Distribution Agreement

In presenting this thesis or dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known, including display on the world wide web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis or dissertation. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

Signature:

_____   _____
Isabella H. Alexander   Date

'Burning' at the E.U. Borders
Liminality, Belonging, and Morocco's New Migrant Class

By

Isabella H. Alexander
Doctor of Philosophy

Anthropology

_____
Dr. Carla Freeman
Advisor

_____
Dr. Oussama Cherribi
Committee Member

_____
Dr. Peter Little
Committee Member

_____
Dr. Michael Peletz
Committee Member

Accepted:

_____
Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D.
Dean of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies

_____
Date

'Burning' at the E.U. Borders
Liminality, Belonging, and Morocco's New Migrant Class

By

Isabella H. Alexander
M.A., Emory University, 2012
M.A., University of Chicago, 2009
M.F.A. certificate, Spéos Institute de la Photographie, 2007
B.A., New York University, 2007

Advisor: Carla Freeman, Ph.D.

An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Anthropology
2016

Abstract

'Burning' at the E.U. Borders
Liminality, Belonging, and Morocco's New Migrant Class
By Isabella H. Alexander

On the most basic level, contemporary studies of transnational migration are studies of the socially constructed binary of "il"/legality, which fundamentally organizes how we experience daily life. Who has the right to access space? And, who has the right to mobility in space? "*Hrig*," the Moroccan Arabic term for "illegal" immigration, translates to "burning." It signifies the literal burning of one's identification papers to avoid repatriation if arrested by European authorities, but also the symbolic burning of one's past in hopes of a better future abroad.

Anthropological studies of migration have long been situated in migrants' sending or receiving communities, but saturated labor markets in traditional immigrant-receiving countries have led to less permeable borders and migration routes are changing. The "migrant"/"refugee" distinction is increasingly problematic, as both now find themselves in liminal spaces of settlement between their homes and desired destinations for months, years, or even generations. This dissertation explores what the "burning" means for the rapidly expanding population of sub-Saharan migrants trapped in Morocco, the primary crossing point for Africans fleeing economic and political instability, and sets the stage for comparative work, as larger shifts in economic migration from the global south to the global south emerge in coming years.

Multiple years of ethnographic fieldwork were centered on sub-Saharans' lived experiences in Moroccan detention centers, borders camps, and migrant-populated slums; migrant-citizen interactions in the marketplaces where smugglers thrive and migrants seek work in black market economies; and the placement of "illegal" subjects within inter/national discourses. This research contributes to anthropological literature on citizenship and "illegality," examining the conflation of race, class, and gender categories with politically vulnerability. While the Maghreb is central to the current migrant crisis, an ethnographic study of Morocco's critical placement between African laborers and E.U. labor markets has been lacking. Findings will be of mounting significance to scholars and policymakers alike, as European-funded border controls across the Maghreb continue to illustrate the E.U.'s desire to mold Morocco into a final destination for all African migrations north, and both sides of the border fail to uphold international human rights conventions.

'Burning' at the E.U. Borders
Liminality, Belonging, and Morocco's New Migrant Class

By

Isabella H. Alexander
M.A., Emory University, 2012
M.A., University of Chicago, 2009
M.F.A. certificate, Spéos Institute de la Photographie, 2007
B.A., New York University, 2007

Advisor: Dr. Carla Freeman, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Anthropology
2016

Acknowledgements

To those who make the other side of my world feel like home, thank you for supporting me in my own long journey. To my parents, thank you for providing the foundation that pushed me to ask the questions that I was asking in the first place. To my cherished friends, thank you for standing beside me through all of the highs and lows, not just of writing, but also of life. To Willow, who sat by my side and listened to more iterations of this text than everyone else in my world combined, thank you for your quiet and constant support. To Michael, whose presence in my life continues to deepen my understanding of human emotion, thank you for teaching me, before you could even talk, what it means to truly love something. For you, more than anyone, I hold on to my hope for our world to see a better tomorrow. And lastly, to Sam and Dottie, I wrote these words with you both in my heart, and I know that you would have been proud.

I dedicate this work to the migrants whose stories bring my text to life and to the countless others whose stories remain untold. Thank you for letting me walk a while with you. As Luca said, "the road is long and hard, and so we learn to laugh with hope."

Table of Contents

List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of Africa
with Morocco and the Western Sahara Highlighted

Figure 2: Map of Morocco
with Primary Research Sites Circled

Figure 3: Map of Primary Migration Routes through Morocco

EMPLACING THE ETHNOGRAPHER: AN INTRODUCTION TO FIELD SITE AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

What does it mean to "emplace" oneself in research – "to put in a place or a position" – or to acknowledge the inevitable influence that I have had over the research project that is unfolding before me? In one of my first Anthropology courses as an undergraduate student at New York University, I remember Dr. Thomas Beidelman instructing us that there is no better study of a man than that which he chooses to study. It became increasingly clear to me, as a graduate student at Emory University, as I watched the dissertation projects of my fellow anthropologists-in-training take shape, that the places and people, the problems and questions that we choose to study are in every way a reflection of us. Yes, certainly, my positionality as a young, white, American, female student-researcher in Morocco[1] shaped my access to the places and the people who would inform my work, as well as the information that would be concealed from or revealed to me by those people and places. This is an important fact not to be overlooked. But even before I arrived in Rabat to commence my fieldwork journey, my desire to ask the questions that I was asking had already been deeply influenced by my previous life experiences. I decided that for me, emplacement is two-fold. It necessitated clarifying my place within my research to respondents throughout my dialectical process of fieldwork, and it now necessitates clarifying my position within the field to readers of that research.

---

[1] Morocco, officially the Kingdom of Morocco, is also referred to by its Arabic name المغرب ("al-Maghrib"), its French name "*le Maroc*," or its placement in the Maghreb

To the men and women who became not only my primary informants, but also my cherished friends and closest confidants in the field, I would explain that I was a student of anthropology. I was asking questions to fuel my study of changing migratory patterns at the Moroccan border, I was completing a large-scale research project on my way to a doctorate, I was hopeful that my work would have an impact on the lives of migrants[2] trapped in liminal places of settlement. But all the while, I was aware of just how little these words did to explain. So I began starting my narrative not by explaining *what* I was doing and instead by attempting to explain *why* I was doing it. Not to earn a doctoral degree. Not even to change the deplorable conditions that I found in detention centers across North Africa. I reached further back and explained why I wanted to ask the questions that I was asking in the first place.

I began explaining (perhaps first to myself) that a transient childhood spent moving between cities and schools, families and friends, churches and communities had left me with a deeply personal curiosity about how individual identities are constructed in the face of change and instability. It had left me with an appreciation and concern for the struggles of migrant communities, and especially for those of migrant youth. My own early years had influenced my work teaching adult literary classes to migrants and my subsequent research on the exploitation of migrant labor in New York City's thriving service industry throughout college. In the following years, while studying filmmaking at the Spéos Institute in Paris, my experiences shaped my desire to center my filmic research on the growing divide between Maghrebi and French youth living in the Parisian

---

[2] Unless referring specifically to immigration law, I have chosen to use the term "migrant," regardless of documented or undocumented status. Unlike the term "immigrant," "migrant" retains a sense of movement, or what Nicholas de Genova calls the "consequent irresolution of social processes of migration" (2005: 3).

banlieues, and then propelled my move farther south to explore the sending communities that France's growing Maghrebi population had once called home. Once in Morocco, my experiences set me on my path to asking how identity is constructed by migrants – not in their sending communities nor in the migrant-populated suburbs that receive them, but in the spaces that lie in between. For the rapidly expanding population of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco, I wondered what it meant to be neither here nor there, but instead, to exist in a space between your home and your destination. How would I have made sense of my daily life, if my present were driven by my "burned" past and an uncertain anticipation of my awaited future on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea?

"*Hrig*," the Moroccan Arabic term for "illegal"[3] immigration, translates to "burning."[4] It signifies both the literal burning of one's identification papers in order to avoid future repatriation if arrested by European authorities and the symbolic burning of one's past in hopes of a better life abroad (Pandolfo 2007). Morocco's new migrant population comes from across the sub-Saharan, the vast majority of them having left behind homes in West Africa, and they view Morocco as a "temporary" stop *en route* to greater economic opportunities in the European Union. Before beginning my doctoral program, I lived in Morocco, where my work centered on reforming the prison systems and multilateral immigration policies that shaped the lives of this sub-Saharan migrant population trapped in Morocco – between their sending countries and their desired European destinations. By returning to the country as a researcher, was I seeking some validation for my own feeling that when faced with change and instability, the human

---

[3] Throughout the following chapters, terms referencing "illegality" are placed in quotations in order to highlight and problematize the notion of the individual as an "illegal" subject and raise questions about the conditions under which such "il"/legalizations have been constructed.

[4] The *derija* term "*hrig*" is derived from the fusha verb "to burn" or "*haraqa*."

need for belonging becomes most apparent? Was I unsatisfied with other explanations of how the search for family and community, the search for attachment on micro and macro scales, has long driven human movement? Was I seeking comparative data on how the uprooted cope with uncertainty in various contexts, or did I want to assert that across diverse contexts, migrants (whether Moroccans in France or West Africans in Morocco) similarly seek to make roots from those that were severed?

When attempting to explain not the *what* but the *why* to respondents, I knew simply that much of my work had been driven by the fact that I felt most at home with those who were lost. Today, eight years after I first set foot in Morocco, I can finally explain to readers that I was seeking a deeper understanding of the human need for identity – the need to feel at home in both your own skin and your community more broadly. I was seeking to question how this need is revealed through the loss of home and perhaps even through the loss of self in the process. The migrant's state of liminality exposes the base human need for social life, and spaces of migrant settlement or "un-settlement" are therefore a locus for central anthropological questions about identity and belonging, kinship and community.

In my first months of fieldwork in 2013, as I struggled to assert to the men and women I engaged with that I was not a member of the CIA (the first assumption made by many Moroccans when an American with advanced language skills and a notebook appears), nor was I employed by Moroccan or Spanish border officials to collect sensitive information that would lead to the deportation of the undocumented, I similarly struggled to clarify why exactly I *was* there and what exactly it was that I hoped to leave with. As anthropologists (or anthropologists-in-training), we are not simply visitors to a place,

perching momentarily on the borders of a community. We do more than watch and listen. We live. We live deeply entrenched in the workings of a place and the lives of a people for some period of time. As anthropologists, we arrive, we take, and we leave.

Yes, I think it is safe to assume that the vast majority of us leave with the hopes of giving something back, whether through our direct involvement in community organizations or through the potential impacts of our research. The ethnographers among us believe that some gift may lay in our revealing of stories untold or experiences unknown. We see a gift in giving narrative, memory, and life to individual experience. But we must reconcile the fact that before we give, we take. And so I told the communities and homes, the families and individuals who opened their doors to me that I was a student, a researcher, a young woman with allegiances to neither the U.S. government nor the Spanish border patrol. *Salaam alaikum*, I am interested in you, in your stories, in your experiences. I am driven by a strong desire to bring public attention to the struggles of migrants trapped at the Moroccan border and what I see as a growing humanitarian crisis. But I am also driven by a deeply personal desire to draw connections across human experience and a true passion for the art of storytelling. I am here to take a gift, which you are so generously giving to me.

I have realized that we all have questions that haunt us, problems that we feel compelled to pursue, and that for many ethnographers, these drivers likely highlight the answers or solutions that have never fully satisfied us. They shed light on the answers that have never been reflective of our own experiences, leaving lingering questions or doubts. We often study what we know, because it is here, immersed in what we know, that we can feel the disconnections between experiences as they were lived and

experiences as they have been theorized. Armed with our experience, with our knowledge, with our intuition, we go searching for answers that make better sense of the world as we have seen it, heard it, or felt it. As one of my fellow anthropologists-in-training wrote to me upon my return from the field, "What is it? What is that thing that never felt quite right to you?"

I left for my great fieldwork adventure, unaware that my greatest challenge would lie not in the quantitative analysis of mountains of survey data or close attention to competing media accounts of migration across the Maghreb. It would not even lie in securing interviews with high-ranking Moroccan officials or research clearances to photograph inside of detention cells. My greatest challenge would lie in making friends. When working with vulnerable populations, building a researcher-informant relationship is never enough. Being gifted with the words, the narratives of those who know that their stories are also their greatest risk, comes only after a built sense of trust, compassion, and mutual respect – and what is that but friendship? At the most basic level, I had set out to connect with those who were lost – even more lost than I could remember being. To emplace myself in the field meant first to learn how to emplace my research questions within my own broader history of experience. What did I seek to learn about myself by questioning how identity is constructed in the space that lies in between? What never felt right to me about the ways in which others have theorized the temporary space between the past and the future, the liminal space between one home and the next, the spaces of uncertainty and instability that we have all known at one time or another? What I do know is that I was surprised by the various states of physical and emotional detachment that exist for those who leave one home and who, for a myriad of reasons, cannot move

on to another. I saw how when confronted with uncertainty of the most extreme kind, the present self and the present space can be denied through a continual remembering of the past and reimagining of the future that lies just out of reach. I was left questioning, how do we make sense of ourselves in liminality?

The Ritual of "*Hrig*"

The concept of liminality, first developed in the early twentieth-century by anthropologist Arnold van Gennep (1909), was advanced through Victor Turner's research on ritual rites of passage and the transformation of the self (1969). I apply some of these foundational concepts in my analysis of migration as a transformational ritual and my argument that new forms of transnational migration are emerging on a global scale and increasingly leaving populations trapped in liminal states between their sending and receiving countries for undefined periods of time. In the context of small-scale societies, van Gennep distinguished between three types of ritual activity, including those that marked the transition of an individual or group of individuals and those that marked the passage of time. But his ethnographic attention was centered on "*rites de passage*," or "such rituals marking, helping, or celebrating individual or collective passages through the cycle of life" (van Gennep 1909, Szakolczai 2009: 141). He isolated three distinct phases found in the *rite de passage*, which Turner would later term the pre-liminal, liminal, and post-liminal phases, marking the passage of an individual from one culturally defined status within a social structure to another (Turner 1969).

Rites of separation (or pre-liminal rites) require a metaphorical "death," or what I claim is parallel to a migrant's experience of *hrig* - "the burning" – as the initiate (or

migrant) breaks with what is known. Van Gennep argued that *transition rites*[5] (or liminal rites) require the establishment of a "*tabula rasa*" through the elimination of previously expected social structures and practices. The destructive nature of the liminal rites allows for the birth of new identities as the initiand moves into the final rite. But it is in this middle stage, what Turner termed the liminal period, where one stands at the threshold between what was known and what will be – a positionality that makes the initiade both vulnerable and threatening to the established structure. The final *rites of incorporation* (or post-liminal rites) re-incorporate the initiand into the formerly known social structure under a new identity. Examining the tripartite structure of *rites de passage* through an anthropological lens, the pre-liminal rites represent a symbolic breaking with, or burning of, the past, signifying the detachment of the individual from the society, or sending community. The individual's status becomes unknown, and the liminal period places one between a fixed point in the past and an unknown point in the future, or the migrant's imagined destination.

While *rites de passage* are overtly destructive, as the known past and known self are broken, they can also be viewed as constructive, as it is this very breaking with the known that prepares individuals under transition for the final phase. It is through destruction that one is prepared to occupy a new self and enter an unknown future, finally reintegrating into the established structure under a new social rank – child transitioning to adult, student of law to attorney at law, single man and woman to married husband and wife, Congolese refugee or Moroccan migrant to European resident. But how do we understand the experiences of those who endure a pre-liminal breaking or burning

---

[5] Essential to Van Gennep's transtion rites are two facets – first, that the rite follows "a strictly prescribed sequence, where everybody knows what to do and how," and secondly, that the rite is conducted by "a master of ceremonies" (Szakolczai 2009: 148).

without ever progressing to the post-liminal re-integration? Living outside of the known environment forces those in liminality to question the self and the existing social order, and according to van Gennep's earliest theorizations, this phase often involves acts of pain or suffering meant to prove preparation for the transition that lies ahead (1909). As the duration of the liminal period increases, those who find themselves in the space that lies in between begin to feel "nameless, spatio-temporally dislocated and socially unstructured," as I will argue is the positionality of sub-Saharan African migrants trapped in the liminal space of Morocco (Thomassen 2006: 322). But like any form of anti-structure, it is a state of great intensity and eventually requires some form of structure on which to stabilize itself.

Because anti-structure tends towards structure with the passage of time, research suggests that states of liminality are rarely permanent, and that those in states of transition will eventually be subsumed back into the original social structure from which they broke. However, Turner finds that a liminal period may become "fixed," in times when "the suspended character of social life takes on a more permanent character," and his concept of permanent liminality has since been expanded (Thomassen 2009: 16, Szakolczai 2000). Szakolczai argues that there are three types of permanent liminality, each one closely related to one of the three phases in a rite of passage (2000),[6] and under sustained periods of liminality, a liminal community can take on its own distinct social structure – a condition termed "normative *communitas*" (Turner 1969), or

---

[6] Szakolczai provides examples of each of the three types of permanent liminality: *monasticism* (with monks endlessly preparing for their separation) representing the first stage, *court society* (with individuals endlessly performing their roles in an cyclical ceremonial game) represents the second stage, and *Bolshevism* (exemplifying a society trapped in the final stage of a ritual passage), represents the third stage (Thomassen 2009: 23).

"schismogenesis" (Bateson 1935).[7] Throughout my analysis, I continue to question how liminality functions as a contemporary anthropological concept – one that has been linked to the spaces of borders, frontiers, and disputed territories (i.e. Fourney 2013), to the subject positions of the clandestine migrant, refugee, or stateless person (i.e. Noussia 2009), and even to my own subject position as ethnographer in the field, "separated from [my] own culture yet not incorporated into the host culture" (i.e. Stoller 2008; Robben and Sluka 2007: 76).

ETHNOGRAPHIC SETTING

There are many places that I called home over the course of my fieldwork, and to each one, I am greatly indebted. In the field, it is easy to feel overwhelmed by data. Every conversation, every morning *adnan,*[8] every blanket of wares spread out for sale on every sidewalk feels deserving of being recorded for future analysis. In this barrage of sights and sounds to be photographed or jotted down, I took refuge in routine, and I established this routine, in part, by the categorization of my research, my life, into the distinct people who and places that shaped it.

My research was based primarily out of three cities of varying size: Oujda, the eastern border town where most migrants first cross into Morocco by way of Algeria and

---

[7] The term "schismogenesis," developed by anthropologist Gregory Bateson in the 1930s, has been used to describe situations of permanent liminality (1935). He posited a *symmetrical* form of schismogenesis built on a competitive relationship between categorical equals and a *complementary* form of schismogenesis built on a hierarchical relationship between categorical unequals. On the role of liminality in ritual, he theorized that there are concrete ritual behaviors that are either inhibited or stimulated by this schismogenic relationship in its various forms.

[8] The *adnan*, or call to prayer, is heard fives times a day and structures the rhythms of daily life in Morocco, as in other Muslim countries.

where they are later deported by Spanish or Moroccan border officials to some of the country's most barren landscapes; Tangier, the bustling northern port city where migration has become a cut-throat business and thousands await their chance at passage across the Strait of Gibraltar; and Rabat, the comparatively quiet capital city, home to governmental offices and aid organizations, and the place where the majority of sub-Saharan migrants choose to "temporarily" call home. Rabat was my home base and the place where I conducted the majority of my ethnographic research. Rabat's central train station was also the place from which I would catch the four-hour train north to Tangier for the portion of my research focused on the European Union's (and specifically Spain's) involvement in Morocco's border policing, deportation, and detention practices. Tangier became the focal point for my study of the human smuggling rings that serve as middleman between governmental officials and individual migrants, and I ended up spending longer there in the final months of my fieldwork than I had originally planned to. Tangier was a place that continually put me two steps forward and one step back – two questions answered and one entirely new line of inquiry revealed. It will also be the place where I eagerly return to continue my research in the next (post-PhD) phase. Like Tangier, Oujda became a critical place for my observation of the principles and practices of detention and deportation in the Maghreb. Reaching Oujda, which is the entry and exit point where migrants are most vulnerable to both smugglers and officials, was never an easy journey. This far-flung point on the map required at least twelve hours of travel – a combination of long bus rides and the generosity of passing cars for the final stretch of the trip, still not traveled to by public bus and rarely by private taxi.

In order for me to contextualize the character of Rabat – my home away from

home – one must first have a brief understanding of Morocco's diverse topography and the unique flavor of each of its other "imperial cities," as they are called. Morocco is a long, thin slice of land, curving around the corner of northern Africa – only 360 kilometers across at its narrowest point and less than 1,000 kilometers long when measured from Tangier to the top of the Western Sahara's disputed territory.[9] Slightly larger than California, it is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the west, the Mediterranean Sea to the north, Algeria to the east, and the Sahara Desert to the south. In the course of one day, my bus could leave the balmy shores of the Atlantic, cross through the always snow-capped peaks of the Atlas Mountains, and arrive in the arid dunes of the Sahara – red sand pouring out before you like endless ocean waves. It is a diverse and beautiful landscape, and I was able to travel it again and again, both in my own journeys from north to south and through the stories of my respondents.

I came to associate the desert region with the oppressive heat of the midday sun, the unquenchable thirst of your throat rubbed raw by sand, the bitter cold of the nights, and the dangers of open spaces and high visibility – but also with the comforts and peace that could come with this kind of isolation. Tangier carries with it a different set of

---

[9] Occupied by Spain in the late nineteenth-century, the Western Sahara has been on the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories since 1963. It is the most populous and the largest territory on this list. In 1965, the UN adopted its first resolution on the Western Sahara, asking Spain to decolonize the territory. In 1975, Spain relinquished administrative control of the territory to a joint administration by Morocco (which had formally claimed the territory since 1957) and the other bordering country of Mauritania. A war erupted between Morocco and Mauritania, and the Sahrawi National Liberation Movement proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) with a government-in-exile in Algeria. Mauritania withdrew in 1979, and Morocco secured control of most of the territory, including all major cities and natural resources. Since a UN-sponsored ceasefire agreement in 1991, two thirds of the territory (including most of the Atlantic coast line) has been controlled by Morocco and the remainder by the SADR, still strongly backed by Algeria. The Western Sahara remains a hotly debated topic in Moroccan social life.

dangers for migrants – border officials ready to deport them back to the desert, "camels"[10] quick to make a penny off of their perilous passage, police officers terrorizing them until they surrender their last remaining belongings, or city dwellers taking advantage of their desperation through cheap labor. While the desert presented migrants with a range of natural threats, Tangier presented them with an equally broad array of individuals poised to threaten.

Morocco's five largest cities, or "imperial cities," often felt to me like different countries entirely. Tangier,[11] located on the northern coast where the Mediterranean Sea meets the Atlantic Ocean and where Spain lies tantalizing beyond the shore, is an eclectic city, long attracting artists and expatriates to its dirty and sprawling streets. It has maintained its reputation as a melting pot of European and Islamic culture and is quite literally, a meeting point for southern Europe and northern Africa. Tangier came to be a place that I returned to again and again, associating it in equal parts with the Spanish border officials controlling much of the city and the migrants squatting in abandoned buildings or forest camps awaiting a chance at passage to the shores beyond. Like these foreign officials and migrants, I never came to feel at home in Tangier. Many described to me the sense of "trying to keep my head above water" as they passed through, and I understood the feeling. Being the final point from which many migrants would attempt a crossing and the epicenter of much of the country's smuggling activity, stakes were always high and the daily rhythms of life for migrants and smugglers revolved around the most critical of exchanges – hope for money, opportunity for money, death for money,

---

[10] "Camel," or *jamal* in Arabic, is a common term used to identify those engaged in the business of human smuggling. It is similar to "coyote," an informal term used for smugglers working at the Mexican-American border.
[11] Population is just under 1,000,000.

bodies in exchange for cash.

Traveling south from the northern point of Tangier, you pass through Ouezzane and reach Fès,[12] often called "the Moroccan's Morocco." Fès was the long-standing capital city until the nation was restructured by French colonial powers in 1912, and there remains a certain authenticity to the city – as if the maze of its central *medina*,[13] begging you to duck and squeeze through low and narrow passageways, is intent on finding those who do not belong there perpetually lost. Known for its leather tanneries, the thick, acidic smell of the dying baths hangs heavy over the streets and the red-hued fog let off by the drying carcasses clouds your vision. In my visits, Fès was always beautiful, magical, and seemingly unknowable to an outsider like me.

If you continue your inland journey south, you will eventually hit Marrakech[14] – a city thriving on tourism and boasting the world's largest outdoor marketplace. Vendor after vendor appear to sell the same strings of dried figs, the same plastic bags of black soap, and the same pottery hand-painted in vibrant hues. There are gritty hostels and lavish hotels, and there are hawkers aggressing you at every turn. Despite economic recession, real estate development continues in Marrakech, with much of the city's money funneling in from foreign accounts. It is located on a flat plateau in central Morocco, surrounded by the snow-capped peaks of the High Atlas range, and even in the winter months, the dry air burns and the slightest breeze stirs up the desert sand settled

---

[12] Population is just over 1,000,000.

[13] *Medina* translates to "the original Arab or non-European quarter of a North African town," making reference to the restructuring of the Maghreb's cityscapes during the colonial period. The word *medina* is now used by Moroccans to denote the old part of a city, usually one that stands in contrast to recent development and is still encircled (at least in part) by its original walls and inaccessible by car.

[14] Population is just under 1,000,000.

underfoot. *Jamaa el-fna*, meaning "Assembly of the Dead,"[15] is the central square and is famously home to snake charmers and fortune-tellers, pickpockets and street performers, child beggars and prostitutes. There you find endless stands of fresh pressed juice, dried fruits and nuts, and after dusk, platters of grilled-to-order meats and vegetables. It is the largest cafeteria that you have ever seen. But it has always felt to me like Disney World's version of Morocco, packaged and sold to the throngs of Europeans who crowd the *medina's* old streets in their running shoes and tank tops, faces freckled from mornings spent lounging by hotel pools and hands painted red with henna.

Along the western coast of the country lies Casablanca, or *Dar el-bida,* meaning literally "white house." The largest city in Morocco and fifth largest in Africa, Casablanca has a population of 3.5 million. It is located only 85 kilometers down the Atlantic coast from Rabat, the nation's capital, but Casablanca is the primary port and center of economic and commercial activity. It serves as home base to most international corporations operating in Morocco and is now home to the nation's primary industrial facilities, as well. Lacking the crumbling *medina* walls that dominate the infrastructure of so many other Moroccan cities, Casablanca can appear uniform and colorless – a city built for business, a city of skyscrapers in place of *riads*, a sprawling metropolis of colonial remains.

Rabat, or *ar-Ribaat*, meaning "a fortified place," is only the fourth largest city in Morocco, but being the capital city and base for the reigning king and parliament, it remains the center of much of the country's commercial, academic, and governmental

---

[15] The origin of the name *Jamaa el-fna* is still disputed. *Jamaa*, meaning "congregation" in Arabic, refers to the Almoravid mosque which once stood here. *Fna*, meaning "death" or "courtyard," could refer to one of two things – the distinctive courtyard found in front of the mosque or the public executions that took place on the plaza around 1050 AD.

activity and is home to the national university and all foreign embassies. Situated on the Atlantic Ocean, the walls that once protected the small port city from outside invaders still stand around the *medina*. The Bou Regreg River runs alongside these crumbling clay walls, dividing Rabat and Salé, a smaller city, which now serves mainly as a lower-income bedroom community for those working in Rabat. Together with Temara, a middle-income bedroom community on the other side of Rabat, the Rabat-Salé-Temara population is estimated at 1.8 million and growing.[16] While Rabat's role as a primary port of entry has diminished, it remains a stronghold for textile, agricultural, and construction industries. The labor demanded by these industries and the promise of aid through non-governmental organizations and international governmental offices makes Rabat the most desirable city for settling sub-Saharan migrants.

Morocco's colonial-era French administrator, General Hubert Lyautey, is the one responsible for relocating the country's capital from Fès to Rabat, claiming that local rebellions made Fès an unstable location from which to rule. Following the decision of the French in power, Sultan Moulay Youssef had his formal residence relocated to Rabat, and in 1913, General Lyautey hired a French architect to begin redesigning the city to establish an administrative quarter. This large-scale reconstruction project resulted in what is now referred to as the *ville nouvelle* – Rabat's modern quarter, or literally, the "new city," which is still home to much of the new commercial development. When Morocco finally gained independence from French rule in 1956, King Mohammed V, then leader of the nation, decided to leave the capital in Rabat and reclaim the newly developed quarter as home for incoming governmental offices.

---

[16] The city has an estimated urban population of 620,000 and metropolitan population of 1.2 million.

To this day, Rabat's city center has remained clean and manicured. It is home to the national bank, the parliamentary building, and the crown jewel of the King's many palaces, which are scattered throughout the country. These buildings are grand and imposing, lining either side of the main thoroughfare, *Avenue Mohammed V*, with their columned fronts, wrought iron gates, and guards standing at attention in full military regalia, loaded assault weapons held causally in their hands. At first glance, it could be any number of post-colonial cities, the influence of French architecture apparent behind the etchings of Islamic stars and red and green national flags flying high. In Rabat, as in other Moroccan cities, the *centre ville*[17] is reserved for commercial and not residential activity. It is in the sprawling suburbs around Rabat that the estimated population of 1.2 million citizens and growing population of sub-Saharan migrants live.

Conducting the majority of my ethnographic research on migrants' daily lives in Rabat, I returned often to the notion of emplacement, thinking about my own experiences as an outsider in Morocco and the ways in which they converged with and then so radically diverged from my respondents' experiences of being foreign in a foreign place. I alternated between the "slums"[18] that they called home and the markets that housed the informal economic networks, which employed the majority of them as "hawkers"[19] and some others as hourly laborers. The heart of Rabat is divided between the *centre ville* and

---

[17] Where there is a *ville nouvelle* or a "new city," it is typically synonymous with what many Moroccans call *centre ville*, literally the "center city" or the downtown district, as is the case in Rabat.

[18] "Slums," known in Arabic as "*hay alfuqara*," are defined here by their makeshift structure, but in a colloquial context, they are also commonly defined simply by the presence of migrant squatters.

[19] "Hawkers," or sidewalk merchants, are found working in all of Morocco's outdoor marketplaces, at all times of the day and night. They sell an eclectic mix of goods ranging from fresh fruit to counterfeit clothing, and due to their lack of physical infastructure, they can easily move from one corner to another when hassled by police.

the *medina*, and this divide serves as a stark contrast between the pre- and post-colonial states of the nation – between old and new, Arab and European, struggling and elite. As I discovered new layers to Morocco's cityscapes with each passing month (and then year) in the field, I saw an increasing number of parallels between the physical divides and the dividing practices that sequester the lives of migrants in Morocco according to ethnicity and religion, education and language, race and class – always placing them squarely on the side of political vulnerability.

Rabat's *medina* is a sprawling labyrinth of crumbling white buildings. They are one, two, or three stories at most, and hollowed out in the center where a family's courtyard would have been. Most buildings still have their original doors, hand-carved works of art with the hand of Fatima securely placed at the center – doors that require you to shrink down as you pass through. Window glass is uncommon, but most lower-level window openings are protected by iron bars and occasionally covered with hanging sheets or towels for privacy. Some doors have been fashioned with modern touches like locks, chimes, or numbers for mail delivery, but most have not. On the main thoroughfares, each building serves multiple purposes, housing large families on the upper levels and serving as makeshift restaurants or workshops on the lower levels, with their own storefronts tumbling wares onto the streets in front of them.

Within one block, you can pass black-market DVD stands, rolling fruit carts, and a modern storefront selling organically and sustainably produced argan products to tourists – one bottle marketed for cooking and another for a smoother face. But there is an order to the madness. Along *Avenue Mohammed V*, you find peddlers of used clothing from dusk till the evening *adnan* and used Tupperware only in the mornings. A walk

along *Avenue Souika* is much like a walk through your local grocery store, with vendors leaning against the buildings on either side of the street for as far as your eye can see. Each vendor has blankets or cartons displaying their fresh produce. Some sell vegetables – the familiar colors of peppers, onions, tomatoes, zucchini, eggplant, and cucumbers sprinkled before them. Others sell fruits – boxes of oranges, apples, bananas, avocados, grapes, and prickly pears stacked one on top of the other and large metal scales and weights sitting at their feet. The produce varies little from one vendor to the next, each displaying the same variety of vegetables or fruits, on the same blue woolen blankets or old wooden crates, stained from years of rotting food and stamped with faded Arabic characters on their sides. At first, it is difficult to imagine how the more than one-hundred produce vendors that I counted along *Avenue Souika* on one Thursday evening can survive with such competition, or how one determines from which vendor to buy one's nightly supply of tomatoes. But I imagine that most Moroccans make this choice in much the same way that I did – out of an obligation to a vendor who quickly becomes a friend.

Items that fall in and out of season are sold off of rolling carts or out of baskets hung over the handlebars of bicycles that roaming vendors peddle up and down *Avenue Souika*. In September, you find baskets full of pomegranates or carts overflowing with strawberries, scales and weights tucked inside of the peddlers' backpacks, as they shout "*Anduk*! *Anduk*!" and watch the crowds part before them. A few specialty shops sell meat, cheese, or eggs, and on every corner, you find a *hanout* – the smaller ones selling soda, candy, chips, and *hboz*,[20] and the larger ones offering other household products

---

[20] *Hboz*, or bread, remains the staple of the Moroccan diet, along with densely sweetened hot mint tea, which is more commonly referred to as "Berber whiskey."

ranging from toilet paper to baby formula. Through my study of Morocco's *souks*,[21] I began to see the many ways in which difference is mapped onto economic activities and how the marketplace can be illustrative of social hierarchies through not only the national origin of vendors and hawkers, but through the very goods that they peddle and hawk.

To the west, beyond the *medina*, is one of the only in-town residential settlements, L'Ocean, followed by a succession of lower-income neighborhoods, including Diour Jamaa, Akkari, Yacoub El Mansour, Massira, and Hay el-Fath. Between these two axes, running north to south, there are three distinct areas of middle- to upper-income residential concentration – Agdal (upper-middle income residential, with some commercial developments catering to residents' leisure), Hay Riad (a neighborhood of wealthy villas, which has been expanding since the 2000s, and Souissi (another middle- and upper-middle income mostly residential neighborhood). To the east of *centre ville*, along the coast of the Bou Regreg River, is the Youssoufia region.[22] It is a lower-income bedroom community and home to the neighborhood of Taquadoum, which is among the most heavily migrant-populated *banlieues* in Morocco and was one of my primary research sites throughout fieldwork. In contrast to the *medina*'s bustling streets, Taquadoum's narrow passageways reveal a dark and quiet corner of the city. The lack of economic activity leaves little but dilapidated apartment buildings, and I always remarked at how still and empty the rooftops were, after living among those crowded with clotheslines, television antennas, and clucking livestock.

Distinctions between these different residential neighborhoods are marked not

---

[21] All of Morocco's "old cities" are built around a *souk*, or sprawling outdoor marketplace, where everything from fresh vegetables to iPhones are sold on the black market.

[22] In addition to Taquadoum, the Youssoufia region includes the neighborhoods of Mabella, Hay Nahda, Aviation, and Rommani.

only by the cost of apartment rentals, but also by the goods available for sale on the streets below and the ease of accessibility to Rabat's *centre ville*. While Agdal is easily accessible by the city's new tramway, for instance, the lower-income and farther flung neighborhoods are accessible only by city bus – a poorly maintained and less reliable facet of Rabat's municipality. On any given day, I would expect to wait for upwards of an hour on the arrival of a bus that never ran according to its schedule. Bus fare is cheap, making it an affordable means of transportation – and often the only means of transportation – for those living in the city's outskirts and working in central Rabat. However, buses are overloaded with passengers at peak travel times. The combination of standing-room (or more accurately, squeezing-room) only buses and the impropriety of women being in close proximity to men in the public sphere meant that I would commonly find women sitting at the bus stop for several hours, awaiting the end of rush-hour and the arrival of a bus with an open seat.

Never sitting idle, the women huddled over some task to be done as they waited – mending a dress, peeling a large bag of potatoes to be boiled for dinner, or practicing characters on their way to literacy. In fact, the bus stop became one of the locales where I was most likely to find working-class women willing to share a conversation with me. Due to the structural limitations placed on women in Morocco, the majority of those riding the bus were of migrant status, despite the small percentage of migrant women living in Morocco overall. The few conversations that I had with local women on city buses tended to focus on the changing social landscape of their city. The waves of migrants, they claimed, made an already "difficult" job even more so. When pressed on statements like this one, it became clear that the pressures placed on women in Morocco

encouraged work exclusively in the private sphere. The conflation of race, class, and "illegality," which was on the rise in Rabat, made public spaces not only gendered (male) spaces, but additionally made them racialized (black) spaces that were equated with political vulnerability and economic disenfranchisement. Therefore, Moroccan women who already felt shame for their work in the public sphere now felt doubly stigmatized by the presence of migrant women in similar positions. In much the same way, migrant women, coming from countries like Nigeria or Ghana, felt the added pressure of having moved from a society in which women played a key role in the marketplace and commonly occupied the gendered (female) position of "street hawker" (George 2014; see also Freeman 2001 for the comparable status of the Caribbean "*higgler*").

As Ong and Peletz examine in *Bewitching Women, Pious Men* (1995), gender identities, although experienced in the everyday, are not constructed according to local knowledge alone. It is instead within the expanding geographies of "production, trade, and communication," that gender is constructed, and in the case of mobile subjects like the West African hawker, it can be re-constructed again and again (Ong & Peletz 1995: 8). The lived experience of any identity is thus shaped by processes of nation building, the restructuring of global economics, and the related flows of labor migrations, which lead to fluid categories of not only gender, but also race, class, and legality. Cutting across national borders, these categories interact with one another to create nuanced and fluid subject positions. Ong and Peletz' research underscores how with new forms of interconnection, cultural understandings of what it means to be male and female are becoming harder to define, and as my research reveals, what it means to be female in the public sphere in Nigeria is not what it means to be female in Morocco's public and male-

dominated spaces. What I will question is how individual subjects navigate these competing expectations of femininity and masculinity within a framework of mobility. It is not only the Nigerian migrant whose femininity is challenged by the gendered expectations of a new host community, but also the Moroccan citizen whose landscape is impacted by the new geographies of gender, race, class, and legality that are emerging.

I found that for migrants and citizens alike, a casual inquiry from an obvious outsider about the sewing, peeling, or studying underway was an easy segue into deeper questions. I asked about where they were coming from and going to. I asked about conflicts between the social expectations placed on women in a Muslim society and the economic pressures placed on everyone (women included) in a struggling society. We talked about how these can be reconciled and how class, race, and nationality contributed to new forms of identity and expectations of femininity. We also laughed in hushed tones about the men around us, taught each other new words in our respective languages, and occasionally, I was even trusted with a potato or two. Riding buses, or waiting to ride buses, as was often the more time demanding of the two, became something that I looked forward to in my days, and it was largely because of these women and the conversations that we shared. Understanding the lines (real and imaginary) that delineate Rabat's bus routes, tram lines, and many neighborhoods is essential for my later analysis of how the city's inhabitants navigate social spaces and the boundaries between them. I will raise questions about how respondents "read" one another's gendered, classed, and racialized performances of foreignness or Moroccan-ness, often dependent on the surroundings. Factors such as dress, language, and mode of transit become key markers of liminality or belonging in Morocco's changing landscape.

A ROOFTOP HOME AWAY FROM HOME

Riad Art is an old home buried deep in Rabat's *medina*. It was purchased in the 1980s by a French hotelier with grand plans to gut the interior and renovate the space into an upscale bed and breakfast. However, difficulty in securing the building permits required by foreigners interested in renovating historic structures in Morocco and then in finding a reliable crew to complete the work in his absence led him to sit on the property for over a decade. It was in the mid-1990s that a French couple – Thomas and Julian - with a different vision stumbled upon the building. Based out of Casablanca, they were able to oversee the renovation work themselves, and the walls of the old home were slightly reconstructed to accommodate five small guest suites, while maintaining the traditional structure of a Moroccan home with an open courtyard at its center.

For the period that I called Rabat home, I lived on the top floor of this *riad*, where I shared the small maid's quarters with a young Moroccan woman named Hajar. Hajar cleaned the rooms every morning when the guests set out about their sightseeing and spent most of her afternoons doing laundry - a laborious task that necessitated carrying all of the sheets and towels down to the ocean with a washing board and then stringing them up to dry on the rooftop lines beside our bedroom. Hicham, an industrious, middle-aged Moroccan man, was hired by the French couple to tend to the *riad* shortly after its opening. A "jack of all trades" position, "tending" the riad required that he manage reservation calendars and finances, repair leaky faucets and prepare Berber whiskey on command; offer tours of the *medina* and translate train schedules from Arabic to one of

his five other languages, and most importantly, keep his wife and two young children quiet, so as never to disturb the guests living around them. Hicham and his family occupied the makeshift bedroom off of the kitchen on the lower level – he and his wife, Majida, alternating their sleeping schedules on the futon and his then two year-old son and newborn daughter spending their days in the confines of the small space.

Hicham had been a dear friend of mine in my previous years spent working in Morocco, and when I arrived for a period of pre-dissertation research in the summer of 2012, he immediately offered me a place to sleep. Knowing that I would only be able to pay him in the form of *dirhams* periodically hidden in his pocket, clothing and toys for his children, and the rare gifts that he would request of me (a wallet and swimming trunks for himself, perfume and whitening cream for his wife, English DVDs for his son and "American" pacifiers for his newborn), I agreed to the arrangement only if Hicham first agreed to give me work. We decided that I would take over the role of cooking breakfast for the *riad* guests – a task that Hicham had long lamented. The one escape from work that he desired was a sunrise soccer game that other men from the neighborhood played every morning on *Rabat Plage* after the first *adnan*. While I prepared a traditional breakfast of *msemen* with honey, soft-boiled eggs, and the guest's choice of coffee, orange juice, or Moroccan tea, Hicham and a ragtag team ranging in age from old men to young boys chased worn soccer balls up and down the tightly packed sand, in a series of games that led to a big tournament every *Ramadan* – the final games always being the source of much betting and brawling in the neighborhood. The coffee making was left to me, for as an American, I was assumed to be a connoisseur of sorts. But no matter how many times I insisted that I had mastered the art of making of Moroccan tea – I knew to

add the sugar cubes before the mint and to "release the mint" by slapping the stalks against the countertop before pulling the leaves off, crushing them, and adding them to the steaming black tea – Hicham still refused to leave for *Rabat Plage* without first ensuring that he had made a large pot of it to perfection. After several weeks in the *riad*, he finally entrusted me with the serving of it. Pouring each small *tasse* full, pouring the tea back into the kettle, and then repeating this cycle five more times is the only way to properly serve Moroccan tea – a process believed to steep the tea leaves and evenly distribute the flavor.

Orange juice making was a task similarly relegated to the experts. From my room on the roof, I could hear the clicking of his crutches on the cobblestone street below every morning, just after the first *adnan*. I ordered a liter or two, depending on the number of guests, and watched as Hadi, an old Moroccan man with tattered clothes and an open, toothless smile, went to work. He seamlessly peeled the oranges with his old rusted knife, placed them in his old metal press, held an old plastic water bottle collected from the trash the day before in the spout below it, and then tossed the seeds and pulp to the minions of stray cats that were always gathered at his feet as the juice began to flow. Hadi was a man of few words, and I took great pleasure in each one that he shared with me – our morning conversations growing longer as he came to expect my appearance in front of his stand with the same regularity of the neighborhood strays.

The bedroom that I shared with Hajar was small and simple – windowless clay walls on four sides and an opening where a door could have been (but was not). The clay floor was covered with an old woolen rug and two straw-stuffed cushions that served as beds. In the corner, we stacked old crates salvaged from *Avenue Souika* to store clothing and

our own small collections of personal belongings. The rooftops in the *medina* bleed into one another, and you can walk directly from one housetop to another, all the way down the line, just as one might stroll down the street. Throughout the many months that I called *Riad Art* home, I kept everything that I owned in Morocco in that small, door-less, rooftop room – my stack of clothes (mostly large scarves that could be wrapped to serve as dresses or skirts, shirts or hijab), my plastic bag of soap and scrubbing stone, my many books and one precious jar of almond butter, my Nikon camera and Apple laptop. Crime, while prevalent throughout Morocco, does not loom in the ways that one might expect. The structured sense of community necessitated by the tight living quarters of the *medina* – the shared ovens and bathhouses, the open windows and doors – ensured a sense of material safety, and nothing that I owned was ever disturbed, except by the curious neighborhood children who occasionally took to riffling through the *Amreekia's* crates.

On my second night sleeping at *Riad Art*, Hajar (who cleans everyday but Friday) and her younger sister, Kaoutar (who cleans on Hajar's day off) invited me to join them in one of the most central of Moroccan rituals – the *hammam*. Like the mosque, the *hammam,* or Moroccan bathhouse, is a cornerstone of most lower-income neighborhoods, and one can be found in every five to ten block radius of Rabat's *medina*. Yet despite their prevalence (or perhaps because of it), *hammams* maintain the intimacy of showering in your good friend's home, and they are not generally open to passing tourists. I had met both Hajar and Kaoutar a time or two before when visiting Hicham at his workplace, but I had never said more than a few words to either of the young women, and I was surprised by their invitation. Our interactions had been limited, in part because they did not speak French, English, or standard Arabic, and my lack of Berber language skills

greatly limited our communication, so we laughed as they struggled to explain to me what I would need to wear to be properly outfitted for the *hammam*.

In the *medina*, men and women go to the community bathhouse weekly to bathe, as it is uncommon for the "bathrooms" in traditional lower- and middle-income homes to offer more than a hole for a toilet and a tap for washing your hands beside it. Each *hammam* has a schedule posted on the front door, telling you which hours it is open for women and which hours it switches to serving men. You pay your *dirhams* at the door, enter into the changing room, remove all of your clothing, and head towards the bathing room with your *hammam* kit (which typically includes a plastic bucket, a plastic cup, a plastic bag full of olive soap - yes, a bag, as this soap has the consistency of pudding - and a small scrubbing stone made of clay). The bathing room is tiled from top to bottom and has nothing but a faucet on one wall and anywhere between one and three-dozen other women of all ages, all shapes, all sizes sprawled out across the floor before you. Upon entering, you fill your bucket with steaming hot water and stake out a space between the other bathers. Dipping your cup into the bucket, you wet yourself down with the hot water, lather your body with the pudding soap, let your skin "soften" for a few minutes, and then wash the lather off and proceed to scrub yourself from head to toe with your stone. The whole process takes anywhere from one to three hours, depending on how much "gossiping" is taking place between you and your fellow bathers. If your body does not turn pink from the scrubbing, if layers of dead skin are not sloughing off of you onto the floor beneath you, if you do not have at least one spot bleeding from over-scrubbing, then those around you will encourage you - "Scrub harder!" "You're here to get clean!" "Scrub your week off!" In *centre ville*, there are women working in the

hammams who do your scrubbing for you (for a modest fee), but in the *medina*, women scrub themselves, occasionally asking the sister, mother (in-law), or daughter who they are with to get the hard-to-reach spots on their backs.

Through our few shared words and our many shared gestures, Hajar and Kaoutar walked me through my first journey in their local *hammam*. Kaoutar pulled my hair back for me (as I shamefully walked into the bathing room with it down), Hajar filled my bucket with hot water, took out her cup, and poured water over my head until I was ready for the soap application. Kaoutar made sure that I was adequately soaped and instructed me to "*patientez*" until I softened. She then took my stone in her hand and proceeded to scrub me down, as the women who work in the ritzy *hammams* would do for a paying customer. As I sat cross-legged in the middle of the room, she scrubbed one arm and then the other, taking her time on every last finger. She then gestured for me to lie down, so that she could scrub my stomach, chest, and legs, before rolling me over to scrub my backside.

As I lay on the steaming hot tile floor, trying to enjoy what was, in one sense, a decadent hour-long massage, I could not help but feel uncomfortable. Not uncomfortable that I was lying naked in a room full of strangers where the visiting *Amreekia* was the main attraction, but uncomfortable that these women who I hardly knew were in service to me. It took a moment of reflection on my part to see the event not as a Moroccan serving an American, but to look beyond nationality and even class, and to see it as a new friend serving a new friend. They laughed as I winced at the harshness of the stone on my tender spots, as I contorted myself to cover my (shamefully) shaven body, and as I gave my own attempt at scrubbing them as they had taught me to do. We laughed together

about the frequent flirtations of the *riad* owner's son, about the strange couple staying in Room #4, and about how to convince your parents that your *cheri* is better than the one who they have chosen for you. For me, it was this incredibly moving moment of friendship across cultural and linguistic boundaries – this moment defining of the shared experience of womanhood. It was startlingly and refreshingly intimate. It was an *entrée* into the field and into the friendships that would define my period of research there. As I complete my write-up back in my own country, six years after my first summer of research in Rabat, I am reminded of the beginnings of these relationships that have grown deeper over the years and continue to call me home to the Maghreb.

There were so many spaces that I was privileged to observe throughout my time in Morocco, and many of them would have been closed to Hajar, or at the very least, uncomfortable for her to occupy. She spoke to me often about the limitations that she felt living in a country where the public sphere was reserved largely for her brothers and her father and largely unknown to her. She asked me what it was like to have the freedom to move. This question took on many meanings, as we discussed my movement in her own native country, where doors into both public and private spheres were often open to me, and at other times, as we discussed the greater freedoms that women in the U.S. are privileged to. Her experience of restricted movement on a micro scale (restrictions from riding the bus or walking to the market to buy vegetables) reflected some of the macro issues of mobility that I was seeking to explore with migrant populations in transit through Morocco. The female/male dichotomy within the country paralleled migrant/citizen dichotomies within the region, both being rooted in notions of private/public and mobility/detention. They also raised important questions about the

unique spaces reserved for migrant women or Moroccan natives who were racially identified as black (and therefore of migrant status) within these emerging social hierarchies of foreignness and belonging. Although so many doors were closed to Hajar, as to the migrants who became my primary informants throughout fieldwork, it was she who invited me into our neighborhood *hammam*, and thus revealed to me an exclusive space and the unique relationships that existed there.

The most intimate of my experiences in the field, birthed out of my own liminality in Morocco, mimicked in many ways the convergences and divergences of all those who stand at the periphery. I learned that it is a particular form of kinship that can arise between foreigners in a foreign place – between *Amreekia* and local at the bathhouse, between ethnographer and migrant in the field, between migrant and migrant both trapped in the space that lies in between. Migrants from distinct regions of the sub-Saharan formed the strongest of bonds across ethnic, religious, and linguistic barriers, as they found themselves sandwiched together in apartment buildings in Taquadoum, or even sleeping in rotating shifts on their one mattress there. I argue, these are the new forms of kinship that are produced in the diasporic context, where old identities give way to new understandings of the self and the other.

A PLACE AT THE TABLE

The place that I occupy in Moroccan society is an odd one – with one thing about me often closing the door that another thing about me has just opened. My nationality routinely granted me privilege that my gender denied. My age stripped me of access that

my skin color ensured. My economic status provided me with opportunities that my status as non-Muslim forbade. Throughout my first months in Morocco, I closely observed the ways in which I was "read," dependent on both who was doing the reading and where the reading was taking place. I studied how my dress – my decision to cover my head or not, to wear "Western" clothing or not; how my bodily comportment – my decision to avoid eye contact or not, to offer a handshake or not; and how my speech – my decision to "*tutoyer*" or "*vouvoyer*,"[23] to respond in English, French, *Fusha* or *Derija*[24] all impacted who I was "read" to be. And I took note of how I could manipulate these readings in order to gain access to the spaces or subjects I was seeking to interact with.

It was not until years later, when I began analyzing reams of collected data, that I noticed striking similarities between my own consciousness of self presentation in Morocco's public sphere and that of the migrants who navigated similar interactions on their journeys to and through North Africa. I remembered Ousmane – a Senegalese college student who had arrived in Morocco intentionally, thanks to the national university's long-standing exchange program with Senegal, and was one of the few West

---

[23] Most basically, "*tu*" is a form of speech reserved for addressing friends and family, or for children and people of "lower social rank" than you. "*Vous*," on the other hand, denotes greater respect or unfamiliarity. While these distinctions are more fluid in West and North African francophone countries than they are in France, there still remains a choice to be made when meeting new people and weighing your comparative places on the social hierarchy (i.e. He is younger but male.)

[24] *Fusha*, or modern standard Arabic, is often referred to as "pure" Arabic, even by Moroccans. However, mastering the language requires a level of education that is uncommon in lower and middle-income households. *Derija*, or the particular dialect of Arabic spoken in Morocco, was borne from the nation's placement near West Africa and its colonial history, and it has a more rhythmic speech pattern and a sprinkling of French and Spanish phrases. *Derija* is a spoken language, and while it lacks the standardization of *Fusha*, speaking it signals a kind of cultural belonging or insider-ness that *Fusha* does not.

African men of documented status whom I came to know well. Racially identified as black and therefore of migrant and lower-income status, Ousmane spoke about the code-switching and shape-shifting tactics that he had adopted in his short time in Rabat. Among these were his efforts to speak English on his cell phone (even when there was no one on the other end listening) and to dress well "like I'm going to out to *drag*" (a Moroccan play on the French verb *draguer*, or "to pick up [women]") every day of the week. I wanted to find a way to acknowledge the agency of these migrants as they manipulated their own speech, dress, and bodily comportment to serve the purposes of their interactions, without denying the greater fluidity that I could exercise in light of the privileged status that I occupied. Like the migrants, I was aware of being "read," but unlike them, I had a broader range of privileged categories of representation on which I could draw to counterbalance the disadvantaged place that I occupied as a woman or a non-Muslim. As I will examine in later chapters, these choices highlight the important distinction between mutable and immutable categories and the ability of presumably mutable characteristics to become deeply imbued with racial stereotypes. Serving as a locus for the redefining of categories of national and also individual identification, border regions offer an ideal site for exploring how categorizations are constructed, challenged, manipulated, and solidified through daily practice.

In co-gendered migrant and Moroccan homes alike, it is common for two tables to be set – one for women and another for men. If the space allows, the women's table is often placed in the kitchen and the men's in the *salon*. It was remarkable to me that across the diversity of homes I would dine in throughout my fieldwork, I was consistently and predictably sat at the men's table. I never missed a chance to inquire about this seating

arrangement, raising the obvious question of why I (clearly a woman and clearly the only woman among the group of men all seated cross-legged on the floor around the table) was assigned that particular seat. The answers became as predictable as the seat itself – I was seated at the men's table because I was not Moroccan. It was because I was foreign, or I was educated, or I was American, which given the logic behind them, were three synonymous points. Being a foreign, educated, American woman, I would be "bored" by the conversation at the women's table, which the men presumed centered around "neighborhood gossip," and I would, in turn, be "stimulated" by the conversation at the men's table, which they liked to believe always circled around "important debates" of religion, politics, or global affairs. There was a micro/macro, private/public, female/male distinction made, and my status as a foreigner consistently outweighed by status as a woman and placed me in the macro/public/male realm of the household. However, it never denied me the ability to sit with women in the kitchen, as well.

I found this scenario, which unfolded so many times at the dinner tables of friends and informants, significant in illustrating the ambiguous place that I occupy in Moroccan society, and it is important for me to highlight to readers the ways in which this ambiguity made my research possible. My dual outsider statuses granted me unique access to the dinner tables, social spaces (private and public), and conversations of men *and* women in a way that a foreign male or a Moroccan citizen (male or female) would never have been privy to. Just as a foreign male would have been relegated to exclusively male spaces, a Moroccan researcher would have been limited to uncovering inner worlds among their own gender group. Gender was central to my interactions with Moroccan men and women, much in the same way that nationality was central to my gaining access

to and trust from both migrants and citizens in Morocco. My government-issued research clearance and foreign passport eased my access to governmental offices, state-run detention centers, and the officials working within them. And while many of the questions that I posed to sub-Saharan migrants would have been seen as threatening if coming from a Moroccan or European researcher, my status as an American removed me from the immediate crisis at hand and allowed me to establish trust and rapport with greater ease. In addition to facilitating my research, my ambiguity justifies many of my central research questions, as it demonstrates that what appear to be strict binaries – male/female, public/private, Moroccan/African, citizen/migrant – actually become negotiable and, in some cases, mutable categories when factors of class, such as dress, education, or language are considered.

METHODOLOGICAL OUTLINE

The following chapters are based on 27 months of cumulative ethnographic research conducted between 18 months of fieldwork in Morocco (March 2013-September 2014),[25] two shorter periods of pre-dissertation research in the country (summers of 2011 and 2012), and a final research period over the summer of 2015. This research was generously funded by grants from the National Science Foundation, the American Institute for Maghrib Studies, the West African Research Association, and the U.S. Department of Education's Fulbright-Hays program. My methodology can be broken

---

[25] During my fieldwork period, I divided my time between multiple locations, including: Rabat (approximately 12 months), Tangier (approximately 3 months), Oujda (approximately 1 month), Ceuta and Melilla (approximately 1 month), and other locations in the country (approximately 1 month).

down into six distinct phases, although the latter phases were often carried out in tandem with one another:

(1) A demographic survey phase in Rabat's most heavily migrant-populated neighborhoods to establish a core group of participants

(2) A combined interview/participant observation phase with core participants in Rabat's *souk*, where the majority of migrants work in the informal economy

(3) A life history phase with select participants

(4) Ongoing participant observation as a resident in Rabat's most heavily migrant-populated neighborhoods and a volunteer caseworker at the city's largest migrant aid organization, *Le Centre de Droits des Migrants* (CDM)

(5) Ongoing review of Moroccan media centered on issues of migration and EU-Morocco relations

(6) A final "visual life history" phase with select participants

This multi-level methodology strengthened my focus on the daily lives of Morocco's new migrant class by situating participants' narratives within a broader sociopolitical context and allowing me to draw connections between sub-Saharan African migrants' lived experiences, migrant-citizen interactions in Morocco's public sphere of labor, and the placement of "illegal" subjects within national and E.U. discourses.

(1) Demographic Survey Phase

A group of interested participants was first recruited through my community interactions and work with CDM during pre-dissertation research in the summer of 2012, and others were recruited for my initial survey phase using the snowball method in the following summer. Administering biographical surveys[26] to approximately 10% of

---

[26] The survey phase of my research was completed with the support of a local research assistant, Dr. Badre Abdesalam. Dr. Abdesalam holds his PhD in Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies from *Université Mohammed V*, has completed the Fulbright Foreign Student Program in the U.S., and was well-trained in the ethnographic methods demanded by my research.

Taquadoum's foreign-born adult residents (300 individuals) allowed me to collect baseline data on this community's demographics. Taquadoum is a community with one of the (if not *the*) highest ratios of migrant to citizen residents in the greater Rabat-Salé-Temara area. Because of the clandestine nature of most transcontinental economic migrations across the Maghreb, reliable data estimating the number of migrants annually crossing into and out of Morocco is scant. Data confirming where these migrants are coming from and going to is virtually non-existent. This phase of research allowed me to narrow respondents to a purposive sample of sub-Saharan African migrants (60) who were reflective of the diversity found in Morocco's growing migrant population and interested in participating in follow-up interviews[27] in their native languages (See *Figures 4-6* at end of the chapter for statistics on the age, gender, and national origin of interview respondents, which was reflective of the community's demographics more widely).

This core group of participants constituted the subsequent interview, life history, and visual life history phases of research. Although multiple *lingua francas* (Wolof, Hausa, Bambara, Yoruba, Igbo, and Fula being most notable among them) are spoken throughout West Africa, where the majority of Rabat's migrant population is coming from, languages other than French and English are not often spoken publicly among migrants in Taquadoum. In migrant-populated neighborhoods like this one, any linkage back to one's country of origin can increase the risk of repatriation and makes French and English the "safer" languages to speak in the streets, reserving native languages for inside the boundaries of one's home. Much like stigmatized forms of labor in the public sphere,

---

[27] When necessary, my interview-based research was supported by the translation skills of local research assistants, Yassine Eddaoui and Alphonse Nzengui, who are native speakers of Arabic and French (in addition to several West African languages) respectively.

language has emerged as a marker used by Moroccans to delineate between migrant and citizen groups. However, language has also been appropriated by migrants themselves as a tool wielded to erase their pasts and thus protect their futures.

(2) Interview Phase

Throughout my interview phase, I used a "go-along" interview method, which combines traditional participant observation with semi-structured interviewing, creating a more natural dialogue between the interviewer and interviewee (Kusenbach 2003). This method allowed me to supplement my interview protocol with questions that arose in the process of shadowing participants throughout their daily work activities in Rabat's main *souk* – a sprawling outdoor marketplace where the majority of sub-Saharan men and women in Morocco scrape together a meager subsistance. Migrants most commonly work as "hawkers," or sidewalk merchants, selling an eclectic mix of goods. Their ambulent status allows them to easily move from one corner to another when hassled by police. While the presence of migrants in the public sphere has been highly criticized in national discourse,[28] the goods sold by sub-Sarahan hawkers – especially the counterfeit designer clothing imported from Senegal and unlicenced or "bootleg" popular media from the U.S. – have become coveted by Moroccans in recent years. The *souk* is therefore a primary site for observing both migrants' experiences of liminality in daily life and migrant-citizen interactions.

Primary inquiries in my interview phase centered on how different forms of labor delineate between citizens and migrants within black, African, or Muslim identities. The social stigmatization of a predominantly Sunni Muslim migrant population raised

---

[28] Benmehdi, Hassan. "Casablanca conference tackles counterfeit goods." *Morocco World News*. 15 Dec. 2011.

particular questions, given the strong influence of religion among the 98% of Moroccans who identify as Sunni, the tenets of Islamic inclusiveness, and the fact that both North and West Africans follow the *Mālikī* legal tradition. From my experience interviewing migrants during preliminary research, I had anticipated that many of my key questions would arise naturally in conversation. *Hrig* ("illegal" immigration, or literally, "the burning") is a popular issue throughout the Maghreb, and it is difficult to read a newspaper or watch a news program without being confronted by images of detained migrants and capsized *pateras*.[29] However, to facilitate discussion around delicate issues of race, religion, and political vulnerability, I often elicited responses to narratives of *hrig* from popular media or well-known stories from the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*.[30] As I established greater rapport with participants over the course of my research, my daily observations of their home and work lives facilitated ongoing conversations around the themes of earlier interviews.

My interview protocal was centered around three themes:

---

[29] As one respondent explained to Pandolfo during her research on migration among Moroccan youth, "Just look at how many people die each day in the boats. Each day the news tells you how many, shows you the images" (2007: 335).

[30] The Hadith*,* derived from the Arabic word for "report," are a collection of narratives claiming to report the words of the prophet Mohammed. Unlike the Qur'an, which was compiled under the direction of the early Islamic State in Medina, the Hadith reports were not compiled by a central authority. They were based on spoken reports in circulation after the death of Muhammad and gathered throughout the 8th and 9th centuries. Each Hadith is based on two parts – a chain of narrators reporting the Hadith (*isnad*) and the text itself (*matn*). While individual Hadith are classified by Muslim clerics and jurists as "*sahih"* (authentic), "*hasan"* (good), or "*da'if"* (weak), there is no unanimous agreement, and different groups may not agree on the classification. The Hadith are second only to the Qur'an in developing Islamic jurisprudence and are regarded as important tools for interpreting the Qur'an today.

