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

Selina Gallo-Cruz 11/14/2012

Have Repertoire, Will Travel: INGOs and the Globalization of Nonviolence

By

Selina R. Gallo-Cruz
Doctor of Philosophy
Sociology



John Boli
Advisor

Frank J. Lechner
Advisor



Alex Hicks
Committee Member

Ann Hironaka
Committee Member

Accepted:

Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D. Dean of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies

Date

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By

Selina Gallo-Cruz
B.A., Wellesley College 2006
M.A., Emory University 2010

Advisors: John Boli, Ph.D
Frank Lechner, Ph.D

An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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Abstract

Have Repertoire, Will Travel: INGOs and the Globalization of Nonviolence

By Selina Gallo-Cruz

Typical scholarly treatments of nonviolent protest tend to view protest movements as originating among regional mobilization efforts. This is problematic as both the targets and the dynamics of collective action networks have become increasingly transnational. Constructing a global level framework for repertoire emergence, I examine the structural and cultural changes shaping the development of a global nonviolence movement. I first analyze historical data outlining the global conceptualization, systematization, and institutionalization of the nonviolence repertoire. And I explain how the decentralized structure of the world polity and the development of a new global moral order sacralizing the human collective opened opportunities and established the basis for the emergence of a global repertoire of nonviolent claimsmaking routines. I then discuss, with analysis of a longitudinal statistical model, how international NGOs have become important markers of the potential for local movements to protest nonviolently. And I conclude by drawing on an in-depth interview and archival analysis of nonviolent INGOs to explain how they work to expand world cultural modes of claimsmaking. I detail their efforts in transforming the local political process and at fostering multi-level linkages, universalizing social problems, and in professionalizing the global spread of peace-work among civil societies.

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There is no way to peace. Peace is the way.
- A. J. Muste

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INTRODUCTION
STUDYING THE GLOBALIZATION OF NONVIOLENCE

Since I first began work on this project the globalization of nonviolent resistance has come to frequent world news headlines. And some of the most notable of these events have changed the way we think about nonviolent resistance in the schema of global political change. Just before I defended my proposal in the summer of 2010, the Israeli raid on the Turkish flotilla taking supplies into Palestine had pundits abuzz about the impact of such internationally visible nonviolent actions. The event drew attention to the international support network for Palestinian nonviolent resistance, its potential *and* its limitations. Less than a year later I sat in an airport, on my way to give a talk about global nonviolence, and watched with goose bumps as the Arab Spring poured into the streets of historically autocratic, Middle Eastern nations. As the protests bubbled up and over into foreign policy debates, some of these resistance efforts turned violent- and desperate- (and it is hard to say in what order), while others championed the tactics of Dr. Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. or publicly thanked kindred international movements and organizations for aiding their strategically nonviolent mobilization. Then, in November 2010, Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Burmese independence fighter and charismatic leader of the nonviolent democracy movement, was freed after a 15 year period of house arrest. Foreign diplomats claimed this as evidence that democracy was soon in coming to the decades-long military rule of modern Myanmar.

Much else has gone on in the world of global nonviolence behind the front pages of public news discourse. In 2007, the United Nations declared October 2, Gandhi's

birthday, an international day for the celebration of nonviolence. In one of the more recent of these celebrations, Ban Ki Moon addressed the United Nations explaining how nonviolent leaders like Gandhi and King have historically inspired the UN. “The United Nations is proud of this connection to the non-violent struggle for progress.” And he pledged that the United Nations would henceforth offer concerted support to the great work of nonviolent activists.

> The timeless and tremendous power of non-violence has transformed our world in the past year alone. The transitions that are under way will certainly be difficult. For too long, countries invested in violence instead of peace. But people are choosing non-violence. And if they continue using peaceful means they can shape a better future in all countries — including established democracies. Let us commit to supporting the brave individuals who stake their lives on the belief that peaceful forms of protest bring lasting forms of peace (2011).

In 2010, the World March for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence concluded the first ever trans-continental peace walk with a collective affirmation to work for the realization of a global culture of nonviolence. 2010 also closed the UN Decade for a World Culture of Nonviolence for the Children of the World which held that,

> the principles of non-violence espoused so strongly during the International Year for the Culture of Peace’s (IYCP-2000) but focuse[d] increasingly upon the plight of millions of children worldwide, and the need to create and implement non-violent strategies to alleviate that plight (2010).

Accordingly, a host of international NGOs continued their work to spread knowledge of and tools for nonviolent resisters on the ground. Peace Brigades International, an organization that places international volunteers and nonviolent resistance educators into fields of conflict, closed its project in Indonesia (adding to its resume of nonviolence building efforts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Haiti and the Balkans) and expanded its current work in Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, and Nepal,

celebrating its 30th anniversary with an international conference and Gala and awards ceremony. Nonviolent Peaceforce, an organization similar to PBI but governed through a coalition network of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, expanded its fieldwork in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Southern Sudan and the South Caucuses. The International Center for Nonviolent Conflict, a privately funded international organization aimed at educating and training nonviolent resisters the world over, expanded its archives of resources and its up-to-date nonviolent action news database, having already given hundreds of talks, trainings, and workshops around the globe in its first few years of operation. And the work of Gene Sharp, now the globally renowned "godfather of nonviolence" and Executive Director of The Albert Einstein Institute, has won him many more international awards, incited many more movements to strategic nonviolence, has been featured in several more documentary films, and has deepened his insurrectionist's honor of having his manual for nonviolent revolution outlawed in yet another handful of autocratic states.

The scholarly field of nonviolent resistance studies is growing and gaining a small niche of interdisciplinary scholars, many of whom are social scientists. Their approach has, not surprisingly, been focused on understanding what makes nonviolent resistance effective, across a number of political conflicts. But this movement of scholarship has also become globalized faster than its framework has accounted for. And the great attention given to strategic acumen has left the role of cultural framing and orientations to the realm of philosophers and ethicists. In this study of the globalization of nonviolence, I have explored the myriad ways in which an idea about the best way to resist oppression and make positive social change has been linked to a repertoire of nonviolent resistance,

a practice that is increasingly conceptualized, organized, and implemented on a global scale. I provide an in-depth analysis of a global movement for repertoire diffusion arguing that the cultural dimension of this movement matters deeply to its expansion and is evidenced by its increasingly rationalized international organization.

I was inspired to study this topic through a combination of personal experiences in the anti-globalization movement and professional interests in the causes and dynamics of global, collective action; thus my research questions into the phenomenon of global nonviolence are informed both by the literature on repertoires of claimsmaking and world culture and its movements and by my prior knowledge of international organizations working to build a global capacity for nonviolence. Before I begin my in-depth discussion of the literature and data I have engaged with in my study, I want to first provide some basic definitions of key concepts central to my discussion, a brief outline of how my discussion will proceed, the scholarly contributions I hope my research offers, and some important scope conditions within which I have conducted the study.

Repertoires and Resistance

A repertoire, quite simply defined, is a “complete list or supply of skills, devices, or ingredients used in a particular field, occupation, or practice” (Merriam Webster 2012). In political sociology, repertoires are the families of tactics and strategies that contenders draw on when working toward social change. In cultural sociology repertoires are “tool-kits” of beliefs and practices where meanings are bundled with action and which motivate social engagement. In both of these subfields, repertoires emerge in social interactions and events and then become part of the “social structures”, the

meaning systems and social relationships, which drive and shape future interactions and events. To study a repertoire such as global nonviolence and to investigate the sociological foundations of its emergence therefore means to study how such a family of meanings and guidelines for action are linked to social interactions and networks, events and processes, and ultimately social change. It means a study of the social world that supports the repertoire and in which the repertoire is embedded.

In studying a social movement repertoire I therefore also closely examine the movement dedicated to the global spread of nonviolence. This dissertation, while centered on the analytical question of how a repertoire emerges and is shaped by international organizations, holds as its unit of analysis the web of social relations that define, draw on, and structure the tool-kit for claimsmaking to which the global nonviolence movement is dedicated. Unlike most social movements studies, the nonviolence movement is unique in a couple of ways. First, it is a movement committed to the spread of tactics, rather than to any one particular social, cultural, or political objective. Many social movements studies have given attention to the rationalization of social movements that occurs through the formal organization of those movements. The global nonviolence movement, being a movement of movement tactics constructed in part through an extensive network of formal organizations, represents a hyper-rationalization of social movements in the sense that it aims to rationalize the rationalization of social change. It is a movement for movements, embedded in a complex web of other movements and yet directed at transforming that web of resistance to utilize one particular family of claimsmaking forms and meanings. It is a movement that takes movements for change as a given and works toward neutrality save for the one

evaluative assertion that nonviolence is a morally- or pragmatically- superior form of social change. It is also unique because it is deeply global, as I will argue here, in its foundational conceptualization, scope, organization, and implementation. Its principal objectives are based on a universalist understanding of social change and a global understanding of social problems.

Global Nonviolence

As a form of protest, nonviolent resistance encompasses a range of methods for making claims and working through conflicts, all of which are undergirded by a commitment to refrain from the use of violence, even and especially in the face of violence (Weber and Burrowes 1991). Compendiums and manuals organize the broad family of nonviolent tactics into three principal forms: 1) protest and persuasion (such as a march), 2) noncooperation (such as a boycott), and 3) nonviolent intervention (such as a sit-in) (Sharp 2005). Mohandas Gandhi, considered by many the global "father of nonviolence" helped to popularize and theorize the term "nonviolence". He explained that the concept derived from the Hindu term "ahimsa", which roughly translates into "the absence of violence". To formulate a systemic practice for nonviolent resistance, Gandhi incorporated other Hindu concepts, "satya", meaning truth, and "agraha", meaning to insist, into his conceptualization of "active nonviolence", which was intended, in part, to challenge the international pacifist movement's "passive resistance" for failing to actively confront injustice (Ramachandran and Mahadevan 1967).

Gandhi developed his concept of nonviolence from an amalgamation of world cultural ideas (see Ganguly and Docker 2007), from the works of Thoreau and Tolstoy,

the tactics of British suffragettes and ethical vegetarians, his experience defending civil rights protesters in South Africa and the Indian religious themes that characterized his framing of strategic discipline for Indian independence. Following international coverage of Gandhi's nonviolent independence movement in the early 1900s, Gandhi's categorical repertoire of nonviolence, which gave new meaning and effectiveness to a host of nonviolent resistance tactics, became a globally acclaimed orientation toward addressing and resolving conflicts. Global passive and active resisters alike began to conceive of their strategies as deriving from a general repertoire of nonviolence which has since been drawn on to resist colonialism, authoritarianism, and various forms of repression, human rights violations, and injustices the world over.

Since the 1940s when India finally gained independence, hundreds of major movements worldwide and tens of thousands of campaigns have drawn on nonviolence as a guiding tactical repertoire (Global Nonviolent Action 2012). Over 3,000 books have been written on the topic and hundreds of thousands of international news articles have documented conflicts in which nonviolence has been an active form of claimsmaking. Today nonviolence is conceptualized, organized, and implemented on a global scale. International nonviolent organizations, by proliferating knowledge of and aiding in the development of nonviolent techniques, comprise a global institutional structure for the global nonviolence movement. And global nonviolent meetings, marches, conferences, and workshops continue to mark the calendar of internationally organized events. If such a society has grown up around the idea that one way of organizing social change holds within it great global potential, then surely we should look more closely at the origins and dynamics of the global nonviolence movement.

Research Questions and "Roadmap"

Two research questions frame my research. The first is historical and examines the sociological roots of the global nonviolence repertoire. I ask,

RQ1: What historical factors have shaped the emergence and development of the global nonviolence repertoire?

I then interrogate further the organizational dimension of this global repertoire and closely analyze the role of international organizations in globalizing nonviolence, asking,

RQ2: How do international nonviolent NGOs shape the globalization of nonviolence?

To answer these very different types of questions, one about emergence, the other about networks and dynamics, my dissertation proceeds in two parts. That is, I treat each question in turn- the historical analysis as a necessary first step in tracing the origins and development of this movement before uncovering the dynamics of how formal organizations globalize nonviolence.

Part 1: The Globalization of Nonviolence

In the first, historical part of my research I begin with a literature review of three bodies of study that inform a global examination of repertoire emergence, the nationally-oriented collective action studies, the global and deeply cultural approach in world society studies, and the growing body of nonviolent resistance studies. I first discuss collective action studies' structural framework for tracing repertoire emergence but point to the limitations of this framework when theorizing transnational-level repertoire emergence and when trying to account for the cultural dimension of structural changes. I

then point to the insights of world society analysis and explore how this typically state policy-centered approach can also account for the globalization of a civil society repertoire for collective action. I then bring nonviolent studies into conversation with these two bodies of study pointing to where I think a global analysis of the development of nonviolence may enhance the aims and objectives of nonviolent resistance scholarship. I explain in a second methodological chapter how I conduct a historical analysis of nonviolence's global emergence by employing an explicitly global (as opposed to national-comparative) framework, weighing the predictions offered in collective action, world society, and nonviolent studies against the historical record. Then I proceed through an in-depth discussion of how the global nonviolence repertoire has emerged through three stages of global conceptualization, systematization, and institutionalization. I conclude by scrutinizing the structural and cultural precedents that have driven and shaped the globalization of nonviolence.

Part II: The Role of Nonviolent INGOs

In Part II I conduct a closer examination of the organizational dimension of global nonviolence. I begin this second analysis by providing another review of the literature that specifically addresses this second research question on organizational network dynamics. This literature review entails a re-examination of some of the world society and nonviolent studies that explicitly address organizations and an introduction and overview of the insights from the social movements study of organizations. I map out a global ecology of nonviolent INGOs, detailing the descriptive data I have collected on the development of the broader population of nonviolent INGOs and how this population has

grown in scope, in breadth, and in the extension of their global ties. I then weigh the impact of this population in shaping the adoption of the nonviolence repertoire through a statistical, negative binomial analysis of the effect of ties to nonviolent INGOs on the emergence of major nonviolent movements. I conclude with an in-depth qualitative examination of INGOs' role in the globalization of nonviolence in two respects, how nonviolent INGOs shape local contention and a general study of the process of cultural diffusion that nonviolent INGOs set into action.

Scholarly Contributions

The contributions I aim to make in this study are several. A first major contribution is the exploration of the unique data I have collected on nonviolent INGOs. As I have begun to immerse myself in the world of nonviolent studies and have taken seriously the objectives and concerns of this growing body of scholarship, I find it surprising that among some of the most involved scholars are nonviolent INGO activists, and yet the academics that construct large-set studies of nonviolent movements give very little- if any- attention to the role of INGOs in the spread of nonviolence. Furthermore, nonviolent scholarship is heavily case driven, revolving around the production of single or comparative case studies. This is the first comprehensive study of nonviolence as a global movement and the first to examine the broader population of nonviolent INGOs in this movement. I hope this data and study will also be of great interest to social movements scholars, as this is the first social movements study of a global tactical movement and the first study of the general population of INGOs dedicated to spreading nonviolence.

Beyond empirical contributions, my overarching objective is to deepen understanding of how we globalize claimsmaking and how international actors shape the lives of civil societies directly- to complement growing attention to how international actors lobby states and other international organizations. I draw the most theoretical insight from world society studies, which have elaborated some of the cultural mechanisms driving global change. But these studies have given the most attention to tracing this change in formal institutional structures like state ministries and departments. In this study I want to apply the cultural focus of world society theory to how social movements adopt a global repertoire of claimsmaking, generated and developed in a decentralized but highly networked global arena of interaction. An additional and important final contribution is to enrich our understanding of rationalization, global rationalization, that is, as a deeply cultural process. There has been some substantial exploration of institutionalization in social movements but little that is global in scope and no studies- that I know of- which broach the topic of tactical diffusion as a process of rationalization. I hope that this study therefore sheds new light on how value-laden movements like the global nonviolence movement expand world cultural practices through the rationalization of a global repertoire.

Scope Conditions

Before proceeding to my first historical analysis of global nonviolence, I will here briefly identify the scope conditions for and limitations of this study, to address the potential concerns of scholars also interested in these general topics with which I engage.

1) A Global Level, Not Comparative Framework- First, although I draw much from the insights of comparative studies, draw on comparative data, and (as I explain in Chapter 2), incorporate some longitudinal and structural comparisons in my analysis, I operate from a global level framework. This includes all the advantages of such "supra-level" analyses that I hope will in turn enhance future comparative and national and local level studies. Principal among these advantages is gaining an understanding of the development of common general value and structure systems and producing new insights into how they permeate the other embedded, levels of social interaction. But working at this level also necessitates that much of the rich detail of case comparisons and the questions of how the global level operates differentially in different local contexts will be left unanswered by my study alone.

2) Emergence and Development, Not Outcomes and Effectiveness- A second scope condition that must be noted is that my study does not assess the outcomes and effectiveness of global nonviolence. I chose to enter the conversation at a point most scholars overlook, which is to ask how and under what sociological conditions this global phenomenal movement emerged in the first place. My study of the organizational dynamics certainly provides rich, extensive data that will be of use to scholars that incorporate a global level analysis in their outcomes research or at least locate their local level studies as embedded among extensive global nonviolence networks. But to answer three big research questions about a global phenomenon proved too daunting for one dissertation. Suffice it to say here

that much data was collected which did not make it into this particular discussion, data from which I hope to develop future analyses; a study of the effects and the outcomes of the global nonviolence network is likely to be among them.

PART 1
A GLOBAL REPERTOIRE

1
THEORIZING REPERTOIRE EMERGENCE

In this first theoretical chapter I consider three bodies of literature that provide sensitizing hypotheses to guide my inquiry into my first, historical research question: what explains the emergence of a global nonviolence claimsmaking repertoire? I critically review collective action, world culture, and nonviolence studies. Each of these bodies of scholarship offers insights into the conditions under which and how repertoires emerge, as global forms, and as a family of nonviolent protest tactics specifically. Each of these theories also provides valuable ideas for understanding how claimsmaking routines correspond to changes in the polity, how these changes occurs on a global level, and how nonviolence specifically became globally legitimate and universally applicable. But I also note the limitations in the ways that these theories have been extended into empirical analysis, because no one body has considered how the global nonviolence repertoire has historically developed. As I discuss each theory in turn I will therefore point to the predictions they offer, and I will conclude by summarizing complementary and competing expectations that structure my historical analysis of the emergence of global nonviolence.

Repertoires and the State

The concept of a claimsmaking repertoire signifies what is now known as the “rational turn” in the study of protest. Where the older, collective behavior paradigm treated collective action as a result of either convergence or contagion (LeBon 1895, Cantril, 1941) and as spontaneous and irrational (Blumer 1939, Blumer 1969, see also McPhail 1991), Charles Tilly was among an early cohort of rational collective action

theorists to begin to examine protest events as highly structured and even institutionalized phenomena. In his 1977 study of 17th and 18th century French protest, Tilly mapped the momentous societal changes that facilitated the development of a distinctive, yet interrelated family of new forms of organization and collective action. From thousands of Burgundian state reports, Tilly traced the French monarchy's increased taxation and heightened local bourgeois domination to widespread organization among an increasing proportion of landless workers. He followed major changes in the way people protested over the next two centuries to explain how local conditions and national structures create the climate in which social movements develop general claimsmaking routines.

Tilly later lamented, however, that his exploratory work in repertoire emergence theory made less of an impression on the field of collective action studies than he had hoped (1993). To begin to outline an agenda for future repertoire studies, Tilly traced 18th and 19th century British claimsmaking transformations to the crystallization of parliamentary state structure, defining the repertoire as "a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out" (264), and holding that these forms of collective action, otherwise assumed as spontaneous expressions of resistance, are not isolated acts on the part of individuals but develop in a particular social context; "they emerge as a result of struggle" (ibid) among a variety of actors (he pointed specifically to authorities, claimsmakers, policy makers and bystanders). In Great Britain specifically, the centralization of authority and resources in the national parliamentary government drove the development of a general, national repertoire employed over and over again in a variety of conflicts. He later postulated that these general repertoires become so institutionalized in their national contexts that national movements emerge to embody the

institutionalization of claimsmaking routines. It is this standardized form of claimsmaking that came to comprise the social movement, and for Tilly, represented another internal dimension of modern state formation (ibid: 275).[1]

Tilly's second rallying cry for a new area of study dedicated to understanding repertoire emergence mobilized limited but concerted scholarly attention on claimsmaking's distinctive dynamics. Traugott and colleagues (1995) expanded Tilly's national level analysis to case studies of national repertoires in El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, and the United States. The authors, like Tilly, argued that social relations, meanings, and actions cluster in known, recurrent patterns shaped by the national political context in which they develop. In each of these cases, repertoires were found to uniquely reflect local "moral economies" that helped to conceptualize and legitimate claims as well as the particular claimsmaking forms movements utilized. These scholars confirmed Tilly's suggestion that the more modular tactical forms were, that is, the more general forms were in scope, organization, and content, the more easily they could be diffused to new contentious situations. And, like Tilly, they also emphasized the ways in which a prior history of contention constrained new choices for collective action.

