interpretation, the question Socrates raises here is not too different from what was discussed in the *Parmenides*.[59] In this dialogue, the participation between the unchanging Forms and changing things was a serious problem. Socrates repeats the same question, which Plato had to spend much time to explain in the previous work. Indeed, the participation of things to the Forms is well known as a difficult problem of the relation between one and many. In spite of this interpretation's merit, however, there is a great disadvantage: you need to alter the OCT text, *e.g.*, reading *homos* as *holos*.

2.2.2. Plato's Intention in the One and Many Problem in the *Philebus*

I argue that Socrates' doubts in the *Philebus*, such as how many questions there are or what the implication of these questions is, are not Socrates' main interest. This one and many question passage is introduced in the *Philebus* as an example of many difficult problems that need to be solved among the one-many questions. To grasp the function of this passage, it is necessary to go back to the context.

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[59] *Parmenides* 133 a-c

When Socrates asks if some pleasures are good and other pleasures are bad, Protarchus answers that as long as something is pleasant, it should be always good. Socrates responds that Protarchus' suggestion has difficulties regarding the one and many. Without clearly understanding the relation between one and many Protarchus suggests a rudimentary form of this relation: he himself is one as a person but he is taller than a 3 foot tall boy and at the same time smaller than Shaquille O'Neil. So the same person Protarchus is sometimes tall, and other times he is small. In this way he opposes himself who was tall earlier (14d).[60] Nevertheless, Socrates quickly dismisses such an example and says that they are as not only childish and trivial but also a serious impediment to argument. Protarchus asks what kinds of puzzles with respect to the same principle (the one and many) Socrates has in mind. And Socrates uses the one and many question passage as an example to clarify what he meant by 'the problem of the one and many.' He says "it is these problems of the one and many, but not those other that cause all sorts of difficulties if they are not properly settled." (15c) When he says 'those other problems', he meant the Protarchus' example of himself being tall and small. Rejecting Protarchus' problems as something irrelevant to their investigation, Socrates introduces the 'proper' settled form of the problem of the one and many. In other words, he does not raise the problem as a question he must face. Rather, Socrates seems to say in this 'metaphysical' passage, "If you want to consider one of the one and many puzzles, the problem should be proposed in this format not in the other format you presented, Protarchus." That is, the one and many question is introduced in the proper format of the question, that is, in the way the one and many should be presented.

[60] We find the same questions in Plato's other dialogues, such as *Phaedo* 102b-c, *Parmenides* 129a-d, *Sophist* 251 a-b

I argue that the metaphysical question in 15 b is the proper way to present the question of the one and many. My claim is due to the fact that the format is dealing with not only the changing things but also the Forms, namely, Plato's main philosophical concern at least in the middle dialogues. In other words, I think this example should be considered as something important only because it is pointing to the aspect of Plato's metaphysics concerned with relations among Forms. The example of the participation of changing things is useful to show the proper settled form of the problem of the one and many puzzle, and it does not play any other role than a good example at this part of the *Philebus*. To put it another way, this example describes why the one and many question is hard to grasp, but the difficulty does not come from the metaphysical problem in this example.

The puzzle of the one and many is hard to figure out due to the discourse (or language: *logoi*) that "the same thing flits around, becoming one and many in all sorts of ways" (15d). Why does the language do that? It is because of the 'immortal and ageless' condition that comes with discourse. It is interesting that the natures of discourse, *i.e.*, being immortal and ageless, are actually divine attributes. Also the Forms, which we find in Plato's middle dialogues, share the same nature, namely, unchanging and everlasting. The one and the many puzzle exists whenever language is used in an inquiry. The participation question happened to be one of a number of good examples, and the one in the question is actually immortal and ageless. But such a difficult problem with respect to not only the being immortal and ageless one but also the changing many is not exclusively applied to Plato's metaphysics. We will encounter these problems whenever language is involved in a scientific research. The passage 15b is a good example of this problem but it does not function more than that. Considering

the context of the passage, where Socrates is laying down the question, introducing his methodology and examining hypotheses, this question of participation should not be taken seriously as an independent metaphysical problem outside of the context of the *Philebus*.

Since the one and many question should deal with problems in using language and also in other kinds of science that uses language in its research, we need to be equipped with a device that will remove such problems in our research? Protarchus asks if there is some way or means to remove this kind of disturbance from our discussion in a peaceful way (16a). Socrates suggests a gift from gods, that is, the best means (*hodos*) he loves to use (actually he says that he is the lover—*erastes*—of this method) in any field of art (*technē*). The method of division and collection, which Socrates is so much in love with, enables one to comprehend a complete structure of an object of any art.

Socrates in the *Philebus* is interested not in metaphysics *per se* but in a more practical answer to the question, how to find the human good. Thus, the method he wants to use in the *Philebus* does not have to be applied exclusively for metaphysical inquiries. Rather, he is introducing a general method that should be employed not only in inquiring about and the acquisition of knowledge but also in teaching the acquired knowledge. And this method is used for any knowledge regardless of its extent. In fact, Socrates maintains in the *Philebus* that this method is the best way of inquiry and learning (*skopein kai manthanein)* as well as teaching (*didaskein*) of not only the knowledge of the Forms but also other knowledge of arts.[61] Socrates' two examples in the *Philebus*, the art of music and the art of grammar, support my claim. We do not find any metaphysical examination while grasping music and comprehending every element

[61] Especially at 16e.

of music in order to establish the art of music. This process of investigation is an excellent example how a scientific researcher uses the method of division and collection.

Why does Plato introduce this Socratic method in the *Philebus*? It is because he is concerned he is concerned with returning to where we all live and with teaching how are should live. The knowledge he wants to possess is meaningless if it is not applied to our daily lives. Just as the knowledge the skilled craftsmen have benefits human lives, the philosopher's knowledge should be something good and beneficial for men. While writing the middle and critical dialogues, Plato could not spend his energy in figuring out the way to apply philosopher's knowledge. All he was concerned with was acquiring wisdom suitable for philosophers. Possessing this knowledge, Plato desires to accomplish his teacher's project: finding out the way to live a good life, since ordinary people in the Cave are destined to live there, not in the real world.[62] Now he is armed with the proper knowledge and the proper method. This is why Plato writes an ideal dialogue, the *Philebus*.

2.3. Rejecting Initial Theses

Having presented my own suggestion on the notorious metaphysical passage, now it is time to consider the dual examination in the *Philebus*. I argue that this is a very rare occasion, in which Socrates' and his interlocutor's theses are examined, tested, and finally rejected.

[62] *Republic* VII, 519e. Including the philosopher, all people are supposed to live as a community. Therefore, Socrates' rationalistic ideal is not for all. I will discuss this thesis later in Chapter 5.

The first part of the *Philebus* (14-23) is very similar to the early dialogues. Many scholars think that it is only in this part of the dialogue that Socrates employs *elenchus*, while I argue that this section is the first part of Socrates and Protarchus' investigation, which is carried through the rest of the dialogue presenting Plat's method of division and collection as an expansion of *elenchus*.[63] I will begin this section with the summary of the section.

2.3.1. The Original Question in the *Philebus*

The *Philebus* opens when Philebus, tired from an intensive verbal exchange with Socrates, hands over his role to Protarchus. Both Socrates and Philebus have been discussing whether the good for man can be identified either with the life of pleasure or the life of intellect. The naïve hedonistic equation of pleasure with good has been dealt with by Plato already in the *Gorgias*, *Protagoras* and *Republic*. Just as those dialogues did not yield a rather positive conclusion on the topic, both Socrates and Philebus may have not arrived any further than their own positions. Probably exasperated like Callicles from Socrates' questions, Philebus is giving up the dialogue and now Protarchus takes over Philebus' thesis. We do not know how the discussion before the beginning of the dialogue went. Nevertheless, since Philebus is a character similar to Callicles of the *Gorgias*, and his thesis is very similar to Callicles' extreme hedonistic position, we can imagine the discussion between Socrates and Philebus would have been as ruthless as the verbal conversation in the *Gorgias* was. At the same time, Callicles is very stubborn and not willing to change his own position even though a weak point of his argument is revealed. This is why Socrates wants to make sure from the very first

[63] Plato's method in the *Philebus* as an expansion of *elenchus* will be the main thesis of Chapter 3.

question whether Protarchus is ready to get to the truth by doing everything possible (11c). This suggests that Socrates' interest does not focus on winning over Philebus verbally or defeating Protarchus' position. On the contrary, Socrates wants to deal with the truth: he wants to find which possession or state of the soul can be the one that renders render life happy for all human beings. Furthermore, Socrates asks Protarchus to join him in this inquiry. Unlike Philebus, who is not too different from other aggressive interlocutors, concerned only with winning his claim over Socrates' (12a, 18a, 22c-d), Protarchus is more interested in finding the answer. Protarchus is a better interlocutor for Socrates to go on the journey to find the truth.

2.3.2. Three Conditions of the Human Good—Examination on a Life of Pleasure

Socrates and Protarchus begin to examine the life of pleasure and the life of knowledge separately. They present the following hypothesis: let there be neither any knowledge in a life of pleasure, or any pleasure in that of knowledge and test them on the basis of the agreed standards of the good life. They agreed on the following three criteria for judging the human goods: 1) perfection, 2) sufficiency, and 3) choiceworthiness. Perfection means that something is pursued by all only for its own sake. Sufficiency suggests that something does not need anything else other than itself. And the good life would be chosen by all men, that is, it is something desirable for all. These criteria are actually necessary conditions for the human goods. Anyone would concede that any candidate of the examination should meet these three conditions to be qualified as the human goods. Socrates and Protarchus' investigation according to these three criteria follow this order: first they examine what the life of pleasure without any

knowledge of intellect would be like. After the examination of the pleasant life, they will consider what the opposite life is, that is, Socrates' position—the life of reason.

Philebus' and now Protarchus' position, the life of pleasure lacking all element of intellect, would not be sufficient as the good life for man. Without knowing the fact that he is in the state of pleasure, a man would not be able to tell that he is leading a life of pleasure nor remember that he ever enjoyed himself (21a-b). Therefore, intellect is required for the life of exclusive pleasure, and if this life needs something more than pleasure, that is intellect, it would not be sufficient. Consequently, this life does not meet one of the conditions of the good of men, sufficiency. According to their assumption, furthermore, the unique differentia of human beings, which makes man differ from any other creatures, is that man cannot live a life of pleasure without reason and opinion. Socrates says, "It is neither possible nor beneficial for one tribe to remain alone in isolation and unmixed. We would prefer to live side by side with that best kind of knowledge, the kind that understands not only all other things but also each one of us, as far as that is possible" (63b-c). Therefore, a life only with pleasure is not sufficient—unable to meeting the second criteria.

Furthermore, both Socrates and Protarchus seem to have assumed that a human life is worth choosing over any other life, since it is superior to other lives insofar as it has reason. Upon this assumption Protarchus accept Socrates' claim.

> "Due to lack of memory, it would be impossible for you to remember that you ever enjoyed yourself… But, not possessing right judgment, you would not realize that you are enjoying yourself even while you do, and being unable to calculate, you could not figure out any future pleasures for yourself."(21b-c)

Protarchus agrees with Socrates that man, that is, a rational being, would not choose the life of a mollusk or of any creature that lives in shells, because a superior life is worth choosing over an inferior one. In conclusion, the life of pleasure without intellect or knowledge would not meet another condition of the good life for man, choiceworthiness.

The third condition of the good life, *i.e.*, perfection, is not discussed in the examination of pleasure at the early part of the dialogue. The later part of the dialogue describes a conversation, where both Socrates and Protarchus come to an agreement that the life of pleasure itself is a sort of process or becoming, which is something moving toward a certain goal (53c). Nevertheless, a perfect life would be sought for its own sake: If man tries to lead a pleasant life in order to acquire something else, we would not be able to say such a life is perfect. Protarchus has to admit that his life would not be perfect insofar as a pleasant life was a movement and becoming toward something other than itself. All the three conditions are considered; the life of pleasure without any element of intellect or knowledge would not fulfill any of the three conditions for being the good life for man.

So far, the dialogue between Socrates and Protarchus seems to be a typical example of *elenchus* in the early dialogues. Protarchus has a belief that a pleasant life is a good one. Also he agrees with Socrates that such a good life should be perfect, sufficient and choice worthy. While answering Socrates' questions, however, Protarchus comes to concede that the life of pleasure is not exactly what he had in mind. He is left absolutely speechless for the moment, since his belief that the life devoid of intellect is good is proven to be inconsistent with his other principles by Socrates' questions. Therefore, as long as he cannot deny that the good life should be perfect, sufficient and

to be chosen, which seems to be hard to disagree with, he has to reject the position he originally held, and he is happy to do so.[64] It is because his goal in the conversation is not holding onto his initial position but finding the human goods.

2.3.3. An Examination of the Life Only with Knowledge

After the examination on the life of pleasure, both interlocutors consider the second candidate Socrates suggests: the life of intellect or knowledge lacking pleasure.[65] As I will discuss later in this chapter, this examination of Socrates' position makes the *Philebus* unique, as well. In the early dialogues, we cannot find any instance where Socrates presents his own claim and is refuted. In the *Philebus*, not only does Socrates claim to be ignorant as the Socrates in the Socratic dialogues does, but also he is proven to be ignorant by the refutation, just as other interlocutors of the Socratic dialogues were. The dual cross-examinations of both interlocutors will let them begin from the same starting point, being proven to be ignorant. This ignorance, in fact, motivates them to search for the truth. And their search is a joint investigation, not between a teacher and a student, but between two men who do not have answer to their initial question.

In the second part of their dual cross-examination, Socrates and Protarchus use the same criteria that they have employed in the investigation of the pleasant life. First, the life of intellect would not be chosen by men. Socrates and Protarchus concede that a life "having no part, neither large nor small, of pleasure or of pain, living in total

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[64] D. Frede says that this is the dialogue's only *elenchus*, a proper type. However, I see there are other *elenchi* in this dialogue, especially on Socrates' belief as well. Actually other *elenchi* in the dialogue would make this dialogue different and unique from the early dialogues, even though the format and structure of the examination on Protarchus' belief are similar to them.

[65] This is the point where the *Philebus* becomes very different from other dialogues. Here, Socrates's own thesis is investigated and refuted unlike other dialogues. I will consider this more in detail in the following sections of this chapter.

insensitivity (*apathes*) of anything of that kind" would not be chosen by any man. Both seem to agree that a life without any sense is not worth choosing for 'man'. Here is the important point of the dialogue, which distinguishes itself from other dialogues, especially from the *Gorgias*, where Socrates argues that pleasure and good are not the same.[66] What they are considering here in the dialogue is not the Good itself—the eternal, abstract, intelligible Form of Goodness—, as Socrates does in the *Republic*, but specific types of the human goods (11d). In fact, the original thesis that Protarchus has taken over from Philebus was "what is good for all creatures" is pleasure (11b). Socrates also was suggesting a position that would render happiness to "all human beings" (11d). Since the distinctive feature, which makes man in a middle place, is that only man is an animal that has reason. Since reason is regarded as something divine, man shares both characteristics of all other creatures and god.[67] Since the main theme of the dialogue is on the human goods, Socrates could not disregard the non-rational nature of human beings. In other words, as long as he concedes that man has a body, he cannot neglect the obvious fact that man cannot lead a life without any sensation, either pain or pleasure. Therefore, no one would choose to live without pleasure, namely, the life of only intellect. As he admits, gods, who do not depend on body, would live without feeling anything, but human beings cannot live in such a divine way.[68] Thus the first condition of the good life for man is rejected. Man would not choose a life only with intellect, because that would be impossible for man to live. Due to the fact that man is also an animal, which is in need of pleasure, both Socrates and Protarchus come to an agreement that man, possessing reason, would 'not choose all pleasures without

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[66] *Gorgias* 497d.
[67] Cf. 62a-b. Also, see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I. 13.
[68] 62a-b.

intelligence rather than choose at least some amount of pleasure with intelligence (60e)'. Therefore, this life of reason would not meet the second condition, sufficiency, either.

Throughout the dialogue Socrates and Protarchus do not seem to explore the third condition, whether the life of intellect and reason is perfect as the good for man or not. Both settle at almost the end of the dialogue, however, that the two lives, one of only intellect and another of all pleasures without intellect, would not be perfect (61a). It is unclear why Socrates says here in the dialogue that a life of reason for man is not to be sought for its own sake. I assume that his reasoning goes as follows: At many passages of the *Philebus*, intellect is understood in terms of calculation. This notion of intellect is different from what Socrates, or Plato, argued in the *Republic*. Intellect in the *Philebus* is not analogous to perception of the perceivable world as explained in the *Republic*. I will discuss this point more in Chapter 6.[69]

While Socrates presents an argument against Protarchus' position as often he does in other cases of using *elenchus*, Socrates does not present an argument against his own position. In other words, Socrates does not suggest any counter argument to examine his own position, namely, the life of reason. Rather, he evaluates this life in accordance with the three conditions, which both Protarchus and Socrates initially agreed. The second part of the dual-examination of Socrates' position, however, is still *elenchus*. Elenchus' main aim is to *examine* the validity of a suggested thesis. And such

[69] In Chapter 6 I will maintain that there are two different levels of reason for men: 1) A philosopher who has seen the reality has a 'divine' reason, which enables him to see the principles of the whole. 2) Ordinary men have a limited reason, which works within the Cave. This reason should follow the rule of the divine reason. Nonetheless, this does not mean that ordinary people are not autonomous. Using their own reasons, they do make their own decisions according to the principle given by the divine reason. This is how every member of a city is truly just—do what he is supposed to do and has what he should have (c.f. *Republic* IV).

an examination can be done either by putting forward a counter argument or by measuring the current argument against a previously agreed standard.

In summary, both initial positions, on the one hand, a life of pleasure without any intellect, and on the other hand, a life of reason lacking pleasure, are mutually rejected by the dual cross-examinations executed by Socrates and Protarches.[70] According to the agreed criteria, their original positions are proved to be inconsistent and rejected. Thus, they should pursue something else as the human goods, and the third candidate, the mixed life including both reason and pleasure, will be examined in turn and eventually accepted.[71] The long and somewhat challenging investigation on the nature of pleasure and knowledge in the middle of dialogue is required so that they come to understand what the mixed life would be.

2.3.4. The Dual Cross-Examination in the *Philebus*

The peculiar and unique characteristic of the *Philebus* is the dual cross-examination. In the early dialogues, Socrates challenges his interlocutors and examines their initial beliefs. We seldom see an occasion, however, in which Socrates offers any belief to be examined just as he does to others. In the middle dialogues, Socrates proposes his own doctrine and beliefs. There are many cases his interlocutors ask questions about his position, and sometimes he falls into a place where he has a hard time answering.[72] Nevertheless, the process of his examination in the middle dialogues

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[70] Even though both Socrates and Protarchus agree that being perfect, sufficient and worthy of choosing, are the conditions of the good for man, these conditions are necessary. In other words, these would be accepted as the necessary condition for the human good by all.

[71] Why is the mixed life of pleasure and knowledge suggested here? That is another question to be inquired later.

[72] Socrates has to explain the nature of philosophy and the philosopher king to answer the third wave of Glaucon's criticism (*Republic*, 472a). His questions did not make Socrates to reject or abandon his

is different from the way he examines the interlocutors of the early dialogues. His positions are not to be refuted, but by questions from his interlocutors, his doctrine becomes stronger by further arguments in the course of conversations. Socrates does not fall into an impasse. He may go through some hardships to answer tricky questions, but he does not become speechless, as Euthyphro or Meno did. In the *Philebus*, on the contrary, not only Protarchus but also Socrates has to go through examination and both have to give up their initial beliefs. A Socrates, who is questioned and comes to abandon what he believes, is unheard of, at least in Plato's dialogues. This point is, in fact, the reason that makes this dialogue familiar but at the same time somewhat foreign to the readers of Plato's dialogue.

It is possible to think that Socrates sacrifices himself for the sake of the conversation. In other words, in order to keep Protarchus' in the conversation as well as to keep his interests in the topic alive, Socrates puts his own initial thought under examination. However, why would Socrates have to do this? He has been debating against Philebus without giving up his initial thesis, even before the beginning of the dialogue. There is no compelling reason that Socrates changes his mind to reject his position when he faces Protarchus. Furthermore, according to the suggestion, Socrates might have not been sincere with Protarchus or with Philebus. He might have not seriously argued that a life only with knowledge is not good enough. Therefore, it will be safer to assume that Socrates also is like other interlocutors, suggesting his own thesis, putting it into examination, and moving on to the next level of investigation.

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doctrine. Rather, they deepen the discussion on justice into the profound ground of all. Therefore, Glaucon's questions may give troubles but eventually help Socrates to give accounts of what he knows.

Being aware of one's ignorance is a necessary step in gaining knowledge: If one thinks that he knows, he would not even try to learn, because he thinks that he is in possession of knowledge.[73] In the early dialogues, Socrates uses this method, *elenchus*, to reveal his interlocutors' status so that they would join him to pursue knowledge. Socrates himself, however, did not have to undergo such a process, *elenchus*, since he always disavows knowledge, especially in ethical matters. In this dialogue, however, Socrates has a belief, and he has been conversing on this topic already with Philebus before this dialogues begins. They could not reach any conclusion, *i.e.*, knowledge, because Philebus was too stubborn to give up his hedonistic view. At the same time, neither does Socrates abandon his own belief before the beginning of the dialogue. Unlike the typical Socrates of the early dialogues, he has and also expresses his own belief on the human goods. Until his position is also examined, the real pursuit of knowledge would not begin. Thus, dual cross-examining of both sides of the participants in a conversation and showing their ignorance should be the first step of the ideal pursuit of truth as is in the *Philebus*.

Why did Plato not write this kind of dialogue before? I maintain that Plato is trying to signal that he is going beyond Socrates' ideas about the human good. In other words, Plato is leaving an extreme 'rationalistic' position on human happiness—without knowledge of the Forms, as Plato argues in the *Republic*, you would not become happy at all. Plato sees the limit in such a rationalistic Socrates—then, who would be happy in this life after all? Plato is taking a different approach to the human goods than Socrates'. We should have both elements, namely, knowledge and pleasure, to live a good life. It is a less rationalistic strategy, but still has very strong intellectualistic elements.

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[73] The Meno's Paradox. *Meno*, 80d-e. I will discuss this paradox more in Chapter 3.

Nevertheless knowledge is still a necessary condition for good life. Maintaining that there are different levels of rationality respectively for philosophers and ordinary people, I will discuss this thesis more in Chapter 4 (metaphysics for philosophers) and 6 (calculative reasoning for ordinary people).

2.4. Launching a New Systematic Investigation

Many scholars think the first part of the *Philebus*, where Socrates introduces the problem of the one-many, is a metaphysical device to explain the participation of changing things to the unchanging Forms.[74] Therefore, they think the conversation between Protarchus and Socrates on an ethical problem moves quickly to a metaphysical one. Nevertheless, I think this popular interpretation overlooks an important point about the role of this passage in the *Philebus*. My own view is that this participation question, which reminds many readers of Plato's 'critical' dialogues, especially the *Parmenides*, is not a central point for their main conversation in this context of the *Philebus*. Socrates wants to point out the difficulty of their subject matter by presenting this participation problem. The following is the summary of their dual cross-examinations.

1) Both Protarchus and Socrates have their own proposals for the human good.
2) We need to find out the nature of both pleasure and knowledge to see who wins the contest of 1).
3) Both pleasure and knowledge seem to be one and many.

[74] For example, Frede (1994) xxi, who maintains that there are only two questions at 15b-c following the punctuation in the Oxford edition, thinks that 'the old problem of unity and plurality is 'the reminder of the Parmenides in the Philebus.'

4) The one-many question is very difficult to figure out. (Socrates presents *one* example of this difficulty.)
5) Socrates introduces his favorite method to figure out this question.
6) Both interlocutors examine the beliefs each of them has with the method Socrates introduces.
7) Both beliefs are rejected.
8) The third candidate, Socrates proposed previously at 20b, will be examined.

At a glance, it is hard to grasp what Socrates is trying to do. A close look at the passage, however, will enable us to find a structure to the way Socrates leads the conversation of inquiry. In the *Philebus*, Socrates is in fact following the way a scientific research should be conducted. This is the standard way to conduct research in any field of science, a linearized, pragmatic scheme of scientific research sometimes offered as a guideline for proceeding:

1) Define the question
2) Gather information and resources (observe)
3) Form hypothesis
4) Perform experiment and collect data
5) Analyze data
6) Interpret data and draw conclusions that serve as a starting point for new hypothesis
7) Publish results
8) Retest (frequently done by other scientists)[75]

What Socrates does in this part of the *Philebus* is as follows: he lays down the research objective (finding out the human good), defines research questions (what the

[75] Crawford and Stucki (1990) p. 224.

nature of pleasure and knowledge), summarizes background research from gathering information and resources (presenting the difficulties in the research questions in the field), proposes methodology (the method of division and collection) and forms hypotheses (three hypotheses: the life of pleasure without knowledge, the life of knowledge lacking pleasure, and the third life). And by performing an experiment according to the hypothesis—in this case the life of pleasure without knowledge and the life of knowledge without pleasure—the formulated hypotheses will be considered if these are valid in this system. As Popper says, "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability,"[76] every belief, theory, and hypothesis should be tested and open to test. Socrates' *elenchus* is used for this purpose. This is how Socrates follows a thorough procedure of scientific research as a thought experiment in a conversation with interlocutors. My account in the following chapter will show how Socrates' investigation in the *Philebus* resembles modern scientific researches.

I argue that by means of *elenchus* Socrates follows this modern standard scheme of scientific research. Socrates in Plato's other dialogues did not seem to conduct his investigation in such a systematic way. The ethical inquiry in the *Philebus*, on the contrary, as an ideal dialogue on ethical discussions, is organized and structured in such a scientific way of investigation. I maintain that what Socrates does at this stage of the *Philebus* (14-23) is a sort of preparation, or the first few steps of a scientific inquiry.

As modern researchers, writing a research paper, would take steps 1 to 3 of the example scheme of a scientific research, Socrates is taking a similar course of action when going into the main investigation of the human good in the *Philebus*. Without

[76] Popper (1972), pp. 37.

formulating the main question—gathering resources from previous studies, forming hypothesis and proposing the method—no one can perform a proper investigation to gain knowledge. Therefore, Socrates defines the main question once again at the beginning of the conversation with Protarchus. It is a fresh new start after the vain discussion with Philebus. Socrates wants to conduct the new investigation with a friendly interlocutor, Protarchus, in an orderly manner.

The fourth and eight step in the guideline of a scientific research is traditionally considered as 'Socrates' *elenchus*.' This subject is the main thesis in Chapter 3, but I would like to say one following point briefly here: This 'Socratic method' is usually considered a way of refutation. In other words, rejecting the opponent's belief or proposition is the main, and furthermore the only goal of this method. In many Socratic dialogues the main character, Socrates, actually seems to do that. The accusation that Socrates tricks his interlocutors into impasse and enjoys doing that seems to be reasonable, because all Socrates seemed to be doing was nothing more than mere refutation. This is why even Protarchus in the *Philebus* says "Your way of plunging us [Philebus and Protarchus] into difficulties and repeating questions to which we have at present no proper answer to give you. But we should not take it that the aim of our meeting is universal confusion." (20a) I propose, however, that this procedure of refutation is a part of his scientific inquiry. It is a kind of an examination, or an experiment in the modern scientific terminology. A hypothesis should be tested. And if

this hypothesis passes the test, it should be accepted as consistent with other propositions in a system of knowledge.[77]

I should point out the following in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding of my claim. It is not my argument that Plato, the author of the *Philebus*, who lived more than two thousand years ago, is following the 'modern standard of scientific research.' Unlike modern scientific research, which tests its hypothesis in 'controlled' observation, nothing of that sort happens in Plato's elenchus. Furthermore, Plato did not even depend on observations in the process of investigation as Aristotle did. Plato's philosophy is not a natural science, which is mainly about the image of the Forms. Therefore, observation does not have any place in his method, namely, *elenchus*. On the contrary, Plato did establish (in a rough way) such a standard for researchers who want to acquire knowledge in any field of science. Plato was not so conscientious of presenting a structured procedure of investigation in his dialogues. Whereas, writing an ideal dialogue, Plato presents the proper way of investigation. Not only the characters but also the method are ideal. Also the way to begin the conversation should be ideal. This is why Socrates in the *Philebus* presents question, method and hypotheses, and then begins to examine them.

2.5. Two Major Interpretations of Socrates' *Elenchus* in the *Philebus*

[77] In the *Meno*, we can find similar examples of using hypothesis in a philosophical inquiry. First, Socrates introduces geometricians' hypothetical method in solving a problem how to inscribe a triangle into a circle (86e-87b). And then he follows the similar steps to see if virtue is teachable or not (87b-89a).

Before I discuss Plato's ideal method in the *Philebus* in the following chapter, I would like to introduce two major interpretations of Socrates' *elenchus* and its application in the *Philebus*. After showing the limitations of these interpretations, I will argue in Chapter 3 that elenchus, as a way of examination, works at every division of pleasure and knowledge both Socrates and Protarchus make. These are two popular interpretations of Socrates' *elenchus*[78]: 1) *Elenchus* is a method to refute one's interlocutor. Its essential nature is *ad hominem*. Socrates uses this method in order to reject his interlocutor's initial belief and lets the opponent accept his doctrine. 2) *Elenchus* is an efficient tool to acquire knowledge of morality, which is irrelevant to metaphysics. Therefore, *elenchus* is a perfect method exclusively in moral inquiries. I will show in this section why both accounts do not adequately explain its nature and function in the *Philebus*.

2.5.1. *Elenchus* as *ad hominem*

First, I will examine the first interpretation of *elenchus*: a method of refutation. D. Frede and Julia Annas[79] are most well known among other scholars who hold this view. They suggest that the nature of *elenchus* is essentially '*ad hominem*.' In other words, rejecting opponent's position is the essential function of this method. Annas says, "What Socrates is doing in these [early] dialogues is arguing *ad hominem* in the precise sense: Arguing only from the claims made by the interlocutor himself rather than claims of his own, thus showing the interlocutor that he has problems just from

[78] Recently, 'the Socratic method' is revisited as any form of pedagogy conducted through question and answer, as distinguished from pedagogy conducted in lecture form. See Copeland (2005), and Boghossian (2003). Although this interpretation is very interesting, it is not relevant to my discussion on the *Philebus*. Therefore, I won't take this point fully into consideration in this dissertation, but leave it as my next project.

[79] J. Annas (2002), 'What are Plato's "Middle" dialogues in the middle of?' 1-23 in Annas & Rowe (2003).

holding his own position, independently of Socrates' own views."[80] Since no one would pursue further investigation—insofar as he thinks that he possesses knowledge or truth, the first step Socrates had to take to lead a productive conversation was to show that the opponent's belief is false. And then, according to Annas, Socrates adopts a doctrinal mode: after rejecting the interlocutor's claim he teaches the interlocutor his own doctrine.

Applying this interpretation to the *Philebus*, Frede maintains that the one and only *elenchus* in this dialogue, which Socrates uses against Protarchus, stops at 21d. In other words, she argues that there are not dual cross-examinations but only one Socrates' refutation of Protarchus' belief exists. And as soon as Protarchus had to admit that the life of pleasure without knowledge couldn't be the good life, since such a life does not meet three conditions of the good life, the only *elenchus* ends in the *Philebus*. As Protarchus' initial proposition, that is, pleasure is the human good, turns out to be false at the end of this elenchus, he becomes 'speechless', just as many other characters in Socratic dialogues.[81]

Frede maintains that Socrates, who failed to arrive at a positive answer to his own inquiries in many other earlier dialogues, was able to succeed in his own ethical discussion and inquiry in the *Philebus* because of Plato's introduction of the new methods, *i.e.*, both the method of hypothesis and the method of division and collection. She says "So Socrates is back because he is dealing with a Socratic question with a Socratic partner with the aid of Platonic tools."[82] In other words, after Protarchus becomes speechless, *elenchus'* role in the *Philebus* is over. Socrates begins to use his new

[80] Annas (2006) in Reis (2006), p.33.
[81] *Meno*, 80 a-b
[82] D. Frede, (1993), lxxi.

method, which is essentially different from elenchus, a method of refutation. According to Frede's claim, *elenchus* does not play any further role in an actual process of pursuing and acquiring knowledge. Therefore, she argues that the essential character of this method is going 'against one's opinion', or *ad hominem*. According to her claim, Socrates' method is a preliminary step, which lets an interlocutor become a serious seeker so that he admits his own ignorance on the subject matter. This interlocutor also will be free from all the falsities through this process of refutation. In other words, Frede maintains that *elenchus* prepares an interlocutor to use the 'Platonic method' of the middle dialogues—the method of hypothesis as well as method of division and collection—, which are the methods of investigation and acquiring knowledge, unlike the 'Socratic method', *i.e., elenchus*.

Unlike Frede's argument that only the beginning of the dialogue, where Protarchus becomes speechless, is the only appearance of the 'Socratic method,' I argue that *elenchus* in the *Philebus* continues throughout the dialogue. Frede and also Annas assume that the *Philebus* is like 'doctrinal dialogues.' They suggest that the *Philebus* is very similar to the *Timaeus*, where Socrates just explains a certain doctrine.[83] In other words, after Socrates rejects Protarchus' claim that the life of pleasure without knowledge is the best life as something false, he teaches Protarchus what the good life for human beings is supposed to be. Therefore, both Frede and Annas maintain that Socrates in this dialogue uses *elenchus* only to expose Protarchus' false belief. After executing the process of refutation, Socrates becomes like a teacher, who is wise enough to spare the knowledge he has.

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[83] *Ibid*., pp. 32-46.

Both Frede and Annas are also mistaken that only Protarchus' claim was refuted in the *Philebus*. At the beginning of the *Philebus* Socrates also had his own belief that the life of knowledge without pleasure is the good for men. But, Socrates' position turns out to be false, because a life is not choice worthy, at least for human beings. The rest of the *Philebus* is an examination of the third hypothesis, a mixed life of pleasure and knowledge, in order to see whether this is indeed the good for human beings. Thus, the examination by *elenchus* continues throughout the *Philebus* and it does not stop at 21d. Therefore, Frede and Annas' assumption that there is only one *elenchus* in the *Philebus*, the refutation of Portarchus' original hedonistic position, is wrong. If Socrates' *elenchus* is essentially *ad hominem*, Socrates did not have to continue his investigation with Protarchus in the *Philebus*. When Protarchus had nothing more to say, the aim of *elenchus* is achieved. Socrates, however, introduces a hypothesis from his dream in order to continue the conversation with Protarchus. This proves Socrates' method is not essentially *ad hominem*. Although *elenchus* sometimes appears to be *ad hominem*, as it actually does appears to be in many places, this is not the main purpose of the method.

Although I agree with both Frede and Annas up to a point that *elenchus* is a necessary step to strip off false beliefs, I cannot accept their overall conclusion that *elenchus* does not function further than refutation and that Socrates in the *Philebus* is like a sage, who is able to transfer his wisdom on the human goods to Protarchus. I do not think that Socrates explains what he knows to Protarchus in the *Philebus*. As I will discuss in Chapter 5, being ignorant of the human goods, Socrates examines pleasure and knowledge and sees what sort of characteristic each has respectably.

2.5.2. *Elenchus* as a Method of Acquiring the Moral Truth

Unlike Frede, who maintains that *elenchus* is a way of refutation, some scholars suggest that this method is able to generate 'moral truth.' These scholars hold that *elenchus* is a method to test one's belief and see if one's set of beliefs are consistent or not. If this set is consistent, 'moral truth' will be found. According to these scholars, Socrates had a strong belief that he would be able to find someone who has a consistent set of moral beliefs. And also he believed that if this person passes Socrates' test, *elenchus*, and as a result if his set of moral beliefs turns out to be consistent, Socrates would be able to find the answer to his ethical inquiry. Therefore, *elenchus* is a method of testing coherence of a set of propositions. Socrates will admit a coherent set of moral beliefs, as the 'moral truth'.

Vlastos argues that the main and essential character of *elenchus* is *testing* consistency in one's belief not refuting one's belief.[84] At least, Socrates does not intend to win over this opponent. As Socrates says in the *Gorgias*, if one's argument is adamant and firm enough, he will endure all criticisms against his own belief.[85] And *elenchus* tests if one's belief is firm enough to pass Socrates' questions. Socrates does not aim to take his interlocutor down. If this man turns out to have a firm belief, Socrates would be happy enough to learn the wisdom he has. Basically Socrates does not assume either that his opponent does not have wisdom or that he needs to prove this person's ignorance. Rather, as he maintains in the *Apology,* on the contrary, Socrates assumes, meeting his interlocutors on the corner of Athens' streets or by the gym, that they are wiser than he is. The reason he tests other wise men is to see if they are indeed wise and furthermore wiser than himself. He hopes that there is a certain man who has wisdom

[84] Vlastos (1994), p. 10.
[85] *Gorgias,* 508e-509a

already. And if he manages to find such a person, this person will pass the verbal test Socrates conducts through elenchus. Thus, as I pointed out earlier, there is a big difference between refuting or rejecting an opponent's beliefs and attacking the opponent himself. Socrates does not go against the *man*.

Discussing the *Philebus*, Davidson develops Vlastos' point. He claims that the Socratic method, *i.e., elenchus*, is brought back to the *Philebus* because of the main question that this work deals with: ethics. Socrates' mission was to find the way to live a good life. Therefore, his sole concern was something ethical and nothing further than morality. Since Socrates uses only one method, namely, *elenchus*, for his pursuit of ethical knowledge, he should have thought that only this method would lead him to where he was aiming. He holds that after being criticized Plato rejected the theory of Forms of the middle dialogues and returns to the Socratic concern with the good life and the right way to live. He says, "the idea that value depends in some way on being like or resembling a form was recognized by Plato in the *Parmenides* to be incompatible with the epistemological or semantic functions of the Forms. Value in the *Philebus* can no longer be connected with the forms as such. It may be that limits, or mixtures that have limits, are Forms and are good; but what makes them good is not that they are Forms or limits or mixtures, but that they have symmetry, commensurability, and truth - that they are proper limits or appropriate mixtures."[86] According to Davidson, Plato realized later in his career that philosophy could not transcend to metaphysics, but that philosophy should remain in what is inherent in the beliefs and values with which it begins.