Migration. *What was your expected trajectory of migration, and is Morocco a temporary or a permanent destination? For those who view Morocco as temporary – What are your expectations of Europe, and what led to your settlement in Morocco? For those who were deported from Europe to Morocco – What were your experiences in Europe, and how did you avoid repatriation? Do you plan to return home or attempt another crossing? For those who view Morocco as permanent – Why was Morocco the most desirable destination for you, and how have your realities compared to your expectations? And to all respondents, I posed questions about the "push" factors that first propelled their movement, the physical steps of their journeys (the who, the how, the where, and the how much), and the "pull" factors that continue to propel their movement north.*

Identity. *How are distinctions made between citizens and migrants? What role does class or do the markers of class (language, accent, bodily comportment, dress, etc.) play in delineating between two populations ascribed to one race (blackness) in Morocco? More specifically, what role does the form of informal labor ascribed to migrant status play in marking individuals as foreign or belonging? How do particular spaces produce a conflation of race (or blackness), class (or black market labor), and political status (or vulnerability)? What effect does this process have on migrants, and also on the citizens who occupy one of these stigmatized categories? What effect does it have on the subversion of traditional gender roles in a Muslim society? How have your conceptions of identity been challenged by your experiences of minoritization or "illegality" in Morocco?*

Liminality v. Belonging. *How do you envision the future for yourself and your family? How does having your children/partner with you (or not) influence your migration trajectory? How do you imagine that your children's birthplaces (whether Morocco or your sending country) will shape their futures? How have ties to your sending community and family network changed since migration? Who do you consider to be your community in Morocco? In what ways do you feel included in or excluded from Moroccan social life? Do you feel that children born in Morocco will be included or excluded in different ways than you have been?*

(3) Life History Phase

I supplemented interviews with life histories collected from half of my core participants (30), selecting individuals from a wide range of migration trajectories, including some migrants recently deported from Europe, some still in hopes of crossing to Europe, and others who viewed Morocco as a more permanent destination. The life history phase served to deepen and contextualize the data collected on daily life through interviews and participant observation (Behar 2003). Furthermore, it mapped how individuals came to be settled temporarily or permanently in Morocco and how they envisioned their futures. This phase gave participants the opportunity to weave their own narratives of displacement and belonging over the course of multiple meetings with me. I had found in my past experiences collecting life histories that they often create a space for material culture to be incorporated into narratives, and even before I added a final "visual life history" phase to my methodology, I encouraged participants to use family photographs, maps, and other material items to illustrate their stories. My participant observation was extended beyond my residence in Taquadoum and "go-along" interviews

in the *souk* into the homes of participants during life history collection, and I took every opportunity to conduct informal interviews with other family members present whenever possible.

Since my project centers on an emergent form of economic migration that leaves populations in "temporary" spaces of settlement, my research questions beg for a reevaluation of the transnational paradigm, and also of the methodologies traditionally applied in studies of transnational communities. Life history collection is traditionally used to establish a complete history of experience (Yow 2005). However, I adapted the method to be sensitive to the vulnerabilities of my participants. Although focused more on understanding the present lives of migrants in Morocco than on their complete histories, life history collection remained an important tool for assessing how individuals narrate their past experiences in a place where linkages to a country of origin increase the risk of deportation or repatriation.

In later chapters, I will argue for a reconceptualization of transnational subjectivities not as interconnected between their sending and receiving countries, their past and future lives – but rather as largely disconnected from both. I focus on the liminal placement of sub-Saharan African populations in Morocco – in between a past reality and an imagined future – and my methods were therefore designed to build an understanding of how narratives of home and family, self and community, freedom and mobility are rewritten in this "temporary" space. I found that it was often through their denial of the present that migrants' coping strategies were most apparent. What was selectively revealed and concealed to me through migrants' narratives illuminated how they make sense of their present by reconstructing a past and reimagining a future.

(4) Participant Observation Phase

Ongoing participant observation over the course of 27 months in Morocco allowed me to access migrants' lived experience from various levels, engaging with (1) their daily *home* lives through my residence in Taquadoum and other majority migrant-populated neighborhoods, (2) their daily *labor* through my "go-along" interviews in Rabat's *souk*, (3) and their interactions with *state* institutions through my volunteer work at CDM.

Home. My research proposed that there is a heightening attention to racial and political categories of identification in Morocco. An understanding of how Moroccan natives may be reconceiving what it means to be black, Muslim, or Moroccan in light of rapid demographic shifts enhanced the data that I collected through interviews and life histories. As Rabat's most heavily migrant-populated suburb, Taquadoum is representative of other Moroccan suburbs that have shifted from largely homogeneous, lower-income communities into highly mixed settlements of Moroccan natives and foreign-born residents in the past decade. This particular research site highlighted many of the daily racisms faced by blacks in Morocco. It exposed the difficulties that migrants face in finding a place to live and the regular extortions that they face from landlords once a place has been secured. My residence in Taquadoum allowed me to examine not only the daily lives of migrants, but also to the attitudes and behaviors of native Moroccans whose neighborhood had transformed through the growing presence of sub-Saharan African residents. It allowed me to conduct supplemental interviews with Moroccans, posing questions on perceived past, present, and future immigration patterns. *To what degree is the larger public aware of immigration policy? Is the growing migrant population perceived as a threat? And if so, does the sense of threat stem from Moroccan*

nationalism, Islamic sanctity, competition for limited jobs, racial stereotyping, or some

combination of these?

    Labor. My research further proposed that the growing desire to distinguish between migrant and citizen groups is resulting in the social and economic segregation of those racially identified as "*harraga*" ("illegal" immigrant, or literally, "one who burns"). It is important to note that those identified as *harragas* are not necessarily of migrant status, and may simply "look like," "work like," or "live where" migrants are expected to. My investigation highlighted how economic/public and social/private life become intertwined through the marketplace, shaping the formation of migrant and citizen subjectivities. I collected supplemental interviews with Moroccans working alongside migrants in Rabat's *souk*, posing questions on the links between labor and identity. *What does the association of "illegality" with the black market mean for Moroccans who make their livelihood through the souk's informal economy? How may migrant women be doubly stigmatized by their status as minoritized subjects and their placement in Morocco's traditionally male sphere of public labor? How does the growing presence of migrant women impact gendered expectations of Moroccan women's labor?*

    State. Detailed ethnographic methodolgies, like the one applied in my project, are most productive when the particularities of individual experience are analyzed with attention to the broader cultural, historical, and polical-economic worlds in which individual experience is playing out (Wagner 1970). Thus, it was essential for me to analyze participants' actions and narratives with ethnographic attention to both local and national stages. CDM is Rabat's largest migrant aid organization, founded through Morocco's Department of Human Rights in 2002. Serving as a volunteer caseworker at

CDM (approximately 20 hours/week in my first year of fieldwork), I assisted migrants seeking a range of social services from medical to legal aid. This experience provided me with deeper insight into migrants' interactions with state institutions and augmented my observational data on the segregation of sub-Saharans in the public sphere. Furthermore, it enhanced my knowledge of official immigration policies as they relate to Morocco's expanding population of undocumented immigrants and raised critical questions about the influence of European nations on Moroccan legal reform.

I have analyzed the placement of "illegal" subjects within national and E.U. discourses through my attention to public interactions between migrant and citizen groups, my close following of popular media, and supplemental interviews with governmental officials (Moroccan and Spanish). My work with CDM and my well-established connections in Rabat's scholarly community facilitated interviews with high-ranking offices. By following a variety of print media sources – ranging from the official newspaper of the Moroccan monarchy (*Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb*) to Morocco's leading independent daily (*L'Economiste*) and the controversial independent newspaper recently founded by a group of Morocco's highest profile authors (*Al Massae*) – I was able to analyze the competing coverage of *hrig* presented regularly in the realms of politics and media. Recent media coverage of *hrig* also served as the basis for my questioning with policymakers, allowing me to present contrasting opinions from varying party factions for reaction, without taking a personal stance on issues such as detention, deportation, or repatriation.

(5) "Visual Life History" Collection Phase

With funding in part from Emory's Visual Scholarship Initiative, I was able to add a

final phase of research to my methodology, focusing on the collection of migrants' visual culture. Since my primary research question asked what "the burning" (or the process of "illegal" immigration called "*hrig*") means for sub-Saharan migrants who remain in Morocco, my ethnographic setting was situated in a unique place of "neither here nor there" – neither in the migrants' home countries nor in their desired European destinations. Centered on an emergent form of transnational migration that leaves migrant populations in zones of liminal settlement for undetermined periods of time, my research questions begged for a reevaluation of a paradigm that has traditionally focused on a migrant's sending and receiving communities (Glick Schiller et al. 1992). I further pushed disciplinary boundaries by introducing a new method that I term "visual life history collection" to be applied in studies of contemporary transnational subjects.

I supplemented my collected interview and life history data with visual life histories from half of my core participants (30) over my final months of research in the summer of 2014. Having found in the past that even traditional life histories create a space for the incorporation of material culture into narratives, this phase allowed me to center my sessions with participants on the incorporation of their own personal photographs. Encouraging narratives to be built around their photographic memories prompted questions about what was burned and what was saved, problematizing notions of home, identity, and memory in my analysis.

Douglas Harper (2002) claimed that photo-elicitation not only educes more information, but different information. I argue that photographs that connect subjects to particular places (but are *not* reflective of their actual lives) conjure a different kind of response than those that connect subjects to their pasts. This is the distinction drawn

between images that I, as the researcher, brought to the table and those that were supplied by my respondents. While placement within larger social structures brings feelings of belonging, placement within more intimate social groups illuminates the migrant's sense of liminality. In my visual life history collection, I focused conversations around respondents' photographs in order to question how narrative and image are used to reconstruct a past and reimagine a future in migrant communities, after much of one's material past has been lost or destroyed. Chapter Five applies this collected data to analyze photography as a critical research tool in spaces of liminality. Furthermore, I underscore its importance as a process of community collaboration and a means of broader public dissemination across linguistic or cultural barriers, encouraging other researchers to consider the use of visual life history collection in their future projects.

Data Analysis Phase

I conducted transcription, translation, and preliminary data analysis throughout my fieldwork period in Morocco, but the final phase of my research in residence at Emory comprised my primary data analysis. Using qualitative analysis software[31] and the grounded theory approach, I applied key themes that arose during my research to analyze collected interview and life history data (Bernard & Ryan 2009). My multi-level lens allowed me to access migrants' daily lived experiences (*home*), migrant-citizen interactions (*labor*), and the role of the "illegal" subject, as it is understood through popular media representations and E.U.-Moroccan legal conventions (*state*). Interviews and life histories examined daily life at various levels, concretely relating structural elements of social life to individual experience. The rich data produced on migrants'

---

[31] MAXQDA is a software program designed for computer-assisted qualitative and mixed methods data, text, and multimedia analysis and is used widely by academic and scientific institutions.

lived experiences was integrated with my observational data on migrant-citizen interactions in the *souk* and migrant-state interactions in the broader sphere.

A FINAL NOTE ON CHAPTER STRUCTURE

My research is situated in conversation with a growing collection of anthropological research on Islam in the modern-day (Abu-Lughod 2005, Asad 1993, Hammoudi 2005, Hirschkind & Scott 2006, Inhorn 2012, Mahmood 2004, Ahmed 1992, Eickelman & Piscatori 2004, Fisher & Abedi 2002), and within the discipline's history of ethnographic research in Morocco (McMurray 2000, Slyomovics 2005, Kapchan 1996, Bourqia & Gilson Miller 1999, Hart 2000, Hammoudi 1997). The existing literature on the Maghreb has been molded in part by earlier influential ethnographers like Hart (1976), Gellner (1969), Geertz (1968), and his group of symbolically oriented students (i.e. Rosen 1984, Geertz 1971, Geertz, Geertz & Rosen 1979, Rabinow 1975, Eickleman 1992). But not to overly-simply the diversity of literature to emerge from studies in Morocco, anthropologists like the Dwyers (1978, 1982) and Crapanzano (1985) have pushed past central gatekeeping concepts and challenged the very notions of ethnographic work through their innovative methodological approaches to subjectivity, embodiment, and the research-informant relationship. Rather than devote one chapter to the literature that has informed my research, I decided instead to situate my informing literature throughout my text. This structure seemed more reflective of my actual ethnographic process, as the writers most central or challenging to my arguments have grounded and propelled my work from my earliest stages of research to my latter stages of analysis. Furthermore, this structure allows for me to weave together theory and

narrative, privilege the voices of my informants alongside those of foundational theorists working in Morocco and on migration studies more broadly. I have organized the following chapters accordingly:

Chapter Two opens with a case study of one transnational Moroccan family network, exploring what migration has come to mean in social and economic terms in modern-day Morocco. I then provide readers with two historical overviews essential to my later analysis – one on the development of migration studies as an interdisciplinary subfield and the second on the history of Morocco as a crossroads of human migration. The first of these historical overviews is informed by the foundational theories of migration studies, drawing on scholars from a range of disciplinary backgrounds. Arguing for a move beyond static or linear models, I consider the role of individual experience in shaping desire for mobility and the agency of individual migrants relative to historic shifts in the Maghrebi region, as the mobile subject transitioned from "slave" to "soldier" to "migrant laborer." The second of these overviews draws on Maghrebi scholarship to analyze the construction of social differentiation during distinct periods of Moroccan history, including: the Islamic conquest of the Maghreb, the Arab slave trade, and the French-Spanish colonization of Morocco. I close by examining the post-colonization migration boom, which made Morocco one of the world's top emigrant-sending countries by the year 2000, and the nation's more recent transition into a holding cell for sub-Saharan African migrants seeking entry into the EU.

Chapter Three opens with a case study of recent news reports on the growing tide of violent racism against blacks in Morocco, juxtaposing the accounts of one Moroccan university student and one sub-Saharan migrant of the same age, and exploring

conceptualizations of individual and national identity in light of Morocco's colonial history and the region's emergent patterns of migration. I draw on contemporary scholars of the Maghreb to provide readers with a brief historical overview of the Moroccan political state, from King Mohammed V, who brought the nation out of French control, to the current King Mohammed VI. An examination of widespread humans rights violations during King Hassan II's "years of lead," highlight Mohammed VI's democratic shift in Moroccan policy, but also raise questions about the possibility for reformation when a nation remains in the hands of the same monarchy. Narrative accounts of the devastating treatment of sub-Saharan migrants by both Spanish and Moroccan officials on Moroccan soil raise reveal the varying roles that European nations play as sources of migrant "aid" and militarization, uncovering the EU's involvement in Morocco's legal reformations and current migration practices.

Chapter Four opens with a case study of one migrant-populated *banlieue*, examining the impacts of migration and sustained liminality on notions of home, family, and community. The experiences of two migrants lead readers to consider another "new" kind of Muslim masculinity and the influence of migrant women on Morocco's traditionally male sphere of public labor. I inform my analysis with contemporary anthropological work by migration scholars from various world regions, arguing that the emergent patterns of movement found in the Maghreb are indicative of larger global shifts that are underway, and necessitate the re-evaluation of the terms and theories applied in studies of transnationalism. Outlining contemporary work on migration reveals the tendency for researchers to situate the migrant in the receiving community, the sending community, or a web that spans the two, and underscores the lack of anthropological research on

populations who find themselves in the spaces that lie in between one home and the next. Just as the following chapter contends for the need to revise anthropological methods in order to better engage with contemporary transnational populations, this chapter challenges the very terms applied, and specifically what I contend is a problematic distinction made between the "migrant" and the "refugee."

Chapter Five introduces a new methodological approach, which I term visual life history collection. Presenting two visual life histories from my own fieldwork, I contend for the method's ability to open up new realms of experience and articulation in interviews with migrant and refugee populations. Arguing for a reconceptualization of transnational subjectivities not as interconnected between sending and receiving countries, between past and future lives – but rather as largely disconnected from both – I explore the possibility for visual and material culture to better access memories of the past and imaginaries of the future. The narratives of two migrants highlight central themes of liminality, including a glorification of the past and future, a simultaneous denial of the present state, and a chain of communication from sending community to desired destination, which I contend is largely responsible for fueling these imaginaries of what lies ahead. This chapter addresses some of the methodological challenges of working with migrants who are living in liminal spaces and urges other researchers to consider the use of photo-elicitation in conjunction with oral history (and oral *future*) collection to access deeper levels of experience and answer difficult questions about the process of memory-making and re-making.

Chapter Six opens with a case study of one Senegalese exchange student in Morocco, considering the impact of the "other" blacks – international students who make up a small

but prominent class of Senegalese – on local conceptions of blackness. I also analyze the experiences of one phenotypically black Moroccan family to further question the growing syncretization of race, economic vulnerability, and assumed migrant status in the Maghreb. I examine how the social segregation of those racially identified as "illegal" has concrete impacts on the documented foreigners and Moroccan citizens whose places of work or habitation leave them in dangerous spaces of "illegality." Contending for "migrant" and "citizen" to be considered as emergent forms of racialization that are structuring inequality on a global scale, I inform my analysis with literature from the anthropological study of race. I draw on two ethnographic case studies of other migrant populations to explore the connections between racialization and legalization, situating Morocco within the study of borderlands and highlighting the border as an ideal context for constructing and de-constructing new forms of difference.

In my *Concluding Chapter*, I return to the importance of liminality as a framework, moving my ethnographic attention to the other side of the Moroccan border and exploring the narrative of one migrant's "successful" crossing. I draw on interviews with governmental elites and close following of popular media to examine how the EU skillfully exerts pressure on Morocco to strengthen its own borders, amend its immigration policies, and sign repatriation agreements leading to the deportation of more and more sub-Saharan Africans with burned papers to the Maghreb every year. I outline the relevant human rights conventions under violation, Morocco's new immigration related policies, and the failure of both sides to provide detained migrants with access to basic social services. The chapter concludes with one migrant's interpretation of the

"burning," as a symbolic destruction of the past and also the life that awaits those like him, whose futures are never re-constructed again.

The narratives told in the opening to each chapter are the migrants' stories, and they are mine. They are stories that I have woven together from the stories that were told to me. As I set about constructing a traditional dissertation outline from the hundreds of interview transcripts, countless notebooks of scribbled observations, and years of email correspondence with informants, I struggled to find a way to capture the emotion, the humor, and the brutality in the stories that were told to me. How could I translate these stories into a form of standard textual analysis? How could I break them down without losing so much? It was, after all, the cadence of his speech or her choice of words, it was the braying of the sheep on the roof above us or the sweet smell of rosemary wafting in from the community oven below, that had brought the people, the places, and ultimately, the stories of my research period to life. I came to see my experience of fieldwork as an exercise in learning to listen deeply. I was learning to appreciate a lost form of art – the art of storytelling. And so I asked myself, did I not come to understand the experiences of these men and women through the narratives that they told? And would you, my readers, not also understand them best through the words that they shared with me?

I have been influenced by the anthropological approach of person-based ethnography (Behar 2003, Biehl 2003, Stoller 2008) and especially by the long tradition of this approach in Morocco (D. Dwyer 1978, Crapanzano 1985, K. Dwyer 1987) and the Muslim world more broadly (Wikan 1991, Abu-Lughod 1993, Fisher & Abedi 2002). As Abu-Lughod challenges us to privilege the voice of our respondents in research (1993), Wikan pushes even further and challenges the validity of asking questions in the first

place (1991). While each story I share is reflective of the teller's own life experience, I began to see threads of similarity running through them. I began to see them as windows into the beliefs and practices of a particular segment of Moroccan society or migrant experience more broadly. Yet even after multiple years spent in Morocco, there were still moments when I was jolted by the opinions of those who had come to be my closest friends and confidants, aware again of my status as an outsider. Influenced by the writing of feminist scholars like Abu-Lughod, whose *Writing Women's Worlds* included the conversations, stories, songs, poems, and reminiscences of a handful of women and girls (1993), I saw how the second teller of stories must explores how the telling of these stories challenges the power of anthropological theory to render adequately the lives of others. My early attempts at writing-up showed me just how much can be lost by re-structuring informants' narratives in analysis – by pulling out powerful quotes or removing the people from the places – and so I decided to leave a space at the opening of each chapter for a less traditional form of analytical writing.

It is my intention that these opening "case studies" serve to emplace you as the reader in the locations that were most central to the development of the chapter at hand. By using the words of my informants to emplace you, it is also my hope that these introductions familiarize you with the individuals who gave life to the detentions centers, marketplaces, or apartment buildings described. These people and places create a strong foundation from which I engage with related anthropological literature and use my positionality to pose, to problematize, and, in some cases *insha'Allah,[32]* to offer answers to the broader questions of my research.

---

[32] A common Arabic phrase meaning literally "If God wills it" and used in place of the term "hopefully."

MIGRANT COMMUNITY DEMOGRAPHICS

Figure 4: **Demographics of Respondents by Nationality**

Figure 5: **Demographics of Respondents by Age**

Figure 6: **Demographics of Respondents by Gender**

STANDING AT THE CROSSROADS: A HISTORICAL STUDY OF MIGRATION THEORY AND MOROCCO AT THE APEX OF HUMAN MIGRATION

INTRODUCTORY CASE STUDY: A Transnational Moroccan Family Network

What does it mean to be Moroccan when your roots are spread across three continents? What does it mean to be from the red soil of Aïn el-Aouda when your mother lives above the Egyptian bakery in Queens, your uncle cleans litter from the stadium floor after Falcons games, and your brother works for a Dutch company in Spain? This chapter reviews the interdisciplinary literature that now serves as the foundation for anthropological studies of transnationalism and considers Morocco's long history at the apex of transcontinental African migration, questioning what migratory movement has come to symbolize in social and economic terms – on individual and national scales. Morocco presents a unique case study for applying and testing various models of migration, as it exists in a space that is neither fully immigrant-sending nor immigrant-receiving. Arguing for a move beyond static push/pull models, I consider the role of individual experience in shaping desire and the agency of migrants relative to historic shifts in movement from the Maghrebi region, as they transitioned from "slave" to "soldier" to "laborer."

Yes, that's right, girl, it's that bakery that's known for its hirsha. No, they don't let the janitors in till all the fans have left the Dome. My brother thinks Spanish will serve

his children well, but last Ramadan, they couldn't tell their own grandparents what they'd been learning in school!

"Arabic is an old language."

"Yes, it's the language of our family, it's the language of our people! How can you tell me that I won't speak to my own grandchildren?"

"It's old, Baba. Old in the sense that it brings no use anymore. What good will Arabic do my children in Europe? Marking them as outsiders? As Muslims? Terrorists! Their Spanish is beautiful, Baba. I wish you could hear it. English is where they need to focus their studies now."

In Aïn el-Aouda, you grow up thinking about escape. No one asked me what I wanted to be when I was a grown man. They asked me where I wanted to go. I laugh now remembering our childhood dreams.

"To France!"

"To Italy!"

"To Amreeka!"

We spoke with television clips of beautiful homes and even more beautiful women dancing in our heads. In reality, we knew nothing of the places we spoke. How was I to know the kind of work that waited for a man like me in America? How was I to know that I could work for many years and never afford a home half as nice as the one my father grew up in? How was I to know that Moroccans lived like poor men in these rich men's countries? That the Spain that taunted me with Paz Vega and drop-top Renaults was not the immigrant's Spain?

- Hicham,[33] M, 34, Moroccan, service industry worker

Despite the prevalence of Moroccan emigration and the over 4 million Moroccans settled around the world in diasporic communities[34] today, the number of sub-Saharan African migrants pouring into Morocco every year is challenging the strict binary that once stood between "push" and "pull" – two factors that are generally ascribed to a migrant's sending and receiving countries respectively. In the years following its independence from France in 1956,[35] Morocco quickly evolved into one of the world's top immigrant-sending countries. Over 10% of Moroccan citizens were residing in Western Europe alone by the turn of the century (Sadiqi 2004), and when I first arrived to Morocco in 2007, it was difficult to meet someone whose life had not been directly impacted by migration. My research began with the premise that border regions, located at the cultural and geographical intersection of nation-states, offer an ideal site from

---

[33] All names and other identifying details have been changed to protect the privacy of my research respondents.

[34] The Moroccan diaspora consists of emigrants from Morocco and their descendants and is estimated at 4.5 million, with roughly two thirds of Moroccans living in Europe (Eurostat).

[35] The French-Spanish protectorate over Morocco was established in 1912, and the nation was not freed from French control until 1956. The Spanish still remain in control of parts of Morocco to this day.

which to question conceptualizations of individual and national identities. And Morocco – neither fully "sending" nor "receiving" – offered a prolific case study for new scholars of transnationalism. Throughout the past decade, Morocco's placement only miles from an internally borderless European Union has fomented the swell of sub-Saharan Africans crossing through Morocco on their journeys north. This population of trans-migrants, in addition to the tens of thousands who are annually deported from European to Moroccan soil,[36] is producing a new geography of "il"/legality across the Maghreb. But even with Morocco's rapid transition into a net immigrant-receiving country as new patterns of movement emerge, Moroccans continue to be one of the largest and most dispersed of Europe's immigrant populations. The experiences of sub-Saharan Africans in Morocco are therefore shaped by the nation's own long history of movement across the borders that delineate between Muslim and European, Arab and African, welcome and unwelcome migrant. In response to rapidly increasingly rates of sub-Saharan migration, Morocco was the first Arab nation to institute its own immigration policy, highlighting the struggles that come with placement at the gates to the E.U. and, as I discuss in later chapters, the influence of southern European nations over the Moroccan state.

Being one of eight children – six sons and two daughters – it was almost without question that Hicham had siblings scattered across the European continent. Hicham was the youngest, and as is often the case with the last-born male, he had inherited a sort of unspoken obligation to return home and shoulder the burdens of his family in Morocco. He would be the one to keep up the home that he and his siblings had grown up in, the

---

[36] Later chapters will address the illicit practices of "push-backs" and deportation. These practices, which overlook international human rights conventions on deportation and repatriation, are increasingly common at the Spanish-Moroccan border and are contributing to the rapid growth of undocumented migrants in Morocco.

one to handle the paperwork of his large and increasingly dispersed family network, and the one to welcome them all home every year when *Ramadan* arrived on the Muslim calendar. Hicham's experience taught me about the constant stressors and occasional bursts of pride that come with being the one to carry your family's name in the community, and through the stories that he and his siblings shared with me over our countless meals together, I also pieced together the meaning of "migration" for one modern-day Moroccan family – a family that, like so many others, had become a transnational network of migrant laborers, connected by the soil of their homeland, by their shared ambitions for prosperity abroad, and by their common desire to return home and live together once again under the roof that they had all been so desperate to escape.

On Fridays ("a day for rest, for family, for giving thanks to *Allah*!"), when Moroccans gather around the table to share a ceremonial meal of couscous, Hicham would often take me with him to his family's home in Aïn el-Aouda. "You can't eat couscous alone," he would instruct me on the occasional Friday when my stack of interviews tapes to be transcribed loomed heavily in front of me, and I gave him a dubious smile. "If we see a homeless person on the street, we must invite them in to share the meal. It's our duty to see that everyone has Friday couscous and that it's always shared."

Aïn el-Aouda, a middle-income *banlieue* on the outskirts of Rabat, is accessible only by public bus route, and Hicham's home is reached only by a long walk from the town bus stop. Like many of Rabat's newer bedroom communities, Aïn el-Aouda was built in the 1990s – a time period in which rural-to-urban migration rates were on the rise and this, coupled with the first spurts of sub-Saharan migrant settlement in Morocco's urban

centers, was causing cities like Rabat to burst at their seams. Apartment prices in the then middle-income neighborhoods within the capital's city limits were skyrocketing, with increasing demanded from foreign officials and expatriates moving to Rabat for work. The city's lower-income neighborhoods, on the other hand, were on the decline, with more and more sub-Saharan migrants cramming into one-room rentals. The city was becoming a place accessible to only the richest or the poorest. Middle-income Moroccans were pushed out of their apartments by wealthy families wanting to buy and restore old buildings into their original single-family home structures, and the desire of these recently displaced middle-income Moroccans to disassociate from the city's burgeoning migrant class meant that moving into lower-income neighborhoods was not an option. No one wanted to be among the first to gentrify spaces that were casually being called "the Senegalese block," "the Congolese building," or "the Nigerian sleeping rooms."

Working-class families like Hicham's were drawn to the mini-refrigerators and windowpanes advertised on billboards for the new apartment complexes going up further and further outside of the city limits, and they were less concerned with the added commute time. Their jobs abroad, which could afford little in the way of conveniences in the U.S. or Spain, could afford the small luxuries that were beginning to define an emerging Moroccan middle-class – a class built largely on foreign remittances and a consumer-culture fed through growing access to Western media. As middle-income Moroccan families retreated deeper into Rabat's suburban sprawl, neighborhoods like Taquadoum became increasingly dominated by migrants, a trend which furthered the desire of many transnational Moroccan family networks to abandon their old *riads* in the city center. I was interested in exploring one of these new apartment developments from

the inside out and contrasting it to the small *riad* that Hicham and I temporarily called home in Rabat's *medina* – a place similar to what many families would have been moving from.

The Home that Remittances Afford

The bus dropped us along Aïn el-Aouda's main street, but it was all strangely empty for a Friday afternoon – no vendors hawking *hboz*, oil, and sweets for the midday meal. No children begging *dirhams* from the passing *motos*. In fact, no streams of traffic passing by at all. I realized that outside of Rabat's central avenue (which paves the way to governmental offices and the King's palace), I had never seen streets so well maintained. The road was wide, paved in cement, and even had yellow lines denoting a crossing zone for motorists. There were cement block sidewalks on either side, with evenly spaced street lamps, and palm trees marking the way. In central Rabat, where every inch of space is built upon, it is easy to forget that sandy red soil lies underfoot, but here, with so much open space, the air was heavy with it, and every parked car and building entry was coated with a thin dusting of that deep Moroccan red.

We approached a building four stories high, with a linoleum-floored staircase in the middle, and three apartments on each level. Hicham's family apartment was three stories up – a location often lamented by his sisters when walking up and down the narrow, winding stairs, arms overloaded with children and shopping bags. Inside, their apartment was laid out much like other working-class Moroccan homes, but everything appeared new and more intricately designed. Two white columns stood in the middle of the *salon,*

and *divans* ran the length of the walls on three sides. The thick cushions were covered in bright, shimmering fabrics – one half of the room upholstered in purples and the other in oranges. Hanging from the ceiling were two chandeliers fashioned in gold and pink. The walls were covered with memorabilia – old family photographs, framed pages from the Qur'an, and a photograph of the ruling monarch, which was required in every Moroccan home.[37] Doors led to the smaller, closed spaces surrounding the *salon* – a kitchen, a bathroom, and two other rooms used as places for the children to play or visiting family members to rest quietly. As is typical in such homes, the *salon* doubled as a "bedroom" at night, when everyone slept on the divans, head to feet, one after the other.

At first I found Hicham's family home to be lavish by most Moroccan standards, and had it been located in the city center, it certainly would have belonged to a member of Rabat's small but growing elite class. However, these new developers were skilled at mass-producing inexpensive finishes that had once denoted high class. The "gold" paint already chipping at the corners of the chandeliers, the linoleum squares of "marble" already buckling on the bathroom floors, and the intricate molding that, upon second glance, had been etched from plastic, all hinted at the mass production of "high-end"– a "made in China" sticker half expected on the bottom of every square inch. The design indicated his family's status on the periphery of an emerging class, and the trinkets brought back from his siblings on their annual *Ramadan* trips home cluttered the space with material reminders of their transnationality. A lower-income position abroad

---

[37] While every Moroccan is required to have a framed photograph of the reigning King Mohammed VI visible in the main room of their home and business, there is no photograph standardized for this purpose. The choice of this image – a formal portrait or a candid shot of him on his beloved jet ski? A recent image or one of him as a younger man? A solitary moment or one with his wife and two young children? – is often a lively point of discussion among Moroccans.

afforded many migrants a place of power and prestige in Morocco, and being able to buy your goods in another country and bring them "home" with you served as evidence of this.

Hicham's sisters, Soukaina and Fatima Zorha, both lived in Italy with their husbands and young children. They had been married off to Moroccan men abroad in a manner so commonplace that it was coming to supersede traditional practices of arranged marriage in urban Morocco. Soukaina's husband, Mehdi, had emailed his mother saying, "I'm ready to put my head on straight," a translation of the *Derija* phrase for, "I'm ready to marry." Mehdi's mother quickly got to work evaluating the eligible young women in their community. After negotiating with Hicham's parents, she told her son that she had found someone for him to marry on his next return home. Soukaina and Mehdi, having only ever seen a passport-sized photograph of one another, were married in a traditional Moroccan wedding only a few short weeks after his arrival, and the two of them moved back to Rome together – husband and wife – three days after the ceremony. Soukaina explained to me, "You no longer ask about the job a man has, you ask about the country he lives in. Many of us, our families wouldn't consider our marriage to a man in Morocco – this has become low class." Like Hannaford's research on migration and new forms of marriage in Senegal (2014), Soukaina's narrative exposes how the lack of social stability, much less social mobility, accessible to lower and middle class families in Morocco is driving the search for partners beyond the borders of their own country.

Hannaford's study reveals a contemporary space in which middle class Senegalese women are seeking marriage arrangements with lower class men – a transgression that would be difficult to imagine, if not for the elevated status that these lower class men

occupy as successful migrants to Europe. Despite being separated by continents without immediate plans for reunification, this form of "long-distance" marriage allows male migrants to continue investing in social life back home and gives the women whom they marry access to the same material markers of success – foreign clothing, housewares, and even food products – that Soukaina mentioned to me many times in our conversations. Serving as enviable symbols of both mobility and success, these goods are now demanded of her whenever she returns home to Morocco to visit. The Senegalese women who "reach outside the country in an attempt to procure means for building successful social lives within Senegal," are therefore akin to the parents of young women like Soukaina, who are increasingly seeking class advancement with an emphasis on the attainment of foreign consumer goods (Hannaford 2014: 1). A man's placement in the global labor force has become a better indicator of his ability to provide this kind of social and material capital than his standing in the local community. As Freeman argued in her study of globalizing markets and the construction of new gendered identities, the globalization of production cannot be viewed apart from the globalization of consumption (2000). Her study serves to blur the lines between formal and informal economies and challenge distinctions made between first world consumers and third world producers. By introducing a new "pink collar" identity, she illustrates how Barbadian women, like the young Moroccan and Senegalese women discussed here, are active in constructing their own identities and how the material desires of so called "third world" producers are actually driving the goods available for consumption in "first world" markets (Freeman 2000).

Unlike Soukaina's husband, who followed a more traditional route to marriage,

Fatima Zorha's husband, Abdul Rahim, found her on a popular marriage site – *arabmatchmaking.com*. While this method may at first seem to give greater agency to young women in their selection of a partner, it operates in much the same fashion as the previous, only with the power of selection falling equally between the two set of parents. Just as Mehdi's mother had selected Soukaina from the eligible options in their small community, Abdul Rahim's mother had selected Fatima Zorha's profile from a larger pool of eligible young women, thereby expanding her search from those families immediately known to her to the pool of profiles that were searchable on the internet. One key difference was the involvement of the bride's mother in the process. Hicham's mother had been the one to create (along with the help of her more technologically-savvy younger son) a profile for her daughter, and she had been as critical in assessing the inquiries that were emailed to Fatima Zorha as Abdul Rahim's mother had been in assessing the eligible women. Over one meal together, Fatima Zorha showed me the website where "my family found me love," and together with her sister, we scrolled through the profiles, me asking questions about what was considered beautiful or desirable in a partner, and us laughing together about so much that is universal in the complexities of attraction, love, and partnership.

I would eat the traditional meal of Friday couscous in so many different homes, with so many different families over the course of my research, that it became an integral part of the routine that defined my life in the field. Each time, couscous was brought to the table in a large clay tagine, the accompaniments defining the status of the home. At the tables of university professors, governmental officials, and elites, the lavish display would be garnished with raisins, almonds, and olives, and at the center of the plate, a

generous cut of lamb would be served. One step below this, I would find a whole chicken surrounded by such delicacies, or a step below that, only part of a chicken that had been divided among neighbors. In the outskirts of Rabat, where I ate the majority of my meals, I was more likely to be offered a generous serving of root vegetables over couscous by a family like Hicham's. And in most migrants' homes, a simple platter with couscous alone was served. Regardless of the accompaniments, the large tagine was brought out with a smaller clay bowl of oil. I learned from watching those around me that one must first dip the fingers of the right hand (never the left hand, which is always considered dirty) into the oil and then take a mound of couscous, slowly rolling it around in your hand until it becomes a solid ball. Despite all of my Friday meals, my ball-rolling technique never ceased to be a spectacle for those around me, causing detained migrants and high-ranking officials alike to laugh at the sight of me.

Hicham and I made the long walk back along the newly poured cement streets of Aïn el-Aouda. We took the long bus ride back through suburban sprawl to the crumbling density of Rabat. And as we walked through *centre ville* and towards the labyrinth of the *medina* that we called home, he told me stories of his friends and relatives who had migrated. He told me stories of those, like him, who were left behind. Transnational migrants often work towards the goal of building a "dream house" in their home country, although it is not uncommon for them to visit it for no more than a few weeks out of the year (McMurray 2001). In the case of Hicham's family, visits to their home illustrated both their frustrated experiences of transnationalism and the importance of social displays of accrued wealth in their sending community. The status that last-born males, like Hicham, hold within these family networks asserts one of the central struggles of

migration. Migration leaves return emigrants money-rich, but status-poor. Hicham therefore carried the weight of not only maintaining a physical home for his family, but of maintaining a social network for them in their absence, as well.

To be a Moroccan today means to be a migrant – if you're not a migrant, then you're dreaming of being one. If you are a migrant, then you're dreaming of returning home. But all of us, we're dreaming of a place where we are not.

- Hicham, M, 34, Moroccan, employed in the service industry

WHO HAS THE RIGHT? MOVING FROM A STUDY OF MIGRATION TO A STUDY OF MIGRANTS

Morocco arches across northwest Africa, and the country's northern border serves as the funnel through which the majority of all African migrants are pouring into European labor markets today. It is a transitional space where the boundaries of poverty and opportunity, black and white, Muslim and Christian have historically met. The Maghreb's rich history at the crossroads of Africa, Europe, and the Muslim world illustrates how border regions continue to be a locus for the redefining of racially charged ethnic, religious, and political identities. As my research shows, it is the collisions of distinct cultural traditions that are found along well-trafficked borders like Morocco's that create alliances and divisions out of unexpected groupings and give rise to new categories of identification.

The swell of sub-Saharan African migrants crossing through Morocco, in addition to the tens of thousands who are annually deported from Europe to Morocco, is projected to steadily increase in the coming years, as the strengthening of European borders makes passage increasingly difficult and more and more deported migrants choose Morocco as an economically desirable alternative to their home countries (De Haas 2005). My research was driven by a curiosity in this transition from a state of "emigration" into one of "immigration" – a rare transition in the post-colonial world and a first time transition in post-colonial Africa. In this chapter, I analyze how Morocco's history of immigrant-sending shaped notions of migration, later questioning how a marked growth in sub-Saharan migrants is reshaping Morocco's post-colonial structures of identification and social stratification.

Migration has always been a part of the human condition, but an individual's right to mobility is strictly defined by the political constraints of that individual's birthright. I was born in the U.S. to parents who were both full citizens and was thus gifted the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness - including the right to move to 162 (or 100%) of the 162 nations that were independently recognized in the year that I was born (1984). Mohammed, a friend and colleague of mine also pursuing a Ph.D. in the social sciences during my fieldwork period in Morocco, was born in the same year, in a small town outside of Rabat to parents of Moroccan nationality. His birthright included the right to move to 48 (or 24%) of the 192 nations that are recognized in our world today. All of these nations were located in Africa, with a few exceptions, and together they represented a selection of some the poorest economies in the world. Outside of the African continent, Mohammed could move to one of three Caribbean islands

(Grenada, Dominica, or Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Myanmar, Tajikistan, Iran, Jordan, Turkey, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, or Brazil. With the exception of Mali, Senegal, Guinea, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mohammed's visa would be limited to between three and ninety days, and applying for it would require showing upwards of $20,000 (USD) in his personal bank account. However, Mohammed's options would seem generous if compared to those of Najia, a woman who I became friends with over the course of my research in Rabat. Najia was born to Nigerian parents in Lagos in 1988. She was born without the right to move outside of the African continent, with the exception of Barbados, Dominica, or Fiji. Including all the African nations to which she could apply for a temporary visa, still only 12% of the world's borders were open to her.

This correlative relationship between the opportunities for social and economic mobility within one's own country and the opportunity for mobility to more economically prosperous countries is found across the globe. Born in the U.S., I am statistically among the least likely to migrate in search of economic opportunities and am among the small population of global citizens for whom the world's borders are open. Born in a country that continues to suffer from a history of colonial exploitation, political instability, and economic depression, Najia dreamed of escape. She remembers being motivated by this dream to attain a college education and a good job abroad – "I worked harder than all of the other students combined" – she said, until she realized that the vast majority of the world's borders were closed to people like her. "It was hard for me, realizing that the only way I would ever escape would be by breaking the law. I was always the best student. I was always a good daughter. I never dreamed of becoming a criminal." The experiences of Mohammed and Najia give narrative to global shifts in migration trends

that are unfolding at Morocco's borders and beyond. It is in their lifetimes (and in mine) that traditional immigrant-receiving countries, like the U.S. and those across Western Europe, have reached new saturation points and begun pushing their border controls further south. Morocco is among the first to be impacted by this "pushing back." As such, it paves the way for other former immigrant-sending countries that will be transformed by the neoliberal policies of their northern neighbors, as they reach south of their own borders, and by the emergent forms of economic migration that are moving north from the global south to the global south.

In my first months back from the field, global media attention turned to the "Syrian Refugee Crisis," and I was frequently approached to give talks or write opinion pieces on the issue, despite my lack of expertise in Syria or the current political crisis at hand. It was interesting to me to observe what challenges I had faced in earlier years when encouraging my students or colleagues to trouble the distinction made between the "migrant" population that I studied in Morocco and the global refugee populations which tended to be met with much greater sympathies. And yet, I observed others so easily subsuming my work with migrants into the broader category of refugees once the Syrian crisis took center stage. It seemed that while the migrant could not be seen as the vulnerable refugee, the refugee could be seen as the migrant with little difficulty. So I did my research, and I came prepared to discuss the crisis from the perspective that I knew best – from the vantage point of those who await their chance at crossing, from those who never will, and from those whose final crossing is met with the ultimate sacrifice. I used the widespread interest in Syrian refugees to Europe to turn attention to what I believe is a much larger crisis unfolding today and to the stories that are so rarely told.

The varied use of the term "neoliberalism" reflects the desire of researchers to link large-scale economic and political formations to social actions, patterns of thought, and cultural phenomena that are observed in the course of ethnographic research. For the purposes of my analysis, I draw on Michael Peletz's understanding of neoliberal globalization, as referenced in his essay on Islamic governmentality (2015). Following Ferguson (2010), Peletz marks a distinction between "neoliberal doctrines"[38] and neoliberal cultures, projects, and techniques, rather than view it as an abstract social whole (Harvey 2005).[39] His work supports the claim that political elites, while voicing a commitment to neoliberal doctrines, may lack the ability to realize "the full range of such doctrines" in the projects or techniques of governance that they employ. It is with particular attention to arguments of "neoliberal paternalism," often voiced in reference to disciplining the poor (Wacquant 2009, Soss, Fording & Schram 2011), that I apply the theory. I use the concept of neoliberal paternalism to consider the desire to categorize, control, and thereby "discipline" the undocumented in a similar way. Europe's neoliberal policy is illustrated both through the desire to control (by way of labeling – *migrant,*

---

[38] An extended summary of Peletz's use of neoliberalism can be found in the notes to his 2015 essay, including his understanding of "neoliberal doctrines." "By *neoliberal globalization*, I refer primarily to the variants of these processes that are inflected by doctrines of neoliberalism. These doctrines extol the virtues of a number of analytically distinct phenomena, including (1) the restructuring and reform of government or the paring back of social-welfare services and state agencies through business models developed in the private–corporate sector, or both; (2) the privatization, corporatization, and commodification of enterprises, activities, and resources formerly owned or managed by the state; (3) market-based technologies of governance coupled with the "responsibilization" of citizen-subjects (Ferguson 2009: 172); and (4) private enterprise pursued by entrepreneurial, risk-taking, flexible, adaptable selves (Freeman 2007)" (Peletz 2015: 158).

[39] As an ideology, one could argue that neoliberalism has, in fact, spread across the world in tandem with forces of globalization, completely reshaping global socioeconomic structures and discrete cultures in the process of mystifying class relations and redistributing the world's wealth upward (Harvey 2005).

refugee, or *citizen*) populations and through the paternalistic practice of controlling populations beyond one's own borders.

As studies of migration become increasingly nuanced and transnationalism becomes an increasingly important subfield across the social sciences, the literature in is flux and scholars are questioning the extent to which movement can be linked to distinct push and pull factors. Instead, some are beginning to conceptualize movement as propelled by a combination of external (or historically, the "push" and the "pull") and internal factors working on the individual migrant (Castles 2000, Levitt 2001, Olwig 2007). This indicates a shift in focus from global to local stages, as well as a theoretical shift, assigning greater agency to the individual migrants who have long comprised larger groupings. Migrant populations can no longer be assumed to move in unison between their sending and receiving countries. Assigning equal importance to external and internal pushes and pulls illuminates migration as an individual experience, even for those who travel well-grooved paths across the borders that delineate between labor-supply and labor-demand regions of the world. Viewing migration as an individual experience allows for a deeper kind of study – giving names and narratives to numbers and maps. Situating experiences within the competing layers of nationality, ethnicity, and class that individual migrants carry with them and with attention to the distinct socioeconomic factors that drive their migrations establishes a more comprehensive picture of movement. This desire to personalize, historicize, and narrate the "irresolved process of movement" defining the state of globalization and new transnational economic migrations across the globe today has been one of the driving forces behind my own research (De Genova 2005; see also Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994).

Aihwa Ong's work, which more narrowly defines the effects of globalization as "new corporate strategies," instead centers on an understanding of the transnational subject, arguing that, "while mobility and flexibility have long been part of the repertoire of human behavior, under transnationality the new links between flexibility and the logics of displacement, on the one hand, and capital accumulation, on the other, have given new valence to such strategies of maneuvering and positioning" (1999: 4, 1999: 19). Central to my own understanding of transnationalism is Freeman's use of Ong's argument, which she expands in her work on new transnational subjectivities (2001).[40] Underscoring that, "the transversal, the transactional, the translational, and the transgressive aspects of contemporary behavior and imagination that are incited, enabled and regulated by the changing logics of states and capitalism," Freeman contends for a redefining, rather than a limiting, of the term globalization, which she finds closely linked to the transnational (Ong 1999: 4, Freeman 2001: 1016). Considering not only "nation and class formations" as Ong suggests, Freeman calls for the equally critical examination of the "gendered and often racial matrices" in which these processes are embedded (2001: 1017). I apply the term to mean most broadly, a social phenomenon that is grown out of the heightened interconnectivity of individuals and the receding economic significance of boundaries between nation states. What I challenge in the popular understanding of transnationalism is twofold. First, that the interconnectivity of *all* individuals is heightened, and not heightened according to hierarchical structures of privilege (often along lines of gender, race, and class, as Freeman notes), and second, that social boundaries between nation states are receding in tandem with economic ones. My research finds that as "flexibility,

---

[40] An extended summary of Freeman's understanding of transnationalism, in light of contested definitions of globalization, can be found in the notes to her 2001 essay.

migration, and relocations" become practices that are valued and pursued in place of stability, rather than being forced or resisted, the transnational subject takes on new agencies in the face of globalizing forces (Ong 1999: 19).

In the case of Morocco, I questioned, how often is migration the result of the E.U.'s shifting labor markets, and how often is it the stronger "pull" coming from one migrant's desire to send his children to private school back home? Are Bouboucar's stories not molded most by his desire to be the first in his family to education his daughter? "Not everyone thinks you should spend money on your daughters, but my daughter will be a great success!" Or by his son Simo's desire to have Dr. Dre's new "beats"? "I want the red, fight AIDS ones, Baba!" How often is migration the result of Kabila's ascension to power, and how often is the stronger "push" coming from Maryam's forced marriage to her father's cousin? "He's old enough to have twelve cows and the gray hair to prove it!" Or by her sister's stories about working as a maid in southern France? "Her boyfriend is very handsome, and when she visits home, she brings silk scarves for the whole family!" How do migrants like Bouboucar and Maryam serve as links between the global and the local, and how do their experiences connect larger tectonic shifts on sociopolitical and economic scales to the most intimate details of human life? Not distinctly one or the other, migrants are pushed and pulled by a multitude of factors operating internally and externally, and the individual nuances behind each narrative are critical in revealing how movement on the micro level is also situated within layers – influenced, in these cases, by factors such as broader gender politics or the expansion of media-driven consumer desires.

Ethnography can contribute a close recounting of the multitude of small but

powerful elements that motivate and animate broader political-economic changes. We may think of these individual-level decisions as micro political-economic shifts that, when grouped together, allow for and even propel the processes observed at state level. But as individuals, we are not always conscious of the processes underlying our seemingly individual desires and actions, and I questioned, to what extent can researchers like me, standing decidedly outside of my respondents' processes of migration, claim that Bouboucar was pulled by labor demand in emerging European economies and not by the sight of his neighbor's daughter dressed in the starched and buttoned uniform of Dakar's *Muslim School for Girls*? Can I claim that Maryam was pushed by the political fervor of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's new leader and not by photographs of her sister's apartment, complete with a washing machine and a vase of red silk flowers on the kitchen counter? I have struggled with the extent to which I can contend that global push and pull factors are the primary impetus behind movement, when they are not explicitly acknowledged by migrants themselves. Is it, in fact, the job of the ethnographer to draw lines between the macro and the micro, which together motivate movement and shape the experiences of those living between two homes? As the work of scholars like Abu-Lughod (1993) and Behar (1993) illustrates, the practice of person-centered ethnography requires that the listener becomes the second teller of the stories shared, and it is in this process of conversion from listener/observer to teller/analyzer that these connections between macro and micro can be drawn. I found that moving from the study of Migration (population level) to the study of migrants (individual level) necessitates moving from the generalizable to the personal narratives that drive migration, but also offers a privileged space from which to explore the interconnections between the two.

Like many anthropological inquiries, my research is rooted at the intersection of my thematic and geographical interests. Thematically, my focus has been on the study of transnational migration and the ways in which shifting sociopolitical and economic landscapes in the post-colonial world are impacting the movement of people between African and E.U. labor markets. Geographically, my recent focus has centered on the sliver of Northern Africa, where the majority of all African migrants are now crossing into Europe. Weaving together my topical and geographical foci, I study migration through the stories of those who are in the middle of their own journeys. Because Morocco is a country that is neither "push" nor "pull," African nor European, it is an ideal context for challenging long established binaries of social and political inclusion and exclusion and for exploring the lives of those who are neither here nor there. Morocco is situated at a critical border, negotiating between two economically and culturally distinct regions in an increasingly globalized world. Like its fellow "labor frontier" country, Mexico, Morocco plays variant roles, aiding in both the movement and the detention of migrants (Ferrer-Gallardo 2008). However, unlike the U.S.'s southern neighbor, Morocco's role in negotiating modern migration networks has largely been left in the shadows of academic research. By exploring the evolution of Maghrebi migration patterns, I illuminate how changes in movement across borders have never been determined by demographic factors alone. Just as individual narratives of movement are propelled by the personal drivers of migrants like Bouboucar and Maryam, narratives on the national level (i.e. Sassen 1990, Willen 2007) are written by the unique geopolitical context of a region and the historical placement of a country in the global hierarchy.

THE CROSS-DISCIPLINARY STUDY OF MIGRATION: FROM LINEAR MODELING TO CONTEXTULATIZED STUDIES OF GLOBALIZATION

This section sets the stage for my research by examining the history of migration studies, from Wilbur Zelinsky's earliest attempts to set past human migrations to equations that would predict future ones (1971), to more recent attempts at contextualizing the study of migration through global network analysis in the social sciences. Migration studies has long attracted researchers from a diversity of disciplines, and I have therefore drawn on the work of not only anthropologists and sociologists, but also historians, political scientists, geographers, and economists, in my attempt to provide a succinct history of past theories and their current iterations. The vast array of literature available on the subject has also meant that I must find ways to focus and narrow, and I have chosen to pull together the strings that seem most relevant for studies of mobility and detention in modern-day Morocco (overlooking equally important literature that might better inform comparable studies on trans-continental migration across other borders).

Morocco's pre-colonial history exemplifies the importance of societal mobility long before the influences of modernization and serves as a counter-example for theorizations of migration as a step towards development. These theorizations have equated migration with processes of "westernization," overlooking historic precedents of movement between states (Lucassen & Lucassen 2009). Scholars of migration coming from a range of disciplinary backgrounds have recently begun to critique the notion that migratory movement increased dramatically with the rise of nineteenth-century

modernization, following even earlier critiques of theories purporting that time periods predating our modern era were largely defined by static populations living in tightly bound communities (Gupta & Ferguson 1992). The "mobility transition model," developed in part by geographer Wilbur Zelinsky, has been at the center of these debates, as Zelinsky introduced the notion of human migration as a phenomenon linked to economic development. His seminal article, "The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition," formulated the first concrete theory to track past and predict future movements of human populations across regional, national, and continental boundaries (1971). Although thinking has since shifted, his models of inter- and intra-continental migration remain relevant for researchers today. I examine Zelinsky as an important forefather for cross-disciplinary scholars of migration, highlighting how current studies are challenging his work, and the useful ways in which some of his foundational theories have been married with contemporary, non-linear visualizations of mobility.

Zelinsky's Mobility Transition Model

"In a pre-modern traditional society, the life patterns of all but a few privileged or exceptional persons were preordained by circumstances of birth" (Zelinsky 1971: 224). Zelinsky's hypothesis was predicated on the assumption that "options of activities were rigidly constrained by gender and inherited by class, caste, occupation, religion, and location" (*ibid*). Therefore, barring disaster, the orbit of one's physical movement was severely circumscribed from a young age, the range of information and ideas available to one was narrow and stagnant, and these conditions changed almost imperceptibly from one generation to the next. This widely accepted notion that, save the most elite classes,

one's potential movement came about only as a result of crises (e.g. war or natural disaster) indicates why much of the early literature on human migration focuses on groups that we now define as "refugees," or perceptibly vulnerable populations, and not on "migrants" (Lucassen & Lucassen 2009).[41]

Zelinsky succinctly lays out his hypothesis of the mobility transition as follows: "There are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process" (1971: 221-2). Like Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1960), he distinguishes five phases:

> (1) *The pre-modern traditional society* (high fertility and mortality; low population growth, if any) (2) *The early transitional society* (rapid decline in mortality; rapid increase in population growth) (3) *The late transitional society* (rapid decline in fertility; significant but decreasing population growth) (4) *The advanced society* (fertility and mortality stabilized at low levels; low population growth, if any) (5) *The future "super-advanced" society* (sustained low fertility and mortality) (1971).

The crux of his argument is that each of these distinct phases of development is linked to a distinct form of mobility, and that these forms evolve along a linear path in a process termed "the mobility transition." He broadened the existing concept of demographic transitions, or high population growth – commonly seen as *the* main cause of migration – by linking migration to a combination of modernization, economic growth, and increased mobility. What he terms the "vital transition" is, in fact, what we would now call "development."

His research asserts that the onset of modernization –defined as "the onset of major change in the reproductive budget [or a shift from higher to lower fertility and

---

[41] Later chapters will problematize the false dichotomy between "refugees" and "migrants," or those who are seen as socially/politically/religiously vulnerable in their sending countries, as opposed to economically threatening to their receiving countries.

infant mortality rates], along with a general rise in material welfare and improvements in transport and communications" – brings with it "a great shaking loose of migrants from the countryside," or what migration scholars now call high rural-to-urban migration rates (Zelinsky 1971: 236). Following their exodus from rural agricultural centers, migrants have four types of "destinations" available to them: "cities in the native country; cities in alien lands with an expanding economy; rural settlement frontiers, if these are to be found in one's own land; and the pioneer zone in a hospitable foreign country" (*ibid*). In the initial phase of modernization, the rapid growth of urban centers and the expansion of industrial and commercial opportunities presented there have historically attracted and absorbed these outpourings of unskilled laborers from rural surroundings.

Zelinsky's mobility transition model was the first in a series of increasingly complex linear models developed by scholars of migration. His foundational contribution argues:

> Pre-modern societies (phase A) are characterized mainly by limited circular migration. In the early stages of the "vital transition" (phase B), all forms of mobility increase (circular, rural colonization frontiers, internal rural-to-urban, international). In phase C, international migration decreases rapidly, rural-to-urban internal migration slackens but remains at high levels, and circular movements further increase and grow in structural complexity. At the end of Phase C, the rural exodus significantly decreases, as the number of those employed in agricultural production approaches the minimum level associated with optimum economic return. In phase D, residential mobility, urban-to-urban, and circular migration become more important and countries transform themselves from net emigration to net immigration countries because of the mounting immigration of unskilled and semi-skilled workers from developing countries. In phase E, most internal migration is urban-to-urban and residential, while immigration of laborers continues (1971: 230-1).

Shortly after the publication of Zelinsky's hypothesis (1971), historians, economists, and anthropologists sought to counter his model by uncovering earlier and

earlier tracked movements of human populations across the European continent. Most notable among the examples brought to light are the sixteenth-century process of proletarianization (Charles Tilly 1978); the seventeenth-century slave trade across the Indian Ocean (Vink 2003); and the steadily rising demand for seasonal laborers, soldiers, and sailors across purportedly static boundaries in the following decades (Lucassen 2004). We now know that, counter to Zelinsky's model, these large-scale human migrations did in fact take place before the onset of modernization. However, a comparison between data sets that would allow for the thorough analysis of changing rates of migration between the pre- and post-Industrial Revolution periods is complicated by the historically poor documentation of migratory movements.

One challenge in confronting and improving models of linear development, like Zelinsky's, is the lack of comprehensive and comparable data available on human migrations – past and present. The very fact that migratory trajectories have long been constructed in order to avoid legal documentation has made the study of migrants challenging for centuries. Whether due to the state's desire to obscure the forced movement of enslaved populations or the efforts of modern socioeconomic systems that "push" and "pull" migrants along similar lines and have economic motivations for establishing "undocumented" and therefore exploitable populations of laborers, numbers are rarely tracked and migrants' papers are commonly forged, "burned," or forgotten in transit. In their article, "The Mobility Transition Revisited 1500-1900: What the case of Europe can offer to global history," historians Jan and Leo Lucassen make a first attempt at synthesizing the existing quantitative data on human migrations, focusing on movement into and out of the Asian-European continent in the years leading up to the

Industrial Revolution (or the onset of "modernization") (2009). While their conclusions follow the trend of illuminating the pre-modernization mobility of human populations, they also conclude that much of Zelinsky's theory falls in line with the data available and may actually be worth salvaging.

The Lucassens' Re-Construction of a Pre-"Modern" and Mobile World

Drawing on Karl Polanyi *The Great Transformation* (1944), Lucassen and Lucassen present a picture of the early modern (pre-Industrial Revolution) world as static and bounded (2009). It is a romantic image that is soon sullied by the rise of free market economies, the modern state, and ultimately, the movement of populations between states (and often in response to shifts in free market economies). Like Zelinsky, Polanyi's work links increased rates of migration to modernization. Movement, he claims, was the result of newly self-regulated markets and the other "side effects" of modernization – mass-commercialization, mass-consumption, and what is now referred to as the "westernization" (or even the "Americanization") of the "developing" world (Hochstadt 1999). However, historians and other scholars of migration were eager to reject all overly simplified "modernization paradigms" and joined together in a "revolt against the early modernists" (Jan de Vries 1994, 2008; Lucassen & Lucassen 2009). Like those scholars "revolting" against the romanticism of Polanyi's paradigm, Lucassen and Lucassen seek to move beyond Zelinsky's overly simplified mobility transition model. The model, which makes its own romantic distinction between pre- and post-Industrial Revolution Europe, ignores the dynamic nature of human populations in the years pre-dating influences of a liberal state or shifting economic structures more indicative of today's

free labor markets. It obscures the fact that mobility has long defined the human condition. Taking mobility as a fact, the important question for researchers then becomes not *when* did populations begin migrating, but *how* have these migrations changed over time and *what* is the connection between larger social structures and individual desires for movement or inertia?

Attempts to reconstruct migration rates for Europe in the period 1500–1900 shed new light on the linear modeling of a "mobility transition." Drawing any causal relationship between the Industrial Revolution and mobility assumes that early modern Europe was a sedentary society, and historians have convincingly dismissed this static picture by highlighting how Europeans were highly mobile long before the influences of modernization. However, researchers' concentration on relatively short periods of time and small parts of Europe, means that the available data has not been successful in refuting claims that there was indeed a sharp jump in the number of migrations after 1850. A review of the literature reveals that this increase in migration cannot be concretely linked to the modernization process and its side effects, but is, more simply put, an acceleration of "cross-community migration." The availability of cheaper and faster transport dramatically increased the possibility for potential migrants to find permanent or temporary work farther and farther away from home and resulted in a significant change, not to the underlying structural causes of migration, but rather to the scale of it. A migrant's likelihood to move across international borders was a factor of the migrant's distance from those borders. The orbit of one's physical movement was expanding.

Skeldon's Tiered Development Model

Although scholars are increasingly aware of the movement of human populations

across state borders and territorial boundaries in the pre-Industrial Revolution period,

mobility transition theory holds up when applied to the larger scale trans-continental

migratory trajectories that emerged in the twentieth-century and were certainly rare in

centuries past. The trans-continental migration of sizable populations has only been

documented in four particular cases throughout these earlier time periods.[42] Most

relevant to my research among these cases is the movement of large populations from the

Muslim world, formerly stretching across North Africa, in the earliest incarnations of the

West African slave trade. Throughout the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries,

approximately half a million Muslims, predominantly from northern Africa, were

enslaved and taken to Italy (Davis 2007) and hundreds of thousands of West African

slaves were brought by the Portuguese to Iberia and Italy between the 1440s and 1640s

(Almeida Mendes 2008).[43] In some cities, these populations made a significant

demographic impact – as in 1550s Lisbon, for instance, where or 10% of the population

(or 10,000 individuals) was black and Muslim slaves (Davis 2007). The trans-Saharan

Slave Trade[44] was also prominent throughout this time period, bringing slaves to north

---

[42] First among these, at the beginning of the sixteenth-century, approximately 50,000 migrants from the Asiatic part of the Ottoman Empire colonized the Balkans, and the mostly nomadic Turkish tribes settled in Bulgaria (Todorov 1983). Second, in the early seventeenth-century, approximately 270,000 Kalmyks moved from western Mongolia to the borders of the Caspian Sea in European Russia (Hellie 308). Third and fourth are outlined in the text above.

[43] The number of Muslim slaves taken to other parts of southern Europe is not well documented.

[44] The trans-Saharan trade more generally denotes any movement of peoples or goods requiring travel across the Sahara Desert to reach sub-Saharan Africa from North Africa, Europe, or the Middle East. While existing from prehistoric times and still transporting caravans today, the trade was at its peak from the eighth to the early seventeenth century.