Repertoire analysis has therefore predominantly pointed to macro and functional predictions that causal pathways derive from changes in the polity (albeit embedded in general socio-economic power struggles and transformations) to changes in how people think about and make claims on behalf of their long-held grievances to the eventuation of a common "tactical grammar" (to use Ennis' phrase, 1987) constraining the resistance activities of future contenders. As Tarrow later reflected, research on the link between

---

[1] And a common thread of power struggle and consolidation runs through both lines of Tilly's research on repertoire emergence and modern nation-state formation (see Tilly 1992).

state development and collective action has identified a general, historically replicable model: "the consolidated state increasingly became the target, the fulcrum, and the umbrella for collective action" (1996:49). In *Regimes and Repertoires* (2006) Tilly further identified three ways in which the change in the form of the national polity shaped the particular expression of the form of claimsmaking: 1) by exhibiting the means of control over claims-making repertoires (which tactics will be tolerated, which will not, and to what degrees), 2) by constituting both the claimants and the objects of claims, and 3) by producing streams of issues, events, and governmental actions around which social movement campaigns rise and fall (186).[2]

From collective action studies, a general model for repertoire emergence, depicted in Figure 1, contends that repertoires derive from changes in the expansion and centralization of state power. State structures develop in tandem with social and economic relationships, and together these forces shape, according to Tilly, the interests, organization, and opportunities of movements out of which collective action repertoires are developed and, through repeated usage, become institutionalized. To use the Burgundy example, the centralization of power brought on by the French Revolution instigated new struggles for power and a massive restructuring of associations among contenders. New formal clubs and societies organized under the guise of new, national networks and interests. Although the claimsmaking forms of this transformative 19th century retained some of the local idiosyncratic expressions of 18th century protest,

[2] Tilly later revisited this single case-study model of repertoire analysis with a comparative consideration of repertoires as "contentious performances" (2008). In his final statement on what drives repertoire emergence Tilly compared national case studies to focus on the particularities of culturally and politically distinctive repertoires. He identified a continuum along which repertoires range, from weak formulations of claimsmaking languages to strong contentious structures in which routines are repeated with little variation or innovation.

Figure 1. A Collective Action Model of National Repertoire Development



claimsmaking routines became structured around contending with a new national center of power, so that the general and modular forms of the demonstration and the strike appeared as principal means of collectively expressing grievances. Through repeated use the legacy of these forms of action continued and their place among claimsmaking choices became central and standard.

With rigorously detailed historical studies, Tilly and colleagues have given much emphasis to the centralization of power and resources in the national polity as opening up new opportunities for claimsmaking routines. But Tilly and his colleagues' theories on the emergence of national collective action repertoires were not intended for global analysis. I want to therefore be fair to the generalizing tendency of Tilly's detailed studies as I extrapolate from these theories to propose a global framework for repertoire emergence. To get caught up in the historical specificity of national repertoire emergence as insufficiently explaining the distinct historical specificity of the global polity would be erroneous and superficial science. Rather, what we can reliably extract from national

repertoire emergence theories to a global level application is a general set of macro-predictions about how repertoires emerge from broad changes in the structure of the polity and a general prediction for the institutionalization of repertoires after emergence. From Tillyian repertoire emergence studies I believe we can expect that,

P1: The particular form of organization of power in the polity drives a) the particular form of the organization of claims, b) the form in which organized claims diffuse c) and the content of claimsmaking routines and that,

P2: The use of the repertoire constrains further repertoire development.

The National to Transnational Relationship

Beyond the underlying contingent relationship between the form of the repertoire and the structural conditions shaped by national governance, Tilly and colleagues acknowledge that repertoires also travel across national borders. This can occur when the claimsmaking routines of "initiator" movements are imitated by "spin off" movements (McAdam 1995). It can also emanate from a shared, multi-regime transformation, as that which characterized the fall of the Eastern bloc (Beissinger 2002). In his discussion of regimes and repertoires, Tilly speculates that as the organizational bases of movements have shifted following the proliferation of transnational forms of organizing and political opportunities, so too have repertoires emerged across national polities, because local interests and organization have been shaped by these transnational structures (2006: 204-208). He writes, "In advance of the social movement's institutionalization, the demonstration itself is spreading well beyond democratic regimes as a means of challenging corrupt and authoritarian rulers" (205). The ever-expanding dimension of

global political claimsmaking has therefore provided a new canvas on which a repertoire emergence theory remains to be written.

A growing subsector of movements research explores trans-national tactical diffusion. This research highlights the impact of the transnational arena on national tactical choices (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005; Kolb 2005) and illustrates the imitative process of replicating tactical forms among loosely networked civil societies (Soule 1999; Chabot 2000; Chabot and Duyvendak 2002). Nationally-oriented studies focus on questions of how the national context constrains channels of communication with outside affiliates (Giugni 1995; Tarrow 1989; Tarrow 1994), mutual interests among affiliates (Soule 1997), and the adoption and reinvention of claimsmaking (Chabot 2000); but again, this scholarship remains largely case comparative rather than systemic in its inclusion of transnational factors. Theoretical synopses of the diffusion of tactics call for a new lens on cross-border ties (Guidry, Kennedy, and Zald 2000; Strang and Meyer 1993; Strang and Soule 1998). New empirical studies are needed, scholars argue, (Chabot and Dyvendok 2002), and how new organizational forms derive from transnational contentious structures should formulate future inquiry (della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Specification is needed to understand under what conditions transnational networks shape national forms of claimsmaking (Johnson and McCarthy 2005) and the elements composing transnational political and cultural conditions for mobilization (McAdam and Rucht 1996). Because world society theories have provided a more coherent and systemic framework for assessing these connections on a global level, I extrapolate several predictions from world society theories.

The Diffusion of Global Political Forms

Globalization scholars have not yet addressed the emergence of a global tactical repertoire. But, in the field broadly organized as world society studies, scholarly interests surrounding a range of globally shared principles and practices animate research on global political change. Lechner and Boli write, for example, that a "repertoire of symbolic forms… enable, in fact, impel people to become conscious of the world as one place and act in accordance with that consciousness" and they consider forms as diverse as national sports allegiances to human rights (2006: 2). This world society theory which they have helped to formulate is particularly helpful in trying to understand how one repertoire of claimsmaking may be shared across borders despite the differences in outcomes and iterations within distinct local polities[3]. In their study of the "origins and consequences of world culture", Lechner and Boli argue that global political relationships represent one of the many valences of modern society which are increasingly "deliberate and systematized" and which emanate from socially shared, symbolic meaning systems that involve consciousness of the world as one society. How specifically did world culture- this "repertoire of symbolic forms" emerge? Lechner and Boli (as also Boli and Thomas,1999 and later Lechner, 2009) trace its emergence to a series of historical waves of expansion including but not limited to imperialism and colonialism, trade, world conflicts, technology, and the movement of people, practices and cultures around the world. Given these major historical changes, one critical mechanism identified in shaping global cultural emergence is the expansion of consciousness that accompanies increasing interdependence and interaction (as suggested by Robertson 1992), because as societies

[3] Global theories of conflict such as world systems theory may be better suited to address questions surrounding differences across regional impacts.

and individuals become more conscious of the world as one place, they re-structure their identities and social lives to participate in a world society (Lechner and Boli 2006; Lechner 2009).

Informing Lechner and Boli's world culture theory, an extensive body of research under the rubric of "world polity theory" investigates the effects of "supra-level", that is the highest conceivable level of, social processes (Drori 2008) on the emergence of global forms of identity, organization, and action. World polity theory holds that, like Tilly's national polity, an integrated, albeit often conflictual, system of governing bodies and participating actors embody and give shape to world society; and they emphasize how this process has experienced an acceleration following World War II. But a "world polity" differs from a national polity in several respects. First, the modern world polity is not organized around one governing body. The world polity operates, in part, according to a fragmented state-system in which one general model of statehood has become the legitimate and only operative form of regional governance (Meyer et al 1997). Second, this world polity is therefore not governed by a central, brute military force. Rather, a decentralized body of authoritative organizations works in tandem with the decentralized state-system to formulate and regulate a global political culture. This culture is grounded in enlightenment ideals such as human rights and universal citizenship (Boli and Thomas 1999) which help to formulate voluntary rules of right politics. Such global "laws" are not enforced by the powerful but enacted by the able because of their authority and legitimacy (Thomas 2008). Finally, this world polity has become a greenhouse for the cultivation of culturally constructed institutions that structure social as well as political life, including but not limited to the claims of social movements.

World polity theory's initial theoretical formulation drew particularly from Tilly's polity-research framework on state formation in Europe (see Boli, Gallo-Cruz, and Mathias 2010) which provided a basic theory of how external, conflictual interactions among states led to a similar, shared process of internal construction. Yet world polity theory has developed a more phenomenological approach to understanding state structuration on a global scale with the theoretical focus on tracing institutional construction, diffusion, and proliferation (Jepperson 2002) and with a Durkheimian emphasis on the role of the sacred in underlying such institutionalization. In this sense, world polity theory (and world society theory more broadly) lends itself to enhancing the causal explanation for how repertoires emerge on a global level, beyond, as Tilly also suggested, the amiability of national polities to democratic social movements and in a cultural sense, beyond the assumed pragmatics of functionally responding to conflicts. But thus far, world polity research has overwhelmingly placed states at center-stage in the theater of global politics. Even where non-state actors have recently become a part of the main story line for world polity theorists, the activities of these third parties are those that seek to influence state structuration (cf. Boli, Gallo-Cruz, and Mathias 2011b). I will elaborate on this point briefly below and more extensively in Part II when I address my second research question on the role of INGOs in shaping movement emergence.

According to world polity theory, the principal medium through which the world polity is expanded is the state. This can occur both in the enactment of what is perceived as the best structural form of a modern state -enactment being the following of "scripts" for legitimate state action, such as the drafting of a constitution that delineates a variety of citizen duties and rights- and in the active diplomatic activities among

intergovernmental and international nongovernmental actors. States enact globally derived and legitimated scripts (and world polity theorists would argue this is fundamentally different than mere emulation- it is a form of phenomenological structuration) in establishing an internal division of labor among state ministries (Kim 1996), developing modern educational systems (Schofer and Meyer 2005), environmental protection plans (Frank 1997), militaries (Eyre and Suchman 1986), and scientific and technological research agendas (Jang 2003), as well as the discrete ways in which they extend rights and responsibilities to different groups of citizens such as women (Berkovitch 1999), children (Boli-Bennet and Meyer 1978), same-sex couples (Frank and McEneaney 1999), indigenous peoples (Hironaka 2006), even prisoners (Mathias 2009).

A new wave of world polity scholarship on non-governmental organizations developed in the 1990s and was to provide a "missing-link" between global level social construction and policy making and mobilization at the lower levels of organization. Boli and Thomas (1999) and colleagues initiated a new conversation about international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) that also act as authoritative policy-developing bodies in a decentralized world polity of states and other international actors. A growing world polity scholarship on INGOs has demonstrated that INGOs act as external authorities advocating for and influencing state policy changes (Chabbott 2003; Boyle 2006; Frank, Longhofer, and Schofer 2007; Strang and Chang 1993). There are a handful of studies that point to the role of INGOs in mobilizing civil societies (Berkovitch 1999; Boyle 2006; Brewington 2011; Kim 1999; Schofer et al 1999) and the thrust of this focus is in explaining how INGOs act as authoritative generators of new global forms of discourse. Much of the world polity INGO scholarship, however, remains centered on

how non-state actors participate in state structuration, measuring INGOs' ties as one indicator of states' embeddedness in world society.

Figure 2 illustrates world polity theory's simple causal relationship between the legitimation of global models and the diffusion of legitimate models for statehood. The process of the global adoption (or expansion) of a particular political form begins with a global-level legitimation of that form. World polity studies tend to focus on documenting evidence of that legitimation by producing statistical evidence of structural isomorphism among states that theorists claim to demonstrate the "enactment" of legitimate structures- like national curricula- rather than detailing the specific of how legitimation actually

Figure 2. A World Polity Model of Global Societal Change



occurs. Through international interaction, states and other international non-state actors enact and help to diffuse the globally legitimate political form. World polity theory, being grounded in the greater body of neo-institutional theories, also gives a great deal of attention to the ever-more complex forms of institutionalizing global scripts that follows

legitimation. Scholars emphasize the Weberian notion of rationalizing statehood and various other facets of global political and professional life. Finally, world polity theorists also give a great deal of attention to the Durkheimian notion of the individual as a "social fact", that is, arguing that most global forms of state structuration exhibit a quasi-religious worshipping of the individual as a god. This is perhaps not surprising given the great deal of work on documenting the institutionalization of human rights (Berkovitch 2003; Berkovitch and Gordon 2008; Boli 1981; Boyle 2002; Cole 2006; Cole 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Hafner-Burton and Tsusti 2005; Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui and Meyer 2008; Koenig 2008; McNeely 1998; Ramirez and Koo 2009; Suarez 2006; Tsutsui 2006; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004) and the common Western or WASP approach (to conjure Weber's notion of individualism in *The Protestant Ethic*) to such rights as protecting the sacred individual as a sovereign being. But the explanation of the theory often stops short of really incorporating an in-depth explanation of how the "*conscience collective"* (ala Durkheim) figures into the drive for establishing, securing, and giving one's livelihood for everyone else's rights. It stops short of providing an explanation of how social actors of all formulations act on a unified framework of rights as realized through a shared humanity with global others. That is, an "individual as a little god" approach could reasonably lead to greater and more divisive conflicts over human rights as opposed to broad-based solidarity movements. Overall, world polity theory has yet to be applied to an in-depth analysis of global social movements, an empirical analysis of the development of a collectivist understanding of human rights- human as collectivity of individuals not just an aggregation of sovereign individuals. This is not to challenge the general argument that there exists significant arenas of social life- and global social life-

in which the sacred individual is worshipped; but in a study of collective action, we must also locate in a global moral order the sacrality that is extended to the collective.

One world polity theoretical formulation which offers promise for theorizing the emergence of a global form of claimsmaking for the sacred collective is Boli's (2006) alliteration of a theory of the rationalization of virtue and virtuosity. In this piece Boli argues that "virtue adheres in the transcendence of self-interest in service to others while affirming and protecting sacred entities" (1). Global social actors are celebrated for their virtue and become exemplars of how to live, actors that include prominent nonviolent figures such as Gandhi and King among many others. Individuals whose rights are championed- or on whose behalf the infringement of rights excoriated- are understood as categories of individuals, a crucial distinction for theorizing collective action across borders. And I will argue, this is also a crucial distinction for understanding the global nonviolence movement whose objective is to structure how other people protest in the extension of rights to both the oppressed *and* the oppressors. Boli explains that a global moral order has emerged and has at its heart a sacralization of individuals as equal and universal. "The sacred gives meaning and value to human action. It is the font of morality, the framework for distinguishing the laudable from the forbidden" (9). And thus he argues that the condemnation of pariah states and the elevation of individuals and the primordial group to which they belong constitutes the affirmation of righteousness (10).

The connections among the different dimensions of the sacred global moral order as theorized by Boli are illustrated in Figure 3. At the core of the global moral order is situated a group of sacred virtues. Boli counts among them the individual, family, ethnic

and national groups and other identity categories, the nation, nature, and of special interest to the study of the global nonviolence movement, humanity.

Figure 3. The Sacred of the Global Moral Order



Source: Boli (2006)

From these core entities are derived a set of principles, rationalized progress, social justice, and human rights and development, among others, that help to realize the pursuit of virtue in concrete social projects. From these principles stem instrumental means for acting out virtuosity, among them rationalized forms of exchange, techniques,

specialization, professionalization, and organization. In the realm of global nonviolence, this model would therefore suggest an idea of sacred humanity is activated through a technique developed for the realization of collective human rights and is pursued through increasing efforts at professionalization and organization.

Principally, this broad world society model gives us a foundation for thinking culturally about the trans-national origins of political action. Unlike the pragmatically structure-oriented collective action model, world culture theory emphasizes the power of symbolism and expanding consciousness of the world as one place in driving global structuration. Unlike the nationally-focused repertoire emergence model, world polity theory places the causal onus for the development of political forms on global (or transnational) processes that shape how national level polities are organized, thus providing greater specificity for theorizing change in a decentralized polity. The two theories share, however, a central concern with the role of the state in either process. But, while both theories attribute a significant amount of political change to state structuration, state structuration serves as the explicandum for world polity theorists and the explanans for collective action theorists. Both theories therefore provide alternative but complementary logics for thinking about global repertoire emergence, as originating in local level power struggles or in relationships and ideals that span the experience of any one individual regime.

World society theory as a general framework for thinking about how common forms of social interaction globally emerge suggests that,

P3: The global expansion of a world polity will drive the development of global political forms,

P4: The content of global repertoires will become more deliberately organized around the decentralized state-system,

P5: The substance of repertoire development will be driven by the substantive ideals legitimate among world polity authorities.

P6: The sacralization of a collective humanity will lead to greater institutionalization of a nonviolence repertoire, and,

P7: As global interdependence makes political actors more conscious of their global embeddedness, nonviolence will globalize.

One final body of scholarship that must be weighed into a discussion of how a global repertoire of nonviolence has emerged is the growing study of nonviolent protest, indeed one audience for which I particularly hope my study will be of interest. This burgeoning field of interdisciplinary research has different strands of theorizing and empirics. One strand tends to be like Tilly's collective action studies, national in scope and methodological organization. Another places great importance on the individual level of collective action and in the strategic potential of the form of nonviolent protest. And yet another, directly informed by practitioners of global nonviolence, has encompassed a cultural theory that accentuates the moralist origins of a global nonviolence repertoire.

Nonviolent Efficacy and Protest

Perhaps not surprisingly, the growing field of nonviolent studies has been pioneered by activist-scholars. Therefore, most of the scholarship in this interdisciplinary field is primarily concerned with the general effectiveness of nonviolent protest tactics. Nevertheless, scholars of nonviolent protest have long been cognizant of the global

orientation of nonviolence as a tactical movement. Addressing this phenomenon, they write that the global population of nonviolent collective action events represents more than a random concatenation of typically “un-violent” protest; the emergence of a global nonviolence repertoire (though not yet spoken of in those terms) marks a continuously unfolding twentieth-century paradigm of a globally shared and consciously non-violent move toward democracy (Boulding 2000). Many of the nonviolent movement case studies also acknowledge the importance of diffusion from movement to movement. In many cases, this occurs indirectly. Movements draw directly from the inspiration of other national movements, borrowing tactics, philosophical orientations, and organizational forms (Zunes et al. 1999). In other instances, case historians identify direct and formal linkages between movements, such as that between the Indian independence movement and the U.S. Civil rights movement (Chabot 2000) or the influence of Gandhi on protest communities in the United Kingdom (Scalmer 2011). Diffusion therefore represents one key way in which the nonviolent repertoire has spread across borders. But to understand why it has emerged as a global repertoire requires asking quite a different question, to which nonviolent protest scholarship seems to offer two types of answers.

The first line of scholarship, developed early on, underscores the clear moralist orientation of advocates for nonviolence. Early treatments of the nonviolence repertoire were both responding to the international critical acclaim accorded to Gandhi’s nonviolence movement and to the practice-based scholarly concern of how best to incorporate Gandhi’s formulation of “active resistance” into the “passive resistance” anti-war and anti-proliferation movements of the early 20th century. Clarence Case’s 1923 volume, *Non-violent Coercion*, which grew out of his dissertation research on the social-

psychological foundations of nonviolent resistance, was the first attempt to ask, "What social heritages, attitudes, and conditions foster [nonviolence]?"(6). His answer, a small tome of only 414 pages, reviews the historical development of the suffering individual in Christianity, of the social psychological orientation toward retaliation (and refraining from retaliation), and a cultural and deeply moral orientation toward non-resistance, which Case argues is rooted in a number of social belief systems, prominent among them Christianity and other religious orientations, the ideologies of democracy, and some strands of anarchism and democratic socialism.

Since Case's initial exploration of the "essentially cultural determinants" of the non-violent orientation, several additional important works have followed that stress moral sentiments as the driving force for nonviolence. Richard Gregg's 1934 *The Power of Non-violence* was also inspired by Gandhi (to whom the book is dedicated) and continues the scholarly conversation about the possibilities for transplanting Gandhi's program into a Western context (and the book in fact became a part of that process, as noted by Martin Luther King Jr. in the preface to the second edition). Gregg's examination, calling nonviolence "a dramatization of the idea of essential human unity" was foundational for the field of non-violent studies because of his detailed break-down of the "emotional, mental, and moral mechanisms" that make nonviolent resistance work (45). He pins the success of nonviolence on a form of "moral jiu-jitsu" as "the non-violence and good will of the victim act like the lack of physical opposition by the user of physical jiu-jitsu, to cause the attacker to lose his moral balance." Pertinent to our exploration of nonviolence's emergence as a global repertoire is both the author's emphasis on the distinctive moral stance which drives adopters to use nonviolence and

the book itself, which presents evidence of nonviolence's global travels - as Gregg also notes in the introduction to the Indian translation. He noted, "each time the idea stepped out in space and time it seemed to gather meaning, organization, momentum, dramatic and practical, effectiveness and power." (14)

The moralist understanding of nonviolence continues to be a small strand of nonviolent studies today. That is, biographers and other scholars document the moral orientation of nonviolent entrepreneurs (eg Deats 2009; Smith, Pagnucco, and Romeril 1994; Hopgood 2006) and scholars have delineated aspects of a nonviolent "ideology" in which they assume a mobilizing power (eg. Oppenheimer and Lakey 1965), while recent analyses suggest that religious leaders play an important part in non-violent mobilization (Nepstad 2011, Zunes 1999). However, another type of theorizing has come to dominate the field of non-violent studies, and these perspectives tend to be born of rationalist assumptions about the strategic calculations of nonviolent strategists.