Davidson argues that in the *Philebus* Plato returns to the question of the nature of the good life, and also he comes back to the Socratic *elenchus* as the clearest and most

[86] Davidson, "Plato's Philosopher," in Davison (1994), p.14.

reliable method for discovering how we ought to live. The theory of recollection as a Platonic method attemped to substitute the Socratic method of *elenchus* and ultimately failed. Another method in the middle and late dialogue, the method of division and collection cannot tell what the true units are nor does it provide any guide how to judge when a division has to be made at the joints. Therefore, Davison thinks this dialogue is very similar to the earlier dialogues with respect to the method that is used and the main topic. Criticizing his theory of the Forms in the critical dialogues, Plato comes to conclude that metaphysics grounded upon the separate Forms does not have any role to play in the consideration of ethics and values. Since in the *Philebus* Plato discusses the same topic that Socrates spent his whole life dealing with, he has to introduce the same method. This is why *elenchus*, as the clearest and most reliable method for discovering how we ought to live, reappears in the one of Plato's latest dialogues.

First of all, *elenchus* is not the only method that appears in the *Philebus*. If Davison thinks that this dialogues is a dialogue of morality revisited with the main character of Plato's ethical dialogues, Socrates, we should not expect any other method in this ethical dialogue, the *Philebus*. But that is not the case: although I do not think that *elenchus* stops at 21b as Frede argues—so he is using *elenchus* throughout the dialogue as Davidson thinks—Socrates is obviously using the method of division and collection, which is regarded as Plato's method for metaphysical inquiries.[87] In fact, the method of division and collection functions in the *Philebus* more effectively than in any other dialogues.[88]

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[87] In the *Sophist*, this method is used in explaining the relationships between five primary Forms.
[88] The method of division and collection is not only a way of investigation but also a method of explanation and teaching. I will argue in Chapter 3 that such dual uses of this method shows how metaphysics can be related to human morality.

Second, there are in fact some counter-examples against Davison's main claim that *elenchus* is only for ethical inquiries. Socrates in the *Symposium*, which deals with love, uses *elenchus*, even though the main topic was not exclusively about ethics.[89] Therefore, Davidson's argument that *elenchus* is a method for ethical inquiry, and ethical inquiry should be performed by the ethical method does not seem to be sound.

Furthermore, there is much more than ethics in this dialogue. Davison mistakenly thinks that Plato indeed rejected his metaphysics of the middle dialogues. He argues that values in Plato's philosophy are not related to metaphysics anymore, therefore, it is useless to consider the relationship between metaphysics and ethics in the *Philebus*. However, as I will argue in Chapter 4, the metaphysics is the foundation and ground that produces the ethical question Socrates initially raised. As a lifelong follower of Socrates, Plato could not suggest the separation between ethics and metaphysics. I will show how Plato's metaphysics, grounded upon the theory of Forms, completes his philosophy.[90] Therefore, Davidson is right insofar as Plato returns to the ethical question in the *Philebus*. However, his claim that since the *Philebus* is an exclusively ethical dialogue seems to be inadequate. And therefore I cannot fully agree with him that *elenchus* is an exclusive tool for ethical investigation.

2.6. Plato's Ideal Method

So far in this chapter I suggested that the unique dual cross-examination in the *Philebus* is actually the beginning of a new systematic investigation, which resembles the contemporary procedure of a scientific research. I showed that I disagree with Annas

[89] *Symposium* 199c-212c.
[90] In Chapter 4 I will examine how in the *Philebus* Plato reconcile metaphysics and ethics.

and Frede, who argues that *elenchus* is usually regarded as a way to attempt to refute a position by securing its proponent's agreement to something contradictory to that position. Also I reject Vlastos and Davidson's position that *elenchus* shows the coherency of a belief set that an interlocutor has. In fact, these two major interpretations of the Socratic method in Plato's dialogues miss one important point: The *elenchus* in the *Philebus* is used for dual cross-examinations, which is hardly observed in Plato's dialogues. Considering this fact will help us understand better the nature of the *elenchus* in the *Philebus*.

In Chapter 3 I will maintain that *elenchus*, namely, the Socratic method, as a part of Plato's ideal method, surely leads pursuers to their final goal*, i.e.,* positive knowledge. As the dual cross-examinations to reject initial claims of both Socrates and Protarchus is the first step of their systematic investigation of the human goods, the *elenchus* in the *Philebus* is the first and essential part of Plato's ideal method in pursuit of knowledge.

Chapter 3. The Ideal Method in the *Philebus*

3.1. An Ideal Method in the Ideal Dialogue

In this chapter I will argue that the method in the *Philebus*, the method of division and collection, is an ideal method for Plato's philosophy. As *elenchus* and its advanced form, the method of hypothesis, are incorporated into the method of division and collection, this method comes to have dual functions: learning and teaching. With this method, philosophers can investigate and acquire knowledge as well as teach that knowledge to ordinary people so that they can live better lives.

The divine gift (16c), *i.e.*, the method of division and collection, was not something new to Plato's philosophy. This has been introduced and practiced several times in Plato's other dialogues, such as the *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Republic*, not to mention the later works such as the *Phaedrus*, *Sophist* and *Statesman*. I argue that the most advanced and even almost ideal form of Plato's method of division and collection is introduced in the *Philebus*, whereas many scholars think the method in the *Sophist* or the *Statesman* is the almost completely developed form.

There are three reasons I suggest that this method in the *Philebus* is ideal: 1) *Elenchus* and the method of hypothesis—the Socratic method and its developed form—play essential roles in practicing the method of division and collection. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to distinguish these two Socratic methods from the method of division and collection. As Plato developed the Socratic *elenchus* by introducing a hypothesis, he took another step to make this method ideal by adapting Socrates' obsession of defining an object completely. 2) The ideal characters practice this method.

Although both Protarchus and Socrates do not have knowledge on the subject they are investigating, they succeed in acquiring knowledge. It is because the level of intellect of the two key characters in this dialogue is different. And therefore we see an instance that the blind leads the blind in the *Philebus*. Socrates without having definite knowledge leads Protarchus, who lacks knowledge into a joint investigation. 3) The division and collection in this dialogue is practiced for an ethical investigation. In other words, this method will generate an answer to an ethical question, what the human good is, while the method of division and collection in the *Sophist* or the *Statesman*, commonly defines metaphysical terms.

Chapter 3 is structured in the following way: In Section 3.2., I will show how the method of hypothesis in the *Philebus* empowers the Socratic method, namely *elenchus*. Inquirers do not have to stop their investigations at the time of their impasses. Hypothesis enables them to continue their investigation. In Section 3.3., I will analyze the method of division and collection in the *Philebus*. Especially I will survey two examples of the method introduced in this dialogue to reveal the nature and function of the method of division and collection. In Section 3.4., I will argue that the method of division and collection is ideal, because it enables those who do not have knowledge to investigate further to gain knowledge, and it also helps those who have knowledge to teach the knowledge to others.

3.2. Plato's Method in the *Philebus* as a Method of Investigation and Teaching

My major claim in this chapter is that the methods, which Plato uses in the *Philebus*, so-called Platonic methods—hypothesis, and division and collection—are in fact *Socratic*. "Socratic" in a sense that the historical Socrates would have wanted to use those methods, but in fact he was not able to. The Socrates in history and in Plato's early dialogues failed his mission, but his method is supposed for the sake of investigation as well as education.

There is a consistency, and furthermore, a unity among these methods—*elenchus*, hypothesis, and division and collection, which are employed in Plato's many dialogues. Neither the method of hypothesis nor the method of division and collection replaces *elenchus*, that is, the Socratic method. As Plato was writing his dialogues throughout his career, Socrates' method experiences some changes and developments. And at the same time, the method of inquiry has become more and more complete.

3.2.1. The Method of Hypothesis in the *Philebus* as a Developed Form of *Elenchus*

Socrates' ultimate aim in the *Philebus* as well as in his general philosophical inquiries was attaining knowledge. Therefore, evaluating a set of beliefs that an interlocutor has is a preliminary and necessary step in the procedure of pursuing knowledge. As I showed in Chapter 2, I do not agree with both Frede and Annas that *elenchus* is an *ad hominem* device, that is, a way of striping off one's false belief. Their account assumes that these beliefs are false and Socrates, who uses *elenchus*, knows the doctrine. Therefore, Socrates has to get rid of the false beliefs in his listeners so that he can fill them with his doctrine. As I argued in the previous chapter, however, this does not fit well with much textual evidence of the historical Socrates. Especially in the

Philebus, Socrates is not described as an authority with knowledge; rather he is a knowledge-pursuer. By means of *elenchus* Socrates evaluates his own position and Protarchus' and criticizes whether they are true enough to be counted as knowledge.

Similar to Vlastos or Davidson' position I analyzed in Chapter 2, I take Socrates' method, *i.e., elenchus*, as a way of 'evaluation.' Actually Socrates' *elenchus* is, as Patterson rightly observes, a *critical* method, which should be incorporated into both hypothesis and division.[91] Once Socrates' and Protarchus' initial positions are rejected by dual cross-examination (21d), there was nothing supposed to be left for them to examine. Since Socrates does not have his own belief, there would be nothing left to examine whether it is knowledge or not. Then, does Socrates have to give up? No, he wouldn't. He has suggested a third option at the beginning of the conversation. And this enables both interlocutors to go on with their investigation.

3.2.1.1 The Main Question of the *Philebus*

What are both Socrates and Protarchus in the *Philebus* really looking for? In order to understand the nature of the method these two interlocutors are using, it is crucial to examine what they are searching for with the method. At the beginning of the dialogue, both interlocutors make an agreement after Protarchus' takes over Philebus' place.

> "Socrates: In addition to these, shall we agree on the following point?
> Protarchus: What's that?

[91] Patterson (2008), p. 80.

> Socrates: That each of us will try to prove that a certain state or disposition of the soul is the one capable of rendering life happy for all human beings.
> Protarchus: Quite so.
> Socrates: You, that it is pleasure; we, that it is knowledge?
> Protarchus: This is so.
> Socrates: What if it should turn out that there is another possession, better than either of them? Would the result not be that, if it turns out to be more closely related to pleasure, we will both lose out against a life that firmly possesses that, but the life of pleasure will defeat the life of knowledge?
> Protarchus: Yes." (11d2-12a2)

The main question is "which of the two, the state of pleasure or that of reason, *makes* human life good?" This new agreement actually requires a new interlocutor. It is because there are two points that makes the question, which Socrates suggests, somewhat different from the original thesis, which Philebus was initially interested in. First, Philebus is only concerned to see whether pleasure will win (12a7-8) over reason. On the contrary, both Socrates and Protarchus want to find the truth. They do not worry about losing their position in the verbal competition. Insofar as they would find out what really is good for human life, they should be satisfied. As I have discussed in Chapter 1, such an attitude that the characters have makes the *Philebus* much different from Plato's earlier dialogues. Unlike other interlocutors in the earlier dialogues, for example, Polus or Callicles in the *Gorgias*, Protagoras in the *Protagoras*, Thrasymachus in *Republic* I, who mostly wanted to defeat Socrates, or simply to defend their own views rather than seriously evaluate it, Protarchus and also Socrates in the *Philebus* seek to find truth.

Second, Socrates' previous opponent, Philebus, argued that 'pleasure, and many other such things are a good.' Socrates' point in his conversation with Philebus (dramatically this conversation happened before the *Philebus* begins), however, was that wisdom and thought are better and excellent for all who are capable of taking part in them. According to Socrates' summary of their discourse before the *Philebus* begins, they seem to argue for different agents: On one hand, Philebus raised the question whether pleasure is a good, without limiting his claim to human beings. He considers all the living beings in general to see if pleasure is good for all. On the other hand, Socrates is mainly concerned with those who can participate in reason and wisdom—human beings.

Third, he does not argue that wisdom and thought are the good for human beings, but that these are *better* than pleasure for men. Saying this, he opens a possibility that man needs something more than knowledge to be happy. In other words, at the beginning of their conversation, Socrates already opens the possibility that his claim and Protarchus' belief are both wrong: there might well be a third option that would turn out to be the human good after all.

At 21d of the *Philebus*, where their initial claims are rejected, both Socrates and Protarchus become speechless (*aphasia*)—because there is nothing they can argue further from their initial claims—like being stung by a torpedo fish.[92] However, they do not stop at that moment but continue their investigation, using *elenchus*. It is possible for them because they have another 'hypothesis', that is, a third life with knowledge and pleasure, to evaluate and criticize. As a method of investigation, the method of

[92] C.f. *Meno*, 80a.

hypothesis does not replace Socrates' *elenchus*. In fact, this method is an advanced form of the Socratic method.

3.2.1.2 'How' Question in the *Meno* and the *Philebus*

Socrates in many of Plato's dialogues always asks for the definition of an object as the beginning step of his cross-examinations. The *Meno* gives us a good example of his way of investigation: At the beginning of this dialogue, Meno asks Socrates "Can you tell me whether virtue can be taught, or is acquired by practice, not teaching?"[93] This abrupt question shows that Meno is willing to know how to obtain virtue, no matter what it is. Socrates answers, however, "I have to reproach myself with an utter ignorance about virtue; and if I do not know what a thing is, how can I know what its nature may be?"[94] He says that it is impossible to know how (*poion*) something is without knowing what (*ti*) it is. The knowledge of the definition of an object always takes precedence in Socrates' inquiry. Now, does Socrates take the same approach in the *Philebus*?

The summary of the beginning of the dialogue suggests that Socrates wants to know whether wisdom and thought are 'better' than pleasure in making human life good. He does not ask what reason or wisdom is. He does not even define what the good is. He is just asking 'how wisdom and thought are'. In other words, Socrates is asking a '*poion ti*' question. On the contrary, Philebus' question is more similar to questions Socrates raised in the earlier dialogues, "what is X?" He defines a good as pleasure and other sort of things.

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[93] *Meno*, 70a.
[94] *Meno*, 71b.

Why does Socrates ask such a 'how' question? Does he give up the priority of definition in an investigation of truth? It was because Socrates' new 'how' question actually enables both participants of the discourse to avoid futile conflict. The straight question of 'what is the good' may well lead them to impasse (*aporia)*, since neither pleasure nor knowledge fulfills the conditions of being the human goods. Therefore, here Socrates brings the possibility he suggested already at 12a that the human good must be "a third thing" (*ti triton allo*),[95] which both interlocutors do not know yet. While conversing with Philebus, Socrates came to realize at least that wisdom and thought are not the human goods. Upon this realization, Socrates turns his question from what is X to how is X. After all, Socrates initial concern in the *Philebus* is to find the thing that makes human lives happy. Socrates' practical concern required him to use his philosophical method in a little different way. It is not necessary for Socrates to have knowledge immediately; but he still needs a right direction to follow. As Socrates and Meno at the end of the *Meno* agreed that both knowledge and true belief are good for man insofar as they lead him to the right place,[96] the nature of knowledge that Socrates in the *Philebus* is looking for is different from knowledge pursued in the *Republic* or other middle dialogues. For Socrates' practical purpose in the *Philebus* such a strict knowledge is superfluous.

'Seeing' a hypothesis is inferior to having the knowledge; but taking a hypothesis will provide more concrete information than 'believing something.' In the *Republic* the examples of hypothesis are something that is familiar to an investigator, *e.g*., the odd

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[95] *Philebus,* 14b.
[96] *Meno,* 98e-99a.

and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles.[97] After you take those hypotheses, you can move further where you do not have to use them anymore. In the *Meno*, Socrates was using diagrams drawn on the ground so that the slave boy can think clearer than before.[98] Also the method of hypothesis in the *Meno* is introduced with an example from geometry: the question how to inscribe a square to a circle is given (not directly).[99] These examples of hypothesis in Plato's dialogues show that they enable knowledge-pursuers to continue their investigations even after all of their beliefs are rejected. Whenever you do not have any beliefs to examine anymore, a hypothesis functions as a stepping-stone from which you can make progress in the investigation of the truth.

Socrates in the *Philebus* introduced a hypothesis that he had heard in his dream or elsewhere or received as a story from the ancient.[100] This is not what he knows, yet. Just like diagrams, a circle, or other things akin to the objects of their investigations, the story from Socrates' dream is to be used as a beginning of his inquiry, what makes human lives happier. He *knows* that examining such a hypothesis will lead them closer to the truth. At the same time, Socrates was able to *tell* pleasure is *not* the good. Also, he could *tell* something between pleasure and reason is very much related to the human goods. This is why he was able to introduce a hypothesis that makes inquirers to go further than before. If he continues these steps, he will eventually arrive at "the unhypothetical (*to anypotheton*) first principle of everything."[101] And this is how Socrates in the *Philebus* is able to continue to use his method, namely, *elenchus*. Even

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[97] *Republic* VI, 510 c-d.
[98] *Meno*, 82b.
[99] *Meno*, 87a.
[100] *Philebus* 20b, and 16c.
[101] *Republic* VI, 511b.

after all beliefs are rejected, insofar as you have a hypothesis (or hypotheses), you can use *elenchus* to test that hypothesis. Therefore, this method is fundamentally a critical method not aiming to reject another's belief but to evaluate it in order to see if a belief, statement, conviction or a hypothesis is valid.

3.2.1.3. The Limit of the Method of Hypothesis in Ethical Inquiries

The main goal of the middle dialogues was to comprehend the final and fundamental ground of our knowledge, *i.e.*, Forms. The method of hypothesis helps inquirers grasp the one Form, that is, the object of their inquiry. In order to gain full knowledge regarding the Forms and also to fulfill the initial reason for having knowledge, that is, one's practical concerns and interests, however, we should proceed downward to the conclusion after attaining to the Form and taking hold of the first dependencies from it. While philosophizing, an inquiry is supposed to move in two directions: going up and coming down. Certain knowledge becomes complete through these two ways. But the method of hypothesis does not provide a way of coming down. Therefore, this method is still insufficient for Socrates' philosophy.

What both Socrates and Protarchus will arrive at through the advanced form of *elenchus*, *i.e.*, the method of hypothesis, is intrinsically provisional. In other words, the knowledge both Socrates and Protarchus would have is not stable enough until they comprehend the Forms. Then they will be able to better grasp the instances of the Form. Therefore, they need further steps to acquire knowledge.

It is the method of division and collection, the main method used in the *Philebus*, which will enable the inquirers to grasp all the "joints" of the divisions of the one Form in order to have a complete understanding of the object. In addition, this method will

show those inquirers how to come back from the one to the unlimited, that is, all the instances we experience in our daily lives. However, just as hypothesis did not replace the *elenchus* but becomes an advanced form of *elenchus*, the method of division and collection does not replace the methods of *elenchus* and hypothesis.

3.3. The Method of Division and Collection in the *Philebus*

3.3.1. The Method of Division and Collection in the *Phaedrus*, *Sophist* and *Statesman*

I will begin my argument on Plato's method in the *Philebus* with a general account of the method of division and collection in Plato's dialogues. First of all, the *Phaedrus* gives a quick summary what this method is and how this method works. Socrates in this dialogue praises this method, which consists of two aspects and is practiced to inquire into any subject. The first technique, collection (*sunagoge*), involves seeing a group of scattered things as one form (*idea*).[102] Socrates argues that this grasp of the common form primarily enables an inquirer to define a subject, and in doing so, to establish the only clarity and consistency achievable by a discourse.[103] Division (*diairesis*), by contrast, is mainly the ability to cut up things according to forms (*kat'eide*), along natural joints (*kata arthra e pephyken*).[104] Socrates tells Phaerdus "I myself am a lover of these divisions and collections, so that I may be able to speak and to think." Moreover, he gives the name of 'dialecticians' to experts in these methods, and promises that when he finds such an expert, he follows behind in that person's footsteps

[102] *Phaedrus,* 265d 3-4.
[103] *Phaedrus*, 265d 4-7.
[104] *Phaedrus*, 265e1-266a1.

"as if after a god".[105] According to Socrates' account in the *Phaedrus*, therefore, this method is essentially similar to the Socratic *elenchus*, in that this method also primarily aims to define the object of investigation. At the same time, the method of division and collection is akin to the method of hypothesis with respect to the fact that both methods aim to achieve the higher principles from the bottom. After grasping a principle, this method also enables an inquirer to turn his attention to those things that are relevant to the principle.

The Eleatic Visitor in both the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* practices the same—or at least a very similar—technique of dividing according to kinds. The main aim of practicing this method in these two dialogues is to define a sophist and a statesman, respectively. By using this method one will be able to know not only what a sophist is but also what is not a sophist. In other words, this method will let you not only understand the 'form' of a sophist but also distinguish every sophist from non-sophists you encounter in you daily life. You will have a knowledge of all possible instances of sophists and also fake-sophists by means of this method of division and collection. This method is a philosophical device for conducting such an examination, such as seeing which kinds are similar and which are different, and in what respects they are related to each other. The method is valuable in philosophizing, not because it proves anything but because it helps us to understand better any given kind of thing by noticing similarities and differences it has with other kinds. Both the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* describes the method of division and collection as an indispensable skill for a philosopher. In the *Statesman*, the Visitor holds "we must value first and most of all the method itself,

[105] *Phaerdus*, 266b3-c1.

which is the power to divide according to forms."[106] In the *Sophist*, he notices that he and Theaetetus may have stumbled upon the philosopher while searching for the sophist, when they discovered that it takes knowledge of dialectic "to divide according to kinds" (*to kata gene diaireisthai*).[107]

Since the division usually is executed while cutting up things according to natural joints, this method is commonly considered as a hierarchical classification.[108] This hierarchical interpretation assumes that kinds are divided into smaller parts, and that the former fully contain the latter as parts. My interpretation of the method generally follows this traditional interpretation—while I argue that a hierarchical interpretation does not necessarily mean a genus-species model.

It is interesting, however, to briefly consider Grams' "the Weaving model of division" here. Examining the Eleatic visitor's method of division in the *Stateman* and *Sophist*, she argues "rather than producing a branching, hierarchical tree of kinds, the procedure of diaresis is analogous to unraveling individual threads from a messy knot and then weaving the related strands back together."[109] She maintains that this model of division can explain the complex relationships among kinds so that a practitioner can define subjects such as sophistry and statesmanship. Furthermore, she holds that this method is employed on the basis of the separate forms. Therefore, an expert practitioner will be quipped with the skills that produce stable definitions by basing distinctions (or natural joints) on the basis of unchanging forms.

Although Grams' brilliant suggestion helps us better understand those two dialogues, which feature the Eleatic Visitor, I think that at least in the *Philebus* her

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[106] *Statesman,* 286d8-9.
[107] *Sophist,* 253d1-3.
[108] Especially Cornford (1957), Crombie (1963) and Hackforth (1972).
[109] Grams (2012), p. 131.

account does not sufficiently explain the function of this method. Her assumption is that an expert practitioner of the method, like the Eleatic Visitor, has the knowledge of the Forms already so that he can justify his division according to the knowledge that he has. She says "the visitor frequently provides supporting information and occasionally engages in lengthy arguments in order to explain how a division is made according to a particular natural joint."[110] In other words, the division is a good method of defining subjects for someone else, who does not have knowledge. Therefore, the *diairesis* is a sort of a method of education, by which an expert reveals the nature of subjects for others, who need the knowledge of them. I think that this account is only half-true to the use of the division in the *Philebus*: Socrates in the *Philebus* does not have the skills of an expert practitioner, who can produce stable definitions by basing distinctions on unchanging forms.

As I previously argued, Socrates in the *Philebus* is investigating together with Protarchus. He claims that he does not have the definite knowledge of the unchanging Forms, at least in this dialogue, yet. As I will show in the examples in the following section, while Socrates uses the method of division and collection, he does not in fact have knowledge of either music or grammar, not to mention the four-fold division of the universe.[111] As Grams maintains, a practitioner of this method should have knowledge of the forms so that he can *show* or even *teach* the relationships among kinds as well as individual cases. However, this method is also a device of investigation in the *Philebus*: as an extended and advanced form of the Socratic method, the division and collection is indeed employed in the pursuit of the human goods. Therefore, I do agree with Grams

[110] Grams (2012), p.153.
[111] I will discuss this question in Chapter 4.

that *diairesis* can be used for educational purposes, which I will explain in detail later in 3.4.3. In the *Philebus*, however, this method is for both teaching and learning, or showing and investigating. Therefore, it is described in the *Philebus* as a more advanced form of a philosophical method. In the following sections, I will show how Socrates introduces this method in his search for the human goods in the *Philebus* and how the method of division and collection is incorporated with Socrates' method, *elenchus* and its advanced form, hypothesis.

3.3.2. The Example of Sound and the Method of Division and Collection in the *Philebus*

Socrates suggests that they need to use a 'gift of the gods to men' in order to proceed with their investigation. He explains, "we have to assume that there is in each case always one form for every one of them, and we must search for it, as we will indeed find it there. And once we have grasped it, we must look for two, as the case would have it, or if not, for three or some other number. And we must treat every one of those further unities in the same way, until it is not only established of the original unit that it is one, many and unlimited, but also how many kinds it is" (16d). In the process of applying this method, it is important that first we need to assume (*themenous*) one form (*mian idean*). His method in this dialogue is similar to those in the *Phaedrus*, *Sophist* or *Statesman*, but there is something unique in it. An investigation begins with 'assuming and laying down (*hypo-tithēmi*) one form.' When you do not possess knowledge of the object you are about to investigate, you should suggest a hypothesis either to examine or refute. The examples of the division and collection in other dialogues were mainly for educational purposes. In other words, a teacher teaches his students how to divide their

objects. Therefore, there is no need to assume anything. They do know where to begin their investigation. In the *Philebus*, on the contrary, Socrates and Protarchus do not have definite knowledge of what they are investigating. Therefore it is necessary to assume or introduce a hypothesis in order to start their investigation. A hypothesis like stepping stones to take off from enables an inquirer to reach the unhypothetical first principle of this art.[112] This point will be clearer in Socrates' examples.

After introducing the general description of his method, Socrates in the *Philebus* 17a-19b presents two examples of arts (*technai*), namely, the art of music and the art of grammar, in order to explain Socrates' method. These two examples are closely related to each other, because both use 'sound' as the beginning point of the division. At first glance, Socrates is suggesting two different kinds of divisions, that is, music and letters, from two distinct arts, *i.e.*, the art of grammar and the art of music. I maintain, however that these two arts are in fact from the same origin, that is, sound.

According to Cornford, sound, as being opposed to noise (*psophos*), covers articulate speech and musical sound.[113] In order to grasp fully what sound really is as opposed to disordered noise, we should examine both aspects of sound: on the one hand, sound is something uttered in an orderly manner by human beings, and on the other hand, sound is harmony of musical elements. It is reasonable to assume that sound for the Greek has a certain order in itself and also is uttered by men, unlike noise that is essentially chaotic and unintelligibly cried by animals. Then, two orders are found within sound: first, expressing its order with *logos* (or to put in words) and second, giving a pitch to it. The former is done by the art of grammar, namely, Socrates' first

[112] C.f. *Republic* VI, 513b.
[113] Cornford, F. M. (1997), p. 153.

example of his method, while the latter is executed by the art of music, that is, the second example.



Figure 1: The First Divisions of Sound

In fact, Socrates does not seem to be too strict while applying his method. He should have introduced the first division not from articulate sound, but from sound as something that comprehends both sound and noise. It is probably because Socrates is not presenting those two arts, but introducing the method and showing how this method works. In other words, since the divisions are suggested as an example for Protarchus to understand better, Socrates did not have to strictly follow the procedures

of the investigation. Additionally, he could go another level up, which comprehends all sounds made by either man or something else, and which is an antonym to silence.

3.3.2.1. Music Example

At the *Philebus* 17c-d, Socrates takes music as an example to show how the method of division and collection works. First, he takes sound (*phone*) and makes two big divisions.[114] The standard of these divisions are: 1) according to its pitch, and 2) according to the motions of the body (*tais kinesin tou somatos*). From the former an inquirer comes to know the 'musical modes' (*harmonia*), and then from the latter he can tell 'rhythms and meters' in music.[115]

First, the first branch of sound, namely, pitch, will be divided as low (*oxy*), high (*bary*) and equal (*homotonon*). This division is provisional: since there are unlimited ways we hear something as high and low. Also one can hear a pitch as high, but the other will say it is a low pitch. Unless there is a firm standard of the heights of pitch, all judgments on pitch are subjective. Furthermore, pitch itself is not an element of music, while intervals (*diastemata*), which come to be according to its pitch, are essential parts of the art of music. In order to divide sound into intervals along with pitch, we should first grasp limits (*horos*:notes) as two edges, because "intervals are defined as bounded by two notes of differing pitch, distinguished by magnitude, by consonance or dissonance, as rational or irrational, by genus, and as simple or compound."[116] And then count how many (*hoposa*) intervals there are, and finally see what character (*hopoia*)

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[114] In fact, Socrates could have divided a song into two divisions: music and word.
[115] In the *Republic* 398b, Socrates says that a song (*melos*) consists of three elements-words (*logos*), harmonic mode, and rhythm. Since harmonic mode and rhythm makes music, a song is constructed by words and music.
[116] Stanley (2001) 6(iii)(b).

they have. And then these intervals will make scale (*systema*). Musical modes regulate and give order to several scales so that the music from a certain mode sounds strong, soft, or idle. Grasping musical intervals, the numbers of their kinds, their characteristic, and the limits, which differentiate each interval distinctly, will lead an inquirer of music to scales. Then he should be able to name the musical modes, after understanding musical scales.[117]

And then for the second branch of sound, rhythm, the motions of the body are to be investigated. Since music was closely connected with dance, it is reasonable to see rhythm from body movements. There are unlimited ways of movements, but they should be measured by numbers and then these are called rhythms and meters.

The following diagram summarized Socrates' division of music.

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[117] According to *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, Greek scales and modes are not the same. There are many accounts how these are different, but at least Plato and Aristotle use this term almost certainly as "referring to a full complex of musical elements, including a particular type of scale, range and register, characteristic rhythmic pattern, textual subject, and so on." [Stanley (2001), 6(iii)(c)]. Therefore, the modes are higher species than scales.

There are many kinds of modes as well: Socrates divides modes in the *Republic* in another way: There are the lamenting modes, the soft modes, the strong modes (that would suitably imitate the tone of a courageous person), and for the last the peaceful mode. In the lamenting mode, there are the mixo-Lydian, the syntono-Lydian and some other modes. The Ionian[d] and other Lydyian modes are soft enough to be relaxing. And [o]the Dorian and Phrygian modes belong[s] to strong kinds, which is firm and brings about excitement. Aristotle in the *Politics* (viii:1340a:40–1340b:5) "But melodies themselves do contain imitations of character. This is perfectly clear, for the *harmoniai* have quite distinct natures from one another, so that those who hear them are differently affected and do not respond in the same way to each. To some, such as the one called Mixolydian, they respond with more grief and anxiety, to others, such as the relaxed *harmoniai*, with more mellowness of mind, and to one another with a special degree of moderation and firmness, Dorian being apparently the only one of the *harmoniai* to have this effect, while Phrygian creates ecstatic excitement. These points have been well expressed by those who have thought deeply about this kind of education; for they cull the evidence for what they say from the facts themselves." See Comotto (1991) p. 78.

Aristotle continues by describing the effects of rhythm, and concludes about the combined effect of rhythm and *harmonia* (viii: 1340b:10–13): "From all this it is clear that music is capable of creating a particular quality of character [ἦθος] in the soul, and if it can do that, it is plain that it should be made use of, and that the young should be educated in it." Also there are other variations of these modes such as hypo-phrygian, hypo-lydian, hypo-dorian, etc. Therefore it is reasonable to say that there are basic four musical modes in Greek scales: Lydian, Phrygian, Dorian, and Ionian. And each, but not all, mode has its variations: mixo-, hypo-, syntono-, etc.



Figure 2: Music Example

It is interesting to see how to grasp the definition of 'musical mode' in this process of division and collection.

- The first hypothesis: the one, sound.
- The first division: high, low and flat pitch.
- The second hypothesis: the limits of pitch in sound.
- The second division: dividing sound into the intervals according to limits of pitch. (*e.g.*, 4th, 5th, octave, 12th and double octave)
- The first collection: collecting intervals into scales (*e.g.*, Lydian, Dorian, etc.)

- The second collection: collection scales in a certain manner—Musical modes (*e.g.*, hypolydian, Mixolydian, etc.).

On the one hand, the method of collection makes a vertical hierarchy among musical elements: Musical modes, scales, and intervals. If you can collect all the instances of a rank, you can go up one level. Then, again by collecting all the cases of the level, you will climb another level up. In order to completely comprehend what muscal scales are, you should collect all the intervals without leaving any case. On the other hand, the method of division makes many divisions of the same level. For example, the first division of sound makes the lowest level, namely, many instances of pitches. The second division of sound makes the second lowest level, namely, intervals. The divisions made among musical modes shows sub-kinds of musical modes, such as Lydian, Phrygian, Dorian, and Ionian. Within a hierarchy collection works vertically, while division works horizontally. Division and collection processes work similarly for rhythms and meters. First, Socrates grasps the numbers of bodily movements. Then, according to the numbers as a certain limits (*horos*), unlimited motions are to be divided into several (limited numbers of) kinds of rhythm and meters.

Through Socrates' application of the method of division and collection on music, he comes to grasp all kinds of rhythm and meters as well as all kinds of musical modes. Also, he is able to understand all the instances of scale, intervals, and many kinds of rhythms and meters. Finally, the hierarchical structure of music and its elements is revealed through several applications of collection and division. Only when Socrates arrives at this stage of division and collection, he is going to have a complete knowledge

of music.[118] In order to understand what sound is like, however, he should execute another division and collection of a sub-level of sound, namely, letter. Without this process, he would not be able to have a full comprehension of sound. This is why Socrates has to present another example, that is, letter. It is another part of the big picture of sound, although Protarchus asked him for another and different example.

3.3.2.2. Letter Example

Being satisfied with Socrates' explanation of the method, Protarchus asks what Philebus thinks of this account (17e). An impatient character, Philebus does not want to waste his time on a matter *unrelated* to his main question. At 18a, therefore, he complains, "of what use is all this talk to us [Protarchus and himself], and what is its purpose?" Interestingly enough, Socrates does not ignore Philebus' criticism, even though he knows that Philebus only cares to see if pleasure is the good. Socrates even praises Philebus that he is right about asking its purpose and use. And then he emphasizes again the importance of grasping both one and the unlimited kind without skipping anything in between. Philebus seems to fail to understand Socrates' example of his method, *i.e.*, the division and collection of music. But Socrates takes up Philebus' question. And then Socrates uses this chance to restate his intention of introducing his method before he discusses the main question of the dialogue.

In order to show how the method of division and collection works on letters, Socrates introduces a certain deity or god-inspired man from Egypt, an inventor of the

[118] And then, collecting music and words together will reveal what a song is.

art of grammar, Theuth (18b).[119] Socrates explains the steps Theuth took in finding all the elements in grammar. There are several hypotheses, divisions, and collections, as in the case of music.

Figure 3: Letter Example

- The first hypothesis: Most of all, Theuth discovered the vowels[120] in that unlimited variety of vocal sound. Then he realized there is not one vowel but several.

[119] Theuth appears in *Phaedrus* 274c-275b as the inventor of the art of writing. In this dialogue, he was presented as a god. King Thamus criticized him, since the art he invented actually weakens rather than strengthens people's memory and knowledge. The letter, which is written, is only an image of the true thing, the living speech (276a).

[120] Vowel is a sound in spoken language pronounced with an open vocal tract so that there is no build-up of air pressure at any point above the glottis. And also vowels form the nucleus or peak of syllables by

- The first division: Making distinctions among those regular vowels (probably according to certain limits, just as he did in case of the music example).
- The second hypothesis: Theuth identified there are other sounds that are not voiced—they cannot form syllables by themselves—but make some kind of noise, among (sort of) vowels, intermediates (*ta mesa*: semi-vowels)
- The second division: Theuth classifies semi-vowels one by one.
- The third hypothesis: Theuth finds that there are "consonants" (*aphona).*
- The third division: Theuth divides consonats into 'consonants with sound' and 'mutes'
- The fourth division: then consonants and mutes are divided into every single unit. Then Theuth numbers every single units of vowels, semi-vowels and consonant.
- The first collection: Theuth names all these units as "letter" (*stoikeion*: elements). He realizes that "none of us could gain any knowledge of a single one of them [letters] taken by itself without understanding them all.
- The second collection: Theuth considered one link (*desmos*) that unifies all the letters. This link is named the 'art of grammar'.

Through these several divisions and collections the art of grammar becomes apparent. Only when we understand such a structure of the letters and how they are associated with each other, we will be wise about letters.[121] Although Socrates explains that it was through this process of division and collection that Theuth finds letters and grammar, this is also how we come to understand grammar, letters, and all elements of letters in our language.

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themselves without having any aid. This is why Theuth can first discover vowels. Whereas consonants can form onset or coda and there is a constriction or closure at some point along the vocal tract.

[121] An expert in grammar is one who knows which kinds of letters can associate with which. (*Sophist*, 253a)

Socrates finishes his introductions to the example of the method of division and collection. The two examples of music and letter suggest how this method functions in philosophical inquiries of knowledge. Readers of these examples come to have knowledge of human sound—a combination of letter and music—from these two applications of Socrates' method. In order to be truly wise about 'sound', however, we should take another process of collection of music and letter and move up to one higher level. As shown in the first diagram, sound and noise belong to one upper category, which is in contrast to silence. And since Socrates did not take this step to a higher level so that he acquires more comprehensive knowledge, it would be possible for Protarchus to blame Socrates for not being dialectical but *eristical*—those who go straight from the one to the unlimited and omit the intermediates are engaging in eristic discourse (17a).

Not always, but at least from this example of practicing the method of division and collection on 'sound', we can observe the following points: on the one hand, collection works for setting up a hierarchic structure, but on the other hand, division reveals how many kinds in a rank there are and what characteristic these kinds have. The method of collection and division displays a big picture of a subject. Not only does this method divide one form into many kinds. This method also shows how a network of individual units is structured. This method was mainly practiced in a vertical way in the *Sophist* or the *Statesman,* that is, from one to many or vice versa. In other words, the structure of division is commonly interpreted as a hierarchical 'tree' of classification: beginning with one general kind, which is then subdivided into its own proper or natural parts until the unlimited numbers of individual units are obtained. This method not only defines an object but also gives a bigger picture that contains all the instances of the object and the complex relationship—not merely hierarchical but also of a certain

network of things that are related to the one—in order to reveal the full nature of it. As in the example of letter, this method not only shows the relationship between vowels and consonants, but also presents the characteristic of the higher genus, that is, sound so that one comes to have knowledge of letters and become an expert of letters.

Furthermore, collection is not necessarily a matter of proceeding "bottom up" from the unlimited to generic unity.[122] Socrates does not always begin from unlimited instances of sound. On the contrary, he first takes a hypothesis from the middle: in the example of music, high, low and flat pitches were the first things to be posited, or in other words, hypotheses. From here, Socrates finds limits in pitch and divides it accordingly into intervals. And then from here collection also begins up to music (and even songs). In the example of letters, Theuth distinguishes three things: vowels, semi-vowels, and consonants. And divisions of these three species first begin 'downward' to many instances of letters. And then collections are done from those instances upward all the way up to the art of grammar. Only then does one become wise in letters. Collection and division are executed in many directions throughout his investigation of letters.