Africa, and specifically to Morocco, where one of the region's largest slaves markets stood in Marrakech (Ennaji 1994). Later chapters will address this trade in relation to the history of enslaved labor forces moving from the sub-Saharan to Morocco prior to the modern-day movement of migrant laborers. This time period is also critical for understanding the origins of blackness as a racialized social category in the Maghreb (el Hamel 2002).

These larger scale movements were notable exceptions though, and Zelinsky's hypothesis that small-scale, rural-to-urban migrations serve as a precedent to migrations across national borders still remains the more reliable model for predicting future movement. Geographer Ronald Skeldon builds on the work of Zelinsky, presenting a revised theory, which adapts linear modeling for a more accurate prediction of migratory trajectories. Moving beyond a Eurocentric view, he creates lines of comparison between diverse nations that have experienced similar transitions from net immigrant-sending to net immigrant-receiving. His work further complicates push-pull models of movement that position migration as distinct from other processes of development. Instead, he presents migration as an integral piece of development – it is a process that is both spurred by economic development and a catalyst for further development. Skeldon's model distinguishes between five "development tiers":

> (1) The old and (2) new core (e.g. Western Europe, North America, Japan) characterized by immigration and internal decentralization; (3) the expanding core (e.g. Eastern China, Southern Africa, Eastern Europe), where we find immigration, out-migration and internal centralization (i.e. urbanization and rural-to-urban migration); (4) the labor frontier (e.g. Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Mexico, the Philippines, and until recently, Spain and Portugal), which are dominated by out-migration and internal centralization; (5) the resource niche (e.g. many sub-Saharan African countries, parts of central Asia and Latin America), with variable, often weaker forms of migration (1997: 52-3).

Simplifying Skeldon's tiered development model, we are left with a foundational inverse relationship – where economic development and state formation are high, more complex systems of transnational and internal migration are present. Conversely, where economic development and state formation are low, migratory movement is confined within the borders of a nation. Spain becomes an interesting case study for those investigating the evolution of migratory patterns in the Maghreb, as data suggests that Morocco is following a similar transition from a net immigrant-sending to a net immigrant-receiving country (De Haas 2007). Spain's proximity to Morocco's borders and continued colonial-era entanglements with the Moroccan state further complicate this comparison.

If one can imagine the eight-mile stretch separating the two countries as the narrowest part of an hourglass, then Spain opens up into the internally borderless states of the E.U., while Morocco opens up into the African continent below. This image positions Morocco's northern border region as the holding cell through which all of Africa's hopeful migrants must pass. Spain is situated on the side with expanding labor markets and a rising demand for exploitable laborers. Morocco is situated on the other. Spain's rapid ascension from "labor frontier" to "expanding core country" was aided by its prime placement within the E.U., and arguments that Morocco will soon follow suit deny the realities of being situated on the side with struggling markets and a rising demand for escape. As migration from sub-Saharan countries to Morocco increases, in light of the nation's relative economic and political stability, an inverse of the core/periphery or metropole/colony relationship emerges, again challenging binary thinking in migration studies. Skeldon's amended modeling does not account for the strengthening of European

borders, for Morocco's critical placement just beyond the E.U., or for the steady hand that Spain has placed over Moroccan immigration policy. Bolstered security measures across southern Europe mean the movement of formerly colonized African citizens not towards a metropole, but instead towards another emancipated colony – a unique form of movement from the global south to the global south is emerging.[45]

Martin and Taylor's Migration Hump Theory

Phillip Martin and Edward Taylor's joint research moved beyond linear modeling to introduce the "migration hump theory" (see *Figure 7* below), which is still applied by many to explain the transition of "labor frontier" countries like Morocco from net immigrant-sending into net immigrant-receiving in relatively short periods of time. Martin (1993) and Martin and Taylor (1996) argue that temporary increases in migration – or a so-called "migration hump" – is a standard part of the process of economic development and an indication of a nation's imminent progress along linear models of development. In the earliest stages, an increase in per capita GDP and the overall wealth of the nation leads to a rise in internal migration and out-migration, since a certain "threshold of wealth" is necessary in order for citizens to manage the costs of migration abroad (1996). It is only at later stages of economic development that countries transform from net exporters of labor into net importers. They draw on examples from transitioning or recently transitioned countries, such as Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea, to support their argument, again highlighting the connection

---

[45] Parallels can already be drawn between the mass movement of sub-Saharan African migrants from Morocco to Spain along the so-called Western Mediterranean Route and the significant trafficking of migrants across the Central Mediterranean Route (from Libya and Tunisia to Italy) and Eastern Mediterranean Route (from Egypt to Turkey and Greece).

that Morocco has to other nation's "on the brink" of development, but failing to remark on its critical placement at the apex of inter-continental African migration and on the periphery of the E.U.

Figure 7: Martin and Taylor's Migration Hump Theory

Source: Martin and Taylor (1996: Figure 4).

Defining the Migrant: From Slave to Solider to "Seasonal" Laborer

As a rule, labor migrants have historically been assumed to be four things: young, male, low to lower-middle (in cases where a middle-class exists) class, and unmarried (Lucassen and Lucassen 2009). They migrate with the hopes of "build[ing] up [enough] savings to settle as independent producers or become economically attractive marriage partners" (*ibid*: 363-4). While "seamen, soldiers, domestics, and tramping artisans" comprise the most sizable occupational sub-groups in the category of labor migrants, there has been little distinction made between these four in historical studies of migration,

and sufficient statistical data has been located only for sailors and soldiers (*ibid*). The historical analysis of the first large scale human migrations, which comprised the earliest incarnations of the West African slave trade and later exchanges of labor between colonial and colonized states, highlight two important links – the link between post-colonial African states and their former colonial powers' demands for labor (be it sailor, soldier, or seasonal laborer) and the fluid transition that migrants are often forced to make between slave (or forced migrant), sailor/soldier (or conscripted migrant), and laborer (or "illegal" or irregular migrant).

Rather than focusing on the Industrial Revolution as a point of transformation, I turned my attention to this long-standing metamorphosis from slave to solider to "seasonal" laborer. Could the "military revolution" not instead be a turning point in the history of human migrations in the Mediterranean region? From the early sixteenth-century onwards, the military revolution can be characterized by a new use of fire-power and fortification, substantially increasing the size of armies and changing the structure of military service (Parker 1988). Instead of a "pull" confined to periods of war, the standing army became a constant draw for migrants – a so-called "military mouth which needed to be fed at all times" (Parker 1988: 59). "Soldier" thus became an accessible track to professionalization, and young men left their homes in pursuit of the title, spawning large-scale rural-to-urban migrations. The "fiscal-military state," an expression borrowed by Charles Tilly, fell in line, converting taxpayers' money into military salaries and facilitating the mobilization of wage labor and its increasing spatial mobility.

It is in this context of ever-expanding militarization that scholars began speaking of a "fiscal labor-migrants' state" (Parker 1988). The relationship between migration,

state formation, war, and economic development has long been present, as is evidenced by the critical "push" (i.e. war) and "pull" (i.e. economic development) factors driving mobile populations. However, the historical data compiled by Lucassen and Lucassen can also be applied to illustrate how the fiscal–military state had a significant impact on Mediterranean migration by mobilizing part of Europe's male population in inter-continental migration flows, as well as mobilizing the post-colonial world in intra-continental flows that would soon develop into an exodus of unskilled migratory laborers. Most notably, labor was needed to bolster France's Colonial Troops, commonly called "*La Coloniale*," which were comprised of north African (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) soldiers. From the 1830s, they were recruited from mainland France and the populations of the empire and played a substantial role in the conquest of the empire, World War I, World War II, the First Indochina War, and the Algerian War of Independence (Munholland 1964), setting the stage from a tradition of labor exchange between the colonies and metropole.

Measuring Migrations: How Far or How Strange Is Your Destination?

In an attempt to organize and better theorize the various types of movement grouped under the term "migration," there have been distinctions made between regional and transitional; inter- and intra-continental; temporary and permanent; and forced or voluntary migration (although there remains much to be debated about what qualifies as "voluntary" when speaking about labor migration). Through studies of migrant communities, scholars have supported claims that the distance traveled is much less important in terms of marking the type of migration than are the "cultural" or "political"

borders that are crossed (Manning 2005). If one were to privilege religious culture in the case of Morocco, this would mean that migrants coming from Muslim-majority Senegal, Mali, or Niger have an easier journey than migrants coming from Christian-majority Nigeria, Ghana, or Côte d'Ivoire. It is the cultural dissonance and not the distance between countries that is most important. However, this privileging of religious tradition overlooks the importance of the history of trans-Saharan trade that Morocco shares with many sub-Saharan African countries, including Senegal, Mali, and Niger, or the influence of shared language across all of France's former African colonies.[46] This theorization also does little to differentiate between the experiences of those going to Spain from Muslim-majority Senegal or from Muslim-majority Morocco. Moving from the study of "Migration" writ large to the study of "migrants," one must consider not only the cultural and political markers that all migrants from one country carry with them, but also the markers of class and race[47] that transcend nationality and define the individual's experience of migration. Cultural dissonance operates on multiple levels.

The recognition of religious, cultural, or political borders as real and important

---

[46] Beginning with Senegal in 1677, France colonized large portions of modern-day *North Africa* (including: Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia), *West Africa* (including: Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Mali, Niger, Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Togo, Nigeria, and Gambia), *central Africa* (including: Chad, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and Cameroon*)* and *East Africa* (including: Eritrea, Madagascar, and Djibouti), where Francophone traditions still persist.

[47] Throughout my analysis, race is considered as a social construction that is real in its multiple manifestations in individual lives and group experiences. One of the most notable features of the social construction of race is the status of whiteness as an "unmarked" category in the field. As Jugé and Perez highlight, "Being black creates comparison, while being white represents the norm" (2006: 193). The "unmarked marker" of whiteness defines people of color in opposition to the self (Jugé and Perez 2006: 193). Yet while it is unmarked, the category enables the sociopolitical visibility of whiteness across the globe. Conversely, the mark of otherness leaves people of color sociopolitically invisible. From a Foucauldian perspective, I consider whiteness as a "tool of power" used to strip people of color of the agency to define themselves (Foucault 1980: 162), whereby one is either white or other.

(though invisible) is a necessary step in giving voice to the lived experiences of migrants, but I argue for researchers to take one step further. Cultural and political borders, like physical borders, still exist outside of the migrant, external to the physical body, and fail to account for the marked characteristics that are uniquely defining of each migrant's journey. A Muslim Senegalese male migrant is racially marked and carries this marking with him across borders. In later chapters, I will examine how shifting sociopolitical landscapes have led to the conflation of particular phenotypic traits and assumed identities, marking, for instance, Moroccan nationals with a religious identity and black Africans with a political identity, both of which carry their own set of inescapable stigmas.

According to Patrick Manning's migration typology, a "cross-community migration" demarcates any movement in which migrants feel the "cultural impact" of their journey, regardless of the distance traveled (2005). He proposes that migrants moving across cultural, often linguistic, borders "gain new insights," and he finds that this type of migration is most likely to "speed up the spread of innovation" in the receiving country (Manning 2007: 7). However, his theory supposes a particular type of migrant – certainly a voluntary migrant and arguably a privileged one. I considered this theorization in light of Hicham and his extended family network, many of whom had described to me the challenges of managing their "Moroccan-ness" with their foreignness. His sisters, Soukaina and Fatima Zorha, who both lived in Italy with their nuclear families, were especially open about the varying, and often times conflicting, expectations between the proper role of women in Morocco's public sphere and the public lives that they were asked to lead in their new, secular home communities. "I

learned that I can't give my daughter a *hijab* and then tell that her she's Italian." Wanting the best for their children, but also wanting to impart their deeply-held cultural and religious beliefs, Hicham's siblings struggled over the most basic decisions, like which language to speak or which clothing to wear. During my time in Morocco, I could see the impact of transnationalism through the changing desires of Moroccans whose family members lived abroad and through influence of western media on those who remained behind. "How can you give Moroccan youth Arab MTV and tell them not to dance?" Soukaina verbalized the frustrations of many – "You cannot show [us] how the rest of the world is living and then expect us not to dance, to drink, to smoke, to have sex, to express ourselves. How long can we lock ourselves inside of our own bodies?" These experiences of cross-cultural exchange certainly underscore a type of movement in which the "cultural impact" is heavy. There is no disputing the fact that the migrants themselves have "gain[ed] new insights," but contrary to Manning's argument, I contend that it is the sending countries in which the impact of cultural change has been most under appreciated (see Hannaford 2014). While the rhetoric of cultural change brought on by expanding Muslim migration populations is wide spread in popular media, the change felt in the *banlieues* of Paris is minimal when compared to the changing face of Moroccan cities.

Manning argues that a positive exchange is less likely to be the case in "home community migrations," where linguistic barriers are not crossed (again, regardless of the distance traveled or the cultural borders crossed), leading me to question, what is it about the collision of distinct linguistic communities that spurred him to make this claim for innovation? And in what ways does language inhibit, as well as empower, migrant communities who have stepped outside of their linguistic "homes"? In Morocco,

language has emerged as a primary marker used to delineate between citizen (or *Derija* speaking) and migrant (or non-*Derija* speaking) groups. However, migrants have also appropriated language as a tool for obscuring their country of origin and protecting themselves against deportation or repatriation. As is discussed in my introduction, sub-Saharan migrants rarely speak their *lingua francas* in the public sphere in Morocco, choosing instead to speak French or English. Language is an important factor to consider as "temporary" migrants remain trapped in the spaces that lie between their sending and receiving countries for longer periods of time. With each passing year in Morocco, sub-Saharan migrants grow increasingly frustrated by their limited work opportunities and are more likely to seek avenues outside of the informal economy, which allow for little to no social mobility. While a lack of Arabic language skills blocks many migrants from more formalized labor, French and English language skills are increasingly in demand in Morocco's thriving tourism industry and will be valuable assets in the coming years, as Moroccan industries make headway in global trade markets. That which marked migrants as outsiders may therefore give them an advantage over Moroccan applicants when English becomes the most valuable skill.

Restrictions to the Study of [Restricted] Movement

It remains true that despite increased interest in the study of migration and new data-tracking and -storing technologies available to researchers, comprehensive datasets on the movement of people between countries are shockingly dearth. A comparison of nineteenth-century rates of African-European migration and the burgeoning rates of migration across those same borders today is stymied by the lack of comparable data. The

fact that tracking the current movement of migrants across Moroccan borders is even remotely comparable to the difficulties that historians encounter in trying to track the sixteenth-century proletarianization of Europe speaks volumes to the efforts that migrants, smugglers, and states have historically taken to obscure borders and those crossing them.

Contemporary researchers still have little to draw on but national censuses (where available and when dependable) and the registration of international migration movements (which presents a dependably higher number of refugees and asylum-seekers). The system used to quantify pre-modern migration was even more problematic than the census statistics that researchers find themselves pouring over today, as it lacked comparable state data on all fronts and was only recently formalized through the efforts of Lucassen and Lucassen (2009). Their latest contribution to the literature relies on assessing whether a particular society was more or less mobile at a given moment, by determining the share of inhabitants with an important (cross-community) migration experience during their lifetime (*ibid*). With the help of this formula,[48] (which underscores the complicated nature of systemizing migration histories) researchers can, at

---

[48]

$$P_i(p) = \frac{\sum_p \left(M_i^{\text{perm}} + M_i^{\text{mult}} + M_i^{\text{seas}} + M_i^{\text{imm}} + M_i^{\text{emi}} \right)}{N_i(p)} \times \frac{E_i(p)}{L_p}$$

Notes: This formula provides the probability $P_i(p)$ of a person living in period p and geographical unit i migrating in a lifetime. M_i^{perm}, M_i^{mult}, and M_i^{seas} respectively denote permanent, multi-annual, and seasonal cross-community (often long-distance) movements inside unit i. M_i^{imm} is the number of immigrants to unit i from outside and M_i^{emi} the number of emigrants from unit i to elsewhere. The notation $\sum_p$ indicates that these migration numbers are summed over period p. $N_i(p)$ is the total population in geographical unit i in the middle of period p. To compensate for over-counting in the migration numbers, the expression needs to be corrected by the second factor, in which $E_i(p)$ denotes the average life expectancy in period p and L_p is the length of the period. In this article, we ignore the second term, since we estimate L_p = 50 years $\approx E_i(p)$.

the very least, formulaically attempt to fill in the vast "gaps" in the history of transnational migrations.

PLACING MOROCCO ON THE HISTORICAL MAP OF TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION

Despite the history of trade linking Morocco to the rest of the African continent, the Maghreb continues to be an outlier in African Studies. Research at the Moroccan border allows us to examine how the post-colonial Muslim world may offer an exception to existing (linear and non-linear) theories of the mobility transition. In the colonial context, the impact of migration on the sending and receiving societies was necessarily unbalanced, as the migrants (here colonialists) tended to settle in isolated communities with distinct forms of interaction, which were often centered on relationships of (indentured) servitude. The social hierarchies present in the receiving societies had already been molded by long histories of exploitation, which in the Moroccan case, began not with the oppression of Moroccan citizens by colonial forces but with the oppression of African slaves through the trans-Saharan trade routes that cut across the Muslim world and left substantial populations of sub-Saharan Africans enslaved in the Maghrebi region.

From Berber to Muslim, the Islamic Conquest of the Maghreb (647-709)

Language has been central to my analysis in multiple ways. Among Moroccans, one's chosen dialect (whether French, English, modern standard Arabic, the Moroccan dialect of Arabic known as *Derija,* or one of the many dialects prevalent throughout West

Africa) always hinted at one's socioeconomic and educational background, as well as indicating one's degree of familiarity with the speaker. The narrative of one Senegalese exchange student in Morocco further illustrates how among phenotypically black populations, language can be used to delineate between Moroccan citizens (whose speech carries the "appropriate" accent), sub-Saharan migrants (who either do not speak Arabic, or whose Arabic is heavily accented), and the category of "elite" foreign nationals, which this particular young man tried to access through his use of English in the public sphere. In the context of my research among sub-Saharan migrants living in Morocco, language served to mark distinctions based on a shared linguistic background, which often indicated a shared religious, ethnic, and national background among certain groups, as well. In addition to the myriad ways in which language functioned to illuminate the separation and alignment of groups throughout my research, language also served as one way in which I heard, recorded, and questioned emergent forms of racial discrimination.

"*Haratin*," a term that was historically used to mark one as a "freed slave," is one such example of this. I heard it again and again, called out by Moroccans when a group of black men walked by or whispered among citizen groups in response to my questions on racism, and discovered that the origins of "*haratin*" are still debated. In his research on slavery in Morocco, Maghrebi scholar Chouki el Hamel suggests that it is derived from one of three possible roots – from the Berber word "*ahardan,*" meaning "dark color" (black or reddish); from the Arabic terms "*hurr*" and "*thani*," meaning literally "the second free man" or possibly "a second class free person;" or from the Arabic verb "*haratha*" meaning "to cultivate" (2002: 38). Moroccan scholars continue to argue for the importance of deconstructing this etymology, as the various understandings of the term

"indicate that there are difficulties in defining the identity of blacks in Morocco" (el Hamel 2002: 39). In one of my first conversations with Dr. Mohammed Benjelloun, Professor of Islamic Studies at Morocco's national university, I raised a series of questions related to the role of race in Islam. I wanted to know, does the Qur'an make note of different racial groups, and if so, is one group marked as superior or inferior to another? How do Islamic teachings inform race relations in the Muslim world today? He was adamant that the Qur'an and Hadith make no mention of racial difference. "Racism is not a part of Islam. It never has been, and it never will be. In the eyes of Allah, all men are equal." In fact, according to the words of the Qur'an, "We have created you from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you might get to know one another. The noblest of you in God's sight is he who is most righteous. God is all-knowing, and wise" (43:13). Just as he would later justify the distinction made between the free (Muslim) and the enslaved (non-Muslim), his discussion of modern-day differentiation in the Islamic World was similarly structured along lines of religious and not racial difference. Yet, I took special interest in his discussion of the "Curse of Ham,"[49] which scholars from different faiths have suggested is a common misnomer for the curse upon Canaan, imposed by the biblical patriarch Noah (Goldenberg 2003). While most conclude that the story's original objective was to justify the subjection of the Canaanites to the Israelites, the narrative was interpreted by some Jews, Christians, and Muslims – including *imam* Fouad al-Hajji, with whom I later interviewed – as an explanation for black skin and a justification for slavery in later centuries (Goldenberg

---

[49] The narrative, found in the Book of Genesis (Gen. 9:20–27), concerns a shameful act by Noah's son, Ham, who was the father of Canaan. For over two thousand years, scholars from Jewish, Christian, and Muslim faiths have raised controversies over the nature of Ham's original transgression and why Noah cursed Canaan and not his own son, if it was in fact Ham who had sinned.

2003, Brett 2000).

One of the earliest Arabic writers to address race, the renowned religious scholar Ibn Qutayba (828 CE-889 AD), also commented on the Curse of Ham, utilizing the narrative as an explanation for racial diversity found between the Arab world and the sub-Saharan. "Ham was a white man having a beautiful face and form. But Allah (to Him belongs glory and power) changed his color and the color of his descendants because of his father's curse. Ham went off, followed by his children... They are the Sudan" (Muhammed 1981: 15). More than simply linking racial difference to geographic placement, his interpretation links the darker skinned descendants of Ham to a legacy of wrong-doing and punishment. But it was the famous Arabic travel writer, Ibn Battuta (1304-1369), and not the Islamic scholar upon whom Professor Benjelloun built his argument. He explained to me, "Battuta opened the eyes of people who could not travel. He showed us that we do not just look different from our brothers in Africa, we *are* different." Famous for his travel accounts compiled in the *Rihla* (or "The Journey"), Battuta theorized on the subject of racial difference throughout Asia, the Middle East, and the sub-Saharan, drawing correlative relationships between race, culture, and behavior. In his 1353 adventures in West Africa, he remarked at the peoples' "feeble intellect and their respect for mean things" and concluded their "pagan attitudes," as evidenced by "bare breasts, sexual freedom, polygamy, and bad manners" (el Hamel 2002: 41).

Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) a Tunisian scholar who followed in the footsteps of Ibn Battuta, is regarded by Muslim scholars today to be among the founding fathers of modern sociology, but he was known to me as a renowned and progressive historian of

the region. He wrote against the existing scholarship that claimed that the people of the Sudan were descendants of Ham and cursed with their dark skin, like Ibn Qutayba had argued, and also against the notion that their skin color was linked to distinct (and undesirable) personal traits, as Ibn Battuta had concluded from his travels. Challenging the accepted viewpoints, he claimed instead that, "the peoples of the Sudan [are] black-skinned because of the intense heat of the climate in which they live… Furthermore, the strange practices and customs of these peoples [can] be attributed to their climates and [are] not genetic in origin" (el Hamel 2002: 42). Extensive trade between the sub-Saharan and Maghrebi regions meant that even before the advent of Islam, blacks interacted with Berbers through trade, and Ibn Khaldun's writing highlight the prevalence of racial distinctions before religious distinctions were a primary point of contention.

Because Islam traveled along migration routes, conversion occurred primarily through trade in Africa, and not through conquering, as was prevalent across the Middle East. After successive invasions by the Vandals, Romans, and Byzantines, beginning when the Vandals first crossed to Africa in 429, the Berbers were forced to move farther south into the Sahara region. Citing them as "technologically superior, thanks to their contact with different cultures [through trade] and the use of the camel," el Hamel claims that the Berbers likely conquered the black populations of the Sahara and "assumed for themselves a superior status [by] placing the Blacks in a lesser, subordinate status" (2002: 43). From this point, a racial binary naturally developed between the two groups with phenotypic differences and hierarchical social relations. Blacks living in what became Berber territory found themselves marginalized in roles of servitude (servant, slave) or roles of interdependence (intermarriage, trade partner) (*ibid*). When Islam finally reached

Berbers along trade routes with the first Arabian military expeditions into the Maghreb between 642 and 669, the status of blacks was further subjugated. Just as Berbers became Muslims, so did blacks (or non-Muslims) become infidels, and therefore the only population religiously sanctioned to be of slave status. The borders with Sudan became a primary point for importing enslaved populations into the expanding Islamic empire in the seventh century, cementing the distinction between Arabs (Muslims) and blacks (servants/slaves).

The Arab Slave Trade (650-1900s) and Morocco's Black Army (1672–1727)

While slaves serving the Mediterranean world throughout the thirteenth century were predominantly Arab Muslims,[50] those serving the Maghreb were brought from the sub-Saharan region, creating a map of movement not unlike that of present-day labor migrations, with the vast majority of Moroccans ending up in Western European labor markets and the majority of sub-Saharan migrants journeys either being truncated in or returning them to the Maghreb. The Arab Slave Trade, which began in 650 and was not officially abolished until 1970, predates the European Slave Trade by over 700 years. Estimates of the slave population size differ widely, with historians believing that between 8 million (Luiz Felipe de Alencastro) and 25 million (Paul Bairoch) enslaved sub-Saharans were taken across the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and Sahara Desert during this period to serve as soldiers, servants, laborers, concubines, and eunuchs in the Muslim world, which stretched over three continents at its peak (Bairoch 1994). Those settling in

---

[50] In *Slavery from Roman Times to the Early Transatlantic Trade*, Spanish slavery is noted for being "non-discriminatory," with slaves being marked as either "white," "black," or "olive," however records show that those taken to modern-day Western Europe were almost exclusively individuals who would be considered Arab by today's standards of ethnic classification (Phillips 1985).

Morocco were concentrated in the wealthier, urban enclaves and came primarily from East Africa (Nubians and Zanj). Scholars of the Maghreb have since drawn on art, journals, and legal documents to examine how notions of racial identity and racialized stratification were shaped by the large numbers of slaves living in Morocco at the height of the trade (Lewis 1979, Khatibi 1983, Laroui 1983, el Hamel 2002).

In his research on the unique history of slavery in the Maghreb and its lasting influence on contemporary race relations, el Hamel claims that Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya remain united by the sentiment of "one Islam, one nation" (*al-maghrib al-'arabi*), which he expands to represent not only the nations' shared history, geographic proximity, and religious solidarity, but also their unification over "one culture, one language, and a silence" (2002: 29). The cultural tradition of silence that he references is, in fact, the Maghreb's "refusal to engage in discussions on slavery and racial attitudes" (*ibid*). Like others who have contributed to the relatively dearth history on the impact of Arab Slave Trade on the Maghreb, el Hamel's examination is based largely on the contextual and historical readings of Islamic legal texts addressing the practices of slavery and social status of slaves in society.[51] Drawing a distinction between skin color and racial categorization, he argues that Morocco's period of slavery set the foundation for the racially founded biases found throughout the country today.

Fouad al-Hajji,[52] a self-described "progressive" *imam*, was introduced to me by a friend who had studied with him in university, and he agreed to answer some of my questions about the role of religion in contemporary race relations. However, he wanted

---

[51] In addition to Islamic legal texts, historians have drawn on manuscripts, collections of royal correspondences, and court records to reimagine racialized categories at the peak of Morocco's period of slavery.

[52] The name given to those who have completed the *Hajj*, serving to replace the Arabic equivalent of "Mr."

to start from the beginning. "In Morocco, you can't talk about race without talking about slavery." Yet despite my daily conversations directed towards issues of racial identity and lived experiences of racism, I was surprised by his response. He was the first to broach the subject of slavery with me, and he wanted to pose the questions. "So why don't you ask me, did the Qur'an play any role in instituting slavery?" According to Fouad al-Hajji and others who I would go on to pose similar questions to over the course of my fieldwork, there are two sides to it. "All [four] legal schools of Sunni and the school of Shi'a sanctioned the enslavement of non-Muslims, regardless of their skin color.[53] Slavery has always been an issue of religion, and not of race, you see?" But on the flip side of this coin, I knew that Islamic law forbade Muslims to enslave other Muslims, again regardless of their skin color.

Fouad al-Hajji, like others, was quick to assert to me, "The Prophet, *Salla Allah Alaihi wa Salaam* (peace be upon him), owned slaves," and thus even those Muslims living by the words of the Hadith could similarly become slave-owners. Mohammed Ennaji was one of a few Moroccan scholars to tackle the issue of slavery in the Maghreb before el Hamel (1994) and is noted for challenging the assumption of many Western scholars that a common religion overshadowed any racial hierarchies that would have emerged between black and Arab Muslims, despite the widespread practice of slavery across the Muslim world. As one nineteenth century British historian claimed, "They [the Muslims] divide Mankind into Believers and Unbelievers who are all potentially

---

[53] Islam asserts that the base human condition is to be free, but with the codification of Islamic law in the ninth century, the religion formally recognized the category of slaves. In addition to being non-Muslim, slaves had to have been born to a slave parent, captured in a war, or purchased from the previous slave-owner. "On a juridico-religious level, the slave ha[d] a kind of composite quality, partaking of the nature of thing and of person, although spiritually, the slave ha[d] the same value as the freeman" (El Hamel 2002: 33).

believers; and this division cuts across every difference of Physical Race" (Toynbee 1934: 226). In response to the popular argument for racial equality across the Muslim world which persisted in European scholarly circles throughout the twentieth century, Maghrebi scholar Bernard Lewis deemed such theorizations an "imagined Construct," asserting that across the Maghreb, race relations were structured by the notion that blacks (Muslim and non-Muslim) were "of an inferior and lesser breed," substantiated by the fact that they were "almost entirely missing from the positions of wealth, power, and privilege" (el Hamel 2002: 33, Lewis 1990: 20).

Morocco's history of enslaving Muslims is rarely discussed in popular debate, but the mass enslavement of previously freed slaves, or "*hartini*,"[54] during the reign of Sultan Moulay Ismail ibn Sharif (1672–1727) serves as one primary and especially troubling example of this practice. According to the *fatwa*, Moulay Ismail ibn Sharif sought to create an entirely black royal army (*jaysh 'abid al-bukhari*) to defend the Muslim world, leading to a public outcry "not so much about defending a group of people from being enslaved, but rather of defending the Islamic tenet that makes it illegal to enslave a fellow Muslim" (el Hamel 2002: 44). As thousands upon thousands of freed slaves were forced into uniform, skin color suddenly became the key marker by which groups were divided – no longer "Muslim" and "non-Muslim," but "Arab" and "*haratin*," "white" and "black." In contrast to free men ("Arabs" and "Berbers," or light skinned Muslims) whom the Sultan defined in his writings as "irresponsible, lazy, weak, envious, and opportunistic," he found black men to be "loyal, professional, strong, servile, content, satisfied, patient, and strong" (el Hamel 2002). However, the legal documents also make

---

[54] "*Hartani*" is a problematic term that holds multiple meanings, denoting both social status as a freed slave and also racial status as a black, and its etymology will be addressed in later chapters.

note of *haratin* as "restless thieves and rebels," indicating, as el Hamel highlights, that

their good qualities were thought to be subject to their status as slaves and that once

freed, their natural qualities made them a danger to society (*ibid*).[55]

Moulay Ismail ibn Sharif's ruling and the accompanying *fatwa* were hugely

"successful," resulting in a black standing army of over 150,000 freed slaves, who served

to expand and defend the royal kingdom during his reign (Abum-Nasr 1987), but the

Sultan's army was dissolved shortly following his death. As each *haratin* soldier was

replaced by an Arab soldier, the Arab men were given the right to enslave the black

soldiers for their own personal use, collecting all of their personal belongings (including

wives and children) as their own. El Hamel argues that this period of re-enslavement was

critical in the merging of three of the accepted social and racialized categories present in

Morocco at the time – "*labd*" (slave), "*aswad*" (black), and "*hartani*" (freed slave) (2002:

49). Most important to note is how unimportant the religious category of "Muslim" was

in denoting between free and enslaved populations, much as I will argue is the case for

delineating between legally included and excluded populations today, despite the

continued rhetoric of Islamic inclusiveness and a Moroccan racial consciousness that

many claim is blind to color. In a later conversation with Fouad al-Hajji and some of the

more elite members of his mosque, we sat together around a table drinking mint tea, and I

listened as they debated the role of race in Islam, "In Morocco, there is no race, only

religion," proclaimed the *imam*, to which one of the younger men replied, "But we don't

---

[55] El Hamel's research was based, in part, on his close reading of "The Registers of the Slaves of Sultan Mawlay Isma'il" (or *"Daftar Mamalik as-Sultan")* dated 1710 and conserved in good condition in the *Bibliothèque Générale* in Rabat, Morocco. In this document, close to 1,000 black slaves who were present in Morocco at the beginning of the eighteenth century are listed with short biographical data, including "their names, slave labels or categories, and descriptions of their physical characteristics (tall, fat, thick bearded, dark skinned, etc.)" (2012: 177).

see religion, we see race."

The Period of French-Spanish Colonization (1860-1956)

Prior to the colonial period, Morocco was divided linguistically (between Arabic and Berber speakers), religiously (between Muslims and a small population of Jews[56]), and racially (between Arabs and blacks). Even among Arab Muslims, there were numerous divisions between the followers of the various Sufi[57] orders; the *shurafa* (or direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), who enjoyed certain privileges; and the *ulama* (authorities on *Shari'a* law) and *Sheikh* (Sufi masters), who occupied an even more privileged status. Divisions also existed between rural and urban populations, often along lines of labor, including: transhumant pastoralists, nomads, sedentary agriculturists, urban merchants, artisans, a landed quasi-aristocracy, and as was discusses in detail above, an emergent population of slaves and *haratin* (el Hamel 2002: 31). Moroccan scholars have used legal documents to illustrate how physical characteristics, and especially skin color, were central in demarcating at least one of these populations in Morocco – the *haratin,* or freed slaves. Recognized not only by their legal status as freed, historical documents also note their skin color as "*aswad,*" or black. The French colonization of Algeria in 1860 marked the beginning of a sociopolitical restructuring of the region, which integrated the

---

[56] Before the founding of Israel in 1948, there were between 250,000 to 350,000 Berber-speaking Jews in Morocco, concentrated in the northern part of the country, making it the largest Jewish community in the Muslim world (Hirschberg 1974). It is estimated that fewer than 2,500 remain today, most concentrated in the same communities in northern Morocco.

[57] Sufism, also called *Tasawwuf,* is the inner mystical dimension of Islam. Practitioners of the religion, or Sufis, belong to different orders (*turuq*) that are formed around a grand master (*Mawla*), who must maintain a direct chain of teachers back to the Prophet Muhammad. Sufis regard Muhammad as their ultimate leader and consider themselves to practice the only pure and original form of Islam.

distinct categories of linguistic and religious identification together under the categories of "Muslim" and "Moroccan." But as I contend, the same cannot be argued for the unification of the categories of "Arab" and "black," which remain distinct today, as is evidenced by my respondents' language, which consistently grouped "Arab," "Muslim," and "Moroccan" together through the interchangeable use of the three terms, while relegating "black" and "African" to a separate category of shared differentiation.

After the turn of the century, the French and Spanish protectorates over Morocco were established, ceding France majority control, and giving Spain the Western Sahara and northern Rif Mountains, where the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla still exist (see *Figure 8* below). Following the conquest of Algeria (1830) and the establishment of a protectorate over Tunisia (1881), France officially established a protectorate over Morocco with the Treaty of Fez on March 30, 1912. A second treaty signed by the French and Spanish heads of state later in that same year granted Spain a "Zone of Influence" in northern and southern Morocco. Spain's northern zone later became the Spanish protectorate in Morocco, but the southern zone was ruled from El Aiun, on the border between the Spanish Colony of Rio de Oro and French Morocco. The Tangier Protocol, signed by France, Spain, and the United Kingdom in 1923, gave Tangier special status as an international zone, and it remained a multilateral trading hub for decades to come. From a legal perspective, the treaties did not deprive Morocco of its status as a sovereign state, but the French took Tunisia as an example for structuring a successful protectorate, stripping the Sultan of all power and ruling the nation through their colonial government. However, the timing of France's late conquest of Morocco, Morocco's thousand-year tradition of independence, and the nation's proximity to Spain have all been cited as

reasons behind the unique relationship that developed between France and Morocco (Segalla 2009). Rejecting their typical assimilationist approach as "a liberal fantasy," Morocco's French rulers attempted to use urban planning and colonial education to prevent cultural mixing and uphold the traditional society, which the French metropole was depending on for future collaboration (*ibid*). Hubert Lyautey, the first Resident General of the French protectorate, promised:

> In Morocco, there is only one government, the *sharifian* government, protected by the French… [We] offend no tradition, change no custom, and remind ourselves that in all human societ[ies] there is a ruling class, born to rule, without which nothing can be done... [We] enlist the ruling class in our service.... and the country will be pacified, and at far less cost and with greater certainty than by all the military expeditions we could send there.[58]

The French colonial government, instead of assimilation, promoted economic development through the exploitation of Morocco's mineral wealth, the re-structuring of cityscapes, the creation of modern transportation systems, and the development of a modern agricultural system that would meet the demands of the French market. This period was significant for integrating the largely autonomous tribes of rural Morocco with urban centers under one modern state (de Haas 2005). It also marked the beginning of new forms of labor exchange between North Africa and western Europe. In the period between 1914-18, more than 30,000 Moroccans immigrated to France, marking the start of burgeoning rates of migratory labor imported from the colony (Hammoudi 1997, Bourqia & Miller 1999), and new rural-to-urban migratory patterns followed suit with an increasing demand for wage labor.

---

[58] "French-Moroccan Declaration." *Department of State Bulletin*. XXXIV (873): 466–467. March 19, 1956. (unofficial translation)

Figure 8: Colonial-era Map of Morocco

The Post-Colonization Moroccan Migration Boom (1956-2005) and sub-Saharan Migration Transition (2005-present)

Compared to the infamously bloody Algerian War of Independence (1952-1964), Morocco made a smoother transition out of the colonial period. Within a framework of French-Moroccan interdependence, Mohammed V negotiated the gradual restoration of Moroccan independence, and in February of 1956, he agreed to institute reforms that would transform Morocco into a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy, in exchange for acquiring limited home rule. Further negotiations for full independence ended with the French-Moroccan Agreement signed in Paris on March 2, 1956. In April of 1956, France officially lifted its protectorate over Morocco, and the

internationalized city of Tangier was reintegrated with the signing of the Tangier Protocol in October of 1956. The lifting of the Spanish protectorate was negotiated separately and finalized in a joint declaration in April of 1956, although Spain has yet to relinquish control of its territories in Ceuta and Melilla.

The decades that followed Morocco's independence have seen drastic changes in migration. While there were a known 30,000 Moroccan migrants in France before the "great migration boom" of 1963, that number rose to 300,000 in only ten years (Bonnet & Bossard 1973). By 2004, the number of Moroccan migrants living abroad rose to a record high of over 3 million (over 10% of the current population of 31.9 million), with 2.6 million residing in Western Europe alone (Sadiqi 2005). Since then, rates of emigration from Morocco have been declining, as rates of sub-Saharan African immigration to Rabat, Tangier, and other urban centers grow. Although sub-Saharan labor migration has historically been intra-continental, over 5% of Mali's 15.3 million citizens are now settled in Morocco (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). With a per capita GDP of $4,900 (PPP), Morocco is an economically desirable alternative for many migrants who fail to successfully cross the Strait of Gibraltar or are deported from Europe to Morocco and lack the necessary funds, documents, or social networks needed for return migration (UNDP 2010). Morocco's dynamic history of mobility supports the research of Lucassen and Lucassen (2009), illustrating that it is not the structural causes of migration that have been influenced by the onset of "modernization," but rather the scale of these migrations.

In response to a record number of "illegal" immigrants from Morocco (including Moroccan and sub-Saharan African migrants) pushing north on their borders in the past decade, southern European nations continue to intensify their border controls. Spain

erected a ring of three six-meter high electrified and razor-wired fences around the entire enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in the early 2000s and recently installed an early-warning radar system at the Strait of Gibraltar. E.U. countries also continue to externalize their policing forces. Spain and Italy exert pressure on north African countries to strengthen their own borders, re-write their immigration policies, and sign repatriation agreements that lead to the deportation of tens of thousands of sub-Saharan Africans with burned papers to Morocco every year (De Haas 2012). Determining the nationality migrants who have burned the paper trail linking them back to their country of origin is an expensive, time-consuming, and sometimes impossible task. In an attempt to address this issue, Spain has begun signing repatriation agreements with Morocco, offering financial support, military equipment, and a small number work permits for highly skilled Moroccan immigrants in exchange for Morocco's role in accepting more and more *harragas*[59] every year (*ibid*). As public attention turns to this growing humanitarian crisis, many are wondering how Spain has been able to eschew international law in their illicit deportation practices and refusal to properly repatriate sub-Saharan migrants to their countries of origin for this long. In 2003, Morocco established a National Migration Observatory, and with the heavy hand of the Spanish government guiding them, passed new immigration laws that institute severe punishments for undocumented migrants (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). Although new laws make reference to relevant international human rights conventions, my research shows that migrants' rights are commonly ignored in practice, and the poor conditions found in E.U.-funded detention centers across

---

[59] *Harraga,* the *Derija* term for "illegal immigrant," means literally "one who burns," indicating both migrants' burned papers and also their decision to burn their pasts in hopes of a better life abroad. *Harraga* is used as derogatory slang to demark those who may look or act like they are of migrant status.

northern Morocco suggest the failure of both sides to provide detained migrants with access to basic social services.

De Haas and the Incorporation of a Transnational Lens

Hein De Haas, a geographer whose research is deeply rooted in the complex history of migrations to, through, and from Morocco, recently presented his own modeling of the phenomenon, calling for scholars to account for "historical-regional" and "time-spatial" variation within each system (see *Figure 9* below) (2007). Most critically, he calls for a transnational perspective on economic migration, which will more realistically perceive the relationship between development stages and specific types of migratory movement as "indirect and probabilistic," rather than direct or deterministic (*ibid*). His work highlights the fact that these relationships are not unidirectional and that a decreasing relative development level simultaneously holds the possibility of transforming a net immigrant-sending country into a net immigrant-receiving country. I contend that combining De Haas' model with "hump" theories of development allows for a more nuanced model of contemporary transnational economic migration and broadens the view of development.

Figure 9: De Haas' Model of the Relationship
between International Migration and Development

Source: De Haas (2009).

Figure 1 – Relationship between international migration and development.

Source*:* De Haas (2009: Figure 1).

When tracking indicators of development, it is important to weigh not only economic and demographic variables, but also the sociocultural variables that play a critical role in the development-migration nexus. As De Haas claims, increased wealth, transportation, and communication aside, sociocultural variables, such as education, internet availability (or access to information more generally), and social capital are responsible for increasing both an individual's interest in and probability of migration (2006). Drawing on the spatio-temporal theoretical perspective first developed by Zelinsky (1971) and later applied to a Maghrebi context through De Haas's research in the region (2007) illuminates Morocco's historical positionality and evolving role in the global flows of human capital. After Morocco's independence from France in 1956, it became one of the world leaders in labor-exportation. In the past two decades, however, it has fallen in line with migration hump theory predictions and begun its evolution into a net labor-importing country. The recent unfolding of the Arab Spring movement across the Maghreb gave rise to a breadth of new "pushes" and "pulls" affecting migrants, smugglers, and the states in between, and demands a thorough examination of how fractured governance across North Africa and poverty across the sub-Saharan have

propelled structural changes in mobility and the professionalization of the human smuggling "business."

The New Face of Migration

Morocco's history at the summit of transcontinental African migration means that it has long been a site of interaction between Arab and African populations, and that sub-Saharan migrants' contemporary experiences in Morocco are therefore influenced by a complicated racial history. Maghrebi migratory patterns from the pre-modern period to the colonial period, and finally, to the state's current place of transition into a net immigrant-receiving country underscore the migrant's transition from slave (or forced migrant) to sailor/soldier (or conscripted migrant) to laborer (or "illegal" or irregular migrant) and have shaped the region's historically racialized hierarchies. In Morocco, subaltern groups like the *Gnaoua*, the *Soussi*, and the *Tuareg* continue to inform local conceptions of blackness (Laroui 1982, Hall 2011). While the *Gnaoua* (name derived from the type of music that they play) are associated with a Rastafarian style of dress and significantly altered practice of Islam that encourages worship through music, the *Soussi* (name meaning "from the South") are widely thought to carry "backward ways" with them on their rural-to-urban labor migrations from Morocco's southernmost regions (McMurray 2000). Like the historical category of *Hartini*, the *Gnaoua,* the *Soussi, and* the *Tuareg* occupy a unique space that can be both "black" and "Moroccan." The most widely-dispersed of the three, the *Tuareg* (name derived from the dialect of Berber that they speak) are a traditionally nomadic, pastoralist people who claim a territory across northern Africa that transcends the lines of the modern Moroccan nation-state (Keenan

1977).[60] In more recent years, this group has made a transition from "nomad" to "terrorist" in the popular imagination, as they were recruited to armed militias for their deep knowledge of the desert region and played an important role as soldiers in Gaddafi's Libyan regime (Keenan 2012). Like the *Gnaoua,* the *Tuareg* are marked by their particular style of dress – the women being notably unveiled and the men wearing distinct indigo blue robes and turbans. Men and women alike are commonly referred to as "blue people," since the indigo pigment of their clothing leaves their skin stained a deep blue hue. Sub-Saharan migrants trapped in Morocco for undefined periods of time are forced to contend with these and other existing stereotypes of blackness, just as Morocco's minority population of black citizens is significantly impacted by the growing conflation of racial and political identity. For Moroccan groups whose style of dress is distinct, clothing becomes the primary means of disassociating themselves from marginalization.

The following chapters will contribute to a long history of research aimed at understanding how migration engenders new forms of social identification and stratification (Chavez 2008, Willen 2007, Ngai 2005, Ong 2003, 1996, Khatibi 1983). I examine how new political categories of inclusion and exclusion are reshaping post-colonial social identities of "black" and "Arab," "Moroccan" and "African," "Muslim" and "Christian." My questions privilege the fluidity of identity by considering how the categorizations of Morocco's emergent migrant class are constantly shifting, depending on the social spaces that are inhabited by or denied to an individual. While anthropological studies of migration tend to be disconnected from more quantitative analyses of the sociopolitical and economic determinants of movement, I aim to integrate

---

[60] The *Tuareg* language has an estimated 1.2 million speakers. Most are thought to live in the Saharan region of Niger, Mali, and Nigeria, but being nomadic, they move across borders.

macro-level changes to the Moroccan state into my analysis. Driven by a desire to develop more subject-centered studies of migration, I question how macro changes (legal reform and socioeconomic drivers) are experienced in the everyday. The transition from slave to solider to laborer highlights different types of movement, but where are the lines of agency drawn? For migrants and citizen alike, the freedom to move, the freedom to stay, and the freedom to choose, are all greatly conscribed by the limitations of one's birth.

Just as the Arab Slave Trade and the period of French colonization resulted in shifting social stratifications in Morocco, so has the modern period of labor migration from the sub-Saharan towards the E.U. Morocco's large diasporic community means that, as Hicham said, *To be a Moroccan today means to be a migrant."* Migration is an integral part of the Moroccan identity, leading me to question how notions of what it means to be Moroccan, Muslim, or Arab are changing with the rapidly expanding class of sub-Saharan migrants. Hicham's brothers, two young men who understood intimately what it meant to be a stranger in a strange place – to be racialized and marginalized as Muslim migrants in the E.U. – were eager to leave no place for the young men occupying the new and marginal status of the "migrant" in Morocco. How could they not see themselves in the struggles of these sub-Saharan Africans trying to put food in their mouths day by day, trying to save a little extra money to send home each month, trying so desperately to carve out a space of belonging in a foreign place? Being a Moroccan means being a migrant. But what does it mean to be a migrant when suddenly being a migrant means being black?

The process of migration changes the individual, not the system. It's the individuals who will eventually change the system when they return home to their communities with new practices, new beliefs, new priorities, and new ways of relating to one another. Take Morocco, for example – it's not that Moroccans are unproductive, it's that the Moroccan system doesn't allow for productivity. But place a Moroccan in an efficient system like those you find in other countries, and he becomes a productive worker. It's the return of these workers from the E.U. who will one by one make Morocco a more productive place. Then, we won't need to leave our homes anymore.

- Hicham, M, 34, Moroccan, service industry worker

COLONY, MONARCHY, MULSIM DEMOCRACY: THE CONTEMPORARY MOROCCAN STATE AND THE MAGHREB AS NEW AFRICAN "DESTINATION"

INTRODUCTORY CASE STUDY: Two Accounts of One Event

My fieldwork period was bookended by murder. I arrived to a nation strung tightly with tension between migrants and citizens, blacks and Arabs, Africans and Moroccans, between those calling out "Murderer!" and those calling out "Yes! Find them! Stop them! Send them home!" On August 12, 2013, only months after beginning my ethnographic research on the emergent migratory patterns at the Moroccan border, news of a young migrant's murder began spreading through Rabat. First drawing on popular media and later on textual analysis, this chapter constructs a keyhole into the contemporary Moroccan state, questioning notions of racial and national identity in light of Morocco's colonial history and the current state of Moroccan-E.U. relations. As in my final chapter, I argue for a consideration of the Spanish involvement in Morocco's legal reformations. Studying migration in a Magrebi, Muslim context raises critical questions about how individuals understand notions of freedom or mobility when a ruling monarch still represents absolutist control through his role as the leader of a nation and also the religious leader of his people.

I will tell you how it happened. A young man boarded a bus from Rabat to Fès. He told the woman who was sitting in his seat that she was in the wrong seat. She refused to move. She pretended that she didn't hear him. She refused to let him sit in the open seat beside her. She pretended that she didn't see him, but she moved her bags and set them there. The husband of the woman boarded the bus and confronted the young man – "Why are you speaking to my wife?" A fight broke out between them, the husband pulled out a knife, and he killed the young man right there on the crowded bus. No one tried to stop him. He was a military man. The young man was a migrant, of course.

- *Chidiki, M, 23, Nigerian migrant*

They both told me, *"His name was Ismaila Faye."*

You let a migrant tell you the story? He won't tell you right. It's not about race.

You know, there's a section of the Qur'an that tells us that color makes no difference. It's what lies in the heart of the man that matters. There's no racism in Morocco, because the Prophet, Salla Allah Alaihi wa Salaam (peace be upon him)*, told us that every man – white, black, red, yellow – every man is made the same.*

It's not about race, it's about culture.

Africans have a different language, a different religion, different customs, so you wouldn't want them living in your neighborhood or marrying your children. I'm not a racist. I have black friends. I even have a black girl who is a friend, but I can't imagine having a black girlfriend. It's not about race. I wouldn't want someone who was obese or wore a niqab everyday as my girlfriend either. Would you judge me if I said I didn't want

someone who was blind or grotesque? To me, it's just not attractive. And can you imagine, I would have a black child! I just can't imagine having a black child. In Morocco, the lighter your skin is, the more attractive you are. Everyone would question why a lighter skinned Moroccan married a darker skinned Moroccan. Certainly someone would think I had lost my mind if I married a real black.

It's not about race, it's about history.

You know, blacks have been in Morocco for a long time, but they started here as slaves, and it's difficult for them to escape their history. It's the same for Moroccans in Spain. No one wants an Arab in their neighborhood. They worry for the safety of their children. The Spanish don't look down on us because of race. They look down on us because we're different. We look poor, like people who should clean their streets. They think we're coming up to take all of their jobs. They think we're all terrorists.

It's not about race, it's about the work you do.

I have a friend who runs a construction company, and he pays Africans 120 dirhams an hour and Moroccans 100 dirhams an hour, because he knows that Africans work twice as hard. Africans are hard working. If Moroccans worked as hard, then he would pay them more. They're going to take all of our jobs soon.

It's not about race, it's about money.

If you hear someone say they don't want a migrant to live in their apartment, it's not really to protect their neighborhood. Would I want to rent my apartment to someone when I'm not sure if they're going to be able to pay rent next month?

You know, I lived in the same building as a West African when I was in school, and our neighbor called him a goat. He always paid his rent early. He smiled when I

passed. At first, I thought there was no racism in Morocco. But when I reflect on it, I start

to remember little things like this.

- *Amine, M, 22, Moroccan, university student*

They both told me, *"Allahu Akbar! Thanks be to God."*

Racism is bad in Morocco. It's a way of life. Blacks are Muslim brothers only

within the walls of the mosque. Outside, they are foreigners. Why did no one on that bus

call Ismaila Faye his brother?

- *Chidiki, M, 23, Nigerian migrant*

The murder of this young man on a public bus sparked two schools of protest in

Morocco's capital city – those for and against the protection of foreign nationals. But the

competing accounts told to me by Chidiki, a Nigerian migrant, and Amine, a Moroccan

university student of the same age, revealed deeper tensions in each man's understanding

of himself in relation to the other. Their stories were not simply about the state of

aggression rising between "Moroccans" and "Africans."[61] They were about how they

made sense of themselves in these changing times. I could not help but notice the

parallels that Amine drew between the treatment of Moroccans in Spain – where, as

---

[61] The desire of many Moroccans to remain largely culturally distinct from surrounding regions, despite Morocco's growing socio-political entanglements, was perhaps best evidenced to me by the terms that Moroccans used to describe their own identity in contrast to the "other," or those who fall beyond "the island" – *Jazirat al-Maghrib*. I noted how the terms "Moroccan," "Muslim," and "Arab" were used interchangeably by my Moroccan respondents, often in direct opposition to the terms "African," "Christian," and "white" or "black."

"darker" and "dangerous" Muslims, they are feared for stealing jobs and demoralizing communities – and the treatment of sub-Saharan Africans in Morocco – where they, too, are feared for the economic and social threats that they present. Amine asserted that hierarchies of racial difference are no different than those regional difference and that just as many *Rabatis* would protest their daughter marrying a *Marrakechi*, any Moroccan would protest their daughter's marriage to an "African." However, the language of cultural difference seems to cloak his obsession with blackness, highlighting the deep-rooted racisms born, in part, out of Morocco's history of slavery. "Is it a crime now, being black? Is it punishable by death? Will there be no retribution?"[62] asked Eric Williams, another sub-Saharan migrant settled in Morocco, when he was interviewed for a local newspaper article on Faye's murder. This particular question, "Is it a crime now, being black?" stuck a cord with the public, being repeated again and again in various clips on the unfolding story.

Spain is located only eight miles from Morocco's northern coast, easily visible from Tangier even on the cloudiest of days, and Ceuta and Melilla bring the Spanish borders within the confines of the Moroccan state. Spain, by way of Morocco, is the primary entry point into an internally borderless E.U. for African migrants seeking to escape the destitution of their home countries or seeking a chance at economic mobility abroad. Sub-Saharan migrants use Morocco as a launching pad into Europe in one of three ways – most commonly, by scaling the fences into the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla or piling into small wooden fishing boats, or *pateras*, captained by smugglers across the Strait of Gibraltar. Secondly, by stowing away in the trunks, engines, or

---

[62] "Morocco's African immigrants fear rising racism tide." Jalal al Makhfi. September 06, 2013. AFP.

specially constructed "underbelly cages" of cars or trucks crossing into Spanish territory. Or least commonly, by carrying forged papers. The practice of hiding in vehicles has gotten increasingly difficult in recent years, as it is now routine procedure for officers at border check points throughout Morocco to attach sonic devices to the hoods of every passing car, checking for the number of heartbeats inside. My work, positioned at the critical border between Africa and the E.U., examines the socially constructed binary of "il"/legality and the ways in which it fundamentally organizes how individuals experience daily life. Most basically, studies of migration are studies of the right to move and the right to occupy space.

I know that Ismaila Faye, a 31-year-old migrant from Senegal, was stabbed to death with a knife. I know that he was awaiting departure from Rabat's central bus station, where I traveled to and from on most days. I know that the man who murdered him (whose name was never released, for his own protection) remains uncharged for the crime. It is still debated whether Faye asked the Moroccan man's wife to move from the seat that was assigned to him, or whether, as some Moroccan sources claim, Faye was already seated and was asked by the man's wife to move, so that she did not have to sit beside him. However, both sides agree that the altercation ensued when the man boarded the bus and saw Faye speaking to his wife. He was stabbed multiple times. In the weeks that followed, public attention turned to a collective of European non-governmental organizations that began organizing a series of protests in Rabat for the regularization of migrants ("*Papiers pour tous*") and launched an anti-racism campaign that went viral in late 2014, called "*Masmiytich Azzi*" ("*Je ne m'appelle pas Aziz*" or "My Name is not Nigger" – See Image A below).

Image A, "My Name Is Not Nigger."

Parliamentary member Mehdi Bensaïd, from Morocco's Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), was the first to publicly declare Faye's murder as "racist." He added that "when faced with immigration, [Moroccans] behave like members the *Front National*[63] in France," making reference to the party's staunch anti-immigration policies. However, the legislative draft for Morocco's first anti-racism law, which was put forward by PAM in the following year, still sits on the parliamentary shelves. It was exactly twelve months after Faye's death, with public attention so recently turned to rising racism in Morocco, that another young migrant was murdered – this time at the hands of a police officer and not a military man.

The headlines were all too familiar. On August 29, 2014, Charles Ndour, a 25 year-old migrant from Senegal, was found murdered. The Moroccan who murdered him (name unreleased) remained uncharged.

> According to eyewitnesses, some Moroccans stormed into the apartment where Charles Ndour lived with seven other migrants in Tangier's peripheral neighborhood of Boukhalef. They led the women to the back of

---

[63] The National Front is a socially conservative and nationalist far-right political party in France, known for their opposition of the European Union.

the apartment and asked all the men but Charles to stand outside, "as if they wanted to make an example out of him, as if they wanted to show us what they were capable of, really terrorize us." They slit Charles' throat open with a knife and pushed him outside to die on the street. He was found face-down in a pool of his own blood. The mishandling of this affair by Moroccan authorities has sparked outrage in Senegalese and Moroccan communities who protest the conditions surrounding his death.[64]

Like Chidiki, I wanted to ask, "*Why did no one on that street call Charles Ndour his brother?*" How could everyone walk right by? But this story, like many other Moroccan news reports that ended with similar tones of concession, concluded: "Though shocking, Ndour's death did not come as a surprise to anyone." In contrast to the protests and anti-racism campaigns launched in Rabat in the wake of Faye's murder, Boukhalef saw xenophobic demonstrations and the organization of a militia calling themselves the "*Syndicat des racistes*," or "Trade Union of Racists." There were many in support of the eventual finding that Ndour's death was the result of an "altercation" between sub-Saharans and Moroccans and that no one party could be blamed. Those who were not in support faulted the prevalence of slumlords operating around Tangier and escalating the tension between migrants and Moroccans through their schemes. Slumlords, or "*marchands de sommeil*," routinely take over the northern Moroccan residences of citizens living abroad and illicitly rent them to sub-Saharan migrants awaiting their chance at crossing into Europe. Serious issues arise every summer when Moroccans return for vacation and throngs of migrants are forcibly evicted onto the streets.

Even outside of the slumlord schemes dominating the rental markets in towns like Boukhalef, migrants face great challenges in finding housing in Morocco. Landlords commonly refuse to rent to sub-Saharan tenants. Those who will charge higher rents,

---

[64] Bachelet, Sebastien. "Murder of Senegalese migrant overshadows "radically new" politics of migration in Morocco." *All Africa*. 23 Sept. 2014.

require multiple months of payment as an upfront security deposit, and are known for taking money from migrants without providing housing or evicting them after one month without returning their deposits. Countless times, I heard about similar scenarios unfolding when migrants took jobs from Moroccans and were left with no course of action for their failure to be paid. As one Congolese man explained to me, "I can't go to the police when I'm cheated or attacked. If I present a problem, then I *am* the problem." The largest barrier to "escape" for most sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco is money. It takes money to leave, whether to return to one's native country or to travel north towards the promise of greater opportunity in Europe, but the routine exploitation and extortion of migrants living in Morocco makes the accumulation of money all but impossible. They are, quite literally, trapped.

"Your landlord can enter your apartment at any time, and he will. He will enter it almost everyday and take anything of value that you have there." Although I never witnessed what migrants call "apartment searches" by a landlord, I did frequently witness what they call "pat-downs" by police officers. Like apartment searches, "routine" pat-downs make it impossible for migrants to accumulate money. They cannot leave money in their homes, and they cannot carry it on their bodies. Even those who creatively cut open their shoes to store bills under their soles or those who had only coins and stored them in the bottom of an old tin full of rice, were eventually found out. I saw migrants approached by Moroccan officers in uniform while awaiting buses on crowded street corners, hawking fruit in the *souk*, or walking down the street with their young children in hand. The officers would search their bodies, search their belongings, and often dump all of their goods out onto the street before taking anything of value that was found.

Many times, I saw a response to this theft ("Please, brother, no!") met with violent assault. I saw migrants bloodied, bruised, and left sprawled out on the street like their belongings, as people casually walked by. Even with the visible presence of an ethnographer, a foreigner, these attacks seemed no less brutal or common. I was occasionally part of the target due to my interaction with the migrants, and in a series of several different altercations, I had officers aggress me, threaten me, and confiscate all of my camera equipment (never to be returned). One of the most difficult parts of my ethnographic work in Morocco was knowing just how little I could to do to help those who were so immediately and outrageously wronged, and it often brought to the forefront a question posed by Ruth Behar, "If you can't stop the horror, shouldn't you at least be there to document it?" (1996: 2).

In the months that followed, reports of murder continued to surface. Moussa Seck, a 19 year-old migrant from Senegal, and Cédric Bété, a 23 year-old migrant from Cameroon, made the headlines next. The first young man "fell" from the window in his fourth-floor apartment building in Boukhalef during a police raid, and the second was chased onto the roof of his four-story building by raiding police forces before also "falling" to his death. Both were deemed "highly suspicious conditions," but no arrests were made following the investigations. One migrant told the press, "We feel the police are trying to chase us out of Tangier."[65] Boubker el-Khamlichi of *l'Association Marocaine des Droits Humains* (The Moroccan Association for Human Rights), publicly condemned the treatment of sub-Saharan migrants by Moroccan police as "savage." He charged that these murders were, in fact, part of a deliberate plan — with backing from

---

[65] Rippingale, James. "Are Moroccan Gangsters Being Paid to Beat Up Sub-Saharan Migrants?" *Vice*. 22 Nov. 2014.

the E.U. — created to deter migrants from attempting to make a crossing. When I interviewed el-Khamlichi at his office in Casablanca one month later, he expanded on this claim. "It's a policy really. It's a way of pressuring migrants to leave our country voluntarily – before they make it any further north. You had better believe that Europe is giving money to Morocco to play the role of their policeman." Tangier's police chief, Abdellah Belahfid, declined to offer me any response on the deaths of Moussa or Cédric, but he did publicly deny that his force was bowing to any European pressure to stop the flow of *harragas*, or sub-Saharan Africans, traveling towards a dream of the E.U. "These raids are a part of routine police operations," claimed Belahfid in our interview – a routine established to fight the sub-Saharan migrants who are responsible for "the trafficking of hard drugs" and protect local communities.

The War on Migrants, the War on Drugs

In response to the popular picture that the media painted of black migrants in Morocco – one that inextricably linked the population to drugs and prostitution – I encountered little to no evidence of either in the circles of men that I knew. Prostitution was occasionally spoken of as a draw for female migrants from the sub-Saharan who were hoping to earn a free passage to Europe (or, as I suspected was true in some cases, for the families of these migrant women, who were looking to earn a free passage through their prostitution). It was also occasionally spoken of as a means for securing funds for the final crossing for those female migrants who had made it as far as Morocco and found themselves trapped. The male migrants with whom I broached the subject of prostitution agreed on a few facts about their present state. One 22-year-old man from Niger

explained to me, with his friend sitting beside us and laughing in agreement, "Sex with Moroccan women, this does not happen. Sex with black women, where are they? Sex with black prostitutes, this costs money, and so this does not happen often. Black prostitutes are for Moroccan men. Moroccan women are for Moroccan men. Even the boys are for Moroccan men!" Drugs, on the other hand, they similarly demanded money, and as these young men explained, money was never in large supply.