Gene Sharp's work on nonviolent resistance is both canonical and foundational to the new pragmatist theory of nonviolence.[4] Sharp was trained as a political scientist and has built an entire career (and a critically acclaimed international organization) on his research on the power of nonviolent resistance. Sharp, like other scholars of his day, used Gandhi's experiment as a starting point but quickly turned from what he considered was part of a family of "principled nonviolence" to the "pragmatic" type of non-violent resistance he later declared most characteristic of the historical record of non-violent movements. And yet, Sharp's pragmatist turn also reflected his participation in the

[4] Although to further distinguish themselves from moral theorists and principled activists, pragmatists prefer to distance themselves from the term "nonviolence" using the increasingly popular moniker of "nonviolent resistance".

general orientation of nonviolent scholars who searched for ways to expand implementation and effectiveness of the universalist repertoire. As Sharp writes,

> It appeared evident that both moral injunctions against violence and exhortations in favor of love and nonviolence have made little or no contribution to ending war and major political violence. It seemed to me that only the adoption of a substitute type of sanction and struggle as a functional alternative to violence in acute conflicts- where important issues are, or are believed to be, at stake- could possibly lead to a major reduction of political violence in a manner compatible with freedom, justice and human dignity (1973: vi).

Sharp's subsequent discussions followed suit with such a "functionalist" objective (although he only used this terminology early in his career). His 817 page work on *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* deconstructs the sources of political power and posits the potential for a "political jiu-jitsu", reframing Gregg's moralist concept in terms of the political power to redirect repressive regime behavior by exposing brutality and disabling the regime's public support. Although, again, Sharp's intention was not to analyze the origins of the repertoire but the efficacy of its tactics, he has forwarded a rationalist variant of collective action theory. In a 1979 piece in which he contemplated domestic nonviolence as a substitute for international war, Sharp proposed nonviolence as a "functional alternative to violent forms of defense" and suggested that should military leaders become strategically savvy, they would do well to reevaluate their use of weaponry asserting that "nonviolent struggle has almost always been improvised without significant awareness of the past history of this type of struggle" (245).[5]

Following in Sharp's intellectual footprints, Peter Ackerman and colleagues have forwarded a strategic program of nonviolent studies, with, again, little to no attention given to what drives movements to use nonviolence. Rather, like Sharp, when the

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[5] And Sharp has allegedly given such training to the Israeli Defense Force upon their request.

emergence of strategic nonviolent conflict is considered, the pragmatist school asserts that "nonviolent sanctions have most often been used by people who needed to make practical choices under very difficult circumstances, rather than by people committed to the avoidance of bloodshed for ethical reasons" (1994: 5). And even the most recent works in this sub-field on strategic efficacy conceptualize the "appeal" of nonviolence in purely strategic terms, as exemplified in Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) identification of three barriers to nonviolent mobilization, physical, informational, and moral, where lower risks provide higher incentives.

Therefore, these different approaches to explaining nonviolence, while not directly theorizing the emergence of the movement or the adoption of nonviolent techniques, provide some competing predictions about how and why a global nonviolence movement will develop. First, the moralist approach suggests that,

P8: The greater the moral commitment to the repertoire, the more the nonviolence movement will globalize.

And the strategic approach suggests, alternately, that,

P9: The more effective nonviolence tactics are proven, the more the movement will globalize.

Predictions and Limitations

Each of these theories provides some insight into the range of factors that have given shape to a global repertoire of nonviolence, although my expectation going into the project has been that no one theory will entirely account for a global level analysis of claimsmaking. The Tillyian school of collective action is methodologically nationalistic,

and the theory is constructed to highlight distinctions among national repertoires with the aim of expanding national-level analysis of repertoire emergence. Tilly's collective action theory will therefore not neatly transfer into a global level of analysis, despite his own final musings that one may be in order. That stated, Tilly's theorizing on repertoire emergence has clearly been foundational to the study of claimsmaking routines and two key insights from Tilly's theory will guide my investigation (keeping in mind these sensitizing ideas provide meta-level insights that lack specificity about the particular elements that can emerge in a global repertoire). These are the predictions that: 1) structural changes in the polity shape a) the interests of claimsmakers, b) claimsmakers' forms of organization, and c) the particular tactics claimsmakers adopt to make claims. An additional expectation derived from collective action theory is that 2) the use of the repertoire constrains further repertoire development.

An attempt to globalize Tilly's repertoire emergence theory into a macro-schema analysis will draw on some of the insights of world polity theory. That is, world polity theorists describe a world polity that is decentralized and fragmented, marked by a state-system rather than one coherent world state. The state system has expanded and predominantly eventuates in a bureaucratic model of statehood and is accompanied by the expansion of a decentralized system of non-state actors. World polity theory, and world society theory more generally, provide a more nuanced explanation of structural changes in the polity, by arguing that these changes often stem from deeply cultural origins; in particular, world polity theorists have pointed to enlightenment ideals of 1) progress which translate into the rational bureaucratic model of the state and of 2) individualism which translate into a global human rights regime (see Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and

Boli 1987). To consider these assumptions in my study of the globalization of nonviolence, I expect nonviolence to become ontologically attached to the notions of a progressive state or the pursuit of human rights. I will also more generally consider evidence of nonviolence as sacralized in a global moral order of claimsmaking, marked by the celebration of major movements or leaders. Finally, I will give careful attention to how greater integration and interdependence leads to a change in consciousness that makes movements more likely to engage in nonviolence as a globally legitimate repertoire.

One central aspect in which my analysis will deviate from- and in which I aim to contribute to- either tradition will be my focus on what drives collective action in civil societies, as opposed to what drives state structuration (although this research may help to formulate new hypotheses about the relationship between the two). To restate the explicandum, I ask, what drives the emergence of a global, non-state collective action repertoire? For collective action theory, this will mean re-orienting the claimsmaker and the objects of claimsmaking to a new framework of global 1) social control, 2) units of claimsmaking, and 3) issues and actions giving rise to movements. For world polity theory, however, this will mean shifting the focus from states' structuration (states that are often but not always the targets of nonviolent action) to civil societies' structuration. Where world polity scholarship gives attention to changes in civil society, it tends to emphasize the "top-down" process of diffusion from authoritative external bodies through local state- political structures (cf. Frank, Schofer, and Longhofer 2007)[6];

[6] Frank and colleagues use the top-down versus bottom-up metaphor to emphasize that policies are created by external, global authorities rather than developing indigenously. They point to the crucial relationship of influence by external NGOs on states' policies, versus those we might expect to find in a study of global nonviolence, from local civil societies' claimsmaking efforts influencing national level practice.

theorizing on the global dimensions of “bottom-up” organizing, such as that which characterizes nonviolence, merits expansion. At least I argue here that there should be, in a cultural theory of globalization, other ways world society develops beyond state structuration (and perhaps other ways states develop, from other transnational avenues across non-state channels in addition to their attenuation to other states and formal global political actors).

Nonviolent studies have produced two main lines of theorization, either of which shares some assumptions with the national collective action or world polity theories. Like collective action theory, strategic efficacy theory assumes some degree of trial and error, where rational actors respond to changing circumstances in their political systems and adopt repertoires based on an assessment (however calculated) of low-risk and high-risk incentives. It is the explicit hope of strategic efficacy theorists that their scholarship will enhance the incentives to collective actors to use non-violent methods as their research both proves non-violent methods to be most effective and articulates how they work. This is therefore a difficult prediction to translate into a historical and global level analysis of repertoire emergence. Whether nonviolent methods become more accessible or lower-risk among tactical choices, as a *global* tactical repertoire, would involve some assessment of the global persistence of violent methods over time and the risks to adopting nonviolence. I expect that the globalization of nonviolence will follow a curvilinear trajectory where, as Tilly asserts, the institutionalization of the repertoire makes adoption much more plausible, whether or not further adoption is conceptualized as morally or strategically driven (and I will argue that this is not necessarily mutually exclusive in the post-institutionalizing phase of global nonviolence).

The smaller, but steady stream of moralist theory in nonviolent studies shares with world society theory an assumption about value-driven tactics, although the former is not always as explicitly theorized as the latter. Both perspectives point to the importance of symbolism in driving mobilization and tactical adoption. That is, despite the persistence of violence or the "high-costs" to activism that pragmatists might underline, moral theories suggest collectivities choose nonviolence because of the tactics' embeddedness in a meaning-system they subscribe to (which in world society terms is known as the global moral order). They also both emphasize the importance of canonical leaders or movements in legitimating (or further inspiring) the spread and global emergence of the repertoire. In his forward to a comparative study of nonviolent resistance in Latin America, Leonardo Boff, one of the earliest and most well-known liberation theologians, (1991: viii) writes,

> This answer [of active nonviolence] is inspired in part by the extraordinary example of persons who have successfully demonstrated another way of confronting highly conflictive situations. Some of the best known are Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Dom Hélder Câmara, and Adolfo Perez Esquival.

Boff goes on to endorse the case studies in the book as exemplary of both the most effective and most desirable ways to wage peace in a world of increasing violence. He concludes by asserting that "behind every concerted nonviolent struggle there is a powerful *mística*: the conviction that truth, justice, and love are ontological" (italics in text). A similar argument is made in Boli's discussion of the "rationalization of virtue and virtuosity" in world society. Boli explains that because leaders like Gandhi and King have become aligned with the sacred, the lives they have lived stand as exemplars to be followed. "Righteousness is demonstrated by opposing oppression (Amnesty

International), fighting inequality (Gandhi, Mandela), preserving life (Mèdecins sans frontières), protecting persecuted groups (Martin Luther King, Dalai Lama), and so on" (2006: 10- 11). Incidentally, this sentiment is both an important insight to counter the prediction offered by pragmatist theorists of nonviolence and one that places even their assertions in the context of a globalizing morality. Consider comparatively the following statement by an explicitly pragmatist advocate for global nonviolence.

> Just as St. Paul understood that his freedom was God-given, a natural right, the world is coming to acknowledge that rights are not conferred by states—they must be honored by states because they belong to individuals. Eventually it will be accepted everywhere that each person's rights come before any ruler's will and that no government is legitimate unless it is based on the people's consent.
>
> The day when that becomes a universal fact will not arrive until the world realizes that rights are won more surely by the people than by terrorists or armies. To make nonviolent struggle the global boulevard to political liberation, we must relentlessly propagate the ideas and strategies that pave its way to victory. Former president Jimmy Carter has said that "nonviolent valor can end oppression." But not until we all enlist to help the valiant (DuVall 2004).

The spread of global nonviolence as an example of an expanding moral order is, according to Boli (2006), anchored in the more general structural expansion of the world polity.

> In periods of strong globalization, I suggest, movements that anchor themselves in the moral order are especially likely to flourish. By aligning themselves with the sacred and championing principles of excellence (progress) and goodness (justice), such movements gain a wider hearing, attract more enthusiasts, and generate more resources than movements that are inconsistent with or ignore the moral order. (26)

This moralist imperative constitutes a distinct dimension of global structuration- "the post-war period has witnessed rapidly expanding moral mobilization, that is, exponential increases in the recognition and rationalization of virtue and virtuosity." (23)

2
FRAMEWORK, DATA, ANALYSIS

Methodological Approach

Like my theorizing, my historical analysis incorporates conventional political sociological strategies but works to build a global framework for repertoire emergence studies. Guided by the sensitizing concepts and hypotheses outlined in Chapter 1, I employ an in-depth historical analysis. That is, I will systematically weigh the impacts of the different predictions outlined on the development of the global nonviolence repertoire, identifying fundamental structures and dynamic events that have been necessary for the repertoire to emerge (see Lipset 1958). Among historical sociological approaches, my principal objective here is to trace causal regularities in history, assessing the different impacts of historical events and changes on the emergence of global nonviolence (see Skocpol 1984).

Typically, comparative historical analysis conceptually embraces a macro-level and comparative view of the emergence and development of politics (Mann 1994) and there is an expectation that case studies be situated in comparative contexts. But, even comparative historical analyses concern themselves with states- as causal structures or as bounded fields in which interactions of interest occur (Alford et al. 2005, especially Amenta 2005; Rueuschemeyer and Stephens 1997). Thus, when events are situated in a macro context, as in European repertoires, they are analyzed comparatively across different states and case studies emphasize the general structural changes that have transformed the distinctive means and modes of collective action within individual state-units (Hunt 1984).

Figure 4 depicts two models of historical analysis. The conventional model, Model A, is most often employed by comparative-historical event analyses. The focus of this inter-unit comparison helps to elucidate how structural distinctions and similarities shape internal differences. Systemic properties are analyzed within the brackets of unique state structures, for example, how capitalist economic development shapes state transformations in France, China, and Russia (to use Skocpol's cases). The obvious advantage to the comparative unit design is the contrast it provides among outcomes and contexts, which some scholars argue helps to provide more reliable generalizations about the mechanisms shaping social change *within either unit* (and yet these advantages also point to the limitations of the model, as I will explore below). Additionally, because the state is the theorized unit of interest, the inter-unit analysis allows researchers to provide a "powerfully parsimonious" explanation of the state's role in any one aspect of political change (Goodwin 2001).

Because I want to work my analysis at the global level I view all relevant actors (states, INGOs, global networks and communities) as embedded in the broader world society as illustrated in Model B. Model B depicts how intra-unit comparisons are organized within one polity and subdivided into distinct time periods, populations, regions, and socio-political conditions. In chapter 1 I explained the theoretical distinctions between world society approaches and state-centered approaches. Here it is important to highlight the methodological differences between these two approaches. Where state-centered frameworks postulate how general structural processes vary across unique states (or types of states), world society studies inquire into the structural similarity of distinctive units and how these units are shaped by a common global system.

Methodologically this means that states (or other domestic level institutions, like NGOs) are still important units, but globally derived processes are principally interrogated to unravel their effects on these secondary units. Global processes are compared longitudinally, across global-local levels, cross-regionally, or according to other schematic distinctions.

Figure 4. Two Models for Systemic Historical Analysis

Model A. Inter-unit Analysis (Used in Comparative Historical Studies)

Inter-unit designs, like comparative historical analysis, assess how structural similarities and differences shape internal processes. They acknowledge transnational processes but focus on inter-unit distinctions and differences.



Model B. Intra-unit Analysis (Used in World or Domestic Polity Analysis)

Intra-unit analysis compares units within one system assesing variation across time periods or structural location. Inquiry is designed to directly understand the effect of the supra- level (global, trans-national) on the organization and dynamics of processes that occur across other internal dimensions.



One potential criticism of a global level historical analysis is the presumed sample bias of a study global in scope, that is, the lack of a standard, comparative empirical context. Although global theorists jest that the rigor of our research will be significantly enhanced when an "inter-galactic" sociology is possible, the empirical reality is that the global level lacks an identical unit comparison. The comparisons that currently characterize salient debates about "the global" are global/local level analyses. Global/local discussions tend to be highly polarized with, not surprisingly, political scientists arguing for the primacy of the state, movements analysts arguing for the power of the grassroots community, and global scholars insisting on a pervasive "top-down" global structuration of local politics.

These debates, by their nature, are wrought with conceptual contradictions and limitations. To consider, just briefly, the basic theoretical tenets of either side- that the trans-national realm operates as ancillary to the national realm, or that the national level represents an enactment of globally derived models- remove either element and you fundamentally alter the equation. This explains in part, however, the not-surprisingly intractable debate between inter-unit and intra-unit analysts because either side operates on distinctive assumptions stemming from distinctive levels of analysis that are essentially quite different. This is not to suggest that comparing the impact of levels of social organization is futile. Rather, I proceed in using an intra-unit approach with caution because it is my strong opinion that such inter-level comparisons risk imposing a complex inter-level set of structures and relationships into an artificial conceptual dichotomy where one level must be entirely determined by the other. Scholars engaging

in such inter-level comparisons should take caution not to reify the distinctions of these levels of social organization or ignore their interdependence.

Therefore, I argue here that to employ a global level analysis of repertoire emergence Model B is more appropriate, because I am not interested in how national repertoires differ but how one global repertoire of nonviolence has emerged as a globally conceptualized and purportedly universally applicable set of tactical routines. I ask not how global nonviolence addresses or is shaped by any one particular set of domestic polity characteristics. Rather, I ask how this global repertoire continues to be salient among globally embedded movements despite individual polity distinctions, and how it is shaped by global level events, structures, and interactions. Model A would be inadequate to answer these types of global emergence questions, even though Model A may suffice to elaborate theories of national emergence.

Furthermore, I believe this approach will yield important, new insights about global nonviolence. One of the main contributions I wish to make to the growing field of nonviolent studies is to illustrate the importance of applying global level analyses to studying the nonviolence repertoire. To this end, I suggest several ways of looking at the advantages and explanatory power to be gained in a global analysis of nonviolence. The first is theoretical and that is to re-state that the previously reviewed works in global analysis all point to a need for understanding the global dimensions of collective action and nonviolent protest specifically. To extrapolate from Goodwin's opinion on the principal strength of state-centered analysis (2001), the family of independent variables I am most interested in is located in the global dimensions of society and so a framework that highlights the impact of that dimension is vital. And, given the limitations

acknowledged by state-centered theorists, a departure from "methodological nationalism" may be in order to examine how best to expand theorization of the transnational dimension.

Second, many collective action studies provide a model for studying repertoire emergence that remains to be "globalized" in scope. State-centered theorists (on either side of the inter/intra unit divide) may reject a global analysis of collective action based on biased assumptions about the centrality of the state in political change, or because there is no identical unit with which to compare a world society. But such criticisms would be unfair to the general framework of an extensive body of collective action studies that is based on comparisons across temporal and internal variability. Beissinger (2002) explains that,

> In addition to allowing systematic temporality in social and political relationships, one of the chief advantages of event analysis is its great flexibility. Events can be segmented by their particular characteristics. They can be aggregated at almost any meaningful level of space or time. It is a misnomer to speak of a single methodology of event analysis (460).[7]

I add to this critical discussion a third, important advantage offered by a global historical framework for repertoire emergence, a general, in-depth look at systemic effects. This is not to erroneously suggest that other types of analysis do not weigh systemic effects; rather, I wish to point out that the systems they are capable of analyzing are bracketed within the scope of study. To understand *global* systemic effects, that is, beyond the transnational effects of interest in comparative historical analysis, necessitates a global framework.

[7] Event analysis as Beissinger describes it encompasses much more than the commonly identified statistical method known as "event history analysis". In collective action studies "event analysis" is a particular form of historical analysis that seeks to locate and explain the effect of key historical events in shaping political and social change (see Olzak 1989; Gamson 1975; Spilerman 1970; McAdam 1986; Tarrow 1996).

To begin my historical study, I first conduct a timeline of the globalization of nonviolence that accounts for phenomenal transformations in how the repertoire is conceptualized, systematized, and institutionalized. I then use the shifts between these periods as markers of critical historical changes that merit closer scrutiny. Following the alternative predictions of collective action, globalization, and nonviolent protest theories, I assess the differential effects of the structure of the world polity, grand events that have shaped global politics, the unique twentieth century integration of the world, and the cultural development of a twentieth century global moral order on the emergence of a global repertoire of nonviolence.

Data Collection and Analysis

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in my historical analysis is the historical emergence and development of a global nonviolence repertoire. To construct a historical outline of the emergence of a global repertoire of nonviolence I first collected data on how nonviolent movements, nonviolent organizations, and nonviolent discourse have developed over time. Data on the global emergence of a nonviolence repertoire were drawn from both secondary and primary sources. From this data I identify noticeable developments in the repertoire that delineate three distinct periods in nonviolence's globalization.

Because historians and scholars of nonviolence have conducted some impressive case studies of nonviolent movements, secondary sources have given me a solid foundation for building a nonviolent movements database. I began by constructing a database of a core sample of 117 periods in which nonviolent protest movements were

active in a country. I identified these as movements that used the nonviolence repertoire as a guiding tactical framework and that have considered their commitment to nonviolence crucial to their collective identity. That is, these movements publicly proclaimed themselves to be nonviolent movements and nonviolent scholars and historians have added them to the historical record of significant nonviolent movements. I drew directly from the nonviolent movements literature to construct this database as a core sample that could provide a big picture view of how critically acclaimed nonviolent movements have spread and developed over time and, in the second part of my dissertation, some comparative quantitative insight where qualitative case descriptions have been plentiful. My database includes data on the years in which the movement occurred, the country, and the principal objectives of the movement/s that were active during those years. It is a sample database of nonviolent movements, however, not a complete global database of every nonviolent movements or campaign that has been organized. With this core sample I examined 1) the overall growth of prominent nonviolent movements 2) the geographical spread of movements by time period and 3) the geographical spread of movements by principal objectives as well as the 4) temporal spread of different types of nonviolent movements. Information coded on these movements is listed in Appendix B.

Several compendiums of nonviolent movements catalog movements from the nonviolent efforts in the early phase of the Russian revolution to ongoing movements in Burma and Palestine. These include a bibliography of “People Power and Protest since 1945” (Carter, Clark, and Randle 2009) which categorizes nonviolent anti-colonial movements, rights and democracy movements, resistance against oppression and/or

dictatorship movements, cultural, civil, and political rights movements, social and economic justice movements, and reviews the use of nonviolent action in a range of other large social movements of the twentieth century. Other primary references include Gene Sharp's *Waging Nonviolent Struggle* (2005), Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler's *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict* (1994), Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher's *Nonviolent Social Movements* (1999), Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall's *A Force More Powerful* (2000), Kurt Schock's *Unarmed Insurrections* (2005), Philip McManus and Gerald Schlabach's *Relentless Persistence* (1991), Richard Stahler-Sholk, Glen David Vanden and Henry E. Kuecker's *Latin American Social Movements* (2008), George-Williams' 'Bite Not One Another' (2006), Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber's *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders* (2000), The International Center for Nonviolent Conflict's Nonviolent Conflict Summaries Database (2009), and Sharon Erikson Nepstad's *Nonviolent Revolutions* (2011).