3.3.3. The Divine Gift in the *Philebus*

So far, I explained how the method of division and collection in the *Philebus* is used as a method of acquiring knowledge in two examples. Is this device something new to Plato that enables him to do what he was not able to do without it? While I disagree with many commentators including Frede, who takes the method of division and collection as 'Plato's tool,'[123] I shall show how the Socratic methods are seamlessly

[122] Hackforth (1972), p. 25-26.
[123] D. Frede (1993), Introduction, xiii.

working with the method of division and collection. I will suggest that the method of division and collection is another advanced form of Socratic method, which will generate a profound knowledge. Therefore, Plato is not diverting from Socrates' philosophy; as I claimed in Chapter 1, Plato's philosophical project is to find a better way to realize Socrates' lifelong pursue—finding the answer to the ultimate human question, that is, how to live a good life. And the advanced method in the *Philebus* is the tool a philosopher should use.

Socrates, beginning with proposing his main method of inquiry of the whole dialogue, praises this method of division and collection as "a gift of the gods to men…hurled down from heaven by some Prometheus along with a most dazzling fire" (16d). Upon a belief that "whatever is said to be consists of one and many, having in its naure limit and unlimitedness", the method of division and collection begins with assuming (*temenous*) 'one form (*mia idea*) for every one of things. Then "we must search for it, as we will indeed find it there. And once we have grasped it, we must look for two, as the case would have it, or if not, for three or some other number." This process goes on until we understand that the original object of an inquiry is "one, many and unlimited, but also how many kinds it is" (16d).

In Socrates' explanation of the gods' gift to men in the *Philebus*, it becomes obvious that this method is a more advanced form of his philosophical method than *elenchus* and the method of hypothesis are. Most of all, a practitioner should be careful to check and examine thoroughly every kind of an object. As Patterson argues, many numbers of *elenchi* are observed in this process of examination in the *Philebus*.[124] As Socrates proposes divisions of pleasure and knowledge, Protarchus does not merely

[124] Patterson (2008), p. 86.

concede as the characters in the *Stateman* or the *Sophist*. He asks for more clarifications and sometimes objects to Socrates' suggestion. This process of examination is executed not as being *ad hominem* but as a way of evaluation for the sake of investigation. In other words, Protarchus' goal is not tackling Socrates so as to defeat him; just as Socrates does, Protarchus wants to know which alternative between pleasure or knowledge will win the second prize for the human goods. Socrates and Protarchus help each other to gain knowledge. And Protarchus does not have to become diffident. He is more than a yes-sayer, like Theaetetus in the *Sophist*. He is equal to Socrates in the *Philebus* as a pursuer of knowledge. Therefore, Protarchus' giving consent to Socrates' division is voluntary and deliberate. *Elenchus* is incorporated into the division so that a practitioner of this method can find a right joint and cut it well.

At 16e, Socrates emphasizes an interesting point: While practicing the method of division and collection, you should not miss anything in between one and many.[125] If we go straight from the one to the unlimited without touching those intermediates, Socrates argues, then our discourse of investigation will turn out to be *eristical*, not dialectical (even though one did not intend it to become so). Only a serious pursuer of knowledge will go through every detail and step within a certain structured domain of investigation, while someone like Philebus, who is interested in winning a verbal dispute, would skip some instances between one and many insofar as that enables him to defeat his opponent. Therefore, it is necessary for a *thorough elenchus* to be executed in order to examine whether a practitioner does not skip anything at all. While analyzing the long middle part of the *Philebus* in Chapter 5*,* we shall see how completely Socrates and Protarchus examine 'natural joints' with this method so that their conversation does not

[125] *Philebus*, 16 d-e

become *eristic* (or unintentionally incomplete) while they divide and collect both pleasure and knowledge.

In addition to showing that *elenchus* is an essential part in the practice of the method of division and collections as a crucial way of evaluating subjects, the explanation of the divine gift in the *Philebus* explains how a hypothesis is proposed in the middle of employing this method. Socrates gives a detailed account of how to collect the one when beginning to practice this method. We assume one form first, and then search for it. The account in the *Phaedrus* 265d did not break this collection (*synagoge*) into two steps. It is explained that one needs to 'see' a group of scattered things as one form (*idea*). Socrates in the *Philebus* says that we should propose one form as a hypothesis and then pursue (*zetein*) it. This is a short but typical account of the method of hypothesis.

Socrates' two examples of the method of division and collection in the *Philebus* show how hypothesis plays its role in the application of this method. In the music example, for instance, Socrates begins from the first hypothesis, sound. He takes this sound as the beginning point of his investigation. The first division goes all the way down to unlimited numbers of different levels of pitches. Nevertheless, high, low or flat pitches are not 'elements' of the art of music. These are taken as hypotheses to begin an inquiry on musical sound.

Interestingly enough, the division and collection in this example does not begin from the extreme ends: Socrates takes neither the one nor the unlimited many but chooses something in the middle and then begins his investigation both directions—up and down. Since Socrates has to collect 'many' pitches, he takes the second hypothesis, namely, limits of pitch in sound. Upon this hypothesis, the second division of sound into

the interval is executed. I say, hypothesis, because Socrates does not yet know the nature of either the first hypothesis, namely, sound, nor, the second, limits. Such hypotheses enable Socrates to move to the next division and collection, even though he lacks precise knowledge on these subjects.

Such a use of method of hypothesis is more obvious in the case of the letter example. In this example, Theuth, namely, the discoverer of letters takes three hypotheses, that is, vowels, consonants, and semi-vowels as the stepping-stones in his investigation of letters. Assuming these three elements, the division and collection of letters go up—from vowels to letters—and come down—from consonants to consonants with sound and mutes and individual instances of these consonants. Even though Theuth does not have concrete knowledge of vowels, consonants, and semi-vowels, he encounters them in the process of investigation and posits them as a beginning point of the next division or collection.

In many instances of the method of division and collection in Plato's dialogue, a division begins either from the top, that is, the one to the bottom—*e.g.*, the *Sophist* or the *Statesman*—or from the bottom to the top. Socrates' example in the *Philebus* is quite different. Since this method aims to acquire knowledge of whole structures of subjects, the philosophical investigation—division and collection—can go in both directions. And this is possible, because Socrates (and also Theuth) uses hypothesis to continue his investigations through divisions and collections—dividing into vowels, semi-vowels, and consonants, and then dividing into many instances of the three classes, and then collecting them up to letter, and furthermore to the art of grammar. Through this process a practitioner of this method will be able to *acquire* comprehensive knowledge.

3.4. The Ideal Method in the *Philebus*

3.4.1. Knowledge Seekers Who Lack Knowledge

In order to show how the method of division and collection in the *Philebus* is ideal, I will discuss again the characters, who practice the method of division and collection in the examples of the *Philebus*.

Unlike the Visitor in the *Sophist* or the *Statesman*, Socrates and Theuth in the examples of the method of division and collection in the *Philebus* do not have knowledge of things they are inquiring into. And this fact also differentiates the method of division and collection in the *Philebus* from the instances in other dialogues. Since Socrates and Theuth do not have either the art of music or the grammar, they need to use hypothesis in order to execute their investigation. Socrates in the music example provisionally makes the first division to find pitches, *i.e.,* high, low, and flat ones. As I mentioned previously, such high, low or flat pitches by themselves are not musical elements. On the contrary, they are certain states of sound, which will be categorized into intervals by limits. When Socrates begins the first division, he did not know all the limits or intervals. The tentative division reveals how Socrates should find the limits in various pitches, and intervals according to the limits. He did not have knowledge of intervals at all, but he was able to catch the different levels of pitches in sound according to its limits (*horos*: notes). Therefore, Socrates uses pitches that he knows just a little as hypotheses of the later investigations.

This point is obvious in the example of letters. Socrates says Theuth was a 'discoverer' of the letters. It means that he did not know about the kinds of letters or the art of grammar before practicing the method on spoken sound. He 'finds' the vowels first, and then semi-vowels and proceeds to consonants. Furthermore, after finishing the

divisions completely, he realizes that there is a need to find something higher, which ties all them together in a certain order. Therefore, this method works for Theuth as a way of acquiring knowledge and also gives him a perfect comprehension of the letter, enough to establish the art of grammar. This is why I maintain that the method in the *Philebus* is primarily not *Platonic* but *Socratic*—it is a method of investigation. It does not mean that Plato did not contribute anything at all to this method. Rather, Plato is true to Socrates' intention and develops *elenchus*, *i.e.,* Socrates' method of investigation to a higher level.

Although both Socrates and Protarchus lack knowledge of the human good, the level of their 'blindness' is not the same. Socrates, at least, knows better than other people. He is better than Protarchus insofar as he is able to lead the conversation in the right direction for finding the answer for their initial question.[126] Also both characters are making progress in expanding their knowledge, which is also an ideal example of Plato's inquiry for knowledge. The most important reason I argue that this dialogue is 'ideal' is because Plato's dialectic in this work is a way of investigation, most of all, for *both* interlocutors so that they come to have more knowledge by this method. Since the levels of mental capacity of both does not necessarily have to be the same, it is important that both of them make progress throughout the discourse. The *Philebus* describes such an investigation between two people genuinely seeking knowledge about a particular question, while having different level of expertise or knowledge in other respects. As an ideal dialogue, as I argued in Chapter 2, these two sincere and genuine knowledge seekers—even not knowing where the discussion is leading to--are able to arrive at a

[126] I will discuss what it means to hold "Socrates knows better" in the following section.

certain point of having knowledge of the human good. The *Philebus* shows how effectively the method of division and collection is used in this learning process.

3.4.2. Socrates' Human Wisdom in the *Philebus*

What do I mean by saying that Socrates and Protarchus have different level of knowledge? Even though both Socrates and Protarchus do not have knowledge of the human goods, at the beginning of their investigation Socrates seems to know a little more than Protarchus does. Even though he failed to prove that knowledge is the human good, Socrates knows better than either Philebus or Protarchus, who think pleasure is the good and do not consider other options at all. While maintaining that knowledge is the human good, Socrates allows the possibility that he could be wrong. Therefore, he makes himself available for the third option, which will eventually turn out, after a long conversation, to be knowledge.

Since Socrates knows better than Protarchus in the *Philebus*, he might have known that the third candidate for the human good, that is, the mixed life of pleasure and knowledge would eventually win. He just did not know how this third option would win. As I previously argued, knowledge in Plato's philosophy is more strict: without being able to explain what you think you know, you are not to be considered as being knowledgeable. Socrates may have known that the mixed life will be the best life for man, but he had to explain how this is so. On the contrary, Protarchus does not even know that there is a third option, and this is why he became speechless when his position was rejected.

Therefore, Socrates' attitude in the *Philebus* is similar to Socrates' claim in the *Apology*—he is not a knower, but, at least, he knows that he (possibly) does not know.

This is what he means by 'human wisdom'[127]—he is wise in such a limited sense. In the similar fashion, Socrates' level of knowledge at the beginning of the *Philebus* is higher than the levels of other interlocutors—either Philebus or Protarchus, just as Socrates in the *Apology* was wiser than politicians, poets, and craftsmen of Athens. Nevertheless, the conversation led by Socrates in the *Philebus,* however*,* is different from the stories in the *Apology*. This talk actually generates knowledge—an investigation of two ignorant men comes to a success. It is truly a story of the blind leading the blind in the right direction, except that one sees a little more clearly than the other and also has knowledge of a good method for finding the way to truth.

Some skeptics would say that Socrates is deliberately playing the role of genuine seeker in order to help Protarchus and—more importantly—help the readers see how two ignorant people should cooperate in a philosophical inquiry. In other words, Socrates is playing a role—not sincerely—in order to benefit both Protarchus and the readers of the *Philebus*. I think that is a plausible suggestion, but not sufficient. Without being a role player, Socrates, as the main character in the *Philebus* can do both: helping Protarchus to possess knowledge and also helping the readers observe how two persons, who lack knowledge, can work together in a philosophical endeavor. If it is possible for Plato, namely, the author of this dialogue, to show how such a philosophical inquiry is executed as an ideal example without making Socrates a sort of a deceiver, pretending to be someone else, different from who he really is, why should Plato need to describe Socrates as a not-a-sincere knowledge-seeker? The *Philebus* may be a real corrective to Socrates' overly intellectualized view of the good life—or to the views of some overly intellectual followers of Socrates.

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[127] *Apology,* 21d.

3.4.2.1. Socrates as a Teacher in the *Meno*

In fact, Socrates and Protarchus' conversation in the *Philebus* is not the first instance in Plato's dialogues of the blind leading the blind. In a famous example, Socrates in the *Meno* 'teaches' the Slave boy how to figure out the length of a side of a square, which is twice bigger than an original one.[128] As we will see, Socrates in the *Meno* does not know the answer to their initial question before he begins conversations with the Slave boy. Also in the *Philebus*, Socrates does not have definite knowledge of the human good. Therefore, both the demonstration with the Slave boy and the philosophical inquiry in the *Philebus* are good examples, which show an ideal conversation in which two interlocutors without having knowledge can find and teach knowledge from a philosophical discourse.

Some readers may object that Socrates in the *Meno* is not investigating knowledge but teaching mathematics to the Slave boy. In other words, the dramatic setting of the *Meno* is different from the ideal philosophical conversation settings that I have been maintaining, namely, two ignorant men come to grasp knowledge through a mutual investigation. If Socrates were indeed a knower in this demonstration, the objection would be valid. Then, it is not a situation in which the blind leads the blind. I would answer, however, that the example in the *Meno* is still a very good example of a knowledge-investigation between two ignorant men, because Socrates does not actually know the answer. Furthermore, just as in the case of the *Philebus*, the first blind man, namely, Socrates is wiser than the Slave boy is, in a limited sense.

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[128] *Meno,* 82b-86a.

Most of all, Socrates in the *Meno* knows that the diagonal of the original square with two-inch long sides would make a square twice bigger than the original. Socrates leads the Slave boy to *see* the diagonal is the answer they are looking for. Socrates knew how he should lead the boy and helped him to see what makes the original square two times bigger. Socrates was able to see the direction and let the boy take the steps to follow it properly. Therefore, as some scholars complain, this conversation so far does not indeed seem to be an example of pursuing knowledge between two men without knowledge.

Yet, this is not the whole story: Socrates is wiser than the Slave boy, because Socrates knows how to lead the boy in the investigation. At the same time he also does not know the answer of the mathematical problem, as a mathematician would know the answer. To put in another way, he did not know how to *say* the answer. The answer Socrates should say that the length of the side of the twice-larger square is $2\sqrt{2}$ (*i.e.,* $\sqrt{8}$). Since the original square had two-inch long sides, the length of the diagonal of the original square is to be expressed by an irrational number. Not only the Slave boy but also Socrates was not able to say this number because it is 'irrational.' Greek mathematicians did not recognize irrational numbers, but treated of irrational quantities as geometrical entities. Therefore, they were not able to name these irrational numbers as they did with rational numbers. With the aid of diagrams, such irrational numbers were to be shown to others, but it is impossible to express what number they are, because irrational numbers cannot be represented as a simple fraction.[129] This is why ancient Greeks termed this ratio of incommensurable magnitudes *alogos*, that is,

[129] Cf. *Theaetetus*, 147d-148c. Here Theodorus showed for a series of powers (square) that each is incommensurable in length with the one foot square to prove the irrationality of series of irrational numbers, such as $\sqrt{3}$, $\sqrt{5}$, ...$\sqrt{17}$.

inexpressible: They were not able to say this number but only can show these by diagrams. After all, one who possesses knowledge should be able to explain his knowledge. However, Socrates in this discourse cannot explain what he knows; he only can *show* what it is.

The Slave boy's first answer is that a square with four-inch long sides would double the original square. But Socrates shows him that such a square will actually make the original square four times bigger not double. Then, this boy answered three, but that is also not a correct answer, as it gives an area of nine. At this point the Slave boy gives up, since he cannot think of any other answer—evidently because he knows the side has to be shorter than three but longer than two, but he knows of no number in between.

Of course there is in fact no rational number he could ever identify between two and three. This is why he comes to a place of *aporia* and gives up. This boy thought the answer only in terms of *rational numbers* that he can say.

In this mathematical demonstration, Socrates seems to know how to *lead* the boy to the right direction and how to *show* the answer. But does Socrates really *know* the answer? No, he does not. He is able to draw it on the ground and to point and show others. Just as the Slave boy could not say the answer, however, Socrates cannot *say* the answer, either. Since he does not have knowledge of irrational numbers, he does not know the answer to the question—as ignorant as the Slave boy with regard to saying the irrational number. Yet, Socrates is able to *point out* and *draw* the answer, which the Slave boy does not have any clue at the very beginning of the demonstration. Consequently, The Slave boy merely guesses an answer, and in fact, there was no option left for him to guess, but Socrates at least 'knew' better than this poor boy. While both Socrates and the Slave boy are ignorant in saying—because they do not know how to

say—the irrational number of the geometry question, Socrates knows better than the Slave boy because Socrates can draw the answer to the Slave boy in order to *teach* him the answer.[130]

3.4.2.2. An Ideal Investigation in the *Philebus*

Although the demonstration in the *Meno* is a good example of 'the blind leading the blind', this conversation between Socrates and the Slave boy is not such a perfect ideal investigation as the joint investigation between Socrates and Protarchus in the *Philebus* is. That is because, I maintain, the *intention* of the conversation in the *Meno* is different from the goal of the *Philebus*: the former is suggested as a demonstration or performance to show the possibility of recollection as a way of learning,[131] while the latter is an actual knowledge-investigation.

Why then is Socrates' performance in the *Meno* not an example of Socrates' preferred method of philosophical inquiry. First, the ideal conversation between two interlocutors, who want to know more, should be able to expand their knowledge or acquire the truth, mutually, unlike as the case in the *Meno*, in which one person leads the other to his level of knowledge. The participants in the conversation should be able to know more because of the discussion they have. We do not see such an example in the earlier dialogues, because no *elenchus* in those dialogues was successful in leading to a gain in knowledge. Nonetheless, Socrates always invites his interlocutors to 'join' the investigation. It is not only the interlocutor but also Socrates who are investigating. In

[130] Just as Socrates in the *Philebus* would do, Socrates in the *Meno* could play a role of a person, who does not know the answer to the geometrical question. He could pretend to be such a person only in order to teach the Slave boy. But describing Socrates as a person disavowing knowledge but also as a teacher, who is able to lead the Slave boy is better and more sincere for Plato than suggesting Socrates as a character, who is deceitful.
[131] *Meno*, 81e.

other words, as Socrates disavows his knowledge, he also need to investigate in order to gain knowledge. Socrates in the *Meno*, however, is not benefited from the conversation with the Slave boy. In other words, he does not become more knowledgeable about mathematics than before he began the performance on the Slave boy, in the same way he become knowledgeable about the human goods in the *Philebus*. He used what he knows in order to lead the boy to the level that he has true belief. It is not a joint investigation, but only an example that one leads another to higher level of knowledge.

The conversation between Socrates and the Slave boy in the *Meno* was not introduced as a perfect example of the kind of mutual philosophical inquiry the historical Socrates, or the Socrates of the Socratic dialogues intended. Socrates *performed* this conversation only to persuade Meno to stay in the conversation so that both of them could resume the investigation about the definition of virtue. In other words, for the sake of the conversation Socrates showed Meno that philosophical investigation between two persons, who lack knowledge, is possible. On the one hand, Socrates knew more than the Slave boy and he was able to make the boy to understand as much as he did with the given geometry problem. On the other hand, Socrates in the *Philebus* not only becomes more knowledgeable than he was at the beginning of the dialogue but also acquires *ethical* knowledge that is necessary for us to live a good life. Therefore, the *Philebus* introduces the perfect way to conduct an investigation between two persons who do not have knowledge: while the blind leads the blind, both of them become knowledgeable in the subject they are concerned with. And this investigation is possible because of the ideal philosophical method—the Socratic method of division and collection.

3.4.3 The Method of Division and Collection as a Teaching Device

So far, I have been considering the method of division and collection as an expansion of Socratic method—a device of philosophical investigation. The method of division and collection in other dialogues, however, seem to have additional purposes beyond those it has in the *Philebus*. Especially in the later dialogues, as Grams' argument suggests, this method is possibly used as a device of *education* to show the relationships among the kinds and instances of subjects. The Eleatic Visitor in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* seems to know all the division even from the beginning of his execution of divisions. His interlocutors in these dialogues, Theaetetus and young Socrates, who are young and have lots to learn from the old and wise philosopher from the hometown of Parmenides, obviously do not possess any knowledge of definitions of a sophist or a statesman so that they follow the Visitor's lead in the application of the method. Therefore, the method used in those two dialogues is a pedagogical device, by which a teacher 'demonstrates' (*epidexis*)[132] a subject to his students. As Grams argues, the Visitor kindly explains his knowledge to the younglings while dividing subjects so that they become much mature in philosophizing. Furthermore, he teaches the method itself, unlike Socrates in the *Philebus*. Also in the *Phaedrus*, Socrates says that a rhetorician should learn all kinds of human souls in order to persuade each soul effectively with the knowledge of speech and soul.[133] This method of division and collection, therefore, is a way of education so that anyone with knowledge can transfer to someone else.

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[132] Sophists, especially Gorgias, were famous for this practice. They hold that they can 'show' the knowledge they possess. Socrates in the *Meno* also demonstrates a sort of knowledge to the Slave boy, who does not have knowledge. I will discuss this example later in this chapter.
[133] *Phaedrus*, 277 b-c.

I have been arguing in this chapter that Plato's method in the Philebus is primarily a method of investigation. Then, how does this method work as a tool of education in the *Philebus*? At least in those two examples of letter and music, this method is used exclusively as a device of knowledge investigation not a tool of teaching as in other dialogues. It is because of the context of the examples: They are introduced as a supplement or addition to Socrates' account of the method. And this method will be used to answer the question, what are the human goods? Therefore, Socrates and Protarchus' immediate goal is to grasp knowledge of the human goods. Their final interest, however, is not only possessing the knowledge but also applying it to their practical lives. After all, their ultimate goal is to find the list or ranking of the human goods. Consequently, even though Socrates immediately needs to show Protarchus how effective his new method is in acquiring knowledge, he had the next step of this method—teaching—in mind already when introducing the method from the gods. This is why he says, "the gods handed down to us this mode of investigating, learning, and teaching one another" (16e). At this moment of Socrates and Protarchus' conversation, they pay little attention to the teaching part of the method. Socrates, however, mentions the two main functions of the method, investigating (learning) and teaching so that when they arrive at the point of applying the knowledge, they still can use the same method for education.

Furthermore, the usage of the method of division and collection in the *Philebus* moves one more step further than in any other dialogues: it is eventually used for an ethical purpose. Socrates and Protarchus' aim of the investigation throughout the *Philebus* is to find the human goods, and both interlocutors are able to generate the list of the human goods at the very end of their conversation. The method of division and

collection is at work throughout their conversation not only to find knowledge but also to generate the application of that knowledge. In other words, this method helps them find all the kinds of pleasure and knowledge and collect only good ones to make a perfect mixture that will make human life happy.[134] The ultimate goal in the *Phaedrus* as well as the *Sophist* and *Statesman* was not ethical. The *Philebus*, however, shows an ideal form of the method that will accomplish the ultimate aim of Socrates' philosophy—finding answer to ethical questions and applying the answer to human lives. In Chapter 5, I shall suggest a more detailed analysis of the actual practice of this method with respect to pleasure and knowledge in the *Philebus*.

3.5. The Method of Division and Collection-The Ideal Method

To summarize my argument in this chapter, the method of division and collection is an ideal method, because it helps investigate, learn, teach, and apply knowledge—especially on ethical matters. I maintain that unlike in the cases of *Sophist*, *Statesman* and *Phaedrus*, with this method Socrates and Protarchus in the *Philebus* can do these all—investigating, learning, (mutual or one-way) teaching, and finally applying the knowledge acquired to generate a practical outcome. The outcome in this case is the list of the criteria of human goods. Consequently, not only with respect to characters but also with respect to the method of investigation, the *Philebus* is an ideal dialogue. Two

[134] It is important to note that the method of division and collection in the *Philebus* for the ethical investigation actually does not go all the way to the unlimited. At the end of the dialogue, what both interlocutors acquire are the ranking of the human goods. I take the ranking as the order of criteria with which ordinary people can then reasonably apply in making moral and ethical decisions. Therefore, the account how knowledge is taught and applied is not fully suggested in the *Philebus*. Probably this is why at the end of the dialogue Protarchus still does not let Socrates go and says there is still a little missing. Surely you will not give up before we do"(67b). I will come back to this point later in Chapter 5.

ignorant persons can still pursue knowledge by conversing each other, and eventually expand their knowledge and apply it to human lives.

A philosophical investigation between two ignorant men would be impossible without any guidance at all. An advanced form of Socratic method, namely, the method of hypothesis, helps knowledge pursuers posit something in order to begin their investigations. The method of division and collection lets them continue their philosophical pursuits up and downward so that they can grasp the whole structure of the subject. While trying to grasp a whole structure of an object of knowledge, *elenchus* works at every joint to see if the divisions are natural—not arbitrary.

After explaining his method in philosophical investigation, Socrates introduces a new weapon (*belē*) that will help both Socrates and Protarchus judge whether knowledge or pleasure will take the second place of the human goods. Unfortunately, this metaphysical new device, known as the 'Fourfold Distinction,' seems to be in conflict with another metaphysical account in the *Philebus*, namely, the one and many as suggested in the one-many question. And because of this contradiction between two metaphysical accounts, many readers of the *Philebus* have found it hard to make the dialogue consistent. In Chapter 4, I shall explain how my interpretation reconciles these two metaphysical passages. We shall then be ready to follow Socrates and Protarchus' pursuit of the human goods in Chapter 5 and 6.

Chapter 4: The Fourfold Distinction

4.1. A Difficult Passage in the *Philebus*

In the *Philebus* 23b-32b, Plato introduces the so-called "Fourfold distinction" of the universe. He says that there are four classes in the universe: the Unlimited, Limit, a mixture of these two, and the cause of the mixture. Socrates in the *Philebus* suggests that all things that exist in the universe can be categorized into one of these four divisions.

This passage is notorious for its difficulty. Many scholars have complained that it is very hard to understand, because this account is quite different from Plato's ontological statements in other dialogues. While explaining how the universe is in this passage, Socrates does not mention Forms, images, or even numbers or shapes and so forth. Such an account with four elements is rather unheard-of in Plato's previous dialogues. Furthermore, since this Fourfold division of the universe does not seem to endorse the function of the Forms in the universe, this account in the *Philebus* seems to be at variance with Plato's overall metaphysics, especially the theory of the Forms. To make things worse, Socrates in this dialogue suggests a story of the fourfold distinction, which does not seem to conform to the previous account of the same dialogue 15b, *i.e.*, so-called the Heavenly Tradition. Worst of all, it is not clear why Plato in the *Philebus* introduces the complicated argument of the Fourfold division of the universe at all: This dialogue is primarily about the human goods. What then is the point of going through Limits (*peras*) and the Unlimited (*apeiron*) of the universe in the examination of the human goods in an ethical dialogue, the *Philebus*? By answering these questions we

should be able to understand Plato's intention in this metaphysical passage of the *Philebus*. While dealing with these questions in this chapter, I will continue to maintain that the *Philebus* is still an ideal ethical dialogue, in spite of this metaphysical puzzle.

Debate over the metaphysical and ontological significance in this notorious passage in the *Philebus* spans more than a century. Although many interpretations beginning from Jackson in the nineteenth century have been introduced,[135] none of them is persuasive enough to be accepted by every scholar. In this chapter I will go through these main interpretations of this passage and add my own suggestion, which may be able to solve many problems in this passage—or just add another puzzle.

The initial question I raise in Chapter 4 is this: why does Socrates bring up this metaphysical account here at this point of the dialogue? In this introduction to this chapter, I would like to briefly answer these initial questions, before I examine my answers in detail later (especially in Section 4.2).

First, as I hold in the previous chapters, especially in Chapter 3, Socrates in this passage is not a knower. The conversation between Socrates and Protarchus on the Fourfold distinction of all things is also not a lecture from a teacher but a joint investigation between two persons who do not have knowledge. Socrates in this passage uses hypothesis to discover the four elements of the universe.

Second, even though it does not seem to be, the main topic of the Fourfold distinction passage is not metaphysics but still ethics. The context of the 23bff of the *Philebus* clearly suggests that this discussion is a new 'weapon' (*belē*: 23b). This philosophical weapon will be used in making the final decision—which of the two candidates, knowledge or pleasure will take the second prize for the human goods.

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[135] Jackson, H. (1882), pp. 253-98.

Therefore, it is important for the readers of the *Philebus* to be reminded of the location of this Fourfold distinction passage in the dialogue and to understand the context of this passage. Nevertheless, I do not mean that the metaphysical account in this passage does not have any importance at all. This account is still important, since it gives a firm ground for Plato's ethics. The metaphysical claim in the *Philebus* is made possible on the ground of Plato's metaphysics, especially of the *Timaeus*. Since I take that the *Timaeus* is in line with Plato's theory of the forms in the middle dialogues, *e.g.,* the *Republic* or the *Phaedo,* metaphysics in the *Philebus* also assumes the separate forms.

Third, this passage is not seamlessly in agreement with the *Philebus* 15b. I maintain, however, that this variance between two passages on Plato's metaphysics in the same dialogue does not bring about a serious problem at all. As I argued in the previous chapter, the one and many problem at the *Philebus* 15b itself does not have any direct role in the overall argument of the dialogue. This old problem of the relationship between one and many was introduced as a good example of employing Socrates' method of division and collection. Moreover, at 23b-32b, Socrates examines unlimited *degree* of a given object's status or action, which does not directly relate to 15b of the *Philebus*. Most of all, I take the former passage, the Heavenly tradition, to be on the structure of the universe, but the latter, namely, the fourfold distinction to be about how things in the universe are divided or categorized.

Once I answer my initial questions in Section 4.2, I will explain later in this chapter the significance of the Fourfold division in the universe of the *Philebus*. Furthermore, I will argue how this metaphysical account works together with Plato's ethics in this dialogue. In order to explain the notorious passage in the *Philebus* clearer, I structure this chapter as follows: In Section 4.2, I will examine the context of this

passage, 23b-32b, and see what role this passage plays in the *Philebus*. In Section 4.3., I will introduce well-known interpretations of the four elements in the Universe and show limitations in those accounts. In Section 4.4., I will answer the question, what the objects of the classification in this passage are. In order to reveal the nature of the things concerned in this passage I will propose what the Universe (*to pan*) in this passage means. In Section 4.5., I will present how the *Timaeus* and the *Philebus* are similar but distinguished from each other: on the one hand, the *Timaeus* is about the composition of the universe. But, on the other hand, the *Philebus* is about the restoration (*anachōrēsis*: 32b or *katastasis*: 46c) of the universe. According to the argument in the *Philebus*, the good pleasures that should be pursued come from the process of coming back to the best state (53c). Finally in Section 4.6., I will summarize what those four elements are.

4.2. The Context of *Philebus* 23b-32b

4.2.1. Assumptions in Reading the Fourfold Distinction

In order to figure out what Plato intended to suggest at 23b-32b of the *Philebus*, it is important to examine the context of the dialogue. Before the examination, however, it will be helpful to restate my two assumptions in reading Plato's dialogues.

First, each of Plato's dialogues has its own theme and argument as well as its conclusion. In other words, a dialogue itself is a complete—with beginning and ending—conversation or discussion on a certain given topic. Almost every one of Plato's dialogues is structured in a dramatic format. A question is presented, and then all the characters in a dialogue participate in a discussion on the topic suggested. After going through sophisticated arguments, a dialogue somehow reaches a certain end (whether it

is open-ended—*aporia*, myths, or in other positive ways). Plato structured each dialogue carefully in such a way: every part of a dialogue is closely interconnected to each other so that the readers can arrive at the conclusion, to which the characters within the dialogue come. Understanding the context of a certain part of a dialogue, therefore, will show what role a part of a dialogue is playing in the bigger picture.

Second, even though a dialogue has a dramatic structure—having a beginning at a certain point of a conversation and its sort-of conclusion, readers should not see a dialogue as an independent work, which is absolutely unrelated to Plato's other dialogues. These assumptions are commonly accepted by both revisionists and Unitarians of Plato's dialogues.[136] Anyone, who believes either that Plato developed his philosophy throughout his career or that he held the same ideas from the beginning to the end of his life, sees the importance of comparing one dialogue to the others in order to grasp his comprehensive philosophical theory. By doing this comparison, you will acquire a broader and more profound understanding of Plato's philosophy. These two assumptions lead me to see the *Philebus* as an ideal dialogue: As I maintained in Chapter 1, the *Philebus* is a drama in which Socrates is described as succeeding in acquiring an answer to his ethical question. Therefore, it is important to read the dialogue both as itself and also in relation to other Plato's dialogues.

4.2.2. The Role of Fourfold Distinction Account in the *Philebus*

What did Socrates and Protarchus discuss right before Socrates introduces the fourfold distinction to the conversation? As I summarized in the previous chapter,

[136] I discussed this point already in the Introduction. Also as I mentioned in Chapter 1 footnote 5, reading Plato's work only individually will miss many important points in Plato's philosophy.

Socrates presents his method of investigation and then explains the nature and characteristic of his method. The introduction of Socratic method for the inquiry in the *Philebus* is followed by the mini-*elenchi* on a pleasant life without knowledge and on a pleasure-less life with knowledge. Both knowledge and pleasure are rejected as the human good, because they cannot fulfill the three conditions of the good. Now the third candidate for the human good—a life with both knowledge and pleasure—is proved to be eligible to acquire the first prize for the human good. Socrates, however, does not stop his argument at this point. It is because 'neither of the two would be the good, but it could be assumed that one or the other of them is the cause [of the mixture]" (23d). Therefore, it is still remaining undecided to which the second prize would be claimed.[137]

A long discussion on the second prize, which will cover more than thirty pages in the middle and later part of the *Philebus*, requires a different device from the philosophical tool used in Socrates and Protarchus' previous discussion. The Fourfold distinction of all beings is introduced as this new (but partly the same as the old device) weapon for the new discussion. Socrates uses this division of all things in order to comprehend clearly the nature of pleasure and knowledge. And then they will be able to tell to which category either pleasure or knowledge belongs. True and false pleasure and knowledge are also to be investigated in order to figure out what man really needs to achieve the good. Through this discussion both Socrates and Protarchus would arrive at the list of the human goods at the end of the dialogue.

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[137] It is important to note that Socrates is still not interested in winning his argument over Philebus or Protarchus. In other words, he does not care whether knowledge is more important than pleasure regarding the human goods. The reason he continues this investigation is to find the cause of the human good. Again, understanding a cause of something gives someone knowledge about the given subject. And Socrates is not satisfied with finding out which will claim the first prize of the good but wants to have the knowledge of the human good by investigating the cause. On the contrary, Protarchus does not seem to understand Socrates' intention at this passage. He is still worried about Pleasure's 'being deprived of second prize' (23a).

The Fourfold distinction of all beings, 23b-32b of the *Philebus*, is again a sort of a preliminary discussion that helps both Socrates and Protarchus to be prepared before the beginning of the main discussion of the dialogue—the human goods. The method, which will be employed in order to sort out the kinds of pleasure and knowledge, has been already presented. In order to continue the investigation on the second prize, however, a new device is still required. It is important that this tool should be able to show what function either pleasure or knowledge have in the human good, and/or which will also introduce what categories pleasure and knowledge belong to. This is the role of the ontological/metaphysical passages—presenting new weapons for both Socrates and Protarchus.

Consequently, Plato's theory of the Forms, or his metaphysics or ontology, is not a primary concern for either Socrates or Protarchus in this passage of the *Philebus*. The main topic of the whole dialogue is still ethics. This ethical investigation would not stop until both Socrates and Protarchus find which of knowledge or pleasure gets the second prize for the contest of the human goods.[138] Therefore, Plato is not doing metaphysics for its own sake: He does not explain the full philosophical account of the beginning and the end of the world and the eternity of the Forms. It is unnecessary to repeat what he discussed in other dialogues. Rather, the *Philebus* suggests Plato's developed philosophy from his philosophy in other dialogues. Therefore, the *Philebus* will be best interpreted in light of Plato's other dialogues, especially the *Timaeus*.[139] On the one hand, in the

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[138] Ross also holds this position that the metaphysical account at this passage is not the essential discussion. He says, "The *Philebus* is concerned in the main not with metaphysics but with ethics, and we must not expect in it so clear a statement of metaphysical principles as we find in the *Timaeus*. " [Ross (1951), p. 136]

[139] This is the main point I will raise later in this chapter. The *Philebus* becomes easy to understand only under the consideration of the *Timaeus*. (Without a question, the metaphysics of the *Timaeus* is founded upon the separate form theory of the middle dialogues.)

Philebus Plato assumes his metaphysical accounts, which were discussed in other dialogues. On the other hand, he does not repeat (nor revise) every description in his metaphysics and ontology. This is why it is important to assume the interconnectedness of Plato's dialogue. Plato *does* expect readers to see the main argument in a certain dialogue. At the same time, Plato asks his readers to refer to other dialogues that he wrote so that they better understand the whole picture of Plato's philosophy.[140] While expecting ethical discussion in Plato's dialogues Plato's readers should take his metaphysics into consideration.

In summary, I argue that the Fourfold division at 23b of the *Philebus* does not provide a complete picture of Plato's metaphysics. It is not giving a full-fledged lecture on his metaphysics that Plato is interested in at this passage. This ontological account in the *Philebus* does not play any further role than being a preliminary explanation for the ethical discussion later in the *Philebus*—divisions and collections of both pleasure and knowledge. This passage introduces a new device for Socrates and Protarchus to deal with the fierce battle for the second prize between knowledge and pleasure. Plato does not have to provide the detail of his metaphysical position since both the main characters and readers of the dialogue are more concerned with the ethical conclusion, that is, the human goods. As long as readers should be able to skillfully use their weapons in order to tell which one, either pleasure or knowledge, is going to win the

[140] A good example is found in the *Timaeus*. The beginning of the *Timaeus* is the summary of the conversation between Socrates and others on the fine city in the *Republic*. The main argument in the *Timaeus* begins from the fine city to a question, whether such a city historically existed. Also, the *Theaetetus*, *Statesman* and *Sophist* are closely related to each other not only with respect to the dramatic format but also to the subject matters of their conversations. It is interesting that we cannot find such a tendency among 'Socratic' dialogues. Probably Plato wrote dialogues in a more systematic way—presenting a big argument throughout series of dialogues—in the stage of his career.

second prize, Plato's metaphysical account sufficiently functions its given role in the *Philebus*.