When analyzing drug trafficking in the Sahel, one cannot overlook the role of Morocco. Moroccan drug cartels are growing larger and are increasingly linked to their African and Latin American counterparts, as well as the European markets that they all serve (Zehmer 2010). While it cannot be denied that Morocco is a central route for drug trafficking, there is no evidence to suggest that the quantity of drugs brought to Morocco from the sub-Saharan comes close to matching the huge quantity of cannabis produced in and exported directly from Morocco's northern Rif Mountain region. Morocco was, in fact, ranked the world's top producer of cannabis until a 2012 U.N. report placed Afghanistan as the top producer. According to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report, Morocco annually cultivates upwards of 47,500 acres for a total production of 38,000 tons of cannabis and 760 tons of cannabis resin – or 21% percent of the world's total production and over 70% of the cannabis consumed in Europe in 2012. The cultivation of cannabis is a vital source of income for more than 800,000 Moroccans, and the impoverished regions of northern Morocco are especially dependent on the crop (Zehmer 2010).[66]

---

[66] Cannabis accounts for 3% of the gross national product (GNP) of the Moroccan agricultural sector (UNODC report 2012).

Cannabis – or *hashish*[67] - was first introduced to Morocco during the Arab invasions of the Maghreb, between the seventh and fifteenth centuries, and prior to the internationalization of the cannabis trade, it was grown nationwide on a small scale to be consumed locally – smoked in a pipe with tobacco or mixed with honey and eaten on food, it is commonly used in Sufi religious rituals or enjoyed recreationally (Clarke 1998). It was only in the nineteenth century that the Rif region became the center of Morocco's cannabis production. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, an influx of Western tourists had a profound impact on the industry, and with the growing demand from tourists and international smugglers, Moroccans adopted larger-scale techniques to replace artisanal ones (*ibid*). The Rif region was not only suffering from poverty in the years following Moroccan independence, but was also still plagued by the government's memory of former Riffian leader Abdelkrim al Khattabi (1921-1925), who was infamous for his contestations of the monarchy. The Rif region, which was one of the few Spanish territories during the period of French colonization, was the site of multiple uprisings led by al Khattabi, and King Hassan II's decision to exclude the region from his post-independence plan for economic renewal surprised no one. It is been suggested by historians that two events led to the expansion of the drug trade from the Rif – one being the monarchy's decision to de-invest in the region, while upholding the cannabis production privileges that had previously been granted to several Riffian tribes, and two being the discriminatory policies of the palace, which propelled many Riffians to leave for Europe in the following decade (*ibid*). This migration is claimed to have become the

---

[67] *Hashish* is an extracted product composed of purified preparations of stalked resin glands from the cannabis plant. It contains the same active ingredients as marijuana – namely tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) – but often in much higher concentrations than the unsifted buds used in the production of marijuana.

foundation of the "Moroccan network" of cannabis trafficking between North Africa and the E.U.

Although drugs were officially banned in Morocco following independence, the traditional tolerance for cannabis production in the Rif, the recognized use of cannabis as a recreational drug preferable to alcohol in the eyes of many Muslims, and the practical need for diversified crop production as a large share of the national economy, has led to recent debates over legalizing cannabis. In 2009, leader Fouad Ali el Himma received multipartisan support amongst Moroccan politicians for his proposal to re-brand cannabis as a traditional Moroccan herbal remedy, rather than an illicit drug. In 2014, the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) proposed a draft law, which would maintain the consumption of recreational cannabis as illegal, but license and regulate growers, redirecting their exports to licit medicinal and industrial cannabis products. Yet debates over the international drug trade in Morocco rarely center on the selling of cannabis. Instead, Morocco's connection to the broader drug trafficking scene is illustrated by the growing presence of sub-Saharan Africans in the Maghreb and the recent confiscation of large amounts of cocaine and heroin – by stories like the one of Moroccan customs officers who intercepted over ten kilos of heroin dissimulated in copies of the Qur'an destined for European markets in 2012.[68] The cocaine traffic between South America and West Africa is expanding, as is evidenced by the increasing amount of cocaine cargo that accompanies cannabis in transport from Morocco to Europe (*ibid*). But while cocaine and cannabis drug cartels may be strengthening their relationships in response to stricter international laws, my exposure to the drug smuggling scene indicates that it is the higher

---

[68] Roslington, James and Jason Pack. "Morocco's Growing Cannabis Debate." *Foreign Policy*. 4 Nov. 2013.

ranking among them – the "camels" collecting fees for transport and not the migrants paying the fees – who are likelier to be found transporting illicit goods, from "illegal" persons to drugs and other contraband. As one migrant told me, "No cartel would trust me with drugs! They know I will be lucky to make it to the other side [of the Algerian-Moroccan border] with my shoes still on my feet, much less anything of value on me."

AID FROM THE OTHER SIDE

As the number of sub-Saharan migrants living in Morocco increases, so does the racism and abuse. But so, too, do the number of non-governmental organizations and volunteers providing services to those detained or recently released. While there was already a well-established group of organizations working on issues of Moroccan immigration, ranging from the integration of return-migrants to anti-immigration media campaigns (De Haas 2005), the population of sub-Saharan migrants settling around urban centers confronts the nation with a new set of challenges. Multinational offices like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and some smaller European-funded NGOs have expanded their services to include not only Moroccan migrants, but also sub-Saharan migrants trapped in Morocco, in recent years. As increasing numbers of migrants seek new opportunities in response to strengthened border controls and saturated labor markets in traditional immigrant destinations, like those across Western Europe and the U.S., the resulting encounters between the nationalist ideologies of former immigrant-sending countries, like Morocco, and migrants' desires for basic human rights will have wide-reaching consequences. Morocco is setting the stage for

what will unfold on a global scale. There, new forms of social stratification have had concrete effects on all levels of Moroccan society, determining the provision of social services to citizens, migrants, and the emergent population of "invisible" youth born to sub-Saharan African migrants in Morocco.

The frustrations felt by both sides – citizen and migrant – were voiced in the opening narratives of Amine, the Moroccan student, and Chidiki, who I first met at *La Fondation Orient-Occident* (FOO), a Spanish-run NGO located outside of Tangier. He was doing translation work for them on days when he could find nothing else, but he had been recruited to join their "fight" several years before. He had sat through the initial "teaching" sessions offered to new members to inform them of their basic rights as migrants, and I wanted to learn more about his experiences there. FOO struggles to offer a range of basic services to many more sub-Saharan migrants than their small office can accommodate, and like the organization for which I volunteered (*Le Centre de Droits des Migrants – CDM*), the work of FOO was constricted by the complete lack of legalization processes available in Morocco. Migrants seeking applications for temporary work visas, temporary student visas, refugee status, asylum status, or even protection as unaccompanied minors, all had to be turned away, some given a packet of crackers or small *Derija* phrasebook as a consolation prize.

The organizers told us, we can change things. But we said, no, we cannot. Africans don't believe that change can happen. They've never seen it happen. One of the problems is, we're all migrants here. People don't leave their homes to sit through meetings, they leave to make money. You don't come here to tell your stories in a book,

you come to make money. Sometimes I think, who wants to hear my voice? It's not my country. It's hard to form a community from migrants. The only thing we share is the feeling that we don't belong. Europeans feel different. They feel more comfortable because they're home wherever they go. They have a voice. They haven't had to fight every day to stay alive. The little money that I make, I send it home. Like my brothers and sisters, I have nothing left. When your life is easy, you have time to fight for justice. Our lives are hard, so we have no time. My spirit grew tired before the fight began. We don't have the educations we wanted, the jobs we wanted. Europeans have had a fortunate life. It's easy for them to believe in good. It's not the same for me. Justice is a new idea. I don't believe much good is waiting for me anymore. Sometimes people don't understand how lucky they were to be born.

So, I asked her, what good is it to know your rights, if there's no one who protects them?

- *Chidiki, M, 23, Nigerian migrant*

In Morocco, the face of Spain persists as both the captor and the savior. The vast majority of the few services available to sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco are provided by European, and usually Spanish- or French-run, organizations and volunteers. As a migrant, it is the European volunteers who offer you food at the church on Sunday mornings, the Italian doctor volunteering his time who sees your sick child, the French woman who teaches you how to read, and the Spanish lawyer who informs you of your rights. It is me, the American researcher, who brings you new clothes for your children,

helps you fill out your asylum application, buys you groceries for the apartment you share with seven others, or sets up a Skype account for you on her computer, so that you can call home. It is no wonder to me that visions of Europe as the land of great opportunity – that visions of Spanish streets paved with gold – are so easy for migrants to keep alive. Even along the migration routes that the E.U. is so desperately trying to block, even along the individual journeys that they are so eagerly hoping to impede, they appear at every turn to lend a hand. For migrants, the faces of oppression – the extorting smugglers and the aggressing police officers – are the faces of their own people. It is the sub-Saharan "camels" and the Moroccan police who harass, supporting their image of the place that they are so desperately trying to escape. However, moving from the micro to the macro scale, it is not the Nigerian smuggler (not even the Nigerian smuggling ring), it is not the Moroccan officers (not even the Moroccan police force) who are conscripting their movement across northern Africa. It is the neoliberal hand of a European Union whose face is unknown to them. It is the political engine behind the place that they are so desperately trying to escape to. I myself came to imagine Morocco's Spanish borders as a place with arms outstretched, asking to protect the vulnerable and feed the poor, while harboring a brutal border control just outside of the migrant's view. However, in traveling many times across the Spanish borders that line Morocco's northern coast – traveling to Ceuta, to Melilla, and across the waters of the Mediterranean – I realized that the brutality is not as well disguised as I had once imagined it was and that, in fact, it becomes increasingly visible with each step towards escape.

Struggling to manage and ebb the flow of migrants onto European soil, but also knowing that once migrants reach European soil, they are granted certain rights by way

of international law, the E.U. sees significant advantages to stopping hopeful refugees and migrants in Morocco, before they ever make it to Spain. Spanish officials, operating on Moroccan soil, are therefore able to carry out abuses that would be punishable under international law. Stephanie Hecquet Lepoutre – who transferred from her position as Regional Director at the UNHCR office in Dakar, Senegal to Regional Director at the Rabat, Morocco office during my period of fieldwork – became a close friend and source of information on the limited capabilities of the UNHCR office in Morocco, despite Morocco being a signatory to international refugee law.[69] She shared with me the official statistics on "irregular migrants seeking naturalization" in Morocco, including the fact her Rabat office received nearly twice as many applications as an other city in the country. However the number of migrants who were willing to avail themselves to aid (which necessitated leaving a paper trail in their wake) was still small, and the vast majority of them were women or minors traveling alone.[70] There are no official refugee camps in Morocco, and there is actually no legal path to naturalization in the country, although migrants who present themselves are almost never aware of this fact at the time.

It's an incredibly frustrating job here. I want to help, but my hands are tied.

Sometimes I think I should transfer back [to Senegal], where at least there are paths to

---

[69] The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention, is a U.N. multilateral treaty that defines who is a refugee (and not), the rights of individuals who are granted asylum, and the responsibilities of nations that grant asylum. It builds on Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which first recognized the right of all individuals to seek asylum from persecution in other countries. Morocco became a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1956 and to the 1967 Protocol in 1971.

[70] The Rabat office received 3,927 demands in 2014, compared to 1,999 in Fès (the second highest number), 1,249 in Tangier, 782 in Marrakech, and 613 in Casablanca. (There were 63 other cities included in the list for a total number of 15,132 demands in 2014.)

safety, paths to asylum – but then I think that these who have nothing probably need me most of all. There's a humanitarian crisis unfolding in this city. We have a huge population of "invisibles" [individuals with burned papers who lack citizenship claims to any nation] here now. We have all these kids trapped in a country where their basic rights to healthcare and education are denied, and racism and police brutality leave them in constant danger. So I can't give these kids who show up the safety they deserve, but I can use their stories to fight for change. And if I'm not hear listening to them, then who is?

- Stephanie Hecquet Lepoutre, F, 42, French, UNHCR Regional Director in Rabat

THE LONG ROAD: DEPORTED TO NOWHERE

At night, the 225-kilometer stretch of road that runs along the Algerian-Moroccan border between Bouarfa and Oujda has become a route of despair. Unlike any border that I had seen before, this one is a desert border, and so it is always changing. The sand underfoot buries the tracks of those who have walked before you, and from day to day, the peaks of the dunes rise and fall with the wind. This is the stretch of land that is walked by those who have been deported. It is here that I made a temporary home for myself and began collecting the stories of sub-Saharan migrants deported by Moroccan officials, not properly deported to their countries of origin, but deported to a desolate stretch of land deep in the Saharan dunes. Some migrants are picked up by police in their communities across Morocco and brought here, and others are deported directly from the Spanish border – from Ceuta, Melilla, or the southern coast.

The first group I encountered included two dozen young men who had recently been dropped from Melilla. They explained to me that after scaling the fence, they had been beaten with batons by Spanish officials and "pushed back" across the border into Morocco. Abraham, a 22 year-old migrant who left his home in Sierra Leone several months before, waved papers showing me that he was an "official" refugee, recognized by the United Nations, are therefore had "the right to be in Europe." However, we both knew that his paperwork meant nothing if not on European soil. His "camel" had abandoned his group in Algeria, and after finally reaching Morocco on his own, Abraham made his first attempt at "the crossing" – a term commonly used by migrants to reference either scaling the fences into the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta or Melilla or crossing the Strait of Gibraltar by boat to mainland Spain – and was detained quickly before reaching the other side. I could see him proudly waiving his papers before the Spanish officers, much as he had done for me, so certain that they would protect him. But he learned that even on European soil, they meant nothing.

Hidden in the woods surrounding the Spanish enclaves, migrants like Abraham wait for weeks or even months, sleeping on the ground in makeshift tents. As the time passes, their sprawling migrant camps grow. They wait until night falls to storm the fences (a ring of three six-meter high electrified and razor-wired fences) with ladders they have fashioned from tree limbs. As many told me, "If 1,000 men start out, maybe fifty will reach the top of the first fence, maybe five the second, and maybe one will make it across." Despite these discouraging odds, the migrants know that without banding together, none of them will stand a chance. And so they camp, building their ladders and subsisting on what little food they have, knowing all the while that the longer it takes for them to band together a group,

the weaker their bodies will grow and the less likely it is that they will be among the few to master the physically grueling feat of "the crossing." Melilla and Ceuta represent the front lines of Spain's fight against migrants, and there, sub-Saharan bodies carry little value – shot to death, trampled to death, or beaten to death at the hands of Moroccan and Spanish officials, all with little to no media attention. Abraham told me that in his group, no one made the crossing. Instead, they were handed over to Moroccan police officers and forced to board a bus towards the desert that Abraham had spend the past weeks escaping.

I had read similar accounts of forced deportation to the desert in the foreign media – Joseph Shaka, a 20 year-old migrant from Nigeria, said that he had been working in Casablanca when the police came for him. "I am black. And that is why." He was deported on a bus alongside migrant men and women, and reported that ten of the women in his group died on their treacherous journey back through the desert on foot. "You don't want to go back to the people who dropped you, but where else can you go?"[71] Shaka speaks to the physical lack of options for migrants dropped in the desert, but not to the internal struggle that many face in turning away from their dream and walking south instead of north. If border controls serve as the "push" in this case, then the dream of reaching Europe remains an even stronger "pull." Bemba Martin, a 26 year-old migrant from the Democratic Republic of the Congo who had been on Shaka's bus, added, "This is not how you stop immigration. This is how you hunt for blacks" (*ibid*). Hussein, one of the young men who was walking with Abraham on the morning that I met them, told me that he had given up after multiple failed attempts at the crossing and was now living and working outside of Boukhalef. "I was sleeping in my apartment when the police came and told me I

---

[71] Parkinson, Joe and Drew Hinshaw. "Africa's Migrants Form a Second Wave." *Wall Street Journal*. 2 Nov. 2015.

was going to be sent home. They put me on a bus full of other men. The bus stopped in Oujda. They pulled us off, handcuffed us, and then the bus turned south towards the desert. This is the first time that I've been dropped. But some of my friends in Boukhalef, they've been dropped more times than they can remember." It was true that most of the sub-Saharan migrants who I interviewed over the course of my fieldwork in Morocco had been "dropped" at some point during their stay, some of them many times before.

The sub-Saharan migrant community that I came to know so well in Rabat did not fear repatriation to their countries of origin – as this was a practice that was never heard of among them – but rather, they lived in constant fear of deportation to the Moroccan-Algerian border. In Rabat, work was somewhat easier to come by, although it required a move south from Tangier and further proximity from the dream of crossing. While this indicated that migrants had accepted a temporary position in the country, all still held the dream of movement beyond the African continent, and the decision to go to one of Morocco's urban centers was almost always spawned by the desire to save money for the next step north. The "dropping" of migrants to an uncertain survival in the desert gave a visualization of the cycle that so many of them were trapped in. As if a pawn in a game, they were constantly told to go back to square one. *Empty your pockets. Now see if you can escape this merciless desert with no food and no water. See if you can find your way back to the place you are now. And if you do, then see if you can do it all again – and again*. If I met someone who had not experienced this form of deportation firsthand, then they knew of others who had and had been threatened with it themselves. The stories from these deportations always included memories of violent and sexual assaults. "If the police find you, if they want to do more than just take your money, if they want to extort

a bribe from you, too, then they threaten to take you to the border." Migrants who had been unable to pay this bribe and were taken on the bus towards Oujda all reported similar scenarios to me. "They take you to the middle of nowhere, and they drop you. There, any way out is difficult. It is difficult to go home to your own country. It is difficult to come back to Rabat. It is difficult even to survive the night. And the heat makes it so hard to breathe." Those who do survive, begin their long journey towards Oujda (the last town before the Algerian border), where they will find what little work they can and save up what little money they can for the trip back to Rabat or further north towards the Spanish border.

Although I never saw them myself, I heard from more than one dozen first-hand accounts about attacks from gangs of Moroccans who hid out in the woods around Oujda to beat, rape, and steal from those who were passing through. Many migrants told me that their smugglers appeared to work in cooperation with these gangs, telling them when and where they would be dropping their next group of hopefuls. Every one of the migrants who described these assaults to me remembered them not because the violence or theft were anything remarkable to them, but because the gangs hid in the woods with knives and dogs. "Of all the horrors I'd come to expect by the time we reached that last border, I didn't expect the dogs. Ask any of us who crossed there, and we'll tell you how their glowing eyes, the sound of their barking, the feeling of their teeth in your flesh is hard to forget." The site of so many bite scars was hard for me to forget, too. While no official statistics exist, I estimated around 5,000 sub-Saharan migrants gathered in squalid conditions in a crowded, makeshift camp just outside of Oujda in the time that I was there. The migrants, mostly young men, but some women and children among them,

came from across the continent. They represented those who were first crossing into Morocco with the dream of Spanish soil, and those who had already made it – who had scaled the fence, crossed the waters, and felt that soil underfoot – and who were ready to try it all again. This was a liminal space situated inside of a liminal space.

Attention was first brought to the issue of Morocco's illegal deportation practices in 2005, when the international organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)[72] tracked and rescued a group of more than 500 sub-Saharan migrants who had been abandoned by Moroccan authorities to fend for themselves in a desert area – far from any access to food or water. This is where Abraham and the others had been dropped in 2014. MSF's immediate rescue efforts targeted the large number of children, pregnant women, and the more than fifty migrants who had sustained serious injuries from attempting to cross the fences at Ceuta and Melilla before being "pushed back." While some contusions could have been the result of the barbed wire, as Moroccan officials claimed, others were clearly caused by rubber bullets and beatings at the hands of Moroccan and Spanish police (MSF 2005). Despite this brutality, MSF reported that those who were not under their medical attention were eager to set out on the treacherous 600-kilometer journey across the desert to reach the border with Spain once again.

Those who are deported to the Moroccan-Algerian border are the lucky few, who have already survived a dangerous desert crossing in their first migration from sending country into Morocco. In the winter of 2013, as my fieldwork transitioned from Rabat to Oujda, the Maghreb was again shocked by the discovery of 92 sub-Saharan migrant bodies, including 32 woman and 48 children, who had been abandoned in the Sahara by their "camels." According to local authorities, "We found their bodies scattered over a

---

[72] This organization is also known as "Doctors without Borders."

large area in small groups. Some were lying under trees, others exposed to the sun.

Sometimes we found a mother huddled with her children. Sometimes we found children

alone." The few who survived and made it to the nearest town on foot claimed that the

others had died of thirst and exposure after their vehicle had broken down in their attempt

to reach Algeria from Niger. The survivors asserted their status as victims of human

trafficking, trying to make it to Europe by way of Morocco. It is difficult to make a

distinction between the practice of human trafficking and migration, as it is the same

smuggling rings that facilitate the movement of both groups of individuals, but the large

presence of women and children in some groups lead rescuers to assume a lower degree

of agency on the part of the migrant. Hopeful that their story would be believed, this

small group of survivors knew that a stamp of vulnerability would be their only chance at

travel further north.

"Trapped at the Gates of Europe"

In 2013, shortly after this shocking incident, MSF released a special 38-page report

titled "Violence, Vulnerability, and Migration: Trapped at the Gates of Europe. *A report*

on the situation of sub-Saharan migrants in an irregular situation in Morocco."

> Over the last ten years, as the European Union has increasingly
> externalized its migration policies, Morocco has changed from being a
> transit country for migrants en route to Europe to being a destination
> country by default. MSF's experience in country demonstrates that the
> longer sub-Saharan migrants stay in Morocco, the more vulnerable they
> become. Their pre-existing vulnerabilities, related to factors such as age
> and gender, as well as traumas commonly experienced during the
> migration process, accumulates as they are trapped in Morocco and
> subjected to policies and practices that neglect, exclude, and discriminate
> against them (MSF 2013).

MSF's data illustrates that the main factors influencing the critical medical and

psychological needs of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco are their precarious living situations and the wide-spread institutional and criminal violence that they are exposed to. Despite the fact that MSF teams have repeatedly highlighted the criminality of this situation in local and global media, their report highlights that the period since 2011 has seen a sharp increase in violence against sub-Saharan migrants by Moroccan and Spanish authorities. And the problem extends beyond these officials. Violence is common practice in human smuggling and trafficking networks, and shocking levels of sexual violence against migrants (men, women, and children) shape the migration journeys of most. MSF's annual reports, which are widely distributed to national and international governing bodies, select and outline what is deemed to be the single "most urgent" and "most critical" of global humanitarian crises in the given year; however, even their selection of the Moroccan migrant crisis in 2013 did little to facilitate public debate or institute amended policies and practices.

There exists a great discrepancy between Moroccan and European immigration policies – one viewing migration through a security prism that criminalizes and marginalizes sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco and the other placing attention on protecting and upholding migrants' fundamental human rights. However, not enough focus has been placed on the role of the Spanish in writing Morocco's newest immigration reforms. Morocco was, in fact, the first nation in the Arab-Islamic world to develop an immigration policy. The E.U.'s concern for the rights of migrants and refugees comes in tandem with their desire to lock down their own borders, export their border controls south of the E.U., and heavy-handedly re-write a Moroccan policy that widely deports and dehumanizes migrants in transit. There is a tacit understanding that just south of the

Spanish border, there is no obligation to uphold the same human rights standards demanded by the E.U.

My "outsider" status in Morocco was perhaps never more obvious to me than in the shock that I continued to feel at routine military and police aggressions. It served as a reminder that I was in a foreign place – a place that was not mine, a place that had its own sordid history and was largely unknown to me. Morocco has been molded by the exploitations of French and Spanish colonial regimes and a long-standing monarchy that survived colonialism and brought citizens from the iron-fisted rule of Hasssan II to the comparatively benevolent rule of King Mohammed VI. The years following Morocco's independence from colonial powers produced the nation's current sociopolitical climate and European relations, and an understanding of the post-colonial period is essential to any analysis of citizens' (and undocumented residents') relationships with state agencies and officers. Again faced with an array of literature from notable historians and political scientists of the Maghreb, I chose to structure my brief history around the leaders who shaped the post-colonial Moroccan state – beginning with King Mohammed V, who ruled in the years leading up to the European colonization of Morocco and ending with King Mohammed VI, who continues to lead the nation's monarchy today.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MODERN MOROCCAN MONARCHY AND RELEVANT STATE POLICY

Morocco has always been a place where different cultures meet – European, African, Arab – but we are only now for the first time dealing with real issues of

immigration and integration. Our immigration laws, our treatment of blacks, they are reflective of a country that has never dealt with a population of immigrants before. We are country that is still trying to figure itself out.

- *Amine, M, 22, Moroccan, university student*

Literature on the post-independence period in Morocco (Bourqia & Gilson Miller 1999, Hammoudi 1997 – and on post-colonial Africa more generally, Mamdani 1996) commonly centers on social and economic shifts in their relation to the rotating seat of the nation's monarchy. By focusing on the distinct reigns of King Hassan II and King Mohammed VI – in addition to the distinct period of Mohammed VI's rule defined by the state's Equity and Reconciliation Commission (*Instance Equité et Réconciliation* – IER) – I elucidate changing constructions of national identity and consequent changes in individual liberties, state transparency, and the (dis)acknowledgement of international human rights conventions. Morocco's IER, launched in January of 2004, was the Arab-Islamic world's first attempt at a tribunal predicated on the values of transnational justice and stands out as a critical historical moment in recent Maghrebi history, as it marked, in many ways, a disjuncture from authoritative to more democratic rule. The Commission also formalized the recognition of a "citizen-victim," giving individuals the power to speak out against those in power for the first time.

This period of history is especially relevant to studies of citizenship, "illegality," and the mistreatment of migrants in Morocco, as it marked Morocco's *entrée* into an international community and subsequent recognition of international human rights. Although Morocco's IER officially closed in 2006, it continues to spark debate on a

global scale over the ability of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) model to be adapted to diverse contexts (Shaw & Waldorf 2010). On a national scale, it fuels debates over the meanings of terms such as "democracy" and "human rights" (Bourqia 2011) and the challenges of integrating Western notions of rule of law with the nation's long-standing tradition of (arguably absolutist or constitutional) monarchic rule. Introducing a new set of legal inclusions, the Commission carved out a space for Morocco's citizen-victims, which gives hope to migrants whose rights are routinely denied by the state today. It was, in fact, the acknowledgement of these first citizen-victims that led to the integration of other vulnerable populations, like migrants and asylum seekers, in debates over who has the right to a state and how individuals can access state services. Drawing on historical and ethnographic literature from the Maghrebi region, this chapter explores the "Years of Lead," which necessitated Morocco's IER, and the more recently instated policies of King Mohammed VI, which have led to the possibility of recognizing Morocco's newest non-citizen/citizen -victims, and problematizes the possibility of democratic policy reform in the coming years.

The European Colonization of the Maghreb: The Rise of Fall (and Rise Again) of King Mohammed V (1927-53, 1957-61)

In April of 1956, forty-four years after the French Protectorate was first established over Morocco in 1912, the nation gained independence, and Mohammed V resumed his position of leadership, crowning himself King of his newly freed people. Prior to his exile by the French occupation between the years of 1953 and 1955, Mohammed V had ruled as the Sultan of Morocco since his original instatement in 1927.

His rule was characterized by civil unrest in the years leading up to Morocco's independence, but he was largely adored by his people for the role that he played in emancipation and his commitment to formalizing systems of education after colonization (Slyomovics 2005).

Despite the nation's post-colonial return to monarchic leadership, both Laroui (1970) and Hammoudi (1997) have argued that the years immediately following independence cannot be accounted for as "the resurgence of a pre-colonial system" (Hammoudi 1997: 133). Rather, Hammoudi contends that under Hassan II, the "habits and habitus" of the nineteenth-century were reinterpreted in light of the colonial period (1997: 132, Bourdieu 1977), and with greater attention to two particular tropes of authoritarianism – one "with a socialist bend" and the other "guided by economic liberalism in the service of the new state" (1997: 133). He finds, much as Mamdani argues was the case in other parts of post-colonial Africa (and especially in South Africa) throughout the mid-twentieth century (1996), that authoritarianism in the form of monarchic rule had evolved – "drap[ing] itself into a new legitimacy after independence" (Hammoudi 1997: 133). With this evolution came a desire by the people to rebuild state institutions in a distinctly Moroccan fashion (Khatibi 1983, Laroui 1970), and also a desire by the monarchy to reinstate absolutist control over a population fresh out of popular dissent against French governmental rule (Hammoudi 1997).

Recent scholarship has argued that the establishment of this "new" form of authoritarianism was fomented by the monarchy's linking of modern state power to the historic "house of power" (Bourqia & Gilson Miller 1999, Hammoudi 1997, 1999, Combs-Schilling 1999). Combs-Schilling's work (1999), in particular, investigates how

authoritarianism was performed and reinstated on the national stage. She argues that celebrations of the Prophet's birthday held by the reigning Kings in 1593 and 1993 were similarly orchestrated with the monarch as a central figure – Mohammed VI, cloaked in symbolism that marked him as the moral, religious, and fatherly head of state, much like Sultan Ahmad I al-Mansur had been centuries before him (Combs-Schilling 1999, Laroui 1970).

The "Years of Lead": King Hassan II and the Building of Morocco's Police State (1961–1999)

Following the death of Mohammed V in 1961, his second eldest son, Hassan II, took the title of King and remained in power until his own death in 1999. Hassan II's conservative rule, unlike that of his father, is remembered for his consolidation of power and gross violations of human rights against his own people (Slyomovics 2005). This dark period of Moroccan history, from the early 1960s to the end of the Cold War, is now openly referred to as the "Years of Lead," for the iron fist with which Hassan II ruled (Hazan 2010: 94).

In Morocco's first constitution, written only two years after Hassan II assumed the throne, he reaffirmed the nation's multi-party system of governance, while also granting the King significant power that was used to strengthen the Alaouite dynasty and establish control over dissenting citizens (Hammoudi 1997). When elections were first held in 1965, they were rigged to favor loyalists and resulted in protest demonstrations organized by opposition parties who strongly challenged the King's tactics (Gilson Miller 2013). A protest fronted by the most powerful of Hassan II's opposing forces – the

National Union of People's Forces (*Union Nationale des Forces Populaires* - UNFP) and the Istiqlal party – led the King to quickly dissolve the nation's parliament (*ibid*). Although he maintained the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy, Hassan II ruled Morocco directly until the end of the Cold War. As is chronicled in *The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco* (2005), the end of French rule therefore marked a drastic increase in the practices of "imprisonment, torture, killing, and forced disappearance," which were first directed at suspected political dissidents, but soon became "widespread and arbitrary" under Hassan II (Slyomovics 2005: 34). "If you spoke out once," one respondent remembered, "you weren't ever heard from again." These practices of forced disappearance extended beyond those who vocally protested the King in public spheres, impacting the lives of ordinary citizens whose line of work (including academics, journalists, and others assumed to hold "progressive" opinions) left them in vulnerable positions.

In a study of Fatna el-Bouih, a former political prisoner and the current female face of political activism in Morocco, Susan Slyomovics applies a Foucauldian lens to study the transition of the Moroccan state from absolutist to constitutional rule through the control that it exercised over one woman's body (2001, Foucault 1977). She questions what it took for el-Bouih to summon the courage to speak out against the government once again, nine years after her release from prison. El-Bouih was first arrested in 1974, after becoming active in the *Union Nationale des Élèves du Secondaire* (National Union of High School Students) and leading a strike for the group. Three years later, she was forcibly disappeared in her second arrest. El-Bouih, along with other well-known feminist activists, was placed in Casablanca's infamous secret prison and torture center,

Derb Moulay Cherif, where they were all held without trial for several years. Three years after her initial arrest, el-Bouih was finally sentenced to five years imprisonment for "conspiring against the security of the state," "membership in the Marxist-Leninist group March 23," and "distributing political paraphernalia" (Slyomovics 2001:1). Her political activism did not begin again until 1991, when she became a member, and soon after, a leader, in *al-Majlis al-Watani lil-Transiq*, a council for Moroccan women's groups. The group fought for the amendment of the *Moudawana* legal code, which was the first to give women any rights in marriage, divorce, or child custody. "If we could change that law, we suddenly felt that we could change anything" (Slyomovics 2001:1).

When I sat down with El-Bouih in her home outside of Casablanca in the summer of 2014, I was interested in both her experiences and in Slyomovics analysis of them. How had her embodiment of state power and her (in)ability to speak out for equal rights from one monarch to his son shaped her political convictions? El-Bouih is as close to "celebrity status" as any female activist in Morocco has ever been, and I was taken aback by her modesty. After sending an email to her office, I received a direct response from her – not only agreeing to meet with me, but giving me her phone number and telling me to call her the next time that I was in Casablanca, so that she could make us lunch in her home. She mentioned the work of her own two daughters, who were studying in France at the time, and said that she enjoys "helping students reach their dreams – especially young women." The house itself was reflective of the elite status that she and her husband, Youssef Madad, who is a well-known journalist in his own right, occupy in Moroccan society. However, once inside, her home felt more like a museum exhibit of her long history of fighting for a new Morocco. Every square inch of the walls was

covered – not only with the family photographs and framed pages from the Qur'an that were commonly seen – but with framed newspaper clippings and pages torn from academic texts, important lines highlighted or underscored. Knowing that one photograph of the King is required in every Moroccan home, I asked her how she had chosen which one to display. "I like to imagine him as a young boy," she told me. Yet it was not just Mohammed VI who graced her walls – it was many in Morocco's long line of leaders from the Alaouite Dynasty.[73]

Her experience represents those of many former political prisoners who felt, as she claimed, an "enormous psychological relief with the death of King Hassan II." She explained that it was only in this "new era" of Mohammed VI that she felt the freedom to become fully active in her society again. But despite the liberalization of media, the reformation of the Moroccan penal code, and an increased acceptance of protest marked by the instatement of King Mohammed VI, Morocco remained – as it does to this day – an executive monarchy. Power is still concentrated in the hands of one man, both the leader of the nation and the *Amir-al-Mu'minin* (religious leader) of his people. It was remarkable to me that a woman who had seen eight years of her life stolen from her by her monarchy, and who had lived through innumerable abuses during that time, could still speak about the state with such optimism. Was this an indication of El-Bouih's own resilience in the face of oppression, or did it speak more broadly to the power of a nation whose absolute authority leads with political and Islamic rhetoric?

A "Modern" Monarchy: King Mohammed VI Navigates the Competing Pressures of

---

[73] The Alaouite Dynasty was founded in 1631 by Moulay Ali Cherif and continues to this day.

Western and Islamist Neighbors (1999–present)

Facing pressure from the international community, Hassan II took a slow turn towards processes of liberalization in the final years leading up to his death, creating the *Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme* (or Consultative Committee of Human Rights) in 1990 and ratifying the UN's "Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment" in 1993 (Hazan 2010: 94). But it was not until King Mohammed VI's ascension to power at the turn of the century that the processes of political liberalization begun in 1995 accelerated. Hazan (2010) and Slyomovics (2005) have both argued that it was in the context of Mohammed VI's "carefully managed" process of democratization that Morocco launched the Arab-Islamic world's first Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), a political move aimed at garnering global media attention and bolstering Morocco's image as an "ally" of the West (2010: 94).[74]

The TRC model was first popularized in post-apartheid South Africa, where citizen-victims were heard and citizen-perpetrators were sentenced by a court-like restorative justice body. In his inaugural speech as King, Mohammed VI acknowledged, for the first time, state responsibility for the disappearance of dissidents during Hassan II's reign and brought forth citizen-victims to formally address their previous torture and imprisonment in front of the perpetrators of the crimes (Slyomovics 2005). He outlined a

---

[74] Morocco's special relationship with the U.S. is long-standing, as it was the first sovereign state to recognize the U.S.'s independence in 1777 and currently holds the longest unbroken treaty relationship with the U.S. While this relationship has waivered over the course of more than 200 years, and became less central to American foreign policy following the Cold War years, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 forced the U.S. to refocus on the Middle East and North Africa. This included reinforcing a strong U.S.–Moroccan partnership centered on shared economic and security interests. Morocco is now a designated major non-NATO ally (one of only 15 globally and two on the African continent), as well as a free trade agreement (FTA) partner with the U.S.

national plan centered on "a constitutional monarchy; a multiparty system; economic liberalism; regionalism and decentralization; building the rule of law [and] safeguarding human rights; and individual and collective liberties" (Lalami 2001b: 1), giving many Moroccans hope that their country would emulate post-Franco Spain. Not only economically but also socially, Spain was upheld as a model for the peaceful transition to democratic rule (Slyomovics 2005). In a final attempt to distance his reign from that of his father, the new King restructured the regime's top leaders, removing Driss Basri, the former Minister of the Interior and the public face of political repression under King Hassan II, and in 2002, Morocco saw the freest legislative elections that it had ever known (*ibid*). However, Hazan (2008) and others have publicly questioned the power of reformation in Morocco, when no institutional or political break was made from the brutal Hassan-era of governance.

In January of 2004, King Mohammed VI's Equity and Reconciliation Commission (*Instance Equité et Réconciliation* – IER) was announced to the world, with its three-pronged goal to "shed light on all cases of forced disappearance and arbitrary detention; compensate [and] seek to redress all damages suffered by the victims; and establish a report analyzing the violations of human rights… as well as recommendations to guarantee the definitive break with practices of the past" (Hazan 2010: 96). Within months, more than 20,000 files were opened, some to obtain information on those still missing and others to obtain compensation for years of imprisonment, for torture that was endured, or for loved ones who were lost (*ibid*). Morocco's IER differed from the South African, Chilean, and Argentine Commissions on which it was modeled in that it covered the longest period to be investigated (beginning with Moroccan independence from

France in 1956 and ending forty-three years later with the death of king Hassan II). South American, African, and Asian TRCs had all tended to follow a similar model, being created under a period of political change and with the involvement of the social sphere (Shaw & Waldorf 2010). Morocco's IER, in contrast, was not the product of a new political power or social movement. It was a construction of the state's continuing system of governance and reflective of Mohammed VI's efforts to restore a positive national identity to the "Western Kingdom" on the global stage.

In his decision to create a TRC modeled program, Mohammed VI was shedding light on the past abuses of his dynasty, although there was no acknowledgement of the fact that as a member of the United Nations since 1956, Morocco held an obligation to address such abuses under international law. Mohammed VI's IER differed not only in the circumstances of its creation, but also in its internal functioning. In contrast to South Africa's TRC, Morocco chose against offering state agents the possibility of amnesty in exchange for full disclosure of the crimes they committed, and therefore had little cooperation from state, police, or military forces in investigations of the claims brought before the commission (Wilson 2001, Hazan 2008). Even more problematic was the IER's decision to forbid any naming in the collection of information from citizen-victims in public trials (Amnesty Int'l 2010). IER commissioners have explained, in defense of this decision, that while the commission itself lacked the authority to name or prosecute perpetrators, nothing prevented Moroccans from turning to the traditional court system to seek justice (Hazan 2008). Although Morocco's constitution guarantees judicial independence from the legislative and executive branches (Article 82), scholars have agreed that courts could not equitably judge politically-charged cases of past abuse,

especially as they involved officials who continued to hold powerful offices (Hazan 2008).

While the international community recognizes the potential of transnational justice to ensure the emergence of truth about past abuses, the U.N. maintains that sentencing of suspected perpetrators of serious violations must still be determined in a traditional court of law (Principle 24). Morocco's IER Mandate clearly states that, "The commission is not a judicial body and cannot assign responsibility to individuals for violations" (Article 6). Thus, even if the IER had succeeded in producing an exhaustive account of the repression and mass violations that were practiced during Hassan II's reign (1956-1999), and even if it had provided compensation to all of the citizen-victims, the Mandate accepts that it could not have ended the impunity that the perpetrators of past human rights abuses continue to enjoy to this day. The inability for perpetrators to be named or criminal offenders to be prosecuted in Morocco's IER led many in the international justice community to question if reconciliation can take place through monetary restitutions alone – or if Morocco's model overlooked the deeper values of punishment, political change, and restoration embedded in notions of transnational justice (Hazan 2010, Shaw & Waldorf 2010). These questions remain important, as Morocco's adaptation of a western legal construct to an Islamic context has been credited with the spread of similar programs throughout the region in the post-Arab Spring world – namely, in Lebanon's Commission on Disappearances and Abductions and Commission of Inquiry, in the Iraq Special Tribunal, and in the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. In the wake of the political revolutions that would reshape North Africa, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton launched a new "Strategic Dialogue" with

Morocco, in which she praised King Mohammed VI and his nation as "a leader and a model" for the region. The White House hoped that this new strategic relationship would not only strengthen an already long history of close cooperation between Morocco and the U.S., but most importantly, that it would establish a new anchor for U.S. efforts to realize the vision shared by President Obama and reigning King Mohammed VI – a vision for a Maghreb that stands strong against those who would undermine it through extremist violence and Islamism.[75]

The Arab Spring and the Moroccan "Exception"

The double role held by the leaders of many Arab-Islamic countries, who are seen as descendants of both a royal line and the line of the Prophet, is more than symbolic. It shapes citizens' relationships with the state in complex ways, and as some have argued, it played a critical role in creating what has been termed the Moroccan "exception" in the stream of citizen revolts that led to the upheaval of long-standing political traditions across the Maghrebi region in 2010-11 (Rogers 2012). While Moroccans stress the need for "more democratized institutions" or "a solely constitutional monarchy," they similarly emphasize the centrality of Allah and religious tradition in their daily lives (Cherribi & Pesce 2012). These competing desires pull in opposite directions, as the King's role of political leadership is detrimental to political reform, but his role of religious leadership is essential to continued Islamic tradition. Cherribi's research contends that such a tension can result in "social paralysis" (2012: 320), just as Mamdani argues that current

---

[75] Clinton, Hillary. "Remarks at the Opening Plenary of the U.S.-Morocco Strategic Dialogue," Washington, D.C., 13 Sept. 2012. Recorded lecture. Complete transcript (including remarks by Moroccan Foreign Minister Saad-Eddine al Othmani) available through the U.S. Department of State website.

structures of power throughout Africa more broadly tend to "fragment resistance in contemporary African states" (1996: 3). In *Muslim Politics* (2004), Eickelman and Piscatori examine the cultural and political implications of the recent transnational shift in Islam, as an increasing number of migrants bring their religious customs to non-Muslim majority world regions, and subsequently influence the traditional practices of former immigrant-sending countries like Morocco (de Haas 2007). An emerging generation of young Muslims, commonly the products of secular schooling in Europe or the U.S., have learned to take advantage of social media to begin reshaping not only religious practice, but also political expectation. As was the case with Arab Spring movements throughout the region, the restructuring of their own traditional religious values that were brought on by migration led them to organize in defiance of state authorities and national/religious leaders (Rogers 2012).

Morocco, long considered by international media to be one of the more stable countries in the Arab-Islamic world, was not immune to the wave of protest sweeping North Africa. With the ousting of Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, the Maghreb erupted in "popular protests for democracy and dignity" (Lalami 2011a: 1). Spurred by the protests in neighboring countries, a group of young Moroccan activists, calling themselves "Democracy and Freedom Now" (notably without a French translation), drew on modern social networking technology to organize their own day of protest. Among the formal list of demands presented to King Mohammed VI after the February 20th movement in Rabat were "constitutional reforms; the dissolution of the present parliament; the creation of a temporary transitional government; an independent judiciary; accountability for elected officials; language rights for Berber speakers; and the

release of all political prisoners" (*ibid*). In reaction to these demands, Morocco's Minister of Communication, Khalid Naciri, explained that the nation "embarked on an irreversible process of democracy a long time ago," crediting King Mohammed VI for placing them on the path to democratization and undermining the demands of the nation's (largely unemployed) urban youth population (*ibid*). The military, playing no active role in the protests but to ensure the current government's stability, remains firmly under the control of the King.

In contrast to protesters in other North African countries, Moroccans who joined the February 20th movement did not call for the end of Mohammed VI's reign, but rather for a parliamentary model (Jamaï 2013). Scholars of the region now question whether this protest demanded too little (Cherribi & Pesce 2012, Boudoudou 2004, Jamaï 2013). In a recent interview with me, Moroccan journalist and social activist Aboubakr Jamaï explained, "Organizers were fearful that they would scare away the middle classes that are still attached to the monarchy and couldn't demand real change, as the Tunisians and Egyptians did, or as the Yeminis and Syrians are doing now" (Jamaï 2014). While the protest failed to demand or produce fundamental shifts in the government, Jamaï contends that the movement did succeed in creating a "constitutional moment," in which a diversity of interest groups and politicians were forced to grapple with the state of the nation in a common space (*ibid*). He holds hope that this promises a better post-revolution future for Morocco, when substantive changes do come. "If progressives and conservatives do not meet before the revolution [as was the case in Egypt], then when one side gains power, they have no reason to concede to the demands of the other" (*ibid*). His argument suggests that Morocco still has the opportunity to learn from the mistakes

of other Arab Spring nations, continuing to serve as an "exception," both in the circumstances of its revolution and most critically, in its smoother transition to democratic rule.

In Morocco, royal authority has been held by a succession of sultan-kings since the early ninth-century – a phenomenon almost without equal in world history. Bourqia and Gilson Miller tackle this question of Morocco's "exceptional" status as a Muslim ally to the western world and the nation's unique legacy of monarchic rule. *In the Shadow of the Sultan* searches for the "connections between state power and the individual," centering on the work of past anthropologists – most notably, Clifford Geertz – who have been interested in power as it is performed and symbolized in Morocco (1999). Geertz found that Morocco's political life had been dominated by a "combustible" or "extravagant" charismatic authority best articulated by the ideology of *Baraka* and embodied by the figure of the holy man (1999: 213) – this type of authority therefore rendering Morocco as distinct from the Weberian model of the traditional but rational state (Weber 1946). However, Bourqia and Gilson Miller argue against this, claiming that historically, political authority has also resided in the notion of "just rule" – something which a particular ruler may or may not symbolize at any given point in history (1999: 221). The laws and ethical norms giving expression to "just rule" have existed above and beyond the office of the sultan and been confirmed in popular perceptions, rituals, beliefs, and praxis (*ibid*). Due, in part, to its longevity, the Moroccan state in its pre-modern and modern forms has invited scholarly analysis from across the disciplines. Yet much of the historical literature on the state was shaped by colonial scholarship, leading Bourqia and Gilson Miller contend for the continued re-evaluation of Morocco as an exceptional case.

The (Il)Legalization of Morocco's New Migrant Class

At the end of 2013, shortly after my return to Rabat from the eastern border city of Oujda, King Mohammed VI launched what would later be called "an exceptional period of regularization," in response to the growing police brutality against sub-Saharan African migrants and the subsequent attention of foreign media. In the government's first public recognition of a growing migrant community, he opened a process towards regularization for those who met the requirements – one must have lived in Morocco for at least five continuous years; have obtained a two-year work contract supported by a recognized Moroccan company; have been legally married to a Moroccan national for at least two years or a foreign resident legally settled in Morocco for at least 4 years; or be the child (under the age of 16) of a migrant who met these requirements. The following Monday, I saw the long lines of what the media later claimed were over 5,000 sub-Saharan migrants in Rabat alone, queuing to submit an application to the newly opened *Aliens' bureau* (or Foreign Aliens' Office). The government reported that over 30,000 migrants coming from 116 different countries applied, and 18,000 were approved – the majority of those approved coming from Senegal, followed by Syria,[76] Nigeria, and Côte d'Ivoire. However, the approved migrants with whom I spoke were greatly disappointed to discover that "approval" meant being provided with legal residency status in the country for one year. There were claims that the entire regularization "scheme" was only instituted to allow Moroccan officials to collect statistics on the number of migrants present and the number of sending countries represented, in order to organize a more efficient system for future

---

[76] The government automatically granted all Syrian applicants with legal status in tacit recognition of their refugee status.

repatriation. Regardless of the state's intention, when this "exceptional" period closed in December of 2014, migrants were again left with no avenues to legal residency, and those who had chosen to register were left with a dangerous paper trail linked to their legal names.

Understanding Morocco's political state as one that has been simultaneously influenced by the nation's colonial history, years of political repression, recent period of "liberalization," and ongoing struggles over human rights is essential to analyzing citizen subjects' relationships with the state and questioning the placement of "illegal" subjects within Moroccan national discourse. As Amine, the Moroccan student, explained to me, the nation's laws and racisms are *"reflective of a country that has never dealt with a population of immigrants before."* Morocco is a country already burdened with a high unemployment rate, hovering around 22% for Moroccan males aged 15 to 29 and even higher for those who hold a university degree, indicating the lack of jobs available for qualified applicants.[77] It is a country in which the remittances from one migrant often support a large family network left behind. In Morocco, a long history of out-migration has left both a deficit of man-power and of brain-power. It is a nation that, as Amine said, is *"still trying to figure itself out."* In one of our interviews together, discussing politics at the library of the national university where Amine was enrolled, he encouraged me to view African states as a patchwork. If viewed as such, one begins to see that within each nation, multiple layers of identity exist, only one of which is defined by nationality. Drawing lines to delineate one place from another, as was done in the colonial era, spliced regional and cultural communities and gave rise to new modes of (racial, ethnic,

---

[77] "Youth" between the ages of 15 and 29 account for 30% of Morocco's population and 44% of those who are of working age. In this population sub-set, 22% of males and 38% of females are unemployed.

religious, racial, and national) identification. My research highlights how drawing lines to delineate Morocco's citizens from Morocco's migrants in the face of new patterns of movement and a rapidly expanding sub-Saharan population similarly gives rise to new forms of political identification, marking those who are excluded by and included in the modern nation.

You cannot take a child and expect him to run a country. In the same way, you cannot take a people who have never been educated and expect them to run a country. Concepts like democracy or freedom, like women's rights or racial equality, they must be fed slowly to the child, in order for him to digest them. The education must come before the reform, the schools before the democracy. Moroccans, we are all lacking in education. Our children don't have good futures here. Many of them don't even go to school. How can you expect migrants to have access to things like schools or hospitals when Moroccans themselves do not? The migrants' burdens are not ours to carry. We are a country teetering on the edge, and we may fall.

- *Amine, M, 22, Moroccan, university student*

CHAPTER FOUR

GENDERING THE MARKET: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MIGRATION STUDIES AND THE "MIGRANT" / "REFUGEE" DISTINCTION

INTRODUCTORY CASE STUDY: A Neighborhood No One Calls Home

What are you doing in this neighborhood, girl? Your shoes are worth more than our lives. You should go home.

- *Khadija, F, 36, Malian migrant [to ethnographer]*

As conditions of globalization lead to increasingly expanded and extended migratory trajectories, issues of mobility, deportation, citizenship, and "illegality" must be explored from new angles and distinctions between the "migrant" and the "refugee" must be re-thought. Previous chapters have illuminated how understanding periods of "temporary" settlement that situate migrants in liminal spaces between their sending and receiving countries is critical for those who are trapped there – as well as for the states that are forced to contend with vulnerable populations of unwelcome and semi-permanent residents. The following chapter reviews recent anthropological literature, arguing that the emergent patterns of movement found across the Maghreb are indicative of larger global shifts that are underway. Just as my last chapters contend for the need to revise anthropological methods in order to better engage with contemporary transnational populations, this chapter draws on the work of established scholars of migration to argue for the need to first re-conceptualize the basic terms and theoretical approaches applied in

studies of the "migrant." Specially, I build a case for the need to acknowledge the increasing overlap between the defining factors of migrant and refugee populations. As is evidenced through the narratives of my respondents, language and terminology is critical, as it is responsible for shaping the journeys that unfold. In the current political climate with media attention turned towards the "Mediterranean Migration Crisis" and the E.U. faced with new floods of Syrian refugees, the distinctions drawn between groups will drive sweeping policy reforms and determine the future of millions.

Girl, don't know where you are? You're on the black side of the street now. Those boys are talking to you. Don't you hear them? Don't you talk back.

Like the vast majority of female migrants temporarily settled in Rabat, Khadija spent her days hawking goods around the *medina*. Shortly after the first *adnan*, she began her journey from Taquadoum to the city center. She walked towards the bus stop with a brightly patterned cloth that held all of her wares, knotted and slung over her shoulder. Some days, her hands would be weighted down with other bags full of food she had prepared the night before – sweets or little phyllo rolls stuffed with minced meat and vegetables. She crowded onto the first morning bus – an act which, as discussed in earlier chapters, required an inappropriate proximity to unrelated males and caused most Moroccan women and many migrant women to await a less crowded, later morning bus. But every morning, Khadija would stand, packed tightly among the male passengers, for the jostling forty-five minute ride to the bus stop in *centre ville*.

Someone's going to hurt you, white girl. I asked you what you're doing here? Don't you look at those boys. You tell them to leave you alone. I'll tell them to leave you alone. Now find yourself a ride home. Someone's going to steal the scarf off your head on these streets.

Exiting the bus, she decided where to start her morning sales. Some days, Khadija would head straight to the bustling *souk* to spread her cloth out on the sidewalk, knowing that it would not be long before the first shop owner emerged with his broom, shooing her along to another open patch of cement.

I told you to go home, little girl. Stop standing there. If you're going to be asking me questions, then you might as well be helping me, too. Aren't you strong enough? Here, carry this.

Other mornings, she would begin her sales in the *ville nouvelle*, spreading her wares out on the main avenues that connected the *medina*'s maze of food stalls and black markets to Rabat's center of formal economic activity – to the central bank and governmental offices, the national university and museums, the consulate buildings and finally, the King's palace. These sidewalks were also crowded with men and women hawking goods, but unlike in the *medina*, where many sellers owned small retail spaces on the bottom stories of old *riads*, the sellers in the *ville nouvelle* were all ambulatory. The space was occupied by three distinct types – those who sold goods from a rolling cart, those who sold goods off of their backs, like Khadija, and those who begged for

money. Khadija knew that she was free from the brooms of shop owners on these main avenues, but she also knew that the more abundant selling opportunities carried with them higher risks. Most of the buildings alongside these main thoroughfares were patrolled by uniformed military men, and these men took it upon themselves to selectively harass the hawkers and beggars who congregated out front.

Now lay these out in a row. Put the pinks ones out first. Kids like the pink ones best. Go ahead, ask them what they want to buy. Don't you speak that language? Aren't you educated enough? Tell them these are the best. What do they want? I can find it. I can make it. I can sell it for less. Aren't you trying to help me here? Smile at that one, he likes you. Tell him what he wants to buy. Aren't you trying to help me make some money today, smart girl?

- *Khadija, F, 36, Malian migrant [to ethnographer]*

It was through watching, listening, and raising questions for those who crossed in and out of my repsondents' daily lives – questions that I often would not have known to ask, if not for the situation at hand – that I was able to re-construct my their lifeworlds, or "the whole sphere of everyday experiences, orientations, and actions through which individuals pursue their affairs" (Wagner 1983). Combining traditional participant observation, as an assistant to the migrants with whom I spent my days, and semi-structured questioning in a "go-along" interview style enabled me to situate Khadija's day in the marketplace through her interactions with (and my unstructured interviews with) other migrant sellers, Moroccan sellers, Moroccans buying goods on the streets,

and those who protested the presence of ambulatory vendors or other "non-professional" subjects in public view. In my months of shadowing Khadija and other migrants selling goods on the street corners around Rabat, I developed a keen sense of who would be approached by a uniformed man and who would be left at their post to beg, trade, or sell their goods for money. Those who were approached knew that their goods and whatever meager amount of money they had earned that day would be confiscated. They knew that their physical safety was never ensured in these altercations and that the threat of deportation to the Moroccan-Algerian border always loomed. It was a dangerous job.

The most elite of the ambulatory sellers strolled up and down the avenue with their carts – all selling a similar assortment of pre-packaged snacks and bottled sodas. The nicer carts had a series of plastic containers mounted on their sides, displaying salted peanuts, cashews, pumpkin seeds, and raisins to be spooned out into little rolls of newspaper and weighed in the hanging metal scales. I never saw anyone but Moroccan men wheeling these carts on the streets, and I never saw any altercation between these sellers and Moroccan officials, despite the fact that they, too, lacked proper licensing for selling goods in public spaces. When asked whether or not this was ever a concern, Youssef, an older man with a stern face, replied to me, "There are too many Africans to worry about me being here." The growing presence of sub-Saharan migrants in the informal economy had actually made the job safer for Moroccans like Youssef. This, coupled with the fact that they posed no real threat to their profits, as Youssef had also asserted that migrants "don't sell anything that Moroccans want to buy," left me questioning their continued hostility and aggression towards Khadija. Further interrogation with the officers who regularly patrolled the main streets revealed that

bribes routinely paid by Moroccan sellers ensured a kind of safety or invisibility that is not for sale to non-citizen sellers like Khadija.

Like Moroccan men with rolling carts, I found the role of "the beggar" to be uniquely occupied by Moroccans in the public sphere. These men and women never had carts and rarely moved from corner to corner, but rather, they sat on the pavement, staking out lucrative intersections and slowly laying claim to their territories through their presence there day after day. The majority of the seated beggars were women and almost always, they were accompanied by multiple young children. The only time that I saw men seated on the sidewalk begging was when they had some form of visible physical impairment – an amputated limb, a disfigured foot, or an oozing wound. Some beggars sat empty-handed, imploring the kindness of strangers with their common refrain – "*Sadaka lah yarham lwalidin.*"[78] They would hold out hands in which passersby could place spare change, or they would set a discarded plastic cup in front of them to collect their day's earnings. Others sat with cloths spread before them, much like Khadija, only these cloths all displayed exactly the same array of goods, and the goods were not for sale, but were for the taking, in exchange for a "small kindness." These goods included small blue packages of stiff paper tissues and individually wrapped pieces of peppermint chewing gum. Occasionally, the children would sneak gum into your pockets and then run after you begging for payment. I was curious about the large number of beggar women and children congregated around Rabat's central train station every afternoon and the large sums of "small kindnesses" that they appeared to accumulate over the course of the day. Shadowing Khadija on the main avenue one morning, I watched as passersby leaned down to place coins in the beggars' hands, to place coins in their cups, to offer

---

[78] A *Derija* saying similar to, "God blesses those who give alms to the poor."

bills in exchange for paper and gum, and I noted how rarely someone stopped by Khadija's cloth in comparison. Did she never consider testing this other approach to "hawking" – did she never consider selling, instead, her own narrative of vulnerability in exchange for the kindness of strangers?

In Morocco, as in other Muslim societies, Islam not only structures religious life, but also shapes cultural values and daily practices. This was especially apparent to me in the kindness, openness, and generosity with which neighbors interacted and in the community's treatment of its poor. The Moroccans whom I came to know took their religious (and neighborly) duty to care for those less fortunate them very seriously – from their offerings of coins and Friday couscous to beggars, to the significant donations of food and money that were ritually given with the end of *Ramadan* and the beginning of *Eid al-Fitr* every year.[79] The five pillars of Islam include faith (*Shahada*), prayer (*Salet*), charity (*Zakāt*), fasting (*Sawm*), and for those who are able, a pilgrimage to Mecca (*Hajj*). Jalal al-Hajji was one of the *imams* whose voice I heard every day in Rabat – his *adnan* playing five times through the loudspeakers mounted on the top of the minaret by my rooftop room at *Riad Art*. My friend Hicham, who prayed at Jalal al-Hajji's mosque, had arranged for me to ask him some questions about one of these five pillars – *Zakāt*. I wanted to know, what was the role of charity in the Muslim faith? And how were the "new" Muslims in his community – namely, sub-Saharan migrants – included in or excluded from the ritual practice of giving? "*Zakāt*," he explained to me through Hicham's translation, not because I could not understand his Arabic, but because he was

---

[79] During the holy month of *Ramadan*, Muslims deny themselves of worldly pleasures, and at the end of this ritual period of fasting and spiritual reconnection, they have a three-day celebration to break the fast - *Eid al-Fitr*. Before the celebration begins, families undertake *Sadagah al-Fitr* (charity of fast-breaking), donating ritual foods and money to the poor.

not comfortable speaking directly to a non-Muslim woman, "is the principle of knowing that all things belong to Allah… So it is our duty to work towards eliminating the inequalities in our community by redistributing Allah's blessings equally." However, the word "community" can be understood in many ways. In Morocco, where 98% of the population identifies as Sunni, and where, as in West Africa, Muslims follow the *Mālikī* legal tradition, the tenets of Islamic inclusiveness can vary from theory to practice. While sub-Saharan migrants from Muslim countries are certainly a part of the larger Islamic community, they are foreigners in the local communities that many Moroccan Muslims feel indebted to serving. In fact, they are viewed by some, like Jalal al-Hajji, as "a strain on the needs of our poor brothers." Khadija, echoing this sentiment, explained that the beggar's post is constructed in response to Moroccan Muslims duty to donate to "Moroccans, not Muslims."

Jalal al-Hajji elaborated on his understanding of migrants as a "strain," explaining to me that when Africans are offered jobs (often in construction or other types of manual labor that pay by the day), they ask first, how much money will I make? "They don't accept work because they need work," he explained, "They ask, is your work worth my time? And if not, they say, no, I won't take that job, I can make 100 *dirhams*[80] a day begging in the street instead!" He told me that he has respect for the migrants who will take any job that is offered to them, who will work hard, and who would never beg. Presumably, he has respect for those who work without asking how much they will be paid for their labor. "There is no racism in Morocco, if that is what you're trying to prove here. We have respect for good workers and disrespect for *harragas*. If you show me one

---

[80] Depending on the conversion rate, 100 MAD (Moroccan *dirhams*) is equivalent to roughly 10 USD.

who works from 8 in the morning till 8 at night without complaint, who works like a Moroccan, then I will tell you that I respect him, even if he is black." What was most interesting to me in this particular exchange was the *imam's* use of the term "*harraga*" and his insinuation that the "illegal" migrant is not only synonymous with blackness, but also with qualities of laziness, greediness, and deception. On the walk back from our interview, I pressed Hicham for further interpretation. "Where are the migrant beggars that the *imam* spoke of?" I spent everyday on the streets of Rabat and had yet to see one who had taken the post of the beggar. Upon reflection, Hicham agreed with me on the lack of migrants begging in the public sphere. "I guess they've stopped begging, since we stopped giving them alms," he offered as explanation, although I remained doubtful that their presence had even been remarkable and that alms had ever been given to the city's greatest "strain."

With a bruised faith in this one of the central Islamic tenants, Khadija, instead of begging, sells whatever she can find. Most days, she sells a random assortment of goods discarded by Moroccans and picked out of the trash-bags set in front of apartment buildings or the heaping mounds of garbage at the dump – children's plastic toys and half-used bottles of cologne. Other days, she sells food that she has prepared – little snacks baking out in the hot sun. And on her best days, Khadija sells clothing that she buys from a Senegalese migrant who lives in her apartment building. She says that her neighbor would rather not sell to her, because the clothing is worth more the farther north that it travels, but they are friends, and in exchange for his kindness, she occasionally brings him the food that he misses most. Youssef, the Moroccan man with a rolling cart, had been right in his assertion that many of the goods salvaged and sold by sub-Saharan

migrants on the streets are in little (if any) demand by passing Moroccans. However, he had overlooked the critical role that migrants play in Morocco's black market economy.