To fill in the gaps from these historical summaries, I conducted a search using Google Scholar for scholarly articles on nonviolent movements by country (excluding countries significantly covered in secondary historical sources) and produced another small cache of scholarly commentaries on a range of prominent movements for each country though they have been less-publicized nonviolent movements. I have also added to this database with reports from nonviolent INGOs on movements not covered elsewhere.

A second objective in my study of the nonviolence repertoire is to understand the global organizational dimension of the nonviolence repertoire. To map out this

organizational aspect of global nonviolence I first collected extensive data on international NGOs that characterize themselves as nonviolence INGOs. Demographic data on nonviolent INGOs was drawn from the Union of International Associations Annual Yearbook of International Associations electronic database. The UIA Annual Yearbook was initiated in 1907 on the efforts of Henri La Fontaine and Paul Otlet to construct “a master bibliography of the world’s accumulated knowledge”. According to the UIA, its Annual Yearbook of International Associations is “the world's oldest, largest and most comprehensive source of information on global civil society” (2012).

The electronic database of international organizations historically catalogs information from over 40,000 organizations (information remains in the archive even after an organization dissolves). It is a central networking catalog for international organizations and most active INGOs (and IGOs) regularly submit their information to be stored in this database. In some instances the UIA also frequently solicits data. The data submitted is voluntary, however, and the extent and breadth of data on any one organization varies. The electronic database organizes data into a number of categories for which organizations can submit information and which guided my initial search. These include founding, history, aims and objectives, structure, languages spoken, secretariat, finance, IGO relations, NGO relations, activities, publications, and the countries in which the organizations hold membership.

To construct a database of INGOs active in the global nonviolence network, I began with a comprehensive search of nonviolent INGOs in the UIA’s 2001-2002 cd archive by looking for mentions of the terms “nonviolence” or “nonviolent protest” in all of the aforementioned categories and limiting the search to NGOs only (excluding IGOs).

From this initial list I excluded organizations whose only participation in nonviolence was to foster awareness of philosophical or religious orientations to nonviolence, eg. “nonviolence as a way of life”, without participating in nonviolent resistance movements. This yielded an initial database of 139 organizations. I later expanded this database with data drawn from the newer 2008-2009 cd archive. In the latter search I did not have to conduct a search in each individual category because by 2008, the UIA had created a distinct category for “nonviolence organizations” so that one simple keyword search brought up several hundred organizations (and the same list is yielded despite trying to conduct the search through different categories). I did have to pare down the list from the latter search however, as the UIA includes “peacemaking” organizations in their nonviolence category, which then, by default, includes organizations that self-categorize as peacemaking organizations despite the use of violent methods, such as Al Qaeda. My final search yielded, in combination with organizations found in the earlier search, 211 organizations, listed in Appendix C.

To get a sense of the global expansion of this formal organizational dimension of nonviolence, I first traced the foundings and longevity of nonviolent organizations, the trends for which I will discuss in the next chapter. I also analyzed membership country ties, that is, a general list of countries in which organizations hold members- not a gross count of members or counts of members by country- and I analyzed how ties changed over time. To construct a sample of membership ties expansion, I first conducted a “relevance ranking” search, which is a function provided in the UIA electronic database that lists organizations in order of how often the search term appears in organizations’ overall entry, or how central the term is to its organizational description. I compared this

relevance ranking for “nonviolence” OR “nonviolent” to the organizations that feature most prominently in nonviolence news discourse and historical sources and with their ties to other nonviolent INGOs. I then compiled a sample list of twenty nonviolent INGOs that provide member country data. This list is provided in Appendix D. With this list, I checked out every fifth volume of the UIA annual yearbook (electronic databases are not available for older volumes) from 1948 until 2003 (I stop at 2003 to account for a lag in reporting that results because new organizations often take several years to get up and running before submitting data) and recorded membership country ties for each organization as they have developed over time. Because organizations typically only update their yearbook entries every five years or more, I interpolated data to fill in the five-year periods using Excel.

I also conducted a qualitative analysis of what nonviolent INGOs do, how they specialize and how specialization has changed over time. This entailed checking the organizations’ websites for detailed information where yearbook entries were not extensive. I coded organizations for specialization, the primary ways in which they work to globally diffuse nonviolence. I also coded whether they were global in scope or regionally or topically focused to get a sense of how many organizations worked on numerous international projects and how many aimed to draw international attention and resources into specific or local projects. I organized these data into an Excel sheet and produced a diagram of types of specialization and a timeline of how types of specialization have developed.

To trace the growth of the global growth of nonviolence discourse I drew data from two different types of public discourse. I began with an international news archive search, using the same search terms and ProQuest News database cited above (without limiting the search by country). The spread of news coverage of global nonviolent events is reported in Table 1. I then conducted a search of book discourse on nonviolence through *Global Books in Print*[8] reported in Table 2.

To assess the qualitative dimensions of global discourse on nonviolence I began with the same secondary sources I used for researching global nonviolent practice. Many of these sources focus partially, others significantly, on the history of the idea of nonviolence, on conceptualization of the repertoire of tactics as a whole, and on the theorization of their meaning and universal applicability. As I will detail in the next chapter, this consisted of tracing the ways in which prominent authors spoke about nonviolence as a repertoire for resistance, where they explored its implementation, and how they discussed the repertoire. In addition to coverage of movements, I also read through histories of prominent nonviolent leaders and their original works, and I looked for ways in which leaders were publicly celebrated by international institutions.

To map out the celebration of the repertoire as a whole I used several rich sources of qualitative historical data, online archives and reports from nonviolent organizations and networks, annual reports from prominent nonviolent INGOs, historical documents collected from the archives of Peace Brigades International and Nonviolence International, tactical manuals and conference reports collected from Nonviolence International and the International Fellowship for Reconciliation, and in-depth qualitative

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[8] Although this source includes only five English-speaking countries, the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

interviews conducted from some of the most prominent nonviolent INGOs, including Peace Brigades International, Nonviolence International, Christian Peacemaker Teams, Witness for Peace, International Fellowship for Reconciliation, and War Resisters League, although I save most of this analysis for my interrogation of the role of INGOs explicated in Part II.

Interviews were conducted with organizers from prominent nonviolent organizations including the International Fellowship for Reconciliation, Training for Change, Christian Peacemakers Team, Peace Brigades International, Nonviolence International (including NI U.S., NI SE Asia, NI Russia and New Independent States, and NI Latin America), the International Center for Nonviolent Conflict, War Resisters League, Witness for Peace, and a handful of local activists that have worked with these organizations. Interviews were used to supplement both historical analysis and the organizational analysis I will discuss in Chapter 6. Questions were loosely structured around the following themes: 1) factors leading respondent to participate in international nonviolence work, 2) role and responsibilities with current (and other) organizations, 3) knowledge of how organization works (on various levels participant is involved with), 4) programs and activities that respondent has been involved with (and fields in which these programs have occurred), 5) successes and challenges encountered in fieldwork, and 6) assessment of global nonviolence network and the role of the international community in supporting nonviolence. Interviews were then transcribed and historical data gleaned from interviews has been added to my historical sketch of the global growth of nonviolence.

Independent Variables

Data from secondary sources was used to analyze the effect of global, historical conditions outlined by collective action, world society, and nonviolent studies theories. As I have stated above, some of the predictions outlined in Chapter 1 were used to structure a more formal consideration of causal regularities in the history of global nonviolence, while others I have used as sensitizing ideas about what to expect in the dynamics and development of a global repertoire.

I consider Tilly's institutionalization thesis with data on the institutionalization of global nonviolence (P2). I apply a new historical lens to Stephan and Chenoweth's (2011) data on the development of violent and nonviolent insurrections in the twentieth century to consider the impact of proven effectiveness on repertoire development. And I examine the development of moral commitment among nonviolent practitioners in shaping the repertoire's institutionalization.

To model the predictions (P1) from Tilly's national repertoire emergence studies, I combed the history books identifying political opportunity structures and resources that have shaped the emergence and development of a nonviolence repertoire in the three periods of repertoire development I have identified. As this study engages a global approach and is heavily informed by a world society framework and to assess the predictions offered by world society theory (P3), I considered the form of twentieth century global structural characteristics such as 1) the nature of authority, 2) the degree of cohesion among elites, 3) the degree of openness among social units, and 4) waves of resource accumulation and contraction at a global level. To test the predictions of world society theories I also investigated 5) the substantive ideals legitimate among world

polity authorities like states and international organizations (P5), 6) including specifically the sacralization of humanity as one collective (P6), and 7) the spread of global organizational networks (P7).

In addition to drawing on the global historical work of world society studies and the histories of the movements, organizations, and discourse that I outline in my global nonviolence timeline, I consulted several compendiums on grand historical changes of this period including *The Columbia History of the World* (Garraty and Gay 1972), *The Times Concise Atlas of World History* (Barraclough 1982), *The Essential World History Volume II* (Duiker and Spielvogel 2011), *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Curtin 1984), *The Modern World System II* (Wallerstein 1980), *The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900* (Edgarton 2007), *Globalization* (Scholte 2005), *Colonial and Global Interfacings* (Backhaus and Murungi 2007), *Decolonization: The Fall of the European Empires* (Chamberlain 1999), *Extremely Violent Societies* (Gerlach 2010), and *Imagined Communities* (Anderson 1983). In my historical reading I investigated historical foundations of the changes that occurred in the nonviolence repertoire from the early and middle phases to the latter phases of repertoire development. I also consulted numerous article and online sources cited in text.

Like any global historical analysis, the challenge I faced in this first historical part of my study were in selecting a comprehensive data source to substantiate changes that occurred leading to repertoire emergence and development. To avoid data selection bias (and because there exists no authoritative archive of global polity changes) I consider comparatively: 1) how the events and changes scrutinized make possible a repertoire that did not emerge a century earlier and 2) how the structural and cultural dimensions of

historical development would alternately explain a different sort of global repertoire quite different from global nonviolence. To this end I reread earlier historical records to think critically about what specifically in the structure of the twentieth century polity allowed for a global nonviolence to emerge. And I studied the history and development of violence to consider how nonviolence could have won out in the global moral order of our day. With that brief introduction to the causal pathways I investigated, I turn to my rich historical outline and my historical study of factors that have given shape to the globalization of nonviolence.

3
STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF GLOBAL NONVIOLENCE

People have been protesting nonviolently for centuries. Long before the early twentieth century conceptualization of a nonviolence repertoire. George Lakey (1968) points, for example, to records of nonviolent resistance dating as early as the 5th century B.C. when plebians conducted a general strike in protest of the excessive Roman tax after which the patricians were forced to make concessions. Gandhi, now considered the modern “father of nonviolence”, was deeply indebted to a cosmopolitan pell-mell of philosophers, philanthropists, activists, and outspoken critics of injustice that preceded his own programmatic statements on resistance. From Thoreau he borrowed the concept of “civil disobedience” and a political philosophy on the duty of citizens to participate in and drive the changes made in their government (Hendrick 1956); from Tolstoy the very ideas of non-resistance and non-violence and musings on the nature of coercive states (Lavrin 1960); from the suffragettes a practical example of how non-violent action could be effectively employed (Gandhi 1906); and from the English ethical vegetarian activists a radical cosmopolitanism and the notion of the relationship between the civil values that people engender and the informal sanctions that govern social behavior (Gandhi 2007). I will argue below that prior to the global movement which coalesced around Gandhian nonviolence, early efforts represent incomplete, although important precursors to the early 20th century global emergence of a nonviolence repertoire. But I first outline a timeline of nonviolence’s globalization; to do so I begin by unpacking events that mark the passage through three pivotal periods in which nonviolence globalized: early

conceptualization, post-war systematization, and late and post-Cold War institutionalization.

1) Early Conceptualization

The first wave of the *global* emergence of a nonviolence repertoire is an early conceptualization period marked by three major dimensions that galvanized a global spread and way of thinking about a nonviolent system of claimsmaking. This wave can be traced from the international attention drawn to Gandhi's nonviolence repertoire, which he and other influential international activists theorized as a coherent system of claimsmaking, a holistic approach to world peace and social change. The commitment to nonviolence by other major movements and supporters of the Indian independence movement then helped to substantiate the general nonviolence formula. In this early conceptualization era, early visionaries and intellectuals collectively began to participate in the construction of a general model that could be universal in application and effectiveness.

A Holistic Approach to Claimsmaking

There were other major movements and movers that engaged with non-violent tactics (tactics that simply did not require or result in acts of violence) before and around the time of Gandhi's activism. The global labor movement had already enjoyed a brief stint of international organizing that ended in 1914 and the union model of organizing- including striking, picketing, rallies, and such- had diffused long before international organizational efforts. Historical compendiums of nonviolence note the Russian Revolution of 1905 as a first, large-scale nonviolent struggle of the twentieth century (cf.

Sharp 2005). And Gandhi is noted to have read about many of the tactics which came to comprise his approach earlier in his career, like the French resistance against a salt tax, an early Indian cotton boycott (inspiring his South African resistance efforts), and the organizing efforts of Badshah Khan, a Muslim Pashtun, who first devised a "nonviolent army" in the Northwest Frontier Province of India, that later joined Gandhi's civil disobedience movement against the British (Easwaran 1999). Yet Gandhi's entrée into the global political arena marks an important shift in how claimsmaking was organized, and specifically how nonviolence came to be conceptualized as a global repertoire.

Gandhi, although not alone in working toward a holistic conceptualization of resistance, was a leader in theorizing the formerly disparate family of non-violent tactics into a coherent resistance system of "nonviolence". In formulating this system, Gandhi insisted that nonviolent tactics were both effective and meaningful because of their inclusion in a nonviolence repertoire. And Gandhi worked diligently to develop the ideas about "active resistance" that have become foundational to contemporary forms of non-violent claimsmaking. While working against discrimination in South Africa 1909, Gandhi published a call for a new term that could adequately encapsulate the resistance techniques South African Asians had been employing. He then utilized part of one suggestion, but revised the term to account for the active resistance methods he was formulating, in response to the then salient discourse of "passive resistance" among international peace activists (Gandhi 1963).

Soon after Gandhi's return to India in 1917, he became an active member of the Indian National Congress and began working with the Congress to expand the legislative rights of native Indians. Within a couple of years, his leadership role and his statements

on the importance of nonviolence were globally publicized among international news wires as brazen and yet unique acts of resistance against the British empire. In one of the earliest archived international news stories of Gandhi's leading role in Indian resistance, he enunciates the principles underlying his 1919 "satyagraha" campaign, averring that individual non-violent tactics would fail to be meaningful or effective if they were not rooted in the "tree" of truth and non-violence.

> Satyagraha is like a banian tree [sic] with innumerable branches. Civil disobedience is one such branch. Satya (truth) and Ahimsa (non-violence) together make the parent trunk from which all the innumerable branches shoot out. We have found by bitter experience that, whilst in an atmosphere of lawlessness, civil disobedience found ready acceptance, Satya (truth) and Ahimsa (non-violence) from which alone civil disobedience can worthily spring, have commanded little or no respect. Ours is a Herculean task, but we may not shirk it (The Times of India 1919).

International support for the Indian independence movement helped to amplify the nonviolence concept. The Quakers, who had been in India from the 17th century and had established formal centers there in the late 19th century, were quick to establish a Friends of India center in London from which they advocated for the practice of nonviolence in Indian independence and beyond. And active at this time was a generally more visible group of "cosmopolitan translators", authors and public figures that were instrumental in bringing Gandhian thinking on nonviolent resistance to the West, among them well-known pastors, politicians, political activists, philanthropists, and educators from Europe and the U.S. (Scalmer 2011).

There was also in this era, however, widespread skepticism and debate about the practical potential and limits of such a holistic system of nonviolence. Public discourse illuminates the fits-and-starts process of global repertoire theorizing. Within India,

pundits doubted the potential for discipline among the masses, and they inveighed against the effects of general strikes on Indian workers and regional politicians. When the threat of international war loomed on the horizon, global outsiders were dubious that nonviolence could be realistically employed at the global level of conflict. In World War II, commentators opined that Indian civil disobedience campaigns menaced Allied positions and detracted from the common Indian nationalist and British goal of warding off the threat of Axis imperialism. They challenged the potential for Gandhian nonviolence to subjugate the violence of a Hitler, (to which Gandhi responded by attempting to meet with and persuade Hitler to end the war) or even to quell the smaller scale violence that characterized ethnic conflicts within India. Nevertheless, a commitment to the nonviolence repertoire among a core network of international activists continued to spread.

New Movements Commit to Nonviolence

In a second phase in the globalization of nonviolence, the repertoire gained a solid following among international peace-niks and was adopted by kindred non-Indian independence movements. As early as 1921, news archives record public proclamations of a commitment to nonviolence “like that of Mr. Gandhi” by the Burmese independence movement whose leaders claimed, “Ours is a noble fight, a fight against domination and other rule. Our doctrine is ‘right is might’ not ‘might is right’ ” (LA Times, 1921). Soon after, leaders of the Egyptian independence movement too committed themselves to nonviolence and the targets of nonviolent resistance began to fear imminent changes in their stature.

> Word has reached London that Nationalist leaders are thinking of introducing the nonviolent, noncooperationist methods of the Gandhians of India- methods already such a blight on certain British industries- into the villages along the banks of the Nile. Is it not the threat of nonviolence that makes Britain reiterate so sharply her desire to make Egypt free? (Boston Daily Globe, 1922)

And dedication to developing a nonviolence movement to resist racial discrimination deepened in South Africa where Gandhi had been instrumental in founding a "Tolstoy farm", a communal living environment based on the pursuit of passive resistance.

An international community that had long contemplated other forms of passive resistance against the threat of international war also soon vowed allegiance to "nonviolence" and "active resistance". At a 1922 International Women's League for Peace and Freedom meeting, presider Jane Addams called on activists to use "nonviolence" as a means to ending war. She was among many early draft resisters and conscientious objectors to adopt this new terminology. There was also at this time much recorded discourse among the U.S. peace, labor, and early civil rights activists detailing Gandhi's nonviolence philosophy and how the principles of nonviolence were relevant to other social issues (Chabot 2000; Diwakar and Nidhi 1964). Prominent Indian activists made several international trips to promote the nonviolence philosophy as a generally beneficial method of action. And in some instances they were invited to come and speak to mobilizing communities. Thus the repertoire began to be conceived of as generalizable to other movements. Ministers spoke of Gandhi as "The Christ of Today" for his methods of personal suffering in commitment to the truth (Walker 1967), and activists from the Gandhian movement shared tactical insights with other groups of activists (Chabot 2000; Scalmer 2011). In the early 1920s, for example, Indian independence activist and noted

literary figure Rabindranath Tagore was invited to China in the midst of a series of silk-worker strikes to give a lecture on the importance of nonviolence (Beck 2008).

Expanding the Repertoire's Reach

There were also a handful of public proposals about the general applicability of nonviolence to other arenas of conflict. Notable among these is Maude Royden's vision for a nonviolent "Peace Army". In 1939 Royden, a former suffragist and English pastor, worked with other peace activists to draft and submit a formal proposal to the League of Nations for a cadre of volunteers to physically and peacefully intercede in the violence that broke out after the Japanese invasion of the Chinese province of Manchuria. Although the proposal gained global attention, published in newspapers from the United States to Sierra Leone, and the organization recruited nearly 1000 volunteers, it failed to receive UN institutional mandate and only several years later was able to place a few volunteers in the Palestinian territories. Nevertheless, Royden's vision sparked a steady stream of continuing efforts to think through how best to export nonviolent intervention (Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber 2000).

Still more formal efforts to globalize nonviolence were penned by scholars and philosophers, and many of these writings remain canonical among foundational statements on the repertoire's universal applicability. Clarence Case, a sociologist who completed his doctoral thesis on Gandhi in 1919, published in 1922 an extensive historical analysis of the Christian roots and social-psychological dynamics of nonviolent action. Numerous books specifically on Gandhi soon followed and they all touched on his formulation of a nonviolent active form of resistance, contemplating its universal appeal.

Exemplary among these is Romain Rolland's 1924 *Gandhi*, which was considered an authoritative treatment of the workings of the "Mahatma", or great soul, (Rolland being a Nobel Prize winner and at the time considered "the conscience of Europe"). The book explains Gandhi's cultural background and how his social experiences shaped his politics and was one of the first biographies framed for a Western audience.

Also notable among early efforts to globalize nonviolence were Richard Gregg's 1934 *The Power of Non-violence*, which outlines a general theory of conditions under which nonviolence is effective, and Krishnalal Shridharani's 1939 *War without Violence*, that delineates the logics of satyagraha. Gregg's discussion begins with the Gandhian movement as an example for a general and deeper discussion of the role of morality in nonviolent conflict and conflict resolution. He insists that this process of non-violence is ultimately universal and,

> With it, every single individual of every race, nation, occupation, and all ages above infancy, can do something real and immediate and continuous for the cause of peace, without waiting for any other person or organisation to do something first. It suddenly becomes clear that the work of saving humanity does not rest with the great leaders but begins and continues with one of us (1934: 189).

Gregg's book ends with a proposal for the development of self-discipline and group training that will ensure the accessibility of peace to all peoples. In this sense the book also presented a bridge between early conceptualization and later systematization efforts, and it was not surprisingly a highly consulted text for second wave nonviolence theorists. Shridharani's text on Gandhian nonviolence as a general system of resistance was also highly consulted and set a new kind of precedent for thinking systematically about the strategic potential of nonviolence. Shridharani mapped out the social and political conditions and techniques which brought about a successful nonviolent direct action

campaign for social change and he identified a set of progressive stages through which nonviolence leads to social change.