4.2.3. Disagreement Between the Heavenly Tradition and the Fourfold Distinction

One of the most difficult questions in the *Philebus* is how to make two problematic passages in the *Philebus*—15b (the Heavenly Tradition) and 23b (the Fourfold division)—in agreement with each other.[141] Since in both passages Socrates uses the same terminologies—limit (*peras*) and the unlimited (*apeiron*), the *Philebus* seems to be internally at odds. While some scholars have attempted to show the agreement between the two passages, others just gave up and say these passages are irrelevant to each other.[142] The scholars who belong to the latter group primarily blame Plato for this variance: either he was not careful when revising the *Philebus* or for whatever reason just left it in an uncompleted form.

Unlike many scholars who try to find an agreement between these two stories, I argue that that the two 'metaphysical' accounts are in fact at odds with each other. The accounts of these two passages are actually two different stories: On the one hand, the Heavenly Tradition, as I previously suggested, is mainly on the participation of particular things in the Forms or the relationship between the Forms. On the other hand, the Fourfold distinction is about classes, division or distinction of things that exist

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[141] Waterfield uses a stronger term 'inconsistency': Waterfield (1984) p. 46. I do not agree with Waterfiled's choice of the term, because those two accounts in the *Philebus* are not contradictory to each other. As I will explain in this section, these two stories are related insofar as the same concepts are used. But they are at odds with each other, because those accounts are about different subjects.

[142] Davis (1979, especially p. 127) and Dancy (2007, p.37 and section 2) also take this position. Davis even argues that those two passages "present two different and incompatible doctrines concerning the relationship of genesis to *ousia*."

in 'the Universe (*to pan)*'. The variance between these two passages, however, is neither because Plato was too careless in editing this dialogue, nor because he left the *Philebus* incomplete. I do not think that Plato made a mistake or that he could not finish the dialogue, because I maintain that the *Philebus* is written as an ideal dialogue for ethical inquiries. I think that Plato was very conscientious to show how Socrates' project would be successful in this work. Therefore, the claim that the *Philebus* has mistakes would be a too hasty conclusion. It must have been the author's intention to make these two stories seemingly in disagreement with each other.

Why then does Plato introduce two accounts, which do not fit with each other but still seem to be closely related?[143] It is because they perform different functions in the *Philebus*. The first account at 15b is, as I claimed in the previous chapter, an example of using Socrates' method, *i.e.,* the method of division and collection. Of course, the account deals with old Platonic themes, such as, the separate Forms, participations as well as the one and many problem. Plato has spent much time in presenting his ideas and answering questions against his position in other dialogues.

With regard to 15b of the *Philebus*, the Heavenly Tradition is introduced as a good example to show the effectiveness of his method that would be used in this dialogue. Since this account has been examined and discussed sufficiently in other dialogues, Plato does not have to deal with the theory of the Forms again at this point in the *Philebus*. The first passage on limit and the unlimited is nothing but an example that explains the puzzle of one and many.

[143] They are obviously related to each other, because they use the same terms. I will discuss this point later at 4.2.5.

The Fourfold distinction passage, on the contrary, puts more weight to the main argument of the *Philebus* than the Heavenly Tradition passage does. This account is introduced as a new device (or weapon) to deal with the ethical conversation between Socrates and Protarchus. As I argued in Chapter 3, Socrates does not have definite knowledge while categorizing all things in the universe, because he was refuted from the dual cross-examinations. He does not know that there are four categories in the Universe, yet by dividing first limit and the unlimited on the spot, Socrates tries to find a good categorization of all things.[144] Limit and the unlimited are somehow hypothetically 'taken (*tithōmeta:* 23c11)' as the first two categories of things.[145] A mixed one (*hen ti symmisgomenon:* 23d1), then, has to be divided again as the third category, because it is possible to think of a mixture of the first (hypothetical) classes. And the fourth category, the cause, is required to explain the third category, a mixture. Furthermore, Socrates does not reject a possibility of introducing the fifth kind, that which separates them into limit and the unlimited again, as Protarchus proposes. He disagrees with Protarchus who says there is no reason they should think of the fifth kind, at least for now. Nevertheless, if it turns out that the argument requires another classification, Socrates will surely search for a fifth kind (23d).

In such a way Socrates divides all things in the Universe. At the beginning of his classification Socrates does not have an initial belief about the classes of the Universe.

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[144] Socrates answers to Protarchs' suggestion that they would be in need of a fifth kind that provides for their (the mixture) separation, "Perhaps, but I do not think so at least for now. But if it turns out that I need it, I gather you will bear with me if I should search for a fifth kind." (23d-e) It is important to observe the almost casual style in which Socrates introduces this passage, giving the impression that this classification is being devised on the spot, especially to deal with a problem which has just now arisen. Since he is not teaching but investigating in this passage as I argued in Chapter 3, the categories Socrates suggests are tentative and provisional. This is why Socrates says in a future indicative: he assumes that they possibly need another kind in the process of their investigation.

[145] Socrates takes these two hypotheses from his previous account, the Heavenly Tradition (16c-19d). Using the same terms of the earlier explanation, he begins a new investigation.

This conversation between these two characters of this dialogue shows that they are indeed investigating the categorization of the universe and ultimately the human good without knowing about them.[146] Furthermore, in examining the nature of the third kind Socrates prayed and waited until one of the gods to become favorably disposed to them (26b). This dramatic device, as it usually does in Plato's dialogues, shows not only that Socrates himself is the medium of this knowledge, but also how important the account he is investigating is.[147] Both characters, Socrates and Protarchus, are searching for the categories that they can use as a new device in the forthcoming discussion on the second prize of the human good.[148]

The Fourfold distinction is a metaphysical foundation, upon which Plato's ethic is grounded. Unlike the Heavenly Tradition, which in Chapter 3 I suggested is best understood as an example of Socrates' method, the Fourfold distinction plays a critical role as a foundation in the general discussion of the *Philebus* so that both Socrates and Protarchus can continue their investigation of the good life. Without understanding how the universe is divided, it is impossible to find the human goods. Consequently, two problematic passages have different functions in the *Philebus*, and therefore, they do not have to be in agreement with each other.

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[146] Davis also stresses the same point I raised: "It is important to observe the almost casual style in which Socrates introduces this section, giving the impression that this classification is being devised on the spot, for the purpose of dealing with a problem which has just now arisen." However, he argues all the discussion here is 'ad hoc', which I do not agree with. In summary of his argument, the metaphysical explanation does not play any role at all to discuss the ethical problem, which both Socrates and Protarchus have to deal with.

[147] The most famous passage is found in the *Meno*. When the conversation between Socrates and Meno comes to an *aporia*, Socrates introduces a story he heard from some religious men and women (*Meno*, 81b). Plato effectively uses 'mythos' in many corners of his dialogues, especially when Socrates has to claim something big: *e.g.*, the myth of Er at the conclusion of the *Republic* or the myth of the island of the blessed at the end of the *Gorgias*.

[148] I do not mean that Plato did not know this categorization while writing this passage: he wanted to make this dialogue 'ideal' by showing how those two characters are investigating and finding the answer.

4.2.4. Differences Between the Heavenly Tradition and the Fourfold Distinction

In order to support my claim that two accounts in the *Philebus*, *i.e.*, the Heavenly Tradition and the Fourfold Distinction, do not actually fit with each other, I will show how these two stories are different. This examination of the difference between two passages will help us to read the Fourfold distinction account deeper in later sections of this chapter.

There are three major differences in these two passages: 1) While the latter passage is about quantity of things, the former is about quality. 2) The former passage is on the composition of all, while the latter is about their categorization. 3) Socrates' attitudes are not the same: he explains what he knows in the former passage, while he investigates in the latter.

First, the Heavenly Tradition passage discusses the indefinite *number* of a certain thing in terms of one and many, *e.g.*, the music example, while the Fourfold distinction passage deals with indefinite *degrees* of instances of a certain subject. On the one hand, the Heavenly Tradition passage was introduced as an example in order to deal with the old problem of one and many. This is evident from the context of the dialogue: This question of one and many is introduced into their conversation in order for Protarchus to say that while pleasures are unlike each other and even some are opposites, they are good insofar as they are pleasures (13b-c). Without having evident knowledge of one pleasure and many pleasures, he would not be able to show that all pleasures are good. Therefore, understanding the relationship between one and many is the crucial step for the interlocutors in the *Philebus* to judge what the human goods are. Protarchus first suggests the relationship between one and many is similar to that of a whole body and

its parts (14c-d). Socrates, however, dismisses it as being too simple to consider. Then, Socrates presents a proper format of the one and many question—as I have discussed in 2.2. Above all, this Heavenly Tradition passage is about the numbers of the things in both the perceivable world and the world of the Forms. To make a long story short, Socrates explains how unlimited numbers of particular things can be called under one name. What is that which binds all together as one? The unlimited in this passage is obviously about quantity. There are so many, probably unlimited numbers of pleasant things in the world. Nevertheless, what makes us see them all as something *pleasant*? It is a limit that holds indeterminate number of instances of each of the different degrees as one. It is evident from the music example in the Heavenly Tradition: there are many levels of music, *e.g*., high and low pitches, but there is a limit that collects them into the established scales[149].

On the other hand, the Fourfold distinction passage is about quantity or degree of a particular thing, or state (25c), or an action (24c), which takes 'more and less (*mallon te kai hētton*). In other words, this unlimited class admits comparatives (24e-25a): The unlimited at this passage designates a state that obtains a 'more and less' (24c) or excess of a state (*to poly lian*: 26a), and limit plays a role to give a 'definite quantity' (*poson*: Frede's translation) or 'qualitative degree.' For example, temperature itself is unlimited. The scale of temperature could go down so that all the air becomes frost and eventually the temperature becomes zero. And also it could move to another extreme, that is, heat,

[149] The Heavenly tradition passage seems to be gone too far from their original question, the relationship between one name, pleasure and many pleasures. This is why Philebus interrupts the conversation and complains the irrelevance of the account to their initial question. However, the context how this passage is introduced in order to show how understanding one and many takes precedence over formulating Philebus and Protarchus' initial position.

by becoming hotter and hotter, continuously.[150] When limit is applied to this extreme state of weather so that temperature's excesses and unlimitedness are taken away, however, the weather that depends on temperature becomes moderate and harmonious (26a). Other examples, such as health, beauty, strength, and others also have unlimited states, accepting more or less, not unlimited numbers of instances of such a state.

Second, Plato used the Heavenly Tradition in order to explain how the universe is composed. On the contrary, the Fourfold distinction shows how things in the universe are categorized. The Heavenly Tradition passage is about the 'composition' of the world. Especially Dancy argues, "16c speaks of thing with an Unlimited component and a Limited component, while 23c speaks of one kind of things, those that are Unlimited and another kind of things, those that are Limited."[151] Socrates says of the universe and all the things in it at 16d, "Whatever is said to be consists of one and many, having in its nature limit and unlimitedness (*hōs ex henos men kai pollōn ontōn tōn aei legomenōn einai, peras de kai aperian en autois aymphyton echontōn).*" On the contrary, the Fourfold distinction at 23c is about Socrates' *dividing up* all the things that now are in the whole universe. He does not explain the process of composition of the universe in the later passage; his main concern is to see how the things that now exist in the universe are 'categorized.' The Heavenly Tradition is Plato's explanation of the ontological composition of the universe. Everything that exists in the universe has unlimitedness and limit in itself. The Fourfold distinction is, however, an account regarding the ontological classification or categorization. The criterion for the unlimited kind is the admission of comparatives (24e-25a), while the limit kind is the exclusion of

[150] There is 'absolute zero' at the extreme end of temperature's going down. But there is no limit discovered for the highest extreme of the scale.
[151] Dancy (2007) p. 39

such comparatives but the inclusion of definite quantitative ratios (25a). Therefore, explaining the constitution of things is different from saying in what categories things exist.

Third, Socrates, the main *character* of the *Philebus*, takes dissimilar positions and attitudes about these two accounts. In short, Socrates *explains* the Heavenly Tradition to Protarchus, while he *investigates* the Fourfold distinction. When he explains the Heavenly Tradition, he presents this as one who knows about this question very well[152]. He has been well aware of the problem of the one and many, although he may not know the definite answer. This is why he could use this account as an example of his method. He knows enough that this quantitative relationship between the limit and the unlimited would show the uses and advantage of his method, *i.e.,* the division and collection. Socrates of the Fourfold distinction, however, is not described as a knower, yet. As I argued in the first chapter, both ideal characters, Socrates and Protarchus, do not have knowledge about the ethical question after the dual cross-examination of their initial positions. Thus, they begin to examine what would take the second prize for the human good, either pleasure or knowledge.

According to these three differences I suggested above, I argue that trying to find an agreement between the Heavenly Tradition and the Fourfold distinction is actually unnecessary. The main themes, the objects of discussion, and the attitudes of the characters are different in these two accounts. It is because with contrasting purposes Plato introduces these two stories: the Heavenly Tradition of the *Philebus* 15b is an example of the Socratic Method, namely, *elenchus* and its developed form—the division

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[152] After introducing the question of one and many, Socrates begins to explain how this question is related to letters and music (17a). Socrates says to Protarchus "you should take your clue from them [letters], since they were part of your education." (17a)

and collection—, but the Fourfold distinction at 23b is Socrates' new device that will be used for the investigation of the newly raised ethical problem.

Nonetheless, other scholars would raise an objection to my claim that those two passages are at variance with each other. If the Heavenly Tradition and the Fourfold distinction are actually two different accounts, why does Plato use the same terminologies? It is because a new weapon is introduced in the Fourfold distinction passage.

4.2.5. Fourfold Distinction of the Universe as New Weapons

Why have many commentators failed to notice the disagreement between two metaphysical accounts, but tried to streamline the flow of arguments in this dialogue without success? It is because they did not grasp Socrates' point when he says, "a different device will be needed, **different weapons** (slingshots), as it were, from that used in our previous conversation, though **some of them are the same**" (23b, emphases mine). What Socrates meant by saying 'partly the same but different' is, I argue, that Socrates is going to use the same terms, that is, 'limit' and the 'unlimited', in different ways in the Fourfold distinction passage than those names were applied in the Heavenly Tradition account. Many commentators, especially Frede, argue that Socrates keeps using the same terms with the same meaning. They say Socrates uses the same method only in a different way. In other words, Socrates was a little clumsy at applying the method in the previous passage, but now he would do better with it. This is why many scholars want to see that these two passages are and should be closely related to each other. For the different uses of the same method in the two passages, the Heavenly tradition and the Fourfold Distinction, Frede says:

> "I take it that the coherence consists not so much in the quite different application of the same set of terms, but rather in that in the fourfold division Socrates applies the prescriptions of the divine method to the degree that suits his purposes…So there is at least a rudimentary application of the divine method, even if it is not carried out in the way that Socrates had declared necessary for all those who wants to be counted as experts in any field."[153]

Frede maintains that since Socrates and Protarchus did not use the method of division and collection skillfully enough in the Heavenly Tradition passage, he introduces another account, the Fourfold distinction. Socrates claims here that he is going to use the same method in a better or more proficient way. And this is why the same method is considered as being 'different.' Nevertheless, I think, Frede overlooks the deeper problem of the Fourfold distinction because she did not focus on the relationship between the two accounts.

Most of all, while introducing the Fourfold distinction Socrates at 23b uses some adjectives that have fairly strong senses, such as '*allēs*' or '*hetera*'. These words, which mean 'other' or 'opposite', and sometimes even 'contrary', should have a stronger sense than indicating the same method is employed in a less proficient way, as Frede claims. Especially, '*heteros*' is commonly used to indicate an alternative; in other words, when you have two options and choose A over B, B is '*heteros*' to A.[154] Unlike Frede's argument, employing a method unskillfully is not *heteros* to using a method skillfully. In fact, the former—unskillful use of a method—somehow belongs to the latter—skillful use

[153] Frede (1993), xxxviii
[154] More on the use of this word, see Liddell and Scott, *Heteros* A.1.

of method. Or, at least, both belong to the category of 'using a certain method'. As I argued in the previous section, however, what Socrates philosophizes at this Fourfold distinction passage is clearly distinguished from what he does in the Heavenly tradition passage. Therefore, '*alles'* or '*hetera'* should be taken in a more strong sense.

Second, even though Socrates says he is using one different device, he could surely employ several methods. Socrates says "*kai gar d phinetai dein allēs mēchanēs, epi ta deuteria hyper nou poreuoenon hoion belē echein hetera tōn emprosthen logōn: esti de isōs enia kai tauta*." Frede's translation goes as follows "a different device will be needed, **different armament** as it were, from that used in our previous discussion, though it may partly be the same" (the bold fonts are mine). Although '*belē hetera' and 'henia'* are plural, Frede intentionally translate them in a singular form so that they should go well with *'allēs mēchanēs*.' Since she thinks that a different method is another application of the same method, she had to translate 'different armament' in a singular form to make this passage fitting to her argument.

Nevertheless, I think that it would be better if we can make sense out of this passage without making any grammatical change. I take the first sentence, "a different device will be needed," as a general and introductory statement and the second part of the sentence, "different weapons as they were…though some are the same," as a specific explanation of his investigation that follows. To put it differently, Socrates here tells Protarchus that "since we are dealing with a new problem, which requires a new device—as we always face a new subject, I would like to use different weapons to deal with this question, which of two, pleasure or knowledge, will get the second prize. Even though these are different weapons, some (aspects) of them are the same as the case in

the previous discussion." There are several 'weapons' Socrates employs, more than just one.

What are these 'weapons,' which are different ones but some are the same? The terms that Socrates uses in this discussion, *e.g.,* 'limits' and the 'unlimited', are the same 'names' as he employed in the previous account. I see these terms as the 'weapons' he is going to employ—and therefore, they are plural, and the 'names' of the terms are the same in both passages. As I pointed out earlier, however, the meanings of these terms are not the same. These terms in the Heavenly Tradition passages, on one hand, were used in a quantitative sense. There are many pleasant things, but they all have the same name, pleasure. Limits and the unlimited in the Fourfold distinction passage, on the other hand, show numbers of kinds in a certain object. Insofar as two characters are using the same names for the new inquiry, some of their weapons are to be regarded as the same. Yet, the main point and use of the argument at this Fourfold distinction passage is not the same as the Heavenly tradition. Consequently, the account of the classifications of the universe, which Socrates is about to examine, is indeed a new weapon for his new question, while some parts of this weapon have the same names as the method used in the Heavenly tradition passage. The metaphysical project Socrates launches at the Fourfold distinction passage is completely different than what is found in the Heavenly tradition passage, although both use the same names.[155] This is what Socrates means by 'a new weapon' and 'some are the same.'

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[155] This does not necessarily mean that Socrates at this point is using 'homonyms' for the further discussion. The one and many question has indeed two aspects: quantity and quality. He focused on the first aspect in the previous Heavenly tradition passage; and now he examines another qualitative aspect in order to give a clear account on the one and many question. Without a complete examination of the question a comprehensive knowledge on the matter would not be acquired. Furthermore, an investigation on the other aspect of the question, one and many, will prove the current subject matter, that is, to where the second prize for the human good goes.

In summary, Socrates at 23b of the *Philebus* begins a new investigation of the second prize of the human goods. In order to discover which one will win the second prize, either pleasure or knowledge, Socrates and Protarchus move into a new phase of their investigation. With an ethical purpose of their discussion in mind, they begin to categorize all things in the universe as a part of their new investigation of the human goods, while employing a different metaphysical device, which uses the same terms in the account of the Heavenly Tradition in different ways. Eventually by the same terms in two accounts, both interlocutors will come to depend on the Forms, which will be the fundamental basis of both metaphysics and ethics.

In the rest of Chapter 4, I will focus on the Fourfold distinction passage and present my interpretation of this passage. After examining other interpretation of this passage, I will present my own account of the Fourfold distinction in relation to the theory of the Forms of Plato's middle dialogue.

4.3. Several Interpretations of *Philebus* 23b, ff.

4.3.1. The Forms and the Fourfold Distinction in the *Philebus*

The Fourfold distinction passage of the *Philebus* is of much importance in its own right, but in context serves as a preliminary to the awarding of the second prize in the competition for the best human life.[156] According to Plato's claim in the *Republic*, all things should be related and connected to the Forms and ultimately the Form of the Good, which makes all things good. Therefore, it is a natural and also logical assumption that this *Philebus* passage should discuss the Forms and especially the Form of the

[156] In the previous discussion between Protarchus and Socrates of the *Philebus*, neither pleasure nor knowledge turned out to be the human good (22b).

Good. Because Plato is the author of the *Philebus*, and his ultimate interest throughout his philosophical career is always the good, this dialogue is also about the good—the good in human life based upon the Form of the Good.[157] Plato seems to hold onto the Theory of the Forms of the middle dialogues until he writes the late work, *Timaeus*.[158] However, in this passage of the *Philebus*, which seems to present a cosmological account similar in some important respects to that found in the *Timaeus*, the Forms are not mentioned at all. It is strange that the *Philebus*, while explaining the universe (*to pan*), does not directly mention anything about the Forms. Of course, if Plato gave up the Theory of Forms after writing the critical dialogues, and especially the criticisms of the Forms found in the *Parmenides*, Plato would not want to use the Form in the *Philebus* passage in order to argue about the goods in human lives. But again, the Forms are central to the *Timaeus*, which—like the *Philebus*—is apparently later than the *Parmenides*. Therefore, further investigation is required to better understand Plato's project in the *Philebus* and the role of the Forms in that project.

In order to answer the question why direct mention of the Form is not found in the "Fourfold" distinction passage, many commentators hold the following position: since the Theory of the separate Forms has been rejected by Plato in light of the criticisms Plato himself formulates in the *Parmenides*, the *Philebus* is a fresh new start that pursues ethical questions without being grounded in any way in the Forms.[159] Some scholars claim that limits and the unlimited, which might seem to be important concepts

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[157] In Chapter 5, I will argue that the knowledge of the Form of the Good is not granted to all, but only a few selected ones, *i.e.,* philosophers. They can teach what they know to others in his community so that others, who do not know a direct knowledge of the Good, also can live in accordance with the Form of the Good.

[158] *Timaeus* 28a-b.

[159] Most notably, P.J. Davis (1979). Therefore, there are not a direct relationship between the *Timaeus* and the *Philebus*, even though both dialogues belong to the 'later' ones.

in Plato's metaphysics,[160] are in fact nothing more than an 'ad hoc' device to lead the conversation between Socrates and Protarchus to the ethical conclusion about the human good.

Nevertheless, it is a hasty conclusion that in the *Philebus* Plato has dismissed the Forms in evaluating human goods. This is true not merely because Socrates in the *Philebus* introduces a classical problem of the theory of the Forms at 15b,[161] as an example of his method,[162] but Socrates also says at a later passage of the dialogue that 'the eternal and self-same (*ta kata tauta de kai hōsautōs onta aei*)' is the truer criterion (61e).[163] This is the same expression that Plato uses in order to describe the Forms in the *Republic,*[164] *Phaedo,*[165] and other middle dialogues, not to mention the *Timaeus*.[166] If the conclusion of the *Philebus* is related to the Forms, this passage should be considered in light of the middle dialogues. In other words, if the pure pleasure and pure knowledge, which have been discovered through Socrates and Protarchus' investigation in the middle of the *Philebus*, belong to the category of things that are regarded as something eternal and self-same, it is safe to argue that they belong to those which have the same character as the Forms of Plato's middle dialogues. And if both

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[160] Of course, they appeared at the Heavenly Tradition passage of the *Philebus*.
[161] Whether the forms exist and how things participate in them: "Firstly, whether one ought to suppose that there are any such unities truly in existence. Then again, how they are supposed to be: whether each one of them is always one and the same, admitting neither of generation nor destruction; and whether it remains most definitely one and the same, even though it is afterwards found again among the things that come to be and are unlimited, so that it finds itself as one and the same in the one and many things at the same time." (15a-b: D. Frede translation)
[162] As I argued in the previous section, Socrates intentionally chooses the Heavenly tradition as an example of his method—not only it explains his method, but also it leads both Protarchus and the readers to the Forms, namely, the ultimate criteria of the human goods.
[163] This is not the only occasion Socrates uses this expression. 'What is really and forever in every way eternally self-same' (58a), 'things eternal' (being contrast against 'what comes to be, will come to be, or has come to be;59a9), and 'things that are forever in the same state, without anything mixed in it' (59c3-4).
[164] *Republic,* 479a: "that remains always the same in all respects."
[165] 78d, 79a, 79d, 80b.
[166] 28a2, 28a6-7, 29a, 48e, 52a.

Socrates and Protarchus come to grasp these Form-like things as a result of their long discussion in the middle of *Philebus*, then it is reasonable to suppose that the beginning of this examination, that is, the Fourfold distinction, should in any event say something about the Forms. The four kinds, that is, limit, the unlimited, the third kind—so-called the Mixture,[167] and the cause, must have some sort of relationship to the Forms.

Many suggestions concerning this relationship between the Fourfold distinction and Plato's Theory of Forms have been presented, but none is entirely satisfactory. Before I add another interpretation, I will summarize the leading alternative accounts and examine how plausible their arguments are.

4.3.2. Forms in the Fourfold Distinction

Since the Forms play the most important role in Plato's ontology of the middle dialogues, his intention in introducing the Fourfold distinction will become evident by seeing which, if any, of these four elements corresponds to the Forms. Davis classifies many attempts to reconcile the theory of the Forms with the problematic passage under the following headings. He summarizes:

1) The Forms are to be identified with the Cause of the Mixture.
2) The Forms are to be found in the Mixture.
3) The Forms are to be identified with the Limit.
4) The Forms are not to be identified with any of the four classes but they are present in the background of the Limit.
5) The Forms are to be found in all four classes.

[167] I will try to avoid naming third kind 'the Mixture,' because this term does not show the nature of this kind. I will explain later in this chapter why 'the Becoming' is a good translation of this class.

6) The Forms have no relevance to the analysis.[168]

There is an obvious agreement among almost all scholars that the Forms are not to be found in the unlimited, because the unlimited is changing and becoming (24d), but the Forms are always the same.

Turning to the "live options", let us examine the last claim 6): the Forms have no relevance to the analysis. Davis is representative of those who claim that the Forms are not especially relevant to the general discussion of the dialogue.[169] As I already pointed out in the previous section, he claims that the *Philebus* is all about ethics. He argues that this passage is not an analysis of the universe but of the states or conditions of bodies or souls, and therefore, these conditions do not have a direct relevance to the Forms. Plato introduced the Fourfold distinction, Davis argues, in order to show that *nous* is superior to the unlimited. Since pleasure is identified with the unlimited and knowledge with *nous*, Socrates easily wins the debate concerning which of the two would get the second prize for the human good.

The ethical context, that is, a quest for the human good, is a very important element to take into consideration. Nonetheless, if Plato's interest in this passage were exclusively ethical, he would not have to go through a difficult-to-understand discussion of these four basic elements. It would be enough for him to show that the Cause is the world reason (*nous*) and the human *nous* belongs to the same kind. By proving this point to Protarchus, Socrates would be able to persuade him in the following way: 1) knowledge, which is identified with reason, is superior to the unlimited, which is governed by the world reason 2) Then it would be evident that knowledge should take

[168] Davis (1979), p. 129.
[169] Taylor (1928) and Shiner (1974) also hold this claim.

the second prize of the human good over pleasure. If Protarchus accepted this account, further examinations of limits and the mixture would be superfluous. Insofar as Socrates demonstrated the superiority of knowledge over pleasure, no further metaphysical or ontological discussion would be necessary.

Furthermore, pure pleasure and pure knowledge, which Socrates and Protarchus find at the end of their discussion, do have certain metaphysical characteristics. Unlike Davis and other commentators, who agree with the claim 6), I think that the conclusion of the dialogue is not exclusively ethical: it is, rather, an ethical position that is grounded upon a profound metaphysical foundation. As seen in the middle dialogues, Plato's metaphysics lays a foundation for his ethical claims. Even if he had given up the theory of the Forms in his philosophy, it would not follow that he had rejected the principle that ethics stands upon metaphysics.[170]

Nevertheless, Davis' claim that the discussion of 23b, ff. of the *Philebus* is not about all things in the universe, but only the states or conditions of (sensible) things is a very important observation that many scholars have failed to notice. I will use this point in my argument that will be presented in the following section. Meanwhile, I will reject the extreme view that the passage has nothing to do with Platonic metaphysics.

Secondly, it is easy to reject two of the remaining interpretations: the claim 2),[171] Forms are to be found in the mixture and the claim e)[172] that Forms are found in all four elements. Socrates in many passages of the *Philebus* argues that the third kind is something that comes to exist. As long as one uses the term, 'Forms', with the same meaning that Plato used in the middle dialogues, he/she has to say how these

[170] As I argued in Chapter 1, a metaphysical foundation can provide a ground for universal morality, and I take this is Plato's ultimate aim in philosophy.
[171] Jackson (1882).
[172] Stryker (1970) p. 77-81, Dies (1941) p. xciv, Hampton (1990), p. 40.

unchanging and everlasting Forms would 'come to be.' This is why Hampton argues that the name, '*genesis eis ousian,*' for the third kind (26d) is likely to be only metaphorical,[173] or D. Frede suggests leaving aside the common notion found in the middle dialogues and the *Timaeus* that Plato's Forms are ideal models.[174] However, as long as Plato keeps employing the same concept of the Forms (or of certain entities that have the same characteristic as the Forms of the middle dialogues, such as immutability, eternality, and others) while arguing that they are forever in the same state, 'without anything mixed in' (*amiktotata echonta*; 59c3-4), it is hardly plausible that Plato thinks of the Forms as a kind of mixture, as entailed by both 2) and 5). After all, if the Forms were indeed something unmixed as Plato keeps arguing throughout his dialogues, the mixture would not be the Forms. Furthermore, claim 5) is unsatisfactory, as Davis argues, "because it fails to escape the criticisms leveled at the identification of the Forms with any particular class; it rather incurs the criticism leveled at all of them."[175]

Thirdly, claim 1)[176] that the Forms are to be identified with the cause can be easily dismissed. As commonly accepted on the basis of good textual evidence, Plato takes *nous* to be the Cause of the third kind. In Plato's Theory of the Forms, the Forms are always objects of thought, not thoughts or thinkers or intelligent agents themselves. Plato in the *Philebus* seems to hold on to his claim.[177] Furthermore, if the cause of the

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[173] Hampton (1990), p.45. She thinks this refers to Forms, and hence must be metaphorical. She argues that Forms cannot be generated in the sense that sensibles are, by coming into existence in time. Therefore, 'generation' of Forms should not mean exactly the same as other generations of the perceptibles.
[174] Frede (1993), p. xxxix. She argues that the four highest genera of all being must be Forms and each of them must contain Forms as their subgenera, species, and subspecies.
[175] Davis (1979), p. 132.
[176] Zeller (1989), p.691; Adam (1969), p. 161. And also Hampton p. 48.
[177] At 59a Socrates says 'Such a person [he, who works at most of arts and sciences, is concerned with opinions and makes opinions the center of his search] assumes the task of dealing, not with things eternal, but with what comes to be, will come to be, or has come to be.' This passage clearly shows the Plato's concept of two worlds view of the middle dialogues, especially the *Republic*.

third kind is reason, it means nothing more than that the Forms are the paradigms of the good things in the universe. Therefore, the Forms are the causes to that extent—*i.e.*, as a sort of formal or final cause. But they would not be "efficient" causes. At any rate, Aristotle frequently claimed that the Theory of the Forms alone could not give a full account of changes in the perceivable world, since the Forms would not function as efficient causes.[178] As Davis persuasively points out, soul in Plato's philosophy plays the role of efficient causes.[179] Moreover, the Demiurge of the *Timaeus* fulfills the role of an efficient cause with respect to the generation of the cosmos as a whole, while looking at the Forms as paradigms. This is 'to *dēmiurgoun*' (that which fashions or crafts: 27b) of the *Philebus*, that is, the efficient Cause. Therefore, the Forms, as the formal and final causes, are not the fourth class of the Fourfold distinction; the cause sees the Forms in order to make things[180] good and these paradigms are not identical with the cause that brings good things into being.[181]

Fourthly, are the Forms to be identified with the Limit, as in claim 4)? Socrates says that limits are 'the equal' and 'equality' and, things like 'double, and all that is related as number to number or measure to measure (25a-b) or 'the kind that contains equal and double, and whatever else puts an end to the conflicts there are among opposites, making them commensurate and harmonious by imposing a definite number on them' (25d-e). Since 'the same' and numbers, 'double' and other mathematical

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[178] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 991aff, 1097b 23ff, 1081b 14.
[179] Davis (1979), p. 130. He quotes *Phaedrus* 245 c5-9 "Every soul is immortal. For that which is ever moving is immortal but that which moves something else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to move, ceases to live."
[180] The mixture: I will argue that the mixture is something that has turned out to be good.
[181] This distinction of the formal cause and efficient cause is apparent at 28c-30e, where the fourth kind is identified with wisdom (*sophia*, 30b) and reason (*nous*, 30c), which rules (30d), orders, and coordinates the universe.

objects are recognized as Forms in Plato's philosophy,[182] it is easy for many commentators to take the limit in the *Philebus* as the Forms. This claim is probably most popular among the commentators.[183]

Nevertheless, mathematical objects, according to the Divided Line in the *Republic* VI, are grasped not by understanding (*noesis*), which is the mental faculty that observes the Forms, but by reason and thought (*dianoia*), which is inferior to understanding. Moreover, although Plato recognizes some mathematical objects as Forms—*e.g.*, in the *Phaedo*, this does not necessarily lead us to conclude that the limits, that is, mathematical things in the *Philebus* are the same as the mathematical Forms found in the *Phaedo*. Without a further explanation it is too hasty to conclude that the Forms should be identified with limit.[184]

Benitez has recently defended the claim that that the Forms are the limit in the *Philebus* by arguing that the Forms, especially at the *Phaedo* 100ff, are introduced for the purpose of explaining how perceivable things exist. Or at least, they function as logical causes[185] of all sensible things. As Plato employs the Forms as the logical causes in the *Phaedo*, he uses them in the same way as the logical causes in the *Philebus*.[186] At 65a Socrates says "if we cannot capture the good in one form, we will have to take hold of it in a conjunction of three: beauty (*kallos*), proportion (*symmetria*), and truth (*alētheia*). Let us affirm that these should be treated as a unity and be held responsible for what is in the mixture, for its goodness is what makes the mixture itself a good one."

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[182] *Phaedo* 74b, 104, *Republic* 529e-530a.
[183] Grube (1980), Burnet (1914), Guthrie (1978), Sayre (1987), Benitez (1989) and others.
[184] The limits I discuss here are embodied limits, or the 'double-in-us' in the language of the *Phaedo*, rather that the Double itself, *i.e.,* the Form of Doubleness.
[185] She does not clearly explain what 'logical' causes mean. Probably she has the 'formal' cause in mind.
[186] Benitez (1989), p.90. Benitez argues that the theory of Form is introduced in the *Phaedo* precisely for its use as a theory of causation.

Benitez argues that these three, that is, beauty, proportion and truth, play the same role as the Forms do in the *Phaedo*, *i.e.*, logically causing all things to become good. However, she does not explicitly explain what 'logical cause' really means here. She might think of the forms as 'formal causes', since the example she cited from the *Phaedo* is how the form of equality lets us think two different things (like two sticks or stones) are equal (probably in size). If my reading of Benitez is correct, she argues the following: just as the Forms are the logical causes of the good things, as the formal causes, these three are the cause that makes a good mixture and also allows us to perceive it (the mixture) as good. Since these three do not belong to the category of *nous*, they cannot be the cause mentioned in the Fourfold distinction. Furthermore, they cannot be identified with the unlimited, which lacks harmony, nor the third mixed kind (because they make this third kind good). Therefore, by process of elimination they ought to be regarded as the limit.

Nonetheless, there are three textually based reasons why Benitez's argument does not plausibly establish interpretation 3), that is that Forms are to be identified with the limit:

1) These three, that is, proportion, beauty, and truth, are not limits, but rather what come to exist *through* limits. In other words, these three objects are the products of applying limits to a certain state, which otherwise would keep changing. Socrates says, "Once engendered in frost and heat, limit takes away their excesses and unlimitedness, and establishes moderation and harmony in that domain" (26a). Proportion and harmony come to exist or are made by limit that eliminates all the extreme states in a certain thing or domain. If that is the case with proportion, it is likely

that the other two things that are mentioned at 65b*, i.e.,* beauty and truth also should be the outcomes of the application of limit, not limit itself.

2) If these three—proportion, beauty, and truth—come to exist by limit, they belong to the third kind that of things that are generated. The Forms, however, are things that exist eternally without going through any change. So these three cannot be the Forms—because they are also something generated—, Benitez's argument that depends on the Forms' being the logical causes of generated things fail to support her claim that the Forms are limit in the *Philebus*.

3) Finally, these three are ranked at the end of the dialogue as the second of the human goods that a man possesses (66a-b). According to Plato's theory of Forms in the middle dialogues, however, it is obvious that the Forms are not to be possessed by men. Benitez' claim, therefore, does not seem to be plausible.

Limits are not to be identified with the Forms. I think, however, Benitez and other commentators' arguments that limits are something mathematical are one way or another acceptable. Moreover, limits do indeed make things proportionate, harmonious, beautiful and truthful.[187] Proportion, which comes to exist by limit, makes things good. Proportion, beauty and truth are the cause of good things, and limit is at a more fundamental level the cause of these three things, which are in turn the cause of all good things. Consequently, limit does play one role in making all things good. How does limit come to function in this way? Partly because of *nous*, and partly because of the Forms that are indeed the cause of the good. Although limits and the Forms are not the same things, they are closely related to each other in making things good. I will hold claim 4) with Ross, Rist and Hackforth that the Forms are not to be identified with any of the

[187] This is clearly described at 25d-26d.

four classes but they are present in the background of the Limit. Rist says, "The classification we recall is of the natural world. That world of course contains particulars. It does not contain Forms. Rather in contains among other things immanent characters, which represent the Forms. The immanent characters are the definiteness or limit of each thing."[188] In other words, I take these four kinds of all things are subclasses of '*panta ta nun onta to panti*' (23c4), which is the universe, namely, the perceptible world. Therefore, the Forms do not (physically) exist in 'all', while the limit, the representation of the Forms, exists as an immanent character in particulars of the natural world. I will clarify in the following section how I interpret 'all beings that presently exist in the universe.'