The path of goods traveling north from Senegal to Morocco and on to Europe has existed for as long as the human migrations themselves. "Haven't you ever been to London or Paris? Haven't you ever seen the purses and sunglasses for sale on the street? The Guccis and Pradas? Haven't you ever seen those Louis shoes that look like the real thing for sale on the street in Rome?" Khadija's neighbor asked me with great pride. It is true that this network of counterfit imports from West Africa is pervasive, and it is not limited to clothing alone. If you have ever been a touist in Europe and have ever bought a touristy trinket, there is a good chance that it started its long jouney north in Senegal, and a fair chance that it spent some time for sale on a Moroccan sidewalk before it made its way to you. While the presence of migrants hawking goods on the street has been highly criticized in national discourse and there are large scale efforts by Moroccan sellers to forcibly disperse them, the goods sold by the hawkers – especially the counterfeit designer clothing imported from Senegal, which is second only to bootleg American media – has become coveted by Moroccans in recent years (Benmehdi 2011). The media drives the consumer desires that the clothing in turn fulfills. And ironically, it is the transnational networks of Moroccan families like Hicham's, with their tastes in everything from fashion to music shaped by their transnationality, who put food on the tables of Morocco's sub-Saharan migrants through their contributions to the black market economy.

In his recent talk on "Low-End Globalization" and the burgeoning trade networks between the global south, Gordon Matthews explores the enormous "knock off" industry

of counterfeit fashion made in China and purchased primarily by African traders (2014). Traveling from West Africa to Guangzhou or Hong Kong, traders break international regulations by carrying back supplies for their African markets, and even more to be transported north into expanding European markets. Dealing in what he calls "informal circuits" that cross-cut the globe, they have become experts at navigating customs in both Chinese and African contexts. He finds that for these African traders, the issue is not "morality" *per se*, as they believe that their trade in knock offs is a service to their communities back home, but rather, it is an issue of "fate."[81] Drawing parallels to the powerlessness of man in the face of divine will, customs and legal restrictions more broadly operate like Allah and his divine word. The laws at play follow their own mysterious paths, and while the traders can try to elude law enforcement or bribe their way our of customs inspections, Gordon finds that ultimately, the traders believe that only prayer can be attributed for them making it out successfully. Drawing on the recent work of Peter Little (2015), the problematization of dichotomies like "il"/legal, can be extended from the traders (often migrants) who participate in these cross-border exchange networks to the goods themselves, and even the distinctions drawn between in/formal markets becomes important to question. Little's research on trade networks situated in the Horn of Africa reveals how the wide ranging border policies found from one nation to the next and the differing relationships between border countries (in his case, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia) challenge the ability to make any sweeping generalizations in categorizing trade practices as wholly legal or illegal, formal or informal (Little, Tiki & Debsu 2015), and we could extend this notion to similarly

---

[81] Matthews, Gordon. "Subject: Customs, Copies, and Smuggling: Secrets of Low-End Globalization in China and Africa," Hong Kong Anthropological Society. Hong Kong, China. 5 Sept. 2013. Recorded lecture.

challenge any categorization of goods or the migrants who transport them.

Doing "Man's Work"

Sociologists and economists seeking to understand social change in the context of economic growth have historically studied the function that expanding migrant communities serve in national labor forces. However, there has been far less attention paid to how particular public spaces or roles in the marketplace become imbued with racial, political, and gendered identities in the face of new migrations. By focusing on informal marketplaces as a primary site of citizen-migrant interaction, my research highlights a new class of migrant laborers in Morocco, who are emerging as a consequence of strengthened E.U. borders and arrested patterns of movement. As European nations reach beyond their own borders to fortify Moroccan immigration controls, they are engendering an economically marginalized population defined by their status as "migrant-laborers," and are in turn molding the identities of Moroccan citizens whose race, location, or vocation places them in new public spheres of "illegality."

The *medina*, as the primary place of migrant-citizen interaction in Morocco, illuminates the role of labor in creating partnerships and cementing distinctions between migrant and citizen groups. The association of "illegality" with hawking goods has had concrete impacts on the large number of Moroccan citizens who have historically made a livelihood through the *souk's* informal economy. Consider for instance, Abdul-Aziz, who has worked at his father's fruit stand since he was old enough to count change. Now 16, Abdul-Aziz recounted to me the frequent torments of his peers, who often shout out as they stroll down *Avenue Souika*, the *medina's* main thoroughfare – "He only speaks

Wolof now" or "Where are your papers, kid?" [In translation from *Derija*]. A Moroccan, Abdul-Aziz's work now places him in uncomfortable proximity to his nation's growing population of Africans. The changing migratory trajectories through Morocco have transformed what was once a space associated with lower-class Moroccan labor to one that is increasingly linked to the sub-Saharan migrant-laborer and a state of political vulnerability.

In her seminal article, "Is Local: Global as Feminine: Masculine? Rethinking the Gender of Globalization" (2001), Freeman engages with the dichotomies most central to theorizations of globalizing economies – "global/local; masculine/feminine; production/consumption; and formal/informal sectors of the economy." By positioning the Caribbean "higgler's" work (akin to the "hawker" in the West African context) as a global process, rather than as a result of a global process, she blurs the line between the local and the global, while simultaneously challenging the gendered identities that have commonly been linked to macro and micro processes of change. "In particular," she writes, "the higgler challenges any notion that global spaces are traversed by men and gendered masculine. She also disrupts familiar formulations in which the "third-world woman is defined as either outside globalization or as the presumed back upon which its production depends" (Freeman 2001: 1012). The gendering of a space as feminine is difficult to disassociate from the gendering of the social and economic shifts that have re-defined a space as global (and therefore masculine).

Khadija's own narrative further illustrates the challenges of navigating a marketplaces' shifting sociopolitical landscapes – not only in terms of gendered identities, but in terms of the race and class that is often written on "the local." Although

she usually chose to "hawk" on her own, I accompanied her on one afternoon when she spread her cloth out on the corner of *Avenue Mohammed V* in *centre ville* with two other migrant women – both from Senegal. These women had recently received a shipment of imported facial creams, and Khadija expected high sales. Sitting together on the sidewalk, the four of us called out to the Moroccans who passed – "*Bon prix*!" "*Hak!*" "*Aji!*" "*Zween bezeef*!" – and the women spoke to me about the difficult space that they were forced to occupy. The predominance of migrant women selling goods on the streets leaves them doubly stigmatized, by their "illegal" status in Morocco and by their placement in Morocco's traditionally male sphere of public labor. Fatou explained, "In Morocco, the respectable woman stays in her home. Even to buy her groceries, the respectable woman must bring someone with her – her sister, her daughter. The idea of a woman walking through the medina alone is unrespectable. The idea of a woman *working* in the medina, this is unthinkable!" Fatou and Khadija were forced to occupy a space that was first reserved for Moroccan men, but that, as Abdul-Aziz and others contended, was increasingly reserved for the sub-Saharan migrant-laborer.

I thought about my own unique positionality in Morocco – a position that allowed me to sit at both the men's and the women's table, to occupy both the public and the private sphere, and I and questioned the ways in which it paralleled the positionality of migrant women like Fatou and Khadija. I would like to first underscore the fact that while my being labeled as a foreign (*white, American*) woman afforded me a more privileged space in Morocco, their being labeled as foreign (*black, African*) women afforded them an even more stigmatized and marginalized place than the one that sub-Saharan male migrants occupied. However in both cases, it was the combination of our status as

"foreign" and "female" that opened up an entirely new space in the public sphere. It was this unique subject position of being both "othered" and gendered that allowed us to transcend strict boundaries between male/female and public/private spaces. It was my reading as white, and therefore educated and upper-class, and it was there reading as black, and therefore uneducated and working-class, that led to the great disparity between the types of male spaces that we were newly privy to. Gender united our experiences, while race divided them. Shadowing migrants in their daily work lives throughout Rabat illuminated to me how economic/public and social/private become intertwined through the marketplace, shaping the formation of new kinds of citizen, foreign-researcher, and migrant-laborer identities.

Strangers Sleeping Side by Side

Khadija and her neighbors are representative of the burgeoning population of sub-Saharan Africans from distinct ethnic, religious, and linguistic backgrounds who are coming together in impoverished housing settlements around Morocco's urban centers. Over the past decade, Rabat's lower-income neighborhoods have been on the decline, as more and more sub-Saharan migrants cram into one-room rentals and more and more Moroccans move to lower- and middle-income suburbs, like Aïn el-Aouda, in a process of reverse gentrification. Moroccan cities are becoming accessible to only the richest or the poorest, and sub-Saharan migrants were certainly the poorest of the populations present. Taquadoum was the most heavily migrant-populated of Rabat's *banlieues* during the time that I lived there, and as such, it was representative of other suburbs under transition. As it shifted from a largely homogeneous, lower-income Moroccan

community into a highly mixed settlement with few remaining Moroccan natives and thousands of foreign-born residents from a wide range of sending countries, both citizens and migrants were forced to formulate new and contested notions of belonging.

In their studies of liminality through the lens of *rites de passage*, Victor and Edith Turner popularized the term "*communitas*," a Latin noun originally referring to an unstructured form of community in which all individuals are of equal status, or to the very spirit of community itself. They find *communitas* to be a unique state existing "outside any differentiated respect for rank, moral status and social structures" and thriving "in those precious in-between times when stress about status is low and nobody bothers about rank" (1978: xxxi). Along with the distinct phases of separation, liminality, and reintegration, the Turners highlight *communitas* as a central feature of van Gennep's *rites de passage,* or as one of the social phenomena representative of modes of anti-structure (1969). The term denotes the intense feelings of social togetherness and belonging that arise when individuals, although standing outside of social structures, are united through their common placement in a period of liminality. However, it also indicates an agency on the part of those who do not "stress" or "bother" about markers of social differentiation. The Turners suggest that those within the liminal state are choosing to forgo hierarchical structure in favor of community, and it is therefore not surprising that research on the subject has tended to focus on chosen and not conscripted movement between social categories or physical spaces.

According to the Turners later work (1978), this sense of *communitas* can be found outside of rites of passage – perhaps most notably in the act of pilgrimage. Their work on pilgrimages illustrates a dismissal of established social hierarchy, as members of

upper and lower classes often travel the same well-grooved paths (Turner and Turner 1978). As pilgrims move together through space, they physically distance themselves from their known social structures and symbolically distance themselves from their known social identities, leading to a homogenization of status within the group. Liminality has a long tradition in religious mythology, where it accounts for such central realms as the Catholic Purgatory,[82] the Jewish *Da'at*,[83] and arguably, the Muslim *Barzakh*[84] – each physically symbolizing a temporary space that lies in between. Because some theologians deny the existence of such realms, they can be posited as doubly liminal spaces central to our understanding of the afterlife. *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture* places liminality in the present, and although the Turners focus on the Christian tradition,[85] the *Hajj*, or annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, represents a similar tradition in the Muslim faith. While the undifferentiated self is a necessary precursor to

---

[82] According to Catholic Church doctrine, Purgatory is an intermediate state that is found after physical death in which those destined for heaven "undergo purification, so as to achieve the holiness necessary to enter the joy of heaven" (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1030). Only those who die in the state of grace, but have not yet reached a sufficient level of holiness to enter heaven in life, will go Purgatory, and therefore it is assumed that none will remain forever in the liminal state of Purgatory or descend from Purgatory to hell.

[83] *Da'at*, a Hebrew word meaning "Knowledge," is found in the branch of Jewish mysticism known as Kabbalah and is the physical location or mystical state where all ten *sephirot* (or emanations) in the Tree of Life are united as one.

[84] *Barzakh*, an Arabic word meaning "a veil or a barrier that stands between two things and does not allow the two to meet," is a physical location or spiritual state considered by some to be the Muslim equivalent to the Catholic Purgatory. It is a period beginning with death and lasting until the Day of Judgment (*Bihar al-Anwar*), or as is stated in the Qur'an, "before us is a barrier (*Barzakh*) until the Day we are raised" (23:100).

[85] In *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture*, the Turners examine four types of pilgrimage: "the *prototypical*, those established by the founder or great saint of a religion; the *archaic*, deriving from an earlier devotion and with syncretic features; the *medieval*, from A.D. 500-1400, set in a broad era of theologizing, and with all the faults and virtues of the vigorous and venal popular world of the time; and the *relatively modern*, appearing to be concerned with the abuses of industrialization and strongly female in character" (Turner and Turner 1978: xvi, emphasis added).

the re-differentiation of the self in the final reintegration phase of rituals, there can be a darker side to this liminal period of *communitas*, touted for its dissolution of social status and inclusion of all. The dissolution of differences can, in fact, "encourage the proliferation of the double bind" creating a scenario in which individuals are confronted with two irreconcilable demands or the choice between two undesirable courses of action (Girard 1992: 188). Applied in the case of ritual transitions (1969) and pilgrimages (1978), the Turners argue that liminality induces community building among those who stand in between, but among those who stand in between a past home and a future imaginary of home in Morocco, I found *communitas* to operate in two very different ways.

Khadija shared her one-room apartment with five other migrants – three women and two men coming from Niger, Guinea, Togo, and Mali. Migrants like her recognized the ways in which they were viewed and differentiated not by their nationality, but by their blackness and presumed status of "illegality" in Morocco. In the public sphere, others imposed a sense of community on them, regularly berating them with racialized slurs or calls of "*harraga*," meant to assign them to a physically identifiable group of "illegal" persons. It was true that all of the sub-Saharan migrants whom I came to know lived with and worked with others who occupied a similarly precarious political status in the country. But within the spaces that denoted migrant work and the buildings that held migrant homes, the "feelings of social togetherness and belonging" which define the Turners' exploration of *communitas* were lacking. While others may have imposed a sense of community with sweeping labels of inclusion and exclusion, migrants' social

ties were secured along the lines of shared life history, with nationality often being the most prominent feature.

As the eldest, Khadija had assumed a sort of "mothering" role with many of the young migrants in her building. Like all of the co-gendered living spaces that I observed, with the exception of migrant "camps" located around primary border crossings, the men and women who shared this space were related. She had left her own five children behind when she migrated from Mali, and I could sometimes see her longing for them in the way that she cared for those around her. Khadija was among the hardest working of all of the men and women whom I came to know. She was deeply driven by her dream of reaching Europe, so that she could be reunited with her sons and daughters. "I hope one day Allah will grant me a way, so my children can join me." I asked her once if she ever thought of bringing her children to be with her in Morocco, and she replied that no one would want their children to have to live here. "If Allah won't grant me a way, then I hope for them to stay [at home]." The complete lack of social services available to undocumented migrants in Morocco extends to the youngest generation, and even those who were born on Moroccan soil are denied access to public classrooms. The impossibility of obtaining an education and the endemic racism structuring segregation on multiple socioeconomic levels makes Morocco an undesirable alternative for parents, most of whom would prefer that their children remain in impoverished or war-torn sending countries than make an uncertain journey north. While there were few women and even fewer mothers among the sub-Saharan migrant community in Morocco, the majority of those who I met had stories of losing (or never having) a husband or partner. Leaving their children in the care of extended family, they were as deeply driven by their desire to provide a better life for

their children as many of the young men who I spoke with were driven by the desire to "afford" a wife. This desire for a wife was linked to a future plan for children, and while the young male migrants' movement north presumably would provide their own future children with a better life, as well, their ambitions were never explained to me as such.

Despite the diversity and density of migrants packing into small apartments together in Rabat's *banlieues* and despite their often rotating their sleeping schedules to share the one or two mattresses inside of each apartment, this was not a uniform nor a unified population. I was warned that "Nigerians make fake papers" and "Cameroonians make fake money." "Malians are kind, but uneducated" and "Congolese are strong, but aggressive." "The rich Ghanaians sell drugs and women," and "The Senegalese all think they're better than you." There were divisions present between Francophone and Anglophone, between Christian and Muslim, lighter skinned and darker skinned, west African and central African, those with status markers and those without. Within the apartments and neighborhoods that I came to know well, there were dozens of distinct cultures struggling through the challenges of co-habitation. But outside of these spaces, there was a recognition by the migrants that they were all simply "*harragas*." *Harraga,* (or "one who burns") was one of many derogatory slurs thrown at anyone who was racially identified as someone of migrant status in the public sphere. The intimate spaces that were shared by strangers in Taquadoum shed light on how border regions can bring a collision of distinct cultural traditions, and how it is here that new alliances and divisions can emerge out of the most unexpected groupings.

In my early months of fieldwork, I was warned by one informant, "Those of us who are here, we are all desperate." Abidugan was 24-years-old and had migrated from

Nigeria two years ago. "Maybe some of us try to beg at first, but it doesn't take long to see that you'll never get any kindness from Moroccans. So then we look for work, but you can't get hired by Moroccans either. The Cameroonians have figured out the only way to get by here, because if we want to live to realize our dream, then we have no choice but to "*trompe*" them [the Moroccans]." Although an Anglophone himself, Abidugan uses the French word "*trompe*," meaning "to trick or deceive." His use of this term indicates how in a multi-lingual space like Morocco, terms can become popularized based on the prevalence of their use. The concurrence of stories about "deception" and the francophone Cameroonian population that is thought to run deceptive schemes in Morocco has made the French translation of this particular word the most prevalent, even among English or Arabic speakers. "They [the Cameroonians] have created a scheme," he continues, "in which they ask Moroccans for money to make counterfeit *dirhams*. They need some money upfront to buy the mercury, because it's expensive. But they take this money from the Moroccans without ever returning the counterfeit *dirhams*, which, in fact, they don't have the knowledge or ability to make. They are playing on the Moroccans' perceptions of them as thieving to make money!"

In Morocco, as at many borders, language serves as one way to demarcate those who belong from those who do not. It was used commonly to denigrate and discriminate against migrants in their interactions with citizens. But language is also a critical tool for the migrants themselves. The use of French or English was a means of erasing their pasts and protecting their futures against repatriation or deportation in the public sphere. It served to align them all as ambiguously "foreign." The use of *lingua francas* was conversely a means of solidifying allegiances and establishing hierarchies based on

regional difference within the walls of their buildings. It was a way to include and exclude in the confines of the private sphere. Technologies of communication were also central in linking migrants to their sending communities and connecting them to receiving communities north of the Spanish border. As the means of communication available only continues to expand – from letters, telephone calls, and Western Union wires to emails, Skype calls, and Google chats – migrants exercise greater and greater agency in their self-presentation to those who were left behind. As is explored in Chapter Five, these narratives are responsible for shaping desire in home communities, as well as expectations (realistic and not) of what lies ahead. Communication was also a source of anxiety for some, as direct linkages to home was accompanied by implicit (and sometimes explicit, as is highlighted in an interview excerpt from Collyer's 2007 research about sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco) demands for financial support: "I try to call every few weeks, but we only have a minute or two. Once she has heard that I am OK, she says **"Send money! Send money!"** but of course I cannot. Then the call is over" (682).

As Hannaford finds in her article (2015), the series of advances that we have seen in communication technology over the past two decades have enabled migrants to invest in multiple locations at the same time – economically, socially, and as she explores in "Technologies of the Spouse," even intimately. Technology has therefore enabled a new form of "transnationality," which link the spouses and children left at home to the transnational sphere through their sustained interactions with those abroad. Hannaford's work fascinatingly explores the role of communication technologies in the lives of Senegalese women with migrant husbands,' who experience the virtual presence of these

men as representing "a spectre of suspicion, control and surveillance" rather than "emotional closeness," my research highlights the experience of these technologies from the other side (2015). For the migrant husbands or mothers who are able to feel more present in the lives of their families at home, despite their physical presence in Morocco, communication technologies forged feelings of belonging – not belonging in the present, but to a place that represents the past. One is connected to the past and future, while the other is made a spectacle in the present.

Mother, Sister, Daughter, Wife – The Vulnerability of the Female Migrant

Khadija speaks to her children every week, and every month, she sends money home for their educations. Her husband left on his own migration journey many years before hers began and had promised to send for his family once he arrived in Spain. At first, there were calls and letters. There was the occasional wire received. But then, there was nothing. The worst part, she explained, was the not knowing. "Did he grow tired of helping us? Did he die before his journey ended? Did he find a new family for himself in Europe?" To this day, her questions remain unanswered, and her loss remains unmourned. But she had no way to support five children in her community without a husband and, almost immediately, began saving up to pay the same "camel" who had transported her husband to the Malian border in the underbelly of his van. Khadija's migration was spurred by a lack of choice – poverty, gendered inequality, and the desire that her children would have more. Yet for those few whose journeys begin from a place of choice, how often does news of present conditions at the Moroccan border travel south and to what extent does it shape a family's decision of who to send north?

Oluwafemi, a young migrant from Niger, lived next to Khadija and would sometimes accompany us on our trips to sell in the marketplace. He explained, "The fact that male migrants come from West Africa alone is because of our culture. No one would ask a woman to walk to the marketplace alone, so of course no one would ask her migrate alone." His use of the verb "*demander,*" or "to ask," is important, as it portrayed a scenario in which a woman is subject to the demands of her family and never agentic in her decision to go – whether it be to the marketplace in search of goods to buy or to a foreign country in search of greater economic opportunities (or greater freedom to access opportunities). "Women only come to Morocco if they're accompanying their families, and even then, I think they're a greater burden to their families than they are a help." Perhaps conscious of Khadija's presence beside us, he rationalized his opinion through the prevalence of violent (and often sexual) crimes committed against female migrants and the responsibility that a family would feel to keep their mother, daughter, wife, or sister protected.

"In Muslim countries," one Moroccan respondent had explained to me, "women are seen as vulnerable." He was speaking to me about the limited freedoms that Moroccan women have to occupy and move through public spaces. Yet his argument informed the placement of migrant women in liminal spaces, as well. "It's the family's job to protect them. A woman alone is seen as a woman without a family, and so she's free to be taken." If a woman migrates to a new country without any accompaniment, then she, too, is seen as "free." "Yes, of course will be propositioned sex for money. She will be seen as an object. This is not the case for male migrants traveling alone." Both men underscored not only the dangers presented to female migrants, which I would

contend are present for male migrants, as well, but also the responsibility of the family to protect their female relatives. I argue that the difference between male and female migrants in transit is not in the physical threats presented to the migrants themselves, but rather in the symbolic threats presented to the families that are left behind, and speaks to the high value placed on reputation. The honor of the family is uniquely threatened by the dangers presented to female migrants, and female migrants carry with them the unique responsibility to uphold the honor of their parents and husbands as they move across time and space. This is a burden not placed on the backs of male migrants, not even those who are traveling alone.

Of course, it is not the case that female migrants never travel alone, as Oluwafemi had said, and when presented with conflicting evidence, he agreed that yes, women were beginning to travel the well-grooved routes from West Africa to Morocco with more frequency. "You see some women from Nigeria, Ghana, or the Congo migrating alone, and that's because of the independence given to women in these cultures." Oluwafemi's second argument is, in fact, based on religious, and not cultural, difference. And it is a plausible one. He had selected three Christian-majority countries from the map of West Africa, but I questioned what role religion actually played in a family's decision to support a female migrant, and to what degree you could disentangle the more broadly defined influence of "culture" in majority-Christian countries from the (im)mobility imposed on women in Senegal and other Muslim-majority countries throughout West Africa.

All of the arguments presented to me privileged the role of cultural or religious tradition in shaping who migrates, but they all denied the role that labor plays as a

primary "pull" factor in economic migrations. None considered how the demand for certain kinds of work often dictates who moves across which borders. As Freeman argued (2001), "In the recruitment of labor along the global assembly line, in modes of disciplining and controlling that labor… and in the patterns of migration within and across national borders, there are embedded (and sometimes quite explicit) expectations that rely deeply upon ideologies and practices of gender" (1011). Considering this, could the presence of a predominantly male migrant population in Morocco not also speak to the nature of work that was available to migrants in the Maghreb? Mahler's work raises similar lines of inquiry and underscores the inattention that has historically been paid to how gendered recruitment practices structure migratory patterns (2006).

While the migrant-laborer played a visible role in the public sphere – through the selling of goods and increasingly through day labor in the construction industry – there was presently no demand for migrants to do domestic, or traditionally female, work in the private sphere. I argue that a transition from the male/public sphere of labor to the female/private sphere of labor indicates a shift in the receiving-nation's acceptance of a migrant population, as we cannot deny that contemporary forms of movement are driven by globalizing economies and, as Freeman's work explicates, they are also "deeply imbued with specific notions about femininity and masculinity and expectations for the roles of women and men" (2001: 1001). With tensions between migrants and citizens in Morocco so high and a violent tide of racism on the rise, sub-Saharan women were not considered viable options for domestic labor. However, as the second-generation of sub-Saharan migrant youth born in Morocco enters the workforce, I propose that we will see an increasing number of migrant women hired for work inside of the home, indicating the

nation's gradual acceptance of a no longer "temporary" class of migrant-laborers. With this new sector of the informal economy opened, the rate of female migration from West African sending-countries is sure to increase, and it is plausible that those coming from Muslim-majority countries will be in even greater demand, given the intimate nature of work in the domestic sphere and the desire for everything from food preparation to children's discipline to be informed by Islamic teachings (see de Regt 2007 for a study on the domestic labor of Somali female migrants in Yemen). The growing settlements of foreign Muslims throughout Europe are also likely to expand this demand for particular types of migrant labor. In the coming decade, streams of working class Muslim migrants from Africa will serve the needs of an expanding and economically diversifying population of more established Muslims in the E.U.

"New" Muslim Men in the Study of Migrant Youth

Contributing to the literature on masculinity, and Muslim masculinity in particular, my research is situated in a new and expanding sub-field of anthropology. While gender, which Ong and Peletz define as "a fluid, contingent process characterized by contestation, ambivalence, and change" (2005: I), has long been a central theme of ethnographic research, gendered studies have often meant studies of the gender that was historically overlooked by researchers – or more simply put, the study of women. As Peletz argues (1994), anthropological work on masculinity, which is distinct from the large body of work characterized by its masculinist bias, is still in its infancy when compared to the existing work on women and femininity. The study of masculinity in the Muslim world has drawn particular attention in recent years, and Ouzgane's *Islamic*

Masculiniites (2006) was one of the first collections to counter gendered stereotypes of Muslim men by outlining the great complexity of male identities in Islamic societies today. The ethnographic focus moves between distinct social spheres like the Taliban orphanages of Afghanistan to the (markedly male) street cafés of Morocco, and between distinct experiences of masculinity from males seeking infertility treatment in Egypt to Iraqi conscripts facing war. By illustrating how the male gender is constructed, inhabited, and negotiated across diverse contexts (Peletz 2004, Ouzgane 2006, Inhorn 2012), the burgeoning research adds complexity to prevailing western norms of modern Muslim masculinity.

In *The New Arab Man* (2012), Inhorn strives to paint a picture over the widely vilified image of Muslims as religious zealots and oppressors of women that has been proliferated largely through western media. Taking a more detailed look at one of the facets of daily life highlighted in *Islamic Masculiniites* (2006), she examines the intimate lives of ordinary men confronting their own infertility in Egyptian clinics. She presents a "new" kind of man who is rethinking the patriarchal masculinity of his forefathers and challenging expected norms though companionate marriage and a greater degree of gender equality, often with the backdrop of war and economic insecurity looming. Similarly deviating from media-driven stereotypes of the hyper-masculine, my research illustrates another "new" Muslim man – one that provides a rather grim counterpoint to Inhorn's more optimistic treatment of the subject and falls in line with Pandolfo's study of young Moroccan males facing desperate futures in the same *banlieues* that many of my sub-Saharan migrant respondents called home (2007).

Taking on the same vilifying and exoticizing narratives that Inhorn was writing

against, Pandolfo's research among economically disenfranchised Moroccan youth is centered, in part, on the western media's representations of martyrdom and suicide and the influence of these representations on the figure of death in the contemporary Muslim imagination (2007: 332). It is set in the aftermath of Morocco's deadliest terrorist attacks, which took place in Casablanca in 2003 when fourteen suicide bombers (young Moroccan males between the ages of 20 and 23, all coming from the surrounding slums of Sidi Moumen) bombed centers of foreign investment and leisure, including a Spanish-owned restaurant, five-star hotel, Jewish-owned Italian restaurant, and Belgium consulate, killing a total of forty-five (including twelve of the bombers) and injuring more than one-hundred.[86] Pandolfo's subjects, coming from slums like Sidi Moumen, struggle to conceive of a future with the limited (or complete lack of) economic opportunities available to them, and migration to Europe is the only possible future that can be imagined for many of them. She questions, "What becomes of 'bare life' when death is understood as 'awakening,' the beginning rather than the end, as is the case in Islam and in other religious traditions?" (Pandolfo 2007: 332; see also Agamben 1995). In much the same language as sub-Saharan migrants used in interviews with me, her informants illustrate an obsession with escape and a sobering awareness of the risks involved. They seem agreed on the fact that, "He [the migrant] will either die or ruin his life. If 100 that go, 90 will die; 10 will survive and fall into the hands of the Spanish police,"[87] and yet they engage in a lively debate about the nature of such a gamble

---

[86] In addition to the restaurants, hotel, and consulate bombed on the night of May 16, 2003, there were attempted attacks on a Jewish cemetery and Jewish community center. In total, 33 civilians (8 Europeans and 25 Moroccan citizens) were killed and more than 100 were injured (97 of them Muslims), along with the 12 suicide bombers who died during the attacks. The remaining two were arrested.

[87] Jawad and Kamal further illustrate their awareness of the struggles awaiting them at the

(Pandolfo 2007: 336).

"*Ghadi mghamar b rasek*" (You go gambling with your life!) Jawad, one young man, finds the decision to throw oneself into "a dream, an illusion" to be a form of suicide ("*intihar*"). Based on the knowledge that suicide is strictly forbidden in the Muslim faith, he argues that despite his abject poverty, "there is value in the fact of living as such, however unbearable its present condition, not because human life is inviolable (as posited by humanitarian logics), but because no one has access to the knowledge of God and it is God who gives and takes life" (Pandolfo 2007: 339). Jawad's counterpart, Kamal, roots his argument not in religious doctrine, but rather in "an ethical struggle for a better life" (*ibid*). He proposes migration as the only alternative to losing his integrity (or becoming a common pickpocket) and draws on the Qur'an to underscore that "a person oppressed has an obligation to migrate rather than risk losing moral integrity" (Pandolfo 2007: 340). Pandolfo cites the use of "*Hijra*," literally "abandoning" or "severing the ties" (Khalid Masud, 1990), in the Qur'an and Hadith, "modeled on the Prophet's departure from Mecca to Medina (AD 622) in a situation in which the new faith was under attack, it is the injunction to migrate from a land of injustice and oppression" (2007: 337). Migration, imagined through Kamal's language, is a struggle for a better life, a *jihad*,[88] and as such, death through migration is like death in a religious war, "for which the faithful find reward in the afterlife" (Pandolfo 2007: 344). Kamal sees no

hands of border officials, "the disappointment of being discovered, on the Spanish or the Moroccan side, being questioned and sent back, and often beaten up by the police (beatings on the legs, to break the bones, 'so that we can't try again')" (Pandolfo 2007: 351).

[88] Pandolfo distinguishes between two types of *jihad* – "On the one hand, *jihad* is a constant 'war' with oneself, against an internal enemy, impossible to eliminate, and in fact also necessary for life – a *jihad* that only ends at death. On the other, it is a war against an external enemy who represents a threat for the community of Muslims" (2007: 344).

alternatives – "you want to go in order to support your family, feed them; they are poor, don't have anything, live packed in a single room, a prison" (Pandolfo 2007: 345), while Jawad counters that it is ill-founded to consider migration a war, as the migrant "seeks to resolve a personal problem, to improve his life, obtain a material gain; while in a war one fights in the collective interest: 'In a war you fight for your country, in the *harg* [act of "illegal" migration] you fight for a dream, an illusion" (Pandolfo 2007: 345). Most poignant to me in Pandolfo's sensitive ethnographic engagement with these young men was her attention to language and imagery, especially as they pertained to a shared desperation about the past, a hopeful imagination for the future, and the cyclical nature of the present. She illuminates the driving forces behind migration, as powerful as addiction or love, and the language of her respondents is so strikingly similar to that of my own informants, that reading the excerpt below, I could easily be hunched over a pot of mint tea in the small apartment that Oluwafemi shares with seven other young men like him.

> They describe the state of mind of the *harg* ["illegal" migration] in a language of addiction: *'l-harg keyjri f-l-'aruq bhal ddim, ana mbli* (burning flows in my veins like blood, I am addicted),' *mbli*, a term that is used for drugs, but also for being in love – I have lost all desire – *reghba* (desire, longing, for anything other than the burning itself). And in terms of rage, oppression: *'Ana hayr* (I am beside myself),' (*hayra* is confusion, helplessness, extreme anguish) and by the image of an elsewhere that becomes an obsession, and produces a cleavage, a rift, somewhat comparable to what happens in the phenomenology of dreams: *'Ddati hna, khat.ry lehe, bhal l-wsuas fiya* (my body is here, my Being is over there)' (with a gesture of the hand, far away, over there, in Europe), 'as if with a constant whispering in my ear (Pandolfo 2007: 353).

I discussed this particular feeling of "*hayr*" (confusion, helplessness, or extreme anguish) often voiced in reference to narratives of struggle with Samira, a friend and colleague of mine also pursuing a Ph.D. in the social sciences during my fieldwork period in Morocco. Her research was focused on what she termed Morocco's "culture of

poverty" – a culture from which Pandolfo's respondents, Jawad and Kamal, were coming. Samira suggests that poverty leads to the acceptance of one's circumstances – "I accept that I am poor, and thus I accept that I will eat poorly. I will dress poorly. I will live poorly." But she also highlights the role of religion in this acceptance – "The Qur'an justifies present-day suffering by promising riches in the afterlife." Connecting her theories on a distinctly Moroccan, or what I might suggest is an Islamic, culture of poverty, I questioned how the migrant's desire for mobility challenges this notion of acceptance.

While Jawad's decision to value "the fact of living… however unbearable [life's] present condition," is a validation of his acceptance of poverty, Kamal's decision to migrate – to fight, to sacrifice, to risk the loss of home and family and even life – is an invalidation of it. Kamal instead values the refusal of his life's present condition. Both young men were from the same impoverished *banlieue*, and yet their reactions to the subject position into which they were born were opposite. Pandolfo argues that one is driven by a religious doctrine that forbids suicide and privileges Allah's divine will, and the other by man's continual war with himself (or *jihad* in the first sense of it) and the desire to provide better for his family. Their narratives shed light on the power for social circumstances, especially those which conscribe the orbit of one's physical movement and economic opportunity, to result in the secularization of religious fact. Fethi Benslama, a Tunisian scholar and psychologist, discussed a similar phenomenon in the aftermath of Mohamed Bouaziz's now infamous self-immolation (2011).[89] Despite his

---

[89] Tarek el-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi was a Tunisian street vendor who set himself on fire in December of 2010, in protest of the repeated confiscation of his wares and the harassment inflicted on him by a municipal official and her aides. His act is now remembered as a catalyst for the Tunisian Revolution and the wider Arab Spring, inciting

undeniable act of suicide, even the *mufti* of Tunis granted Bouaziz his official pardon, claiming that Allah, too, would forgive his act. The political-economic circumstances under which Bouaziz took his own life made it not a selfish act, but a sacrificial act for the greater good of his country – with his death, he quickly moved from suicide to martyrdom, as the public moved from religious to secular doctrine.

Samira and I found in our discussion that both Kamal and Jawad played out familiar scenarios that had been performed for them, unable to imagine futures outside of the two trajectories available to other men in their community – an uncertain death by poverty or an almost certain death by crossing, as she says. What makes the latter more appealing, I would claim, is that it is the only imagined future that leaves space for mobility (both literal and social mobility), however slim the chances of realizing this escape may be. Given the constraints of poverty in Morocco, how is the growing presence of sub-Saharan Africans within Morocco's culture of poverty shaping what it means to be poor and reforming desires to accept or rebel against this subject position on the periphery? The study of the young Moroccan male informs the study of the (mostly young and male) sub-Saharan migrant community with which I was engaged, as both are working in tandem to re-define the possible futures that can be imagined within a state of economic disenfranchisement in the Maghreb. Understanding categories of differentiation as intrinsically linked to what falls beyond the borders of each, the politically included can be understood only through the study of those who have been excluded, and the study of masculinities not only enhances data on the dialectically

---

riots throughout Tunisia. The population's outrage intensified following Bouazizi's death, leading then-President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to step down in January of 2011, following 23 years in power. In 2011, Bouazizi was posthumously awarded the Sakharov Prize for his "historic changes in the Arab world," the Tunisian government honored him with a postage stamp, *The Times* named him as "Person of the Year."

related experiences of femininity, but as Peletz argues, it is also necessary if we are to consider gender alongside other forms of difference and inequality (i.e. race, class, and "illegality") (1994: 137).

Working for Tomorrow, Working for a Wife

As is discussed in my last chapters, sub-Saharan migrants coped with the terrors of their current place – stuck in Morocco between their past lives and their imagined futures – through an obsession with both the past and the future, and a subsequent denial of the present. The various spaces that are occupied by migrants in Morocco – the overcrowded apartments and street corners, the detention cells and squalid forest camps – are male dominated spaces, and most of the males in these spaces were younger than I was at the time of my fieldwork (late 20s). Their frustrations at being young men trapped without any access to or interactions with young women were heard through their narratives, and often seen through their direct advances at me. I remember often asking a similar question, "Oluwafemi, do you ever think about having a wife?"

In the same way that Khadija described working towards the goal of reuniting with her children, migrant men structured their narratives around the goal of reuniting with women – whether it was the women they had left back home, the women they imagined they would find on the other side, or for some, the women they could find back home, only once they had reached the other side. Yet in all of these possible scenarios, two things remained the same – young male migrants were deeply motivated by the goals of marriage. And even so, they never entertained the notion of finding a wife in a liminal space that lies in between. In Morocco, the space that was neither here nor there, migrants

embodied a remarkable detachment from their desired status as husbands and a remarkable denial of their physical desire for human connection. I was often shown photographs of wives and *cheris* who were left behind. I was shown cell phone images of beautiful women – women like the one who Oluwafemi hoped to find. But Morocco represented a space in which migrants felt all of their desires suspended. Just as their narratives existed in the past and in the future, so often failing to give voice to the present, so were their desires were relegated to a space of liminality. I saw migrants' refusal to accept their current space as more than a space that lies in between in their refusal to put down any roots that may indicate a sense of permanency or home. Young men without girlfriends, young Muslims without mosques, young migrants without community – men like Oluwafemi who showed no signs that they accepted their presence in a place. They were, in fact, united most in their denial of the present.

Oluwafemi suggested that I speak to one of his friends, Ibou, whose story was unique, because he had succeeded in finding a wife back home, before he had reached the other side. To me, his experience represented the new kinds of kinship and attachment that are forming in the context of new migrations and the extended periods of "temporary" settlement in between. Ibou's wife entered into a marriage knowing that her only tangible attachment to her husband would be in the remittances that he sent home. Her only physical relationship was, in fact, with his extended kin network, which she was expected to join. Her bond to Ibou existed in the form of one home that they dreamed of building together in the place that he had left behind, and another home that they dreamed of finding together in the place that he had not yet reached. For Ibou, a wife represented an investment in his past, an increased social status in his sending community, and

perhaps, the dream of having her with him in Spain made his investment in an uncertain future seem worthier of his sacrifices.

A few years ago, my mother found me a wife. Her name is Rafika. I saw her [photograph], I liked her, and I told her I would marry her and bring her to Spain with me one day. It's every man's priority to find a good wife in Africa. Everything else comes after. I've been setting aside a little extra money for Rafika and sending it home every month. She lives with my mother and helps her in our family's store. I see her [on Skype] every Sunday. There, war has ruined everything. I live Taquadoum. It's not easy here either. I share my room with three others, but none of us are ever there long. I work any job I can find. I'm saving my money to get to Spain. I'd like to go back to my country someday. I miss my mother. Someday, I'd like to go back and build a nice house for my mother, my wife, and I to live in, but for now, I make money. You can't go back until you've made it all the way. Many people tell me, once you leave, you never go back.

- *Ibou, M, 28, Senegalese migrant*

The Vulnerability of the [Female] Researcher

When recounting stories about my research to friends or colleagues back home, I was often met with somewhat concerned or incredulous looks, with comments of "*You did this research?*" or with questions about how I navigated the "minefields" of conducting research with a predominantly male population. Not only were they male, I was reminded, but they were young males who found themselves physically and emotionally isolated from the opposite sex, expressing in their interviews with me their

acute feelings of loneliness and desperation. Although not explicitly stated, I could usually infer that the curiosity of my friends and colleagues was not centered on how "*You*" as a young researcher or "*You*" as a white American negotiated the inevitable hardships of fieldwork, but instead on how "*You*" as a woman did so. Not to suggest that other factors, including the elevated class position that I occupied as both a foreigner and a graduate student, did not further distinguish me from my subjects and perhaps make me seem even more vulnerable to "minefields," but it was first and foremost my gender which was of interest to inquiring minds. I remember one particular instance in which I had the pleasure of meeting with an Emeritus Professor of Sociology (who will remain unnamed) from a prestigious European university during his visit to Morocco. I was eager to share my preliminary findings with him and discuss some of the theoretical issues with which I was struggling. But over the course of our three-hour meeting, I could scarcely get in a word but to answer his barrage of questions – not one of them related to my research findings or theoretical contributions to the field. "What did they call you?" "What did they do to you?" "What did you *wear*?" I left the meeting feeling frustrated, like I had just wrapped up a police interrogation on a reported crime. But what was the crime? Experiences like this one, which accumulated over my first months of fieldwork, left me defensive to later, more sensitive, inquiries that I would receive. My responses grew terse and defensive. *I dressed however I pleased. My respondents were always respectful. I never felt threatened.*

Through my recounting of stories from the field, I began feeling the need to protect the integrity of my respondents,' many of whom had become my friends, and the enormous kindness, openness, and generosity with which most of them had greeted me.

In some sense, I felt that the integrity of even the few who had not greeted me with kindness deserved to be protected, if for nothing more than the daily abuses that they were enduring in their present state. Even now, with more distance between myself and my memories of fieldwork, this has proven to be the most difficult section for me to write. But I began to worry that by denying my own sense of danger (or security) in the migrant-dominated spaces that housed my research, I would be denying the fear that must linger in the bodies of all of us who pass through. It *is* a dangerous space, and once I was able to separate this danger from my own gendered position in the field – to recognize that I felt fear, as all of the men with whom I interacted daily lived in fear – once I was able to see the pervasiveness of danger in the spaces of my fieldwork, it became impossible for me to deny it. Yes, sometimes, it was my respondents who felt threatening to me; sometimes, my respondents and I felt threatened by the same uniformed men; and many other times, I was not sure who I should feel most threatened by in a given space. Did Oluwafemi and Ibou, these men much younger than I, not also question who was friend and who was foe? One thing that I discovered about borders is just how rapidly identities and social alignments can shift in spaces in which no person is clearly labeled and no group is clearly defined. In spaces of liminality, the self and the other are fluid, the known social structures have been broken, and this unknowing breeds a certain sense of trepidation in all social encounters. Who are you here? Who am I here? Are you a source of hurt or of aid? Together, do we stand aligned or in opposition? These questions were constant, largely subconscious, and shaped not only how my respondents received me, but also my sense of danger or security with them.

I covered as much of my body as possible, with loose clothing and multiple layers, so as to disguise any semblance of my shape. Although I came to know most of my respondents as kind, generous, open, and respectful young men, I rarely had an interaction with someone of the opposite sex that was not marked by overt (and less overt) suggestions at my sexuality. In the prisons and border camps, marketplaces and slums that I spent my days, I felt an almost constant sense of danger looming.

This particular reflection has brought two things to light for me – First, like the migrants who occupied these same spaces and felt these same (and countless more) threats on their physical safety, I understand how constant feelings can cease to exist at all. And secondly, I recognize how the ambiguity of a woman who is neither mother, daughter, sister, nor sexual object can be difficult to place in spaces in which feminine/private and masculine/public have been long differentiated and how the clashing of these categories was brought forth by my presence in the field. I came to see how my elite (as a white, American researcher) but unthreatening (as a young female) subject position functioned in a public space of assertive masculinity. I was pushed and touched by border guards and police officers. I had bills taken out of my pockets and expensive camera equipment forcibly "confiscated." I feared for my personal safety and for the safety of those around me. I sat powerless as others were bruised and bloodied. I watched powerless as friends were taken away. I heard countless stories – raw and heart-wrenching – of experienced rape and witnessed murder. In my interactions with high ranking officials and street vendors, with Moroccans and sub-Saharans, with boys the same age as my little brother and men much older than my father, in all of the many

languages present on the Moroccan streets, I was shouted at and whispered to – "*Salope*," "Whore," "*Gazelle*," "*Belle*," "Sexy," "*Sopessa*."

Upon later reflection, I realized that on a not entirely conscious level, I had adopted a strategy of sorts for handling encounters with men in liminal spaces in which my subject position seemed threatening and I therefore felt threatened by it. When first walking into a new camp full of strangers, for instance, every individual could at times feel like a potential threat to my security. But once it was clear that I would stay for more than one day, I was comforted by thinking that my potential to help in the longer term became greater than what I may have been worth in my first hours there. I would therefore strive to make myself seem useful – more useful to the camp tomorrow or next week or next month than I would be useful to them in the moment. I found that once I had made it through the first night in a new border camp, sleeping in a makeshift tent in a small patch of forest with somewhere between one and three dozen young migrant males who were awaiting a group for the crossing, then I ceased to be an ambiguous presence any longer. With every passing day, with every additional interaction, I came to feel both less threatening and less threatened. Neither mother nor sexual object, I would soon became the researcher or the student, the friend or the confidant. And as soon as a relationship was established, as soon as they knew where to place me, then interactions ceased to feel threatening to either party involved. In fact, there were countless incidents in which I felt protected by my respondents in the face of dangerous encounters. I noticed that their drive often shifted towards one to win affection or attention, and in these situations, I came to feel that if any one individual were to threaten me, I would have a camp of twenty-nine other young men eager to defend (perhaps still in the hopes of

winning some carnal or monetary reward, but no longer in the immediate). This transition from object to researcher/friend necessitated that I move past my own fears as quickly as possible. While crawling into my tent to sleep till the sun came up left me feeling a sense of danger through the night, I learned that approaching the biggest or loudest in the group and asking him to tell me his story before turning in solidified some sense of community amongst us. So I kept my possessions on my back until I felt that I was known and that hurting me would be considered a crime against not me alone but against us. It was the fear that drove me to appear not afraid and which, I believe, lessened any actual threat of danger.

I was not the only one to use this entry strategy, as I witnessed other migrants arriving to new camps, especially the youngest of them, often giving their last belongings – food, water, or what little money they had – to those already settled in the space. It was not a payment for the right to set up tent, as the forest was no one's to claim and all who were there knew that the group was waiting for others to join them in their attempted crossing. The camp existed for the sole purpose of growing in numbers. Rather, it was a present payment for a future promise to protect. I will feed you now, before I am starving, so that you will feed me when I am. While in the migrant-dominated marketplaces and apartment buildings of Rabat, social alignments formed between groups with a shared nationality, the forest camps and border towns lacked this order. There were too few for any to be selective. The times were too desperate to consider from which direction one came. Nigerian, Congolese, Senegalese – in the present, with only miles between them and their dream of crossing, they were all just hopeful *harragas*.

My interactions with Morocco's sub-Saharan migrant class were, of course, the central focus of my ethnographic work, and my experiences were not representative of what other foreign women would have experienced in Morocco during the same time period. A very different kind of masculinity – more assertive and vocal in its nature – structured those public spaces that were not migrant dominated but remained largely gender divided between Moroccans. When trying to describe the state of sexual harassment in Morocco, the omnipresence of which friends who visited me over the course of my fieldwork were often shocked by, I began recounting this one narrative: In one of my first weeks in Morocco, I was walking down the sidewalk, being followed by a taxi driver who had come to a near stop to continue hurling sexually explicit insults at me. Doing what I thought was best, I kept my head down and said nothing. The next day, a similar scenario unfolded, only I was not going to a familiar destination and was struggling to find my way. *If he's going to follow me all the way there*, I thought, *then he may as well be of some use*! I stopped, I made eye contact with the man, and I asked him which way to go. The events that followed are illustrative of what I came to understand as an assertive performance of masculinity (and perhaps even an aggression towards the presence of women in the public sphere) through the verbal assaulting of foreign women. The taxi driver transformed. His tone lightened, his face softened, and he offered to take me to my destination. On the ride there, he told me about his family, he asked me about my own, and he insisted that I join him and his wife for couscous in their home one Friday afternoon (not an uncommon occurrence when meeting strangers in Morocco). This is, of course, only one particular case and is not representative of all such interactions, but it was the easiest way for me to illustrate to visiting friends that the

verbal harassment they experienced on the streets could sometimes be dismissed as no more than an armor that men wear. My approach to street harassment quickly changed – no longer looking down in the face of stalking taxi cabs, I would always find a question to ask. Perhaps it was my own performance of vulnerability that validated their masculinity without the need for a vocal assertion of dominance, or perhaps it was simply my attempt at engagement that brought about the recognition of us both as individuals, but whatever it was, it served me much better than silence.

LEARNING FROM COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF CONTEMPORARY MIGRATIONS

The movement of people, goods, cultures, languages, and religions has long been at the heart of anthropological research and is also a key point of intersectionality between anthropology and other disciplines. Morocco presents a novel and compelling case study for scholars of transnationalism, a paradigm that has traditionally focused on "the process by which migrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement" (Glick-Schiller et al. 1992: 1; also Basch et al 1994). As borders become less permeable, scholars have begun exploring how migrants' journeys can be punctuated by periods of settlement between their sending and receiving countries that may last for months, years, or even generations (Collyer 2007, Malkki 1994, Van Hear 2009, 2015, Castles & Miller 2003). Yet there remains to be an ethnographic examination of the new migrations that are unfolding at the Moroccan border – an ideal site for raising questions about the ways in which transnationalism is experienced in liminal spaces of settlement. An understanding of how populations live in

spaces that are neither here nor there – a phenomenon that is central to refugee studies – should be equally important in studies of economic migration today. Moving beyond the traditional focus placed on sending and receiving countries (Kearney 1986, 1995), and later attempts to critique the sending/receiving binary by emphasizing interconnection (Glick-Schiller et al 1992, Basch et al. 1994), my research aims to better account for the complexities of contemporary economic migration that situate migrants in a space that lies in between. Focusing on recent anthropological studies of transnationalism, this section draws on the work of established scholars to argue for the need to re-conceptualize the basic terms and theoretical approaches applied in studies of the "migrant."

The Transnational Paradigm

Transnationalism has tended to center on one of three foci: (1) the influence of emigrants' remittances, absence, or overall migration on sending communities (i.e. Chu 2010), (2) the daily life of receiving communities within destination countries (i.e. Ong 1999, 2003), or (3) the socioeconomic networks created between sending and receiving countries (i.e. Basch et al. 1994, Glick-Schiller et al. 1992). First in conjunction with research on globalization, anthropological studies of migration began highlighting the increasing interdependence of "developed" and "undeveloped" societies in distinctly cultural, political, and economic terms (Erickson & Murphy 2008), but in the past decades, distinct paradigms like the French "*circulation migratoire*" (De Tapia 1994) and the American "transnationalism" (Glick Schiller et al. 1992) have allowed anthropology to cement transnational migration in its list of disciplinary subfields. While the distinct

conceptual and methodological frameworks developed in France focused largely on postcolonial Africa, those first established in the U.S. tended to focus on the U.S.'s own growing migrant populations. Despite these geographic differences, both centered research on similar themes of how the social and economic relationships established across political and geographical boundaries should be understood in an increasingly mobile world. The underlying implication was that with globalization, came new understandings of time, space, and movement between the two.

In the American paradigm, as in the French approach to studying movement between the colony and the metropole, scholars maintained that transnational social fields are produced by individuals and their familial (often times intra-continental) circulation practices (Massey 2005). These practices are then solidified by collective behavior in circulation across national borders (*ibid*). While the earliest approaches to cross-border migration tended to depict migrants as embedded in a transnational field of opportunity, more recent approaches have begun to place greater emphasis on the "here" and "now" of migrant actors as they navigate a range of non-migrant institutions. The push and pull factors under study have therefore grown increasingly localized. This reappraisal of the transnational paradigm better accounts for existing cross-border connections and the situated lives of individual migrants in transit, although it still lacks a means for accessing the experiences of liminality, the very foundation of which challenges fixed concepts of a "here" or "now" and is reflective of many migrants' journeys today.

New Forms of Movement from the Global South to the Global South

Migrations to and through Morocco are comparable in significant and under-

explored ways to other migratory flows leaving populations at a border south of their intended destination. Transformations at the Morocco-Spain border therefore raise important questions for researchers working in other world regions. Are the migratory patterns being enacted by sub-Saharan Africans in the Maghreb echoed elsewhere? How might Morocco suggest particularities as a new immigrant "destination" country, or how might it reveal a global shift in economic migration from the global south to the global south? As other former immigrant-sending countries transition into new destinations, how will the forms of migration differ based on geographical, political, or cultural constraints? Mexico has become another state that aids in both the detention and the movement of migrants across critical borders (De Genova 2002, De Genova & Peutz 2010, de Haas & Vezzoli 2012), and contemporary processes of economic migration in the region are increasingly leaving migrants from Central America (Garcia 2006), South America (Portes & Sassen 1987), and the Caribbean (Olwig 1995, 2007) "temporarily" settled in Mexico. Research at the Moroccan border not only offers an ethnographic case study grounded in an Islamic, Maghrebi context, but also bring the experiences of Morocco's "temporary" migrants into dialogue with existing anthropological literature on transitory populations along the U.S.-Mexico border (De Genova & Ramos-Zayas 2003, Alvarez 1995, Anzaldua 1999). As scholars move towards a recognition of the fludity inherent in the "social processes of migration" (De Genova 2005: 3), my research paves the way for cross-cultural comparisons of liminal populations in other parts of the world, and specifically in other African nations that are soon to undergo their own migration transitions.[90]

---

[90] The research of Fabos (2010) and Crush & Frayne (2010) examine how Egypt and South Africa will be first among the other African nations to undergo their own migration

An exploration of ethnographic case studies rooted in the African diaspora more broadly and in the migrant populations settling in traditional immigrant-receiving countries across the E.U. and in the U.S. allowed me to interrogate the ways in which particular theoretical traditions and methodological approaches to the study of transnationalism have come to be associated with different world regions. These distinctions in theory and method present challenges to researchers who are engaging in comparative studies and find themselves pulled between a desire to establish overarching theory and localize research methods to fit the particular time and place under study. How to best reconcile the two brings us first to the underlying ambitions of anthropological work on transnational migration, past and present.

Looking at what Massey terms "the world's principal international migration systems" (2005: 3) – North America, Western Europe, the Gulf, Asia and the Pacific, and the Southern Cone of South America – highlights the contemporary evolution of migration studies through the transitions of the places themselves. *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium* (2005) outlines the most prominent approaches in the subfield, in an attempt to present a new framework for studying migration in the twenty-first century and overcome the disciplinary, geographical, and methodological boundaries that have hindered comprehensive theories of transnational migration in the past. The authors draw on diverse case studies to evaluate how approaches, ranging from neoclassical economics and the new economics of labor migration and from world systems theory and social capital theory, have been applied in transnationalism, since it was first popularized in the writings of Glick-Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc (1992, 1994).

transitions.

These scholars' definition of transnationalism as a process through which migrants create and maintain "multi-stranded social relations" between communities of origin and settlement allowed for their analysis of migrant experience as more fluid than traditional models of integration or resistance (1994: 7). In *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States* (1994), Basch et al. compare Filipino and Caribbean migrant populations residing in New York, exploring how these two groups have been molded by sociopolitical processes within and between their home countries and receiving communities in the U.S. The text also challenges associations of geographic space with social identity (Gupta & Ferguson 1992). No longer is the Filipino situated exclusively within the space of the Philippines. No longer is Caribbean tradition linked to the islands that comprise the region. With globalization, time/space takes on new meanings, and communities begin to associate a particular class of Filipinos with their mobility and migrant status, just as they begin to link particular neighborhoods in New York with distinctly Caribbean cultural practices of food, religion, or family structure.

By approaching transnational migration as a social process flowing across the spatial boundaries of nation-states, my work acknowledges the transformation of migrants, as well as non-migrants who reside in "host," "home," and transit societies. The stories of my friend Hicham and others whose transnational family networks give them a unique "mobility" even in their static position in Morocco demonstrate that it is never the migrants alone who are transformed by new and expanded understandings of national and ethnic identity. Caribbean migrants in New York adopt new understandings of selfhood that are not entirely Caribbean or American, but a melding of the two, and those who find

themselves fixed in predominantly "sending" or "receiving" communities must similarly adopt new ways of self-understanding. Those who reside in highly mobile "sending" communities are impacted by the loss to their communities, and by the cultural and capital flows back into their families from the exodus of migrants – by the remittances that come in multiple forms. In contrast, those who remain static in predominantly "receiving" communities must adjust to the re-structuring of socioeconomic systems that accompany an influx of migrant labor and with changes to a cultural identity that is no longer distinctly "European," "Moroccan," or "American."

Situating the Migrant in the Receiving Community

Basch et al. analyze how migrants (here including political leaders of immigrant status in their analysis) employ symbols, language, and political rituals within in the U.S. in order to cement ties to their homes. Through this new mode of "nation-state building" (Basch et al. 1994: 3), migrants maintain their symbolic status as citizens of their home countries through actions in their host communities, highlighting the importance of migrants' incorporation into their new countries of settlement in allowing them to sustain social relations with their communities of origin. Much like Oluwafemi and Ibou's desires to afford a nice home or beautiful wife in their home countries, these migrants saw investment in their ethnic-minority communities in the U.S. as another means of investing in their social status back home. While the authors' seek to establish the fluidity of individual migrants' experiences between two nation-states, their work does little to address what happens to these critical social ties between sending and receiving communities when migrants fail to reach a destination country (1992, 1994).

A similar conceptualization of transnationalism as a social process that links two formerly discrete communities is seen in *Buddha Is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America* (2003), Ong's ethnographic study of Cambodian refugees resettled in California. Her analytic framework draws on Foucault's argument that the modern liberal state uses biopower to "invest bodies and populations with properties that make them amenable to various technologies of control… with the purpose of producing subjects who are healthy and productive" (2003: 8, Foucault 1995). Yet she focuses on one shortcoming of Foucault's analysis by examining how subjects can resist the "schemes of control" imposed on them (2003: 17). Cambodians, she contends, have learned how to not only inhabit, but also manipulate the subject-positions that have been created for them by the state. Just as they disguised an education to be overlooked during Pol Pot times, they similarly learned how to craft a narrative to be selected for resettlement, and then how best to present an "American" self to state agencies in California. It is a form of self-manipulation that I witnessed with sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco many times. In fact, the process of "settling in" to Morocco for migrants seemed to be the process of mastering *when*, *where*, and *how* to be *who*. At the absence of governmental resettlement offices, they had to learn from the migrants around them. Ong's work never fully engages with the practices that are shared between individuals, as she maintains her focus on the governmental level. She reveals how recently arrived refugees are instructed on how to perform their new "American-ness," from dress to their personal hygiene, through governmental institutions' portrayals of American norms. The crux of Ong's argument is portrayed in the image of the hiding Buddha – or a refugee population that appears to accept the new American values that they have been taught, while selectively acting in

accordance with their own traditional norms behind closed doors.

Being Cambodian-American therefore involves a disjuncture from both Buddhist and American social norms, just as migrants in Morocco are often forced into their own forms of religious compromise, either through the promise of aid from non-Muslim religious institutions or through their denial in religiously-oriented forms of community life. Ong's study of citizenship is less focused on the ties created between nations and more on the internal compromises required of migrants and refugees in their reconciliation of competing cultural value systems in receiving communities. Of import to my own research are the ways in which Ong's study of the refugee psyche subverts the accepted values of vulnerability that are commonly associated with refugee or asylum seeking populations (and similarly, the agentic or threatening kind of movement that is more commonly associated with economic migrants). Ong's research reveals how refugees can, in fact, take on agentic roles in the manipulation of their stories, beliefs, and practices. Their very histories become fluid, adapting to fit each audience. I interrogate a similar process of subversion, in which migrants inhabit a space of vulnerability and temporality – a space that has typically been reserved exclusively for the refugee. In the liminal space found at the Spanish-Moroccan border, where Africans await their chance at opportunity abroad, migrants' future trajectories lie largely in the hands of the governmental agencies controlling the space. Stripped of much of their agency, they, too resort to the manipulation of their histories, their stories, and their selves through the burning of social identities.

The Other Side of the Coin: Situating the Migrant in the Sending Community

While Ong's work focuses on how citizenship is constructed for and manipulated by Cambodian refugees in their receiving country, Chu's research on the Asian diaspora makes an argument for the importance of situating research within home countries, as an antidote to the scholarly emphasis on displacement, detachment, assimilation, and integration. *Cosmologies of Credit: Transnational Mobility and the Politics of Destination in China* (2010)*,* centers on Chinese economic migrants' desires for and strategies of mobility in their sending community. Through individual narratives, she illustrates her claim that immobility, as much as mobility, serves as a source of detachment for those residing in Longyan, a primary site for human smuggling to the U.S. Mobile subjects have become an integral part of everyday village life through their monetary contributions to family networks and their physical contribution of "holiday houses" that crowd the landscape, leaving those who cannot move feeling displaced at home (Chu 2010: 132). Like Hicham who was burdened with maintaining his family's physical home and social ties in the community while his the rest of his family network migrated north, her narratives raise questions about how fixed subjects make sense of themselves in communities that have come to be associated with aspirations of mobility. Although rooted in a community that is strongly linked to migration, Chu's work does not examine how return-migrants and the stories that they share are shifting imaginaries of mobility for those left behind.

Her work raises another representation of the complex relationship between home and diaspora is seen in the financial ties – not only of remittances, but also of debt. Among sub-Saharan migrant populations, as was the case among Chu's subjects, the transferring of large amounts of debt between individuals to cover the high costs of

smuggling has produced a distinct system of social relations. Drawing comparisons to Mauss' "gift" (1954), she finds that the ubiquity of credit in lower-income migrant communities has given rise to a "moral economy" in which one's ability to acquire debt becomes a sign of trustworthiness and a marker for future success abroad (Chu 2010: 239). This system also binds migrants tightly to the individuals who have supported their journeys and places even higher stakes on their successful crossings. The supported migrants – almost always single, young men – who are not successful in their journeys to Europe, therefore, know that their failure to succeed and repay the debt that is owed damages the reputation of their families back home and, in some cases, even leads to the confiscation of their family's property to pay back what was given. When large family networks, and even communities, come together to pay for the smuggling of the most promising among them, existing social hierarchies are bound to shift.