Both of these statements on the nonviolence repertoire would soon become programmatic for a new generation of nonviolence globalizers. Although discourse about nonviolence did not cease to be contentious in the coming second wave- the horrors of World War II would long linger on the contemplative minds of nonviolence theorists- the international network that had come to support nonviolence efforts in India and abroad began to shift gears from asking how it could be generally conceptualized to figuring out how best to begin its systematic global implementation.

2) Post World War Systematization

Several significant events mark the transformation from early conceptualization into a post-world war systematization period. First, the major independence movements around which a global nonviolence movement had rallied came to a close and new independence and other movements necessitated new ways of thinking about how best to implement nonviolence. This entailed deriving general lessons from the Indian and other early era models for nonviolence and mapping their replication into new contexts. Second, and importantly, these movements increasingly became international through increasingly formal means of organization. The global organizational dimension for nonviolence blossomed in the post-world war era with a proliferation of new organizations explicitly dedicated to spreading nonviolent protest tactics.

Third, nonviolence continued to be a principal organizing framework for a world peace movement, but there was a substantive shift in the concerns of international peace

activists, moving from the prior focus on non-violent resistance to the world wars to the push toward disarmament during the Cold War arms race, which entailed the development of new forms of direct action protest and demonstrations. Fourth, both shaping and resulting from all of these movement transformations, was a noticeable change in the tenor of nonviolence discourse. Authors continued to write about Gandhi, but many more gave their attention to the general repertoire of nonviolence and its extension into a number of new political arenas. Scholars helped to forge a new field of nonviolent studies and activists developed tactical manuals for nonviolence as a universally applicable repertoire- one that could be systematically outlined, organized, implemented, and evaluated. So systematized became nonviolence in this post-war era that many smaller movements drawing on and supporting nonviolence forged to crystallize a global movement for nonviolence.

Old Movements Wane, New Movements Emerge

Throughout the Second World War, anti-colonial movements maintained their resistance against colonial powers, challenging residual illusions about colonialism as a civilizing or beneficent force. In India proper nonviolent protest had played a significant role up through independence- most visibly in the 1930-1931 Satyagraha salt march. Following the extension of electoral reforms in 1935, however, the Indian National Congress, an Indian political party that became the party supporting the Indian independence movement, worked through the electoral process, and Gandhi and other civil disobedience activists shifted their attentions to local, social reforms. Then, on the eve of a British invasion of Germany, which ignored strong disapproval from the Indian

Congress Party, the Congress Party moved into an all-out rebellion against British colonial rule. The 1942 "Quit India" campaign launched massive civil disobedience that resulted in organized nonviolent as well as violent protest resulting in the arrest of hundreds of thousands of Indians and over 1000 killed in the conflict. Meanwhile, outside of India, an Indian National Army colluded with the Japanese to usurp Britain's hold over Southeast Asia.

Tens of thousands of Burmese had already joined forces with the Japanese comprising a native resistance army almost as big as the invaders', and together they temporarily ousted the British (until the Japanese surrendered to the Allies and the Brits returned in late 1944). But, by war's end, tensions among the colonies mixed with a change of focus in British politics, opening new opportunities for independence. In 1945, the British Labour Party was elected to power, giving priority to the rebuilding of Britain and leaving little room for prior colonial sentiments towards the "Asian gems", Burma devastated from the war and India fraught with heightening Hindu-Muslim tensions. The immediate post-world war period saw the independence of India, Pakistan, and Burma in 1947. Egypt's full independence eventually came through a coup in 1952.

As these movements were winding down, however, new movements were gaining momentum, movements that would also soon captivate global attention. In the U.S., civil rights activists had long been interested in the methods and philosophy of Gandhi. Indian exiles and traveling speakers publicized new developments in Gandhi's tactical nonviolence as did a number of international peace journals. In the 1930s, several African American leaders, among them Howard Thurman and Benjamin Mays of Howard University, traveled to India to see Gandhian nonviolence in action and open a dialogue

about the potential for a mass nonviolent movement for civil rights in the U.S. South. So invested was Gandhi in the success of this effort that he began to view the civil rights movement as the next major portal through which nonviolence would be globalized, commenting, "It may be through the Negroes that the unadulterated message of nonviolence will be delivered to our world" (Sibley 1967). The earliest non-cooperation actions were launched at the same time as Gandhi's globally acclaimed Salt March, but it took another decade to really build up a concerted effort at widespread nonviolent resistance in the U.S. When a concerted and mass movement mobilized, the U.S. civil rights movement became a major political event that the world kept its eyes on (Spence 2011); and as the next great demonstration of the repertoire in action, its leaders would soon join Gandhi as canonical forefathers of the new global repertoire (Gaines 2007).

The particular features of this movement that helped to usher in this new era for global nonviolence was the systematic way in which civil rights activists trained in and prepared for nonviolent action and the movement's fervent commitment to the repertoire as a holistic meaning-system. A complex network of community organizations and social institutions provided the vital communication channels that sustained mobilization in the U.S. civil rights movement. Pre-world war activists modeled and revamped Gandhian techniques of training for nonviolence in movement "halfway houses", crucial networking and mobilization sites where activists transmitted tactical knowledge and skills from as early as the mid-1940s (Morris cited in Chabot 2000). One of the first among the very visible civil rights protests, the 1947 Freedom Ride, for example, entailed an extensive two-day training in which activists were presented with a number of scenarios. The participants were made to contemplate, "What if the bus driver insulted

you? What if you were actually assaulted? What if the police threatened you?" And the trainers and trainees proceeded to simulate and work through these and other scenarios taking on the different roles of bus drivers, "hysterical segregationists", the police, and the protesting participants (Hare and Blumberg 1968: 51). As mobilization for the movement ramped up, these trainings became more widespread, systematically preparing activists for boycotts, sit-ins, marches and demonstrations, and a range of other protest and noncooperation techniques.

Throughout all of these preparations there was another driving force shaping commitment to nonviolence, the role played by African American religion. The black churches were just as significant an organizing site as the halfway houses, and the image of Jesus' suffering for truth and justice a paramount, motivating imagery. Cementing the "reinvention of the Gandhian repertoire" in an African American vernacular (as Chabot's work has so eloquently articulated) was that the direct U.S.-Indian ties, the U.S. emulation of Indian tactics, and the discursive commitment to nonviolence among civil rights leaders were all formulated into a generalizable recipe for social change. As the now most canonized leader of that movement would later come to proclaim in his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize, "If [world peace] is to be achieved, man must evolve for all human conflict a method which rejects revenge, aggression and retaliation" (King 1964).

This was not the only major nonviolent movement active in the immediate postwar period. During the war there had been a number of broad, societal efforts to resist fascism in the 1940s notable nonviolent efforts at resistance unfolded in Norway, Denmark, France and Berlin (Sharp 2005). Major general strikes brought down

dictatorships in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1944 and general strikes ensued in Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua the same year. Following the war, efforts to build a nonviolent movement in South Africa revved up into a major general strike in 1957, and anti-colonial movements in Africa found new strategic power in nonviolence. Kwame Nkrumah was an important leader of one such African nonviolence movement. Nkrumah claimed inspiration in Gandhian satyagraha as he helped to mobilize a Ghanaian independence movement under the concept of "positive action", a form of civil disobedience pledging resolute commitment to nonviolence and aimed to counter the deficit model of dealing with colonial transitions with a Gandhian emphasis on positive social reconstruction. Once successful in bringing Ghana to independence, Nkrumah began working to export a general, African nonviolent model for independence, proclaiming that "without African independence, the freedom of Ghana is meaningless." Inviting nonviolence leaders from around Africa and the Pan-African world to come and build strategic and tactical networks, Nkrumah helped to organize a series of African independence conferences in Ghana with over 300 delegates from over 65 organizations (Sutherland and Meyer 2000). Soon kindred, African independence leaders helped to organize movements based on a public commitment to nonviolence, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya most visible among them (although both would later come to challenge their allegiance to nonviolence after becoming statesmen, to the great disappointment of their transnational nonviolent support networks).

Another surge in nonviolent movements marked the next couple of decades, a worldwide phenomenon of student uprisings in the late 1960s, as well as workers, independence, democracy, and various human rights movements. In Latin America,

democratic initiatives moved across Honduras, Bolivia, and Brazil, where activists elaborated a commitment to "firmenza permanente" or "relentless persistence" (McManus and Schlabach 1991). Later, nonviolent movements would resist brutal military repression in Argentina and Chile. In Africa conflicts over independence resulted in violent civil wars, but nonviolence remained a part of many resistance efforts, on a larger scale especially in Mali and Senegal (ICNC 2009). In Asia, the same violent-nonviolent tension persisted, with groups in West Papua and East Timor holding to nonviolence, as did the student movements in Japan and Korea.

The late 1960s also saw a blossoming civil society movement in Palestine, and major nonviolent resistance movements sprang up in Greece, Portugal, and the Basque country. Anti-proliferation of nuclear power movements that drew heavily on a nonviolence framework developed in the U.K. and Germany. In the U.S. the nonviolence repertoire transformed the organization of farmworkers in the West, under the leadership of Cesar Chavez, who wove Gandhian ethics into a Mexican revolutionary narrative for the rights of immigrant laborers. Resistance against the Vietnam War was organized under the auspices of nonviolence and a second wave emerged for women's rights organizing, all of these movements drawing on a nonviolent repertoire and the increasingly systematic ways in which nonviolent tactics came to be organized within that repertoire.

Globalizing Nonviolent Protest

Another signpost of the systematic turn in this second wave is the increasingly global level on which nonviolent movements were organized, precisely because networks

became linked through their shared tactical orientation. A big globalizing force in the early conceptualization era had been the pacifist movement through which a common, global vision for world peace emerged as a unifying schema for nonviolent action. This movement, although passing through waves and troughs of mobilizing fervor, gained greater momentum in the post-world war period, in part because of the movement's central role in helping to systematize and trans-nationalize nonviolent direct action. As the shock of world war lingered on the global consciousness of the peace movement, activists witnessed the construction of a new type of conflict in the building up of the Cold War. Fearing the next major global battle would have even more deleterious effects, a great deal of international attention among nonviolence theorists and practitioners immediately turned toward issues of disarmament.

In the 1950s there was a series of disarmament conferences in which activists envisioned a new global nonviolence movement. The goals of the movement were two-fold: to raise global awareness of the buildup of arms and to develop direct action tactics to halt the arms race (Sibley 1963). In the U.S., the Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA) became a central network through which major actions were developed and the orientation of "most of the leadership" was "strongly imbued with Gandhian ideas" about the best strategy for claimsmaking (ibid). Actions were sometimes locally implemented but often transnational in organization and scope, and in other instances borders were physically crossed by nonviolent actions to target the locale of the buildup, stockpiling, or testing of weaponry. The CNVA was especially productive in innovating highly visible and daring techniques, sending ships into nuclear test zones in the late 1950s and early 1960s, holding vigils at factories where arms were produced, staging a global walk

against proliferation from San Francisco to Moscow in 1960, another walk from Quebec to Washington to Guantanamo in 1963 (which entailed a series of risky direct action events along the way), and leading a series of "imaginative and dramatic protest demonstrations" to call attention to the alarming rate of arms production during the Cold War (ibid). This action-intensive movement helped to expand strategic efforts towards systematization, as the core groups of peace activists involved in this network carried tactical experience into other realms of organizing and began to develop the movement's nonviolent alternative to nuclear proliferation, an expanding stockpile of tactical manuals and workshop training models. The successes of organizing in formal committees and with long-standing organizations also made the build-up of more formal organizations all the easier (ibid).

It was in this second wave of global nonviolence that formal organizations became an active and expansive conduit for repertoire diffusion. Organizations that participated in early conceptualization efforts like War Resisters International and The International Fellowship for Reconciliation continued to place nonviolence specialists in new conflict locations and these organizations helped to spread new models for teaching and implementing nonviolence. This was an important process for seeding new, regional organizations that facilitated local mobilization on one level and the strengthening of transnational ties to and support for global-local movements on another. The Goss-Mayrs' time in Latin America (two very active global nonviolence activists from IFOR), to point to an exemplary case in point, resulted in the establishment of SERPAJ, the Servicio Paz y Justicia para America Latina (the Latin American Peace and Justice Service), a regionally focused but transnationally networked organization that was

extensively involved in building up resistance movements in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Several IFOR and WRI members also worked extensively in Africa during this period, providing tactical consulting for the Upper Volta River project and helping organize independence efforts in Tanganyika and Zambia.

Within this nascent global nonviolence network emerged the World Peace Brigade and a number of other smaller nonviolent defense teams that placed global activists into local zones of conflict. WPB activists and scholars credit the idea of a peace brigade to Gandhi's 1906 suggestion for a "nonviolent army" (Walker in PBI Archives), which he later revived in his vision for an Indian nonviolent force that could help in national defense during the world wars (Shephard 1987). By the late 1940s Gandhi and others were actively working on the establishment of such a brigade within India to quell the threat of violence amidst ethnic antagonists, but Gandhi was assassinated (by one such ethnic extremist) just two weeks before the inaugural meeting. The idea finally came to fruition when Vinoba Bhave organized a Shanti Sena army in 1957.

This model turned into a *World* Peace Brigade in the late 1950s as a "natural outgrowth of internationalizing the forces of nonviolence" (Walker in PBI Archives). In particular, there had been steady involvement of the same loose network of international activists in a number of actions, the Sahara Project to protest French nuclear testing in the Sahara desert, the San Francisco to Moscow March against Proliferation, and the string of independence efforts beginning to develop in East and Central Africa. The explicit plan to form an official organization for globalizing nonviolence was drafted at the 1961 War Resisters International triennial in India. Activists focused on four aspects deemed priorities for constructing such a global organization, the building up of a Gandhian

nonviolence, transnationalizing support for the peace movement in U.S. and Europe, nonviolent social justice struggles (among them the U.S. civil rights movement), and movements for national independence and reconstruction (PBI Archives).

From 1961 to 1981, WPB was involved in a number of internationally organized events. First, WPB activists spent several years supporting the mobilization of the Pan-African independence movement. They set up a nonviolent tactics training center in Dar es Salaam, on the front lines of the Zambian freedom movement, and they worked to build transnational support for several important marches and protest efforts. Although energies concentrated on planning for a march on Northern Rhodesia, WPB was also active in repairing relations on the India-Chinese border, organizing a Delhi to Peking Friendship Walk after the conflict broke out on the Indo-China border. The organization officially dissolved a few years after its founding, but activists connected to WPB helped to negotiate and maintain a ceasefire during the 1962-1974 Nagaland conflict in Northern India. In 1971 former organizers went to help in the crisis area that eventually became Bangladesh. And from 1972 to 1974, former WPB activists were among an international group that launched an extensive "Cyprus Resettlement Project" to help resettle 5000 Greek and 20,000 Turkish refugees that fled the violence of 1963.

Nonviolent Protest Scholarship Develops

Finally, and of great consequence for nonviolence's globalization, was the emergence and development of nonviolent studies during this second wave. This new field of inquiry wove together insights from activists directly involved in major movements and organizations with the principles of social science to create a rigorous

study of how nonviolent protest affects power and social change. There were several scholars from the early era of conceptualization that helped to systematize analytical thinking on nonviolence in the second era. Richard Gregg's *Power of Nonviolence* was reprinted in 1959 with a new forward by the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who had also just published his own reflections on the topic in his *Stride toward Freedom* (1958). Clarence Case and several of his students (among them Paul Hare and Charles Chatfield) helped to establish a new focus on the social psychological dimensions of waging nonviolent conflict.

Second-era compendiums began to organize classic and programmatic statements on nonviolence with contemporary theoretical and empirical extensions. In 1963 *The Quiet Battle* weighed the import of classic texts against the (then) current cases of U.S. and South African rights movements, disarmament, and the potential for a nonviolent national defense force. In 1967 the edited volume *Gandhi: His Relevance for our Times* examined the factors that instantiated the successes- and failures- of the Indian independence movement and contemplated the "the ideal and the actual" in Gandhi's philosophy and the application of nonviolence into the U.S. Civil rights movement, the disarmament, and anti-war movements. In 1968, American sociologists Paul Hare and Herbert Blumberg organized a now canonical collection of sociological analyses of various critical cases and the general sociological process of change galvanized by nonviolent techniques.

Among these influential authors were Joan Bondurant, who has published prolifically on Gandhian methods and tactics, George Lakey, whose sociological treatise on the "mechanisms of nonviolent action" pioneered the translation of sociological

analysis into practical and systematically devised plans of action, and Gene Sharp, now affectionately known as the "godfather of nonviolence". George Lakey's published works are now highly valued archival remnants of this era of systematization. From his direct involvement in the U.S. civil rights movement to his more recent work in environmental justice campaigns, Lakey has given more than 600 consultations and training seminars in more than 30 countries. Lakey developed a talent for translating social theories into action guides early on and published the seminal manual for nonviolent resistance *Strategy for a Living Revolution* in 1973, which provided insight from the deeply reflective action-ethos of a Movement for a New Society, a nonviolent revolutionary movement in the U.S. that brought together activists for various causes in the late 1970s to contemplate how nonviolence could be used to construct a new society (much like Gandhi did in later life with his satyagraha ashrams). Lakey is today still a phenomenally prolific nonviolent journalist, writer, speaker, activist, and trainer.

Gene Sharp's work has gained the widest acclaim among nonviolent scholars, although the foundational concepts of his work are borrowed from Gregg's "moral jiu-jitsu" and Lakey's mechanisms. Sharp was an anti-conscription activist during the Korean War and later earned his doctorate in political theory at Oxford in 1968. His first major book in 1973 elaborated on his dissertation research and was a three-volume opus on power and struggle, the dynamics of nonviolent action, and the methods of nonviolent action. Sharp's major contribution in this highly lauded book has been to generally delineate the sources of power in any one society and to provide a typology for the ways in which nonviolent action can successfully redirect that power in the favor of

claimsmakers. Sharp has also since then continued to write prolifically, major works of which will be noted in greater detail below.

Nonviolent studies continued to grow as a vibrantly interdisciplinary field that galvanized a valuable exchange among academics and practitioners. Leaders of major nonviolent movements came together to identify the generalist strands of their methods for a global movement in the 1977 *The Struggle for Humanity: Agents of Nonviolent Change in a Violent World*. If this volume leans slightly more toward the pragmatic side, another important volume of this era, Hare and Blumberg's *Liberation without Violence*, (1977), categorically addressed a range of types of third-party nonviolent interventions, and *Nonviolent Action and Social Change*, edited by Severyn T. Bruyn and Paula Rayman (1979) produced rigorous theorizing on nonviolence as a system of generalizable protest tactics with first-hand contemplative accounts of specific actions by leading activists and organizers from a global array of major movements.

These and many more efforts of activists wholly dedicated to spreading an awareness of and skills for practicing nonviolence helped to systematize this now global repertoire. With systematization came more formal modes of organization and ultimately the professionalization of a civil society network for the global spread of nonviolent protest.

3) Institutionalization

Zucker identifies two sociological features that define the process of institutionalization: 1) a rule-like, social fact quality of a pattern of behavior and, 2) an embeddedness in formal structures, such as formal aspects of organizations that are not

tied to particular actors or situations (1987: 444). There is no one particular point in time that explains the passage from nonviolence's global systematization into an institutionalized repertoire of protest; rather, a noticeable shift in these two aspects illustrate the process of the institutionalization of global nonviolence. First, nonviolence began to become the most legitimate form of claimsmaking and, second, the repertoire of nonviolence came to be a cultural repository for defining how protest is meaningful and which tactics are possible in an increasingly formalized way. The earlier period of systematization therefore provided elements that would become foundational to the repertoire's institutionalization, new types of characteristically nonviolent movements, organizational proliferation, the methodical development of tactics, and the scientization of nonviolence discourse. The institutionalization of global nonviolence is therefore evident in the continuation and deepening of these processes and in the formal organization of the meanings and practices associated with the repertoire.

Nonviolent Movements

The 1980s was a busy time for global social movements. Major changes were taking place in the global political climate and the world experienced a massive expansion of civil societies. The era of systematization proved fruitful in establishing a core set of models and relationships that compelled and organized new nonviolent movements in the 1980s. Like the shift from the first to the second waves, there was not a clear break in specific movements from the systematization to institutionalization eras. But movements that carried over into this institutionalization era had much more to gain from practicing nonviolence. In Latin America, for example, the establishment of

SERPAJ in 1974 and the work of its president, Argentinian 1980 Nobel Peace Prize winner Adolfo Perez Esquivel, brought great international attention to the nonviolent demonstrations of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo protesting torture and disappearances in Argentina. The Catholic Church's election of a Polish Pope in 1978 and his public support for the nonviolent actions of the Polish Solidarity movement in 1980 also led to a Nobel Prize for organizer Lech Walesa and later helped to provide the morale for the movement that would bring down the Soviet occupation of Poland in 1989. The South African movement against discrimination and eventually Apartheid experienced several waves and peaks that traversed decades of mobilization efforts.

Figure 5. The Historical Trajectory of Nonviolent Movements



Source: ProQuest Historical News

National movements of the 1980s and through the 1990s and 2000s precipitated a new, global wave of democracy, toppling the dictatorships of Latin America, bringing down the fall of the Eastern Bloc, challenging the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, testing the authoritarian regimes of Asia, and inserting peace efforts into war-torn regions of Africa. Figure 5 outlines how major nonviolent movements, that is, prominent movements that actively drew on a nonviolence repertoire to organize their

claimsmaking strategies and routines, developed from early systematization through two significant phases of institutionalization. This longitudinal view shows a steady increase in the late 1970s and another two-fold increase through the 1980s and early 1990s. In terms of the sheer number of active movements drawing on one global nonviolence repertoire, this institutionalization period experienced the greatest of national, nonviolent movement activity.