4.4. All Beings that Presently Exist in the Universe

In order to find a place for the Forms among the four classes of all things, the precise meaning of '*panta ta nun onta en to panti*' (23c) should be determined. All the commentators who hold one of the five claims I examined in the previous section, share the same basic assumption: 'all beings' at this passage of the *Philebus* covers literally *all*: not only the sensible world, where we are living, but also the transcendent world, where the Forms are "located". Nonetheless, I argue that the phrase "all beings" in this passage indicates only the sensible objects in the universe that fall under the Fourfold distinction, and therefore, that the Forms are excluded from this classification. Yet, the Forms still have close relationships to those four classes, especially to limit.

[188] Rist (1964), p. 230.

To understand what Plato intended to argue by introducing 'p*anta ta nun onta en toi panti*' as the beginning point of his argument, it is important to understand what three phrases here should mean: 1) *nun*, 2) *to pan*, and 3) '*ta onta*'. The conjunction of these three problematic phrases indeed presents the objects of the classification that Socrates introduces in order to judge which of pleasure or knowledge will win the second prize for the human good. I hold that '*nun'* means the temporal 'present,' *i.e.*, when Socrates and Protarchus are having a conversation; '*to pan'* means the entire sensible world; the phrase '*ta onta'*, which might seem to be referring to the Forms, does not include the Forms. Rather, in this passage Plato calls all things in the sensible world '*ta onta'*.

4.4.1. *nun*

Needless to say, this Greek word means 'now, both of the present moment and of the present time generally.'[189] The problem with those who argue that the Forms are among the objects under consideration here is that the Forms are not to be judged by the standards for the sensible objects. In other words, it is absurd to say about the Forms, which transcendentally exist beyond any temporal restriction, that they exist 'at the present moment.' It is absolutely impossible to say anything in a temporal sense about the Forms, since one of the most essential characters of the Form is that it is 'eternal', that is, atemporal.[190] This means that the Forms do not exist within a certain time period; rather they provide the formal basis of time.[191]

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[189] Liddell and Scott (1899).
[190] See Patterson (1985) p.29-31 for the detail of this interpretation.
[191] By this I simply mean that, as in the *Timaeus* the time is an eternal image (*aionion eikon*) of the Forms, not the other way around (37d).

Some would be tempted to argue that 'now' in this passage means the 'eternal present' in a sense that some Christian theologians, *e.g.*, Augustine,[192] used to describe the nature of God, who transcends the created world, which is temporally bounded. It may be a good suggestion, but we do not find any indication that Plato uses this world in the same sense as they do[193].

D. Frede and Striker suggest another possibility—that the 'now' indicates everything that actually exists at this moment. Frede argues that since all genera and species are Forms, there will be Forms as well as sensibles in all four kinds. Therefore, the "'now' emphasizes the all-inclusiveness of this division, as opposed to the earlier application of the dialectical method, which dealt with the highest genera of particular disciplines."[194] This also should be considered as a possible suggestion for the meaning of '*nun*.' Nevertheless, doesn't '*panta*' do this job already, even if we accept their metaphysical account of this passage? '*nun*' is obviously a temporal adjective used to define the objects under consideration. This word, therefore, should add something, not just help or reinforce the all-inclusiveness of '*panta*'.

'Now' should be taken in a strong and literal sense: at this present moment, when the speaker and his interlocutor are having a conversation. Above all, *nun* grammatically modifies *onta*. Therefore, *ta nun onta* should be taken all together: "the things that *presently* exist". 'Now' temporally limits the meaning of 'exist'. Therefore, anything that transcends any such temporal limitation should be excluded from the extension of this

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[192] See *Confessions*, XI.
[193] The creation of the universe is the creation of time: "For there were no days and nights and months and years ... but when he (God) constructed the heaven he created them also." - (*Timaeus*, 37). For the creation God used "the pattern of the unchangeable," which is "that which is eternal." (*Timaeus*, 29). Therefore "eternal" -*to aïdion*, "the everlasting" - is a better word to describe the Form's atemporal characteristic.
[194] Frede (1993), p. 18.

particular occurrence of 'all beings'. Furthermore, as I discussed in the previous section, this conversation between Socrates and Protarchus is being devised on the spot to deal with a problem, which (dramatically speaking) has just now arisen. Socrates, right before he begins to classify all things, says, "A long discussion lies ahead of us, and not exactly an easy one either at this point (*nun*)" (23b). If the examination of "all things that presently exist" in the universe is a pivotal point in their discussion, and if when Socrates pointed out that they need to begin to deal with a new problem that he uses in speaking of '*ta onta*,' then it makes good sense to take the word '*nun*' in the same senses in both places—as indicating the temporal present. From these observations on the grammatical and contextual points, therefore, *nun* is a word that gives a strong temporal sense to the Fourfold distinction, and consequently, the Forms, which are atemporal, are not part of the object in question 'at this moment' when Socrates and Protarchus categorize "all things (that presently exist)."

4.4.2. *to pan*

According to Liddell, Scott and Jones, *to pan* generally means either 'all,' 'the whole', or 'the universe'.[195] I claim that Plato uses *to pan* in the latter sense, specifically meaning the physical and sensible world. Above all, on other occasions in the *Philebus* when Plato uses this phrase,[196] *to pan* does not seem to include the Forms in the 'whole.' See 64a, where Socrates says, "this is true particularly if he wants to discover in this mixture what the good is in man and in the universe (*to pan*) and to get some vision of the nature of the good itself." Plato clearly means by *'to pan*' the entire world in which

[195] The latter usage is found at Emp. 13, Pythag. ap., Aristotle. *De Caelo*, 268a11 and Plato, *Timaeus* 28c and 30b.
[196] 29b, 29e and 64a.

man exists—that is the sensible world. Taken in the context, this passage is about discovering the original and best state for the universe. The assumption under consideration is that *to pan* has changed from the best—the original—to a bad—present—state. If that is the case, the Forms, which are unchanging, should be excluded from *to pan*. After all, Socrates' interest at this part of the dialogue rests on all things that are in an eternal flux, upward and downward (*aei hapanta anō te kai katō rei*; 43a), alluding to the Heraclitean Flux theory. This observation shows again that the primary objects of the Fourfold classification are things that are changeable. Therefore, *to pan* is the mutable and universe, namely the world of perception.[197]

4.4.3. The Forms in the *Philebus*

In the *Republic*, Plato says the Forms are the very things themselves in each case, ever remaining the same and unchanged '*aei kata tauta hōsautos onta* (479e).' Or he describes the Beauty in the *Symposium* as "Beauty itself, taken by itself, within itself, one in Form, existing always" (*auto kath' hauto meth' hautou monoeides aei on*; 211b1). As is well known, Plato argues that the Form is eternal, taken by itself, and remains the same without undergoing any change. In the *Philebus* there are several expressions that indicate Plato has in mind the Forms of the middle dialogues.

At 59a Socrates contrasts two different objects of investigations, one that changes and the other 'that eternally exists' (*ta onta aei*). Then he says that knowledge about the latter will give a certainty that the former cannot provide. Furthermore, the highest level of knowledge is about 'the things that are forever in the same state without anything

[197] Additionally, Timaeus in the *Timaeus* is introduced to perform a special task—to teach his listeners about the nature of the Universe (*to pan*; 27a). Also *to pan* and *to kosmos* are interchangeably used in the *Timaeus* (especially at 27a).

mixed in it (*to aei kata auto hōsautos ameiktotata ekhonta;* 59 c), where we can find certainty (*bebaion*), purity (*katharon*), truth (*alethēs*), and clarity (*eilikrines*). Obviously Plato here means that the highest knowledge is the 'understanding' (*noesis*) represented by the highest section of the divided line in the *Republic*. The object of knowledge here in the *Philebus* not only has the same characteristics as the Forms of the *Republic*, that is, being eternal and unchanging, but also provides again the firm ground of any knowledge that would not be shaken. Furthermore, at 61e Socrates reveals a difference between different sciences: one kind deals with a subject matter that comes to be and perishes, the other with one that is concerned with what is free of generation and destruction, and which is eternal and self-same (*ta kata tauta kai hōsautos onto aei*). These references in the *Philebus* clearly show that Plato had the Forms in mind while discussing the most certain and highest knowledge that a man possesses.

If this is correct, it seems to be notable that being 'eternal' (*aei*) is one of the most important characteristics of the Forms. If he wanted to include the Forms, which exist eternally in the same state without any change, among the classes of the Fourfold distinction, he should have used the phrase, '*aei onta*' in addition to '*nun onta'* so that both temporal and atemporal things would be included.

In summary, a range of evidence shows that '*panta ta nun onta en to panti*' should at *Philebus* 23c ff. be translated as *'all things that presently exist in the universe.'* And these "all things" are to be categorized into four classes, none of which is identical with or includes the Forms. Therefore, trying to answer the question, "With which of those four classes are the Forms are to be identified?" is a futile effort. Plato does not directly deal with the Forms in the Fourfold distinction of "all things that presently

exist". The Forms are standing behind the limit, but the limit itself is not to be identified with the Forms.

4.5. The *Philebus* and the *Timaeus*

4.5.1. Plato's Philosophical Project after the *Republic*

4.5.1.1. Restoration in the *Philebus*

Many scholars have noticed a similarity between two of Plato's later dialogues, the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus*.[198] Specifically, one of the main themes of both dialogues is Plato's account of 'becoming (*genesis*).' Plato's so-called two worlds theory is generally presented in the following manner: Plato holds that in a sense there are two separate realms or that there are two very different kinds of things, ordinary physical objects and the Forms. The Divided Line in *Republic* VI clearly draws this distinction: The intelligible world always remains the same without going through any change, but the perceivable world is always changing, its contents coming to be and ceasing to exist.[199] The middle dialogues, especially the *Phaedo* and the *Republic,* introduce the intelligible world, which exists without any change. Now it is time for Plato to turn his philosophical focus to another part of his metaphysics, the sensible world and the genesis within it. Nevertheless, the instances of becoming that Plato is concerned with in those two dialogues are not treated in the same fashion: on the one hand, the *Timaeus* is about the becoming of the universe (*tou kosmou genesis*: 27a) but on the other hand,

[198] Especially, Guthrie (1978) p. 215, P. 238, and Ross (1951) p. 136, and Benitez (1989) p. 86.
[199] At 27d *Timaeus*, Plato names the former as 'that which is existent always and has no Becoming'(*to on aei, genesin de ouk echon*) and the latter as 'that which is Becoming always and never is Existent' (*to gignomenon aei, on de oudepote*).

the *Philebus* deals with a question how the things that were created in a good state have disintegrated to a bad state and how we can restore them to the original good state.

Most of all, in order to explain what I mean by 'restoration', I would like to quote an important passage of the *Philebus*, in which Socrates explains the origin of pleasure and pain in the following quotation:

> "Protarchus: You mean the one you introduced after the unlimited and the limited, the one that included health (*hygieia*) and also harmony (*harmonia*), I believe?
> .....
> Socrates: What I claim is that when we find the harmony (*harmonia*) in living creatures disrupted, there will at the same time be a disintegration of their nature (*physis*) and a rise of pain.
> Pro.: What you say is very plausible.
> Soc.: But if the reverse happens, harmony is regained and the former nature (*physis*) restored, we have to say that pleasure arises, if we must pronounce only a few words on the weightiest matters in the shortest possible time.
> Pro.: I believe that you are right, Socrates, but why don't we try to be more explicit about this very point?
> .....
> Soc.: But thirst is, once again, a destruction and pain, while the process that fills what is dried out with liquid is pleasure? And, further, unnatural separation and dissolution, the affection caused by heat, is pain, while the natural restoration (*kata physin apodosis*) of cooling down is pleasure?
> Pro.: Very much so.
> Soc.: And the unnatural coagulation of the fluids in an animal through freezing is pain, while the natural process of their dissolution or redistribution is pleasure. To cut matters short, see whether the following account seems acceptable to you. When the natural combination *(kata physin empsychon*) of limit and unlimitedness that forms a live organism, as I explained before, is destroyed, this destruction is pain,

while the return towards its own nature (*tēn deis tēn hautōn ousian hodon*), this general restoration (*2*), is pleasure." (31c-32b)

In this passage, Socrates says that pleasure arises in the process of restoration toward its nature or natural state. And this original state is, as in the case of health, a nature of being harmonious.[200] The harmony in living creatures (*empsychon eidos*) is, he says, not being disrupted. In other words, when something is well-proportioned, it is considered to be harmonious. Therefore, the original nature, to which everything should be restored, is the nature of proportion (*he symmetries physis*: 64d), and pleasure is a product from the process of such general return toward the natural state.[201] And this nature, *physis* or *ousia*, is, according to Socrates, good and beautiful (63e). And this is why at the end of the *Philebus* measure is the first rank and the well-proportioned is the second rank of the human goods.

It is unthinkable for human beings to live without pleasure (21c). Therefore, Socrates need to justify pleasure so that he can say at least some pleasures that arise from the restoration toward the good and original nature should be taken as good. Since the current state falls less from the original and good state,[202] it should be restored toward the its nature so that the good is achieved. Pleasure arises from this process

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[200] Alcmaeon, one of the most eminent natural philosophers and medical theorists of antiquity, says, "health is a well-proportioned mixture of qualities (*ten hygeian ten symmetron ton poion krasin*)." (DK 4, I. 107) In this quotation the close relationships between being harmonious and being well-proportioned is suggested. Obviously, Plato uses this connection between *symmetron* and *harmonia* in the *Philebus*.
[201] Similar account is also found in the *Timaeus*. "This, then, is what we should understand about pleasure and pain: an unnatural disturbance that comes upon us with great force and intensity is painful, while its equally intense departure, leading back to the natural state (*eis physin apion*), is pleasant…They pass on the motions they receive to the entire body, and so they do get pleasures and pains--pains when they are alienated from their natural condition (*allotrioō*) and pleasures when they are once again restored to it (*eis to auto*). All those bodies which experience only gradual departures from their normal state or gradual depletions but whose replenishments are intense and substantial are bodies that are unaware of their depletions but not of their replenishments, and hence they introduce very substantial pleasures in the mortal part of the soul but not any pains." (*Timaeus*, 64d-65a)
[202] As images of the original nature, it falls short of being perfect. (*Republic* VI, 510b)

toward the good nature, and therefore, pleasure according to such a restoration should be counted as good, too. Consequently, such good pleasure in the restoration should not be rejected at all from human lives.

In fact, this account of restoration is grounded upon Plato's metaphysical account of the composition of the universe in the *Timaeus*. Therefore, the *Philebus* will be better understood together with *Timaeus*: the latter is mostly about creation, while the former is primarily about restoration.[203]

4.5.1.2. *Timaeus* and *Philebus*

This section of Chapter 4 proposes a coherent structure within which we can understand Plato's project in the later stages of his career. Having emphasized in the *Phaedo*, *Republic, Symposium*, and *Phaedrus* the nature and fundamental importance of the intelligible world, he intended to return to the world in which we live, in order to answer his teacher's ultimate question*, i.e.,* How are we to live a good life here in the realm of becoming? Plato's blueprint for the later philosophical project is found in a passage of the *Timaeus*.

Man was created to be as good as possible. His body and its perceptions, however, disrupt the motion of his soul. Furthermore, the six motions of the soul make man become wicked and evil (*Timaeus*, 86e). How has man been becoming more and

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[203] In this dissertation I argue that the restoration happens among everything in the perceptible world. However, the example Socrates gives in this passage is exclusively is on animals (*empsychon eidos*). It is because only animals or living creatures can experience pleasure in the process of restoration, while other creatures in the world, such as trees, rocks, weather, etc., cannot feel pleasure. But it does not necessarily mean that the restoration is allowed only to those, which perceive pleasure. Rather, I argue that Socrates needs to use this example of animals—it is easier to consider the restoration among the living creatures, because the restoration is easily observed by their pleasure. Yet, my claim is weak: at least in the *Philebus*, Socrates does not explicitly consider the restoration of all created things. I would say that it is because the main point of the dialogue is not the creation or restoration of the whole things—as the *Timaeus* is—rather the human goods. Therefore, the restoration of cosmos does not have to be fully discussed in this dialogue.

more wicked and vicious? Plato says in the *Timaeus* "there is no symmetry or want of symmetry (*ametria*) greater than that which exists between the soul itself and the body itself."[204] Then, how can he live the best life (*aristos bios*), which is set before him by the gods? Each one of us should follow the intellect (*dianoesis*) and revolution (*perophora*) of the Universe so that the revolutions in his head, which were distorted at the time of birth, would be rectified (90d). And this could be done by learning the *harmonies* and *revolutions* of the Universe through fine educations (88c). Plato does not demonstrate in the *Timaeus* how exactly we can restore this revolution and harmony. This is not the topic Plato wants to deal with in the *Timaeus* (as opposed to the *Republic* and especially the *Laws*.) It was sufficient for him to mention that mathematical media, which were the means of the composition of the world, would again play an important role in restoring the good.

In the *Timaeus*, Critias, after wrapping up the story about Atlantis, says the following to Socrates.

> "Seeing that Timaeus is our best astronomer and has made it his special task to learn about the nature of the Universe, it seemed good to us that he should speak first, beginning with the **origin** of the Cosmos and ending with the **generation** of mankind. After him I am to follow, taking over from him mankind, already as it were created by his speech, and taking over from you a select number of men superlatively well trained. Then, in accordance with the word and law of Solon, I am to bring these before ourselves, as before a court of judges, and make them citizens of this State of ours, regarding them as Athenians of that bygone age whose existence, so long forgotten, has been revealed to us by the record of the sacred writings; and thenceforward I am to proceed with my discourse as if I were speaking

[204] This is what Timaeus says at 87d of the *Timaeus*.

> of men who already are citizens and men of Athens." (*Timaeus*, 27a-b, Cornford translation, and emphases mine.)

According to the quotation above the presentations from the participants will be offered in the following order: First, Timaeus, who has a vast knowledge of the universe, *i.e.*, *to pan*, is supposed to tell a story about the *generation* of the universe and of man. Following him Socrates will share another story on *aretē* or the good of a few men, and then Critias will draw also on Socrates' story of the previous day, taking over people of exceptional worth and the best community, where the right law governs all citizens in accomplishing good lives, not just in peace, but in war (as against Atlantis).[205] This is the sequence of the discourses, with which Plato's readers should expect to be requited as a 'feast of speeches' (*tēn ton logon hestiasin*: 27b). I hold that this was Plato's big scheme for his philosophy in the later dialogues. The theory of the Forms, which was the main philosophical claim that he made in the middle dialogues, has gone through examinations in the critical dialogues, such as *Parmenides*, *Sophist* and *Statesman*. Now, these two are the main themes of the *Timaeus*: first, how the sensible world has come to be good by using the Forms as paradigms, and second, how the physical and psychic aspects of a man are composed. In other words, the composition of the perceivable world and its members should be discussed. Next, the good life of a man, which requires both knowledge and pleasure, is the main topic of the *Philebus*. The single most important concern is how to restore the original, good state of things. And finally, how to organize and legislate for a community of such men to make everything

[205] The *Timaeus* clearly does not begin on the day after the Republic (except for Socrates the cast of discussants is entirely different), but it does just as clearly recall many of the most conspicuous elements of the conversation in the *Republic*. It was Plato's intention to show that there is a close relationship between the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*.

good will be the finale of the feast—Plato's *Laws*. That is Plato's grand philosophical project.[206]

With this big picture in mind we will be able to comprehend better what the *Philebus* is about by comparing this dialogue to the *Timaeus*. Especially the problematic passage, *i.e.*, the Fourfold distinction of the things that presently exist in the universe, seems to contain Plato's ontological position or, at least, the background and basis for his ethical account to come. Not only do both dialogues explain the 'generation' of sensible things, but both explain that generation using a four-fold categorization. At 48e-49a of the *Timaeus*, that which comes to exist, the Craftsman (*Demiurgos*) as the efficient cause of the Becoming, the ever-existing Receptacle (*hypodoche*),[207] and finally the Forms as models or paradigms are presented the four kinds that play in the process of generation. The doctrines elaborated at length in the *Timaeus*, I argue, are assumed in the *Philebus*, especially at the Fourfold distinction passage as a foundation on which to build an ethical discourse. A juxtaposition of those four kinds or categories in Plato's metaphysical and ontological accounts in the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* will help us comprehend Plato's intention at 23b, ff. of the *Philebus*.

4.5.2. The Composition of the Universe and Man in the *Timaeus*

Roughly speaking, there are several steps of the becoming of the universe in the *Timaeus*. The first step is the creation of the four elements of the universe, that is, fire,

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[206] If my interpretation of Plato's project of the later dialogues is correct, the main speakers of each dialogue seem to fit the themes of each dialogue. An astronomer is the best speaker for the generation of the universe (*Timaeus*). And there is no better person than Socrates to discuss the question of the good life (*Philebus*). A man from Athens, which has a long history of regarding itself as the best polis, is a suitable mouthpiece to explain how to build the best human community—provided, of course, one looks to Ancient Athens of 9000 years ago, when the city was truly great.

[207] Or place (*chora*: 52a).

water, air, and earth. For this purpose, the Demiurge uses shapes (*eidos*) and numbers (*arithmos*) while looking to the Forms (53b).

These four elements are bodies (each corresponding to one of the regular, "Platonic" solids), which the Demiurge employs to compose the body of the universe at the second step of the composition. The Demiurge begins to build the body of the universe initially by using fire and earth. However, a bond between these two elements was required in order to make the fairest and most perfectly united body. The natural property of proportion (*analogia*) works best in this process. If he would be going to make only a two-dimensional shape, one middle term would be needed. Since the body of the universe, however, has to be a solid in shape, it is necessary for the union to have always two middle terms. The Demiurge, before building the body of the universe (34b),[208] constructed the world Soul by making a mixture from a blend of the Being (*ousia*), the Same (*he tautou physis*) and the Other (*he tou heteru physis*) and then dividing the mixture in three *mathematical* steps using geometric, arithmetic, and harmonic proportions. And then he gives two motions to the whole structure of the Soul, that is, the Motion of the Same (*phera tēs tautou physeōs*) and the Motion of the Other (*phora tēs thaterou physeōs*) in circles (*kyklos*). Thus the World Soul "is a compound, blended of the natures of the Same and the Other and Being, these three portions, and is proportionately (*ana logon*) divided and bound together, and revolves back upon herself" (37a).

[208] The *Timaeus* passage does not necessarily suggest that the body of the universe is younger than the soul in a temporal sense. Rather, the priority of soul is suggested here. It says, "As for the world's soul, even though we are now embarking on an account of it after we've already given an account of its body, it isn't the cas that the god devised it to be younger than the body. For the god would not have united them and then allow the elder to be ruled by the younger" (34b-c). cf. *Laws* 892a-b, 896c ff.

The next and third step of the composition[209] is intended to bring about all living creatures in the Universe. However, several different motions are involved depending on the levels of the creatures being created. On the one hand, heavenly bodies move in a perfect circle and also forward, always being dominated by the circular motion of the outermost circle of the Same and Similar (40a-b). On the other hand, man has six motions, that is, forward and backward, right and left, and upwards and downwards, which makes his motion disorderly and irrational (*alogos*; 43b). Because the human soul was composed according to mathematical proportions, it is stable and will not be dissolved. However, perceptions (*aistheseis*) and strong sensations disrupt and fracture the circular motions of soul (43d). This is—very roughly put—how man's soul, which was created to be good, modeled on the Forms using mathematical proportions, comes to be unjust (42b).[210]

4.5.3. The Forms and Mathematical Intermediates

In the process of the composition of the Universe described in the *Timaeus*, numbers, figures and proportions play important roles in making all composed things resemble the Forms. Plato claims in the *Republic* that those mathematical elements are "hypotheses" (underlying supports or "stepping stones") for reaching the first principles but they are not the first principle themselves (510c). This is why in the upper half of the Divided Line a man uses different faculties, that is, understanding (*noesis*) for the

[209] Time was created before the creation of all living beings in the universe.
[210] Plato explains how perception disrupts human souls: "Once the souls were of necessity implanted in bodies, and these bodies had things coming to them and leaving them, the first innate capacity they would of necessity come to have would be sense perception, which arises out of forceful disturbances. This they all would have. The second would be love, mingled with pleasure and pain. And they would come to have fear and spiritedness as well, plus whatever goes with having these emotions, as well as all their natural opposites. And if they could master these emotions, their lives would be just, whereas if they were mastered by them, they would be unjust" (*Timaeus*, 42a-b).

Forms, and thought (*dianoia*) for the mathematical numbers and figures. The difference is that *dianoia* a) uses images and b) fails to ascend to the first principles. Just as in the *Republic* those mathematical figures are employed as aides that let a man possess a higher-level understanding, in the *Timaeus*, numbers, shapes and proportions are used for the Demiurge to compose the Universe in the best state in accordance with the Forms. In every step of the composition, numbers and shapes are the important means that make created things resemble the form. They are not the Forms themselves[211]. Rather the Demiurge constructs all things, so far as he can, to be as fair and good as possibly, imposing shapes and numbers while looking at the Forms as paradigms (53b ff., 56c). Mathematical and geometric elements not only help a philosopher to understand the Forms (going upward to the Forms; the *Republic*) but also let the Demiurge make all creatures good by resembling the Forms (coming downward to realize the good in composing the universe; the *Timaeus*).

Numbers and shapes stand between the Forms and the sensible world while functioning as a bridge between two worlds. Man can cognitively reach the world of the Forms via these mathematical hypotheses, and the Demiurge goes the other direction, from the Forms to the perceivable world while composing the latter via these same numbers and shapes. This is why I call those mathematical elements 'intermediates' between two worlds.

4.5.4. Restoring the Good Life

[211] Most of all, the geometric shapes in the *Timaeus* possess extension, which the Forms lack. Furthermore, there are several triangles, circles, and other shapes unlike the Forms that exist as 'one and only' being.

The *Philebus* is Plato's ideal answer to Socrates' question, that is, how to live a good life.[212] The main theme of this dialogue is not ontology or metaphysics but ethics. However, as we have observed in the *Timaeus* and also in the *Republic*, the metaphysical foundation is a necessary basis for discussing ethics and the good in human lives. But while it is therefore necessary for Plato to mention that metaphysical foundation, he does not need to give a comprehensive account of his metaphysics in the *Philebus*: that has been taken care of especially in the *Republic* et al. (with emphasis on making one's way up to grasp the Forms) and the *Timaeus* (with its account of the composition of the sensible world). Above all, the *Philebus* is about man, and especially the human good. The metaphysical and epistemological accounts of these other dialogues are now applied to the discussion in the *Philebus*.

If my proposal about Plato's larger philosophical project is right, the *Philebus* is mostly about the restoration of the Universe and especially about bringing its most important constituent, man, back to the best state obtainable in human life. While the pleasurable restoration to the natural state (*kata physin apodosis*: 31a) that has been disrupted is primarily discussed in the *Philebus*, I do not argue that every endeavor to make something good in the perceivable world is a restoration. However, there is always a *metaphorical* restoration, in that there is for each natural type of thing in the world there is a pre-established best or natural state, as embodied here on earth in the things first created by the Demiurge. The *Philebus*, the ideal dialogue on ethics—where as discussed earlier Socrates comes back to his life-long investigation with his own method—is a perfect fit for the topic. Plato as the author of the *Philebus* explains how to

[212] Living a good life for human beings is in fact returning to the original human nature. I will argue this point more in Chapter 5.

make a human life to the best state, as it is originally supposed to be. Numbers, shapes and proportion were used as the means for the Demiurge to compose the Universe while employing his reason to apprehend and use the Forms as a guide. Also man, who is like the Demiurge except for the fact that he does not create anything anew or restore things to their original state, uses mathematical media, such as numbers, measures, to repair a broken and therefore wicked state while applying his reason to apprehend eternal standards that guide his efforts at restoration. In other words, man imitates the Demiurge: as the latter composes the world by using divine reason in employing numbers and shapes while looking to the Forms, the former makes things in the universe good by applying numbers and proportions using human reason.

Many commentators have apparently overlooked the difference between the accounts in the *Timaeus* and in the *Philebus*, and take them to be equivalent with respect to their ontological views and what they build on those views.[213] Although it is true that both works build upon the same metaphysical and ontological basis, they in fact present two distinctive explanations—one of the Becoming, the other of the Restoring of the Good state. Upon this interpretation of Plato's project and the place of the *Philebus* in this project, I will suggest in the following section a new way to understand the Fourfold distinction of the *Philebus*. The discussion will make use of the results of Section 4.3.2. above, in which I summarized how scholars of the *Philebus* have answered the question: With which of the four kinds in the classification of "all things that presently exist in the universe" are the Forms to be identified?

4.6. The Four Kinds of the Universe in the *Philebus*

[213] See Rist (1964), Ross (1951), Hackforth (1972), and Ostenfeld (1982).

So far, I have made two major claims in this chapter: 1) *to pan* should be identified with the sensible world. Therefore, the Forms do not have a direct connection with any kinds within the four-fold classification of *to pan*. 2) The *Philebus* is the ethical part of Plato's big project after writing the *Republic*. The theory of the Forms in the middle dialogues was introduced in order to explain how a philosopher would come to grasp the knowledge that is unchanging and stable. Plato turns his attention to the opposite direction, that is, how to realize in human life the knowledge that has been gained.[214] Just as the Demiurge in the *Timaeus* uses numbers and shapes to compose the Universe while applying his reason and looking at the Forms as paradigms, a man, as argued in the *Phielbus,* employs his reason to restore his action and state by making it (mathematically) harmonious and proportional.[215]

4.6.1. The Unlimited

Now it is time to return to the Fourfold distinction passage of the *Philebus* and to see which of the things of the universe each of these kinds corresponds to. In accordance with the discussion of these four kinds in the *Philebus*,[216] the unlimited is the first to be examined. The most essential characteristic of the unlimited is that it does not permit the attainment of any end (limit), as the 'more and less' reside in it. It is important to note, however, that the unlimited itself is not a 'place' as the Receptacle is in the

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[214] Plato explains in detail the education of the guardians in a fine city throughout the *Republic*. I argue that the education in the *Republic* is a preparation for the guardians, both rulers and auxiliaries, who are born with necessary qualities but still need to be guided into the right direction so that they come to acquire knowledge necessary to rule and guard the city well. The project in the *Philebus*, I argue, is more about the 'application' of acquired knowledge. In other words, the *Republic* is the way up out of the Cave and the *Philebus* is the way down to the Cave.

[215] On the one hand, the *Philebus* is about realizing the good in an individual life. On the other hand, Plato in the *Laws* argues further than individuals: how to make a fine community by a good constitution according to the Good is the main topic of the *Laws*. This is the next project I will be working on.

[216] Socrates says, "The unlimited in a way is many I will try to explain now. The treatment of what has limit will have to wait a little longer" (24a).

Timaeus. The unlimited in the *Philebus* stands in opposition to the limit. Or to put it another way, the 'more and less' and 'a definite quantity' (*to poson*) cannot remain in the same place. One expels the other: once a certain thing takes on a definite quantity, it will no longer become more or less. Or, if this thing becomes hotter or colder, it would not remain at a definite quantity at all.[217] Socrates says "if they ['strongly' and its counterpart 'gently'] do not abolish definite quantity, but let quantity and measurement take a foothold in the domain of the more and less, the strong and mild, they will be driven out of their own territory" (24c). Therefore, the explanation Socrates presents at 24c-d, that is, the relationship between the unlimited and the limit is not the same one that we encounter in the *Timaeus*: giving the Forms to matter in order to compose something out of them. On the contrary, the explanation in the *Philebus* is about placing a limit to something so that it would stay at a definite level of degree, and if one fails to do this, this thing will be in a constant flux and never remain the same quantity. This is how the 'more or less' comes to exist in something. Therefore, the unlimited itself is not a thing; rather it is privation of limits or end, *e.g.*, extreme heat.

The problem that we should deal with now is what the 'domain' (*hedra*; 24c) or 'territory' (*chora*; 24d) of the unlimited and/or limits is. It is obvious that the unlimited itself is not a domain or territory. Socrates at this passage, where he introduces the unlimited, explains how the more or less comes to exist. He says "by imposing on all

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[217] Plato suggests a similar account in the *Phaedo*: "Now it seems to me that not only Tallness itself (*auto to megathos*) is never willing to be tall and short at the same time, but also that the tallness in us will never admit the short or be overcome, but one of two things happens: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite (*to enantion*), the short approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach. It is not willing to endure and admit shortness and be other than it was, whereas I admit and endure shortness and still remain the same person and am this short man. But Tallness, being tall, cannot venture to be small. In the same way, the short in us is unwilling to become or to be tall ever, nor does any other of the opposites become or be its opposite while still being what it was; either it goes away or is destroyed when that happens." (*Phaedo* 102d-103a)

actions (*praxis*) the qualification 'stronger', 'relative to 'gentler' or the reverse, they procure a 'more and less' while doing away with all definite quantity (23c). Therefore, most of all, human actions that could be either controlled or wild admit the 'more and less' or 'limits'. On the one hand, if an action takes on limit, it will turn out to be proportionate and orderly. This is what we call 'a good action.' On the other hand, if an action repulses the limit, it will go to the extreme becoming wild and untamed, and as a result, turn into a bad or wicked one.[218]

Nevertheless, human actions are not the only 'domain' of the unlimited or limit. Many other things, which have natures (*physis*) that take on the 'more and less,' will be the place for the unlimited or limit. Whatever has susceptibility to 'strong and mild' or to 'too much (*to poly lian*: 26a),' or whatever possesses a possibility of becoming 'more and less' is subsumed under the genus of the unlimited (24e). Not only human actions, but also any things that change in qualitative degrees are places for the 'more and less' as well as limit. This is why health, weather, quantity, speed, size and other similar kinds, not to mention pleasure or pain, are admitted to this category of the unlimited, since they are receptive to change of this specific sort—*i.e.*, along a continuum of 'more and less.' In other words, a certain thing can become both limited and unlimited: when this thing remains in a balanced and harmonious state, it comes to be like this because of the forms that *limit* these things so that they stay in this state: however, when this thing loses its balance, it comes to belong to the class of the unlimited. For example, a

[218] Aristotle says "it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which reason also one is easy and the other difficult—to miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also, then excess and defect are characteristics of vice, and the mean of virtue" (NE 1106b 28-34). There is no direct reference to the *Philebus* here, but it is likely that Pythagorean ideas were mediated to Aristotle by his reading of Plato, especially the *Philebus*. If so, this would explain why Aristotle assumes the mean must embody some determinate amount, degree or intensity, on either side of which lie unacceptable extremes. And this is a necessary feature of the mean, affirmed in the *Philebus*.

pleasant day is limited mathematically between extreme hotness and coldness. However, when a day loses its balance and become very chilly, it becomes 'unlimited.'

All things that are composed and seen in the perceivable world, however, are supposed to be always susceptible to change or motion: Even the heavenly bodies, which are almost divine, are in a continuous motion.[219] Consequently, all things that exist in the composed universe would become potential places for the 'more and less,' and therefore, they should be harmonized and become orderly by taking limits into themselves.

4.6.2. The Limit

While examining the nature of the unlimited, the essential characteristic of the limit has been pretty much revealed. Socrates says "what does not admit of these qualifications (the more and less) but rather their opposites, first of all 'the equal' (*to ison*) and 'equality' (*isotēs*), and after the equal, things like 'double' (*to diplasion*), and all that is related as number (*arithmos*) to number or measure (*metron*) to measure" (25a-b) should be categorized under the heading of 'limit'. Since they are contrasted with the unlimited, limit and the unlimited cannot both be located at the same place.

One point is noticeable here: the examples of limits that Socrates introduces here are all related to numbers or measures. These are not the Forms, but, as I argued earlier, they act as intermediates between the Forms and the sensible world. Consequently, limits in the *Philebus* function in one respect like the hypotheses of the *Republic* and in another like the numbers and shapes of the *Timaeus*. Limit should not be identified with

[219] However, their circular motion mostly resembles the Forms, because it does not have too much variation.

the Forms, because they are 'media' between two worlds. However, the Forms are present in the background of limit in that the Form is realized in the realm of becoming by means of introducing appropriate limit into the realm.

4.6.3. The Third Kind: A Generation into a Being

Above all, the third kind may not have to be translated as 'the Mixture' as many scholars do. At 26e, Socrates says, "I treat all the joint offspring of the other two kinds as a unity, a generation to a being (*genesin eis ousian*) through the measures produced along with the limit." The third kind is what has come to exist (*ta gignomena*; 26e). In other words, this kind is not Being but Becoming according to Plato's categorization in the middle dialogues. Of course, the third kind is made from both limit and the unlimited and comes to be by mixing both elements. Limit and the unlimited, however, repel each other. They do not stay in the same place. This 'mixture' is not to be identified with that which comes to be from the Demiurge's composition between the Forms and matter in the *Timaeus*. On the contrary, this 'mixture' is a process of generating a good state of something by eliminating extremes while imposing limits. The generations in the *Philebus* are not the 'creations' in the *Timaeus*. They are 'certain' (*tinas*; 25e) generations, that is, re-generation as restoration. The generations described in the *Philebus* are becomings into 'the right combination' (*orthe koinonia*) that make a certain action and state of all things fine, good and beautiful. Health, beauty, strength and other fine things (especially of soul: 26b) are good examples of results of the third kind.

The third kind, that is, a generation to a being, should not be regarded as the initial generation of the Universe. Thus, it is a re-generation: becoming like what it was

supposed to be at the original creation, *i.e.,* being (*ousia: c.f.,* 32b). Therefore, the third kind is a product of making such a thing, a state, or an action to the finest and best state as it is supposed to be. This is why the third kind in the *Philebus* is not simply a generation but 'a generation to a being,' that is the restoration to the natural state (*kata physin apodosis*: 31a). And this process of becoming is done not by 'mixing together' but by 'mixing' in a sense of imposing limit on the thing that is in the state of being unlimited. One becomes harmonious and fine by being given numbers, proportions and order. And this is the coming-back to the original state, the state in which the Demiurge initially created beautiful things.

4.6.4. The Cause

Since it is necessary that everything that is generated should come to be through some cause, there must be a fourth kind, which is different from all other kinds, that is, different from limit, the unlimited and a generation to a being. Socrates in the *Philebus* argues that there is no difference between an efficient or "making" cause (*to poioun*) and the cause (*to aition*), except in name. And then he takes all things falling under these terms as '*aitia'* of the third kind, that is, as causes of generation. Even though there is no general agreement on the interpretation of the relationship between the Forms and the Demiurge in the *Timaeus*, it is possible at least to argue that the Forms (the formal causes) and the efficient cause (the Demiurge) seem to have different functions and in that respect they are different from each other. The latter looks at the former and composes all things in accordance to the Forms as paradigms. In the *Philebus*, however, Plato holds that there is no difference at all between the cause and the maker. Probably this is why Plato rightly names the cause *to dēmiurgoun* (27b1). Plato uses this neutral

noun in order to signify both the maker himself and an exercise of craftsmanship, for example, the creation, instead of naming the creator *dēmiurgos* as he did in the *Timaeus,* which means exclusively the agent as efficient cause.