The Ties that Bind: Connecting the Sending and the Receiving

Experiences like Khadija's shed light on how the different forms by which individuals become connected or disconnected to a home (or the imaginary of a new home) situate them a continuum of transnationality. The importance of multi-sited ethnography in studies of transnationalism is stressed for through focus on the familial, religious, and political connections that arise between a sending community in the Dominican Republic and a receiving community on the outskirts of Boston in *The Transnational Villagers* (2001). Levitt examines how these ties transform life at home and for the diasporic communities abroad. Her research defines transnational migrants as those who are "incorporated into the countries that receive them while remaining active

in the places they come from" (Levitt 2001: 4), and expands traditional conceptualizations of the mobile/immobile subject by further defining "transnationals" as those who remain in sending communities, but are dependent on a migrant family member. The reliance on remittances places even non-migrants within a "transnationalized" space (Levitt 2001: 9). The concept of transnational exchange is also expanded to indicate both the monetary remittances transmitted between sending and receiving communities and the social and cultural resources that have come to define transnational family networks. But even in her recognition of a "transnationalized" space, there is no acknowledgement of migrant communities that exist between one home and the next. The narratives of migrants occupying this kind of liminal space in Morocco highlight how the physical and emotional trauma of their temporality can actually add another layer to their disconnection from home. Their experiences also raise questions about the extent to which immobile subjects can be understood as "transnationals," even when they are not receiving "payment" in the form of financial or cultural resources. Does simply the loss of someone situate you in a transnational space? Khadija's narrative of a husband turned migrant turned mystery was not an anomaly, and similar situations had left many others like her with unanswered questions and no remaining connection to their family's transnationality beyond a missing person.

Classifications of transnationalism can also be extended beyond the individual, as multilateral trade networks, business, and even militarized groups like ISIS – a terrorist organization defined, in part, lack of territorial boundaries – are identified by their ability to move freely across borders and impact an international community despite their ties to specific regions like Iraq and the Levant. In his review of anthropological literature on

the economic effects of labor migration on sending communities located in lower-income countries like Mali, Taylor looks at the impact of financial remittances and professional "brain-drain" (Taylor 2005). He finds that existing literature largely supports claims that out-migration is inimical to development, as it "depletes human capital in sending areas, fosters dependence on remittances, promotes a culture of premature consumption, and undermines previously self-sufficient rural communities" (Taylor 2005: 326). However, his contribution to Massey's *Worlds in Motion* (2005) argues against this view as too "static" and "restrictive," failing to account for the "multiplier effects" of remittances as they trickle down through local and national economies (Taylor 2005: 342). Weighing the investments made by current and return-migrants to their home countries, Taylor's second argument provides estimates of the aggregate and longer-term economic effects on communities, rather than being limited to the shorter-term consequences of labor migration on individual family networks. While his conclusions fail to account for the impact of what Levitt termed "social remittances" – or the "ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from host to sending country communities" – he finds a level of structural improvement that outweighs the sending communities loss of brain-power (2001: 54).

In her most recent writings (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007), Levitt emphasizes the importance of moving beyond "methodological nationalism" to account for the interconnectivity of places and incorporate residents of both home and host communities into analyses of migrant experience (132). Researching between Miraflores and Jamaica Plain, she was able to explore how transnational migration transforms family and work life for those who stay behind as much as, if not more than, for those who are mobile. Her

study illuminates how the values adopted by migrants in the U.S. (specifically with relation to gender, race, and rule of law) have subsequently influenced cultural value systems within the Dominican Republic and underscores the narratives of conflicted value systems that my friend Hicham's sisters had shared with me. A similar critique of traditional anthropological approaches to the study of migration, which have tended to privilege place-based research centered around push-pull factors, can be found in Olwig's multi-sited study of Caribbean migration (2007). *Caribbean Journeys* (2007) centers around what Olwig and Levitt would both contend are integral narratives of family, home, and belonging that transcend spatial boundaries and increasingly define contemporary experiences of migration.

Rooted in three sending communities in the Caribbean, Olwig's research is unique in that it follows not one migration route that each family took to a new home abroad, but multiple migration routes, which situated each transnational family network across many continents. Olwig explains how the focus on push-pull factors often raises themes of economic motivations for migration, processes of integration, or the molding of new identities (2007). Collecting life histories in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and the Caribbean over the course of several years, she was able to examine the migration processes and changing notions of belonging in three Caribbean family networks. The selection of these families, who represent distinct geographic, racial, and economic backgrounds, allowed Olwig to capture the diversity of Caribbean migration, while simultaneously demonstrating how on each of their home islands, migration is not a temporary state of movement, but a way of life. The chatter of multiple voices that arises throughout her text, informed by one island's history of British colonial development,

another's modern French Creole society, and the American and European cultural values that permeate the region, all confirm how the life history approach can present a more complex picture of migration. Her study emphasizes the kinds of personal histories of movement and emplacement seen in Chu's ethnography, but presents a new methodological and analytical framework that builds upon previous frameworks of integration or resistance that long dominated anthropological studies of migration. Multi-sited fieldwork, while offering less depth in one community, allows for researchers to account for the equal impacts of transnationalism on sending and receiving countries and the narratives collected serve to support arguments that migrants respond more to internal drives of personal and family ambition, than to external economic conditions. Like Bouboucar had shown me, it was the desire to send one's daughter to private school, it was the desire to buy one's son the new headphones that he so desired, it was the accumulation of these small human moments that often led to the greatest shifts in migrants' paths.

The Lived Experience of Liminality

My research is rooted not simply in a discussion of how liminality is lived, but how it forges new personal identities and new kinds of collective identities out of unexpected groupings. Past research has explored how the settlement of distinct ethnic groups, like West Indians in New York, ultimately gave way to new meanings of blackness in the U.S. (Foner 2001), underlining the impact of migrant populations on citizen- and especially on minority citizen- subjects. While indicators of ethnicity, class, or vocation may have been most salient to an individuals' understandings of themselves

at home, new identities of "other-ness" are inscribed on migrants in their journeys, and the receiving community often dictates which indicators will be most salient abroad. In the Maghreb, as in the Caribbean, conceptions of race differ dramatically from the historically dualistic (white/black) interpretations more common in the U.S., and the plurality of racial categories means that in many contexts, race has come to symbolize class, and in turn, class to symbolize race. Maghrebi scholars have examined how skin color has historically been only one marker of racial identity, read in conjunction with markers of class, education, and vocation as displayed through speech, dress, or accent (Lewis 1979, Khatibi 1983, Laroui 1983). Yet in Morocco, where blackness is equated with a particular racial history, I find that it is less shades of color than it is the distinct features defining of blackness, which mark an individual as included or excluded. As Ousmane explained to me, "black is bad no matter what kind of black you are!" Throughout history, migrants' desires to distinguish themselves from established minority populations, such as African Americans in the U.S. or Muslims in Europe, have led them to actively use cultural markers to redraw what would otherwise have been understood as racial groupings based on simply phenotypic traits – whether skin color, hair texture, or facial structure.

In *The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe* (2009), Geschiere sheds light on the connection between our rapidly globalizing world and the rise in claims to belonging – whether belonging to a particular place or to a particular group that has historically occupied that place. In contexts as diverse as the Dutch government's attempted integration of a majority Muslim (and largely Moroccan) migrant community and the Cameroonian people's struggle for a representative ethnic

presence in their emergent multi-party political system, his studies underscore how when confronted with "other-ness" individuals fight to belong. The simultaneous desire to globalize and localize often results in the creation of new categories of inclusion and exclusion in attempts to segregate mobile populations. Located at the intersection of Geschiere's two case studies, is the argument over the placement of West African migrants who remain in Morocco – neither in their home countries nor their desired European destinations. I argue that rapidly evolving migratory patterns at the Moroccan border are suggestive of transitions in mobility writ large and reveal the contested geographies of legality, liminality, and belonging that are emerging as diverse groups of sub-Saharans are forced to "temporarily" carve out a space to call their own.

Studies of Europe's expanding Muslim migrant population, much like those of black migrants in Morocco, reveal the desire to mark the other through their difference. For Moroccan populations in Spain, it is their religious values and not their skin color which most differentiates them from the majority population, while for sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco, it is their race and not their religion that most distinguishes them. And so it is Islam and blackness that become both the defining factors for those migrant populations, and also the key labels that the majority populations work to define themselves against. My argument contends that an overall narrowing of difference can emerge in the face of change, whereby the nuanced categories that fall outside of strict "Muslim-Christian" or "Arab-black" dichotomies cease to be recognized. No longer Senegalese or Nigerian, race defines both in terms of their blackness. In contrast to this, Wilson argues that scholars looking at identity as it relates to patterns of migration should view it not as a process of homogenization, but rather should explore it as a "proliferation

of diversity" (1996: 11). With collisions of distinct racial or religious groupings, in other words, come new forms of identification. Recent attention has been paid to the religious dimensions of belonging in studies on European migrant communities (Geschiere 2009, Pandolfo 2007), and the study of modern Morocco promises to expand on the role of racialization in delineating between categories of political inclusion and exclusion in the Maghreb and other border regions faced with new populations of migrants in liminal settlement.

Writing "Local"

As a twenty-first century paradigm, Massey contends that transnational migration must reach across geographical boundaries to explore how analyses of globalization and the increasing mobility of individuals is developing connections between sending and receiving countries at competing ends of the development spectrum (2005). While there are advantages to working cross-culturally, as is explicated in the work of scholars like Levitt and Olwig, there are also challenges that these authors fail to address. Different anthropological traditions have been linked to distinct world regions, bringing one set of methodological tools and theoretical frameworks to, for example, Latin America (where inquiries have tended to focus on economic relations between groups, i.e. Wolf 1972), another set to the Pacific Islands (where inquiries have tended to focus on ritual practices within smaller groups, i.e. Oliver 1989), and yet another to sub-Saharan African (where inquiries have tended to focus instead on kinship and social organization, i.e. Evans-Pritchard 1940). The anthropological tradition in which studies are conducted has thus influenced the questions that are asked, and necessarily, the answers that are found –

often requiring a form of translation before one can embark on the comparison of ethnographic research that was conducted in different regions. While understanding central gatekeeping concepts can open the door to research, they can also limit one's findings once "inside" (Appadurai 1988).

The problems raised in these comparative endeavors are not unlike those found in cross-cultural studies of transnationalism, where the population under study dictates the lens applied. The growing body of literature on north African migrants in western Europe (Geschiere 2009, Balibar 2003, Brubaker 1996, 1998) commonly focuses on the role of religiosity in processes of assimilation, making it difficult to compare with the literature on Latino migrants in the U.S. (De Genova and Peutz 2010, De Genova 2005, Chavez 2008), which gives little attention to the role of religion in migrant experience. Yet there may be far greater similarities between Moroccans in Paris and Mexicans in Chicago than the ethnographic data would lead one to believe. Rather than searching for a comprehensive theoretical framework, questions of transnationality can be addressed by reconsidering the theories and methods of this paradigm in light of the contemporary and increasingly fragmented experiences of migration, or as Wilson (2010) contends, by working towards "localizing" it.

Informing research with an issue of contemporary relevance – in this case, the settlement of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco, between their homes and desired European destinations – allows for researchers to incorporate multiple theoretical threads and develop intersections between related questions of anthropological interest. The connection between transnational migration, identity construction, and the expansion of the neoliberal state can be illustrated through the E.U.'s desire to control emergent

migrant and refugee populations and the paternalistic practices that led to their ability to label populations beyond their own borders. Addressing new and experiential articulations of race, class, citizenship, and "illegality," I expand the paradigm of transnationalism to account for the longer and less direct economic migration routes that are emerging on a global scale today. In my attempts to "localize" my study of migrants, I was influenced by what Abu-Lughod terms an "ethnography of the particular," and wove together perspectives that ground their analysis in ethnographic fieldwork on the everyday (1993). While situated in the particularities of North Africa, my research explores on a broader scale how new migratory patterns play a central role in redefining categories of social identification and stratification and examines border regions as a locus for the contestation of belonging.

THE REFUGEE AND THE MIGRANT

In previous sections, I have presented an argument for the need to re-conceptualize the theoretical approaches applied in studies of the "migrant," drawing attention to the space that exists between sending and receiving countries. It is, I claim, the lack of ties between these two that define migrants' experiences of liminality. In this section, I push further, arguing for a problematization of not only the theoretical approaches to migration studies, but the basic terms themselves. I examine the ways in which the terms "migrant" and "refugee" have historically been employed as categories in order to serve broader political motives. In fact, the defining factors of those fleeing a home and those seeking new opportunities abroad can easily be muddled. As border

controls increase, migrants' journeys are often interrupted by periods of "temporary" settlement in liminal spaces – a phenomenon that was first explored in refugee studies (Barbara Harrell-Bond 1986, Malkki 1995, Fassin 2005). Yet the form of punctuated migration suggested by Malkki is reflective of much larger structures that reach beyond the experiences of refugees and are increasingly shaping the realities of migrants, whose political and economic motivators are commonly one in the same (1995).

The refugee and the migrant have long been disassociated from one another on the terms of their movement – one being forced movement and the other chosen, one being associated with the loss of a homeland and the other with the search for greater social mobility in a new one. Refugees have therefore been associated with a state of "temporary" displacement – locating them in liminal spaces of settlement for undefined periods of time. Although they may, and often do, spend years or even decades in refugee camps, they are not considered a part of the country that houses them in their state of displacement. The Congolese refugees who spent many years in West African camps before moving north to Morocco in hopes of moving further north into Europe, for instance, were never considered permanent fixtures in Senegal, Mali, or Ghana. Despite the actual permanency or temporality of their stays, they were always seen as "in between" the homes that they had fled and the homes that they were fleeing to. Much like migrants in Morocco, they were seen as neither here nor there, but always in motion. They were fixed, and they were in transit.

In contrast to refugees, migrants have been conceptually associated with a state of movement between a sending country and a desired destination country. The distinction here comes in their "leaving," rather than "fleeing" home. However, a rapidly expanding

population of migrants are now setting out (or being forced "out") on journeys that mirror the state of dislocation traditionally associated with refugees. They spend years or even decades in between their homes and desired destinations, living in migrant slums or makeshift encampments akin to refugee camps in almost every way. Given the contemporary state of transnational migration, I argue that the persistent binary between these two terms is now less indicative of differences between their patterns of movement, and is more indicative of broader political ambitions to mold strict categories of inclusion and exclusion through the classification of the "other" as either threatening or vulnerable to the state. The distinction between the migrant slum and the refugee camp should be explored not in terms of the differing experiences, trajectories, or push and pull factors driving the individuals who end up in them. Rather, it should be examined in terms of the differing labels stamped on those individuals in transit and the multilateral governmental pathways that are opened or closed to them based on these labels.

According to what Ticktin terms the "illness clause," *sans papiers* (or "illegal" migrants) with documentable illnesses are given the right to stay in Europe for the duration of their treatment (2006: 37). However, migrants must be inspected by immigration officials, placing their fates in the hands of the citizens who apply state policy and in their own ability to perform a particular type of "vulnerability" for the state. The danger of leaving such critical decisions to subjective interactions is elucidated by one worker's pity for a Muslim woman's "familiar Orientalist narrative" of physical abuse and another worker's suspicion of an Algerian man's reported medical condition – these decisions ultimately leading to the safeguarding of a women with superficial wounds and the deportation of a man with a terminal illness (Ticktin 2006: 43).

Legitimacy becomes a matter of one's "cultural citizenship," or ability to mold to the process of "self-making" and "being-made" in relation to nation-states (Ong 1995: 51).

Didier Fassin's research (2005) tackles the same policy, exploring how the body has always been a privileged site on which institutions evidence their power, but how for migrants, in particular, the body has become a site on which one displays the evidence of truth. As European immigration controls proliferate, migrants are having to repeatedly prove their eligibility to certain social rights, often through the very scars that they wear. Asylum seekers are more and more frequently asked to provide evidence of their endured physical and psychological traumas, their autobiographical accounts needing to be evaluated by professional eyes (Fassin 2005). Tickten and Fassin both illustrate how the subject's lived experience is overshadowed by the medical authority, as state and non-governmental institutions alike commonly take testimony only from experts in their attempts to develop standardized protocols for evaluating truth and suffering.

In order to be deserving of refugee status and humanitarian aid in the modern era, one's narrative must first be accepted – requiring both a construction on the part of the migrant and a reception on the part of the citizen, who relies on images of "the other" in the European social imagination to inform the legitimacy of the migrant's performance. In contrast to Ong's re-reading of Foucauldian theory, Ticktin's work exposes a French political space that has forced a population of bodies to exchange their subject-power for the right to live. It is a subversion from the migrant to the refugee (from able-bodied to body marked and evaluated as dis-abled through suffering), and one's survival depends on a fluid transition into a space of complete vulnerability and verification by medical expertise. In "Refugees and Exile: From "Refugee Studies" to the National Order of

Things," Malkki examines the generalized category of refugees as one that connotes images of suffering (1995: 496). Her work raises important questions about the exclusivity of the migrant and the refugee as discrete legal categories and the power of the state to create threatening and vulnerable subject-positions. Do migrants seeking state services need to subvert their agency? Do refugees seeking to access their subject-power through work lose their stance in the sphere of the suffering? Ticktin's ethnographic study of North African migrants and refugees seeking healthcare in Europe answers some of the important questions raised in Malkki's research, exposing the struggles of those who develop lives beyond the confines of their state-assigned vulnerability. This research also problematizes the continued binary between migrant/refugee, and the many cases in which migrants are asked to perform their weakness before authorities. How does the historic link between refugee status and the protection human rights privilege those migrants for whom a performance of vulnerability comes easily – how does it distinguish between the helplessness of men and women, children and adults, or those who present us with "familiar narratives" of suffering?

As the UNHCR informs us, the migrant *chooses*, and the refugee lacks a choice, but is choice not the essence of what neoliberalism mystifies? Knowing the stories that appeal most to the confines of U.N.-sanctioned definitions, many sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco request fake documents reflecting Congolese origin, regardless of their birthplace, convinced that the DRC promises the most convincing of desperate back stories. Moroccans are now adopting similar strategies in their attempts to impersonate Syrian refugees when making the crossing to Europe, as other groups will likely do in the coming years. Despite public attention on the "migrant crisis," there is little research to

date that incorporates the sub-Saharan migrant's liminal state of "in-between-ness" with the threatening subject-position that is generally assigned to economic migrants. The rapidly growing population of migrants trapped in Morocco is comprised of first-generation sub-Saharan African migrants and their children – the children often lacking citizenship claims to their parents' native countries and having an all but impossible time claiming citizenship in their birthplace of Morocco.[91] The population of youth being born in the Maghreb is what would be referred to as a "paperless" or "invisible" population in the language of refugee studies. Yet, studies of migration never refer to migrant youth as such. The liminal placement of Morocco's youth population leaves them with the same limited work opportunities as their parents and without the necessary documentation to leave Morocco in search of greater social mobility. Restricted access to public classrooms also means that second-generation migrants lack any formal education or study of Arabic. Language, like labor, therefore becomes a marker of citizenship and will perpetuate the social stigmatization of Morocco's migrant class into coming generations.

Liminality has long been theorized in relation to refugee experience as both a legal and a lived state (Menjivar 2006). While many sub-Saharan Africans view their homes in Morocco as places of "temporary" settlement, the second-generation youth born into these communities challenge notions of temporality. The placement of this

[91] Moroccan nationality law is the subject of the Moroccan *Dahir* (Decree) of September 6, 1958. In theory, Moroccan nationality is transmitted by filiation or birthplace in Morocco. According to Article 9, any child born in Morocco of foreign parents can become a Moroccan citizen provided that they make a formal request approved by the Minister of Justice. According to Article 11, a foreigner applying for Moroccan citizenship must fulfill the following conditions: (1) Have regular and continuous residence in Morocco during the 5 years preceding the application (2) Be of Legal age at the time of the application (3) Be mentally and physically fit (4) Have a record of good conduct and reputation in addition to not being convicted of crime or any offense punishable by Moroccan law [*including "illegal" migration*] (5) Have sufficient knowledge of the Arabic language (6) Be able to provide for himself.

population between their sending and receiving countries begs for questions about how "liminal legality" (Menjivar 2006) and temporality will operate as a symbolic framework differently across generations. How does being "in between" shape expectations for citizenship, temporal anticipations for return, or constellations of belonging? For parents, who cling to both memories of a past and imaginaries of a future, it may be easier to live in a place that is neither here nor there. But for their children, how do they explain that home is a point on the horizon?

A refugee is someone who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. – The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

A migrant is someone who chooses to move in order to improve the future prospects of himself and his family. – The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

So tell me, how often is one not the other?

- CDM Caseworker

BURNING FOR TOMORROW: A NEW VISUALIZATION OF MIGRATION AND THE SPACE THAT LIES IN BETWEEN

INTRODUCTORY CASE STUDY: A Journey to the Place in Between

In this chapter, I draw on the narratives of two sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco to build an argument for the need to revise anthropological methods in order to better engage with contemporary transnational populations. I had seen Phino many times before I first spoke with him. He was doing construction work on the building next to the *riad*[92] where I was living, and he would often be standing on the makeshift scaffolding - sanding, caulking, or painting the crumbling walls - as I passed beneath him. He wore the same boots with holes where the steel toes once were, the same pair of tattered blue jeans, and one of three T-shirts with foreign phrases printed across the back. He kept his hair closely cropped, his face cleanly shaven, and he looked at least a decade younger than his nearly fifty years. But his hands showed every day of his hard labor. The one pair of gloves that he and the other workers shared was made of camel skin, and I guessed that it belonged to the man in charge – a Moroccan no doubt.

There was a small but growing population of sub-Saharan migrants working in construction during the time that I lived in Rabat, and I was interested in learning where they were working and what kinds of work they were doing. I sought ways to linger long

---

[92] A *riad* is a traditional Moroccan house built around an open courtyard. However, the term has become synonymous with "small bed and breakfast" in recent years, because almost all *riads* that have not been converted into small family apartments by Moroccan elites are now used as such.

enough that I might catch a hint of an accent that would trace a laborer back to his country of origin. Phino spent several months re-constructing this building – an old home that was purchased by a French couple hoping to open a competing *riad* in Rabat's *medina*, where tourists were increasingly seeking "authentic" Moroccan experiences. The migrants worked on a team with *Souissis*, or Moroccans who had moved from the rural South in search of paid labor. The foreman, a middle-aged *Souissi* with a full beard, strong build, and small, watchful eyes, had been the one to pull the team of laborers together, and I often saw him inside the main level of the building as I passed – drinking mint tea, eating *hersha*,[93] and discussing the intricacies of the project in a series of loud projections over his cell phone.

It was this particular pattern of speech – not only loud, but aggressive and adversarial – that led me to believe when I first arrived in Morocco that the majority of men I encountered throughout my day were infuriated by one another. Men standing on the street corner as we waited for the bus, men seated at the table next to me in the café, men standing in long lines to buy fried potato sandwiches in the marketplace. With time, I came to better understand this projecting and confident tone as one way in which Moroccan men perform their masculinity in the public sphere.[94] It was not a sign of anger, but an indication of interaction between men of equal social status in a space outside of the home. It was, in fact, friendly. This, like so many things over the course of my fieldwork, became apparent to me not directly, but in its absence. I began to notice

---

[93] *Hersha* is a Moroccan bread made with cornmeal, eggs, sugar, salt, and animal fat. It is dense and filling and has often been described to me as "the laborer's bread," because it provides enough sustenance to complete long hours of physically demanding work. It is eaten alone or with sweetened, curdled milk.

[94] It seems worth noting that this same tone is used by men to project the sexual harassment of women for others to hear – another primary way of performing masculinity in these same spaces, and often times by these same individuals.

when this deep-toned, sharp-edged banter was missing. In the offices of governmental officials, where I sat awaiting an interview, I heard it behind closed doors, but listened as the men working in the front of the office took on hushed, even demure, tones with those who ranked above them.

I began to notice its absence in all conversations across distinctions of social status – conversations between husbands and wives, fathers and sons, and equally between Moroccan nationals and those who had been born outside of the country's borders. I even heard a distinction in how *Rabatis*[95] spoke to other *Rabatis* or to *Souissis*, a population commonly stereotyped as being poor and uneducated, having left their rural farms in search of menial labor in Morocco's larger cities (McMurray 2001). *Souissis* were described to me as bringing "backwards" ways or superstitious beliefs with them, setting them apart from the city's proper Muslims. As Phino's foreman explained, "We [*Souissis*] took the work no Moroccans wanted. We worked for wages no Moroccan wanted." But now, many have moved up the ladder to oversee teams of sub-Saharan migrants, those who have traveled from even farther south and are willing to work for even less. "*Harragas,*" he continues, making reference to Rabat's growing population of sub-Saharan migrants, "are trapped here until they can make enough money to leave. They are desperate to leave. And so they don't turn down any work or complain about any pay."

As my fieldwork progressed, I was fixated on the minute ways in which identity – one's ethnicity or political status – was read over overt racial cues. How, for instance, did

---

[95] *Rabati* is a slang term used to demark those born in Rabat from those who moved to the city. It can also serve to elevate *Rabatis* from other Moroccans in conversation, as Rabat is considered by many to be the epicenter of intellectual life, and to produce a well-educated and elite population of Moroccans. However, any *Fèsi* or *Marrakechi* would contend otherwise.

two men, both phenotypically black, assert their status as welcome in the public sphere? Did a good "performance" of belonging succeed in marking one as a black Moroccan, as opposed to a black migrant? As the population of sub-Saharan migrants living in Rabat grew, was it becoming harder and harder for phenotypically black Moroccans to disassociate their skin color from a presumed status of "illegality"? Along the same lines, I questioned how migrants like Phino, who are phenotypically black, accepted, challenged, or manipulated their status as unwelcome in the public sphere. How were dress, bodily comportment, and most importantly, speech adopted as tools of self-representation? How well did Phino's "performances," or attempts at representation, impact how he was read by others? I began to notice that it was not only in the accented speech of migrant laborers that I could detect their country of origin – but before I was even standing close enough to hear their hushed conversations, it was in the volume, the pitch, the deference or aggression of their speech that I could guess at their place in Morocco's emerging hierarchy of political inclusion and exclusion. So in contrast to the loud projections of the *Souissi* foreman over his cell phone, I listened to the quiet conversations between Phino and his friend, Stephan, and I picked up on hints of the Congolese accent that had become familiar to my francophone ear. In the sphere of labor, there was no feigning political inclusion. If blackness alone did not serve to mark the laborers as "*harragas*," then their menial work under the direction of a *Souissi* certainly did.

Phino had followed the most commonly traveled route for Congolese migrants to Morocco – after a plane ride to Mali, he had traversed Algeria by foot and bus, crossing the vast desert landscapes and entering Morocco at its eastern border near Oujda. Like so

many others, he had never made it beyond the Moroccan border. His story is full of theft and abuse, exploitation and deceit, imprisonment and deportation – a series of events so brutal and so habitual that it seems all but impossible that any ever make it to European soil. Working in the construction industry gave him enough money to survive week to week, but rarely enough to send home to his family and never enough to save for the final leg of his journey that he was still so desperately awaiting. Every morning, he stood on a particular street corner outside of Rabat's main *souk,* where Moroccans knew that migrants could be picked up for day labor. He was happy when a job promised work for more than a day and always eager that the steady pay would allow him to pocket some change for his crossing. However, Phino had been in Morocco long enough to know that a week rarely passed without whatever money he had accumulated being stolen by police officers in a "routine" pat-down, or if not by them, then by his landlord in a "routine" apartment search. This was the migrant's way a life.

I learned from the stories of men like Phino that while each sending-country in the sub-Saharan region has its own smuggling network, many work in conjunction with one another, so that a migrant may pay a "recruiter" in his country, who passes him off to a local smuggler, who will again pass him off to another local smuggler once he crosses the border into a new country. As the Spanish economy becomes less desirable and more Moroccans are seeking work opportunities in Morocco rather than attempting their own migrations, Morocco's own smuggling business is also quickly expanding to serve the needs of sub-Saharan migrants in crossing. For Moroccans like Kareem, a middle-aged man who returned from his low-paying job as a farm hand in Italy to work for his uncle's business in human smuggling, the choice was a simple one. "I can make much more

money helping Africans go to Europe that I can make going to Europe myself!" he explained.

Congolese working as "camels," or human smugglers, charge one lump sum upfront for their services. Once they have accumulated a group of at least one dozen hopefuls, they produce the false papers, purchase the plane tickets, and arrange for the guides. But being a clandestine business, there is no protection for the buyers, and I heard many stories of migrants whose journeys never materialized – their camels disappearing after funds were paid. Even more common are the countless stories of migrants like Phino who paid in full to be delivered to European shores and were instead extorted for more and more money at every leg of the journey, until their pockets ran dry. This left them penniless and without social networks or other resources in countries where they never intended to be. In addition to the obvious economic strain, migrants trapped in between their sending countries and desired destinations often lack basic linguistic skills and have no prior cultural understanding of the communities in which they are abandoned, making the prospect of accumulating money for a final crossing even more daunting. While stories of migration – some glorified, but most tragic – floated heavy in the air in Rabat, it was difficult to convince one individual to tell you his or her personal story from start to finish. Trust was needed first, and nothing was harder earned than this.

My relationship with Phino and the other Congolese migrants working alongside him started with casual greetings as I passed under their scaffolding and progressed to offerings of "extra" couscous from my *riad*'s kitchen on Fridays and finally to shared meals on the small table set up outside of my makeshift sleeping quarters on the roof. There were so many models of acceptable behavior that had to be crossed in my

interactions with him – a woman speaking to man, an elite to a laborer, a white to a black – that I decided it must have been the last of these – a foreigner speaking to a foreigner – that had granted me his pardon. Phino laughed with me later, remarking that "You Americans, you talk to everyone!" I remember well the first time that Phino agreed to share his story of migration with me. It was a sweltering summer day, and we sat together on the roof, sweat beading down our faces from the late afternoon sun. He had just finished work, and I had set a plate of traditional almond paste cookies and a silver kettle of mint tea from the *riad*'s kitchen on the table between us. I had learned in our previous interview sessions together that Phino had adopted the Moroccan belief that drinking hot beverages cools the body down – a belief that still eluded me. I clicked my voice recorder on. "Tell me when you first thought of leaving home…"

In many ways, Phino's sending narrative is a familiar one among African economic migrants situated liminally along the borders to the E.U. He had grown up in a small town, where many families made their way on subsistence farming (which, in his case, meant cassava, plantains, mangoes, and guavas). As this way of life became increasingly difficult, women would take their staple crops to the local markets to sell or trade, and men began venturing even farther beyond the boundaries of their rural communities to seek labor in small neighboring cities like Bongandanga. "When I was young, mine was a small town full of families. Today, I hear it is a strange town full of women and children. The men have all left to find work."

The men who make the migration from small towns like Phino's to the countries that lie beyond have been chosen by their communities for a reason. In the stories that other migrants shared with me, I heard common refrains of past successes and a sending

community's high hopes. Often deemed "the smartest" or "the most promising" student in the schoolhouse, "the hardest working" or "the most successful" in the small family business, there was a reason that the community banded together to support the dreams of one migrant over all of the other hopefuls. It took many people pooling their resources to afford the high fees[96] demanded by "camels," and the community was thoughtful about this investment. There was an expectation that these young men were the most likely to succeed abroad and that the sacrifices of the community would be richly repaid in the future. As I learned from the collected narratives of men like Phino, it is both a privilege and an honor, it is an expectation and an obligation, it is the impetus for freedom and mobility and it is also a heavy burden to carry, binding one tightly to a place, even as it disappears farther and farther into the distance behind you.

MEMORY MAKING: HOW ONE MIGRANT BUILDS HIS NARRATIVE [And how one researcher re-builds it]

Memory is wildly inaccurate. Despite all of the detail with which I poured the day's events into my field journal each evening, despite the quality of the recording equipment, or the resolution of my photographs – despite these pieces of "data" which comprised my post-field analysis, I am aware of the limitations of my own memory. My Nikon captured the assortment of belongings neatly arranged on Phino's shelf and the

---

[96] Migrants making this Congo-Morocco journey (one of the longer journeys that sub-Saharan migrants to Morocco make) today are paying their "camels," or smuggling services, an average of 5,000 USD in one lump sum upfront. When Phino made his journey in 2004, he remembers his community pooling 7,500 USD for him and two other men from his native village. They were offered a highly discounted price for purchasing multiple "crossings" at once.

squalor of the migrant encampments surrounding Oujda's detention center, but where did he say that he found that silver coin with the horse's head on in? And, what did it smell like, that mixture of fresh mint and trash piled high, stagnant in the desert heat?

As ethnographers, we are trained to be intimately aware of how our relationships in the field shape our interactions, but how do our memories of these relationships continue to influence our analysis? Most prized to me now in my latter stages of writing are my memories of individuals, of the places where we met, of the objects that they carried with them, and of the time that we spent cultivating a sacred space for the most vulnerable to share their own memories with me. Just as Ruth Behar remarked on her experience of fieldwork, "an anthropologist's conversations and interactions in the field can never again be exactly reproduced… gone before they happen, always in the past, even when written up in the present" (1996: 7). So what does it mean to base one's research on memory? It means first to think of memory not as fact, but as fiction. It means to think of memory as storytelling and to think of stories as truth. I have come to accept that it is the way in which Phino remembers his wife's voice or the color of the mud underfoot in his native village, the way in which he has constructed and re-constructed a thousand times the story of his "sending ceremony," it is each of these memories that hold truth for his experience (Hayes, Sameshima & Watson 2015). His experience is, in fact, what he remembers of it. And the power that he holds to manipulate parts of his story depending on the audience – emphasizing the war-torn landscapes of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for governmental officials or the beauty of the village that he called home for me – may be the only power that he has. His competing memories of a particular place hold not any less truth, but more. They hold

layers of truth. Each layer reveals the teller's subject position in relation to the listener. Each one reveals both the teller's re-constructed memory of the past and also his or her desired imaginary of the future. In Phino's depiction of a war-torn home, I heard the most torturous moments of his youth *and* I heard his imagined future on safer soil – a future located beyond Morocco's border. I heard him building the narrative most likely to achieve the much-desired stamp of "refugee."

In surveying migrants' oscillation between narratives of a remembered past and narratives of an imagined future, it becomes difficult to overlook their denial of the present. In the following section, I propose a new research method – one that I term "visual life history collection" – and argue for the need to adapt traditional methodologies applied in studies of transnational communities to account for the punctuated journeys of migrants like Phino. The traditional focus on sending and receiving communities ties researchers to narratives of the past and future. However, as an increasing number of migrants spend years in liminal spaces of settlement in transit countries like Morocco, it becomes important to add a third dimension – the study of the space that lies in between and the present-tense stories that are told (or un-told) there.

I was best able to observe this present-tense space through migrants' interactions with their families, friends, and sending communities. As I heard how Phino actively constructed his life in Morocco – through letters and photographs, narratives and images – for his family back home to consume, I realized that I was standing in the middle of his process of memory making. Not unlike the ways in which he had built a narrative of his "sending ceremony" – recounting it so many times before he first told it to me that it was already one of the better worn grooves in his brain – he was in the process of building a

narrative of his present, which would be told again and again by his friends and family members at home in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the process of memory making, that which is remembered or revealed is just as important as that which is forgotten or concealed. I was able to explore the "pushes" and "pulls" that dictated how he wove his narrative in the present-tense through our visual life history sessions together.

TRADITIONAL LIFE HISTORY COLLECTION AND THE INCORPORATION OF VISUAL DATA

Douglas Harper (2002) has claimed that photo-elicitation not only produces more information, but a new kind of information. Photo-elicitation is based on a simple concept – one inserts images, usually photographs, into a research interview. In some cases, interviewees are asked to bring their own photographs, but more commonly, the interviewer provides them. Photographs can be selected around broad themes of the interview, like news clippings from a recent article on migrants who capsized in crossing, or they can be selected to elicit specific memories, like images from an interviewee's home. The primary difference between a standard interview and a photo-elicitation interview lies not in the interviewer's questions, but in the interviewee's responses. The difference between a protocol that relies on both image and narrative, as opposed to narrative alone, has biological roots (Harper 2002, Clark-Ibanez 2004). As humans, we respond differently to these two types of information. The brain's visual cortex is evolutionarily older than the parts that process verbal information. Therefore, as Harper

explains, "Images evoke deeper elements of human consciousness that do words… Exchanges based on words alone utilize less of the brain's capacity than do exchanges in which the brain is processing images as well as words" (Harper 2002: 13). This is one reason why interviews that incorporate visual data are likely to produce more numerous *and* more complex responses from the interviewee.

Twelve months into research in Morocco, I felt that there were certain aspects of individuals' migration narratives that I was still having trouble accessing – parts of the journey that I was unable to map. At this point, I no longer felt that it was due to a lack of trust or to a lack of willing respondents. I worried that I was not asking the right questions to access the emotional reactions and drivers behind the physical steps of migration. With time and trust, migrants seemed increasingly comfortable narrating the intimate details of their physical journeys to me with remarkable openness, but I wanted to know more about the "pushes" and the "pulls," the past realities and the future imaginaries that had fueled their movement. I wanted them to dig a little deeper in their re-tellings.

I decided to augment my collected data with what I began calling "visual life histories," in which I relied on interviewee's own photographs to open up new pathways in the brain. Oral history collection has traditionally been used to establish a complete history of experience (Yow 2005). In more recent adaptations, it has been used to condense one's complete experience in relation to a specific, and often times traumatic, event – a veteran's experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom or a Syrian refugee's journey to the E.U. I propose an adaptation of this method, combining it with photo-elicitation

techniques to encourage narratives, whether complete life narratives or complete event narratives, to be built around material culture.

I had found in my past experiences collecting traditional oral histories with migrants that they often opened up a unique space for material culture to be incorporated into narratives. Because oral history interviews tended to be conducted over many long sessions together and because these extended sessions often necessitated meeting in respondents' homes, greater rapport built naturally with each meeting. Just as tea was offered and dinner was shared, family photographs were often passed back and forth across the table. By intentionally centering my visual life history sessions on the incorporation of material items – specifically photographs, but also maps, books, clothing, and other household items – I found that I elicited from my respondents both more narratives *and* different kinds of narratives about their experiences of home, movement, detention, and identity in transitory spaces. Through the process of looking at their photographs, some of the questions that I had not known to ask naturally arose. These questions seemed to open deeper levels of communication and more emotional connections to past experiences in my respondents. I asked, what had "home" come to mean in light of their journeys? In what ways had their imaginaries of Europe or the process of migration changed? How was their current "temporary" situation explained to those left behind? And most importantly to me, in what ways had their own conceptions of identity been transformed?

In all of my time spent working with migrants in Morocco, I never met a single one whose material possessions had not at least once, and usually multiple times, been stolen from them. If they left home in their best clothes, they were gone. If their parents

bought them a new pair of shoes for their journey, they were gone. If they set out with a cell phone or a pocket knife, a camera or a watch, they were gone. Whatever money they had in their pockets, it was certainly gone. I was always curious about what it was that migrants packed on their day of departure – leaving home with the knowledge that they may never return and able to bring no more than what they could carry on their backs. The answers that I received were surprisingly similar, even across ethnic and socioeconomic divides. Aside from the necessities (a change of clothes, food and water, money, and a cell phone, if possible), many carried a copy of the Bible or the Qur'an and almost all carried a small and cherished collection of family photographs. By the time that I was sitting across from these men, women, and children, they had been hustled and abused by a long and merciless line of smugglers, border agents, and detention center guards, and they had generally lost all that they started out with, backpacks included. Photographs were the one possession that held no value for others, and as such, they were often the only possession that migrants were able to hold on to. They became increasingly valuable as the other parts of their material pasts disappeared one by one. The images, faded and wrinkled by the time that I saw them, had become their one physical connection to home. Their photographs had become their memories.

On the connection between photographs and memory, John Berger famously wrote:

> The thrill found in a photograph comes from the onrush of memory. This is obvious when it's a picture of something we once knew. That house we lived in. Mother when young.

> But in another sense, we once knew everything we recognize in any photo. That's grass growing. Tiles on a roof get wet like that, don't they. Here is one of the seven ways in which bosses smile. This is a woman's shoulder, not a man's. Just the way snow melts.

Memory is a strange faculty. The sharper and more isolated the stimulus memory receives, *the more it remembers*; the more comprehensive the stimulus, *the less it remembers*. This is perhaps why black-and-white photography is paradoxically more evocative than colour photography. It stimulates a faster onrush of memories because less has been given, more has been left out (1992:192–193 emphasis added).

Because the migrants I came to know had so few material possessions, the handful of photographs that they had hidden in their pockets and smuggled across borders served as both sharp *and* isolated stimuli. The less they had, the more they remembered. I drew on Douglas' argument that photo-elicitation produces new kinds of information, and I took it one step further by considering how photographs that connect subjects to particular places (but are *not* reflective of their lived experiences) conjure a different kind of response than those that connect subjects to their pasts. In each of my sessions, I included some general images of people or places my respondents would likely recognize – past leaders of their countries, geographic landmarks close to their homes, towns they had traveled through in their journeys. And then they themselves provided the images of their pasts. While the former served to highlight migrants' memories of connection to a people or a place, I contend that the latter more commonly highlighted migrants' memories of disconnection.

Placement within larger and more anonymous social structures therefore brings feelings of belonging, while placement within familial and more intimate social groups illuminates the migrant's sense of liminality. A National Geographic image of the Congo River, for instance, made Phino voice a felt connection to his home country (*"I come from a beautiful country." "I am Congolese." "In the Congo, we have all the natural resources a man needs."*) However, an image of his actual home made him voice his

distance across time and space and a felt disconnection to the place he comes from. (*"I have never seen this home before." "My family has grown so much since I left." "That big man is my little brother."*) Because Image A exists outside of his personal experience, he can assume that it remains unchanged in his absence. It was his home country, and it remains his home country. In many ways, the image serves to collapse the time and space between Phino and his home. Image B, a photograph included in one of his wife's letters mailed to him in Morocco, shows a home that has evolved since his departure (in large part thanks to the remittances that he has sent home). It is a home that he has never and likely will never see. It is a home that instead marks his many years of absence. Phino's reaction to these images seemed to speak to the depth of his connection to various imaginaries of place – a nostalgic connection to an imagined place that has come to represent home, or a real connection to a previously experienced place that still holds his family within its four walls. His wife's photograph illustrates how both homes – real and imagined – are now unknown to him.

Image A
(Copyright: National Geographic)

Image B
(Copied with permission of respondent)

I argue that by amending traditional photo-elicitation techniques, they can be used by researchers in combination with oral history collection to assess how individuals creatively narrate their pasts. This methodology is especially useful in work with transnational populations when linkages to home may increase deportation risks or large portions of one's material history may have been destroyed. The following examples walk through two of my visual life history collections, exploring in detail what was selectively revealed and concealed through narrative and image, as migrants attempted to reconstruct a past and reimagine a future in a new space of liminality. What I heard were oral histories and oral futures, both constructed in an overt rejection of the present.

PHINO: A Visual Life History

Sending Country: The Democratic Republic of the Congo
Destination Country: France
Current (Dis)Location: Morocco

Phino is originally from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and left his home in 2004 with the goal of migrating to Paris by way of Morocco. Phino and two friends who began their own migration journeys with him all posed for formal portraits on the day of their departure (see Images C-E below). These are the first photographs that he shows me when we sit down together in the small apartment that he now shares with seven others in a migrant-populated suburb of Rabat. The three men each took turns posing in the corner of Phino's uncle's kitchen, dressed in their finest clothes – Phino in a tan suit jacket given to him by his uncle, khaki slacks purchased at a store in Kinshasa, brown leather shoes brought home to him by a cousin working in Europe, and a striped tie that was "My wife's favorite… She thinks I'm a big man when I wear this tie!" While

the styles worn by his friends range from what I would call "business casual" to what Phino calls "street glam," the positions that they chose to take were remarkably similar. Gaze confidently placed on the camera's lens, arms resting easily at their sides, left foot placed forward, as if each man's journey had already commenced.

Images C-E (Copied with permission of respondent)

In our first session together, Phino also shows me a collection of over a dozen photographs that were taken at his "sending ceremony" – a ceremony held in honor of the departing migrants on that same day (see Images F-M below). He had managed to keep these photographs in impressively good condition over the past decade. As he remembered, "This day was important because it marked the beginning of my journey. Our families had worked so hard to send us, and they wanted to pray for our success. It makes me feel sad to see their faces sometimes. To see the faces of these people who sacrificed so much so that I could go to France. It makes me sad to think that I haven't made it yet." I tried to imagine how it must feel for all of your social connections to band

together to send you on a journey that, despite your best efforts, you repeatedly failed to complete. To set out for one country and find yourself trapped in another.

Images F-M (Copied with permission of respondent)

When I returned to questions about the importance of these photographs later, Phino remarked, "Yes, they remind me that my journey was blessed. I haven't made it to France yet, but when I look at these photographs, I know that someday I will." These two comments and the accompanying photographs serve to illustrate how images are used to narrate two competing stories of migration for Phino – one of failure and one of success. They also highlight what I found to be a central theme among liminal migrants – the sense of being neither here nor there, neither successful nor failed. It is a conflicted and unresolved personal narrative that they tell.

In addition to these prized photographs from his sending ceremony, Phino had another set of newer photographs (see Images N-R below) displayed around his one-room apartment. Some were taped over the peeling paint on the wall above the "kitchen," which was a hot plate and a large metal pot in one corner of the room, and others in the "bedroom," which was two old mattresses laying on the floor in the opposite corner. Phino and the other seven migrants shared these two mattresses in rotating shifts and cooked quietly to avoid disturbing those who were sleeping. Each floor of the old *riad* had one bathroom that was shared between the multiple apartments – a coat-closet sized

room with a hole in the floor and a single faucet attached to the wall at knee-height for washing. There were rats and roaches scurrying around at all hours of the day. When asked about the images that he chose to display on the walls, Phino explained to me that he often included a photograph in his letters home to his family, so that they could "imagine" his life in Morocco. He taped the ones that he liked best on the walls to bring a smile to his days.

Interesting to note about this second collection is just how little they allow his family to imagine the life that Phino is actually leading in Morocco. Instead, they feed into the imaginary of the other as being more desirable than the known – a notion that Phino himself described having before leaving the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and a notion which he continues to hold for France, despite Morocco's failure to meet any of his expectations. Included are photographs of him standing beside a car, which is notably not his, and in front of some of Rabat's most popular tourist destinations, which he has not actually entered. Many of the photographs use one of the city's nicer bed and breakfasts as his backdrop, and I learned that he took these on visits to see a friend who was briefly employed there as a "bagboy." We see him posing beside a painting of a Victorian-era woman, paging through coffee table books on Morocco, and leaning against weight machines in the small fitness center. When asked about the photographs taken in the "kitchen," Phino explained that he wanted his wife to know that "I am eating well. And I even wash my dishes!" However, these images of him posing inside the bed and breakfast – this time inside their restaurant's small kitchen – do nothing but feed a glorified image of life outside of his native country's borders. Ironically, this particular set of images of him cooking, eating, and cleaning hangs above the hotplate in his own

gritty apartment – a space that his family will never see.

Images N-R (Copied with permission of respondent)

The only photographs that do not portray Phino or his sending community are the

ones of the *riad's* open courtyard and hotel room – starched white sheets and pillows displayed neatly under a collection of "traditional" African art (see Images S-U below). The room is cast in a red glow from the equally "traditional" Moroccan lamp made of camel skin dyed red and adorned with the Arabic characters for "sleep." Did Phino's family really believe that he slept in this room, his roommates and rotating sleep schedule hidden from them? Did his friends really believe that his days ended with exercise on these machines and not with muscles aching from hard labor in the hot sun? I asked him, "Do these photographs make your family question why you don't send more money home to them?" The issue of remittances is a sensitive one for many migrants, and Phino acknowledged that yes, his family remained unsatisfied with the money that he sent home. But he seemed resigned to the fact that whatever amount he sent home – however much or little – it would never be enough. He also seemed confident that they had little way to assess how much one earns abroad or how much daily life (especially one as luxurious as his photographs suggest) in Morocco might cost him. Before he left home, he, too, was operating under the assumption that "everyone [abroad] lives well." The life that migrants find outside of their sending countries is far from their expectations.

Images S-U (Copied with permission of respondent)

When we reached the photograph of him standing outside of Mohammed V Mausoleum (see Image V below), Rabat's premier tourist destination, Phino commented, "I've never visited the monument, but I had a friend take a photograph of me here." The entrance fee of 100 *dirhams* would be a significant sacrifice for Phino, who makes an average of 200 *dirhams* a week, and goes some weeks with less than 100. "I try to spend as little as I can, so that I can send money home to my family every month," explained Phino, echoing the plight of so many like him. "They think that if you're living abroad, you should be making money, a lot of money, and sending a lot of money home. They don't understand how hard it is here. It was easier for me to find work at home some weeks. And even when I work hard here, I'm never guaranteed to be paid anything." While the Moroccan minimum wage is set at a monthly rate of 2,000 dirhams (approximately 200 USD), sub-Saharan migrants are hired with the expectation that they will work for significantly less. As Phino highlighted, migrants also have no course of action when they are not paid the price that was agreed upon or not paid at all. He painted

a picture of comfort for his family, while struggling to survive and send home what little he could. He was both embarrassed by his present living conditions and resentful of his family's inability to understand how difficult life abroad truly was. He resented their inability to understand what they could not see. The fact that this desire to present a better image of life abroad and this resentment felt by migrants supporting large family networks back home are so pervasive highlights just how rough conditions in their sending countries must be.

Images V (Copied with permission of respondent)

The final photograph that he showed me in our first visual life history session together pictured Phino with a female tourist who was staying in the same bed and breakfast where his friend was once employed (see Image W below). I asked him why this image was important to him, and he explained to me how she had been kind to him. Her kindness, it seemed, came simply in the form of her acknowledging him – asking his name, where he was from, and a few simple questions about his life back home. Her

willingness to engage him in conversation, to share a pot of mint tea with him, or to take a photograph with him transgressed social norms around gendered, socioeconomic, and racial status, much as my own interactions with him had. "She was from London. She told me to contact her if I ever come to London. She was very kind to me, and she even bought a little doll for my youngest daughter in the marketplace before she left," he explained. Phino fell silent, and for the first time, I saw him cry. I had known Phino for over a year at this point, and I wondered if in that moment, he felt how impossibly far London was for a man like him – born in the Congo and now trapped in a cycle of exploitative labor and police harassment on the periphery of the E.U. His voice cracked, "I haven't seen my daughters since I left home. My youngest daughter is 18 years old now." This poignant moment brought about by the images that Phino shared in our interview revealed the very paradox that he was living. Clinging to memories of a past and hopes of a future, the world around him had moved forward, and there he was, neither here nor there – stuck in between, with little to his name but a doll for a daughter who had long since outgrown the world of make-believe.

Images W (Copied with permission of respondent)

Phino's original set of images – his photographs from home – elucidate my first finding that among liminal migrants, there persists a sense of being neither here nor there, neither successful nor failed, but perpetually in between. The newer set of images – his photographs of "life abroad" taken for his family back home – illustrate the second theme that I found among liminal migrants – the theme of "continuing the imaginary." In combination, the two sets of photographs functioned not unlike a Rorschach or Thematic Apperception Test, allowing me to access a deeper level of perception about respondents' physical and psychological worlds. During interviews, I heard so often sentiments of sadness, loneliness, and loss among migrants. I heard a desire to return home and a recognition of intangible social ties that are lost in migration and no longer seemed worth sacrificing. At the end of each interview, I asked the same series of questions. One of them being, "If you knew that you would never make it to France [or insert here the migrant's desired destination country], then would you like to return home tomorrow?" To which every interviewee responded, "Yes." The present conditions in Morocco offered little in exchange for all that had been lost. It was not what they had expected life abroad to be. My follow-up question to them was, "If you knew there were still a small chance that you would eventually make it to France, then would you choose to never again return home?" To which the answer was also consistently, "Yes." Despite the failure of Morocco to live up to expectations, their remained a strong conviction that other nations would.

Among Phino's collection of photographs were three distinct depictions of home – the home built by remittances, which he had never seen (mailed to him by his wife), the home awaiting him in Europe, which he had never seen (emailed to him by a friend in Spain), and the home in Morocco, which we know was actually a hotel where his friend once worked and never his own (mailed by him to his wife). The latter of these three raises the question of whether or not the European "homes" depicted to Phino by those few who successfully made a crossing north are any more real, and leave us doubting that they are. Phino's actual home in Morocco is the one that is never pictured – the one that he refused to claim as his own. And for many others like Phino, it is the one that will never be photographed, the one that migrants' continually struggle to deny, to obscure, and to forget, even in their present state.

I noticed that Phino and many of the others with whom I sat down in the process of visual life history collections were responsible for perpetuating this imaginary of the other by sending photographs of places where they did not live, friends who they did not have, often accompanied by stories of work that they did not do, and always accompanied by remittances that stretched them far beyond their means. This all suggests that the chain of narratives and images does, in fact, continue north, and that other migrants continue to fuel Phino's belief that once the Moroccan border is crossed, comfortable conditions are abundant. It is not a new phenomenon that individuals are creating idealized imaginaries of a fresh start through life abroad, but what seemed remarkable to me about the state of liminality found in Morocco is that the chain of these imaginaries are never-ending.

De Genova proposed the use of the term "migrant" to describe all emigrants, immigrants, and transmigrants, of documented and undocumented status, for unlike the

other terms, the word "migrant" is reflective of lived experience (2005). It retains a sense of movement, or what he calls the "consequent irresolution of social processes of migration" (2005: 3). Phino's desire to "continue the imaginary" speaks to this unresolved state of being. It speaks to the contemporary state of transnational economic migrations, which leave those who have fled from their countries of origin perpetually seeking a destination that is better than the last. Unable to return home and unable to find the destination that was promised to them, the physical and emotional dislocation of this seeking makes men and women like Phino remain forever in the unresolved status of "migrant."

LUCA: The Digitization of Visual Life History Collection

Sending Country: Cameroon
Destination Country: England
Current (Dis)Location: Morocco

My second example of visual life history collection comes from a very different case study. Luca, who left Cameroon two years ago at the age of 15, had only one photograph to his name (see Image X below). "They took this photo of me when I went to the UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office in Rabat] to file for asylum papers," he explained to me after we sat down at a café in central Rabat for our first session together. "I asked them if I could take it with me, cause I'd never had a photo of myself before. I don't think they're supposed to give you the photos they take there. But this woman was nice, and she let me take one with me… It'll always be special to me cause it's my first. Someday, when I'm living like a big man, I'll laugh at this old photo."

Image X (Copied with permission of respondent)

I met Luca through my work with the CDM, one of Rabat's largest migrant-aid organizations. He came in seeking help filing for asylum papers, and I was in the unfortunate position of having to explain to him that there is, in fact, no route to asylum or refugee status on Moroccan soil. I directed him to the local office of the UNHCR, where he would be able to pick up an asylum application, and asked him to bring it back to CDM, where I would be happy to help him fill it out. This was our standard protocol. However, there would be nothing that he could do from that point forward, but carry the completed application around in his pocket and wait for the day when he reached European soil and could find an appropriate office to file it for a chance at the highly-coveted refugee stamp of approval. I deplored this particular part of my job, and Luca, with his enthusiasm and eager smile, made me deplore it even more. He was so young, and he was so alone. With Luca and others like him, I could never help but to think of my own little brother, who at sixteen often shared the same combination of idealism and bravado when he spoke to me about his future. I would later learn through the stories Luca shared with me that he had seen no less suffering than Phino or the others who had

traveled before him. Yet he had managed to hold on to an optimism that I worried would soon fade, as his years in transit grew.

Most migrants preferred to share their stories with me in the privacy of their own apartments, but when I offered my usual options for meeting places (including my home, Luca's home, the desolate university library, or a convenient café), Luca always picked the café. He claimed that his roommates, with whom he, too, took shifts sleeping in their overcrowded one-room apartment, would be disturbed by our conversation. And he also seemed to enjoy the free meal. Taking me up on my "order anything you like" offer, Luca devoured an astonishing amount of food in each of our many sessions together – always ordering a Coca-Cola, beef brochette, and French fries, and happily eating the second plate that I requested when he was done with the first. I tried my best to shield him from the rude remarks from waiters or stares from the tables surrounding us. It embarrassed me when we often had to go to three or four cafés before one would agree to seat us. But, of course, none of this came as a surprise to him. Luca reassured me that this was "normal," as I apologized for the management's behavior, and it is likely that he felt just as embarrassed for me, understanding their assumption that not only was he a "*harraga*," but that I must have been a prostitute to be eating with him.

After several sessions together, I asked Luca what he had brought with him when he left home and hoped that he would have some photographs to propel his emotional reflections on migration even deeper. He was able to produce only that one passport-sized head-shot of himself from the UNHCR. However, like many other teenaged boys, Luca's phone was full of images. He was happy to show me his collection of digital photographs – images of his favorite soccer team and his favorite female celebrities, familiar images

of Messi and Ronaldinho, Beyoncé and Rhianna. I began to see that for the youngest generation of migrants, digital culture can take the place of material culture, and Luca's Facebook profile, like the digital archives of so many other migrant youth with whom I worked, held a trove of data to be mined. His profile held not simply a compilation of his "favorites," but of the photographs that he had selectively chosen to curate his own outward image to the world. Walking through the collection with him, one photograph at a time, I was able to fill in holes in his narrative that traditional interview techniques alone had failed to access.

The first theme to emerge was Luca's desire for consumption of "the West" – both materially and ideologically. Scanning through his photographs, I saw images of material goods that he did not own but desired. I saw images not of him, but of others who he aspired to be like, presumably because they had attained epic levels of buying power (see Images W-DD, copied from his Facebook profile with permission, below). Basketball stars, rap stars, African Americans who have long been idealized by popular media for the stories of triumph that they represent – a rise from the underbelly of marginalization and poverty, from "the ghetto," to the courts and stages where they perform their success for others to see. This narrative of "zero to hero" is not unlike the narrative that many migrants ascribe to themselves.

I came to see that for Luca, reaching London would be his own performance of success and for him, it was linked to the consumer-driven lifestyle that he idealized. "Everyone's got a good job there," he explained to me. "Me and my friends, we're gonna be living big." Of course, this narrative perpetuated the ideal of western Europe as a land of endless opportunity. Yet unlike Phino, whose story was fueled by the letters and

photographs of those further along the path to "success" and whose own letters and photographs home fueled the desires of those behind him, Luca's narrative existed in a undefined virtual space and was driven more by the promises of popular media than by the journeys of other migrants who had traveled before him. Phino's visual life history reflected how he is largely driven by the past, as Luca's reflects him instead being propelled by the future.

Images Y-DD (Copied from respondent's Facebook profile with permission)

 The second important theme to emerge from Luca's digital archives was that of tribulation. There was a select number of photographs that told stories of discrimination, police harassment, and restricted movement - a narrative very true to his actual lived experience in Morocco, where race and "illegality" have become conflated and racism is rising as quickly as the nation's growing migrant class (see Image EE-FF, copied from his Facebook profile with permission, below). Included in this subset are an image of a black man in shackles, reminiscent of images from Morocco's long tradition of slavery, and a cartoon animal proclaiming, "*Je n'ai pas le temps de détester les gens qui me détestent, car je suis trop occupé à aimer ceux qui m'aiment,*" which Luca translated for me as meaning "Don't worry about your haters, worry about your lovers!" His digital photo narratives highlighted a fundamental connection between this tribulation and awaited triumph. As he explained to me, "No one wants to be here [in Morocco], where they treat us like dogs. But sometimes you've gotta lose before you win."

Image EE-FF (Copied from respondent's Facebook profile with permission)

Unlike the majority of the migrants in Morocco, who traveled with extended family members or other members of their sending communities, Luca traveled on his own. His parents died when he was still young, and as he said, "there was no one at home to notice that I left." While Phino felt strong ties to the community that had helped him migrate and regularly sent money back to his family, Luca carried little memories of his past. His narrative led me to question if, among some migrant groups, researchers should begin thinking about the collection of "oral futures," or constructed imaginaries of what lies ahead, as just as important as "oral histories," or memories of what has been. For in the case of Luca and many other migrants who make up the youngest generation of sub-Saharan Africans in Morocco, it is these visualizations of the lives yet to be lived, the places yet to be seen, and the things yet to be owned that are most defining of their journeys. "Money," Luca said to me, "it's like wings. Someday when I have enough, I'm gonna fly."

In an attempt to parallel my own experiences of collecting visual life histories for readers, I have included photographs (unaltered and just as they were shown to me). As

was true in my interviews, the images add a depth of understanding unavailable in text alone. In the cases of Phino and Luca, the incorporation of photo-elicitation into my interview collection illuminated the highly visual aspect of both oral histories and futures, as well as the need to incorporate material culture in order to access migrants' obsessions with past and future and their simultaneous their denial of the present. Just as those "trapped" in Morocco find themselves in a physical liminality between their sending countries and their desired destinations, my research shows how they also find themselves in a state of emotional liminality between a burned past and a future that lies perpetually beyond their reach. For Luca, like Phino, the eight miles that separates Morocco from the Spanish coast remained full of promise and expectation.

MAPPING MIGRATION: A VISUALIZATION OF (DIS)LOCATION

Reaching across disciplinary boundaries in search of a way to better represent migrants' contemporary experiences of movement (and detention), I discovered the work of Moroccan-born artist Bouchra Khalili. A migrant herself, Khalili similarly sought ways to visualize "the unresolved process of movement," or today's state of transnational economic migration (De Genova 2005). Parts of her work influenced my reconceptualization of transnationalism and can be emblematic for anthropologists engaging in a reconfiguration of traditional research methods in their own studies of transnational populations. Along with new definitions of the migrant and new tools for incorporating visual culture into narrative-driven analysis, researchers should be raising critical questions about how liminal migrants are reconceiving of space, of mobility, and

ultimately, of themselves.

Born in Casablanca in 1975 and raised between Morocco and France, Khalili now calls Paris home and works throughout the Mediterranean - collecting the narratives of migrants and transforming their journeys into artistic representations of transnationalism. In interviews, she explains how she arrives in places with concentrated migrant populations (Marseilles, Istanbul, Malaga) and awaits a natural interaction with one of the many undocumented migrants settled there to emerge – a moment when, for instance, she needs to ask for directions or a stranger offers to help her find her way. Her *Mapping Journey* film series and accompanying screen-prints (see Images GG-II below) map the migratory trajectories of these men and women who she happens to meet. After her "chance encounter," Khalili asks each migrant if they would be willing to trace the route by which they managed to arrive at their current location on her map. She pulls out a paper map and a pen and steadies her camera's eye on the migrants' hands as they begin. Their journeys never follow a straight line from point A to point B, but rather, their tracings underscore the increasingly convoluted routes that contemporary economic migrations are taking.

Image GG (Copyright: Bouchra Khalili)

These contorted lines from sending countries to final destination countries take center stage in each of Khalili's short films, and we as the viewers never see the men and women themselves. Their journeys slowly unfold on the map, and Khalili maintains her camera's focus on the hands of the interviewees connecting one line to the next. The lack of visual stimulation allows the dialectical qualities of each voice to rise, hinting at who the narrator may be. Although Khalili never asks about the "push" or "pull" factors driving these migrations, the men and women find it difficult to trace their journeys without noting how the various legs involved years of working under exploitative conditions to save money, years of waiting on legal (or forged "legal") paperwork, and experiences of deportation, incarceration, and repeated attempts at movement.