International Organizations

Also notable in this period is the rapid expansion of the international organizational dimension of nonviolence. The founding of formal nonviolence organizations mushroomed in the post-war period. In Gandhi's day, the early 1900s, there were hundreds of international NGOs, and many of them dedicated to peacemaking were outwardly supportive of Gandhi's methods of nonviolence. It was not until 1961, however, that the first explicitly "nonviolence" INGO was established, the World Peace Brigade. The World Peace Brigade was modeled on Gandhi's Shanti Sena Peace Army, a nationally organized group of formally trained "peace soldiers" that would intervene in outbreaks of violence and rioting by meeting with both sides of a conflict and offering to facilitate peaceful resolution (Shepard 1987). A meeting of international peacemakers in Delhi and later in Beirut led to the development of this world peace brigades that would implement nonviolence intervention across national borders. WPB helped to facilitate nonviolence efforts in Indian, Chinese, Turkish, and Cyprian conflicts and focused its greatest efforts in Zambia (then Rhodesia) before dissolving and being re-organized as Peace Brigades International.

Following World War II the population of nonviolence INGOs like PBI expanded into an extensive network of global repertoire specialists. Figure 6 illustrates the annual growth rate of nonviolence INGOs. Pacifist organizations later self-categorized as "nonviolence organizations" contributed to a steady stream of nonviolence INGO growth until the 1970s, when new organizations came into existence with the intent of globalizing nonviolence. Mirroring sharp increases in organizational foundings in the wider population of INGOs, nonviolence INGOs experienced significant population growth in the 1980s and 1990s and have continued to develop into the 2000s.

Figure 6. The Expansion of the Population of Nonviolent International INGOs



These organizations also became more varied in their objectives. Through the 1970s, nonviolence organizations generally focused on the promotion of the repertoire and programs, undergirded by a deep philosophical commitment to nonviolence, and worked to embed the philosophy into systematic programs of tactical education and training. In the 1980s there was a rapid expansion of organizations advocating nonviolence in the context of issue-specific campaigns and focusing on implementing nonviolence methods in particular conflicts. Organizations became professionalized

means of globally diffusing a tactical repertoire. In Chapter 6 I will expand my discussion of their impact in the global spread of nonviolence.

Global Discourse

The institutionalization of nonviolence discourse can be traced in two major ways. First, the development of books dedicated to theorizing and strategizing nonviolence has grown significantly. *The Global Books in Print* database catalogs over 3000 books on the topic of nonviolence from the early 1900s through 2010. As Figure 7 illustrates, there was a significant increase in publications on nonviolence toward the end of the systematization era and this rate more than quadrupled with the institutionalization of nonviolence, as I will discuss below.

Figure 7. Publication Record for Books on Nonviolence



Correspondingly, international news coverage deepened the global discursive attention to nonviolence's role in global political transformations. As Figure 8 shows, early news mentions of nonviolence were scarce, but attention to nonviolent discourse and events grew steadily with the popularization of Gandhi's independence movement in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s and then waned in the 1950s. The U.S. civil rights movement again

captured the international gaze in the 1960s when discursive attention to nonviolence nearly tripled, with special interest in the U.S. and India as King's articulation of a nonviolence repertoire was constantly compared to Gandhi (whom King frequently referenced). Since this time nonviolence has maintained a steady niche among political topics discussed in public news, including current events and the continual revisiting of great global leaders of the repertoire.

Figure 8. International News Articles Covering Nonviolent Events



Source: ProQuest Historical News

Post-Cold War Institutionalization

Figures 6, 7, and 8 show another significant trend following the fall of the Eastern Bloc, from 1989 through the early 1990s. That is, although Figure 5 points to this period as pivotal to the growing momentum of earlier independence movements (and historians consider this period the final phase of global decolonization), global attention to and discourse about nonviolence continued to grow after a slight decline in globally acclaimed nonviolent movements. Furthermore, nonviolence's status among global

political events began to change. As a historically civil society driven repertoire- aimed at transforming the state through mass resistance against the state- nonviolence became so legitimate a means of politicking in this post-Cold War period that even states and inter-state organizations began to promote the use of nonviolence as an ideal system for social change.

One important marker of this is the 1989 UN adoption of the Seville Statement on Violence. This statement was drafted at an international conference of scholars and scientists who opposed the assumption that violence is a natural or inevitable aspect of human conflict. They insisted that the scientific basis for this assumption was unfounded and encouraged the UN and other international bodies to work for peace as a fundamental responsibility of humankind (UN 1989). Other important international events sanctioned by the UN and other IGOs and NGOs aimed to enlist governmental endorsement and support for broadening civil society capacities to use nonviolence. Some of the more visible of these campaigns included the UN International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence, which came to a close in 2010. Between 2009 and 2010 there was a first ever cross-continental World March for Nonviolence. Beginning in 2011, World without Wars and Violence, the INGO established at the conclusion of the World March, publicized an international call to a World Forum for Peace and Nonviolence that has launched a series of worldwide events to promote nonviolence. In 2011, the INGO Global Food for Thought declared the time between Gandhi’s and King’s assassinations a “Global Season for Nonviolence”, celebrating their role as global moral leaders in the best way to political change. But these represent only a few examples of a steady stream of global conferences and events centered on international nonviolent organizing.

A final aspect of this organizational endorsement for nonviolence is the use of diplomatic pressure and economic and political sanctions to support the development of nonviolent social movements in other countries. Just as IGOs have supported nonviolence and nonviolent movements, so too have states supported nonviolent movements in other countries, even as that support proffers a direct challenge to the sovereignty of the ruling regime (and it often does). Diplomatic and economic tactics may be used by governments to shame and limit the power of rogue or ideologically opposed states without major nonviolent movements (the U.S.'s counter-communist stance in the Cold War exemplifying these efforts); but from the late 1980s through the 1990s and 2000s, intergovernmental efforts to support major nonviolent movements became more common. Schock (2005) lists two examples in particular in which international sanctioning pressure was successful: the Philippines and South Africa. Gene Sharp's famous *From Dictatorship to Democracy* manual lists seven international forms of diplomatic pressure that can support a nonviolent movement: 1) changes in diplomatic and other representation, 2) delay and cancellation of diplomatic events, 3) withholding of diplomatic representation, 4) severance of diplomatic relations, 5) withdrawal from international organizations, 6) refusal of membership in international bodies, and 7) expulsion from international organizations.[9] More recently, a number of states came out in direct support of the protest movements of the Arab Spring with public statements of support for resisters issued by heads of state in Australia, Botswana, Canada, Eritrea, France, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, Turkey, the

[9] This is not to suggest that these means always help the movements, however. In Sharon Nepstad's (2011) recent comparative analysis, she find that in some circumstances the way that sanctions are issued by outside governments can in fact hinder the chances for successful mobilization from within. My point here is to emphasize the legitimacy of nonviolence as a global repertoire in states' support for nonviolent movements aimed at regime change in other states- among a host of other issues.

United Kingdom, and the United States (Ruud 2011; Juppe 2011; Bryant 2011; Paxton 2011; McCully 2011; Peck 2011; Doward 2011; Poonawalla 2011).

Furthermore, there are many informal ways in which nonviolence has been celebrated, most noticeable in the global critical acclaim accorded to nonviolent leaders. Figures like Gandhi and King have undoubtedly gained international renown and continue to be celebrated by organizations, conferences, concerts, programs, literary works, plays, and movies and nonviolent activists are frequently pointing to the inspiration their lives and works have provided. The Gandhi movie is one of the most globally viewed films (Juergensmeyer 1984) and was released in 1982 just at the turn toward the institutionalization of the repertoire. Martin Luther King Jr.'s influence has been found recently in a series of comic books on his life circulated throughout the world of the Arab Spring (Vesely-Flad 2011). Activists from Otpor, the Serbian student organization that led the overthrow of Milosevic, have gained global renown as their symbols show up in protests the world over. And the growing world of peace studies curricula further enshrines the value of nonviolence as the ideal form of citizen-led social change (Harris, Fisk, and Rank 1998). As the data on nonviolence discourse shows, the global interest in nonviolence has skyrocketed most especially in this latter period of high institutionalization.

THE DYNAMICS OF NONVIOLENT CONTENTION

Given these trends in the development of the global nonviolence repertoire, there are a few descriptive predictions I would like to address before moving onto my discussion of causal forces in repertoire emergence. The first of these regards the

institutionalization of the repertoire. Both collective action theorists and world polity theorists predict the institutionalization of repertoires, insisting that practice begets more practice and more practice leads to the institutionalization of that particular model of practice. Collective action theorists stipulate that the more a repertoire is used the more it constrains elaborate innovation for the general form. And world polity theorists argue that as repertoires are celebrated as legitimate they will become more deliberate and systematized.

In my above outline of three phases of nonviolence's globalization, I have described how conceptualization folded into an intensive period of systematization which eventuated in the institutionalization of the repertoire sustaining the global nonviolence movement. This process has been impelled by both the persistence of the basic structure of the repertoire and in the organizational dimension of nonviolence diffusion. And significant throughout this process, the global nonviolent movement has continued to mobilize and expand mobilization under the banner of one, general concept of nonviolence. The three main forms of nonviolence outlined in my introduction: tactics of protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention remain the main categories around which only peripheral innovations in tactics are generated. And with the rise of a global network of authoritative international nonviolent organizations, the globalization of nonviolence has become more deliberately diffused and implemented and increasingly systematized.

Additionally, this historical outline helps to shed light on some strands of nonviolent studies theories about why movements adopt the repertoire. While the historical outline provides ample evidence of how moral leaders and pragmatic theorists

alike have shaped the repertoire's development, the systematization and institutionalization of the repertoire has also expanded its pragmatic theorization and appeal and the extensive and concerted networks aimed at repertoire diffusion have made nonviolence more accessible to more peoples in more places. I will consider the moralist explanation in greater depth in my discussion of world culture below as the two families of prediction are quite compatible and I will elaborate on organizational diffusion in the second part of my analysis.

Before moving on, I want to briefly address the nonviolent studies prediction about the proven effectiveness of nonviolence, although it is more difficult to provide in a study of what drives nonviolence's globalization. The theory's formulators have explored the strategic logic concept with macro-level analysis, and the strategic thinking of activists is ultimately a micro-level concept that requires a more micro-level study to rule out alternative hypotheses. Nevertheless, we can take another look at the development of major movements and their effectiveness to gain a macro-level view of the weight of this theory of strategic outcomes as it might apply to a study of repertoire development.

Chenoweth and Stephan's data (2011) on violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns, although collected and analyzed for an understanding of what makes campaigns successful, can provide a historical view of whether effectiveness has driven the globalization of the repertoire. Chenoweth and Stephan comparatively examined data on 100 nonviolent campaigns and 209 violent campaigns over the long twentieth century, drawn from a number of historical sources which they argue to represent the major political campaigns of this period. In Table 1 I have reorganized their data by successful and unsuccessful campaigns (excluding those they identify as partially successful) in the

different time periods in which major changes occurred in the global nonviolence repertoire according to the year of the campaign's completion. Of the nonviolent campaigns in the early conceptualization period, only four campaigns were successful, as opposed to seven successful violent campaigns. Then in the post-world war period of systematization, where the success of that period's movements may have shaped whether or not the repertoire continued to institutionalize, only nine nonviolent campaigns were successful as compared to twenty-six major violent resistance campaigns. What then explains the subsequent period of the institutionalization of nonviolence in the 1980s when seventeen nonviolent campaigns and only five violent campaigns were successful, or the following high institutionalization period when twenty-six nonviolent campaigns were successful as opposed to thirteen violent campaigns?

Table 1. The Development of Successful and Unsuccessful Violent and Nonviolent Campaigns through Three Waves of Global Nonviolence

	Successful Violent	**Successful Nonviolent**
Early Conceptualization Period, through 1944	7 (3%)	4 (4%)
Post-world war Systematization Period, 1945-1979	26 (12%)	9 (9%)
Early Institutionalization Period, 1980- 1989	5 (2%)	17 (17%)
High Institutionalization 1990-2000s	13 (6%)	26 (26%)

Source: Stephan and Chenoweth, 2011

Below I comparatively examine structural and cultural factors that explain the historical globalization of nonviolence and argue that without the deeply moral impetus to organize nonviolently there is little solid historical or functional evidence for the development and global institutionalization of the nonviolence repertoire.

Structural and Cultural Foundations of Nonviolence

By situating the historical outline of major paradigmatic changes in global nonviolence in relation to the broader historical events that have shaped and re-shaped the world polity, the causal force of structural and cultural changes come to light. In particular, nonviolence's globalization can be traced to three phenomenal global changes: 1) the structural expansion of the world political system, 2) the decentralization of political authority, and I will argue that underlying these changes, 3) some fundamental cultural foundations were formulated among crucial global communities. Below I consider how each of these dimensions has developed over the long twentieth century to drive the globalization of nonviolence.

Structural Expansion of the World State System

To test the first prediction of collective action theorists, that structural changes in the governance and economy of the polity opened new opportunities for a corresponding repertoire of claimsmaking to emerge, we must look at what structural changes occurred in the world polity that could have given rise to the development of global nonviolence.

The global political system expanded in two ways which are important in considering global collective action repertoire development.

First, global politics were transformed by the rapid state building that characterized the twentieth century. The industrial revolution gave new impetus for the expansion of power in the nineteenth century. Imperialism based on the plunder of exotic treasures transformed into a massive expansion in colonialism based on the search for new raw materials for industry and new markets for commerce. Between 1880 and 1914 Europe added over 81/2 million square miles or 1/5 of the land area of the globe to overseas colonial possessions (Barraclough 1982). And yet these expansions were marked by a serious fragility in governance where the resources to rule them all adequately were sorely lacking. Thus, as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth century, the age of imperialism began to wane and an era of revolution and nationalism emerged.

Although there was in place an international system of nations since the 17th century, the basic model for modern state-system as we know it crystallized through and beyond the 18th century (Tilly 1977). But the model spread most rapidly throughout the 19th and especially in the 20th century. Conflicts ensued within nations that shaped the reorganization of the nation-state. From 1808-1826 revolutions in Latin America brought independence to thirteen nations. In 1848 revolutions broke out across Europe, and although they were largely unsuccessful, they galvanized new widespread mobilization around a new form of nationalism. At the end of the 19th and into the early 20th centuries a first wave of independence movements gained momentum in challenging colonialism, bubbling up sentiments that soon swept throughout Africa and Asia. Then the conflicts

between nations in World Wars I and II left an indelible mark on how the model of national sovereignty would develop (Garraty and Gay 1972). At the end of World War II, there were 82 sovereign nations in the world. Forty years later, the world had undergone a massive expansion of the system of sovereign nations (largely in the form of decolonization), bringing the world population of states to 191 (UN 2012).

A phenomenal aspect of this process was how the inter-state system characteristically changed following World War II as the number of non-state actors that participated in international relations also grew prolifically. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) had been around for decades, but post-World War II was a period of rapid expansion in the number of IGOs that were founded and the breadth of issues they addressed. Figure 9 reports the cumulative growth of world states and the growth of intergovernmental organizations. Inter-state organizations, or inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) doubled in the first decade following World War II, tripled a decade later, and grew five times before the fall of the Eastern bloc. Where there were 40 IGOs

Figure 9. A Comparison of State and Intergovernmental Organizational Growth



in 1938 (Schofer and Meyer 2005), by 1951 there were 123 IGOs and this number doubled again by 1972 (Lechner and Boli 2006). Intergovernmental agreements in this period added a new dimension to externally re-enforce the sovereignty-of-the-nation-state model.

In addition to state expansion, global economic and social expansion also drastically changed the structure of the world polity. Where world trade was estimated at $700 million in 1700, it was estimated at $35,150 million in 1914 (Scholte 2005).It had experienced a nine-fold increase between 1820 and 1880 alone, generated by the industrial revolution (Curtin 1984). A Westernization of world commerce integrated the loosely knit economies of the world and ended the era when trade diasporas were dominant (Wallerstein 1980). Much of this expansion was made possible by new globalizing technologies. In the preceding century, world trade had increased manifold but the world market had been largely confined to port cities and surrounding areas. Following 1860 new innovations in shipping and the expansion of railroads aided the world market in penetrating new depths of world society. This, in turn, facilitated greater and more rapid forms of world communication and the increased travel of people and ideas (Garraty and Gay 1972).

By the end of the First World War global trade was 16 – 17% of world income (Held et al 1999). By 1970, exports alone rose to 78% of world income and the ratio continued to decrease into the 1990s (WTO 2012). The number of export processing zones grew from 0 in 1950 to 3000 in 2002; the world stock of foreign direct investment funds grew from $66 billion in 1950 to $7,100 billion in 2002, and international trade grew from 629 billion in 1960 to 7,430 billion in 2001. Additional important indicators of

the rapidly expanded travel of people and information across borders are: the growth of the number of radio sets from 57 million in the mid-1930s to 2400 million in 1997; from 75 million television receivers in 1956 to 1400 million in 1997; and an increase in international air travelers from 25 million in 1950 to 400 million in 1996 (Scholte 2005:117).

Such expansion in the model of states and activity among them may have helped to bring the institutionalization of one mode for organizing politics, one model of a polity around which social life would be governed- were that model to functionally correspond to structure of the world state system. And indeed, nonviolence became one motor through which the state-system expanded in the twentieth century. Major movements that embraced nonviolence from its early conceptualization phase into its latter institutionalization phases were movements impelled by new visions of state-making. 80 states were created following World War II, over 25% of them were precipitated – to varying degrees- by major nonviolent movements.

But, structure alone is insufficient to explain the emergence of global nonviolence. Nonviolence, a repertoire predicated on the right of individuals to wage and resolve conflicts peacefully, the entitlement of citizens to redress grievances to their governments, and the expectation of governments to accommodate the claims of a critical mass of mobilized citizens, has no clear functional relationship to the development of the modern state-system. Those elements considered causal to the emergence of a national repertoire, such as the nature of authority, cohesion among powermakers, and the openness of the political system, have not proven favorable to the emergence of global nonviolence when weighed as structural features alone.

Rather, the nature of global authority in the twentieth century has been highly fragmented. That is, there is no one world state governing the states that comprise the state-system. And although the modern state has become the only legitimate form of national governance, states vary in type from participatory democracies to communist states, to autocracies. Relations among elites have been highly conflictual (and have led to massive violent conflicts) not only in the world wars but throughout the Cold War (in which the expansion of global nonviolence was prolific) and has taken on new forms in the conflicts around alliances in the Middle East and Northern Africa. The United Nations Security Council has extended veto power to five permanent members who often split in opposition against each other. And the openness of change in the political system has been highly limited. At least there has been no successful attempt to construct an effective structural alternative to the state system as we know it (the barriers to the real jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court present just one blaring example of these state to state conflicts).

Furthermore, there is just as much structural impetus for the elaboration of a violent repertoire of claimsmaking in the dynamics of the world polity. The decolonization of dozens of new sovereign states was also accompanied by high levels of internal violence. The international community, rushing in to prop up new fledgling states, left impoverished, weak nations to fight out conflicts within artificially imposed boundaries. International intervention and military aid oftentimes exasperated local weaknesses and tensions. From 1945 to 1997 there was an estimated 165% increase in the incidence of violent civil wars (Hironaka 2005). Regional security interests were still realized through military power and lacked effective conflict-resolution strategies,

marking the latter twentieth century as the "age of global conflict" (Held et al. 1999). A good number of nationalist movements also mobilized through violence (Dandeker 1998; Rupesinghe and Rubio 1994: Stephan and Chenoweth 1998) and as I have mentioned above, violence was the more popular choice for mobilization throughout the systematization era.

The expansion of resources is considered one of the most critical pre-conditions to the organization of social movements on a grand scale (Jenkins and Eckert 1986). But it does not tell us anything about the form- or particularities of the claimsmaking repertoire- of those movements. Rapid economic integration has also been accompanied by drastic increases in global poverty. In this sense there is much room for globally derived incentives toward aggression and more importantly, no clear relationship in the global expansion of resources and the empowerment of civil societies to innovate nonviolent forms of claimsmaking. Since 1980, the world's poorest regions' share of global trade has declined by more than 40% (WTO 2012). Within those countries that have experienced the most rapid liberalization, internal inequality has increased 20- 30% (WTO 2012). The increasing interpenetration of the global economy has led to new forms of suffering, like the modern slavery epidemic (Bales 1999). With new types of political conflicts within states and a deepening of global inequality, the Cold War era experienced an intensification of guerilla warfare in some regions of the world.

Advancements in global technology and commerce have fueled the distribution of arms and other violent weaponry into the hands of insurgents the world over (Louise 1995). Twentieth century technology developed for warfare has been unique in that it promotes new, totalizing forms of destruction- involving whole societies in its production

and in producing weaponry that targets greater portions of populations, such as war planes, nuclear bombs, and poison gas (Edgarton 2007). Because of the scale of violence that has resulted from new technologies, the period from 1910- 1970 has been known as history's "great trail of violence" (Gerlach 2010).

Structural arguments about political opportunities and resources at the global level are therefore insufficient to explain the emergence of the global repertoire of nonviolence. Certainly there is cause for including structural changes in the story of how nonviolence was able to spread more rapidly in the post-world war period. But disentangling global "structure" from global culture becomes difficult, and as we unpack the expansion of the state and inter-state system it becomes necessary to discuss how these changes also transformed the workings of global political authority.