In the *Philebus* Plato uses a parallel between macrocosm and microcosm in order to explain how the knowledge (*epistēmē*) or reason (*nous*: 28c) is the fourth kind, the cause. The summary of his claim is the following:

> 1) As it is obvious we have body, the universe also has body (29a). There is a parallel between a man and the whole Universe. They are different from each other only with respect to size, but the universe is the source of our being not the other way around.
> 2) A man has a soul, and therefore, the Universe, which has the same properties as ours, but more beautiful in all respect, has Soul (30a).[220]
> 3) There is a certain cause, which orders and coordinates the years, seasons, and months. This is rightly called wisdom and reason (30c).
> 4) There could be no wisdom (*sophia*) and reason (*nous*) without a soul (30c).
> 5) Therefore, reason belongs to that kind which is the cause of everything.

If all Plato wanted to show by this argument was the fact that reason is the cause, the step 4) seems to be superfluous. What Plato really wanted to argue based on the assumption of a microcosm/macrocosm parallel is this: Just as the reason of the Universe governs all in an orderly manner, so also a human reason, which resides in human soul, should perform the same function in human action and life. After all, this dialogue is concerned with what the good for man is. And the cause of human good is

[220] Plato also says in the *Timaeus*, "Divine providence brought our world into being as a truly living thing, endowed with soul and intelligence." (30b)

human reason or knowledge, just as the World soul and its intellect is the cause of the good in the Universe.

It is important to note, however, the difference in Plato's use of the term 'cause' in the *Philebus* from that in the *Timaeus*. Many scholars do not have a settled view on whether the Forms in the *Timaeus* are transcendental—hence different from the Demiurge—or immanent in the Demiurge. It is safe, however, to argue that the transcendent and separate form theory is a possible and indeed very plausible interpretation of the relationship between the Forms and the Demiurge in the *Timaeus*. In the *Philebus*, however, the maker and the cause should be the same, because man's reason is located in his soul. How so? It is because, I argue, the cause of generation in this dialogue is a human being, who can look at the Forms and reason out from the principles.[221] Man, as an efficient cause, uses his reason. And therefore, he is the cause that makes something happen. In case of the creation story in the *Timaeus*, on one hand, both the Forms and the Demiurge are the causes of the composition. The Fourfold distinction account in the *Philebus*, however, has only one cause in mind, the cause operant in human action—*i.e.*, ordinary man who possesses and employs his own reason.

4.7. Pleasure and Pain in Human Lives

In this chapter, I argued that the Fourfold distinction passage is mainly concerned with ethics, which is grounded upon Plato's metaphysics and ontology, especially the theory of the Forms in the middle dialogue. It is important to read the

[221] Ultimately, I argue that only a few people, namely, philosophers can look at the forms and generate the principles for the human goods according to the forms. Ordinary people can reason out how to live good lives by reasoning out the principles given by the philosophers. This is my main argument in Chapter 5.

Philebus in light of the *Timaeus*, since they present similar stories. The latter, on the one hand, is about the Demiurge's composition of the Universe, but the former, on the other hand, is about man's restoration of all sensible things and especially human actions to the original and best state. Man imitates the Demiurge, while man does not have power to compose anything as the Demiurge does. On the one hand, the Demiurge composes the universe in its best form using numbers and shapes while looking at the Forms. And therefore, this process of composition is correctly called 'the Becoming.' On the other hand, man, who possesses reason, makes those things that take on the 'more and less' into the proportionate and orderly, and therefore, the best state by imposing limits. This process is a becoming to a being. The *Timaeus* describes the Demiurge's initial realization of the Forms in the perceivable world; the *Philebus* describes how a man could ultimately restore the universe, and especially, human actions, back to the original best state initially composed by the Demiurge. The mathematical media play critical roles in composing and restoring the universe. Both dialogues deal with the realization of the Forms on the earth, but on different levels.

A process of change, either restoration or destruction involves a movement. And this movement often causes pleasure or pain in human lives. Insofar as man lives in the changing world, he mostly suffers these sensations. Consequently, it is important to distinguish good perceptions from bad feelings so that man can live a good life. While pains are usually considered as something bad, not all pleasures are judged as good. Thus, one should find good pleasures among all the pleasures in order to live well in the changing perceivable world. In the following chapter I will discuss how Plato distinguishes good pleasures from others in order to create the list of the human goods.

Also I will argue that such good pleasures are actually caused by the restoration of the Good in the world of perception.

Chapter 5: Bad Pleasure

5.1. Pleasures to be Rejected from a Good Life

In the previous four chapters, I argued that Plato's main project in the *Philebus* is to find the goods for human beings living in this world of perception. Plato, as the author of this dialogue, writes the *Philebus* as an ideal work, while describing what Socrates wanted to achieve in philosophy, that is, finding the human goods. In other words, Socratic interlocutors, method, and the way of philosophizing in the *Philebus* will help all interlocutors and readers to reach the ultimate goal that Socrates wanted to arrive at—finding out the way to live a good life.

The next two chapters will deal with Plato's conception of pleasure: Chapter 5 will discuss bad pleasures that should be rejected from a good life, while Chapter 6 will present the good pleasures that are essential to a good human life. These investigations throughout the two chapters will reveal how Plato thinks of pleasure in the *Philebus*.

This interpretation of Plato's understanding of pleasure is somewhat different from his own arguments on pleasure in the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*. Plato argues in the *Philebus* that pleasure is a crucial part of human life because of human nature. Human beings are different from gods who can live without pleasure. Man has to suffer changes as long as he inhabits, as do other animals, a body. This is why he feels, experiences, and desires pleasure. In order to examine the human goods, therefore, it is important to understand which part of pleasure is good and which part has no place in the good life. We cannot live without pleasure. And no one in the *Philebus* denies this. On the one hand, Philebus, the main antagonist of the dialogue, maintains that pleasure

is the good for all living things (11b). On the other hand, both Protarchus and Socrates have come to an agreement that pleasure is not the unique good for human beings but one of two essential elements for the human good life.[222] Because of their unique condition between gods—having reason—and other animals—having bodies—men need both knowledge and pleasure in order to live a good life.

The examination of pleasure by Socrates and Protarchus in the *Philebus* goes though four stages: the origin of pleasure (31-36c), the possibility of false pleasure (36a-45a), pleasure mixed with pain (45a-50e), and pure pleasure without pain (51a-55a). Socrates discusses how pleasure can be false, even though our experience of pleasure—feeling pleasant—seems true. Then, he argues that pleasure mixed with pain could deceive our judgment of the size and intensity of pleasure, and therefore, the mixed pleasures are false. While such false pleasures should be rejected from the human goods because it is associated with badness, the *Philebus* suggests true and pure pleasures are to be pursued as human goods. At a more general level, pleasure in the *Philebus* differs on the one hand from Callicles' notion of pleasure in the *Gorgias*, in that Callicles' pleasure is always mixed with bodily experiences. On the other hand, pleasure in the *Philebus* is not necessarily something transcendent granted only to a few men (specifically, full-fledged philosophers). The pleasure that should be desired in the Cave—this perceptible world—is different from the pleasure experienced in contemplation of the Good, but both are potentially part of a good life for human beings of varying capacities and circumstances.[223]

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[222] Especially 21e-22b.

[223] This pleasure is examined in *Republic* IX, especially from 582d. Socrates considers three kinds of pleasure according to the three parts of soul. I will explain this later in 5.5. I will argue that the pleasure of ordinary people is an ontologically different experience from philosophers'.

The long and important discussion of human pleasure between Socrates and Protarchus shows how these two interlocutors are dividing kinds of pleasure. In these passages both characters examine the nature of pleasure in order to see which sorts of pleasure are more desirable than others for the good life. Many scholars have found this lengthy discussion on pleasure less engaging—and even less important—than the metaphysical inquiries in the first half of the dialogue. I suggest, however, that this long process of division and collection is an essential part of Plato's philosophical project. Plato saves some good pleasure and shows how they are an essential element in human lives.

In this chapter I will deal with bad pleasures that should be rejected from human lives. First, I will discuss how Socrates explains that pleasure can be false. And then, I will examine why mixed pleasures are to be rejected from the human goods. The true and pure pleasure, which is an essential element in human lives, and therefore should be saved as good pleasure, will be one of the main topics of Chapter 6.

5.2. Pleasure in the *Philebus*

5.2.1. Pleasure for Human Beings

Throughout the conversation between Socrates and Protarchus on the fourfold distinction, pleasure and reason have been placed into their proper categories as I argued in Chapter 4: Pleasure belongs to the unlimited, while reason is similar to the family of cause. Since pleasure does not have any intrinsic limit, it does not in itself possess any beginning, middle, or end (31a). There are many steps to follow in order for Socrates and Protarchus to investigate whether pleasure wins over reason. It is already

agreed that a certain mixture of both pleasure and reason will provide the goods for human lives.[224] Now is the time for them to find out which elements of pleasure and reason are required in a good life.

In this changing world—where everything keeps moving from one state to the other—it is natural that pleasure and pain keep arising and disappearing. As long as one remains in this world of change, *i.e.,* where *panta rei*, she will experience pleasure and pain in the process of departing from and returning to a naturally good condition.

In short, pleasure and pain are inevitable and pervasive in human lives. On the other hand, gods, who are unchanging and lack nothing, would not feel pleasure or pain at all.[225] It would sound ridiculous, therefore, to say that gods, who are leading the happiest lives, suffer any pain. Interestingly enough, furthermore, insofar as gods are unchanging and remaining firm in their best states, they will not feel any pleasure, either. While pleasure arises from a change or a filling of an emptiness,[226] gods, who are self-sufficient, do not experience such change. Therefore, gods will not enjoy pleasure, even though they are living happy lives.

Men are destined to live as both animals and gods, yet men are neither animals nor gods. Socrates and Protarchus agree that the lives of gods consist of knowledge and intelligence without pain and pleasure (33b). This kind of life is absolutely not possible for any animal, which constantly feels pain and pleasure (32e). Gods' lives are constituted by the life of knowledge initially presented by Socrates, while the life of irrational animals is the same as the life of pleasure (and pain) that was suggested by Philebus. As I suggested in the previous chapter, the human condition requires both

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[224] 22a.
[225] As they are to remain at their best states, they would not become worse. Any change for them is to worsen because they are at their best.
[226] Shortly I will discuss the definition of pleasure as a process of 'filling' in 5.2.1.3.

pleasure and knowledge. The account in the *Philebus* is about living on Earth—where all things are changing—not about escaping the changing world to the world of the Forms. Because pleasure and pain are essential parts of the ordinary human life, some sorts of pleasure and pain will be present in a good human life. Socrates will show that the right sorts of pleasure actually contribute to the goodness of a good human life.

What then is Socrates' position on pleasure in general? I can present it in a sentence: Socrates is not an anti-hedonist. In the famous verbal dispute between Socrates and Callicles in the *Gorgias*, and its reprise in the *Philebus*, where pleasure is presented as being analogous to filling a bottle with no bottom, Socrates seems to reject pleasure all together.[227] Indeed, he fights hard against the hard-core hedonist Callicles and rejects Callicles' claim that filling constantly and endlessly cannot be something good. A careful reading, however, will show that Socrates does not reject every kind of pleasure, even in the *Gorgias*. Rather he only rejects Callicles' extreme hedonistic position. Therefore, Socrates' rejection of Callicles' preferred sort of pleasure does not mean that all pleasures are bad. This would be true if and only if pleasure is exclusively defined as an endless and unceasing process of filling. Nonetheless, there are other kinds of fillings, *e.g*., restoration. This filling has the goal of arriving at the natural state of harmony, which is considered to be something good. It is not pleasure itself but its goal (or the fact that it does not have a goal) that decides whether a certain pleasure is

[227] *Gorgias* 495c-497e. In a long examination of pleasure, Socrates concludes that pleasure—according to Callicles' definition—is not good. Nonetheless, he continues the examination to show that there are two kinds of pleasure: beneficial and harmful (499e). In other words, Socrates changes the definition of pleasure from Callicles'—all pleasures are good as long as they are pleasures. From Callicles' perspective, and also the extreme hedonists' point of view, Socrates seems to reject pleasure all together. But, in fact, by reexamining the definition of pleasure, Socrates opens a possibility that some pleasures can be good. Yet, because Callicles in the *Gorgias* is too uncooperative , Socrates cannot continue the investigation of pleasure.

good or not. I will discuss this point later in more detail with the passages from the *Gorgias* and the *Philebus*.

Socrates in the *Philebus,* however, does endorse some—good—pleasure in human life within certain limiting conditions. For now, it will be enough to note the following point: there are some pleasures that are not good and also there are many pleasures that are good. The set of all pleasant things and the set of all good things are not identical, but they do overlap. Therefore, it is too hasty to conclude that Socrates is either exclusively a hedonist or an anti-hedonist. He stands in between those two extreme positions.

5.2.2. Memory and Recollection in Pleasure

Extreme hedonists, for example Callicles in the *Gorgias*, assume that pleasure is associated only with the body.[228] But Socrates in the *Philebus* thinks that they are mistaken because some pleasures are experienced in the soul. In order to see what kinds of pleasure exist, Socrates first summarizes Philebus' original hedonistic position at the beginning of the *Philebus:*[229] Since all living things pursue something pleasant, pleasure is the good (11b). Even those who lack reason have the ability to desire what is pleasant and avoid what is painful. Nevertheless, since the set of pleasures and the set of goods are not identical but have an intersection, reason is required in order to make a judgment on any given pleasure as to whether it is good or not. It is reason's function to guide and direct a way of filling. As a rule, then, pleasure turns out to be good or bad,

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[228] For example, a life of never ending scratching. See *Gorgias,* 494c.
[229] It is very unusual to observe that Plato, the author of the *Philebus*, makes the interlocutors sum up their positions three times throughout the dialogue. Plato intentionally calls readers' attention to the main theme of the dialogue. Even though there are metaphysical accounts in the middle of the *Philebus*, this dialogue is about the human good after all.

just because of reason's role in selecting, choosing, and directing the "restorations" one pursues. Therefore, it is wrong to consider pleasure only in terms of the body. Philebus and Callicles did not recognize the human condition: We are not like other animated living creatures, which desire pleasure indiscriminately. A man should be able to enjoy good pleasure by virtue of reason, which resides in the soul.

The next question we need to deal with is how reason works in the mechanism of desire. Since we are considering human desire and pleasure derived from it, man uses his own reason when he desires something. In which capacity does reason function so that pleasures can become either good or bad? In order to distinguish and choose good pleasure, both Socrates and Protarchus agree that the first step is to understand what desire is and on what occasion it arises (34d). First, what is desire? An example of 'thirst' helps us to grasp this phenomenon as 'filling.' Thirst is a desire for something to fill emptiness. The desire is, however, not for something to be used to fill an emptiness—the object that fills something, such as water—but for the process of filling itself (34e). Whoever feels empty desires to change into the opposite state of what she currently suffers. It is only when you are empty that you desire to be filled. What is the agent that suffers emptiness in the case of being thirsty? The body is the agent that suffers in this situation, while its soul is the agent that desires. Without the memory of being full the soul would not desire the opposite of what it is currently experiencing. In other words, it is memory in the soul that gives a certain process of filling a goal. In feeling pleasure, therefore, memory is inevitably required.

One would not be able to desire an unknown object. I desire a can of Diet Coke on a hot summer day in Atlanta, because I can draw on my past experience of enjoying the cooling experience of drinking an ice cold Diet Coke on a hot and humid day in Seoul,

Korea. However, this does not seem to explain every instance of filling experiences. For example, a newborn baby, never having had an experience of being filled with anything, desires its mom and her breast milk as soon as it is born. Does it have any memory or past experience of being filled? This is not easy to answer, but at least we can say that Plato does not seem to think there are memories of events that took place in the womb. So how, on Plato's view, does this newborn baby desire being filled with food? Probably, memory is not essential for all kinds of pleasure.

Socrates again presents an interesting philosophical answer to this question in the *Philebus*—recollection (34b). He says recollection is different from memory. In the case of the former, the soul recalls as much as possible by itself, without the aid of the body, while the latter needs the body's help. However, at least in the *Philebus*, Socrates does not think recollection is much different than memory. Both seem to work in a similar fashion in desiring something—at least in the *Philebus*.[230]

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[230] Recollection was one of Plato's main philosophical themes in his dialogues, especially in the *Phaedo* and the *Meno*.[230] Plato, however, never uses this concept as his main point of philosophical leverage in other dialogues. Recollection in the *Meno* was a breakthrough in Socrates's conversation with Meno that enabled them to continue the search for the definition of virtue. Being refuted three times by Socrates in the process of defining what virtue is, Meno thinks he has nothing further to say, while feeling numb as if he had been bitten by a torpedo fish (*Meno*, 80a). He does not know what to say and what to claim. Consequently, he presents the famous 'Meno's Paradox':

"A man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know. He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for."[230]

In order to continue their conversation Socrates has to show that a man should have a certain level of knowledge about his object of pursuit. It is recollection that provides such prerequisite knowledge: according to the "ancient priests and priestesses," a soul sees and experiences all before it comes into its body. This experience gives it obscure knowledge that enables it to initiate an inquiry. Therefore, learning is actually recollection. Everything one comes to learn is not something new but something she had learned, seen, and experienced before she was born.

Does Plato really talk about a life-before-birth? I doubt it. Recollection is about the forms and not pre-life experience. This story of recollection does not have to be taken literally. This seeing and experiencing before birth is, I think, Plato's way to describe the ways of grasping and understanding the Forms. The Forms themselves do not exist in the changing and perceptible world. Their images, however, exist in this world and they point to the original paradigms, the Forms. It is possible for us to seek after the Forms without having a direct knowledge of them, because we come to grasp the 'likeness' of the

5.3. Possibility of False Pleasure

5.3.1. Pleasure and Falsity: A Strange Mixture

Once Socrates explains that pleasure always involves a rational element, he suggests that the first point to discuss is the possibility of false pleasure (36c). If you hear 'false pleasure,' however, you may yet think it sounds strange: how can pleasure (and/or pain) be false? That was the first reaction from Protarchus. He thinks opinion and judgment (*doxa*) can be either true or false but pleasure cannot.

If reason works with body in generating pleasures as shown above—in memory and recollection, it is possible to distinguish pleasure into two kinds: true and false pleasure. The truth and falsity of pleasure is determined by reason, which works with the body in the process of filling. Even though the feeling is true (in the sense of being real), the rational elements in experiencing pleasure miss the mark. Therefore, it is impossible to label any irrational beings' experience as 'false pleasure'; only pleasures for creatures with reason can be judged 'false.' While gods do not experience pleasure,

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Forms, which both presupposes and makes use of some apprehension of Forms, and provides us a glimpse of the Forms we pursue—a glimpse that human beings can later bring into better and fully conscious focus. We all desire being filled. Even a newborn baby has desire. It is because we have either a memory or recollection of being filled, or have both of them. And this memory of being filled gives a *direction* to the filling that one desires. We desire being filling with food, drink, sex, health, relationship, and others, either physically and/or metaphorically. We desire to be filled so that we can become better than now. Ultimately, our desire aims to return to the original state of the soul that we can recollect. This is how a newborn baby can desire being filled. The state of being filled is indeed the best state for the baby. All human beings desire to become perfect and the best. It is possible for a baby to desire something, because humans can call up the best state through recollection. Because we know—by recollection—what it is like, even though it is known to us obscurely and often it is hidden from us, restoration back to the time of creation as well as the ultimate paradigm of all—the forms—is the final object of human desire. Therefore, recollection is a very important philosophical tool for Plato in the process of both doing an investigation—as in the *Meno*—and living a good life—as in the *Philebus*

irrational beings feel pleasure without any rational elements. Therefore, only human pleasure can be either true or false.

Both Callicles and Philebus did not want to distinguish human beings from other living beings. Socrates, however, points out that because humans have reason, human pleasure can surely go wrong. This possibility of false pleasure is the first step of Socrates and Protarchus' investigation into the nature of pleasure. Once false pleasure is identified, it will be eliminated from the list of human goods. Basically false pleasure comes from a failure of reason. In other words, when reason judges a certain pleasure wrongly, this pleasure turns out to be false.

Yet, as Protarchus complains, it is still hard to understand the possibility of false pleasure. In the following sections I will examine several influential interpretations of false pleasure in the *Philebus* and argue that none of them adequately explains how pleasure can be false. At the end of my examination of these interpretations we will be able to say that it is indeed possible to judge a certain pleasure as either false or true. Also the direction of filling that produces a certain pleasure is determined not only by rational elements in human soul (memory, recollection, or expectation), but also an agent's beliefs—built from her rational deliberations and decisions—which directs her rational elements in experiencing pleasure.

5.3.2. Gosling – False Judgment and True Pleasures

In assessing interpretations of the possibility of false pleasure it may be fitting to begin with one of the most established and oldest interpretations, that of Gosling. His interpretation is easy to understand but not convincing enough to persuade Gosling himself.

Gosling argues that there are three kinds of false pleasures: (mistaken) anticipatory pleasure, pleasure from false measurements, and pleasure from mistakes.[231] Following Protarchus' initial position, Gosling suggests that the falsity of pleasure comes from a subject's judgment about pleasure. Expectation is similar to picturing a future event, which implies a judgment about the likelihood of enjoying some pleasure. Sometimes, however, this picture is incorrect or mistaken. According to Gosling, therefore, it is possible in such cases to say that the expectation is false, in that the expected event does not in fact come about. In the same manner, pleasures from false measurements or mistakes are also false. He says "I may work myself into a frenzy of delight over some quite small occurrence, and the judgment that my delight is out of all proportion to its object is a judgment of abnormality against me; but if I'm thus abnormal I may anticipate a certain degree of delight which is to an abnormal degree quite correctly, so that my anticipatory pleasure is quite 'true' in Plato's sense."[232] In making these comments, however, Gosling thinks that it is still odd to call pleasure false: no matter what your judgment on pleasure is, your feeling is true—your body is enjoying the anticipatory pleasure anyway. Therefore, Gosling insists that the falsity of pleasure is meant only in a derivative sense—*i.e.*, it is derived from false beliefs.[233] His argument depends on Socrates' statement at 38b of the *Philebus*, "these (judgments) are often accompanied by pleasure and pain. I am talking of true and false judgment." It sounds like the truth and falsity of pleasure comes after, depends on, or follows a judgment about the event.

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[231] Gosling (1959), p.45.
[232] *Ibid*., p.50.
[233] *Ibid* p. 53. "Beliefs infect the pleasures (pictures) with their own condition; for the truth or falsity of the pleasures (pictures) is derivative—if they were not based on beliefs they would be daydreams; — nevertheless it is quite correctly attributed to them."

Nonetheless, I do not agree with Gosling's interpretation, since the falsity of a certain pleasure actually determines whether the pleasure is good or not. According to Socrates' point in this context, 38b, false pleasures cannot be good. Philebus maintained at the beginning of the *Philebus* that all pleasures are good without any qualification.[234] Even though Protarchus, who takes over Philebus' role in the conversation, is not an extreme hedonist like Philebus, he cannot give up the ultimate assumption that he has received from Philebus. Since Socrates aims to reject this assumption and show that some pleasures are not good, he eventually tries to show that some pleasures are evil in order to refute Philebus' claim. Socrates' strategy is somewhat indirect. By first showing that there are some false pleasures, he wants to prove that some pleasures are in fact bad.

There are three standards for the human goods, introduced earlier in the *Philebus*—namely, perfection, sufficiency, and choice-worthiness. As I suggested in Chapter 2, perfection means that one does not have to desire anything further than the perfect object. In other words, the ultimate goal of human desire is the Good (or the human goods). Second, sufficiency means that we do not need anything else. If something were sufficient to satisfy our desire, we would not desire it anymore. Third, choice-worthiness indicates that the good is to be chosen by all who know what it is (20d). Judged according to these three criteria, a false pleasure would not pass these three standards at all. Furthermore, it would not be perfect, because something false is not to be aimed at after all. It would not be sufficient, because something false lacks

[234] 13a. In fact, it was Protarchus who says that all pleasures are good. His argument from 12c-13a is summarized as follows: Even though there are many different kinds of pleasures, those pleasures are not opposed to each other insofar as they are pleasures. And pleasure is supposed to be good. Therefore, all kinds of pleasures, no matter how many kinds are there, are good. Since Protarchus just take over Socrates' opponent's role from Philebus, this claim can be taken as Philebus', that is, the extreme hedonist position.

truth (at least according to Plato's metaphysics). Also, it would not be choiceworthy, because not many people would intentionally choose something false. Therefore, if something were proven to be false, it cannot be included in the list of the human goods. Thus, if Socrates manages to show that certain pleasures are in fact false, then they will be regarded as something evil. This is how the original position of both Philebus and Protarchus, that is, all pleasures are good, will be refuted.

Gosling's interpretation that Socrates' characterization of pleasures as 'false' is meant only in a derivative sense—a sort of a byproduct in judging an event—fails to see an essential point in Socrates' argument: with respect to human pleasures, we can and should say a certain pleasure is either true or false. Furthermore, the investigation of false pleasure should be more seriously undertaken: false pleasures are not just something odd. Since they are evil, we have to eliminate them from the good life.

5.3.3. Kenny and Harte – Pleasure and Beliefs

Two other prominent scholars of Plato, Kenny and Harte, suggest another interpretation of the possibility of false pleasure. They hold that an agent's set of beliefs determines the falsity of pleasure. According to their suggestion, pleasures are false precisely because they spring from this man's wrong belief.

I will begin my examination with Kenny's claim. While developing Gosling's claim, he argues that false pleasure comes from false beliefs. He says, "As pictures stand to the text which they illustrate, so pleasures stand to the beliefs which they accompany. But a false text makes the corresponding illustration false; therefore a false belief makes

the accompanying pleasure false."[235] Kenny develops this point by introducing the idea of vice—lacking self-knowledge in assessing future pleasure. When an agent pictures himself indulging in a wrong kind of object of pleasure, he has a false belief about himself, that is, he pictures himself as a man, who thinks doing that will be pleasant. Kenny introduces an example of a selfish man: this man imagines that he will win a lottery and receive £70,000. He anticipates spending the entire sum on beer and taking pleasure in the anticipation. Kenny explains how this man's pleasure is false: "his pleasure in this anticipation would be a false pleasure not because he is necessarily wrong in expecting to win the money, nor because he is incorrect in anticipating how he will spend it; but because he is mistaken in thinking that he will enjoy drinking seventy thousand pounds' worth of beer."[236] But why is it *wrong* to dream about drinking endless amount of beer? This picture of indulging himself in the overconsumption of beer seems to be excessive and intemperate but not necessarily wrong.

In order to relate being wrong to being false, Kenny maintains that his picture that drinking such amount of beer is pleasant is in fact false. Drinking beer excessively would not be a pleasant experience to anyone, but this man does not know that. Why? Because he does not have self knowledge and therefore he is an evil man, and as Kenny says "the root of all evil is not knowing oneself." He does not even know what he can truly enjoy. Consequently, he does not know what he should truly enjoy. The pleasure in picturing a future event in which he overindulges in lots of beer is false, and he draws this false picture because of his lack of self-knowledge. And this makes him a wicked

[235] Kenny (1960), p. 50.
[236] *Ibid*., p. 52.

man. He says, in conclusion, "All men take pleasure in pictures of their future pleasures. Therefore bad men take pleasure in pictures of their future pleasures. But because of their characters bad men's pictures of their future pleasures are false pictures. But pleasure taken in false pictures is false pleasure. Therefore bad men take pleasure that is false."[237]

Even though I am sympathetic to the claim that enjoying something evil is false due to a lack of philosophical knowledge and self-reflection, I do not fully agree with Kenny's view, because not being virtuous does not necessarily cause man to become vicious. Let us consider another hypothetical situation similar to his. If I think I will win the lottery, I can take pleasure in anticipating a good deed that I can perform with the money. What could he say about such a situation? Obviously, I am not dreaming of overindulging in drinking or any other form of wantonness, but considering doing some good works, like donating to a charity. There are two points a man with self-knowledge should consider in this situation: 1) how to use the money, and 2) how to earn the money. Kenny would say that I, who want to use the money from the lottery for good causes, do not possess reflective self-knowledge, because I do not follow a proper (whatever he thinks the proper way to make money) procedure to gain such an amount of money. Yes, I may not be as unreflective as the selfish man in his example; winning a lottery is hardly a virtuous way to become rich. Therefore, Kenny would answer that my pleasure in the anticipation of winning a lottery and engaging in good works would still be vicious, and hence, false. However, it is still questionable that not being virtuous entails being vicious. But am I really vicious? I am just expecting a lucky day and

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[237] *loc cit*.

making use of the luck to help others in trouble. Is my taking pleasure in anticipating spending all the money from winning the Mega Millions really 'false'? Probably not.

Revisiting Kenny's argument while criticizing Frede's position, which will be evaluated in the following section, Harte maintains that the truth and falsity of a certain pleasure depends on some associated belief of the person who enjoys the pleasure. Harte maintains that my belief about what would follow, which has been established through experiences of my life, determines my expectations. She suggests that false pleasures in the *Philebus* are different from certain miscalculation about future event, as Gosling would argue. There are two possible scenarios in which my pleasures become false: 1) the event I expected did not happen; 2) the event I expected is not really something pleasant. Harte argues that only the second case represents what the false pleasures Socrates is concerned with. In both cases, pleasure in my expectation is false, because I misjudged the pleasure. The truth or falsity of pleasure, however, is determined not immediately—*i.e.*, at the time the pleasure is being experienced—but later, by a reflection on the pleasure.[238]

Harte uses an example similar to Kenny's: I take pleasure in dreaming about winning the lottery.[239] This pleasure could be false in two different ways: 1) I bought a ticket to the mega millions lottery from a local grocery shop on Thursday while expecting to see myself winning five million dollars on the following day. This expectation is pleasant on Thursday and will still be pleasant until I find out on Friday that I am not the winner and just lost my $2. The pleasure I enjoyed from the daydream on Thursday will turn out to have been false on Friday, when my expectation to win the

[238] Harte (2004), p. 128.
[239] This story is my modification of her example (*Ibid.* p. 122-123).

lottery is proven to be false. Consequently, the pleasure I took on Thursday becomes a false one. However, she thinks this does not adequately explain false pleasures in the *Philebus*. Because the pleasure I take in the expectation of winning the lottery is justified on its own terms not by my (false) expectation. If I would be right about winning the lottery on Friday, and so therefore, if I would in fact win the lottery, I would have just the same pleasure, without its being had under false expectation. The pleasure I take in on Thursday is taken in something pleasant or something that would be pleasant, if my fantasy come true. In other words, the pleasure in the expectation does not really depend on my false belief about the future. Harte says, therefore, this scenario does not sufficiently explain the problem of false pleasure in the *Philebus*.

A second way my pleasure could be false occurs in the situation that I buy a ticket on Thursday and am pleased to expect that I will win the lottery on the following day. On the following Friday night, I find that it is I who have won the five million dollars! But instantly, I begin to worry about the money: how can I go back to cash the ticket? What should I do with my job? Whom should I tell that I've won the lottery? Colleagues? Friends? I may be in danger of being robbed or even killed, if my identity is disclosed. And also there are many other things to worry about. Then, I realize that the pleasure I expected when buying the ticket is actually not as great as I had thought it would be. Moreover, if I take a class on asceticism Friday morning between buying a lottery on Thursday and winning it Friday night, my belief about the pleasure of winning the lottery could be changed between these two events—I come to realize that winning a lottery is not truly pleasant. Then the pleasure, which I deemed to be good when I bought the lottery ticket, turns out to be not so much pleasant. In retrospect, the pleasure I took on Thursday turns out to be false.

In order not to experience false pleasure, my expectation or judgment regarding the pleasure should be true to what is actually going to happen. Then, how can I form a true anticipation? Harte says that depending on what sorts of belief I have I will experience either true pleasures or false pleasures. Established—or newly adopted—beliefs determine the truth and falsity of pleasure in expectation. Therefore, I was wrong to think of my winning the lottery as pleasant, not because I was mistaken that I will be winning the lottery, but because I was mistaken in my belief associated with the expectation of winning the lottery that such luck would be pleasant. Therefore, what is really important in having true or false pleasure is what kind of belief I have and use to judge whether a certain event would be pleasant or not. My false pleasure was grounded upon my false (or even wicked) established beliefs that winning a lottery is always pleasant.

In spite of Harte's brilliant suggestion, a question still remains: if the falsity of pleasure is decided only by a reflection on a future pleasure—*i.e.*, an assessment of it after it and other, perhaps unforeseen, events have occurred—how can I tell now if the pleasure that I am enjoying right now is either true or false? I am currently taking pleasure in something, but mistakenly judge that this pleasure is good thing for me. According to her explanation, this pleasure that I am now experiencing is also a false one, because I fail to see the true nature of the pleasure due to lack of good character. After all, I need to know whether this pleasure I'm experiencing is true or not in order to lead a good life. While reflection on pleasure after the fact will help me build a better character or have a better belief, it will not help me make a good decision right now.

5.3.4. Frede – *Logos* in the Soul

Taking the old story of Rumpelstiltskin by the Brothers Grimm,[240] Frede takes a different approach from the previous interpretations in order to show how pleasure can be false. She thinks that a firm belief, a picture (a sort of mental image) or even knowledge—*logos*—in an agent's soul determines the falsity of pleasure. But this *logos* governs not only future events but also present and past events. According to this old and famous tale an imp-like creature, Rumpelstiltskin, feeling certain that it was impossible for the queen to guess his name, was pleased by the expectation that he would have the queen's baby tomorrow. Rumpelstiltskin's prediction is more than a simple hope or daydream, such as winning a lottery with a 1 in 10 million chance. Since he expects that a certain event is definitely going to happen, Rumpelstiltskin's present pleasure will be true (similar to the future most vivid sense in Ancient Greek). In Frede's views, such a firm expectation comes from *logoi* or pictures in his soul. He enjoys his thought, as *logoi* written on the tablet in his soul, and this thought consists in an assertion about facts about past, present and future. In other words, if something is written in one's mind as *logos*, an event from the *logos* would be definitely happening because of a certain logical necessity. The expectations in a propositional form, such as, "this is (definitely) going to be the case…" in his mind lets him see it as settled. Therefore, insofar as one "knows" that the future event will be "necessarily" happening—at least as is written, settled and visualized in his mind, the pleasure he experience in the expectation is true. Yet, this 'necessity' is not objective: it is written only in this man's mind as *logos*. Therefore, it is still possible, just as it was in Rumpelstiltskin's story, that the event would not happen as is written in this man's mind. When the actual event, which was supposed to happen according to the *logoi* or pictures, happens in a different

[240] Frede (1985) pp. 171-2.

way, as in the case of Rumpelstiltskin, the expectation turns out to be false, and consequently, the pleasure from the expectation turns out to be false.

At first glance, Frede's argument is not too different from that of either Kenny or Harte: Beliefs, memory, imagination, or any other mental process located in one's soul depend on one's character, and this character governs the falsity of the pleasure. Nevertheless, Frede disagrees with both Harte and Kenny in that she holds all expectations are grounded on one's beliefs; it is a few, very firm expectations written in the *logos* and the picture of an agent that makes certain pleasures true. In case of Frede's example, it is Rumpelstiltskin's judgment—no matter what his character, observation, logical thought process, or expectation—based upon the *logos* in his mind that determines whether his pleasure of having the child is true or false. In other words, the *logos*, that is, the anticipated event as it is described or pictured in his mind itself, dictates the truth or falsity of pleasure he is experiencing. Therefore, there is a parallel between belief and certain kinds of pleasure: As belief, which is expressed in this form 'I believe that…,' is factive, the expression 'I am pleased that…' is also factive. Both pleasure and belief have contents, and the contents may be associated with propositions. And by such propositions the truth and falsity of a belief as well as certain pleasures are determined.

Frede maintains, unlike Harte, that her account of true and false pleasures applies not only to *future* pleasures (pleasures that are expected at the time when the future events are actually happening) but also to present and past pleasures. 'Expectation' (*elpis*) in Socrates' examination does not necessarily involve exclusively future events. There are many elements at play in experiencing present pleasure—sensation, memory, expectation, and so forth. In contrast, there is only one factor in

future pleasure—*logos* in expectation. Unlike past or present pleasures, no perception, feeling, or other bodily elements directly affect the experience of the anticipation of future pleasures. It is easier, therefore, to understand the mental process of feeling false pleasure in the expectation of a future event than in present or past events—it is *logos* or a picture engraved in the soul to be examined in order to judge the truth or falsity of the pleasure.

5.3.5. Human Pleasure and Intention

Socrates also maintains that the ones who are loved by the gods (*theophiles*) are good people among mankind and therefore they deserve to enjoy true pleasures.[241] In other words only good people will enjoy true pleasures while bad people will experience false ones. As I just argued at the beginning of this section in response to Gosling's argument, it is Socrates' intention to relate true and false pleasures to good and evil. Since there is no room for something false in the goods, false pleasures can be easily dismissed as not being a part of the human goods.

Socrates in the *Philebus* presents the new ontology of human pleasure: animal pleasure is solely 'filling' what the animal currently lacks. In contrast, human pleasure is more than merely a process of filling. This process must be carried out in the right direction (or with the right intention). It is the soul that provides the right direction to the process of filling. Therefore, in case of human pleasure, the rational part of the soul necessarily plays a role, which can be big or small. If rationality plays only a minimal role, the pleasure for man is not different from that enjoyed by other living things. But if rationality—originally belonging to gods—were in charge of experiencing pleasure for

[241] *Philebus,* 39e.

human beings, the human pleasure would become somewhat divine, far different from animals'.

There are two different kinds of pleasure: the first kind of pleasure is composed of both the process of filling and its intentional object, whereas the second is merely the process of filling. For example, when I feel thirst, I will feel pleasure as long as I fill my body with any liquid. Even a cup of spoiled milk might satisfy my imminent thirst, even though it will eventually hurt me later. Nevertheless, if I desire to quench my thirst by drinking a cold Diet Coke to alleviate my thirst on a hot summer day in Atlanta, my desire will be satisfied only when I take a can of Diet Coke out of a vending machine and drink it. Milk, water, or even Coke Zero will not fulfill my desire. It is because not only my thirst but also my intentional desire for Diet Coke should be fulfilled. The pleasure I enjoy from drinking an ice cold can of Diet Coke comes both from past experiences of my body, being filled to quench my thirst, and from the Diet Coke, which I intentionally desire.