Image HH (Copyright: Bouchra Khalili)

Beginning in a small town in rural Morocco, we can imagine one such migrant – a middle-aged man named Youness – first describing his long journey to the bustling border town of Tangier. Jagged lines connect his passage to the island of Gibraltar with a series of dots that he makes along the southern coast of Spain - Algeciras, Marbella, Malaga, Nerja, Almunecar, Almeria - before jutting inward in a familiar formation. Many migrants crossing from North Africa like him find that their pockets run dry long before they had anticipated and are drawn inland to the greater economic possibilities of Madrid and its surrounding metropolis. The first series of dots along the southern coast indicate stops of varying lengths in his journey - some may be a couple of days spent with the friend of a friend only long enough to learn that the work opportunities available in Nerja are limited at best. Other dots indicate longer stays - months spent washing dishes in the back of the house at two touristy restaurants on the outskirts of Marbella and pocketing as much cash as possible to facilitate his move to the next dot on the map. Many of the towns along Spain's southern coast have become reliant on the exploitable labor of passing migrants, and the migrants, knowing their own dispensability, have thus come to expect that hours will routinely be rounded down, tips will be pocketed by management, and questions will be met only with the loss of employment. In Madrid, built-in networks of friends or family make it easier for Moroccan migrants to find work, but the exploitative working conditions (especially in the service industry, where the majority of migrants are first employed) are not much improved.

After a couple of years spent in Madrid, we see his journey continue north along Spain's southern coast, more jagged lines connecting dots into southern France and then jutting inward for an extended visit in Paris. (One can imagine Paris holding much the

same allure as Madrid for migrants barely scraping together enough money to live in the Riviera's tourist-rich and labor-saturated coastal towns.) "From Barcelona," he explains, "we took a small road to avoid the police at the border." In addition to being pulled by the promise of one economic opportunity and then another, the migrants in Khalili's films recount measures taken in accord with their clandestine movement from place to place. Primary border crossings are always avoided in favor of less trafficked and further-flung points on the map. From Paris, he was lured farther north to Belgium and then the Netherlands, eventually settling for a period of five years in Amsterdam. His last leg took him back to the southern coast of France and across the Italian border with the promise of work for another friend of a friend in central Italy's construction industry. At long last, Rome is the place that Youness now calls "home."

Image II (Copyright: Bouchra Khalili)

The accompanying screen-printed series, *Constellations,* may at first seem secondary to Khalili's short films, but it speaks to the sense of geographical detachment that accompanies these migrants' journeys. By removing the boundaries of nation-states from her screen-prints, Khalili leaves us with curious lines that indicate a geography distorted by a long history territorial disputes, colonial legacies, and contested political ambitions. While geography itself can make it nearly impossible to travel directly from point A to point B (air travel being an excluded option for the vast majority of transnational migrants and less-trafficked routes beyond primary border crossings often being preferred), political borders have further complicated human travel for millennia, molding who, how, and when we can experience physical spaces.

Khalili's work succeeds in creating a visually stunning and simple depiction of an increasingly complex global phenomenon without losing the nuance of migration as a diverse human experience. But even in her innovative visual scholarship, she perpetuates the myth of migration as a finite journey from point A to point B, albeit along convoluted lines and punctuated with many unanticipated stops along the way. My research among sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco, who consider the country to be a place of "temporary" settlement, despite the actual duration of their stays, suggests that migration is, much like De Genova stated, a never-ending process (2005). Even in the fortunate (and rare) cases when one reaches his or her desired community and begins the process of "settling in," there looms for undocumented migrants the constant threat of deportation. In many cases, there also arises the desire to move elsewhere for greater opportunity. Because the idealized image of the desired destination, whether it is Istanbul, London, or Paris, is

rarely met in reality, it is not uncommon for this idealization to continue – "*Paris is not what I hoped it would be. But Lyon – Lyon will be a land of opportunity*!"

There is also a dislocation, which commences with the first step of a migrant's journey, and which, as many migrants explained to me, remains a constant state of being from that step forward. Just as the migrant never feels entirely a part of the destination country or the spaces of temporary settlement found along the way, migrants explain how they will similarly never again feel "at home" in their countries of origin. The financial and social hardships of return migrations aside, the home that they left is no longer there to greet them. In Phino's case, a new home had been built and new social ties established. His role of father has been subsumed by his brother, with whom his children now shared their worries and their joys. His wife, his friends, his siblings had all found ways to replace his physical and emotional presence in their lives over the course of his long absence. "Home," he said, "has changed." In Luca's case, the disappearance of home was the impetus for movement. His physical home and emotional ties were destroyed with the loss of his parents. "My home was already gone when I crossed the border," he said. "I left to find a new one." Memories of home remain the driving force for both men, propelling Luca's dream to re-build what was lost and Phino's dream to build a better home for his family, and to someday return there a "big" man. Migration can therefore be understood as both a physical and an emotional state of dislocation, and contrary to popular arguments, I contend that this dislocation is among the only constants. "Migrant" becomes the predominant identity.

Although un-tethered, in many senses, from their homes and not yet tied to a new community, visualizations of home – both real and imagined, remembered and re-

constructed – play an important role in the process of migration. In my own research, I applied Khalili's artistic vision to examine what role visual imaginaries of one's sending community play in the construction of migrants' oral histories. In some cases, these sending communities were idealized in contrast to migrants' difficult, present conditions, and in other cases, they were de-idealized as further justification for migrant's endurance of difficult, present conditions – but regardless, these stories were integral. Similarly, I explored what role visual imaginaries of the receiving community – generally idealized as a place of abundant opportunity as a justification for difficult, present conditions – play in migrants' oral histories, or "oral futures," as I encourage other researchers to think of them.

As an ethnographer, I was uniquely privileged to the varied stories that had become the goods with which many sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco bartered. The story that Luca gave to the young woman taking narratives at the front office of the UNHCR was well rehearsed. He had heard the story before, given by other migrants like him, and he had been instructed by them on how best to describe the conditions of his sending country or how to limit the amount of time spent in any one country before reaching Morocco. His story was meant to create an image of desperation and vulnerability. This, of course, was not the story that Phino would give to the foremen looking to pick up a truck-bed full of laborers for a month-long building project on the outskirts of town and seeking stories of strength and competence. The privilege of ethnography is hearing the multiple variations of one narrative – the different threads that tell not so much of one migrant's experience but of one man's subject position in a complicated space where he lives, but never calls home. It is the web of relationships that

simultaneously include and exclude that become illuminated most brightly.

While Khalili, as a migrant and an artist, recognized the dislocation inherent in migration, she collected stories and mapped journeys on European soil. She was working with the privileged few who had finally made their "crossings," and although their journeys were always longer and more complicated than they had anticipated, the migrants whose narratives she depicts had reached the destinations that they set out for – their feet were firmly planted within the borders of the E.U. Working instead with migrants in Morocco, I collected the stories of those whose homes (both burned and desired) were disappearing points on the map, far south and far north of where they stood. Their journeys were never-ending. Some of them described themselves as stuck in a cycle of failed "crossings," while others saw themselves at a final and nearly insurmountable barrier. Migration in and of itself is a process of storytelling, and it was not the truth of the stories so much as the power that they held to shape memory and ambition, to validate suffering or compel movement that was important to me. I found that through visual life history collection, migrants can highlight more concretely what has been lost, saved, and salvaged in their journeys, tapping into the visual cortex to stimulate deeper connections to the past and incite deeper understandings of the future imaginaries that fuel each step in their processes of "burning."

Let me tell you a truth. Those migrants who tell you that they don't want to go home because life is better in Morocco, they are only telling you part of the story. It's not that life is better in Morocco. It's that they are closer to their dream in Morocco. I know how it is to work hard in your country and think you have it good – you eat, you sleep, you

enjoy your family. But as you grow, you start to see those who left for Europe coming home with nice cars, coming home to build big houses, and you start to realize that no matter how hard you work in your country, you will never have a car, you will never buy a house. This dream of leaving for Europe starts to burn in your heart, and once it does, it will never burn out.

So you save up your money to leave, to leave your home, to leave your family, to leave everything that you have known for everything that you do not. You leave your good life behind for a dream. You say that you will make the crossing to Europe, even if it means death. This dream becomes worth dying for.

And maybe one day you cross, but sooner or later, you will be sent back to Morocco. Do you think of returning home? No, you can imagine nothing but trying again. You will spend your whole life in Morocco if you have to, because it is one step closer to your dream. It has nothing to do with life in Morocco being better. Life in Morocco is hard, so much harder. It has nothing to do with choosing Morocco. Morocco is only a bridge to where you want to be.

- Moussa, M, 24, Côte d'Ivoirian migrant

CHAPTER SIX

BLACK BY NATIONALITY: RACIALIZATION, LEGALIZATION, AND THE MAKING OF MOROCCO'S NEW MIGRANT CLASS

INTRODUCTORY CASE STUDY: The "Other" Blacks

As the population of sub-Saharan migrants living in the Maghreb continues to grow, Moroccan media frequently address the perils and problems of rapidly expanding migrant settlements around Tangier, Rabat, and other urban centers. The popular Moroccan news magazine, *MarocHebdo*, recently drew international critique when it ran a cover story titled, "*Le Peril Noir*," or "The Black Problem," along with a closely cropped image of a young black man's – and assumed migrant's – face (see *Image A* below).

Image A, "The Black Problem."

But what does this assumption that blackness equals "illegality" mean for the substantial number of blacks living in Morocco – some of Moroccan nationality, some born to migrant parents on Moroccan soil, and tens of thousands of others trapped without any documentation or means of escape? Caught between their homes and their desired destinations, sub-Saharan migrants have been linked by Moroccan media to the "mounting racism of Moroccan nationals" (*L'Economiste*), the "spread of disease, drugs, and prostitution" (*Telquel*), and a "growing humanitarian crisis concurrently produced and ignored by the E.U." (*Al Massae*). This chapter contributes to the growing body of literature on citizenship and "illegality," and specifically to a new subset of this literature, which examines the racial dimensions of political categorization. I question what "*hrig*," or the physical and psychological process of "the burning," means for sub-Saharan migrants in liminal spaces of settlement, and what their experiences of minoritization reveal about the syncretization of race, class, and "illegality" more broadly. By linking foundational literature from the field of critical race studies to newer research on racialization from scholars of migration, I examine how understandings of political identity are informed by and diverge from traditional studies of racial or ethnic identity, and how a predominantly Muslim, Maghrebi context presents specific challenges in analyzing the racial dimensions of emergent political categorizations.

Is Morocco not in Africa? But here, I'm the African, and here, it's a bad thing. In Morocco, Africa is associated with AIDS, with sex, with alcohol, with a loosening of

moral values, with a twisting of Islamic tradition. It's never thought, what could a migrant contribute to my country? Migrants are always thought of in terms of their African-ness.

- *Ousmane, M, 22, Senegalese, exchange student*

A History of Senegalese Exchange

Morocco has a small but sizeable population of students who migrate to the country from Senegal every year under their university exchange program, and who tend to come from upper-income families in their sending communities. My engagement with this particular population in Rabat helped to disentangle how factors of race and class distinctly and simultaneously impact the experiences of sub-Saharan migrants (documented and undocumented) in Morocco – a country in which the majority of migrants' placement in informal labor markets has led to a common conflation of blackness, economic marginalization, and presumed citizenship status. Ousmane had been living in Rabat for four years when I first met him, but he still called Dakar home and returned there to visit his friends and family whenever his classes were on break. In theory, open borders between Senegal and Morocco[97] should make travel so easy for all Senegalese with the funds to purchase airfare between the two countries. However, his experience indicated how it was his student ID and what I came to identify as a particular set of "class markers," and not, in fact, his Senegalese passport which facilitated the ease of his travel back and forth. In Ousmane's case, as was true for the other migrants who

---

[97] Morocco and Senegal have a long-standing relationship "founded on values rooted in the soil of faith and culture" (Sall) and strengthened through trade agreements and multilateral regional investments by Senegalese president Macky Sall and King Mohammed VI in recent years (*BBC 2014*). As of 2014, Senegal was Morocco's leading African trade partner with a volume estimated at 122 million USD.

comprised a unique class of documented foreign nationals in Rabat, the class markers that he carried with him had been carefully constructed. Foreigners who are marked by their blackness – often times being American, French, or West African students studying abroad – must work to disassociate themselves from Morocco's emergent class of migrant-laborers, and this is done through performances of their status as educated. It was through dress, through speech, through "little things like always carrying this briefcase with me or always responding in English, even when English is not my language!"

"University Village" is located just outside of *centre ville*, along the rail line of Rabat's newly completely tramway. It was first developed in the 1980s when The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) sought to create the first university exchange program for African students. The program's current director explained to me how Morocco was chosen because it was the most politically stable in the region and also the most in need of financial aid (or lacking in oil, unlike the surrounding nations). Moroccan universities, still in a state of disrepair following the colonial period, were reconstructed with UNESCO funds over the following decade. Although UNESCO failed to create similar programs in other African nations, as was originally promised, and eventually cut all funds to Morocco's African Exchange Program, King Mohammed VI has maintained it. Morocco continues to offer scholarships to a large number of Senegalese students in exchange for generous taxation and importation policies with Senegal, and they have expanded the program to include paid exchanges with other West African nations and former French colonies in the Caribbean. This makes University Village a space of interaction between diverse student groups, all similarly marked by their blackness and upper-income status relative to

Morocco's migrant-laborers.

I was first introduced to the space by a colleague of mine, a fellow Ph.D. student at Rabat's national university who had taken classes with Senegalese exchange students during his undergraduate years. He had arranged an interview for me with a young man currently studying for his baccalaureate in Engineering, and I knew nothing about the man I was going to meet except that his name was Ousmane, he was Senegalese, he spoke little English, and he had some family who lived in the U.S. University Village reminded me of the military barracks I had seen back home, surrounded on all sides by a concrete wall once painted white, but now cracking and covered with graffiti. At the entrance was a small guard-man's house with two uniformed officers inside. They were absorbed in the match playing out on the small television screen in front of them when I approached the window.

Now in order to understand how unusual the interrogation that followed was, it is essential to first understand the kind of privilege that is more commonly granted to white foreigners in Morocco. It is hard to recount all of the times that protocol was waived in place of courtesy for me – times in which I can attest an officer's behavior to nothing more than the high status that foreigners of European descent occupy in Morocco (as in the rest of the world). I had been waived through security checks at airports and detention centers. I had been welcomed into the offices of governmental officials with little questioning, and often times, I was escorted to my destination when I stopped to ask someone for directions. This is not to discount the nearly constant barrage of street harassment and the all too frequent police aggressions that I was also privy to. But it is to say that whiteness equals privilege in Morocco. The list of privileges afforded by

whiteness could on and on, although at some point, the lines between privileging a particular racial group and pursuing a particular gendered identity would become blurred and further discussion would necessitate a lengthy dissection of the habituation of sexual harassment in Morocco's public sphere and the unique placement of foreign women on the scale of respectability. Suffice it to say that while I may have well anticipated a denigrating sexual advance when approaching the two officers and avid Madrid soccer fans in the guard-man's house that afternoon, I did not anticipate their hostility.

I was asked again and again the purpose of my visit, the two men obviously unsatisfied with my explanation of the student interview that I had scheduled. They asked me for identification, and being unaccustomed to carrying either a passport or a driver's license with me in Rabat (one being lure for pick-pockets and the other being unnecessary in a city where I relied on my own two feet and the occasional bus or "*petite taxi*" to get around), I was unable to produce anything but an Emory University student ID card and a credit card with my name on it. Both were taken. They wrote my name in their little book and took my photograph for their records. They laughed as they touched – one of them running his fingers through my hair and across my mouth – and threatened more. "*Salope*"[98] they called me in neither their native language nor mine. I was then told that Ousmane would be called down, not to meet me at the gate, but for "further questioning." I sat for several hours on the sidewalk outside of the University Village gates, sweat pooling at the small of my back in the sweltering sun, and waited for the officers to finish interrogating Ousmane. I was not actually granted access to the grounds, but four hours after our scheduled interview time, Ousmane was finally released to speak

---

[98] A derogatory French term from the French word *sale* (n. "dirty"), meaning "whore" or "slut."

with me on the street outside. I was notified that my name and photograph had been added to the University's file of "restricted visitors" (which Ousmane later translated to mean "suspected prostitutes") in order to help other officers know who was and was not allowed inside of the gates.

"No one visits us here in the Village," he started out in his heavily accented French. "None of us have family in Morocco. We don't have any friends who don't also live in the Village. The University believes it's only drug-dealers or prostitutes who would visit us here. I guess you don't look like a drug dealer." His message struck a cord with me, as I had so frequently heard in my interviews with Moroccans, both average citizens and governmental officials alike, a cry against "drugs and prostitution!" as soon as the subject of migration was broached. As I came to know Ousmane and his fellow exchange students better, it was clear to me that the concern of university officials was a reflection of the larger society's xenophobic attitudes towards Morocco's new population of sub-Saharan migrant-laborers, and not motivated by past incidents with Rabat's Senegalese student population. Understanding the placement of minority subjects within state-run institutions like the university and broader national discourses provided a lens for examining the interconnections between emergent forms of transnational migration, identity construction, and social stratification in Morocco.

Like all of us here, I want to go to Europe to finish my studies, because a degree from Europe is worth so much more than a degree from Morocco. With a degree from Europe, you have the chance to find a good job abroad – in Europe or even in America. And if you can't do that, then at least you can return home and find something good. You

can't find anything abroad with a degree from Morocco – we all know that. Even in my

country, it's not worth much. If I can't go to Europe to finish my studies, then I want to

go there to look for a job as soon as I finish my studies here. But I'm not crazy – I know

that it will be hard to find something. If I can't find work in Europe, then I'll go home.

- *Ousmane, M, 22, Senegalese, exchange student*

Ousmane acknowledges how the simple fact of having been in Europe, even if he is unable to earn a degree or find work there, will grant him a higher status on the job market in his home country. His narrative also highlights what I found to be the primary point of distinction between upper-income migrants living in Morocco for the duration of their exchange programs and lower-income migrants working in Morocco for undefined periods of time – the difference was in the imagined futures that they held for themselves. Ousmane's roommate, also from Senegal, reinforced this imaginary of the future, "No one wants to stay here. In Morocco, you're always a black. You can make money, but you'll never move up, you'll always be stuck at the bottom of the ladder. In my country, I may have to start out with no money, but at least I'll have the chance to be promoted someday." His desire to leave Morocco in search of social and economic mobility echoes the desires of Morocco's migrant-laborer class, but for upper-income migrants like Ousmane and his roommate, a return migration is within their realm of possibilities, while for so many others, a return can only be imagined after a great success. As Ibou and other undocumented residents in Taquadoum had voiced to me, *"You can't go back until you've made it all the way."*

I contend that this expansion in the realm of possible futures for some migrants is

linked not to their status as documented (and therefore able to move), but rather to their class background, and in most cases, the two are deeply intertwined. Ousmane's mother and father spent the majority of his teenage years living in New York, where his uncles ran a small car rental company. There, his father worked for the family business, and his mother held a number of odd jobs, including working as an administrative assistant in the local elementary school. After making the decision to "retire, or at least relax," Ousmane explained how they had wanted to return home. They used most of the money that they had saved throughout their ten years working in the U.S. to buy an apartment in Dakar, where they now lived with their extended family. The remainder of their money was used to send Ousmane north. Although the Moroccan University Exchange program did not hold the prestige of studying abroad in Europe, it was considered one step closer. Not unlike the impoverished communities that banded together to send economic migrants like Phino to Morocco *en route* to Europe, Senegalese families participated in this program with the hopes that it would be a launching pad into European universities. Ousmane's upbringing, like most of the Senegalese studying in Morocco, was largely one of privilege, and although he did not voice this explicitly, it was his education and higher class background which afforded him the opportunity to manipulate his self-presentation – through language, through dress, and through other modes of distancing himself from the markers of undocumented status and socioeconomic marginalization that his skin color carried in Morocco. Even unsuccessful as these attempts often were, it was not a privilege afforded to all. Ousmane had lived with his aunts and cousins in a "nice home," he and his brothers had all attended "good private schools," and his family had "never worried over change." In fact, he explained how it was not until he moved to Morocco for

his studies that he truly appreciated the depth of poverty that existed in his own country.

Not unlike the undocumented economic migrants who crossed through Morocco with the dream of ending up in the E.U.'s labor markets, Ousmane hoped to reach European soil to complete his education and find a "worthwhile" career. However, unlike those who lacked his documented student status, Ousmane viewed a return migration to his sending-country as one possible future, if work could not be found. While upper-income migrants certainly felt the weight of their families' expectations on them, they rarely carried the memories of their families, or entire communities, sacrificing everything to send them abroad. There was not, therefore, the expectation that a great debt be repaid with money and gifts upon their return. "My parents want me to be a success – yes, of course. They want to tell their neighbors that I live in Europe, I have a good job there, I drive a nice car there. They want this because it gives them pride, but they don't need this because it puts food on their table." Ousmane's future success (or failure) would be weighed for the social value that it held – for its ability to uplift his family's standing in the community. He knew that he would never carry the weight of physically lifting his family from poverty. I argue that for the more privileged group of migrants in Morocco, this freedom from monetarily shifting the social structures of their households, from the burdens of remittances and debts, allows them to work towards more abstractly reconfiguring their family's place in the hierarchy of those whose children have reached a pinnacle of "European status."

If a "worthwhile" job could not be found in Europe, then Ousmane would be free to return home, and unlike the migrants who were expected to return home only once they had accrued the means to support their families or communities, Ousmane could

return home empty-handed. He acknowledged that a Moroccan degree would hold little social value in Dakar, but that the journey itself would hold value. The very fact that he had attempted to migrate would serve to reaffirm his higher class standing, allowing him to make a way for himself through his family's established social networks. "The fact that I came to Morocco, that I tried my best, whether I end up finding work in Europe or returning home, this is an expected step." Migration to Europe had become a right of passage, like a mandatory military service, expected of all young men who have the economic means to look for work abroad. While I often sensed that Ousmane was underplaying the shame that would accompany a return migration, the fact that he even spoke of this kind of "failure" as a possibility was notable. Europe was not imaged as a land of boundless opportunity, but rather as a place where finding work would be "hard," and Ousmane's imaged future did not begin and end on European soil. There remained in his imaginary the space for an alternative trajectory that led home, and the very imagining of this alternative future distinguished him from Morocco's undocumented migrants. It was only among those whose chances of "making it" abroad were slimmest of all that no other future trajectory could be envisioned.

A Space for the Here and the Now

I returned to University Village several times in the months following my first interview there to continue my conversations with students, and upon later visits, I was finally granted access to the grounds by a younger Moroccan guard who was on duty alone. He asked me a few questions, I showed him my passport (which I had learned to carry with me when heading to the Village), and he wrote my name in his little visitor's

book without looking over the list of "restricted" visitors. Inside, University Village was a large open courtyard surrounded by dormitory buildings four-stories high. The buildings had been fashioned in the same "once-painted-white" concrete of the surrounding walls and since covered in graffiti. There were six dormitories in total, each marked with a letter above the entry door. Ousmane had explained that Buildings A and B were female dormitories and E was for reserved for students from the Caribbean Islands. The courtyard was a dusty patch of land with a couple of concrete benches and a cracked concrete slab. A basketball goal with the netting torn off sat at one end of the slab and at the other was a narrow one-story building that served as the cafeteria and recreational room. I arrived in the early evening, and there were a couple of students scattered throughout the courtyard in conversation with one another, but the "house," as the students called it, was beaming with life. Students were crowded around the one television set in the corner of the recreational room, piled onto the two sofas and overflowing onto the floor below. Groups of friends were sprawled out with limbs intertwined – men with men and women with women, although with a casual intermingling of the sexes uncommon in social gatherings of university-aged Moroccan youth. The "cafeteria" was a pair of vending machines, one selling Coca-Cola products and the other pre-packaged snack foods, an industrial sized refrigerator, and two old microwaves. Sandwiches were for sale at lunchtime, but most of the students chose to eat in their rooms, where many had their own small refrigerators and hot-plates. Across from the television, where students were cheering loudly, sat two miniature pool tables and pairs of male students escalating their bets as their own games unfolded.

It was not until this very moment that I recognized the utter lack of leisure in my

other spaces of observation throughout Morocco – in the apartments and marketplaces, the detention centers and border camps where most migrants' lives were playing out. In many ways, this group was not unlike the other migrant population that I spent the majority of my days with – both were young, male-dominated groups of mostly West Africans. But here, within the walls of University Village, gathered together in the "house," I recognized the sunken cheeks and deflated voices that had become so familiar to me. I recognized them in their absence. Here, the migrants shouted at the television screen, many of them wearing the jerseys of the players who they admired most. They showed off their skills on the pool table, flirting with the girls who gathered around watching. They ate the *akara* and banana fritters that the girls had prepared in their rooms and brought down to the "house" to share – sometimes selling their treats to the students who were not quite friends. The striking difference between this space and the spaces that confined the lives of Morocco's undocumented migrants was how it allowed for leisure in their lives – for shouting and playing, for flirting and kissing, for cooking and drinking. It was a space that allowed for them to be seen and heard. It was a present-tense space, concerned with neither the past nor the future. They were young college students, and within the insular space of University Village, they appeared to be just that. Yet I knew that outside of the gates, they were read for their race and not their class. They would be subject to the same racism and violence that had led to the unprosecuted murders of sub-Saharan migrants like Faye, Ndour, Seck, Bété, and so many others. Being black in Morocco had become dangerous.

In this building, I am a student. But on the street, I am black. And blacks are

never students. Blacks are always thought of in terms of their African-ness.

- *Ousmane, M, 22, Senegalese, exchange student*

A CONFLATION OF RACE, CLASS, AND "ILLEGALITY"

The development of a growing class of economically and politically vulnerable migrants trapped in liminal border regions like Morocco begs us to question how dichotomies of citizen/migrant, Arab/black, and Moroccan/African are constructed and experienced in the everyday, and underscored the importance of my research. The pervasiveness and intensity of discrimination against blacks from all class backgrounds is perhaps best evidenced by a story that one of my advisors recently shared with me. Returning from the annual African Studies Association meeting, he remarked that his African colleagues refused to take flights laying over in Casablanca and instead opted for longer, less direct, and more expensive flights laying over in Nairobi or other African cities. Just as previous chapters have problematized the dichotomy between the "migrant" and the "refugee," this chapter problematizes distinctions made between politically- and racially-charged categories of marginalization. By examining political categories of "citizen" and "migrant" alongside traditional racial categories of "white" and "black," my research integrates studies of racial inequality with those of global inequality and the production of "illegality" (Sassen 1998, Willen 2007, De Genova 2002, De Genova and Peutz 2010). Drawing on scholars of citizenship and "illegality" (De Genova and Peutz 2010, Fikes 2009, Willen 2007a, 2007b, Ngai 2005, De Genova 2002, 2005, Chavez 1997, 2008, De Genova & Ramos-Zayas 2003, Ong 1996, 1999, 2003), and those who

are beginning to examine the racial dimensions of political categorization (Chavez 2008, Cordero-Guzman et al 2001, De Genova 2006), this section explores how "illegality" is socially, politically, and racially constructed in a Muslim, Moroccan context.

Further complicating anthropological debates on how the state produces political status, Chavez has argued that Foucauldian techniques of governmentality are used to stamp labels of inclusion and exclusion on the bodies of migrants in transit (2008, Foucault 1980), producing a condition of "illegality" that is then embodied through lived experience (Willen 2007). While the migrants remain physically unchanged by this process of labeling, the ways in which they are read by their receiving communities, and therefore their daily experiences in those communities, are written by the government in power. In other words, to draw on Chavez's case studies, a Mexican who is stamped as "legal" enters a distinctly different U.S. than does a Mexican who is stamped as "illegal" (or who is rendered "illegal" by bypassing the legalizing process of being stamped). I first call attention to how Chavez could have acknowledged greater agency on the part of the migrant, and contend that migrants, in fact, wield power in their ability to bypass processes of legalization or manipulate the labels that are assigned to them there. Secondly, I contend that labels of inclusion and exclusion are more fluid than his argument would have us believe. Again assigning greater power to the migrant's subject-position, I argue that migrants mold their forms of self-presentation in order to embody or challenge the labels that have been assigned to them. Theories of racialization that assume the labels stamped on migrants at the border will shape their daily experiences in their receiving countries do not account for the power of performativity, nor for the limitations of it for those populations who have limited cultural capital on which to draw.

As was evidenced by the experiences of exchange students like Ousmane, race can label one as "illegal" in Morocco's public sphere, despite documented status and attempted performances of belonging to an educated, upper-income, or "legal" subject-position. In this case, racial stereotyping in routine migrant-citizen interactions rendered Ousmane in a space a liminality, and proved more powerful than government-approved processes of legalization. One can therefore be stamped as "legal," but read as "illegal," and vice versa.

Despite the outlined short-comings, I find Chavez's argument useful for its theorizing of the government's central role in producing conditions of "illegality" (2008, Foucault 1980). In Morocco, however, European powers exercise even greater control over the emergent classification of sub-Saharan migrants than Moroccan governmental officials do. This indicates how traditional immigrant-receiving countries, like those across the E.U., are increasingly exporting their immigration controls south of their own borders and, with a neoliberal hand, are molding identities, dreams, possibilities, and realities beyond the boundaries of their own nation-states. Morocco, as a border region under transition, presents an ideal site for evaluating and developing the transnational paradigm. It allows for an examination of the relationship between state policy and lived experience, as well as the patterns of discrimination that emerge alongside new migratory trajectories, as sub-Saharan migrant populations contend with structural segregation and the subsequent development of new social alignments in a place where they never intended to stay.

Past research on racialization has illustrated how just as legality is "stamped" on migrants, race is "written" on subjects and is contingent on not only their physical

characteristics but also on the social spaces that they inhabit (Hall 1997, Fikes 2009). In border regions, political categorizations are similarly inscribed with attention to one's physical self and social positioning (Anzaldua 1999, de Genova 2002). I argue that in Morocco, one individual may be alternately labeled as "Arab" *and* "black," "Moroccan" *and* "African," "citizen" *and* "migrant" in the course of one day, depending on factors such as dress, speech, and the particular spaces that are occupied by them or denied to them. Since a range of skin colors exists among Moroccan nationals, and some are read as "*noir*" or "*khal*" (darker skinned), the emergent migrant class is not one that is always physically distinguishable. Situating my research in the neighborhoods and marketplaces where citizens and migrants interact shed light on how the classification of particular neighborhoods or vocations as "migrant" has led to the syncretization of class, race, and "illegality." The mutable nature of racial and political identities in Morocco drives the ongoing negotiation of assigned labels by both migrants and citizens, and new understandings of what it means to be black, Moroccan, or African are therefore emerging daily.

In one of my many conversations with Dr. Mohammed Boudoudou, an Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Morocco's national university who has written extensively on social change and stratification in relation to Morocco's patterns of migration (2004, 2012), he shared his thoughts on the connection between class and perceived racism in light of the nation's new sub-Saharan migrant class. He explained, "Every time Morocco detains a migrant, they're given more money for the deportation," referencing the fees paid by the Spanish government to aid in the repatriation of sub-Saharan migrants before they have the chance to cross into mainland Europe. "And so, of course, the same

migrants will continue to be detained again and again. What does Morocco do with them? Morocco dumps them [at the border with Algeria], because this is much cheaper than proper deportation [to their countries of origin], and it also allows for them to be detained again and again," which means more and more deportation payments collected by Morocco on the same individuals. "I'm laughing about this as I tell you, because it's become a circus, but it's not funny. It's a great tragedy in our country. Sometimes when things grow so bad," he concluded, "you can't do anything but laugh."

Boudoudou took my inquiries about how the class markers carried by exchange students like Ousmane or migrant laborers like Phino might impact the frequency and intensity of discrimination against them in Morocco in a new direction. "We could ask the same thing about the Moroccans who are doing the discriminating, because their education [and associated class markers] also play a role." His own research reveals that the more educated and the higher class a Moroccan individual is (the two being related for the purposes of his argument), the higher their degree of acceptance to change will be. In our conversations, we expanded this notion of change to include new migration patterns and growing migrant populations in cities like Rabat. "Certainly, there's a class affect in Morocco, whereby lower and middle class Moroccans are the most racially prejudice against sub-Saharans, and this [prejudice] exists regardless of their [the migrants'] socio-economic status." Bringing my ethnographic assessment into focus, I agreed that the population that he deemed both "highly educated" and of the "highest class" did tend to be the most open to legal reforms, and among these, were reformations that would grant migrants (especially minors) trapped in Morocco greater access to basic human rights. Within this population, there was a larger awareness of international law.

And amongst the university students, professors, and other academic or progressive "elites," whom I came to know well, there was a desire to elevate Morocco's public image through support of international human rights conventions. "This is our chance to show the world that Muslims aren't backwards!" remarked one of Boudoudou's students in a discussion with me. However, I did not find the same enthusiastic support for the philosophizing principles of international, or arguably "western," rule of law among less progressive circles of equally educated and socio-economically privileged Moroccans. The degree of racism that one displays towards sub-Saharan migrants may therefore be more tied to one's combination of progressive ideals (or left-leaning political stance) and higher class position in Morocco, and not to one's class standing alone.

There was a second point on which I took issue with Boudoudou's argument, and urged him to draw a distinction between racist ideologies and "everyday" acts of racism. I deny his assertion that one's class position and progressive political views impact racial prejudice on a daily or micro level. I would contend instead that class positions are responsible for shaping the ways in which Moroccans interact with public space and that those in higher class positions are significantly less likely to have daily interactions with migrant, or even local, black populations. In my last summer conducting research in Morocco, Boudoudou had become a close friend, and I had taken on the "job" of tutoring his twin sons for their college entrance exams. They were 18-years-old, dreaming of attending university in the U.S, and through my interactions with them, I was welcomed into a Morocco that, even after eight years in the country, was still quite foreign to me. I could not, for instance, believe that they had spent their entire lives in Rabat and had never once been to the main marketplace (only miles from their home), where the

majority of the sub-Saharan migrants whom I knew hawked goods and the majority of the Moroccans whom I knew bought their daily food. They could not believe that I had. I remember their father once telling me a story about the young boys being "punished" for mischievous behavior by having to take a public bus to school in the morning, and then recounting to him the horrors of being packed in there "so tightly that we could hardly breathe!" I also remember their faces upon discovering that I took that same bus to our weekly study sessions together, that I had called the "slums" of Sidi Moussa home during one period of my research, and that I had traveled to the "Siberia" otherwise known as Morocco's eastern border with Algeria several times on my own. My time with them reinforced just how distinct the social spheres that those from differing class backgrounds in Moroccan occupy are – living in different *banlieues* within the same city, Boudoudou's family was separated by their modes of transportation and partook in work, school, and leisure lives that remained largely outside of lower income Moroccans' experience or even knowledge.

Working class migrants like Hicham, on the other hand, would often make comments that revealed their proximity to, and their very different experience and knowledge of, Morocco's growing sub-Saharan migrant population. Hicham was significantly more likely to have daily interactions with sub-Saharan Africans – on the buses that he rode to work, on the streets that he walked back to his home, and in the *souk* where they sold the goods that he bought. But to him, the city's migrants represented a different kind of threat. While upper class migrants' private cars and gated homes protected them against their fears of the physical or material danger that economically disenfranchised and desperate migrants represented, Hicham would argue that migrants posed the biggest

threat to those Moroccans who were seeking work in the informal economy. The anxieties of those who occupied a similar class position were expressed to me in interviews with Moroccans in the marketplace, "Africans will work for almost nothing," "Blacks are stronger [than Moroccans]," "Africans will take pennies for this work [that I do]." It is uneducated Moroccan men, who are already plagued by high rates of unemployment and low wages, who feel most threatened by the growing labor force that has been stereotyped as working for the lowest of wages and under the most exploitative of conditions in the informal sectors of Morocco's economy. With unemployment hovering around 25%, the fear was two-fold – one, that migrants' would drive down the wages of unskilled labor, making already undesirable jobs even more so, and two, that they would soon monopolize the day labor market altogether.

AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF RACE

Anthropological theories and analyses of belonging have long centered on racial or ethnic identity, and only recently has political identity become another key dimension to understanding how social stratification functions in increasingly globalized societies. Drawing on Hall's seminal work, *Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (1997)*,* in addition to theories of representation and identification popularized by Foucault and Barth (1982, 1998), I seek connections between these theoretical contributions and more recent ethnographic studies of citizenship and "illegality" in our world's critical border regions (De Genova 2005, Fikes 2009).

The Language of Difference

Representation is an essential part of the process through which race is constructed and communicated between members of a social group. Hall's work (1992, 1997, 2000) stresses the importance of language – or representative signs and images – and the connection between words and meaning in studies of racial identity. Like related semiotic (de Saussure 1916) and discursive (Foucault 1982) approaches, Hall's constructionist approach relies on a basic conceptualization of representation – or the way in which we use language to give meaning to the concepts in our minds – as a two-part process (1997). First, there is an internal system through which all objects, individuals, and events are correlated with a set of images that we carry around in our minds, such as the image of a "chair," the image of "my friend's wedding ceremony," or the image of "my father." Secondly, there is an external system of language through which all of our internal images are correlated with a set of words that give similar meaning to similar images within in a cultural group. Although the images brought to the forefront of your mind when reading the words "chair," "wedding," or "father" are specific to your own history of experience, you were familiar enough with my experience to generate images in response to my words. You could not picture *my* friend's wedding ceremony, but the word "wedding" likely conjures similar (even clichéd) images of white dresses and floral bouquets for many readers. You could not picture *my* father, but you pictured an older male. Depending on your degree of familiarity, you may have even pictured an older, white male with olive skin, dark hair, and Mediterranean features. Still not *my* father, but an extension of your familiarity with both my system of language and my own personal history. While I myself might picture a different "chair" every time that I read the word,

it is likely that we both imagine an object with four legs and a seat, regardless of its exact color or style. The two-part process of representation is therefore the critical link between objects, concepts, and signs, which leads to the production of meaning in language. As was discussed in earlier chapters, researchers have found that migrants moving between two distinct linguistic systems in their cross-community migrations feel the most significant "cultural impact," regardless of the actual distance traveled (Manning 2005).

In the same way that the word "chair" carries a particular meaning within one linguistic system, words marking a racial, ethnic, or gendered identity come to hold a shared meaning within a cultural group. Border regions present a prolific site for the study of these forms of linguistic representation, as they not only bring together multiple languages, but also the multiple systems of representation embedded in each linguistic tradition. "Black" or "Muslim," for example, connote a very different set of meanings in the rural American south than they do in urban Morocco. Even after many years spent living in Morocco, I still commonly struggled to access the meanings behind colloquialisms, and especially behind racialized slurs. This presents a unique set of challenges to transnational subjectivities, as they are forced to negotiate the different meanings of the markers that they carry with them as they move through distinct cultural contexts and linguistic traditions. One young migrant from Nigeria identified this collision when he explained how he had moved from a place where "everyone was like me," or where being black and Christian made him part of the majority, to a place where "everyone thinks I'm a Muslim. And everyone knows I'm illegal." In the context of Morocco, his blackness marked both his political state of vulnerability, as well as an assumed religious tradition. While one may think that the latter would serve to insulate

some black migrants in Moroccan society, there exists a strict delineation between Moroccan-born and sub-Saharan African Muslims in the neighborhoods that I called home.

My research focused, in part, on constructions of religious and racial identity, examining how factors such as language acquisition or religious affiliation affirmed distinctions between two populations phenotypically ascribed to one race. I found that through strict educational, vocational, and religious separation, there is an emergent migrant class being created to ensure the socioeconomic distinction of Moroccan citizens. In Rabat, this was illustrated through the relegation of migrants to distinct and increasingly impoverished neighborhoods and through the isolation of the limited number of upper-income African exchange students to the distinct space of University Village. It was further enforced through the locking of ethnic-minority students outside of public classrooms, the segregation of migrants into specific sectors of work in the black market economy (and even into specific low-ranking roles within these sectors), and the division of community mosques between migrant and citizen groups. In some cases, formerly Muslim migrants were choosing to assimilate into Morocco's minority Christian population, although this could be read as both a reaction to the division of mosques and to the fact that most aid provided to sub-Saharans came through European organizations, many of them with a religious affiliation.

My research raised questions about whether or not francophone or Muslim migrants were assimilating with greater ease, and one group of female respondents discussed with me their public performance of Islam through dress, agreeing that they were subject to less street harassment than migrant women who did not wear

headscarves. In a separate conversation, a young woman from Nigeria indicated an important distinction that can be made between the performance and acceptance of religious identity, stating, "Wearing a *hijab* doesn't mean I accept Islam. It means I want to walk down the street in peace." While some Moroccans suggested that this tactic was motivated by the desire to gain aid from mosques, I observed a large-scale rejection of migrant populations in local religious life and argue that it is instead motivated by a desire for greater public acceptance or anonymity. Migrants' decisions of how to publicly perform their religion can be analyzed in connection with recent work suggesting that in today's "global cultural system," resistances are sometimes "camouflaged as passivity" (Erickson and Murphy 2010: 557, Mahmood 2005).

In light of western scholarship's failure to acknowledge the agency enacted by Muslim women in their decisions to be a part of mosque movements, *The Politics of Piety* (2005) considers the agency that Muslim women enact through their resistance or ascription to religious ideals. At the heart of Mahmood's ethnography is a critique of secular-liberal principles, which she claims have long hindered conceptualizations of Islamic revival movements and the women's piety movement, in particular. Just as mosque movements allow groups to organize and speak out with greater power than political movements have allowed for in the past, she claims that the piety movement provides Muslim women with an exclusive space in which they can organize. But the goal of her work is "more than ethnographic," aiming to re-conceptualize assumptions about the relationships between "action and embodiment," "resistance and agency," and "self and authority" that inform studies of non-liberal movements more broadly (Mahmood 2005: 38). Dislodging agency from resistance, she pushes readers to consider

the act of veiling as an act of liberation, which gives women the power to assert their piety. In the case of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco, the decision of Muslim migrants to worship privately, given their lack of access to public worship in community mosques can similarly be viewed as an assertion of their piety, rather that a loosening of their traditional practice of Islam. And in the same way, I contend that non-Muslims' decision to publicly perform religious piety through the act of veiling is a form of resistance to the structures that bind them. Donning the dress of the dominant power structure is both an overt ascription to dominant social norms and a subversion of traditional Islamic values – one not any less agentic than the other.

In Morocco, the line between belonging and foreignness is drawn by racial, and assumed religious, markers. I was interested in understanding what the assumed links between Islam, blackness, and "illegality" meant for the native-born Moroccans who were phenotypically (and externally read as) black, as well as for those who internally (or through their own narratives of family heritage) identified as "*khal.*" Drawing on Hall's argument, we can understanding "belonging" to mean interpreting the world – or literally, the words that are used to describe the world – in a similar way as those around you (1997). Morocco offered the chance to test this theory, as it illustrates just how rapidly shifts in one's sense of belonging, or ability to interpret the world around you, can take place. Over the past decade, as rates of sub-Saharan African migration to and through Morocco have grown dramatically, the interpretation of blackness has changed. Morocco has been a historic site of collision between distinct groups – most notably, between Africans, Arabs, and Europeans – reaching back to the Arab Slave Trade, which predates the European trade by over 700 years, and the contemporary experiences of blacks in the

Maghreb have thus been shaped by a complicated racial history, in which subaltern groups like the *Gnaoua, Soussi,* and *Tuareg* continue to inform local conceptions of minority populations. However, it is only in recent years that blackness has emerged as "*le peril*" (or the region's most pressing "problem").

Race as Nationality: Placing the Black Moroccan

Although I developed many close relationships throughout my fieldwork, one family grew to feel more like my own than any other. Adil, a 36-year-old Moroccan man born in Sidi Moussa, which is one of the most impoverished corners of Salé, has become like a brother to me over the past eight years, and even now, I speak to him and his family via Skype at least once a week – his sisters keeping me updated on the neighborhood gossip, his mother clipping out articles that she knows I will be anxious to read, and his little brother recounting his weekly soccer games for me in great detail. Adil's brother, Simohammed, was only eight years old when I first met him and is now finished with his schooling and playing for a local team, like his older brother did in his youth. Adil was recruited by the Moroccan national team at a young age and moved to live in the "barracks" with other promising young athletes. A grueling training regimen replaced his schooling, and at the age of eighteen, he went on to play for Rabat's team. Although it has been decades since he last wore his uniform, he is still occasionally recognized by former fans on the streets, who stop us when we are walking past and ask "Barihsina?" "*Na'am,*" he replies "*'ana* Adil Barihsina." He maintains the physique of an athlete and looks much younger than his years, but Adil now sports dreadlocks down to his waist and is hardly recognizable from the old photographs that I have seen of him with his team. I would argue that it is not, in fact, his scoring record (although he is likely

to deny this!) but his race – as one of the few black Moroccans to play for a national team – which still makes him recognizable to many today.

Despite Adil's recruitment by the state and his years of employment as a player, he is no better off than his family and often laments the fact that he missed out on the chance to receive an education. They live in an old *riad*, which looks forever "under construction" like most of the other buildings in Sidi Moussa. The walls are cinder block covered in graffiti and the floors are roughly poured concrete with initials scratched into them in many places, reminders of how long the neighborhood has remained "unfinished." Doors and windows are missing, rebar decorates the rooftops, and electricity is spotty at best. Together with his maternal grandmother, parents, two brothers, four sisters, two brothers-in-law, four nieces and nephews, and two cousins, he calls the small kitchen, one *salon*, and bathroom home. But unless there is rain, Adil prefers to sleep by himself on the roof. It is on the roof, with clotheslines and clucking chickens beside us, that I had some of my most insightful conversations about the effects of Morocco's growing migrant community on the local black population and on the increased discrimination experienced by families like his.

Adil's mother, Rafika, is a priestess of the *Gnaoua* faith, a subset of Islam that is found especially in the poorer *banlieues* of Moroccan cities and is starting to gain tractions with young, urban, and often highly educated converts, as well. The *Gnaoua* are originally from West Africa,[99] and today the term references an ethnic group that is linked to their unique religious practice. While there are more phenotypically black

---

[99] Research on early the *Gnaoua* links them to the ancient Ghanaian Empire of Ouagadougou, which includes present-day Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Burkino Faso, and Mali (Hart 2000). The name "*Gnaoua*" comes from Tamazight, one of the indigenous languages of the Sahara Desert.

Moroccans among the *Gnaoua*, it is not an exclusively black group and those whom I spoke to about the link between race and ethnic identity were much quicker to link the *Gnaoua* to their Rastafarian style of dress than to their skin color. During the Islamization of the Maghreb, the *Gnaoua* became a part of the Sufi order, but they incorporated many of their former religious practices into their adoption of Islam, including most notably, music and ritual possession (Hart 2000). In Moroccan popular culture, the *Gnaoua* are considered experts in the magical treatment of scorpion stings and psychic disorders, but among their followers, priestesses like Rafika are consulted for everything from financial troubles and infertility to broken bones and colicky babies. I had the honor of watching Rafika treat many patients in their small home – converting their one bathroom into a secluded space for trance and using her knowledge to apply music,[100] ritualized dance, and offerings to evoke ancestral saints who are thought to drive out evil, or the root cause of all maladies. She treated her patients with the same enormous kindness and generosity with which she always greeted me, being paid in small change or food by those who could afford it and in appreciation and the promise of future reciprocity by the many others who could not.

Lacking official data, Adil and I estimated that his immediate neighborhood included approximately 20% phenotypically black Moroccans, no sub-Saharan migrants that we knew of, and a remaining 80% "Arab" Moroccans who identified with the traditional practice of Islam. When asked about lived experiences of racism in their community, his family could cite none. Having known them for many years, I was also at

---

[100] The traditional instruments of the *Gnaoua* include the stringed *gimbre*, the rhythmic *krakebs*, and the drum, which are used together to create hypnotic trance music, marked by its low-toned, rhythmic melodies, call-and-response singing, hand clapping, and head spinning.

a loss for conjuring any reported experiences of overt racism against them in Sidi Moussa, but race was ever present in their home. I spoke with his two younger sisters – a few years younger than me – often about the love lives of those around them and about their own prospects for marriage, and I cannot remember a single conversation in which individuals were not frequently referenced by the color of their skin. "He is too dark for you!" Hanan would remark to Farika. "She is so beautiful – she has such straight hair!" "She is the lightest one in her family, so she will marry first." "She looks like you! [an American]" They would observe about their younger cousin, who was married to a "very handsome" and "very light" man from one of the newer, middle class neighborhoods outside of Rabat on her 18th birthday.

Race was most central though in conversations about the youngest child, Simohammed, who is notably darker skinned than the rest of the family, although they all self-identify as "black." Many of our dinners together ended in eruptions of laughter as the children jokingly taunted their mother, Rafika. "Where did Simo [Simohammed] come from, Mama?" "Simo is from the Sudan!" "Was there a *special* cousin that we don't know about, Mama?" Adil would prod, lovingly shaking his finger in his mother's direction. Rafika's joy was contagious, and she would be rolling over in a fit of laughter as her children's suggestions. Their father, a stoic man of very few words, would wear a small smile on his face as the scene unfolded. "We don't know why he is so dark," he would sometimes say, as if to offer some finality to the conversation. But this conversation would unfold again and again, almost word for word, even as Simo grew older and more aware of the taunting. It never seemed mean-spirited nor intended to shame either Rafika or Simo, but certainly, the young boy was becoming increasingly

aware of how blackness was distinctly linked to beauty by his sisters, and I wondered when he would similarly become aware of how it was being linked to migrant status on the larger scale. While there is a large degree of phenotypic variation among citizens in Morocco and parallels have been suggested between the Moroccan and Brazilian context, I found that Morocco was lacking the diverse vocabulary with which Brazilians discuss race (Sanjek 1971, Harris 1970). Harris argues that within the Brazilian context, "money whitens," and socioeconomic indicators are equated with racial terms regardless of phenotypic difference, but Morocco is lacking the "referential ambiguity" found in many other phenotypically diverse countries (Harris 1970). Even within the intimate space of a family like Adil's, which themselves occupied a wide range of phenotypic variation (with some having darker or lighter skin, straighter or courser hair than others), color was still described as black and white, albeit with descriptors of "lighter" or "darker." Despite the fact that all but Simohammed would like be described as such, there were no terms to reference a "brown," "mulatto," or "mixed" identity.

Much as I contend was the case with Professor Boudoudou and his sons' limited awareness of life beyond their protected boundaries in Rabat, I found that Adil's family's limited accounts of racism were linked to the small orbit of their lives in Sidi Moussa. They lived in the same house that the paternal grandfather had once constructed, and their daily routines rarely took them more than a few blocks from it. They were poor, but they were also respected within the confines of their community. Adil was more aware of the changing perception of blacks in Morocco, because he had been selling used shoes in Rabat's main *souk* for over a decade and had seen the dramatic transformation of a space that was once associated with lower-income Moroccans like him and was presently

transitioning into a space associated with "illegality." Once a week, he traveled by bus to the northern border city of Nador, which has long been a hub for international trade (McMurray 2001). The global second-hand trade alone brings thousands of tons of used clothing into Africa annually,[101] a large portion of it beginning its journey south to the sub-Saharan in one of northern Morocco's ports. In Nador, Adil buys clothing by the "bale," mechanically compressed and tied together, and is unable to sort through his goods until he gets back to his rooftop in Sidi Moussa. There, he sets out marking the items that will sell best, keenly aware of foreign brands and style trends, and occasionally, he saves the very best pieces for himself.

Spreading his goods out on a blue tarp in the middle of the marketplace's main thoroughfare everyday, Adil sells socks for as little as 1 *dirham* a pair and the highest-end shoes for as much as 20 (approximately 2 USD). If he has made enough to cover the cost of his trip back to the border (or a total of 20 *dirhams* from the day's sales), then he considers it a big success. Lacking any formal schooling beyond the third grade, Adil taught himself the basic arithmetic skills needed to run his business and can write a text or email in Arabic, French, Spanish, or English, although his low level of literacy makes reading a newspaper article in any language nearly impossible. Unable to draw on the higher class markers that Ousmane could as a Senegalese exchange student, Adil finds other ways to self-consciously present himself as distinct from the sub-Saharan migrant men who work beside him hawking goods in the city's *souk*. Teaching himself English, wearing his hair in a non-tradition style that links him to Rastafarian and not Muslim culture, and hand selecting pieces from the clothing import pile every week that make

---

[101] A massive 387 thousand tons of clothing (equivalent to 2.9 billion T-shirts) are traded annually from the United Kingdom alone (The Guardian 2015).

him look "cool," "American," "like Michael Jackson or Bob Marley" were some of the ways in which he voiced this performance to me. "I'm not *African*, like 'crawled here from the Congo' African," he tells me one night, sitting beside his tarp, with his signature Jordan Nikes, tight gray jeans, foreign-logo T-shirt, and black fedora on, "but if I don't act foreign, then everyone will think I'm Congolese!"

The changing role of race in social differentiation in Morocco was perhaps best evidenced to me through Adil's conversations with his younger brother. Despite the family's friendly taunting of Simo for his darker skin, I could tell that Adil was concerned about the less friendly harassment that his brother would receive outside of the safety of their home. "When I was a soccer player," he explained, "I wasn't the black. I was Adil. I was the one with the fast feet. None of us worried about race. But I hear the things they call after Simo on the field now." Unlike Adil, who played for the national team in the late-nineties, Simo is constantly singled out for his race. By coaches, by fellow players, by cheering fans and venomous opponents alike, he is very much defined by his blackness. "Last week," Adil recounted to me in a Skype conversation in the spring of 2015, "they called him an African! No one would ever have called me an African." The times, he concluded, are, in fact, changing.

The Role of Place in "Readings" of Race

Rather than language per se, Foucault's analysis of representation focuses on discourse, or "a group of statements which provide a language for talking about a particular topic at a particular historical moment," as a means of understanding how individual subjects relate to larger social groups (Hall 1992: 291). Foucault's discursive

approach is centered on the production of knowledge through language and the control of knowledge through institutionalized forms. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language* (1982)*,* he argues that discourse never consists of one statement, text, action, or source. Rather, the same discourse, characteristic of the state of knowledge in a given time and place, appears across a range of texts and is seen in the culturally accepted forms of conduct at different institutional sites within a society. Drawing on examples of mental illness and homosexuality, he explains how discursive meaning is limited to the historical context in which it is created, and that discourse produces forms of knowledge, objects, subjects, and practices that can differ radically from one social group to another (1980). In other words, it is not just movements across space that create disjunctures in the migrant's ability to interpret the world, but even movements between distinct social groups within one space.

In his later work (1988, 1994, 1995), Foucault became increasingly interested in how discursive practices within specific institutional settings, such as the prison, hospital, or asylum, can be used by the state to regulate its citizens. The classifying systems employed to regulate the movement and detention of citizens/non-citizens in border regions, from physical border controls and detention centers to the procedural labeling of bodies, would be an obvious extension of his study. This foregrounding of the relationship between discourse, knowledge, and power marks a significant development in Hall's original constructionist approach to representation. Through a Foucauldian lens, we see how discourse produces the subject and also defines the subject-positions from which knowledge proceeds. By combining the theoretical approaches of Foucault and Hall, I contend for an understanding of meaning (whether language or discourse) as

constantly changing from one cultural setting or historical period to another.

Anthropologists continue to conceptualize notions of space and time in new ways as processes of globalization further problematize the boundaries once imagined to exist between distinct populations. Gupta and Ferguson (1992) illustrate how the disjuncture of place and culture complicates the bounding of anthropological studies within cultural groups or geographical boundaries. Using the example of borders and those who regularly cross them to demonstrate the disjuncture of place and culture in space, they highlight how subjects marked with a particular identity (i.e. "Moroccan" or "Senegalese") inhabit spaces marked with another (i.e. "Spain" or "Morocco") (1992). I take this argument one step further by examining how subjects can simultaneously embody competing political identities ("illegal" and "legal"), depending on their exact placement within a border region.

Those who carry markers of "illegality," whether it be the color of their skin or the type of work that they perform in the public skin, are marked as such even beyond the physical border – some of them actually being of migrant status and others simply looking or working like migrants are expected to in that particular space. But those who carry these markers also have an (sometimes limited) ability to adopt new practices of self-representation through speech or dress, shifting the ways in which others read them in public spaces. I observed how my friend Adil was comfortably read as a black Moroccan within the confines of his home neighborhood, how he fought the stereotypes associated with sub-Saharan migrants when working in the marketplace through his style, language, and behavior, and then how he was easily assumed by others to be a foreign (higher class) black when occupying particular places that he was able to enter only

through my invitation – university lectures, nice hotels, and Rabat's high end "Mega Mall," being among those places. Read in conjunction with Foucault's argument for the power of discursive practices to create subject-positions, Gupta and Ferguson's work suggests that physical location is no longer the only grid on which cultural difference can be mapped. It is increasingly necessary to privilege multiple grids of power, including race, nationality, *and* political status, in order to understand how a shared religion, social class, or gendered identity may indicate a stronger cultural bond between individuals or groups than a shared nation-state does. In the case of the migrant-dominated settlements in Moroccan suburbs, race and political vulnerability alone serves to situate men and women from a multitude of competing national, religious, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds in a shared subject-position.

Stratification and the Making of the Social "Group"

In *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969), Barth established that "boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them," suggesting that even with the increased mobility of goods, capital, and labor, in the modern age of globalization, ethnic distinctions which delineate groups like the *Gnaoua* within Morocco also persist (10) – and as others have argued, these distinctions may even be on the rise (Wilson 1996: 11). This new conceptualization of boundaries accounts for the fact that the cultural and social practices of ethnic groups – and as I argue, racial groups, as well – have never evolved in isolation from one another (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). But what qualifies as an ethnic or racial distinction and how are they impacted by transnationalism? Research among transnational subjects reveals that distinctions continue to delineate between states of

liminality and belonging, even as ethnic and racial groups are divided and inhabit new spaces. (Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005, Geschiere 2009, Menjívar 2006). Although the lines themselves may be re-drawn to include or exclude new populations – as is illustrated by black Moroccans moving into new spaces of liminality – the lines never cease to exist. Anthropologists have traditionally understood ethnic groups to (1) be "largely biologically self-perpetuating," (2) share "fundamental cultural values," (3) represent "a field of communication and interaction", and (4) have "a membership which identifies itself and is identified by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order" (Barth 1998: 11). This definition is linked to an outdated assumption that race is equal to culture, culture is equal to language, and society is equal to a group that maintains its cohesion through the rejection of others. Barth suggests that rejection remains a key component in the making of any group and that boundaries between groups are therefore not dependent on an absence of "mobility, contact, and information," but rather on the presence of "social processes of exclusion and incorporation" (Barth 1998: 10). Given this updated definition, the key question becomes, how are distinct categories of identification maintained as individual subjects move across physical borders and come to inhabit new subject-positions over the course of their lives?

By highlighting how boundaries are not actually maintained through "racial difference, cultural difference, social separation, and language barriers," Barth argues that more institutionalized forms of political and economic segregation increasingly determine the discrimination of ethnic-minorities (Barth 1998: 11). In the Moroccan case, it is therefore the overarching policies, such as the refusal to provide migrant youth with

access to education, that places sub-Saharans in spaces of liminality, and not the routine "micro-aggressions" or racisms that the migrant youth faced on the street everyday. But if you acknowledge the two as deeply intertwined, as I do, such a distinction is not easy to make. Other scholars' attempts to re-conceptualize ethnicity in the face of globalization have focused on the role of citizens in an emergent "politics of stratification," as was exhibited in *Urban Ethnicity* (1974). Cohen's ethnographic study of London's elite businessmen, an interest group qua ethnic group, contends that high-risk business ventures necessitate an establishment of trust and that trust is best established within a small circle in which criteria for entry is carefully delimited. I am interested in Cohen's prerequisites for trust among businessmen in that they strikingly parallel many nationalist ideologies. Whether a circle of trusted partners or a country of loyal citizens, the goal for both corporation and nation is to create criteria of inclusion and exclusion through which to delineate one exclusive group, and homogeneity becomes the organizing principle (Cohen 1974, Williams 1989). Sameness creates a sense of trustworthiness (which Williams connects to "creditworthiness") and loyalty (which I connect to "citizenship"), while difference – even something as minor as the brand of one's shoes or the cadence of one's speech – raises suspicion (1989: 407). Performing to fit the normative standards of one desired group thus becomes essential to belonging, as was true with the many migrants who spoke to me about their conscious and practiced presentations of self. It was therefore a combination of state policy, migrant-citizen interactions in the everyday, and the migrant's own ability to perform an accepted or vulnerable state that could render ethnic-minorities in spaces of belonging in Morocco.

As anthropologists understand identification to be increasingly procedural and

identities themselves to be decreasingly connected to place, the means by which new ethnic groups are created, embodied, and challenged at the macro/state level and the micro/citizen level continue to be explored. The recent work of the Comaroffs (2009) confronts questions about the connection between ethnicity and globalization. They shed light on what ethnic identity means as corporations gain mobility and trace the contradictory effects of neoliberalism as it transforms the identities of corporate entities and individuals across the world. Their argument is based on the notion that in "industrial societies," most groups make use of "bureaucratic form[s] of organization," while in "advanced liberal societies," groups are limited by the fact that their formal organization is opposed by the state (Cohen 1974: xvii). Groups whose organizational strategies are limited by these "structural conditions" are demarcated as "political ethnicities" and make use of available cultural mechanisms, not unlike traditionally stigmatized racial groups have done (*ibid*). We could extend this argument to contend that legalization, like racialization, places minority populations in disenfranchised positions and with limited access to the organizing principles needed for change.

Racializing the Individual

By studying the construction of individual and national identities in the context of borders, I explore how, why, and to what effects categories of social, political, and racial identification become fused. "Race-making" is a process of social stratification, and like others, it is founded on "the ascription of moral, social, symbolic, and intellectual characteristics to real or manufactured phenotypical features," thereby justifying "the institutional and societal dominance of one population over other[s]" (Stanfield 2011,

1993: 161). Although ethnic and racial identities are commonly conflated in practice and analysis, Williams contends that racial constructs alone are "based on biological features that are facts of birth," and, unlike ethnicities, are mutually exclusive (1989: 425). Racism, as the generator of race-making from one generation to the next, transmits the ideologies and practices that lead to stratification along otherwise arbitrary lines of physical difference. Because border regions bring together diverse groupings of individuals, they serve as a primary site for the creation and proliferation of new racisms. Transmitting racist ideology through mundane intergenerational socialization processes makes race a critical component in routine life choices from residence and career to mate selection, shaping the structures of power, authority, and prestige in a society.

In his more recent work (2000), Hall highlights an important distinction to be made between studies of racial identity – or "the relationship between subjects and discursive practices" – and studies of identification – or "the process of subjectification to discursive practices" (16). Considering Althusser's theories of interpellation, I argue that the mass media plays a central role in this process, acting as the mechanizing force behind the hegemonic ideology (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979, Althusser 1972). When we imagine ideologies existing in the very institutions and practices of the state, then in a laissez faire capitalist society, we can also see how most critical among these institutions are the "progenitors and disseminators" of mass media's reinforcing messages (Althusser 1972). Holding the power to shape public opinion on everything from popular culture to immigration policy, media functions so well, in part, because individuals do not realize their subjection in the process. Althusser contends that instead, individuals (or citizens) believe they are participating in ritual practices, as in the practice of voting to elect

Morocco's parliamentary members. They believe there are exercising their rights to act according to their own ideas. The process of democratic voting is rarely, if ever, seen as an act according to the fixed ideas constructed by the state and proliferated by the media. I apply interpellation to mean the constitutive process through which citizens respond to hegemonic ideologies, thereby recognizing themselves as subjects of the state, and in the Moroccan context, where media is highly censored by state apparatuses, Althusser's argument is even more poignant.