Decentralization of Political Authority

The expansion of IGOs is one prominent example of how political authority has diffused in world society. With the foundation of the United Nations as a proto-global governance organization in 1945, the global body of corollary international organizations transformed the "governance" of a host of global political concerns, from regional development and inter-state agreements to multi-lateral political arrangements. The alliance that constituted the United Nations institutionalized a new polycentrism, because, although the United Nations is officially comprised of states as members only (with a few proto-state exceptions), other governmental and nongovernmental quickly became involved in UN affairs and came to comprise a vital dimension of the IO-network. This

great ushering of new, non-state actors into the world polity has expanded the arena of authority in which policies are formulated and developed.

> Whereas statism concentrates the construction and application of social rules in centralized national territorial governments, polycentrism disperses regulation across multiple substate, state, suprastate and private sites, as well as dense networks that interlink these many points of governance (Scholte 2005: 141).

Of great importance to the global emergence of nonviolence, the number of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) also rose sharply during this period. There were about 374 known INGOs in 1909 and by 1960 there were 1987 "conventional" INGOs (Lechner and Boli 2006). This expansion has been pivotal for global nonviolence because these new, non-state international organizations have been an active force in developing, monitoring and challenging states' policies. The foundings of IGOs are highly correlated with those of INGOs and many IGOs were founded as INGOs and then co-opted by states (Boli and Thomas 1999). Because they work together with the states that are party to the global treaties they help to develop, international organizations have increasingly acted as a crucial conduit through which global rules are channeled.

These organizations have also become increasingly specialized and thus increasingly diverse over time. The development of nonviolent INGOs has therefore mirrored the trajectory of INGOs dedicated explicitly to spreading human rights (as depicted in Figure 7). The nonviolent INGO population is tightly networked with the human rights INGO population (and may in fact be considered a subset of those HRINGOs). Their Union of International Associations *Yearbook of International Organizations* entries list thousands of direct organizational relationships with other

human rights INGOs and likewise, thousands of human rights INGOs list support for major nonviolent INGOs. One prominent example of this network expansion is the recently developed Nonviolent Peaceforce, which places volunteers directly into conflict zones to act as witnesses, deterrers, and mediators of violent conflict. Nonviolent Peaceforce was founded at a meeting of over 200 INGOs and NGOs and is governed by a council of over 65 different organizations that provide guidance and support. Nonviolent Peaceforce is one of many prominent nonviolence INGOs that have consultative status at the United Nations (the number of general IOs that have such status has climbed from 250 in 1950 to over 3000, Lechner 2009).

Figure 10. Growth in the Development of Nonviolent and Human Rights INGOs



The decentralization of political authority is significant to the globalization of nonviolence because decentralization has shaped the way the repertoire has developed. INGOs act as formal representatives for a global movement to spread nonviolence and they provide resources to and advocate on behalf of smaller nonviolent movements throughout the world. In addition to holding consultative status at the UN, nonviolence organizations frequently act as mediators between claimsmakers and their targets, states or other actors (cf. Sharp 2008). The organizational dimension of international civil

society also expands the ways in which international “others”, outside non-state authorities, may support and spread the repertoire. News archives reveal how the International Fellowship for Reconciliation has historically sent delegates throughout the world to share news of nonviolent efforts in other countries and among INGOs, IFOR is well-known for sending trainers to major conflict areas. Jean and Hildegrad Goss-Mayr, long-time international IFOR delegates are critically acclaimed for helping to start a transnational nonviolence organization in Latin America, Servicio para Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ), that was successful in garnering international attention to the Argentinian Dirty War and in the Nobel Peace nomination and award given to Argentine Adolfo Perez Esquival (Deats 2009). And this is just one example of thousands of similar nonviolent support efforts among INGO networks. Research and advocacy organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are actively and entirely focused on drawing international attention- and shame- to the repression of nonviolent activists and help to applaud their peaceful tactics.

Participants in the global nonviolence movement can also enlist in short “delegations” hosted by INGOs like Christian Peacemaker Teams or Witness for Peace that tour areas in far off places where nonviolent movements are actively mobilizing. And with the hyper-connectivity of the internet, activists can learn about, remain conscious of, and help to contribute to nonviolent movements through online nonviolent news and movement listservs. All of these activities occur in an international political dimension that states and other targets feel compelled to respond to. Nonviolent INGOs and the general population of human rights and other NGOs have helped to expand the constituency of players in world society.

That stated, the specific decentralized form of authority in the world polity is still insufficient for explaining the emergence of a global nonviolence movement and repertoire. The same types of decentralized networks are activated by perpetrators of violence and terrorism. The UIA lists a number of INGOs that claim they are making global peace through terrorist methods. The list of IGOs dedicated to controlling arms and arms treaties is extensive. And international agreements have generated a number of new ways in which non-state actors have come to regulate the use of military intervention and violent conflict across borders (Devetak and Hughes 2008). What remains to be scrutinized in the development of global nonviolence, therefore, is, why nonviolence? What underlines the legitimation of a nonviolent repertoire as a superior form of claimsmaking, and what compels official and civil society actors alike to work toward institutionalizing formal spaces for building nonviolent movements?

World Culture and the Sacred Collective

In world society theory, globally formulated cultural foundations have come to form an essential component of the structure of the world polity. This is because world society, as any other society, has its own moral order of sacred beliefs and practices, right and legitimate action. I also find the global nonviolence repertoire's emergence and development can be traced to the moral underpinnings of state and inter-state relations and formal and informal civil society structures that have developed over the 19th and 20th centuries in a number of ways.

First, the development of the modern state system is historically unique. Whereas military competition drove state expansion in earlier European history (Tilly 1975;

Skocpol 1979), state expansion in the long twentieth century was most rapid in areas of the world where militaries were non-existent or very weak and dependent on former colonial direction. As former colonies gained independence, indigenous movements for statehood sprang up throughout the colonial world.[10] The global delegitimation of colonialism- although multidimensional[11]- is marked by a six-fold increase in the rate of decolonization following the 1960 signing of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Strang 1990). Underlying these phenomenal changes were fundamental ideas about how best to organize national (and global) society.

The theme of "progress" advanced through the UN Decade for Decolonization and the turn towards sovereignty-building was enshrined in UN doctrine and this theme explicitly theorized the extension of power to the governed. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights began to outline the importance for participatory citizenship among modern states:

> 1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
> 2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public services in his country.
> 3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Later, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples similarly declared that,

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[10] This is not to say that military or economic power is not correlated to some degree with these widespread structural changes. As Strang points out (1990), a decline in the stature of colonial militaries and a global economic interpenetration that evaporated competition over peripheral markets is part of the story of decolonization.

[11] Scholars generally identify at least three different types of major forces driving decolonization through nationalism, international pressures, and domestic incentives (Springhall 2001).

2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.

And Article 73 of Chapter 10 of the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories, advised that UN members should agree to instill human rights and modernizing institutions in decolonizing territories which would extend power to citizens for their self-determination,

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned**,** ***their political, economic, social, and educational advancement***, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

c. to further international peace and security;

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, ***and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article***; and

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, ***statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories*** for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply. (italics added)

These official documents instructing on best state ideas about and practices for state structuration reveal an important cultural, institutional dimension that has driven an

opening for the nonviolence repertoire. To articulate and legitimate the right for citizens to mobilize and redress grievances provides a cultural precedent for them to do so *without using physical force and violence*. By urging states to cooperate with their citizens and to explicitly expand their free political spaces, international doctrines on state-making greatly limit the legitimate arenas in which the use of force against a mobilized citizen-body would be acceptable as these doctrines also open the arena in which a nonviolent repertoire founded on collective rights and cooperative conflict resolution would be legitimate.

In this manner, the trajectory of state expansion and decentralization of authority in a global polity follows from a cultural articulation of 1) how movements are to envision their national sovereignty, 2) how states are to respect and make political spaces for participatory sovereignty, 3) how states are to cooperate with international authorities in developing new nations, and 4) the types of structures that new sovereign nations should contain for their own advancement founded on participatory citizenship. By working through these formal authoritative channels for international rule-making, nonviolent NGOs also help to formalize the link between IOs and citizen movements.

This global envisioning process has not entirely cancelled the use of violent force as a legitimate option among authoritative international bodies like the United Nations; but the UN places nonviolent political and social transformation above violent resolution of conflicts in a hierarchy of moral preferences. And the use of violent force can then only be implemented when the goal of achieving a nonviolent outcome drives its adoption. In the same Ban Ki Moon speech inaugurating the International Nonviolence Day that I quoted in my introduction, Moon (2007) explains,

> Our Charter clearly champions a non-violent approach whenever possible. Article 33 explicitly calls on parties to "first of all" seek a solution by peaceful means. When necessary, the Security Council may use coercive measures. We saw this most recently in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya, where United Nations-authorized operations helped restore stability. The Council authorizes the use of force to protect civilians from violence — and then only as a last resort.

He then goes on to discuss how the UN's political programs help to establish institutional channels for the nonviolent resolution of conflicts and how the UN's social programs help to prevent the use of violence to resolve conflicts that arise from conflicts over resources.

> Preventive diplomacy is one way the United Nations acts on its commitment to non-violence. We are engaging early on, before tensions escalate into conflict. We are training mediators. We are strengthening our strategic partnerships so we can respond more quickly to crises. And we are supporting national institutions that promote dialogue and provide peaceful channels for the resolution of disputes. The United Nations Department of Political Affairs Mediation Support Unit, the United Nations Development Programme Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, and the United Nations Regional Centres in Central Asia and Africa are other important parts of the picture. As I emphasized in my recent report to the Security Council, preventive diplomacy is not an option, it is a necessity. Our peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in hotspots around the world are calming tensions and fostering peace.
>
> In addition to these direct approaches, the United Nations continues its day-to-day work to address the many silent emergencies that create instability. We continue to work for the Millennium Development Goals, our blueprint for overcoming disease, poverty and hunger. We are advancing gender equality and human rights. We are helping to establish the rule of law and to fight impunity. We are striving to create conditions where people can enjoy peace, embrace peace and pass on the value of peace to their children.

These ideas have permeated other aspects of nation-building because this specific model for advancement and statehood is articulated as complete with proprietary educational and political institutions. These de facto Western institutions are assumed to

engage in a general global project of progress, and it is suggested that, to this end, they co-operate with other international bodies and regularly report to the UN Secretary General as the above citation indicates. Prior to the onset of decolonization, other colonial institutions had begun to set in place a predilection towards bolstering a national identity. Discourse on the relationship between colonizers and colonized communicated a sense of civilizing duties, alongside discussion of preserving economic investments. These sentiments translated into the policy of Western institution building, foremost among them educational institutions, which would instill in indigenous peoples a higher form of civilization, paving for them a "high road back to Europe" (Chamberlain 1999: 6). This high road was to be constructed out of parliamentary politics and federalism and the people were to adopt the culture of the European colonizers. Even the peripheral former colonies came to be shaped by a Western cultural identity through their national language systems and by constructing Western-style state institutions (Anderson 2006), in addition to educational systems (Benavot and Riddle 1998), defense systems (Eyre 1997) and scientific and technological ministries (Jang 2003).

The internal state structuration of these ideals of best citizenship is further evidenced in states' constitutions. In an in-depth global study of countries' constitutions from 1870-1970, Boli (1987) found that state authority can be categorized into three areas of social life: citizens' duties to the state, state's duties to citizens, and citizens' rights. Following the Second World War, the constitutional specification of state authority nearly doubled and citizens' rights also doubled, but the claims citizens can make of states nearly tripled. This expanding inclusion of citizens challenges how we think of structural changes in the polity because here we see they are rooted in cultural

articulations of best nation-state structure and I argue that these culture-structures have opened up new ways for conceptualizing a nonviolent claimsmaking repertoire among citizens' movements. Just as Tilly pointed to the inclusion of the Commons in Parliament (1993) as expanding opportunities for nationally organized repertoires to develop, this general global model of statehood embraces the individual citizen as an equal collaborator in the organization of political life, globally expanding the jurisdiction by which individuals may make claims against a general target, the state. To this end, these constitutions also increasingly included articles extending as citizen's rights the right to peaceably assemble, free speech, due process, and voting, among a host of other civil, political and social and economic rights (Boli 1987: 139).

These formal cultural-political openings have positively corresponded to the global expansion of civil society. The work of the United Nations and other international bodies opened the receptiveness of states to nonviolence as a mode (and threatening possibility) of extending power to the people. And one important cultural connection between the formal organizational structure of world society and the broad network of often informally organized civil society movements is the ideal of human rights. In an earlier era, the Enlightenment ideal of natural rights as articulated by the philosophes included things like: equality, freedom of speech and press, and rights to assemble (although they also believed that people needed an enlightened ruler to implement these rights, Duiker and Spielvogel 2005). In the early twentieth century the ideology of human rights came to increasingly permeate new global political units, from IGOs and INGOs to states, and in turn shaped how citizenship has been conceived and organized among non-state claimants. A copious number of human rights documents were drafted from the late

18th through the late 19th centuries. From 1863 to 1939, 113 human rights declarations were drafted. Then from 1940 to 2003, 666 treaties were drafted (Elliott 2009). In the periods of greatest global political activity among IGO-INGO networks, international bodies cumulatively conceived of a plethora of different, new rights to which individual citizens, collectivities, and nations should be entitled. In 1949 alone, 117 different rights were declared in international affirmations. In 1989 131 new rights were declared and in 1990 246 rights were declared. Between the 1940s and 1990s over 1100 human rights were declared (ibid). This phenomenal rights proliferation process was enveloped in a grander move towards legalization of rights, helping to institutionalize on a global level the idea that human rights should be implemented through state policy and claimsmaking should incorporate methods for legally institutionalizing new claims, (although targets would eventually come to include other international authorities that helped to formulate and "govern" such claims).

Much of the work of nonviolence INGOs aims toward realizing human rights *through the realization of nonviolent resistance*. Third party interventionists in particular claim strict political impartiality on the grounds that they act only as witnesses to deter breeches of the conduct outlined in international law and allow human rights activists to carry on their work. The founding statement of Peace Brigades International reads, for example,

> We appeal in particular to…all those who seek to fulfill the high principles and purposes expressed in the Charter of the United Nations and all who work to preserve human life with dignity, promote human rights, social justice, and self-determination, and to create the conditions of peace.

And the global nonviolence repertoire has ridden into the world stage on a long, historical wave of international peacemaking efforts. Following the Treaty of Vienna in

1814, peace societies sprang up all over Europe and some parts of Asia in the mid-1800s and the first series of world peace conferences were held between 1843 and 1853 (Boulding 2000). Organizations developed in the 1860s that worked toward an international peace movement became very active by the 1870s and 1880s (Beales 1931). The Quakers have also had long-established "Friends" communities that have worked for peace since the 1860s in India, Madagascar, West China, Ceylon, and Syria (Friends Service Council 1947) and these early networks would later become active conduits for the international diffusion of nonviolence (Scalmer 2011).

Prior to the world wars there were already hundreds of "peace societies" throughout Europe, smaller communities dedicated to the idea that citizens should be directly involved in influencing international affairs and a principle objective of these affairs should be the cessation of violent conflict (Cortright 2008). Such communities had an influence on the early development of the Nobel Peace Prize, to point to a very visible example. Alfred Nobel (inspired by Bertha von Suttner's *Down with Arms*) notes in his will, "one part to the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses" establishing the now canonizing Nobel Peace Prize (of which Suttner was the first recipient). The Peace Prize, which is one of the most critically acclaimed venues through which global moral leaders are celebrated, has in turn celebrated nonviolence with such prominent nonviolence movements leaders as the International Peace Bureau, the American Friends Service, Jane Addams, Martin Luther King Jr., Adolfo Perez Esquival, Aung San Suu Kyi, Wangaari Muta Maatthai, and Liu Xiabao, among many others who have endorsed nonviolence as a superior form of

claimsmaking in a number of global conflicts. Based on the Nobel model there now exist dozens of international peace prizes that celebrate the works of nonviolent activists.

Because the Gandhian conceptualization of nonviolence was founded on the refusal to do harm in times of conflict and the affirmation of working toward peace, the nonviolence movement has historically enveloped much of the momentum of early international peace efforts. And the flowering of a population of nonviolence INGOs in this post-World War II era stemmed in part from the legacy of early pacifist and other peace INGOs. By the 1940s, international organizations that had long used tactics Gandhi drew on in his formulation of nonviolence began to more explicitly adopt his term to describe their methods (Boulding 2000). The International Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the War Resisters League and others moved from thinking about pacifism and other discrete direct action tactics to thinking about a new category of active resistance as belonging to a family of nonviolence. And the establishment of the United Nations facilitated new networks that were able to support the role of non-state actors in peacemaking on an international scale and the international application of their methods (Boulding 2000). Boulding (ibid) lists several important IGOs and INGOs founded in this period that acted as global civil society mediators of international conflict resolution, among them the International Liaison Committee for the Organization of Peace (in 1946) and the World Peace Council (in 1949).

Through a series of early efforts to place international volunteers in zones of conflict throughout the world, these INGOs began to grow an international network that spread knowledge of and skills for nonviolence and, as interested outsiders investing in

the repertoire's diffusion, they also helped to legitimate the use of nonviolence as a desirable and effective means of claimsmaking. Examples from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s include Peaceworker volunteers sent to Africa, Asia, and North and South America, Peace Service Units throughout Europe, IFOR's Project Eirene in North and Central America, Europe, and Africa, the Sahara Protest Team in Algeria, and World Peace Brigade efforts in Zambia, Rhodesia, and Tanzania, the San Francisco to Moscow walk, the Delhi to Peking Friendship March, the Quebec to Washington to Guantanamo walk, the Nagaland Peace Mission in East India, and later the Cyprus Resettlement Project (Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber 2000). International Conferences have also helped to raise awareness of the global prospects for nonviolence. And in his history of the founding of Peace Brigades International, Walker points to earlier conferences in 1961 in India and in 1962 in Addis Ababa and three important conferences in Costa Rica in 1971, in Driebergen in 1972, and in India on the 25th anniversary of Gandhi's death in 1973. Then in 1977 there was an International Seminar on Training for Nonviolent Action in Mexico, all of these efforts pivotal in moving the global nonviolence movement into a supra-network of peacemakers.

As nonviolent organizations expanded in number and programs in the 1980s, 1990s, and into the 2000s, they have played direct and often visible roles in mediating and facilitating the growth of nonviolence in major political conflicts. PBI, Witness for Peace and others were active in monitoring abuses against civil society in Central America in the 1980s. Global consultants of nonviolent civil resistance tactics have held numerous training sessions with activists in Palestine, in the Philippines, in the Burmese democracy movement, and in the civilian led ousting of Milosevic. Today, nonviolent

INGOs maintain extensive formal and informal ties throughout the Arab democracy movement, African civil rights and anti-violence movements, human rights initiatives in Latin America, and anti-authoritarian efforts in Asia. Nonviolence has become a global movement with internationally extensive and established professional networks of conferences and tactical manuals, annual conferences, seminars, and trainings.

It is therefore essential to note that underlying the shared value in human rights as progress, the broad network of support tied to the global repertoire of nonviolence follows a global morality that honors the sacrality of the collective. That is, nonviolent collective action extends the range of rights entitlements to the whole of humanity, which impels global activists to dedicate their lives to working against the suffering of others in distant parts of the world, as they also extend human rights to perpetrators and victims alike, viewing the personhood violated by violence is a general infraction against the sacred collective.

In a reflective essay on the relationship between nonviolence and human rights, the author begins to define the fundamental framework shared by these two ideals by quoting King's statement on the goal of nonviolent resistance as community building.

> Nonviolence . . . does not seek to defeat or humiliate the opponent, but to win his friendship and understanding . . . The end is redemption and reconciliation. The aftermath of nonviolence is the creation of the beloved community . . . . The nonviolent attack is directed against forces of evil rather than against persons. . . . Nonviolent resistance is a willingness to accept suffering without retaliation.

The article's author goes on explain that because we are enmeshed in an interdependent society in which "almost everyone (even those most deprived) does benefit from abuses of the rights of others" we are morally obligated to realize human rights through the giving of our own talents and skills to the benefit of others. "Try to give to others more

than you receive — in any of the infinite number of ways persons can help others" (Morton: 1998: 25). In the same vein, another author for a magazine of "Living Nonviolence" reiterates the theme of "restoring community" central to the sacred core of nonviolent collective action. "Mercy, in this context, means that the goal of justice is the restoration of the community. The aim of justice is the healing of the community; restoring the community to health. Restorative justice is another name for mercy" (Living Nonviolence 2012).

This theme of the sacred collective runs throughout tactical manuals that emphasize the building of the sacred collective as vital to mobilization. In one central resource, War Resisters International's edited volume on social defence (1991), the author notes "social defence implies a degree of unity, or consensus, on the part of the civilian population." The goal of social defence is not merely the preservation of any one individual's threatened rights, but "organising means building community". Another tactical resource guide author notes nonviolence as building mutuality, expanding equality and diffusing freedom.

> To me it is self-evident that if freedom is to be shared by all- even physically the weakest, the lame, and the halt- they must be able to contribute an equal share in its defense. How that can be possible when reliance is placed on armaments, my plebian mind fails to understand. I therefore swear and shall continue to swear by non-violence, i.e., by satyagraha or soul force. In its physical incapacity is no handicap, and even a frail woman or child can pit herself or himself on equal terms against a giant armed with the most powerful weapons.

And in Witness for Peace's 10-year reflection, the author notes that one of the greatest successes of global nonviolence is "the deeper we go, the more connected we become"; he explains that this is not just in the short-term delegations that have traveled together, or in the connections to the Central Americans that delegations have worked with, but in

the connections between global political problems and the broader nonviolence movement.