An object of human desire seems to always depend on an intention. My intention, which relies on either a set of established belief or the *logos* in my soul, dictates whether the pleasure is true or not. On the one hand, Frede sees the pleasure from the two examples in the previous paragraph, *i.e.*, merely feeling fillings—processes and not propositions.[242] Nevertheless, we do not often experience pleasure, because as humans, we do have our own intentions in desiring something. And without knowing the intention of a desire, it is impossible for us to determine the truth-value of such pleasure involved in desire, because there is no proposition associated with it. On the other hand,

[242] Frede (1985), p. 177.

pleasure with an intention can be judged according to whether it is true or false because of the intention in it.

Unlike pleasure of those irrational beings, which is by nature mere process,[243] human pleasures involve an agent's intention. Men tend to use both the rational part and irrational part of soul in desiring something. Philebus and also Protarchus consider only pleasures of the body, which lack a rational and intentional element. Such mere fillings are not to be included in the distinctively human goods anyway, because these do not exclusively belong to human nature. Both Philebus and Protarchus in the *Philebus* and also Callicles in the *Gorgias* do not see the gap between men and other irrational creatures. They regard corporeal instincts in man as more essential than human reason. Nevertheless, insofar as the main concern of the *Philebus* is the human goods, it is pointless to discuss a process of filling as a candidate for the human goods. Because he has both body and soul, man tends to desire with an intention. Of course, his irrational instinct sometimes takes over, *e.g.*, when he loses himself in taking pleasure in scratching himself continuously. As long as the *human* goods are considered, pleasure with intentions is more important that mere process.

Insofar as a man makes a judgment on the pleasure he experienced, experiences, and will experience, pleasure for human beings is always a co-product of feeling and judgment. As long as it is possible to judge pleasure with reason, it is possible to say a certain pleasure is either true or false. The first step of the investigation of human pleasure, therefore, should consider what true and false pleasure is. And the false ones should be rejected. Pleasure for human beings could be either true or false, in the same fashion that fears, expectations, judgments, and furthermore, intentions are either true

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[243] Frede (1985), p. 176

or false. Since false pleasure is a very strange concept, the investigation of false pleasure did really "stir up a weighty controversy" (36d). Nevertheless, insofar as human pleasures are examined, it is possible to determine if this pleasure is true or false. And false pleasure should be eliminated from the human goods. In the next section, we will see how pleasure becomes false, when it is mixed with pain.

5.4. Mixed Pleasure

5.4.1. Measuring Pleasure and pain

So far we have discussed how it is even possible to say that certain pleasure is false. Many cases of false pleasures are found in the anticipation of a future event. But as Kenny and Frede argue, this is not always the case. Since false pleasure is about *logos* in one's mind, whenever the pleasure we experience is inconsistent with the logos, the pleasure is false. Especially when pleasure is mixed with pain, human reason tends to make false judgment about the size and intensity of the pleasure, pleasure in general becomes false.

Since both pleasure and pain admit the more and less and belong to the unlimited kind (41d), it is important to measure which one is greater or smaller, or which one is more intensive or stronger in order to make a right decision about the matters regarding pleasure and pain. In other words, it is important for reason to better measure pleasure compared to pleasure, or pain compared to pain, or pleasure to pleasure in order to live better. Nevertheless, just as eyesight sometimes distorts the truth and causes false judgment when observing an object from afar or close (42a), the same thing, or even worse, can happen also in the case of pleasure and pain. If pleasure and pain "are alternately looked at from close up or far away, or simultaneously put side

by side, that the pleasures seem greater compared to pain and more intensive, and pains seem, on the contrary, moderate in comparison with pleasures" (42b).[244] In such a way, true and false judgments can affect pleasures and pains respectively. Reason can make a mistake when it cannot judge from an objective point of view. In the case of a mixed pleasure—where pain and pleasure are mixed—it is very difficult for reason to measure the intensity of either pleasure or pain. For example, when I am very hungry—after missing several meals, a very small cut of chocolate cake will give me enormous joy. Furthermore, when I am in a state of extreme pain, just moving to a neutral state, where I would not feel either pain or pleasure, will make me feel pleasure, which in fact is not a pleasure. My intention that wants to avoid this pain exaggerates the pleasure that I will experience. Here, when pleasure is mixed with pain, my intention distorts my measurement of pleasure.

A big problem for anyone who does not want to make a false judgment about pleasure is that pleasure and pain are continuously coming about in our daily lives, and therefore, it is hard for anyone to stand from an objective perspective in order to measure either pleasure or pain. As Socrates says "it has by now been said repeatedly that it is a destruction of the nature of those entities through combinations and separations, through processes of filling and emptying, as well as certain kinds of growth and decay, that gives rise to pain and suffering, distress, and whatever else comes to pass that goes under such a name" (42c-d), almost always we are experiencing either pleasure or pain. Furthermore, if the Heraclitean premise is correct, that is, if indeed

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[244] Frede's example [(1993) p.47, footnote 1] excellently explains such a false judgment. She introduces one of the notorious characters of the Old Testament, Esau. He had distorted anticipated pleasure in eating his pottage. His present hunger, namely, pain, is too big, he falsely judged that eating his brother's pottage would be greatly pleasant and consequently that the (distant) pain of his losing birthright seems small in comparison.

everything changes continuously and is in an eternal flux, upward and downward (43a), there would be hardly any cases in which we do not experience anything at all. As everything moves, pain and pleasure will keep fluctuating—and not remain neutral. Then, it will be very difficult for us to measure pleasure correctly when certain pleasure is mixed with pain.

Moreover, there are people "with a tremendous reputation in natural science" who say that "there are no such things as pleasures at all but pleasures are nothing but escape from pain" (44c). If pleasure indeed exists, as the followers of Philebus argue (44c), then those people with natural science are making a false judgment on pleasure, because of their point of view. If someone were standing in the state of pain, merely escaping from the state would seem to be pleasant to him—even though it is not pleasure at all. Furthermore, he will come across a bigger problem: the bigger the pain this man is in, the bigger the pleasure will be. For example, let us say that the amount of pleasure from drinking a can of Diet Coke is unchanging and the same all the time. But the pleasure I feel (or I judge) will be bigger when I have a high fever for days than when I just had a can of Diet Coke already. In other words, when I am in a bigger pain, namely, being extremely thirsty from a hot and humid Atlanta day, the pleasure seems to be bigger and more intense to me. Therefore, I will feel greater pleasures when the greater deprivations are replenished (45b). This reasoning will eventually force me to agree there are "greater pleasures in a life given to excesses—not more pleasures but pleasures that exceed by their force and intensity—than in a moderate life" (45d). I will further discuss this point soon.

In such ways mixed pleasure blurs our judgment on pleasure and pain. And this is why most often mixed pleasures are false, and therefore, should be rejected from the human goods.

5.4.2. Three Kinds of Mixed Pleasure

After showing the nature of mixed pleasure, Socrates presents three kinds of mixed pleasures (46a).

1) Pain and pleasure are mixed in the body: in case of scratching myself, I feel pleasure from the skin but the cause underneath the skin is still giving me pain. Even though scratching myself does not make any change at all under the skin, I falsely judge that this act of scratching gives me a big amount of pleasure.

2) Pain and pleasure are mixed in the body and in the soul: For instance, I am very hungry, because I haven't eaten for many hours already. The feeling of being hungry is the cause of the pain I am currently experiencing. I feel the hunger through my body. But I know that there will be a huge feast in a few hours at my father's home. At the feast I will definitely eat a lot of delicious foods that will satisfy my current hunger. The expectation, that is, the picture is located in my soul. And I feel pleasure through the expectation in the soul. As is in the example of Esau (footnote 25), the bigger my current hunger is, the bigger future pleasure seems to be.

3) Pain and pleasure are mixed in the soul: For example, after losing his dearest friend Patroclus, Achilles was full of pain at losing his friend but also hope for vindication.[245] In such a circumstance, he was having pain and pleasure at the same

[245] *Iliad*, 18. 107-110. Socrates in the *Philebus* quotes only 108-9. Achilles comes to his mother, Thetis to ask for a new armor in order to revenge his best friends, Patroclus' death.

time. Socrates also introduces an interesting example of someone who laughs while watching a comedy. Laughing is obviously fitting evidence that someone is experiencing pleasure. But where is the pain that is supposedly mixed with the pleasure of laughing? Watching a comedy we laugh at a character's stupidity. The stupidity, whether it is of actions, words, or thoughts, comes from the lack of self-knowledge. It is foolish for someone to think that he has more money than he really has. Or if someone thinks he is more handsome than he really is, he appears to be silly. Furthermore, if someone thinks that he is more virtuous than he really is, he does not know himself. This is one of the characteristics of vice (*ponēria*: 48c), and this third kind of mixed pleasure, which leads us to 'vice,' which I want to mention in the following section, also should be rejected from the human goods.

5.4.3. Vices in Mixed Pleasure

As I discussed in the previous sections, mixed pleasures are usually false, because false judgments are involved. And it is because these pleasures are false that they are considered as bad (40e). However, Protarchus introduces another possibility how pleasure becomes bad (or wicked)—"there is some other grave and wide-ranging kind of badness involved" in either pleasure or pain (41a). Socrates does not reject this kind—pleasure with vice, even though he does not wholeheartedly take his suggestion. He primarily argues the case that bad pleasures are bad, because they are false.

Nevertheless, at 45e of the *Philebus* Socrates also discusses such a kind of mixed pleasure with vice. Since pleasure is defined as a process, *i.e.*, moving from an empty state to a filled state, the strongest pleasure will be observed in the worst situation. To use the same illustration I introduced at 5.4.1, a man with high fever will have a stronger

thirst than other people. In terms of being filled with cold fluid, his need is much greater than any ordinary man. This man with high fever may need to drink not just one but two or even more cold cans of Diet Coke to quench his thirst and fever, and only then will his desire be satisfied. For this poor man with high fever, coming to the neutral state is harder than it is for other ordinary healthy people. If drinking many cans of Diet Coke fills the gap, the change from the former state to the latter is greater, and consequently, the pleasure is (falsely) judged as being stronger than the pleasure experienced by others.

Then, greatest pleasures (which are falsely measured) have their origin in the vicious state of soul and body, and furthermore, the greatest pains have their origin in the same state (45e). In other words, the worst state mostly leads someone to think that he would experience the greatest pleasure. Yet, the worst state is the cause of having the greatest pain. Therefore, ironically enough, anyone who is in the greatest pain is truly ready to feel the biggest pleasure. In case of the poor man's example, his bodily condition with high fever is obviously terrible, or at least, far from being normal. It means that his body is functioning poorly. He is ready to enjoy the strongest pleasure from drinking a cold Diet Coke, because of his extremely poor bodily condition. Socrates, however, changes the direction of their conversation here. From pleasure's state—being sickness (45c)—and the result of this—intensity and force (45d), they are now considering ethical aspect of pleasure, namely, virtue (45e).

The main concern for Socrates and Protarchus is how to evaluate whether pleasure is good or not. It is not merely about over- or underestimating the size or intensity of certain pleasure; it is a matter of morality. The strongest and most intense pleasure is falsely experienced from the worst, and therefore, most vicious state.

Pleasures from such a state are even morally bad for man. Of course, being really sick, *e.g.,* having a huge itch, would not be necessarily morally bad by itself. If other irrational creatures would experience pleasure from continuous scratching from such a huge itch, it should not be regarded something immoral. Nonetheless, since man's proper function is defined in terms of his rationality, *i.e.*, the root of morality, it could be immoral for man to think that it is pleasant to keep scratching an itch—because he fails to use his proper power. And a worst state makes his power more vulnerable to deceptions, and therefore, this man would be easily fall in the state of making mistakes. Therefore, the worst and vicious state could make man yet immoral.

In the case of the third mixed pleasure—pain and pleasure mixed in soul—was agreed as vicious. Therefore, mixed pleasures should be rejected from the human goods, because it is false, and therefore, vicious. Hence, man easily falls into immorality in such pleasures. When Socrates is about to collect the good things in order to generate the final ranking, he says that the "pleasure that are forever involved with foolishness and other kinds of vice" would not be made into an association with reason (63e). Mixed pleasures are not to be included in human goods, because they are somehow associated with vice—either false judgment or other kinds of badness, such as lack of self-knowledge.

Now, it is time to consider the good kind of pleasure, namely, pure pleasure. Chapter 6 will discuss all the essential elements of a good human life: pure pleasure and knowledge. After that, we will be able to grasp what a good life is like.

Chapter 6: Fundamental Elements in a Good Life: Pure Pleasure, Knowledge and the Final List of the *Philebus*

6.1. Introduction

This chapter will examine two major topics in the last part of the *Philebus*: First, the essential elements of a good life, that is, pure pleasure, and knowledge; second, the final list, which is complied by the philosophical method in the dialogue, that is, the method of division and collection. Especially the second part of the method—collection—is used to generate this list by mixing the good elements of pleasure and knowledge (61e).

In order to clarify my interpretation of the last part of the *Philebus*, it will be helpful to recall my main argument concerning Plato's moral philosophy. Most of all, I mean that the 'human way' is not living a transcendent life—escaping from this world to another dimension of the universe. Just as the allegory of the Cave from the *Republic* VII describes, human beings are destined to live in the Cave[246]: Not only do the prisoners remain in the Cave but he who climbed up outside of the Cave also has to return to his people. To live in the changing world is a human fate. Therefore, the ultimate question that Plato and also Socrates had to answer is how to realize the good

[246] I am not holding that the Cave itself is the Fine City. Eventually it will become a fine one, but not yet. As Socrates describes it, the Cave is "like the majority of cities nowadays [Plato's time], by people who fight over shadows and struggle against one another in order to rule—as if that were a great good." (*Republic* VII, 520c) People in the Cave are still fighting against each other and willing to kill the Philosopher, who has seen the reality (517a). Therefore, maybe in actuality there are all the types of city down in the Cave except the idealized Fine City. Then how to turn the Cave into the ideal world to live? It is by the rule of the philosopher, who is not a lover of ruling, in order to stop the fights and struggles in the Cave. (521b) The account in the *Philebus* describes the role of the philosopher, who should rule the Cave better so that the Cave becomes the *Kallipolis*, that is, a just and fine city as described in *Republic* IV.

life in the Cave. And the good life will be realized in the Cave when the philosopher rules. The majority of cities are ruled "by people, who fight over shadows and struggle against one another in order to rule." But "these cities ruled by such people will suffer from 'civil war', whereas a city with the opposite kind of rulers—*e.g.*, philosophers—is governed in the opposite way"—in a harmonious way. When philosophers, who have seen "the truth about fine, just, and good things," as well as "know each image for what it is and also that of which it is the image,"[247] should rule the city in the Cave, that is the world of perception, where all human beings live; then the good will be realized in the Cave.

A philosopher's primary mission in the Cave is not freeing and leading all out of the Cave but making the dwelling place better.[248] According to the Allegory of the Cave in *Republic* VII, only very few men manage to break the chains within the Cave and escape the bounds of human fate. And those philosophers, who were able to climb out of the darkness and see the real world, should return to the Cave in order to make the lives of their friends in their community happy ones. And this is the philosophers' way of paying back their city for making them the persons who they are with the Good they have found. Socrates explains this point in this conversation with Glaucon:

> "Socrates: It is our task as founders, then, to compel the best natures to reach the study we said before is the most important, namely, to make the ascent and see the good. But when they've made it and looked sufficiently, we mustn't allow them to do what they're allowed to do today.

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[247] *Republic* VII, 520c-d

[248] Only a few chosen people would be able to see and study the things above in the intelligible realm, just, and good things. But when a philosopher tries to free some of his citizens from the shadows and chains and lead them upward, other fellow citizens, who still remain as the prisoners, might even kill him. (*Republic* VII, 517a)

> Glaucon: What's that?
> Socrates: To stay there and refuse to go down again to the prisoners in the Cave and share their labors and honors…It is not the law's concern to make any one class in the city outstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happiness throughout the city by bringing the citizens into harmony with each other through persuasion or compulsion and by making them share with each other the benefits that each class can confer on the community." (*Republic* VII, 519d-520a)

The need for this 'coming down (*katabasis*)' to his people in order make their lives good is taken to be obvious: Justice will be most easily found when each group or class in a city is equally happy.[249] Even though this man who has come out of the Cave would want to stay outside of the Cave and enjoy the (enlightened) world, according to Plato, in which he deems that he will be the happiest, this in fact would not be truly just, for he enjoys outstanding happiness by himself, while not making the whole city, which raised and educated him, happy also. Such a philosopher should know better—should not be an unjust "freeloader"—and return to his people in spite of the danger of having to sacrifice some of his philosophical bliss, or even being resisted, attacked, and perhaps even killed by the people he is trying to help. His *anabasis*, or climbing up, would be impossible if he attempted it all by himself: this man owes his community much for his nurture—his birth, upbringing, physical strength, education and so forth.[250] In other words, he would not be a 'philosopher' without his community; he is indebted to his city for his whole being.

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[249] *Republic* IV, 420b.
[250] *Republic* VII, 520 b. Also in the *Crito* Socrates argues, "the laws might say ' that if what we say is true, you are not treating us rightly (*ou dikaia*) by planning to do what you are planning [running away from the prison]. We have given you birth, nurtured you, educated you, we have given you and all other citizens a share of all the good things we could." Socrates takes this as a matter of justice: Since the community (or the laws) have given philosophers much, it is just for a philosopher to contribute with what he has learned so that all classes in the city become equally happy.

Plato's emphasis in this discussion about the human goods led by Socrates in the *Philebus* is very different from either the education of the guardians and auxiliaries or the advanced education of the Philosopher-Kings in the *Republic*: Socrates is focused on earthly human life in general, and not on the life of any class of especially "gifted" people or "advanced thinkers." Therefore, I argue that the subject of 'coming down' in the *Republic*—benefiting the whole community—is mainly discussed in the *Philebus*, while the *Republic* primarily focuses on the chosen philosophers.

The final aim of Plato's philosophy in the *Philebus* is to describe the way to the way to restore the Good in human lives. In other words, his main project is finding the human goods rather than the Good. As I conceded in the previous chapter, the Good and the human good are closely related; but they are not exactly the same. The Good functions as the paradigm of the human goods; these are achieved in the process of the restoration of the Good in all things. The restoration is the process of returning to the original good state from the 'fallen' current state. This restoration necessarily involves changes, which are inevitable in the world of perception. And processes of restoration or destruction in this changing world mostly go with pleasure and pain. Therefore, a deeper investigation of the nature of pleasure is required in order to find out how to live a good life. How are Socrates and Protarchus in the *Philebus* going to examine this question? They will use the ideal method introduced in this dialogue, the method of division and collection. Through this investigation of the goods in human life, the *Philebus* will end up with a list of the human goods.

The first part of this chapter will deal with the good elements of human lives. Section 6.2 will consider pure pleasure. After rejecting bad pleasures, pure (and true) pleasures are to be examined. If change is inevitable in human lives, it is important to

distinguish good pleasure from bad ones and to enjoy the former. I will argue in this chapter that pleasure might be a lesser and somewhat remedial good, as Frede argues, but that it is still an essential part of a human life. In Section 6.3, I will summarize Socrates' investigation of knowledge. To many readers of Plato's previous dialogues—especially the *Republic*, it may seem surprising that Socrates maintains that not only knowledge but also true opinion is essential to living a good life. Section 6.4 will discuss the final list in the *Philebus*. If the list is the goods for human beings, why can we not find here the usual suspects of Plato's dialogues: such as wisdom, courage, temperance, and other virtues as well as other commonsensical good things, such as health, friends, family, and others? I maintain that the final list is in fact a list of the *criteria* to be applied in examining many good things in a human life. This is not the list of all the rules and virtues that we all should follow. Rather, Plato—following his teacher Socrates—expects you to examine your own life in order to live a good life. What he provides in this dialogue is the standards, such as measure, proportion, perfection, and others, for identifying the goods of a human life, as understood by the philosopher—the one who has seen the reality outside of the Cave. In order to live good lives other ordinary men should continue their search for the goods throughout their lives in accordance with these criteria.

6.2. Pure Pleasure

6.2.1 Good Pleasures in Human Lives

In 50e, Socrates turns to the examination of pure pleasures. Pure pleasures are in no way mixed with pain. As I suggested earlier, Socrates argues against the notion that pleasure is merely escaping from pain. According to this argument, every pleasure is

always mixed with pain, since it begins from a state of being empty—a painful and vicious state. The beginning state of this process is somewhat neutral—neither pleasant nor painful. A movement from this state toward being filled is not mixed with pain. This kind of pleasure is qualified to be included among the human goods, since there is no vice in it. As long as the process of filling goes in the right direction, *i.e.*, that one is filled with something fitting a good human life, and does not start from a state of pain, a pleasure from such a movement can be included in the list of the human goods. Such a pleasure has two characteristics: no pain is involved and it involves being in the right direction.

6.2.2. Pure Pleasure in the *Republic* IX and the *Philebus*

Socrates' account of pure pleasure in the *Philebus* is similar to the one in *Republic* IX. It is worth comparing those two passages in order to clarify what Plato means by 'pure pleasure.'

Pleasure in *Republic* IX is presented as the fulfillment of the desires (or loves) of each part of the soul: the love of money (*philokerdes*), the love of victory (*philonikia*) and the love of wisdom (*philosophia*).[251] As in the *Philebus*, Socrates here defines pleasure in terms of being empty and of a process of filling-in. Another similarity is that the *Republic* presents an account of a neutral state between two extremes, being filled and empty. Without doubt, the process of becoming filled is pleasant, whereas the latter state—being emptied—is painful. Since pleasure and pain are byproducts of a process—either becoming filled or emptied—sometimes the nature of pleasure can be seen (*phainetai*) as the cessation of pain and the nature of pain as the absence of pleasure.

[251] *Republic* IX, 581a-c

Nevertheless, just as the case with the problem of the mixed pleasures in the *Philebus*, which I discussed in Chapter 5, such appearance (*phantasma*) are far from the truth and are even some kind of magic (*goēteia*).[252] Therefore, Socrates says, "let no one persuade us that pure pleasure is relief from pain or that pure pain is relief from pleasure" (584c).

Republic IX introduces an example of pure pleasure—a pleasure not mixed with pain, but rather beginning from a neutral state and moving to a pleasant state, namely the pleasures connected with smell (584b). "For these with no antecedent pain suddenly attain an indescribable intensity, and their cessation leaves no pain after them." Such affections do not seem to have any pain in them. Socrates in the *Republic* argues that the true and good kinds of pleasures are closely related to the *objects* of the desires of each part of soul. Since pleasure is defined as the process of filling, true pleasure is given when the truest object is fulfilled. He says, "if being filled with what is appropriate to our nature is pleasure, that which is more filled with things that are more enjoys more really and truly a more true pleasure, while that which partakes of things that are less is less truly and surely filled and partakes of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure" (586e). The rational part of soul will experience the truest pleasure, since it desires to be filled with wisdom, namely, 'that which is more' (*to mallon on*), 'what is always the same' (586c), and truth. The pleasure for the rational part of soul is true, because its object of desire is true. The other parts of the soul—the spirited and the appetitive parts—would not enjoy true pleasure, because their objects of desire do not share the characteristics of the object of the rational part. These objects of desire of the other two parts are not always the same or true. Therefore, in a strict sense, their pleasures cannot be true, because their objects are not. The truest pleasure, of which they are capable, will be

[252] *Republic* IX, 584a-b.

given to these two parts as long as they follow the rational part. At 586e-587a Socrates states, "when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is not filled with inner dissension, the result for each part is that it in all other respects keeps to its own task and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best pleasures and, so far as such a thing is possible, the truest." Following the line of the argument advanced in the *Republic*, Socrates maintains that the best pleasures are achieved only when each part of the soul desires the proper sort of objects in accordance with reason's government. But as I just said, the objects of the other two parts—the appetitive and the spirited parts—are not true. They can enjoy the truest possible pleasure insofar as they are guided by the rational part. Then, how does the rational part govern other parts so that they also enjoy the truest pleasure? Also, in what sense are their pleasures the truest, even though these pleasures cannot be strictly the truest? The *Philebus* explains the missing gap in Plato's account of pleasure in the *Republic*.

6.2.3. Some Examples of Pure Pleasure in the *Philebus*

At this point I would like to examine some examples of pleasure not mixed with any pain. First, there are pure pleasures, which the body and soul work together to experience. And second, there are pleasures perceived only by the soul. For the first type, Socrates introduces three examples: the beauty of shape (51c), sound (51d) and smells (51e). Although all these examples are pleasures from perception, they are not beautiful in a relative sense—they are not beautiful only in comparison to ugly things. These examples are by their very nature beautiful. In other words, pure pleasures are experienced through body and soul, when our bodily senses, such as sight, hearing, and

smell, perceive something *inherently* good and beautiful. Nonetheless, the pleasures received from perceiving them with our senses are pure, not only because the nature of the objects is pure but also because we are not in pain when we do not perceive those inherent beauties. Our being pleased by sensing these things does not depend on any prior state of depletion or pain.

Interestingly enough, the pure pleasure of smells was the example used in *Republic* IX.[253] This suggests that Plato's intention in the *Philebus* was to extend and strengthen his argument of the *Republic* IX on pure pleasure. The pure pleasures from smell are a less divine (*hetton theion*) class of pleasures than pleasure from sound or sight (*Philebus,* 51e), because the olfactory sense is less keen than other senses, especially sight. Socrates says in the *Phaedrus* that, "sight is the keenest of the physical senses (*opsis okxytatē to dia tou sōmatos aisthēseōn*)" (250d).[254] The adjective, keen or sharp (*okxu*) is also applied not only to show how well the sense of sight works, "quickest to see distinctly" (*okxytata kathorōti*; *Republic,* 516c), but also in describing the highest intellectual functions, "notice a thing sharply" (*okxy noein*, *Iliad*, 3. 374).[255] Of course, it is well known that sight is compared to our rational faculty not only in the *Republic*[256] but also in the *Symposium*.[257] Here in the *Philebus*, Socrates assumes that the less bodily perception we use, the more we become like gods—although we have to depend on corporeal perceptions. Since sight is more divine than smell, the pleasure

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[253] *Republic* IX, 584b.
[254] Other uses in Plato: "keen eyesight" (*Republic* II, 368c), "keen senses" (*Republic* II, 375a)
[255] Plato also uses *okxu* in describing 'sharp' sense of mental attention and affection of old people (*Laws* XI, 927c)
[256] Especially in the allegory of the Sun. *Republic* VI, 507d-509b. "But it [sight] is, I think, the most sun-like of all the instruments of sense" (508b).
[257] *Symposium*, 210 c. Unlike the passages of *Republic* or *Phaedrus* there is no direct comparison of the rational faculty to sight. Nonetheless, Socrates in his speech maintains that beholding the beauty in the body, actions and laws will eventually lead us to the 'branches of knowledge,' which is a province of beauty. In seeing also, the beauty the reason and sight function similarly.

from the beauty of shape is more divine than that from the smell from flowers. Even though we do have bodily sensations as long as we are living with a body, some sensory organs like sight help us to transcend the limits of body.[258]

The next example of pleasure not mixed with bodily pleasure is a pleasure from knowledge. Since being ignorant is not a painful state—just as not smelling a good scent or not seeing a beautiful shape would not be regarded as something painful—the process of becoming educated is a purely pleasant experience. This is mental pleasure unmixed with any pain, and therefore, the rational part of soul would not miscalculate the size and intensity of the pleasure. Hence such pleasures are to be desired as something good. In fact, pure pleasures are very similar to the Good. First, as I have suggested earlier, pure pleasures do not start with a state of pain. There is no evil element in them. Second, the purity of pleasure is not the same as, and not determined by, the intensity of pleasure. Other pleasures—because of their unlimited nature—are experienced with great intensity. Some pleasures are stronger than others, while some are weaker. Pure pleasures, on the contrary, are related only to the purity (absence of admixture or contamination with the relevant opposite) of the quality—like beauty—not the level of intensity. Socrates' example of the color white shows this point.[259] A small amount of pure white is always the whitest instance of white, and is thereby more beautiful than any white mixed with another color. With respect to its being white, it does not matter how intense and how great its quantity is. If it is white, it is white; if it is gray, it is not white. No matter how many white elements are there in an instance of white, something

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[258] Sight allows us eventually to learn all the sciences. "Our ability to see the periods of day-and-night, of months and of years, of equinoxes and solstices, has led to the invention of number, and has given us the idea of time and opened the path to inquiry into the nature of the universe. These pursuits have given us philosophy, a gift from the gods to the mortal race whose value neither has been nor ever will be surpassed." (*Timaeus,* 47a-b)

[259] *Philebus*, 53a.

white mixed with other colors is not strictly white anymore. This is exactly the nature of truth and falsity. There is no middle ground between false and true: if something is not true, it is false. No matter how many sort-of-true things are accumulated, they are far from the strict standard, namely, truth. In order to tell whether something is true or not, the quantity or intensity does not matter; it only matters whether this is true or not. In the *Philebus* Socrates stresses the point that pure pleasure and truth are similar to each other because both of them are pure—not being mixed with anything else, either pain or falsity.[260] This point is not made in *Republic* IX. Among many kinds of pleasures, only pure pleasures share the attribute of purity with truth. Pure pleasures deserve to be part of the human goods.

Nonetheless, pure pleasures are somehow less than other goods as long as they are pleasures. Unlike knowledge, which men share only with gods, men and other living things enjoy pleasure. The latter is a byproduct of this world of change. Again, pleasure arises from a process of becoming, a process in which the gods do not participate. Pure pleasure remains somewhat in between two worlds, just as man stands in between animals and the gods. Therefore, pleasure is 'less divine' than knowledge and other goods.

6.2.4. Pure Pleasure—An Essential Element of Human Lives

So far, pleasure has proven to be inferior to reason. In order to prove this point Socrates distinguishes 'being' from 'generation' (or becoming). He says, "Every process of generation always takes place for the sake of some particular being" (54c). On the one hand, pleasure, a process of generation, comes to exist for the sake of some other being.

[260] For the discussion of what it means to say purity of knowledge, see 6.3.1.

Therefore, pleasure is not the good in itself. On the other hand, the object of such a generation belongs to the class of things good in themselves. Nevertheless, this does not mean that pleasure is evil, and that, as a result, it should have no place in a human life. Pleasure is not good in itself, but it can still be good in a derivative sense—*i.e.*, when it leads toward a filling or restoration that is itself good. Since the process of generation of pure pleasure does not begin from an emptiness to be filled, such pleasure does not have anything bad in itself.[261] To summarize, pure pleasure is one of the good things we regard as essential to a good life; but it is less important than other goods, because it does not belong to the class of things that are good in themselves. For this reason, pure pleasure (also other mixed but balanced and well-proportioned pleasures) is included in the concluding list, but comes at the end of it.[262]

Frede agrees when she claims that (pure) pleasures are less good than other good things. She notes that pleasure is not as good as other goods insofar as pleasure is acquired in the process of arriving at the Good.[263] In other words, since pleasure occurs in the process of filling-in, it cannot be the ultimate good for man. Therefore, she maintains that pleasure is nothing but a remedial good: we feel pleasure while we are approaching the Good. In her words, "the progress toward perfection is what the best kind of pleasure in human life represents, and this is why a human life would not be

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[261] Socrates makes an interesting point about the pleasure of learning here. He does not seem to take ignorance as an emptiness. At 52a, when he considers the pleasures of learning, he says, "there is no such thing as hunger for learning connected with them, nor any pains that have their source in a hunger for learning." In other words, the state of ignorance is not something painful, but the process of losing knowledge (again) through forgetting is painful. Therefore, the pleasure of learning begins from the state where I do not feel any pain from being ignorant. I will enjoy the pleasure from learning as I move to the state of being filled with knowledge. But the movement toward a reverse direction, that is, forgetting what I have learned, is indeed painful.

[262] At the last section of this chapter I will discuss the nature of the final ranking—in a nutshell, the ranking is the list of good things as well as criteria.

[263] Frede (2006), especially pp. 455-6.

desirable without pleasure."[264] If we follow her argument that pleasure is a remedial good, however, pleasure would become to some extent unnecessary once we reach the ultimate good, that is, when we are restored and cured according to her medical analogy. Such pleasure would eventually become obsolete when we arrive at perfection. However, we never escape from our earthly embodied existence, pleasure will be always necessary. On her view, although she does not explicitly argue this, it is thus not something essential for a good life, while "it is a necessary ingredient of our mortal condition,"[265] that is, since we all are human.

Although I agree with Frede on the point that pleasure is a lesser good, I cannot accept her overall conclusion that pleasure is only remedial. I do not read the *Philebus* as a story of climbing up to the Forms, and then escaping from a life of depletion and restoration. Rather, the *Philebus* addresses the role of pleasure in the sort of life lead by such "ordinary" people as Protarchus, and by enlightened philosophers who return to society to help others lead a better life. The latter case is more like a homecoming than an escape from one's worldly home to another world. This is what Frede's reading of the *Philebus* overlooks, even as it is right on some other important points.

6.3. Knowledge

6.3.1. The Classes of Knowledge

The investigation of knowledge, which again employs the method of division and collection, is rather short and simple in comparison to the investigation of pleasure. Socrates uses three standards when dividing the classes of knowledge: certainty (*to*

[264] *Ibid*., pp. 455.
[265] *Ibid*., pp. 456.

saphes), precision (*t'akribes*) and the truth (the being truest: *to alēthestaton)* (58c). First, knowledge is divided into two parts (55c-): productive knowledge (*to dēmiougikon*) and knowledge regarding education (*paideia*) and nurture (*tropē*). The first part, which is also called art (*technē*) or science (*epistēmē*), is divided into three divisions: 1) arts that can be acquired with some proficiency through practice and hard work, *e.g*., flute-playing, agriculture, navigation, and strategy. 2) Arts with more precision (*akribeia*). The former kind tries to find the measure by guessing (*stochazesthai*) so there is a lot of imprecision (*to mē saphes*) mixed up in it and very little reliability (*to bebaion*), whereas the latter kind frequently use measures and instruments (*metrois te kai organois*), which give it high accuracy (56a-b). There are also two kinds in this division: first, crafts, which use measures, calculation and other instruments of high precision. Shipbuilding, house-building, wood-working crafts, or other works related to manufacturing are examples of this kind. Second, geometry and others, which are practiced by only a few people who love wisdom (*hoi philosopountes*), count as a second kind. 3) Dialectic, the most precise science, which investigates being (to on) and with what is really and forever in every way eternally self-same, is the last kind. Socrates says that this science is by far the most precise and also truest of all kinds of knowledge (57d).[266]

[266] Socrates does not divide the classes of knowledge on education and nurture.



Figure 4: The Division of Knowledge

There are several different levels of certainty, purity, precision and truth: Dialectic occupies the highest level. The second division of arts takes a lower level than dialectic does. The first kind of science, which is acquired mainly by practice, is least certain, pure, precise and true.[267] This division of knowledge is also known as (true)

[267] What does Socrates mean when he says 'pure knowledge'? When explaining the case of flute-playing at 56a, Socrates says, "The harmonies are found not by measurement but by the hit and miss of training, and quite generally music tries to find the measure by observing the vibrating strings. So there is a lot of imprecision mixed up (*memigmenon*) in it and very little reliability." Socrates seems to argue that impure knowledge is infected by imprecision (*to mē saphes*). It becomes impure, as it is mixed with something that has different (and furthermore opposite) characteristics than knowledge has. Just as in the case of mixed pleasures—mixed with pain, the knowledge is mixed up with imprecision, become impure,

opinion (in the *Republic)*[268] or knack (*empeiria*: in the *Gorgias),*[269] which is less valuable than knowledge (*epistēmē*).

What concerns Socrates in these divisions of knowledge is neither the quantity nor the usefulness of knowledge. It is worth noting that all divisions of knowledge pursue purity, precision, and truth, even though some knowledge is not beneficial. Just as in the case of pure pleasure, knowledge should be evaluated according to these standards, that is, purity, precision and truth, not judged by other standards, such as quantity or consequential benefits. To maintain this point, Socrates says, "Even in a small quantity it can be superior in purity and truth to what is large in quantity but impure and untrue. We must look for this science without concern for its actual benefit or its prestige, but see whether it is by its nature a capacity in our soul to love the truth and to do everything for its sake" (58d). The essence of Socrates' argument is that anything that meets these criteria should be counted as knowledge. At the beginning of his division of knowledge (56c), Socrates says the art of music is less precise than the art of building, which is less precise than arithmetic. Probably one can say that the art of building is more beneficial than arithmetic or geometric, because of its practical advantage. In other words, arithmetic may provide less benefit than the art of building, while the former is more precise than the latter and that is why the former is more true to what knowledge is supposed to be.

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although this is still knowledge. Therefore, pure knowledge what Socrates means here seems to be knowledge which aims precision so that it is stable (*to bebaion*). As long as one search for 'pure' knowledge, which is not mixed up with imprecision, uncertainty, and falsity, this should be counted as 'knowledge.' In other words, if someone aims for taking off uncertainty while practicing flute-playing, this man surely is a genuine pursuer of knowledge.

[268] *Republic* V, 478a-478d.

[269] *Gorgias,* 462b.

An example of a specific musical practice will help us to understand this point better. Flute-playing belongs to the first division of knowledge. This practice is inferior to dialectic with respect to purity and precision. Especially for a novice playing the flute, his level of knowledge may be by far inferior to the level of dialectic in terms of precision, purity, certainty and truth. Nevertheless, insofar as this new apprentice tries to reach these criteria in his playing flute—by the hit and miss of training, by observing the vibrating strings in order to find the measure (56a), his low-level understanding should be counted as one instance of valuable knowledge, better than other beneficial tricks, such as Gorigas' rhetoric, which do not aim to satisfy the criteria of knowledge, *i.e.,* precision, purity, certainty and truth. As long as this new learner tries very hard to master flute-playing with his love of the truth in flute-playing, namely, playing flute without any flaws, his practice is as valuable as all other kinds of knowledge are. Hence, no matter what level of purity, certainty, precision and truth a science meets, it should be included in the list of the human goods insofar as it aims to meet these four criteria.