Identification, as a process, is never complete. In fact, it is best conceptualized as something that can be "won or lost," "sustained or abandoned" by an individual at any given moment (2000: 16). While the notion of winning or losing one's identification evokes a sense of powerlessness, Hall acknowledges the possibility for some subjects to take a more active role in the maintenance or abandonment of their identification. However, his work does little to explore the important distinction between empowered and disempowered subject-positions and leaves the questions, under what circumstances do subjects wield control over their own processes of identification? Is this control limited to particular facets of identity (i.e. gendered and racial identities which are viewed as immutable – or linguistic, ethnic, religious, and political identities which are viewed as more malleable)? And lastly, as my research argues, can one subject's control vary over the course of one day, depending on the social spaces that are inhabited by or denied to them? Always returning his readers' attention to the social and political inequalities that shape subjects' understandings of the world, the people around them, and themselves as citizen- or non-citizen-subjects, Roseberry's work contends for the centrality of political economic in ethnographic research (1989). In the case of sub-

Saharan migrants in Morocco, they remain powerless to negotiate their racial or ethnic identities *vis–à–vis* the Moroccan state regardless of how they may self identify, and they are greatly conscribed in their negotiations with Moroccan citizens in the everyday, depending largely on socioeconomic indicators that may or may not be accessible to them.

While it acknowledges the importance of an individual's positionality, Foucault's work has similarly been criticized for its failure to analyze how and why individuals occupy the subject-positions that they do. In *The History of Sexuality* (1987), he establishes the body as "the point of application of a variety of disciplinary practices" (24), and explores how the law creates a subject-position (through disciplinary measures), which the subject must then respond to (25). This process is similar to what is now referred to as a "performativity of the self" (Butler 1993), and highlights the ability of individuals to not only accept the subject-positions that are assigned to them, but also to perform other desired subject-positions that are not. In *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (1993), Butler draws on Foucault's work to argue that the subject is discursively created and cannot exist outside the boundaries of the law. She views sex as one kind of "productive power" which has the ability to "produce, demarcate, circulate [and] differentiate the bodies it controls" (27). However, her Foucauldian analysis incorporates a psychoanalytic approach by arguing that disciplinary practices form a "sexed" subject in a way that indistinguishably links psychic and bodily formation (Butler 1993: 23). Further exploring the psychology of identity as created through difference, Laclau, like Foucault, confirms that the constitution of a social identity is "an act of power" (1990: 33). "Woman" and "black" are marks in contrast to

the unmarked "man" and "white" (*ibid*). Therefore, it is only in relation to what one is not – or one's "constitutive outside" (2000: 17) – that the positive meaning of any identity can be constructed, solidifying the link between white and black, man and woman, and I would add, between legality and "illegality."

Processes of "Other-ing" from Racialization to Legalization: Two Ethnographic Case Studies [*of Mexicans in the U.S. and Cape Verdeans in the E.U.]*

Focusing on the construction of individual and national identities through processes of racialization and legalization at the Moroccan border illustrates how markers of "citizen" and "migrant" shape who is legal, and therefore politically and socially legitimate. However, the limited ethnographic data available on Morocco as a region under transition means that comparative research must be drawn from studies conducted along other critical borders, where notions of nationhood and belonging are similarly contested by migrants and citizens alike. One contemporary and relevant example of the state's role in producing "illegality" comes from the literature on citizen/migrant identities among Latino subjects in the U.S. and the other from the literature on similar processes of identification among post-colonial subjects in Portugal. Both De Genova (2005, 2002) and Fikes (2009) focused their ethnographic research on migrants assumed to have moved north for economic reasons. While De Genova's work addresses the American concern that migrants are depressing wages within their national work force, Fikes addresses the Portuguese desire to fit E.U. standards, thereby eliminating the filth associated with outdoor markets, where many Cape Verdean migrants are informally employed. Their texts both illuminate how it is the spatial contexts in which migrants

move and the particular citizen-migrant interactions that take place in these spaces that mark them as migrant workers and therefore as occupying subject-positions that are threatening to the state.

Like Foucault, De Genova privileges the "particular historical moment" (Hall 1992: 291) in which subjects are stamped with labels of legality or "illegality," marking them as part of the vulnerable population seeking refugee status or part of the threatening population seeking work (2005, 2002). In "Migrant "Illegality" and Deportability in Everyday Life" (2002), he examines the U.S.-Mexico border as a site where "illegality" is performed and observed, suggesting the need for a visible space of confrontation in order for abstracted legal binaries to be understood by the larger public. The border holds the power to shape a nation's (mis)understandings of "illegality," as is evidenced by popular fascination with the borderland in western media and the common fallacy that Mexicans account for the majority of all "illegal" migrants residing within the U.S (De Genova 2002). De Genova's research shows how the conflation of "Mexican" and "illegal" makes it difficult for Latinos (documented and not) to escape the stigmatization of migrant-laborer and molds larger understandings of the "migrant" as unskilled and undocumented in the U.S. – the Latino therefore becomes "migrant," regardless of immigrant status, just as the Asian or African migrant worker becomes "Mexican," regardless of nationality. Just like Moroccan citizens whose phenotypic characteristics or work in the informal economy position them in zones of "illegality," Latinos citizens, who make up the largest ethnic-minority group, are molded by the marginalization of the U.S.'s substantial migrant population.

In *Managing African Portugal: The Citizen-Migrant Distinction* (2009), Fikes

similarly brings forward a Portuguese space in which Cape Verdean migrants are stigmatized by the work that they perform. However, in Lisbon, the spatial boundaries of "illegality" are not drawn and managed by the state's border guards, but by the citizens themselves. Her description of the daily lives of four migrant women captures how one subject can move backwards and forwards along a scale of social stigmatization, depending on the spaces through which they move within one twenty-four hour period. Moving from the fish market to the home of a middle-class woman, for example, one woman transitions from vocal exclusion as a fish hawker (and assumed "illegal" migrant) who is yelled at by passersby to comfortable inclusion as a domestic servant (and assumed "legal" migrant) who is included in the internal hierarchy of the private sphere (Fikes 2009: 206). We see how in Portugal, as in Morocco, clothing is commonly read as a marker in contexts where political identity cannot be determined through phenotypic difference alone.

Freeman's work, *High Tech and High Heels in the Global Economy* 2000), similarly examines the lives of Barbadian women who enact "professionalism" in both appearance and labor practice, adopting what she calls "pink collar" identities. In an effort to distinguish themselves from factory workers, the women adopt new modes of dress and consciously construct an image of themselves as informatics workers. However, their elevated socioeconomic status as part of an emergent middle class allows them to exercise a degree of agency in their practices of image-making that is not seen among Fikes' Cape Verdean subjects in Portugal or among the migrants with whom I worked in Morocco's informal sectors. The dress associated with the stigmatized work of sub-Saharan or Lusophone migrants is largely inescapable and connotes a particular spatial

orientation whether seen on a city sidewalk or public bus. In this case, migrants carry the spatial boundaries of their work with them, being identified as part of the city's informal economy by their muscular arms, bloodstained buckets, or the glint of fish scales decorating their clothing. By looking at the roles that citizens play in constructing "illegality," we see how the citizen's socialization into roles of management serves to reproduce border sites and re-inscribe categories of inclusion or exclusion in public spaces. Fikes and De Genova both find that political categories of identification, like racial ones, are fluid and that what is understood to be a concrete category of citizenship exists only in relation to the exclusions surrounding it. Like recent writing on the social space of postmodernism in relation to the migrant's world, the subjects identified all possess "multiple repertoires" (Rouse 1991). Rouse's Mexican informant, who is Chicano and Latin American, who is "mexiquillo" on the border, "pocho" in the capital, and "sudaca" in Spain (1991) is the Côte d'Ivoirian woman who is now African and black, who is "illegal" on the border, "*harraga*" in Rabat, and who clings desperately to a dream of someday being anyone in Spain.

However, in both examples, little attention is given to how this fluidity is only present when a migrant has the means to alter their performance of self. There are "material and symbolic resources" required if one aims to sustain control over their identification (Hall 1992: 17), which suggests that those individuals already inhabiting positions of racial or ethnic privilege are the ones most likely to possess the resources needed to remain in control of their identification. In the case of Morocco, European powers exercise their control over the identification of migrants through their funding and controlling of Moroccan borders, deciding who can cross and what labels will be stamped

in their crossings. Because identities are produced within and not outside of discourse, they are inherently subject to the historical moment in which they are created and also to the institutional sites where and "modalities of power" from which the discourse emerges (Hall 2000: 22). I have drawn on Hall's argument to conceive of identification as "the marking of difference and exclusion" (Hall 2000: 17), rather than conceiving of identity as a naturally constituted unity lacking internal variations in the more traditional sense. I therefore contend that the creation of new categories of political exclusion in Morocco necessitates a restructuring of the inclusive categories structuring the interactions of black and Arab Moroccan, as well.

Mapping Migrants on an Axis of Foreignness and Belonging

It has been argued that political categorizations of inclusion and exclusion function much like racial categories of difference in terms of delineating between spaces of alienation and acceptance in western democracies (Chavez 2008). In Ong's earlier work (1996), she contends that hierarchies of cultural difference (here not linked specifically to one's country of origin, but often tied to one's familial history of migration) and hierarchies of racial difference intersect in complex ways to locate minorities of color from different class backgrounds within the same politically excluded categories. Her example of Cambodians and Japanese highlights two historically racialized ethnic-minority groups and the ways in which one category – "Asian" – can be stamped over other competing cultural markers of class or ethnicity. However, Ong's analysis does not elaborate on the long history that contributed to the racialization of "Asian," or how this particular category has arguably become both a racial and a cultural marker of

identification over the course of Asian migrations to the U.S. The racialization of the Asian American is a particularly poignant case study for illuminating how categories of legality have been created and manipulated through immigration law, or as Lowe contends in her study of U.S. immigration policy, how the government has announced its need to mold the identity of the migrant through its history of legal exclusions and inclusions (1996).[102] Just as Basch et al. found in their study of Filipino and Caribbean populations in New York (1994), Ong concludes that Asian migrants are subjected to an ideological whitening or blackening reflective of the U.S.'s dominant racial oppositions. The assessment of cultural competence based on assumed human capital and consumer power becomes the basis for placing minority subjects along sliding scales of "ethnic succession" and "cultural citizenship" (Ong 1996: 750).

How best to incorporate immigrant populations into historically dualistic interpretations of race is a point that continues to be debated in scholarly circles. In "The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans," Kim proposes a "field of racial positions," which maps the processes of racialization molding Asians, both American and foreign-born, in relation to whites and blacks in the U.S. (1999; see *Figure 10* below). Her chart is based on the argument that whites order other racial groups along not one sliding scale of privilege, but along two different axes – one marking inferiority and superiority, and the other marking foreigner and insider status (*ibid*). While groups may self-segregate in an attempt to differentiate from predominant negative stereotypes of those lower than them on the scale of inferiority, there is less agency in placement along the scale of foreignness, as the primary markers of belonging, such as language and accent, are more

---

[102] American citizenship was reserved exclusively for white males until the year 1870, when males of African descent could become naturalized citizens, but the bar to citizenship remained for Asian men until the repeal acts of 1943-1952 (Lowe 1996).

likely to be immutable in nature. The "field of racial positions" accounts for these two dimensions of classification, and Kim proposes that Asians have been "racially triangulated" through their historic interactions with whites and blacks, creating an exclusive space for them in the field – higher than blacks on the axis of superiority, but lower than blacks on the axis of belonging.

Figure 10: Kim's Model of the Field of Racial Positions

Source: Kim (1999: Figure 1).

In attempting to move beyond black and white in studies of race, there are two common approaches – the "different trajectories approach" and the "racial hierarchy approach." The work of Omi and Winant (1986) contributed to the first of these, by discussing the independent trajectories of racialization imposed on distinct groups in the U.S. – "Native Americans faced genocide, blacks were subjected to racial slavery,

Mexicans were invaded and colonized, and Asians faced exclusion" (Kim 1999:106). But this approach fails to acknowledge the mutually constitutive nature of racialization. Distinct racial groups, whether well-established minorities like Asians in the U.S. or emergent populations like sub-Saharan Africans in Morocco, are never racialized in "a vacuum, isolated from other groups," but rather, they are subject to racialization through their interactions with majority and other minority populations (Kim 1999:102). Therefore, it is impossible to disentangle the racialization trajectories of different groups as proposed by many critical race theorists. The failure of the racial hierarchy approach, alternatively, is its assumption that status is ordered along a single sliding scale of privilege, rather than on competing axes of inclusion and exclusion. While Kim attempts to account for historic interactions between minority populations and consider competing grids of power (Gupta and Ferguson 1992), her mapping does not place other prominent racial- and ethnic-minorities in the field. Latinos now constitute the largest minority population in the U.S., and if racial triangulation occurs through the simultaneous processes of "relative valorization" and "civic ostracism," then certainly Latinos have played an influential role in mapping the position of Asians in relation to other groups in the field (Kim 1999: 207).[103] I suggest that just as some Asian populations have historically been valorized in relation to blacks in the U.S., Latinos have served as another point of relative valorization, especially in migrant dominated schools and workplaces (De Genova 2005; Rodriguez 2000). Morocco's migrant population is lacking the diversity of migrants to the U.S., making it less likely for self-segregation or relative valorization to shape the interactions of different citizen and ethnic-minority

---

[103] Latinos now comprise the largest minority group at around 15% of the U.S. population, Blacks comprise the second largest at around 12%, and Asians comprise the third largest at around 4% (U.S. Census).

groups. Although Senegalese, for instance, occupy a higher place in the hierarchy within the private sphere of migrant-dominated apartment buildings or work crews, this distinction was not recognized by the larger society.

Examining racialization as a process informed by a new ethnic group's positioning in relation to competing "established" populations raises a particular set of challenges when working outside of a Eurocentric or black/white context, in which established populations may be more racially homogenous and lines of difference may instead fall along distinctions of class, language, or religious affiliation. As I began theorizing how processes of legalization and racialization operate in border regions like Morocco, viewing competing axes of identification remained useful to my analysis. However, my axes were not limited to superiority (inferiority) and belonging (foreignness) alone. I found that among migrants in the Maghreb, readings of race are highly dependent on the class markers that migrants carry with them, as well as on the spaces that they are allowed to occupy. Kim's work begs for a further exploration of how an individual's placement within society effects his or her placement on the axes of superiority and belonging, as discourses unfolding in the *souk*, for instance, produce a very different set of racial identities than do discourses unfolding within a university classroom. I argue that in order to better understand how labels of "inferior" or "foreigner" are inscribed on minority groups, researchers must contextualize their studies of racialization to a specific time and social space. In my case, the space was defined as the border, and the border was defined by my respondents in a multitude of ways.

Cementing Morocco in the Study of "Borderlands"

The study of borders has expanded beyond the study of political boundaries that physically delineate between states and now encompasses the multiple ways in which borders operate symbolically and conceptually in social life. When viewed discursively, the study of borders can mean the construction of borders by those in power, the experience of borders by those interacting with them, and the manipulation of border spaces and identities, all having concrete impacts on social structures and daily life (Aaron, Altink & Weedon 2010). Taking Morocco as a case study, my research highlights how borders can simultaneously function to politically label those crossing them as legal or "illegal," to symbolically label them as included in or excluded from social life, and to geographically distinguish between the competing socioeconomic structures of the Maghreb, the sub-Saharan, and the E.U.

Morocco's borders with Spain, which can be experienced in crossing between Moroccan territory and one of the Spanish enclaves in the northern corner of the country, are the region's most obvious example of a political border – functioning to evaluate, label, and control the bodies crossing them. Morocco's border with Algeria, found just outside of Oujda, similarly acts to control the bodies crossing it, but it lacks any of the physical demarcation or mechanisms of the state found in Ceuta and Melilla. It is an ambiguous border marked instead by the symbolic transition that those crossing it must make. While the boundary between the two countries shifts with the rising and falling of the Saharan dunes, migrants' in transit noted to me both a visceral relief that they felt at making it one step closer to their final destination, and a heightened sense of fear that they felt at having moved into Morocco, which is known for its harsh treatment of migrants. Despite the vastly different ways in which bodies are controlled at Morocco's

northern and eastern borders, both spaces serve to represent Morocco's colonial period and the influence of the French colonial government over the structuring of North African states. As contested political and cultural spaces, borders can be defined through their processes of signifying social differentiation. Signifiers operate to create and sustain social hierarchy, and in their production of identity – whether it be national or individual – Moroccan borders similarly create binaries, "the two sides of the binary opposition rarely given equal status and value" (Aaron, Altink & Weedon 2010: 4).

In attempting to make sense of the self in a transnational space, a third element is born. It is born from neither the old home nor the new. It is born from neither the past nor the future. It embodies and denies the present time and space. The third element is a new self, a new consciousness – a "mestiza" consciousness (Anzaldúa 1987: 102), and though it is a source of pain, though it is loss and loneliness embodied, its energy comes from the continual creative motion of breaking down and rebuilding the self anew. Migrants here are quintessential post-modern subjects. They belong and do not belong to two distinct nation-states, they live in a period of time suspended, their movement across the border challenges our understandings of self, of culture, and of nation. Questioning understanding of borderlands in Morocco's African and European frontiers forces scholars to Maghrebinize a Chicano term, expanding the notion of the border from the spaces in which it was born.

Many scholars have found the visual and symbolic imagery of horizons as a useful analytic tool for describing transformative states, as in Turner's understanding of "liminality" (1986), Carpranzano's "imaginative horizon" (2004), or Saldivar's "trans-americanity" (2011) – all making way for a new conceptualization of the border. We

have come to understand that just as borders divide, they unite. They bring together "other" and "other," denoting contact and collision by the mere fact of their adjacency. In Anzaldúa's "borderlands" (1987) and Pratt's "contact zones" (1987), we were introduced to colonial borders as spaces defined by the domination of "other" over "other," by the conflict of distinct cultural traditions. Post-colonial studies taught us that borders can be defined instead by the mixing of "other" with "other," by the "mestizaje" (Anzaldua 1987), the creolization (Glissant 2008), or the hybridity (Bhabha 1991) born of distinct racial and cultural traditions. In his theorizations of cultural hybridity, Canclini (1990) introduced a more harmonious version of cultural contact and collision, a kind of modern multiculturalism devoid of analyses of power. But the border as site of contact has always been essential to border studies, challenging our categories of identity, our tendency to tie identity to place, and our hesitancy to rethink cultural difference through connectivity (Anzaldua 1987; Rosaldo 1989). The border itself is an affront to our self-here/other-there structuring of the world.

And yet I recognize that understandings of the border writ large threaten to paint a picture of a uniformed space, a uniformed globalization, a uniformed homogenization of the transnational subject. They fail to account for the socioeconomic inequalities written into neoliberal policies, molding the lives of our international borders and those who cross them. We tend to think of borders as spaces where inequalities come head to head. "Other" and "other." We imagine great political borders where Morocco meets Spain, where Mexico meets the U.S., where suffering meets hope, poverty meets opportunity, pain meets healing. Iconic borders are never found where like meets like, where the U.S. becomes Canada or Spain and Italy meet. To delocalize the border is to see it, instead, in

all of the lines that unite and divide beyond the physical border. Bordering is the practice of defining the self in relation to the other.

The border is a curious object of study, shifting its mechanisms of power for the same subjects at various times and places. Whether through the enforcement of a physical border or the social enactment of inclusion and exclusion, "illegality" is best understood as a form of identification, and, like others, it is always in the process of transformation. Constructions of race and legality are never singular, but are "multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses" (Hall 2000: 25), and an understanding of the physical, sociopolitical, and discursive spaces in which the narrative of the migrant is imagined and concretized through language and practice is vital to accessing migrant experience. All processes of identification require the marking of symbolic boundaries, and that which is left outside of the boundary constitutes the identity of what is permitted inside. Even as "the most inclusive category," the citizen exists only in relation to the migrant (Gledhill 2003: 209). The border, as the line that divides, unites the two.

CHAPTER SEVEN (CONCLUSION)

NO WAY HOME: A MODEN SPANISH RULING OF THE MOROCCAN BORDER AND THE EU'S REPSONSE TO THE MIGRANT CRISIS

I was born by the water. I met Alphonse in my first weeks of fieldwork in Morocco. *It was almost 35 years ago.* Sometimes, his voice sounded like that of a child. *I stayed home until the Civil War grew too strong, and then I had to leave.* He came from a small village called Wamba, in a war-torn region of the Congo. *For two years, I lived in refugee camps. I was alone. I lived like a scavenger bird there, but there was little to scavenge.* The refugee camps in Gabon were among the worst. *Day to day, I was just trying to survive.* A tall, thin stalk, a willowy man. He was always listening. *My parents, all of my family, stayed behind. My father owned a small store, and my mother spent everyday working there. They couldn't afford to leave their work.* His face giving way so easily to a smile. He was always the last one to speak. *But I was young and wasn't afraid to lose everything in my search for something better. My mother was happy when I left, because the boys who stayed behind had no choice but to fight in the war. I was her oldest child, and she wanted better things for me.* Away from the crowds, across the table from me, his stories flowed quietly and steadily. His French was beautiful, his words poetic, his hope so persistent in the face of such pain. How so persistent in the face of such pain? *I don't have any family left in the Congo. My mother, my father, most of my family has been killed. Those who haven't have gone to fight in the war. So still, I am alone.* He was one of the few I knew who had made the crossing.

The Legality of Undocumented Movement

Alphonse is one of many who illustrates how even those who make it to Europe often continue to reside in a space of "illegality," facing economic marginalization, social discrimination, and remaining at risk for the myriad forms of institutionalized abuse that structured their daily lives in the Maghreb. Laws protecting our international human rights trace their origins to the aftermath of World War II and the refugee crises of the interwar years that preceded it. Most central among the foundational principles for today's migrant/refugee population is Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948, which guarantees all citizens of the world with the right to seek and enjoy asylum in other countries. However, the conditions under which a migrant/refugee's home country should be declared unsafe have been contested by the signing nations since the UDHR's conception, often in response to their own needs to bolster a struggling economy with cheap and exploitable sources of labor.

According to Spain's "Law on the Right to Asylum and Refugee Status," adopted in 1984 and amended in 1994, every man, woman, and child arriving on Spanish shores has the right to apply for asylum. Once their application is filed, they have the right to interpreters, legal counsel, and immediate medical assistance. They have the right to state-sponsored accommodation in one of the four detention centers spread across the country for a maximum of sixty days, or until their case has been reviewed. Approval of their application guarantees the right to a work permit and social welfare, including subsidized healthcare and education. Those whose applications are denied must leave Spain within sixty days or suffer deportation to their country of origin. But for years now, Spain's state-run detention centers have all been overrun, as cases take more than twelve

months to review, and individuals have been routinely denied their basic rights to legal counsel. Non-profit organizations, like the Spanish Commission for the Assistance of Refugees (SCAR), have tried to fill this widening gap in the services guaranteed and the services provided by offering refuge and counsel for free, or at highly discounted rates. But these organizations, too, are struggling to handle the new masses.

According to Frontex, the number of asylum applications received by the E.U. in 2014 rose by 25% from the previous year, with 25% of new applicants being under the age of 18.[104] There has also been a dramatic increase in the number of applications from stateless people – totaling an estimated 436,000 in 2014 alone. In countries like Germany, France, and Spain, these increases have been even more dramatic, and the number of asylum applications has increased by 73% in the past five years. The French Refugee Agency, like the Spanish, has admitted to being completely overwhelmed, with their review process now taking an average of 24-36 months and over 90% of all applications being rejected.[105] Given the realities of a failed system, it is no wonder that Spanish officials, with the purported support and encouragement of the E.U., is attempting to mold Morocco into a final destination for all African migrations.

In the spring of 2015, the president of Melilla, Juan Jose Imbroda Ortiz, announced to international media that the aim of returning Africans to Morocco, in place of properly repatriating them to their countries of origin and in direct defiance of international human rights conventions, was to eliminate the "prize" of letting them stay

---

[104] Germany continues to receive the largest number of asylum applications in Europe, followed by France, Sweden, Italy, and the U.K.

[105] In almost every case of rejection, an appeal is filed, adding another 24-36 months to the review process for asylum seeking migrants.

in Spain for a review of their asylum applications after having entered "illegally."[106] This popular argument for "punishing" the journeys of "illegal" migrants/refugees, at least 25% of them being minors, never speaks to Spain's legal conviction that every individual has "the right to apply for asylum."[107] Where, under international human rights law, do we proclaim that migrants/refugees fleeing war-torn and impoverished regions of the world, that men/women/children who have lost everything and sustained untold abuses in their long journeys towards safer shores should arrive with neatly arranged dossiers of their claims for refuge? The migrant is the refugee. The refugee is the migrant. Both arrive at the hands of the same smuggling rings and rarely does either arrive with their completed applications in hand. At the very least, it is the obligation of the states receiving them to assemble the information needed to disentangle the two.

President Ortiz's comments marked a shift – a moment in which, for the first time, Spanish officials publicly acknowledged their illegal practice of "pushing-back."[108] They acknowledged their literal pushing-back of migrants/refugees across the borders into Morocco when they reached the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which should grant them protection under E.U. and international law. They also acknowledged their pushing-back of migrants/refugees through deportation from mainland Spain to Morocco, and not to their rightful countries of origin. President Ortiz highlighted how he hoped that Ceuta and Melilla's routinizing of "push-backs" would reduce the incentive

---

[106] Goodman, Al. "Spanish Enclaves Quiet After Deaths." *CNN*. 7 Oct. 2005.

[107] Furthermore, the deportation of sub-Saharan migrants to Morocco, a country with minimal reception capacity to guarantee fundamental human rights, violates Article 3 of the "Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which maintains that Punishment."

[108] Push-backs were originally done under a little-used 1992 agreement allowing Spain to undertake "exceptional repatriation" of immigrants entering Spanish territory illegally from Morocco, even if they were not Moroccan nationals.

for migrants to leave their homes with the goal of "getting a foot in Spain." The following day, Spain's cabinet quietly approved a €3,000,000 "aid package," to be divided between Melilla and Ceuta, which have a combined population of under 150,000. An aid package sent to Morocco, but intended only for those parts of Morocco that remain under colonial control. According to the press release by Spanish Deputy Prime Minister Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega, he hoped this package would "compensate the efforts of both cities to address illegal immigration before it reaches our shores."[109] He failed to field questions from reporters about the six sub-Saharan migrants who had been fatally shot by Moroccan security forces the weekend before in their attempts to scale the Ceuta-Moroccan border fence. Along with structural changes to the border, security forces had been outfitted with new weapons and their numbers strengthened by the addition of Spanish border control teams.

The European Union wants Morocco to act as its police dog, and Morocco accepts this role because it's a poor country. It accepts this role in exchange for money, in exchange for protection, in exchange for the promise of development.

- *Mohammed, M, 62, Moroccan, university professor*

"Home" at Last: Policy and Practice on Other Side of the Border

Alphonse explained that those who believe their cases for asylum are "strong" generally await the formal review process, for gaining documentation in the E.U. opens the doors for better work opportunities and the possibility of bringing loved ones over

---

[109] Goodman, Al. "Spanish Enclaves Quiet After Deaths." *CNN*. 7 Oct. 2005.

through the family reunification act.[110] However, those who have less faith that their stories will hold up under the scrutiny of the commission – those whose countries have not been deemed "bad" enough or whose stories do not follow the established western narratives of vulnerability – often try to escape the hands of the government during the period when their applications are under review. With detention centers unable to accommodate the masses and migrants scattered around at various non-governmental housing facilities, escaping is not hard to do.

While this escape symbolizes the completion of the migrant's journey, the attainment of a dream, it also comes with a sense of defeat. Migrants do so knowing that they will likely never see their homes or their loved ones again. They escape into the promise of a future on European soil, knowing that it means the final burning of their pasts and any chance to return home. Unable to apply for family reunification, unable to travel outside of the boundaries of the E.U., many remain stuck in the niche of highly exploitative labor carved out for the undocumented in western societies. As one case processer at SCAR told me, "A few will find shelter, but lacking alternatives, most end up on the street. They live in trains in abandoned rail yards, in condemned houses, or on mattresses covered in plastic sheets on fallow land. Very few find paying work – at best, temporary, under-the-table work for €1 or maybe €2 an hour. And this is what they risk their lives for."

Yes, this is what they risk their lives for. There are so many perilous points on the migrant/refugee's journey north – the final crossing across the waters of the Mediterranean being only one of them. The Lampedusa disaster brought international

---

[110] Those who are granted asylum in Spain are also entitled to €51.60 a month and are able to file for additional funds to support any legal family members who have accompanied them.

attention to the dangers of migration from Africa into the E.U. in 2013 when over 350 migrants drowned only 120 kilometers from the Italian shores. "They had made a difficult crossing through the Sahara and Libya packed into cars and walking long stretches on foot, only to pay several times the price of one plane ticket to be packed in again – shoulder to shoulder – on a boat much too small and much too old for their numbers" (Schwartz 2014).[111] Body bags lined up along the beach – shoulder to shoulder again. "Pray [to] God for the victims of the shipwreck off Lampedusa!" tweeted Pope Francis, "An immense tragedy!" (Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta), and "A European tragedy, not just an Italian one!" (Deputy Prime Minister Angelino Alfano). In the weeks following the incident, survivors came forward revealing to the media that casualty reports had been grossly underestimated and that, in fact, hundreds of other hopeful migrants/refugees had been locked in the hold of the vessel by their smugglers. The few who survived the tragedy were taken into custody by Italian officials, where they awaited trial to determine their alleged status as "illegal" – a "guilty" verdict resulting in fines of up to €5,000 and deportation. They waited, hoping that the places they had come from were "bad" enough, that the suffering they had endured was painful enough, that their stories would strike a cord with western narratives of vulnerability. These were the lucky few.

To Europe and Back Again: One Migrant's Story

Alphonse, too, was one of the lucky few – one whose journey had taken him all the way from his home in the Congo to the mainland of Spain, after several years spent in

---

[111] For complete story see Schwartz, Mattathias. "The Anniversary of the Lampedusa Tragedy." *The New Yorker*. 3 Oct. 2014.

refugee camps in Gabon and several more spent saving money for his final crossing from Morocco. His narrative hit all the right keys. His village ravaged by war, his only possible future one of military inscription, all of his family killed or forced into the uniform of the solider in his absence. He is the one who our international laws were written to protect. Yet Alphonse, like so many others whose histories had left them in spaces of complete vulnerability, was sitting across from me in Morocco once again. His story contrasts the utopian view of Europe held by those who had yet to make the crossing and sheds light on the truly cyclical nature of so many migrations, seemingly always returning the migrant to the state of liminality from which they began their journeys. Over the course of several interviews together, Alphonse shared his story with me, and now, I share it with you (just as it was shared with me):

The civil war broke out after one leader won the presidency in the Congo's first democratic election. The former president took his position back, and the people split, some supporting the old leader and some the new. When there is civil war in a country, the citizens all take advantage of one another. There was looting everywhere. There were soldiers everywhere. The good people were terrorized by them everyday. The military was voluntary, because the economy was so poor that the government couldn't pay the soldiers, and the country couldn't survive without the workers. For this reason, the army was young. Education was the only way out. If you had a good job, then you were left free, and if you had a high school diploma, then you were made an officer. I would have been a simple soldier.

In the Congo, children started school at age seven. After six years in the schoolhouse, you had a graduation. It was a challenge to make it through. Once you

finished, you were proud. Your family was proud. Your community was proud. There weren't many students who finished school in Wamba. These students had the chance to move on to high school. The public schools were free and all children could start, but those who weren't good were sent away. There were more than sixty children in my school. There was one teacher. Some children came in early, some late, and the one room held all of the different levels of learners. Some days, it was chaos. Many of the teachers had other jobs, because the economy was so poor that the government couldn't pay the teachers well either. So some days, the teacher would leave. If a child needed any attention from the teacher, he was sent home to his parents. It is sad, because I know that it was these children who needed the most help, but the system had no place for them. If a child was weak, there was no place for him in the schoolhouse. I now say, there are no weak children, only weak education. The private schools, they were stronger. I always said, when I have children, they will go to the private schools, but I never really believed that it would be possible. No one who I knew had the money for school.

I remember the day when I left Morocco for Europe. Yes, I will always remember it well. It was in January of 2000. We do not have the time for me to tell you all of the details of my journey, but I can tell you that it was long and that in the end, I found myself in Spain. I had been packed into the belly of a truck with many others. The air was so hot, and there was not enough for us all. A friend had written a story for me before I left, and I memorized every word of it… "I was born in the Congo, I left when the fighting reached my village, and I lived as a refugee in the years that followed." I paid all of the money that I had left to hire an immigration lawyer in Madrid. My friend

had even given me the name of the man to hire. But after our hearing, I learned that I would not be granted asylum because I had spent too long in another country before I arrived in Europe. We filed for an appeal, and I was sent to another court to have my case heard by another immigration judge there. The judge asked me if the government of Gabon gave me a home, and I said no. He asked me if they gave me three meals a day, and I said no. He asked me if they gave me a doctor, and I said no. He asked me if they gave me an education, and I said no. In the refugee camps, there is little given to you. Sometimes you have a mattress and other times not. Sometimes you have food and other times not. Only the sickest of us ever had any medicine. Never, did we have any books. The judge finally ruled that in Gabon, I was given no means to survive. I was not safe there, so he gave me a path to asylum in the E.U.

The official reason that I was there was that my country was no longer a safe place to live, but the truth is that all of my life, I had dreamed of going to Europe. Going to Europe meant having opportunity. I had heard wonderful things about the country. I thought, now that I have asylum, my dreams have come true. I wanted to help my family. In my first months, I worked with a man who burned African CDs in the basement of a restaurant. I worked with computers, with all kinds of new machines, and I loved it. I worked in the night, long hours, and he paid me with cash. The pay was better than anything that I had ever known before. But the officers came for us in the early morning, just after I had gotten home from work. I was sharing a small apartment with five other Africans, and they came for all of us. I will never know why. Had one of them done something wrong? Had one of us been reported? We couldn't ask any questions. They threw us on the ground, they handcuffed us, I was hit hard when I asked if they would

remove my handcuffs so that I could show them my papers. I was hit even harder when I told them that I was a refugee. I thought, how can I get this far only to be sent home? I have papers now! I am a refugee now! I am safe in Europe now! But I learned that papers mean nothing. Europe is not so different from Africa after all.

In the Congo, the government, they want the power, they want the money. They use the power to build their own fortunes and to help their own children, but they care nothing about their country's children. This is the big problem in Africa. Countries like the Congo are rich in oil, but the people never see these riches. For decades now, bad things have been done, bad things have been ignored. We had our first democratic election in the nineties, but it meant nothing. The leader who loses takes his position back by force if he wants it. I don't have any answers for you now. I don't know what will happen in the future of my country. I am tired. We look to the youth to make a change, but the schools teach you about French culture and not about your own. What can you do in a country that you don't understand? I learned nothing about the history of the Congo until I left.

When you lead a country, you don't lead the trees, you don't lead the rivers, you lead the people. When you say the word "country," don't you mean the people? A country is its people, not its oil. A country is a living thing. What are you going to lead now, big man? You have power because of the people who put you there. You forget this, big man. Thomas Sankara was a great African leader. He would go to the villages and eat what the people were eating. He would sleep where the people were sleeping. He never wore the nice clothes of the politicians, always a soldier's uniform. He preached to his army, a soldier without education is a murderer! He educated his army. He was so

young and so handsome. Sankara was a real revolutionary. A lot of people think that he was the first person to see what the people really need, to listen to what we really want. He was a hero for saying to the Europeans, you aren't treating us like humans! And for saying to the other African leaders, our land is for the people, nothing is for us! He changed the name of his country – no longer will you carry a French name! – he called it "Burkina Faso," the land of the honest people. He was murdered by one of his closest friends in 1987. The man killed him and took his place as the ruler of the honest people. But it was Sankara who had given hope to his country, and that couldn't be taken away. When I was sent back to Morocco, I carried a book about Sankara with me. I had it for many years. The book was like a friend to me. I read it once, twice, so many times. It was like a very good friend to me. Books make me feel not so alone.

When I think about my small days in the village, I think about playing soccer in the street. It was too hot in the sand, it burned your feet, and there were not many cars, so we always played in the street. Every morning, we used to walk to the ocean, the other children and I. We would wash in the water, but our mothers warned us not to swim in the waves – the water is dangerous! The children used to organize fights between dogs after school. We would walk our dogs to another village to fight their dogs. I feel badly when I remember how we treated those dogs. But I was a child, and everyone just wanted to have the strongest dog.

- *Alphonse, M, 34, Congolese migrant [DRC]*

Trapped at the Threshold: Migration as Never Ending *Rites de Passage*

Liminality, noun, from the Latin word *līmen*, meaning "a threshold": the quality of disorientation that occurs in the middle stage of rituals, when participants no longer hold their pre-ritual status but have not yet begun the transition to the new status they will hold when the ritual is complete. During a ritual's liminal stage, participants "stand at the threshold" between their previous self and their new self, which the completed ritual will establish.

In his now famous "Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in *Rites de Passage*" (1964), Turner developed a way of understanding liminality that has since been applied to make sense of political and cultural upheaval in light of ritual transformation. During the liminal period, or the critical space that exists between the old [person, system, nation] and the new [person, system, nation], social hierarchies may be reversed, social bonds may be dissolved, and the continuity of tradition may be uncertain. The future is suddenly cast with doubt. The very person or nation losing that which defined it. It is through the dissolution of all established order, the moment that exists outside of our conceptions of time-place, that liminality creates the possibility for something new. It is through a burning of the past, a ritual throwing of the old self into the fire, that a new thing is born. New customs and institutions are established through the completion of the ritual. Order is re-established. The person is whole again. But how do we understand a continuation of the liminal?

Although less often applied in studies of migrant communities, much has been written on refugee populations stuck in liminal stages, betwixt and between. Afghans in Karachi or Syrians in Amman – the majority of them awaiting the opportunity to move on to destinations in Europe or the U.S., but stuck in a temporary destination *en route* to a

new home. What is most remarkable about the case of those stuck in Morocco, aside from them being a population that makes claims for refugee status while being largely categorized as clandestine migrants, is their proximity to the imagined home. For sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco, unlike Somalis in Nairobi or Burmese in Bangkok, their journeys have not been stalled *en route* to Europe or the U.S., but rather at the very border to the nations that they so desperately seek to enter. They can quite literally see the land of opportunity that they have sacrificed so much for, sustaining the dream and perhaps making it that much more difficult for them to envision another course of action.

Turner called on us to investigate the phenomena of mid-transition, claiming that it is here, in this "betwixt and between period," that we find "the basic building blocks of culture" (Turner 1964: 55). Emplacing the migrant/refugee as the transitional being or "*liminal persona*" reveals to us the process of self-making, the process of nation-making, not only through the individuals' own practice of identity construction but through the nation-state's molding of inclusion and exclusion (Turner 1964: 47). The state asks, who are you? Who are we? Are you us? Are we becoming you? The lines of belonging work to continually redefine the boundaries of the nation and those who comprise its citizenship. For the subjects trapped in a protracted state of liminality in Morocco, a past has been burned in exchange for a new self, a new nation that has not yet been constructed. *Hrig*, the process of "illegal" immigration, the process of "the burning" is a ritual of sacrifice.

The Weight of their Journeys

Writing this conclusion one year ago, I would have made the argument for us to begin recognizing migrants with the same concern for equal human rights that we have long recognized refugee populations. I would have challenged the distinctions made between the two categories of individuals, both escaping one home in search of another. But today, I am not sure that the language matters. For what good does an inclusion of the migrant under the protected category of refugee matter if our world no longer protects the refugee? Integrating studies of racial inequality with those of global inequality and the political production of "il"/legality illuminates a world in which asylum, citizenship, and the state-sanctioned categories of belonging are no longer just markers of identity constructed to include and exclude. They are now the goods with which we barter. Passports are bought and sold. Governments auction off belonging to the highest bidder.[112] It is those at the bottom of our global economic pyramids who end up paying the highest price for their chance at inclusion.

While my research has highlighted the failure of both Moroccan and European governmental agencies to uphold international law and provide migrants (and refugees, if we are to continue making that distinction) with basic human rights, I do not want to overlook the burden that the states situated in our world's most critical border zones have been asked to bare. The U.K. Royal Navy estimates that half of a million migrants will attempt to cross the Mediterranean this year alone, and these numbers are only expected to grow in the coming years, making nations like Greece and Turkey new places of "liminal" settlement for the large influx of Syrians. Morocco struggles under the weight of its own political and economic insecurities, and it may not be reasonable for us to

---

[112] As is evidenced by special EB-5 visas offered by the U.S. to any applicants who make million-dollar investments that create ten or more jobs (Schwartz 2014).

expect its government to turn its back on the promise of European support. The E.U., and especially the southern nations situated closest to the northern borders of the Maghreb, carry the weight of the great exodus of men, women, and children fleeing political and economic instability across Africa and the Middle East – it is a weight that far outweighs the size of those nations relative to the rest of the "developed" world. It is a burden that we all should bear.

Click. Click. Click. The officer passed the hours pulling the trigger on his weapon. Every dry fire was a reminder of the seconds, the minutes, the months I had been locked in there. His keys clanged against the metal bars every time a new man entered, the door grated against the concrete floor as it opened. The whole place was metal and concrete. Cold and hard. All we could do was listen. We didn't know what was coming next. We couldn't see past the walls around us. We were on edge. After months, I should have expected that nothing was coming. And was the ultimate torture. Nothing.

- *Alphonse, M, 34, Congolese migrant [DRC]*

REFERENCES

Aaron, Jane, Henrice Altink and Chris Weedon (eds.). *Gendering Border Studies*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010.

Abu-Lughod, Lila. *Writing Women's Worlds: Bedouin Stories*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Abum-Nasr, Jamil. *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)" in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, Monthly Review Press: 1972.

Ahmed, Leila. *Women and Gender in Islam*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

Alioua, Mehdi. "La Migration Transnationale Des Africains Subsahariens Au Maghreb: L'exemple de L'étape Marocaine." *Maghreb Machrek* 185 (2005): 37–58.

Alvarez, Robert. "The Mexican-Us Border: The Making of an Anthropology of Borderlands." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 447–70.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso, 1991.

Anzaldúa, Goria. *Borderlands: The New Mestiza = La Frontera*. New York: Aunt Lute Books, 1999.

Asad, Talal. *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Appadurai, Arjun. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

Arkoun, Mohammed. *Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

Bairoch, Paul. *Mythes Et Paradoxes De L'histoire Économique*. Paris: Decouverte, 1994.

Baldwin-Edwards, Martin. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: North Africa as a Region of Emigration, Immigration and Transit Migration." *Review of African Political Economy* 108 (2006): 311–324.

Balibar, Étienne. *We, the People of Europe?* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

Barrett, James, and David Roediger. "Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality and the 'New Immigrant' Working Class." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 16, no. 3 (1997): 3–44.

Barth, Fredrik. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Chicago: Waveland Press Inc, 1969.

Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc. *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. New York: Routledge, 1994.

Behar, Ruth. *The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology that Breaks your Heart*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1996.

———. *Translated Woman: Crossing the Border with Esperanza's Story*. Boston: Beacon Press, 2003.

Benslama, Fethi. "*Le geste de Bouazizi a changé le modèle du martyr." Jeune Afrique.* 4 March. 2011.

Berger, John. 1992. *About Looking*. New York: Vintage.

Bernard, Russell, and Gerry Ryan. *Analyzing Qualitative Data: Systematic Approaches*. New York: Sage Publications, 2009.

Biehl, Joao. *Vita: Life in a Zone of Social Abandonment*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.

Biehl, Joao, Byron Good and Arthur Kleinman (eds.). *Subjectivity: Ethnographic Investigations*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.

Bonnet, J., and R. Bossard. "Aspects Géographiques De L'émigration Marocaine Vers l'Europe." *Revue De Géographie Du Maroc* 23-24 (1973): 5–50.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

———. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Brett, Mark. *Genesis: procreation and the politics of identity*. New York: Routledge, 2000.

Brubaker, Rogers. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

———. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.

———. "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism." *Annual Review of Sociology* 35 (2009): 21–42.

Bourqia, Rahma, and Susan Gilson Miller, eds. *In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco*. Cambridge: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1999.

Castles, Stephen. *Ethnicity and Globalization: From Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen*. London: Sage Publications, 2000.

Castles, Stephen and Mark Miller. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. New York: Guilford Press, 1993.

Ceuppens, Bambi, and Peter Geschiere. "Autochthony: Local or Global? New Modes in the Struggle over Citizenship and Belonging in Africa and Europe." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 34 (2005): 385–407.

Chalfin, Brenda. *Neoliberal Frontiers: An Ethnography of Sovereignty in West Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.

Chavez, Leo. "The Condition of Illegality." *International Migration* 45, no. 3 (2007): 192–196.

———. *The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008.

Cherribi, Sam. *In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Chu, Julie. *Cosmologies of Credit: Transnational Mobility and the Politics of Destination in China*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.

Clarke, Robert Connell. *Hashish*. New York: Red Eye Press, 1998.

Clark-Ibanez, Marisol. 2004. "Framing the Social World with Photo-Elicitation Interviews." *American Behavioral Scientist* 47 (12) 1507-1527.

Coburn, Noah. *Bazaar Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011.

Collyer, Michael. "In-Between Places: Trans-Saharan Transit Migrants in Morocco and the Fragmented Journey to Europe." *Antipode* 39, no. 4 (2007): 668–690.

Comaroff, John, and Jean Comaroff. *Ethnicity, Inc.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Cordero-Guzman, Hector, Robert Smith, and Ramon Grosfoguel (eds.). *Migration, Transnationalization, & Race in a Changing New York*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001.

Crush, Jonathan, and Bruce Frayne (eds.). *Surviving on the Move: Migration, Poverty and Development in Southern Africa*. Johannesburg: The Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 2010.

Csordas, Thomas. *Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture and Self*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Crapanzano, Vincent. *Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.

Dawood, N.J. (trans.) *Al-Qur'a*n. [The Koran.] London: Penguin Classics, 1956.

De Genova, Nicholas. "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31 (2002): 419–447.

———. *Working the Boundaries: Race, Space and "Illegality" in Mexican Chicago*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005.

De Genova, Nicholas, and Nathalie Peutz. *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.

De Genova, Nicholas, and Ana Ramos-Zayas. *Latino Crossings: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and the Politics of Race and Citizenship*. New York: Routledge, 2003.

De Haas, Hein. "Morocco's Migration Transition: Trends, Determinants and Future Scenarios." *Global Migration Perspectives* 28 (2005): 1–38.

———. "Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends." *The Migration Information Source* (2012): digital version.

De Haas, Hein, and Simona Vezzoli. "Time to Temper the Faith: Comparing the Migration and Development Experiences of Mexico and Morocco." *The Migration Information Source* (2012): digital version.

Desjarlais, Robert, and Jason Throop. "Phenomenological Approaches in Anthropology." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40 (2011): 87–102.

De Regt, Marina. "Refugee, Woman, and Domestic Worker: The Multiple Tensions Faced by Somali Women in Yemen." European Conference on African Studies (ECAS), July 2007. Presented paper.

Dwyer, Daisy Hilse. *Images and Self-Images: Male and Female in Morocco*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.

Dwyer, Kevin. *Moroccan Dialogues: Anthropology in Question*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

Eickelman, Dale. *Knowledge and Power in Morocco.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Eickelman, Dale, and James Piscatori. *Muslim Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

El Hamel, Chouki. "'Race,' Slavery and Islam in Maghribi Mediterranean Thought: The Question of the Haratin in Morocco." *The Journal of North African Studies* 7, no. 3 (2002): 29–52.

———. *Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam*. London: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Ennaji, Mohammed. *Soldats, domestiques et concubines. L'esclavage au Maroc au XIXe Siècle.* Casablanca: Editions Eddif, 1994.

Erickson, Paul, and Liam Murphy. *A History of Anthropological Theory*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008.

Evans-Pritchard, E.E. *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940.

Fabos, Anita. *"Brothers" or Others? Propriety and Gender for Muslim Arab Sudanese in Egypt*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2010.

Fanon, Frantz. *Black Skin, White Masks*. New York: Grove Press, 1952.

———. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press, 1963.

Fassin, Didier. "The Biopolitics of Otherness: Undocumented Foreigners and Racial Discrimination in French Public Debate." *Anthropology Today* 17, no. 1 (2001): 3–7.

———. "Compassion and Repression: The Moral Economy of Immigration Policies in France." *Cultural Anthropology* 20, no. 3 (2005): 362–87.

Ferguson, James. *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.

———. "The Uses of Neoliberalism." *Antipode* 41, issue supplement s1 (2010): 166-184.

Ferrer-Gallardo, Xavier. "The Spanish-Moroccan Border Complex: Processes of Geopolitical, Functional and Symbolic Rebordering." *Political Geography* 27 (2008): 301–21.

Fikes, Kesha. *Managing African Portugal: The Citizen-Migrant Distinction*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.

Fisher, Michael and Mehdi Abedi. *Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and Tradition*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002.

Foner, Nancy. *Islands in the City: West Indian Migration to New York*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.

Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Random House, 1977.

———. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.

———. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978--1979*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Frankenberg, Ruth. *White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness*. New York: Routledge, 1994.

Freeman, Carla. *High Tech and High Heels in the Global Economy: Women, Work, and Pink-Collar Identities in the Caribbean*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.

———. "Is Local: Global as Feminine: Masculine? Rethinking the Gender of Globalization." *Signs* 26, no. 4 (2001): 1007–37.

Garcia, Maria Cristina. *Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.

Geschiere, Peter. *The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Geertz, Clifford. *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1968

Geertz, Hildred. *Saints of the Atlas*. By Ernest Gellner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969 [book review]. *American Journal of Sociology* 76: 763–766. 1971.

Geertz, Clifford, Hildred Geertz and Lawrence Rosen. *Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society: Three Essays in Cultural Analysis*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Gellner, E. *Saints of the Atlas.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.

Glick-Schiller, Nina. "Transnational Social Fields and Imperialism: Bringing a Theory of Power to Transnational Studies." *Anthropological Theory* 5, no. 4 (2005): 439–61.

Glick Schiller, Nina, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton Blanc. *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered*. New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1992.

Goldenberg, David. *The Curse of Ham: Race and Slavery in Early Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

Gregory, Steven, and Roger Sanjek. *Race*. Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 1994.

Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson, eds. *Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

———. "Beyond 'Culture': Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference." *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no. 1 (1992): 6–23.

Harper, Douglas. "Talking about pictures: A case for photo elicitation." *Visual Studies* 17 (2002): 13-26.

Hall, Bruce. *A History of Race in Muslim West Africa, 1600-1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Hall, Stuart. *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*. New York: Sage Publications, 1997.

———. "Who Needs 'Identity'?." In P. du Gay, J. Evans, and P. Redman (eds.). *Identity: A Reader*. New York: Sage Publications, 2000: 15–30.

Hammoudi, Abdellah. *Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.

Haney Lopez, Ian. *White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race*. New York: New York University Press, 1997.

Hannaford, Dinah. *Married to the Mobile: Migration, Gender, Class, and Kinship in Contemporary Senegal.* Emory University, 2014. Ph.D. Dissertation.

———. "Technologies of the spouse: intimate surveillance in Senegalese transnational marriages." *Global Networks* 15 (2015): 43-59.

Harrell-Bond, Barbara. *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Hart, David. *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif: An Ethnography and History*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976.

———. *Tribe and Society in Rural Morocco*. New York: Routledge, 2000.

Harvey, David. *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. New York: Blackwell, 1989.

———. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Hayes, Michael Thomas, Pauline Sameshima and Francene Watson. "Imagination as Method." *Journal of Qualitative Methods* 14 (2015): 36-52.

Hazan, Pierre. "The Nature of Sanctions: The Case of Morocco's Equity and Reconciliation Commission." *International Review of the Red Cross* 90, no. 870 (June 2008): 399–407.

———. *Judging War, Judging History: Behind Truth and Reconciliation*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2010.

Heyman, Josiah. "Class and Classification at the U.S.-Mexico Border." *Human Organization* 60, no. 2 (2001): 128–41.

Hirsch, Jennifer. *A Courtship After Marriage: Sexuality and Love in Mexican Transnational Families*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Hirschberg, H. Z. *A History of the Jews of North Africa*. Leiden: Brill, 1974.

Hischkind, Charles and David Scott (eds.). *Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors (Cultural Memory in the Present)*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006.

Hoffman, Katherine. *Berbers and Others: Beyond Tribe and Nation in the Maghrib*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierrette. *Gendered Transitions: Mexican Experiences of Immigration*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

hooks, bell. *Black Looks: Race and Representation*. Cambridge: South End Press, 1999.

Hopkins, J.F.P. and N. Levtzion (eds.), *Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Horkheimer, Max and Theodor Adorno. "The Culture Industry" in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London: Verso, 1979: 120-167.

Inhorn, Marcia. *The New Arab Man: Emergent Masculinities, Technologies, and Islam in the Middle East*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Jameson, Fredric. *Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1990.

Jugé, Tony, and Michael Perez. "The Modern Colonial Politics of Citizenship and Whiteness in France." *Social Identities* 12, no. 2 (2006): 187–212.

Kapchan, Deborah. *Gender on the Market: Moroccan Women and the Revoicing of Tradition*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996.

———. *Traveling Spirit Masters: Moroccan Gnawa Trance and Music in the Global Marketplace*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2007.

Kearney, Michael. "From the Invisible Hand to Visible Feet: Anthropological Studies of Migration and Development." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 15 (1986): 331–361.

———. "The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism." *Annual Review of Anthropology*. 24 (1995): 547–565.

Keenan, Jeremy. "Terror in the Sahara: The Implications of US Imperialism for North & West Africa." *Review of African Political Economy* 31, no. 101 (2004): 475–96.

Khatibi, Abdelkebir. *Maghreb Pluriel*. Paris: Denoel, 1983.

Kim, Claire Jean. "The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans." *Politics & Society* 27 (1999): 105–38.

Kusenbach, Margarethe. "Street Phenomenology: The Go-along as Ethnographic Research Tool." *Ethnography* 4, no. 3 (2004): 455–485.

La Pelle, Nancy. "Simplifying Qualitative Data Analysis Using General Purpose Software Tools." *Field Methods* 16, no. 85 (2004): 85–108.

Laroui, Abdallah. *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Levitt, Peggy. *The Transnational Villagers*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.

———. "Transnational Migrants: When 'Home' Means More Than One Country." *Migration Information Source*, 2004.

Lewis, Bernard. *Race and Color in Islam*. New York: Octagon Books, 1979.

———. *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: an Historical Enquiry*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Little, Peter, Waktole Tiki and Dejene Negassa Debsu. "Formal or Informal, Legal or Illegal: The Ambiguous Nature of Cross-border Livestock Trade in the Horn of Africa." Journal of Borderland Studies 30, no. 3 (2015): 4015-421.

Lucassen, Jan, and Leo Lucassen. "The Mobility Transition Revisited, 1500–1900: What the Case of Europe Can Offer to Global History." *Journal of Global History* 4 (2009): 347–377.

Luhrmann, T.M. "Subjectivity." *Anthropological Theory* 6, no. 3 (2006): 345–61.

Mahler, Sarah. *Salvadorans in Suburbia: Symbiosis and Conflict*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1996.

Mahler, Sarah and Patricia Pessar. "Gender Matters: Ethnographers Bring Gender from the Periphery toward the Core of Migration Studies." *International Migration Review* 40 (2006): 27-63.

Mahmood, Saba. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

Malkki, Liisa. "Citizens of Humanity: Internationalism and the Imagined Community of Nations." *Diaspora* 3, no. 1 (1994): 41–68.

———. "Refugees and Exile: From 'Refugee Studies' to the National Order of Things." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 495–523.

Mamdani, Mahmood. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Massey, Douglas. *Worlds in Motion : Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. London: Oxford University Press, 2005.

McDougall, James and Judith Scheele. *Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.

McMurray, David. *In and Out of Morocco: Smuggling and Migration in a Frontier Boomtown*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.

Menjívar, Cecilia. "Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants' Lives in the United States." *American Journal of Sociology* 111, no. 4 (2006): 999–1037.

Merriam, Sharan, and Juanita Johnson-Bailey. "Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/outsider Status within and across Cultures." *International Journal of Lifelong Education* 20, no. 5 (2001): 405–16.

Messick, Brinkley. *The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Miyoshi, Masao. "A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Transnationalism and the Decline of the Nation-State." *Critical Inquiry* 19, no. 4 (1993): 726–51.

Munholland, Kim. *The emergence of the colonial military in France, 1880-1905*, Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1964.

Murugkar, Lata. "*Beurs* and *Beurettes* of France: Crisis of Identity." *Economic and Political Weekly* 29, no. 38 (1994): 2476–78.

Ngai, Mae. *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Olwig, Karen. *Cultural Adaptation and Resistance on St. John: Three Centuries of Afro-Caribbean Life*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1985.

———. *Caribbean Journeys: An Ethnography of Migration and Home in Three Family Networks*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.

Omi, Howard, and Michael Winant. *Racial Formation in the United States from the 1960's to the 1980's*. New York: Routledge, 1986.

Ong, Aihwa. "Citizenship as Subject Making: New Immigrants Negotiate Racial and Ethnic Boundaries." *Current Anthropology* 37, no. 5 (1996): 737–762.

———. *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.

———. *Buddha Is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Ong, Aihwa and Michael Peletz (eds.). *Bewitching Women, Pious Men: Gender and Body Politics in Southeast Asia.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

Pandolfo, Stefania. "'The Burning': Finitude and the Politico-Theological Imagination of Illegal Migration." *Anthropological Theory* 7 (2007): 329–363.

Patton, Michael. *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*. New York: Sage Publications, 2002.

Peletz, Michael. "Neither Reasonable Nor Responsible: Contrasting Representations of Masculinity in a Malay Society." *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 2 (1994): l33-l76.

———. "A tale of two courts: Judicial transformation and the rise of a corporate Islamic governmentality in Malaysia." *American Ethnologist* 42 (2015): 144-160.

Portes, Alejandro. "Conclusion: Theoretical Convergencies and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism." *International Migration Review* 37, no. 3 (2003): 874–92.

Portes, Alejandro, and Josh DeWind, eds. *Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2008.

Portes, Alejandro, and Saskia Sassen. "Making It Underground: Comparative Material on the Informal Sector in Western Market Economies." *American Journal of Sociology* 93, no. 1 (1987): 30–61.

Rabinow, Paul. *Symbolic Domination: Cultural Forms and Historical Change in Morocco*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.

———. *Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1977.

Robben, Antonius and Jeffrey Sluka. *Ethnographic Fieldwork: An Anthropological Reader*. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2007.

Robinson, William. "Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies." *Sociological Forum* 13, no. 4 (1998): 561–94.

———. "Saskia Sassen and the Sociology of Globalization: A Critical Appraisal." *Sociological Analysis* 3, no. 1 (2009): 5–31.

Roediger, David. *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*. New York: Verso, 1999.

Ronen, Yehudit. "Moroccan Immigration in the Mediterranean Region: Reflections in Ben Jelloun's Literary Works." *The Journal of North African Studies* 6, no. 4 (2001): 1–14.

Roseberry, William. *Anthropologies and Histories: Essays in Culture, History, and Political Economy*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989.

Rosen, Lawrence. *Bargaining for Reality: the Construction of Social Relations in a Muslim Community.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.

———. *The Culture of Islam: Changing Aspects of Contemporary Muslim Life.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Rouse, Roger. "Thinking Through Transnationalism: Notes on the Cultural Politics of Class Relations in the Contemporary United States." *Public Culture* 7, no. 2 (1996): 353–402.

Sadiqi, Fatima. "Migration Related Policies and Institutions in Morocco." *EuroMediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration* (2004): 1–15.

Sanjek, Roger. "Brazilian Racial Terms: Some Aspects of Meaning and Learning." American Anthropologist 73, no. 5 (1971): 1126-1143.

Sassen, Saskia. *The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

———. *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

———. *Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money*. New York: New Press, 1998.

Segalla, Spencer. *The Moroccan Soul: French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912-1956*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009.

Slyomovics, Susan. *The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*. New York: Zed Books, 1999.

Smolin, Jonathan. "Burning the Past: Moroccan Cinema of Illegal Immigration." *South Central Review* 28 (Spring 2011), 74-89.

Soss, Joe, Richard Fording and Sanford Schram. *Disciplining the poor: Neoliberal paternalism and the persistent power of race*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.

Stoller, Paul. *Money Has No Smell: The Africanization of New York City*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.

———. *The Power of the Between: An Anthropological Odyssey*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Strauss, A., and J. Corbin. *Basics of Qualitative Research*. San Francisco: Newberry Press, 1990.

Szakolczai, Arpad. "Liminality and Experience: Structuring transitory situations and transformative events." *International Political Anthropology* 2 (2009): 141-172.

Szanton Blanc, Cristina, Linda Basch, and Nina Glick Schiller. "Transnationalism, Nation-States, and Culture." *Current Anthropology* 36, no. 4 (1995).

Thomassen, Bjorn. "The Uses and Meanings of Liminality." *International Political Anthropology* 2 (2009): 5-27.

Ticktin, Miriam. "Where Ethics and Politics Meet: The Violence of Humanitarianism in France." *American Ethnologist* 33 (2006): 33–49.

Toynbee, A.J. *A Study of History Vol.1* London: Oxford University Press, 1934.

Tsing, Anna. *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Turner, Victor. *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-structure.* Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969.

Turner, Victor and Edith Turner. *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.

Van Gennep, Arnold. *The Rites of Passage*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909.

Van Hear, Nicholas. "The Rise of Refugee Diasporas." *Current History* 108 (2009): 180-186.

———. "Dépasser la défection et la prise de parole dans la région euro-méditerranéenne" in Schmoll, C., Thiollet, H., Wihtol de Wenden, C. (eds.), *Migrations en Méditerranée*, Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2015: 371-379.

Wacquant, Loic. "Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh." *Punishment & Society* 3, no. 1 (2001): 95–133.

———. *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.

Wagner. *On Phenomenology and Social Relations: Selected Writings by Alfred Schutz*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Waters, Mary. *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

Weinreb, Alex, Sangeetha Madhavan, and Patricia Stern. "'The Gift Received Has to Be Repaid:' Respondents, Researchers and Gifting." Philadelphia, PA, 1998.

Wolf, Eric. *Europe and the People without History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.

Wikan, Unni. "Toward an Experience-Near Anthropology." *Cultural Anthropology* 6, no. 3 (1991): 285-305.

Willen, Sarah. *Transnational Migration to Israel in Global Comparative Context*. Lexington: Lexington Press, 2007a.

———. "Toward a Critical Phenomenology of 'Illegality': State Power, Criminalization, and Abjectivity Among Undocumented Migrant Workers in Tel Aviv, Israel." *International Migration* 45, no. 3 (2007b): 8–38.

Williams, Brackette. "A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation Across Ethnic Terrain." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18 (1989): 401–44.

Willis, Paul. *Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.

Yow, Valerie. *Recording Oral History: A Guide for the Humanities and Social Sciences*. Los Angeles: Altamira Press, 2005.

Zelinsky, Wilbur. "The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition." *Geographical Review* 61, no. 2 (1971): 219–49.

Zemer, Bob. *Kif.* 2010