Even though it yields actual benefits—sometimes, huge—for human life, especially for the field of politics, Gorgias' art, that is, rhetoric should not be counted as knowledge. His art moves his audiences' mind as he desires. Whoever uses this art, however, is not concerned with truth, certainty, purity, or precision of rhetoric. Insofar as a speaker is able to persuade his listeners as he intends, he does not care about these four criteria of knowledge. Because Gorgias' rhetoric only aims for the profit or advantage (*chreian*, 58c) of efficiently persuading audiences without providing them knowledge of the subject matter, it is not a science. In the *Gorgias*, the art of persuasion was considered as a knack (*empeiria*), *i.e.,* something a man could acquire by mere

repetition and experience.[270] In other words, Gorgias' rhetoric is similar to flute playing. This art of rhetoric would be included in the division of arts through practice in the *Philebus*. Yet, Plato's assessment of Gorgias' rhetoric in the *Philebus* is even much lower than it was in the *Gorgias*. According to the arguments on knowledge in the *Philebus*, cookery, which was cataloged as one of the mere knacks in the *Gorgias*, can be considered an art. While cookery is maybe less precise than other sciences, it is knowledge, if only because cookery aims for precision and certainty through practice, repetition and hard work. As long as any science aims for precision in treating and nurturing the human body, this will be considered as a type of knowledge. Even cookery in general should be acceptable insofar as it is for more than only gratification and pleasure. Even though Socrates praises Gorgias' art of persuasion in the *Philebus* for its profit, his evaluation of this art as a science is harsher than his view in the *Gorgias*. As a science, Gorgias' rhetoric turns out to be even worse than cookery,[271] because it does not pursue the four criteria of knowledge. Gorgias' rhetoric is definitely not a kind of knowledge.

Plato does not reject every kind of rhetoric, just as he would not reject all kinds of cookery. In fact, Socrates in the *Philebus* praises its profit for human life (56c). Thus, insofar as rhetoric aims for precision and certainty with knowledge, the power of persuasion would be much stronger than Gorgias' rhetoric, and therefore, philosophers would like to use the art of rhetoric, that is, true rhetoric, in their discourses in order to persuade and teach others more efficiently with precision, certainty and truth. Socrates in the *Phaedrus* also argues that the true rhetoric is the same as the method of

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[270] *Gorgias,* 463a.
[271] Of course, not a confectioner in the *Gorgias*, which is for producing only gratification and pleasure (463d).

medicine—in both cases we need to determine the nature of something—of the body in medicine, of the soul in rhetoric (270b). And those who teach the art of rhetoric will first describe the soul with absolute precision and enable us to understand what it is (271a). Therefore, what an art of rhetoric aims at matters most, and Gorgias' rhetoric—as long as it does not aim at what other sciences do—is not better than as other knacks or opinions are.

Knowledge is a valuable constituent of the good life for humans not only because of its profit or usefulness but also because of its certainty, truth, purity, or precision. Rhetoric, in which Gorgias takes pride for its profit, has been Plato's target of refutation throughout his career. Not only in the *Gorgias*, *Meno*, and *Phaedrus*, where he directly refutes rhetoric, but also in many other dialogues, Plato values the power of persuasion—at least, as popularly practiced—very lowly. Since Socrates was sentenced to death due to politics of the *hoi polloi* of Athens, Plato has kept fighting against Gorgias' rhetoric, which aims to move people's minds without respect for the truth. At the time of his writing of the *Philebus*, perhaps the last finished and also an ideal dialogue, Plato ultimately comes to evaluate Gorgias' rhetoric even lower than some crafts—mere knacks. The power of persuasion without precision, certainty, purity and most of all, truth, does not have any place among human knowledge or science. This has even less value (in fact, no value at all) in the good human life than an imitation or a lucky hit. Insofar as pursuing the highest standards, *e.g.*, precision, truth, or certainty, knacks or opinions are even better than Gorgias' rhetoric.

6.3.2 The End of Divisions

With the method of division Socrates and Protarchus have investigated both pleasure and knowledge in order to comprehend the natures of pleasure and knowledge. Now their investigation of the human goods moves to the collection phase. The collection in this passage is, as I argued in Chapter 3, the process of collecting (*sunagoge*), mainly involves seeing a group of scattered things as one form (*idea*).[272] In this process of collection, those things to be collected, are like elements or materials of the higher genus: in the example of music, intervals are the ingredients of scale, and also in the letter example, letters are indeed elements (*stoikeion*; 18c) of the art of grammar. Hence, Socrates likens the next step they are taking to "that of builders with ingredients or materials to use in construction" (59e). After dividing pleasure and knowledge into several kinds, they are ready to use these kinds as elements of a good life. With the chosen kinds of knowledge and pleasure, they are seeing one form, that is, the good life, in which all the elements are well mixed. This stage of their investigation involves two things 1) choosing only necessary elements of the good life, and 2) making a perfect mixture of those elements from knowledge and pleasure (61c). Through this series of investigations, both Socrates and Protarchus, who are portrayed as genuinely seeking answers together at the beginning of their investigation, come to understand better the goods constituting human life.

6.4. The Final List

6.4.1. Things to Be Collected

Since the division process of both pleasure and knowledge is finished, it is time for Socrates to employ the second part of his philosophical method, namely, to collect

[272] *Phaedrus,* 265d 3-4.

the divisions of knowledge and pleasure in order to find the right mixture. Human goods will be found in a well-mixed life rather than in a poorly mixed one (61b). Not all elements of pleasure and knowledge will be included in the list of the human goods. As I suggested previously in this chapter, the standard of good and bad—even though both interlocutors do not express this standard explicitly—is already applied in the processes of division (*e.g.*, precision, certainty, truth, etc.). Among the classes of pleasure some kinds—false pleasures—appeared to be not good. Nothing that is not good will be admitted into the good life. Hence, false pleasure should be rejected from the list of the human goods. On the one hand, only pure pleasure and all other pleasures that co-exist with health and with moderation and all of virtue (63e) are going to be accepted as constituents of a good human life.[273] On the other hand, not even a single kind of knowledge will be eliminated from the list, as long as the kinds of knowledge aim to achieve the standards of purity, truth, certainty, and precision.

The knowledge of a philosopher—such as knowing the definitions of the circle itself or of the divine sphere itself, or understanding the nature of justice itself—is required in leading a good human life. Nevertheless, insofar as living in this world is concerned, *i.e.*, a life in the world of perception, a life with only knowledge of transcendent matters (*e.g.*, the forms, ideas), would be considered ridiculous (*geloian*: 62b). In other words, in order to live well, practically speaking, we need more than abstract knowledge. As I have repeated, the main question of the *Philebus* is how to live a good life in the Cave. At the same time, the man who has escaped the Cave, seen and

[273] These moderate pleasures are to be accepted in the good life, because they are not false. The problem with mixed pleasures was that the mixed state makes it difficult to measure correctly the intensity and size of pain or pleasure. But in the case of moderate and well-measured pleasure, there is very little room for such a misjudgment. Therefore, Socrates includes such pleasures with moderation in addition to pure pleasures.

understood the things in themselves, and then climbed back to his people into the Cave for the sake of the others, achieves the good life in the Cave. As a consequence, the good life in the Cave will be a sort of a mixture of two worlds, namely, the transcendent world and the world of perception. The knowledge of the reality from the outside of the Cave is not practical enough for anyone to live with in the Cave. After coming back to the Cave, the man who has seen the Sun should "go down to live in the common dwelling place of the others and grow accustomed to seeing in the dark."[274] Only when he is used to the darkness in the Cave he will "see vastly better than the people there.' And only when he becomes best at seeing things in the darkness of the Cave again, will he be well educated in both lives: a divine life and a practical life, then he will be able to rule the city and lead others to live harmoniously there.[275] Therefore, merely having knowledge of the Form without perceiving things in the Cave will be regarded as ridiculous by others, and this man would not give any benefit to his community. If he tries to "free other people and lead them upward, if they could somehow get their hands on him" they would even kill this man.[276] The mission given to this man, in fact, is to make his community a better place.

Insofar as each kind of knowledge (and even true opinion) meets the strict standards of pursuing truth, precision, purity, and certainty, each kind of knowledge is needed for a good life inside of the Cave. Consequently Socrates says, one should "throw open the doors and let the flood of all sorts of knowledge in, the inferior kind mingling with the pure" (62c). Even a type of knowledge that is full of lucky hits (*stochasis*) and

[274] *Republic* VII, 520c
[275] *Ibid*., 520b-c
[276] *Ibid*., 517a

imitation (*mimēsis*: 62a), such as the art of music (*mousikē*), will be included in the good human life.

The elements of the human good—all kinds of knowledge and a few pure pleasures—have been chosen. The next question to answer is how to blend pleasures in order to lead a good life. Socrates seems to make an assumption in mixing those elements: "That any kind of mixture (*synkrasis*) that does not in some way or other possess measure (*metron*) or the nature of proportion (*he symmetros physis*) will necessarily corrupt its ingredients and most of all itself. For there would be no blending (*krasis*) in such cases at all but really an unconnected (*akratos*) medley" (64d-e). The fundamental elements that a mixture should possess—*e.g*., pure pleasure and all kinds of knowledge—already have 'correct of fitting' measure and proportion (*symmetria*). Furthermore, since everything that has measure and proportion is beautiful (*kallos*), a mixture will also be beautiful. In addition, since a mixture involves both knowledge and pure pleasure, which are true as we demonstrated earlier in our discussion, it is necessary that the mixture will be true. Consequently, a mixture of knowledge and pleasure should possess these three characteristics: beauty, proportion and truth. By taking hold of the conjunction of these three attributes in one mixture you will live a good life in the Cave, even if you fail to grasp the Good as a single form (64e-65a). In other words, in order for ordinary men to live good lives in the Cave, they do not need to have the knowledge of the Good; the attributes of the Good given by the philosopher, who has the knowledge, would be sufficient for them to live practical lives. Therefore, there are many similarities between the *Republic* and the *Philebus*. The former describes how a certain people, who belong to the 'higher class,' can achieve the Good. This is why this dialogue is primarily about 'an upward journey,' and it is not about

every human being. Plato explains how a philosopher, who should rule the fine city, is to be prepared. This is why a philosopher's education is one of the most important topics in this dialogue. However, the rest of the story of the Allegory of the Cave, that is, the coming down (*katabasis*) part is mainly described in the *Philebus*. This dialogue is about how every normal human can live a good life by making good mixtures under a philosopher's guidance. Even though ordinary people do not see the Good itself, they are still able to live a good life through the knowledge of the philosopher, who has seen the Good. This is how the philosopher can rule the fine city harmoniously.[277].

6.4.2. The Nature of the Final List

At the end of the *Philebus* Socrates and Protarchus have arrived at the following list.

1. What is connected with measure, the measured and the timely, etc. (66a).
2. The proportioned, beautiful, the perfect, the self-sufficient, and everything else that belongs in that family (66b).
3. Reason (*nous*) and intelligence (*phronēsis*) (66b).
4. The sciences (*epistēmē*) and the arts (*technai*), and true opinions (*orthē doxa*) (66c).
5. Pure pleasures (66c).

In previous chapters I have been calling this ranking the 'list of the human goods' following many other commentators and translators. Nevertheless, for many people who

[277] As I suggested in Chapter 4, Plato's bigger picture of his philosophy includes the *Laws*. The *Philebus* is mainly about the good life and the standards how individual people can examine their lives to live a good life. This philosopher's work—ruling the Cave in order to make it a better place—is not the main topic Plato discusses in the *Philebus*. He would give the best answer in the *Laws*, and this will be one of the topics I will deal with as one of my future projects.

are familiar with Plato's philosophy, this list looks strange. Where are the "usual suspects" for the Good, such as the virtues of the *Republic*—wisdom, courage, temperance, or justice? Moreover, Plato also presents the list of human and divine goods in the *Laws*: health, beauty, strength, and wealth are the human goods and the four virtues from the *Republic* are the divine goods.[278] Nevertheless, none of these virtues appears in the final list of the *Philebus*. Why did Plato exclude these well-known virtues? Is it because these human and divine goods are lower in the ranking than pleasure? How is it that wisdom fails to be included on this list while pleasure—Socrates' enemy in the earlier dialogues—is included?[279]

Seeing this problem, Vogt claims that the traditional interpretation of the ranking is mistaken. She maintains, "The final ranking is a list of causes or principles of a well-

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[278] *Laws* I. 631b-d. "It is no accident that the laws of the Cretans have such a high reputation in the entire Greek world. They are sound laws, and achieve the happiness of those who observe them, by producing for them a great number of benefits. These benefits fall into two classes, 'human' and 'divine.' The former depend on the latter, and if a city receives the one sort, it wins the other too—the greater include the lesser; if not, it goes without both. Health heads the list of the lesser benefits, followed by beauty; third comes strength, for racing and other physical exercises. Wealth is fourth—not 'blind' wealth, but the clear-sighted kind whose companion is good judgment—and good judgment itself is the leading 'divine' benefit; second comes the habitual self-control of a soul that uses reason. If you combine these two with courage, you get (thirdly) justice; courage itself lies in fourth place. All these take a natural precedence over the others, and the lawgiver must of course rank them in the same order."

[279] Some could raise a question that the ranking does not seem to be complete. And therefore, four cardinal virtues and other usual suspects are not *yet* included in the *Philebus*, because Socrates did not wrap up the ranking. So they argue that if Socrates would continue the investigation, these virtues would be included later as he continues the ranking. In fact, Socrates did not make it clear where the list ends. Therefore, it is possible to say that those virtues actually come after pure pleasures—or that they could be inserted somewhere higher on the list. That is to say, since Socrates did not really stop listing all the human goods, there could be other goods that Socrates did not list. This is why we could assume that at the end of the dialogue, Protarchus says, "There is still a little missing." Then it would be possible to argue that since the list is not complete, it could be still a ranking of the goods for human lives, not a list just of standards. Nevertheless, I disagree with any claim that Socrates did not finish listing all the goods—or certainly any claim that there are further goods to be listed "below" the ones they agree on. Certainly if the latter is the case, those famous virtues—both divine and human from the *Laws*—would be inferior to pure pleasure. And that is obviously wrong. If the list is indeed ranking, and if the virtues are not yet listed in the ranking, as some would argue, the virtues that are not listed yet, should be listed in the lower rank that even pleasures. It is because both Socrates and Protarchus enumerate the items on the list according to their importance. If virtues come later than pleasure, it means virtues are less important than pleasure. Then this possible objection, that is, virtues are not yet listed, does not fit with the previous discussion on pleasure: Even though pure pleasure has been proven to be good, it is still a lesser good than other human goods. Therefore, this feasible objection, *i.e.,* since virtues are not yet listed, this ranking cannot be a complete list of the goods, lacks plausibility.

mixed life, not of goods that add up to a well-mixed life."[280] According to her argument, just as measure, the proportioned, and others goods on the list are causes of a good life, pure pleasures are also causes of the human goods. Such an interpretation of the ranking is in fact extremely useful because it sheds light on the difficult problem of the nature of ranking: first, why are the members on the list so heterogeneous? Vogt's reading supplies an answer: it is because there are many sides of a human life, and many elements must work together in order to make a life good. Therefore, since each item on the list represents an aspect of human life, the nature of items on the rankings are heterogeneous. But, why are those famous Platonic virtues excluded from the list? Again Vogt has an answer: it is because the virtues are not the causes but the outcomes of a good life.

Although I agree with Vogt up to a point that the list is not the full list of the human goods, I cannot accept her overall conclusion that it lists only the causes of a well-mixed life. Most of all, she does not clearly explain in what sense the items on the list are the causes. Are they efficient causes? Or Formal? Or even final cause? Obviously they are not material causes. Since she says "the other pleasures need to be *made* good by measure and reason, or *by being mixed and moderated* by pure pleasures"[281] (emphases are mine), she seems to have in mind that these items such as measure, reason, the proportioned and others are efficient causes. In contrast, I understand the list in the following way: most of all, as many scholars argue, the list is truly a collection of the good things in a human life. Nevertheless, this list is not comprehensive: there are many good things that are not included in this list. Why is it that Socrates leaves some

[280] Vogt (2007) p. 254.
[281] *Ibid.*

virtues off the list? It is because the items on the lists include the *standards* used in examining and evaluating other good things in a life. Unlike Vogt's claim, the listed items on the ranking do not *directly* (as an efficient cause would do) cause the goods in a happy human life. Yet, those on the list function as the *criteria* used to evaluate the goods in human lives. I do not mean, however, that these things are not the causes, because they should in some sense be counted as causes: as Socrates says, "one or the other of them [either pleasure or knowledge] is its [the good's] cause" (22d). I argue that the listed items are not efficient causes but formal causes, that is, certain patterns or forms, which can be used as standards for ordinary individuals to evaluate things in their daily lives.

Additionally, Socrates maintains that the things on the list are something to be possessed (*ktēma*: 66a)[282] in a well-mixed life. And the possessions of a well-mixed life are not the causes, but rather the constituents and results of the good life. Take the example of pure pleasure in the *Philebus*: pleasures from sight. Does such pleasure make a life good? Or does a good life have such pure pleasure as one of its essential elements? A good life *needs* such pleasure. But is such a life caused by pure pleasure? The answer is negative. For example, my knowledge of cooking is one of good things in my life. Nonetheless, it is not the cause that makes my life a good one. It enables a small part of my life to become good by being well mixed with other good elements of my life. Similarly, no one ingredient in a complex stew, and no one patch of paint in a painting,

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[282] Socrates uses this word, 'possession,' to name pleasure. However, the context of his statements clearly (and unlike Vogt reads) says that measure and others are the first possessions. It reads, "*hos hēdonē ktēma ouk esti protōn oud'au deuteron alla prōton men pē peri metron kain to metrion kai kairion kai panta hoposa chrē poiauta nomizein*" Obviously first two neutral adjectives, *proton* and *deuteron,* go with a neutral noun, *ktēma*. And the latter *proton* is related to the previous *proton* and *deuteron* with *alla*. There is no other word that the second *proton* can attribute in this sentence other than *ktēma*. Therefore, this sentence means that all the items on the list are what a well-mixed, and therefore, a choichworthy and good life possesses.

causes the whole to be good. If mixed with the wrong ingredients, or if mixed in the wrong proportion with the right kinds of ingredients, the whole will not be good. Therefore, the items on the list do not directly but rather indirectly cause the good life.

Going back to the first reference in the *Philebus,* where the 'prize' is introduced, will help us to better understand the nature of the final list. After all, the ranking is supposed to provide the measure by which of the two contenders, knowledge and pleasure, will receive the prize. Let us read Frede's translation of the passage.

> "Now I am not arguing that reason ought to get first prize over and against the combined life; we have rather to look and make up our minds about the second prize, how to dispose of it. One of us may want to give credit for the combined life to reason, making it responsible, the other to pleasure. Thus neither of the two would be the good, but it could be assumed that one or the other of them is its cause. **But** I would be even more ready to contend against Philebus that, **whatever the ingredient in the mixed life may be that makes it choiceworthy and good** (*pot'esti touto ho* ***labōn*** *ho bios houtos gegonen hairetos hama kai agathos*), reason is more closely related to that thing and more like it than pleasure; and if this can be upheld, neither first nor second prize could really ever be claimed for pleasure. She will in fact not even get as much as third prize, if we can put some trust in my insight for now." (22c-e, emphases are mine)

Frede translates the aorist participle *labōn* from the Greek verb, *lambano*, in a causal sense. In order to stress the causal meaning, Fowler also translates this sentence into "whatever it may be, which makes it both desirable and good."[283] These translations strengthen Vogt's argument that those contenders, which deserve to receive the first,

[283] Fowler (1925).

second or third prize, *make* the life a good mixture. As a result, the items on the final list do really seem to be the causes of the good life though not the good things in a good life.

Although I admit that the participle, *labōn,* does have causal meaning, I cannot accept many scholars' translations in which this word has *only* a causal meaning. In fact there are many possible meanings of this participle, such as time, purpose, supposition, opposition, and concession as well as cause,[284] just as in the case of participles in English. Therefore, I suggest this translation: "whatever it is that, by possessing it, a life has become choiceworthy and good, whatever it is." By translating *labōn* as 'having' the meaning of this participle does not have to be limited to a causal sense. Although this change may seem trivial, it is in fact crucial in terms of understanding the nature of the final ranking. Leaving *labōn* as a participle in English will preserve many possible meanings of this Greek word vividly. I do not dismiss Vogt's claim and the translation of other scholars. As I argued in the previous paragraph, the items on the list indirectly cause a good life. Nonetheless, they are also good things in a human life, and a good life needs them. Then, what is the nature of this list? I will argue in the following section that it includes the criteria each person needs in order to use to judge good things in his/her own life.

6.4.3. The Final List as Giving the Criteria of the Good Life

While the final list in the *Philebus* does not claim to be the list of every good thing, Vogt is surely right when she worries that some famous virtues are missing from

[284] The circumstantial participle qualifies the principal verb of the sentence like an adverbial clause or supplementary predicate. It expresses simply circumstance or manner in general. Also it may imply various other relations, such as time, manner, means, cause, purpose, concession, condition, etc. But as Smyth points out "it is often impossible to assign a participle exclusively to any one of these relations (which are purely logical), nor can all the delicate relations of the participle be set forth in systematic form." [Smyth (1920), p. 457] For the examples, refer Smyth (1920) 2061-2068.

the list. Knowledge, pleasure, proportion, and others are, of course, goods in our lives. Yet, there are certainly other good things, which are not listed here. And conversely, these are not listed in the *Republic* among things (principally the four main virtues of wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage) that a good life must possess. Furthermore, as many scholars argue, interpreting the list as a ranking of the human goods brings with it a bigger problem: According to the ranking, the pleasures accompanying virtues will take a higher place than the virtues themselves, since Socrates seems to suggest that further items would be listed after the ones they name. Since such pure pleasures are derived from virtues, however, it is impossible to regard them as more important than the virtues that cause the pleasures.

I argue that the things on the list are the criteria or standards that should be applied in evaluating whether something is among the goods to be desired for the sake of human happiness. And the ranking reveals the order for evaluating the human goods. If I want to determine whether a certain thing is good or not, I should evaluate the object using the criteria presented in the last pages of the *Philebus*. I would thus ask the following questions: Does it have measure? Is it proportioned according to the measure? Is it compatible with reason, knowledge, or pure pleasure? These are the questions she should raise according to the order of the standards in the list. Consequently, the ranking amounts to the order of importance in applying the standards to evaluate human goods. Most of all, if something is to be considered as one of the human goods, it should have measure, *i.e.*, it must not be extreme but rather moderate and balanced. As Frede says, "without proper balance there can be no harmonious mixture."[285] In order to make something proportioned, measured, complete, and beautiful, that is, the second

[285] Frede (1993) p. 81

set of criteria, this should be first and primarily somehow connected with measure (*proton pē peri metron*). This is why measure comes as first of the criteria. Therefore, the first step to take is to observe if a mixture has fitting measure in itself, in other words, if this is well-balanced according to its given measure. After that, we will evaluate whether this object is proportioned, measured, complete, and therefore, beautiful within the measure.

If this candidate does not meet these first two standards, this candidate should be evaluated by the third standard, that is, reason or intelligence. In other words, this candidate for a human good is to be evaluated by its compatibility with rational principles. After that, the next step in evaluating a potential object of desire is asking whether it is a sort of knowledge, science, art, or, at least, true opinion. Finally, after applying these criteria, you should determine whether the candidate is a sort of pure pleasure not mixed with pain or mixed pleasure, which is balanced, guided by reason, and accompanied by other virtues. Even if a given candidate for a human good only meets the last standard, *i.e.*, pure pleasure, it will be still considered one of the human goods. In other words, even if something does nothing more than give pure pleasure to human beings, it can be still welcomed as part of a good human life. Knowledge is somewhat ambiguous in that it could mean a sort or type of cognitive condition and also an actual instantiation of such a condition (*e.g.,* my knowledge of arithmetic). In the former sense it is a criterion or standard, and hence on the list; in the latter sense it is not on the list, but is one of the things that meets the criterion that is on the list—and therefore, it is one of the things that is included in a good life.

The last thing comes on the list, namely, pure pleasure, will be accepted as a human good, too. Since pure pleasure is a less important standard than knowledge is,

however, such pleasure will be considered as a lesser good than even the art of music, architecture or even true knowledge in the field of cookery. Even though pure pleasure is one of the human goods, it comes in at last place on the list. As a result, if you cannot meet all the standards on the list at once, you should not choose pure pleasure over art, understanding, reason, and of course, measure and proportion. The list of the standards reveals the importance of the criteria used in selecting good things in a human life.

To sum up, the items on the list of the last passage of the *Philebus* are, on the one hand, the human goods, even if the list itself is not comprehensive. On the other hand, some items are both constituents in the good life and function as standards by which candidates can be judged. Some items (*e.g.*, measure) are properties that must be possessed by all items on the list, and some are items that have that property and can in turn be used as standards or paradigms used to judge further items (like a yardstick that has the right length and also is a standard of comparison for other, non-standard, items that happen to have a length of one yard). So all items on the list are, in one of those ways or the other, criteria.

6.4.4. Human Intelligence and Justice in the Cave

At last, the nature of the final list is clear. We human beings need these criteria in order to judge good things in our lives. The criteria of the human goods are the fundamentals that everyone in the Cave uses to live a good life. Now it is time for me to go back to my claim in Chapter 3 that there are several levels of intellect for those who live in the Cave. This list of the *Philebus* is a key to support my claim as well as to understand how each person in the Cave can live a good life on their own.

In the allegory of the Cave, there are two kinds of people—a philosopher and other ordinary people. The ideal and happy ending of the allegory would be the realization of the Fine City, where the philosopher is ruling and other citizens are doing and having their own[286] and live harmoniously together in the Cave. Nevertheless, if the Fine city would be accomplished by the philosopher's rule, do the other members of the city make their own decisions? If they are 'following' the philosopher's command, being obedient to the king, who is the only one with the knowledge of the reality in the city, how can we say that other ordinary people do their own function or social service (*to oikeion*)?[287] If they are not, can we say that they are just? A just city will be achieved only when all the parts of the city are doing their own part through their own capacity and power. However, if those ordinary people are commended by the philosopher and follow what they are told by wise rulers, do they use their own in their lives other than the areas of their own expertise? Williams argues in his article, "The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato's *Republic*" (1973)[288] that Plato wants to claim that a) A city is F if and only if its humans are F as well as b) The explanation of a city's being F is the same as that of a man's being F. And justice in the city is c) each of the elements (the rational, spirited, and appetitive parts) does its job, and d) the rational part rules. Therefore, e) a city is just if and only if its humans are just, and f) the parts of the city—people belong to the spirited and appetitive parts (or classes) of the city—are also rational, if and only if the parts of the city are human beings. Williams claims, however, that Plato's explanation of justice in city and soul has grave problems, because g) a city is just if and only if the leading, most influential, or predominant citizens are just. In short, Williams is worried

[286] *Republic* IV, 433a 5-6, 433a 8-9, 433d 8-99, 435b5, 441d12-e2. Especially at 433e justice is defined as 'having and doing of one's own (*tou oikiou te kai hautou hexis te kai praxis*).'
[287] *Ibid*., 433e
[288] In Kraut (1997), pp. 49-60

that ordinary people in the city—although they have all three parts of soul—do not make any decisions for themselves but they are being prevailed upon by the superior people. Consequently it is possible to say that they do not use their rational parts in doing their own functions and therefore, they are not just, even though the superior men rule the Fine City. Because of e), thus, this city cannot be just.

In order to clarify Williams' question, I would like to consider an example. In the Fine city, a good cobbler will make good shoes. Insofar as he is making shoes, he has knowledge and he will use his knowledge to the best so that he does his own part.[289] But what about other areas of his life, such as hobbies, leisure, food, relationships? Since his knowledge is limited to shoemaking, he would not have knowledge of other areas such as taking pleasures in a proper manner. Therefore, to lead a good life he would have to live a life being ordered by the philosopher in every aspect of life except making shoes.

Such a life, however, would be similar to a life of a robot or a machine. In all areas of this man's life except the shoemaking part—which is prescribed by justice, he does not do his own work on the basis of understanding that he himself possesses, but simply does what he is instructed to do by the philosopher king. Therefore, he is not fully rational. In other words, he does not thoroughly use his rational part. Namely, he would

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[289] Justice determines how a city is supposed to be structured: 'It is the power (*dynamis*) that makes it possible for them [wisdom, courage, and moderation] to grow in the city and that preserves them when they've grown for as long as it remains there itself' (*Republic* IV, 434b). Plato refers to justice as a power in another passage of the *Republic*: "It seems then that the power that consists in everyone's doing his own work rivals wisdom, moderation, and courage in its contribution to the virtue of the city" (433d). If we understand justice as a power or capacity (*dynamis*), Socrates's definition of justice is a good answer to Adeimantus' question about the power of justice and injustice, 'what each itself does, because of its own powers, to someone who possesses it, that makes injustice bad and justice good' (367b). Socrates defines justice as 'doing one's own (jobs).' The structure of the Fine City is established upon this principle, which *prescribes* duties or jobs for the citizens and *forces* them do their duties or work. From this, 'one's own' (*ta hautou*) can be comprehended as 'one's own *work*' as a particular sort of contribution to the city as a whole. Justice, which explains how operations in the city should be distributed and undertaken and enables them to be realized in the city, is the structural principle and power of the Fine City. A city cannot be just only by being composed of just men; rather, it must have a structure that makes it just. Each member should do his work according to the given structure, which places him into his own work.

not make any decision about his own life. Furthermore, not only this poor shoemaker but also other people like house-builders, cloth-makers, ship-builders and others with such arts would not be regarded as being rational. Additionally, justice in this man will be achieved only when all of his parts do their own work, or perform their own function, just as the Fine city is supposed to work well when all its different sorts of inhabitants do their own work. And if someone were not fully making his own decisions for some of the parts of his soul, in other words, unless all the parts of him, that is, rational, spirited and appetitive parts are doing their own functions just as all the citizen of the Fine City do their own jobs, he would not be considered to be a just man. This is because justice of an individual is also defined as doing one's own.[290] As a result, this cobbler would eventually turn out to be an unjust man, but a crucial part of the just and Fine City. If that were the case, the philosopher king would be the only just man in the just city. But this conclusion sounds absurd: A just city is made of unjust individuals?

I maintain that by distinguishing two levels of intellect that people can have, we can remove this absurdity. The intelligence that a philosopher king has is different from the intelligence that ordinary people have. A philosopher can grasp the knowledge of reality with his own intelligence. Since ordinary people do not have such a level of knowledge, they would not be able to directly understand reality as the philosopher does. However, they will be able to get a glimpse of reality through the commands and teachings given by the philosopher. So although their level of knowledge is insufficient to reach reality, their own capacity enables them to understand the rules and principles discovered and communicated by the philosopher-king.

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[290] *Hekaston to tautou pratttein* (*Republic* IV, 433a5-6).

With the knowledge of the Forms the philosopher king will generate the list of criteria that ordinary people can use when they make certain decisions in their lives. Ordinary people not only create their own product with the arts they have but also make decisions in their lives, such as what to drink, what to eat, whom to date, and so forth, with their own intelligence. But there is a guideline: the list of criteria is given to them as the standard in making such choices in their lives. In order to live a good life, ordinary people need to use their own intelligence in accordance with the criteria that is set by the philosopher king. Therefore, these ordinary people do not blindly follow the philosopher king without thinking on their own. They are not machines; they are self-governing rational agents. Being guided by the philosopher king, they do employ their own reasoning. Therefore, insofar as they make their own choices, they are rational. Consequently, they are just. Thus, the Fine city is made of just people, from the philosopher king to the cobbler. This is how the *Republic* is to be harmonized with the *Philebus*. The former explains a philosopher's role in the city as well as his education, whereas the latter completes the account of the Fine City by suggesting how the ordinary people also should live in accordance with the criteria. And this is how Plato's philosophy of the Good for all human beings is wrapped up in the *Philebus*.[291]

Not everyone can see the Forms, but every human has reason and so is able to think. Only select people can climb out of the Cave and observe reality, but not everyone is to leave the Cave to see the outside. Those who remain in the Cave will not see reality.

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[291] It is still a sort of general idea how ordinary people will be taught the list of standard to apply in their lives. Plato does not develop this idea in the *Philebus*, so we should wait until we read the *Laws* in order to observe how this picture can be (or whether it is) realized in ruling a city. Possibly, a philosopher-king could establish law, educational system, or all sorts of rules in the city so that the citizen can shape their lives better and choose wisely. However, in this case again, these ordinary people do not follow the institutions without thinking. They will evaluate the rules and laws according to the criteria of the *Philebus* and choose to live by them.

But they are still rational enough to name the passing objects in front of their eyes and to tell what comes next in light of criteria of judgment given to them by the philosopher, as opposed those they devise for themselves in their initial deprived situation. So all the members of the city are doing the best that they are capable of doing: a philosopher can provide the standards with his knowledge of the Forms, and others can think and decide for themselves using that standard.[292] When everyone uses his own level of intellect and examines his own life, everyone within the Cave can live happily there and also change the Cave into the Fine City. This is the general description of the Fine City suggested in the *Republic*. And at the end of the *Philebus*, the roles of a philosopher king and other craftsmen in the Cave are fully presented.

Therefore, for Socrates' interlocutors and also for the readers like you—Plato's co-investigators of the human goods, "there is still a little missing": there is still work to do in order to deal with the unlimited instances of human affairs in daily life and to find the human goods there. Standards are given by the investigation between Socrates and Protarchus, and now it is ordinary people's turn to reason out the good things in their lives. Therefore, we "will not give up" before we come to find out "what is left" (67b). This is the way to live a life worth living.

6.5. A Life That Is Worth Living

Man in the Cave cannot have everything. Through constant investigation and evaluation, he has to decide what to choose and what to abandon in his life. Since he

[292] And this is why the division process in the *Philebus* does not go all the way to the unlimited but stops at the lowest level of species. A philosopher cannot answer all the problems in any possible circumstance. He guides ordinary people, while these people find their own answers to the problems in their own situations with the guidance.

can't take in everything, the search for the goods in his life never stops. Like his teacher Socrates, Plato kept examining different human lives and searching for ultimate human happiness. In other words, both Socrates and Plato never stop their inquiry for truth. Unfortunately, Socrates was not able to find the answer. Nor was Plato able to generate a complete list of the things that everyone should keep to. Nevertheless, from Socrates' philosophy Plato takes a further step. He provides a list of the standards that we should use in evaluating goods in a human life. With this list in hand, I can search, find, and evaluate the human goods that might make my life the best. As Socrates and also Plato believed, an unexamined life is not worth living.[293]

In order to continuously examine my life in the Cave I need two things: reason and the standards for evaluating human goods. As a human being, I have my own intellect, *i.e.,* the divine faculty granted to all human beings. However, the criteria that should be used in examining life are hardly to be acquired by ordinary men, who have never been out of the Cave. With the knowledge he has, however, a philosopher can impart such criteria to the other men in the Cave through laws, which will be the main topic of the following dialogue, the *Laws*, and a fitting education, including the 'noble lie' (*gennaion pseudos, Republic* III*,* 414b) or likely stories (*eikôs muthos, Timaeus* 29c). After seeing the real world outside of the Cave and adjusting back to the darkness inside the Cave, the philosopher has become wise about both lives inside and outside of the Cave.[294] A life that is examined by reason using proper criteria is much better than Philebus' unexamined one—a life of taking pleasure as the only good.

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[293] *Apology*, 38a

[294] Therefore, everyone in the Cave, or every citizen of the Fine City employs his own reason to live. Citizens in the city do not merely follow the orders from a philosopher king or a leader of their community. The king guides them, teaches them criteria for assessment, and limits their boundaries. Nevertheless, all citizens are expected to use their own judgment in living out their roles. Only when all

Since men can live an examined life, a human life is far superior to lives of other animals. Plato's answer to the question of how to live a good life*, i.e.,* how to live well in the Cave is *a life that is worth living is an examined one*. As Socrates keeps examining whoever he meets wherever he is—either this world or the world after life, both people in the Cave and others who been outside of the Cave should lead lives of constant examination so that they can achieve the human goods.

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members of the community have their own possessions and do their own jobs (*Republic* IV), the city will become a fine one.

Conclusion

By the time he was writing the *Philebus*, Plato's philosophy had reached a certain level of maturity at this last stage of his career. He is now ready to answer the ethical question, how to live a good life, based on unshakable metaphysical grounds, namely his theory of the Forms. Nevertheless, the metaphysical theory itself was vulnerable to criticism.

In this dissertation, I argued that Plato comes back to the ethical matters in the *Philebus*. Convinced by the defenders of the theory of the Forms, I maintained that once Plato has secured this metaphysical ground, he is able to defend the truth concerning how to live a good human life. The hierarchy of the goods in a human life, introduced in the last pages of this dialogue, is what Plato and his main spokesman of the Socratic dialogues, the character Socrates, and probably the historical Socrates as well, have been pursuing for a long time. Due to the nature of human beings, which is between divinity and animality, the Good for human beings should be a mixture of these two different kinds of lives. And this is why the ethical question must be investigated on a firm metaphysical basis. Plato shows how to successfully carry out such a project in the *Philebus*.

In addition, he shows this project being carried out by means of portraying an ideal philosophical discussion—one in which neither interlocutor has all the answers from the start; both submit their views to "Socratic" cross-examination and *elenchus*; both revise their views in light of refutation and subsequent discussion, and both agree in the end on a reasonable, constructive, answer to the main question under discussion.

Thus the *Philebus* is not just Plato's answer to the question what the human goods are. In this dissertation, I have maintained that this dialogue is a part of his grand philosophical project, including his thoughts on metaphysics, ethics, and philosophical method. On the basis of his theory of Forms, which is the foundation of knowledge for human beings living in the physical and sensible world, Plato in the *Philebus* wants to return to giving an account of the good life for ordinary people, and to show clearly the proper manner of seeking the truth for oneself. Plato has never given up these practical and ethical concerns. In fact, the theme Plato described using Socrates as his spokesman in the Socratic dialogues, that is, how to live a good life, is always the ultimate philosophical question in his mind. Accordingly, the metaphysical project in his works is investigated not just for its own sake but for the sake of practical, ethical, aims. And this is why Plato writes the *Philebus* at the last stage of his career, as a finalized answer to his lifelong philosophical journey.

After engaging with the topics of method, metaphysics, and pleasure and knowledge, Plato presents the ranking of the goods at the end of the *Philebus*. However, this list is not a how-to guide, which every human being should follow without thinking. Since man can live an examined life, a human life is by far superior to lives of other animals. Therefore, it is time for man to examine his own life, preferably in company with an interlocutor of good will and in the critical but constructive spirit and manner portrayed in the *Philebus*. Therefore, the *Philebus'* concluding presentation of the ranked human goods is not the end of the examination of human life. And the pursuit of human goodness is not over yet. Rather, it can serve as a new beginning for all those who want to live a good life, and to find their way to a good life by means of rational examination. Plato's answer to the question of how to live a good life, that is, how to live

well in this perceivable world, is shown best in the *Philebus*: the human *life that is worth living is an examined one*.

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