Evidence of the sacred collective that compels the nonviolence repertoire also runs throughout assessments and case histories of the work of global activists in supporting local movements, illustrated here in the International Fellowship for Reconciliation's narrative of its role in the Philippines democracy movement. The author opens the discussion by asking about the impetus for sacrificing oneself in service of the sacred collective,

> How can one kneel and stare down rumbling tanks and hundreds of soldiers trained for military battle, especially when all one has is supplies of food to offer, words for conversion, faith and hope in their common humanity, and prayer to the possible source of that humanity and power?

And she goes on to explain how the Filipino concept of nonviolence, "alay dangal", means "to offer dignity" which is realized through collective action and interests.

> They [IFOR, the Catholic Church and other mobilizing civil society organizations] taught that human dignity was an unalterable, inextinguishable, and equivalent value given (i.e. inherent) to each human. Regardless of what we have, such as money, power, intelligence, looks, etc., or what we do, such as generosity, justice, murder, sin, etc., human dignity remains unaltered, inextinguishable, and equal for each human. We are encouraged and perhaps drawn by gratitude to both illuminate and live in accord with this gift of dignity in all people by our choices

She finishes this thought by underlining the universalizing notions of nonviolence as a collectivizing force, across the lines of conflict as well as national and cultural borders.

> Yet, the people of the Philippines were largely experiencing economic and political oppression, which ignored their dignity and left the oppressors living in discord with their own dignity. Thus, from the perspective of *alay dangal*, 'to offer dignity,' both groups were suffering and as a community were in need of restoring their sense of human dignity. The power of nonviolence activates this restorative and liberating process.

This universal notion of the sacred collective is therefore rooted in the common moral order that informs the alliteration of human rights among governmental and intergovernmental bodies like the states that vocally supported nonviolent movements in the Arab Spring or the UN speech quoted earlier that articulated global progress through collective action.

GLOBAL FOUNDATIONS OF NONVIOLENCE

Collective actions studies have outlined some fundamental factors which have caused changes in tactical forms of claimsmaking and how general tactical repertoires develop. The Tillian school of repertoire studies asserts that the way in which a polity organizes itself comes to bear on how claimsmakers organize their interests, on the specific form of their tactics, and the actual tactics they adopt to make claims. These scholars also note that once major structural changes in the polity set in, so too do tactical forms institutionalize. But this school of thought uses comparative analysis to highlight the distinctions in tactical repertoires across different polities. While they implicitly acknowledge some major societal similarities among polities, (structural changes brought on by industrialization and capitalism), they have yet to theorize how common forms of politics have emerged on a trans-national scale despite conflicts and the decentralization of authority. No one has yet explained the emergence of global tactical movements, the development of networks aimed at globalizing tactics conceptualized as universally applicable, effective, and meaningful, such as nonviolence.

In extrapolating from the predictions offered by nationally-oriented collective action theory to the global level of analysis, the structural features of a world polity do provide an important set of opportunities for a general global repertoire to emerge. As the

world has become more connected through economic expansion and integration, technological development and diffusion, and in the development of one common state-system and a corollary network of authoritative non-state actors, the development and diffusion of a global family of claimsmaking tactics is more likely. But, the twentieth century changes in the form of the world polity alone cannot verify a purely structural-opportunity thesis. Rather, violence has also become more facile and possible on grander scales than ever before.

World society theories' predictions about the deeply cultural, ontological foundations of modern, world society help to fill in the story of why nonviolence became a globally legitimate repertoire that has experienced greater systematization and institutionalization in the long twentieth century. At the core of what impels states, other global institutions, and global civil society actors to create a space for and a repertoire of nonviolence is a common moral framework centered on the sacred collective realized through the formulation of and formal efforts to implement human rights from "above" and "below". That is, the ideals of progress and human rights are bundled in a broader sacred moral order which extends to the celebration of the collective, a collective whose bonds are honored and strengthened through nonviolence. This analysis also therefore affirms the moralist thrust of nonviolent studies that argue for the moral foundations of repertoire expansion, adoption, and implementation. From a macro-perspective, these moral foundations are seen in the sacrality assigned to rights and citizenship, and the universal respect for personhood that underlines the openings in opportunities for nonviolence and in the formulation and construction of the repertoire by global activists.

As an early biographer of Gandhi once noted, the historical time in which nonviolence emerged is rooted in the right mix of opportunity and culture.

> Such passive resistance methods would not have been successful in the days of Attila the Hun or even of Jaime the Spanish conquistador, who only 700 years ago burned his Majorcan heathen captives in Christian oil. The effectiveness of these methods of the Indian passive resisters today depends upon enlightened public opinion, upon the verdict of a modern world which labels wholesale slaughter of unarmed men as belonging to the days of barbarism, rather than to 1932. Moreover, a new international will to peace had been born from the womb of World War I… Fifty years ago such a passive resistance movement would not have created a stir. A year before the world war it would probably not have succeeded… Gandhi took this will to peace and shaped it into a practical political weapon (Fisher 1932).

Figure 11 depicts what I have developed as a globalized framework for repertoire emergence. This global framework incorporates the underlying factors outlined by collective action theorists, broad structural changes in the polity and its accompanying economy, specifying that they are articulated at a global level and in relation to a decentralized world polity underlined by a cultural, institutional dimension of world society based on human rights and collective action. This world culture has shaped the polity transformations that have favored a nonviolence repertoire as well as the development of the organizational dimension of global civil society. And it recognizes that the process involves both governance structures and informal civil society networks shaped by a sacred moral order for a universal collective that informs and impels collective action nonviolently, so as to honor the participation of all individuals in that global humanity. It expands on the national collective action model by including global non-state actors and civil societies and explaining the fundamental role played by world culture. It links the emergence of a global repertoire to structural changes that have

conceptualized nonviolence as an ideal realization of human rights, progress, and the healing of conflicts in the global community.

Figure 11. A World Cultural Model of Global Repertoire Development



When thinking about how a global repertoire of collective action develops, the political opportunities and expansion of resources which are tied to its development are found in a characteristically different way than in state-centered studies. At least in the world polity, authority is diffused through a decentralized state-system. And a common, globally-developed set of ideal values underlines how states are organized and the global identities they construct. While certainly brutality still exists among autocratic regimes, it is noteworthy how states respond to these incidences when explaining them among global publics; the insistence that the Syrian uprising is not nonviolent, for example, seems to better justify its repression. This may not answer, to the dissatisfaction of some scholar-activists, questions about why violence endures. And the explanation of how perpetrators cover their actions by trying to manipulate the ideology of the sacred collective in their favor may even offend one's theoretical sensibilities about the value of this theory to practical application. But from a social movements perspective, articulating the role of culture has helped to revitalize and deepen our understanding of how mobilization works.

Therefore I argue here that a global "moral economy" (to use Traugott's phrase from his analysis of French claimsmaking repertoires) drives the articulation of how we globally understand and address conflicts, not just in the local articulation of claims but also in the global formulation of structures toward which claims are directed. Furthermore, in a global analysis of repertoire emergence, I wish to underscore the importance of rational diffusion such as that which nonviolent INGOs coordinate and participate in. To say "repertoires emerge" globally necessitates a careful examination of the ties that bind us in repertoire development, the topic of which I now turn to in greater detail.

Part II:
The Role of INGOs in Globalizing Nonviolence

4
STUDIES OF SMOs, INGOs, AND NONVIOLENCE

Having established that the organizational dimension of global civil society has provided a crucial conduit for the globalization of nonviolence, I now take a closer look at the role nonviolent INGOs play in global repertoire expansion. I provide a broad, descriptive analysis of the contours of this specialized population and I assess their impact on shaping the adoption and implementation of nonviolence. I consider their effect on movement emergence as well as their influence in constructing and redirecting political opportunities and resources for transnational mobilization.

In addressing my two distinct research questions in two parts, I will first provide another brief literature review that illuminates my inquiry into how organizations shape the rationalization of the nonviolence repertoire. Here I consider world society and nonviolent studies once again, but I address specifically how these bodies of study have approached the organizational dynamics of mobilization and social change. I also bring in insights from the social movements literature on social movement organizations, as nonviolent INGOs act as tactical leaders in this regard and because this literature has been foundational to re-theorizing social movements. Yet, social movements theories, only recently moving into a global field of analysis lack a comprehensive framework for thinking about how movement organizations cross political and cultural borders and how those transnational efforts shape global change.

After reviewing the literature my analysis proceeds in two chapters. First I look at the population of INGOs that specialize in nonviolent diffusion. I provide a broad descriptive overview of this population and conduct a negative binomial analysis of its impact on shaping the emergence of prominent nonviolent movements. Then, I look more

closely at what these INGOs actually do through a case study of Peace Brigades International and in a comparative assessment of how nonviolent INGOs construct transnational spaces for repertoire expansion. Finally, I conclude by proposing an extension of rationalization theory into the realm of INGOs. Building on the work of Boli and Thomas (1999) who have delineated three ways in which INGOs participate in global rationalization, I suggest a bridging of the literatures reviewed below and the types of empirical analysis that follows to map more clearly how rationalization works as a cultural process of world societal expansion.

The study on INGOs (in social movements studies, TSMOs, or transnational social movement organizations) is growing in the social sciences. These studies tend to follow a couple of different approaches in examining INGOs' effect on global politics. Large-set quantitative analyses measure INGOs' impact on policy adoptions at the state level or they scrutinize the growth and dynamics of specialized groups of INGOs. In-depth qualitative studies are typically case-centered and elaborate on the history and dynamics of one organization or organizational population and the role of those organizations in specific state-focused movements. Only a handful of studies scrutinize how INGOs shape social movement development and tend to treat INGOs as trans-national resources ancillary to indigenous mobilization efforts. No scholars have- to my knowledge- comprehensively examined the role of INGOs in shaping a global tactical resistance repertoire. Below I review insights that can be applied to a study of nonviolent INGOs centering on the themes of global authority, political process, and organizational rationalization.

INGOs as International Authorities

Two lines of scholarship have come to characterize an INGOs-as-international-authorities approach. Political scientists weighing in on the debate about the state in a globalizing world were among the first to give attention to international NGOs. Risse-Kappen's edited volume (1995) *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In* set out to save INGOs scholarship from state-centered international relations conclusions that non-state actors were of little importance. Although the study of intergovernmental organizations has long been alive and flourishing, Risse-Kappen and colleagues articulate for the first time a number of ways in which global political interactions are also shaped by INGOs as authoritative non-state actors, from international security and the economy to the environment and human rights. They find that the embeddedness of any one state in a network of international agreements provides an opening through which INGOs and other international actors come to influence foreign policy.

Another touchstone building on early INGO scholarship is Keck and Sikkink's (1998) *Activists Beyond Borders* (see also Keck and Sikkink 1999). In their in-depth study of international networks advocating for human rights, the environment, and women's rights, Keck and Sikkink argue that INGOs are a big part of the global process that is transforming state sovereignty. Although, again, INGOs' impact at the state level varies, Keck and Sikkink find that INGOs help to frame the international political agenda, promote particular norms that inform policy-making, and act as influential international diplomacy structures through which local activists place pressure on states.

This scholarship has added a new dimension to state-centered studies. The field of international relations now recognizes a tripartite force driving political change in which international non-state actors act as policy-formulators among other states and transnational economic actors (Florini 2000). Comparative studies of global political change now ask how INGOs figure into the landscape of other international organizations, how they are organized and governed and how they affect policy outcomes among states. This scholarship has also opened the door to a number of quantitative attempts to measure INGOs' global effect on policy making, from the repression of human rights to the expansion of healthcare (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Davis and Murdie 2008).

A similar line of global sociological research was galvanized by Boli and Thomas' 1999 *Constructing World Culture* (see also Boli and Thomas 1997). In their attempt to explore one of the "missing links" between global level construction and organization and policy and mobilization at the state level, Boli and Thomas (1999) argue that a world polity theory that accounts for other non-state authorities (the UN and other IGOs) should also articulate INGOs' role in constituting a global environment. Along with their collaborators, Boli and Thomas explain how INGOs have come to constitute one of the global sources from which globally embedded actors (states, corporations, groups, and individuals) derive ideas about and models for action. By examining the growth and activities of various specialist sectors of INGOs, they conclude that the phenomenal growth of the global civil society sector over the latter half of the twentieth century is one of the significant factors that have shaped the course of world politics. Through different forms of authority, INGOs have increasingly acted as agenda setters, as

key collaborators in policy formulation, and they have carried legitimate practices to new dimensions of global and local society. On the heels of the Boli and Thomas edited volume, others have looked at how ties to INGOs shape the structuration of states, which are more likely to develop rights policies and similar national agencies given membership in global civil society organizations (Brunsson et al 2000; Frank et al. 2007; Kim et. al 2002; Ramirez and Koo 2009).

Although these two lines of scholarship emphasize their differences when in cross conversation, (and methodological differences further emphasize substantive assumptions- the state analysts view INGOs as accessories to state politics and the globalization theorists emphasize the autonomy of the global dimension), they have cumulatively added much complementary knowledge on INGOs as global political authorities. INGOs can be seen as forming transnational advocacy networks that draw new attention to globally developed policies. Through these networks INGOs mobilize new types of resources and garner moral authority (Boli 2006) to pressure more and more states into adopting proposed policies. INGOs, they might all agree, then continue to act as a global "neighborhood watch" (to use Bell and colleagues' term, 2012) and bring violators of legitimate policies into compliance, to varying degrees of success, which in turn depends upon a complex confluence of local conditions and global integration. But, all their participation in institutional level state-making aside, what do INGOs do for local movements? And what specifically do they do for global nonviolence? The INGOs literature, like the general study of IOs, has focused on how non-state actors fit into formal global political relationships offering only fragmented insights into INGOs' role in mobilization.

INGOs in Global Political Process

A small body of scholarship now addresses how INGOs participate in social movement emergence but, overall, these studies offer fragmented pieces of the puzzle of how INGOs fit into the broader schema of mobilization. These studies emphasize the importance of countries' location among global networks and populations' access to international power structures. In one approach, scholars look at particular populations of INGOs and their effect on movement development. Murdie and Bhasin (2011), for example, conduct a panel analysis of three select years in which countries experienced large-scale anti-government demonstrations and found that country member ties to Human Rights INGOs is strongly correlated to resistance in these three years; they point to the need for further exploration of the longitudinal effect of civil society ties to INGOs on protest development.

Scholars have also detailed how particular movements tap into international networks to globally expand mobilization efforts. Barrett and Kurzman (2004) detail the impact of the world wars periods on the eugenics movement. And Boyle (2006) and Berkovitch (1999) point to an international opportunity structure in which INGOs work closely with IGOs to, again, bring states to formally implement laws protecting women's rights. Beyond INGO-specific studies there is plenty of empirical evidence that the global networks in which INGOs participate have been critical to local mobilization. Tsutsui's studies of Japanese movements detail how alignments with global-level frames and events have amplified the claims and power of local movements in both the national and transnational arenas (Tsutsui 2006; Tsutsui and Shin 2008).

In the growing global social movements literature, there are also a handful of studies that mention INGOs among the important global resources and opportunities to be harnessed by local movements (Tarrow 2005; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht 2009). Some scholars, particularly Jackie Smith and her collaborators, have made a small cottage industry in describing the landscape of global civil society that INGOs inhabit (see Smith 2008) and we know that these movement INGOs tend to grow into greater numbers and more expansive ties on the heels of the expansion of other global political networks, IGOs and the general population of INGOs (cf. Smith Weist 2005; Weist and Smith 2007). But we have no comprehensive understanding of how they fit into the scheme of local political process.

The general population of social movement organizations (SMOs) has, however, figured prominently into local-level movement studies. If we narrow the frame to ask how movement organizations shape movement emergence, then the broad consensus is that SMOs are a critical foundation to the whole political process of mobilization. Doug McAdam's (1982) synthesis of studies outlining the role of organizations in political process[12], depicted in Figure 12, has been seminal to the social movements literature. McAdam identifies among the elements necessary for mass mobilization, the presence of: 1) political opportunities, 2) access to resources, and 3) a network of indigenous organizations. He explains that organizations are important for many of the reasons cited above; but they also forge a critical link between the ecological capacity to effectively make change and a fourth element necessary for mass mobilization, 4) cognitive liberation, the collective recognition that change is possible coupled with a cohesive idea for how best to initiate desired changes (see also Freeman 1999).

[12] See also Morris 1981 and Blomberg 1991.

Figure 12. McAdam's Domestically Oriented Political Process Model



Likewise, the ability to mobilize available resources, develop critical political institutional ties and then actively pursue a cohesive sense of injustice are all part of what enables SMOs to emerge (Lofland 1996; Benford and Snow 2000). Social movement organizations help to envision the institutionalization of a new and what they hope to be a better form of social reality (Lofland 1996). As populations, SMOs provide the network structure across which key movement actors communicate and coordinate actions (Freeman 1999), through which ideas about claims or initiatives to adopt particular forms of claimsmaking diffuse (McAdam 1982). They create interactive fields in which new tactics are developed (McCammon 2003) and they constitute a vital part of the social environment in which movements develop (Morris 1981).

In the growing field of global movements analysis, transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) construct networks to enable local actors to act in new ways in global political arenas (Smith 2005). Movement organizations are therefore considered a fundamental part of the structure and process of political change. But this political

process model was developed primarily in examining the U.S. civil rights movement. Although McAdam revised his original theory to take note of the role of the international U.S. image in determining political responses to the movement (1999), what we know about the global origins of local activity is limited; we know much less about how movement INGOs emerge and shape these local fields.

The Global Organizational Dimensions of Nonviolence

For much of the development of nonviolence studies, the focus remained on strategic efficacy; scholars asked, how can nonviolent protest be effectively devised in a number of political contexts? This work, now commonly called "nonviolent civil resistance" studies, centers on one predominant framework which articulates a sort of "strategic logic" that shapes successful nonviolent resistance from the "bottom-up". A recent addition to the canon of civil resistance studies illustrates this framework in action. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) statistically examined 323 violent and nonviolent insurrectionary attempts, finding that nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53% of the time while violent actions have only been successful 26% of the time. Their extensive study accounts for everything from the type of regime and its response, to insurrectionary campaigns, to the ethnic composition of the population, and the geographical terrain in which campaigns developed. The crux of their argument, more clearly spelled out in their subsequent book on the topic, *Why Civil Resistance Works* (2011), is that a "strategic logic" is at work in nonviolent resistance which tunes into the real potential for mass participation, targets diplomatic vulnerabilities that raise the stakes for opposed regimes to repress such resistance efforts, and by building up civil network

structures, greatly enhances the likelihood that peace will endure after regime transformations.

Their work stands as a now critically acclaimed capstone of a long tradition of articulating the fundamentals of a successful strategic logic of nonviolent resistance (cf. Sharp 2005; Ackerman and Kruegler 1993; Ackerman and Duvall 2000), all of these studies which are heavily organizer-centered. An emphasis on the strategic acumen of the organizers in critical times of intensive action reveals a form of mobilization that is highly agentive, dynamic, and pragmatic and hinges on the analytical foresight of the organizers. This approach, however, limits understanding of the non-strategic factors that shape nonviolent conflict, like the organizational environment that has shaped global politics. It leaves out a range of conditions that can variably shape strategic success- not to mention strategic development. And, as I will argue is critically related to this process, it leaves out the longitudinal picture of how movements emerge and grow into campaigns and big events, a fundamental political process considered crucial in the sociological literature on social movements. Finally, this approach leaves unanswered a question that is of central importance to those of us concerned with the mobilizing dynamics of culture and belief-systems, like the form of nonviolence that animated Gandhi.[13] That is, what is the role of culture in driving repertoire adoption and implementation (beyond the pragmatic act of moral framing that Sharp alludes to)?

Social movements scholars who have weighed in on nonviolent studies have challenged some of these assumptions, expanding the frame for how we study nonviolent

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[13] And, in fact, early on in his career of formulating a pragmatic theory of nonviolent resistance, Gene Sharp admonished against the thinking that morality was a necessary step to strategic success. Rather, he asserted that most movements were highly pragmatic and explicitly amoral. Later, he would have to figure out how to fit morality back into the pragmatic formula, given the rise of so many charismatic moral leaders in the prominent nonviolent movements he began to catalogue.

resistance. Two recent works stand out - works that help to structure the conversation about how conditions shape strategy in nonviolent movements, and that point to the importance of the international dimension beyond the accessory shaming and blaming that aids indigenous mobilization. Kurt Schock's *Unarmed Insurrections* (2005) compares successful and unsuccessful movements in non-democracies. By assessing how states are differentially embedded in international financial and political networks, Schock concludes that, more than just developing the acumen to harness resources, movements are constrained by their access to variable types of resources and networks and the qualitative form of targeted states' global integration. Schock also underlines the fact that it is not just the drive of the local leaders or the breadth of the local mobilization that poses a threat to targeted states. Rather, states' situation within a global geopolitical system molds how states will interpret and respond to nonviolent resistance movements. Likewise, in *Nonviolent Revolutions* (2011) Sharon Nepstad looks at both successful and unsuccessful cases of nonviolent revolution to chart how different conditions shape strategic success. Nepstad shows that these conditions, repressive states' integration into the global political economy, for example, differentially shape the outcomes of similar nonviolent strategies. She argues that savvy strategy can be enhanced if strategists can effectively address the deep-seated historical processes that shape targeted states' interests and resources. And yet much remains outside the grasp of strategy, like military defection and the challenges of ousting a former liberator. Furthermore, to the extent that these movements are shaped by transnational ties within global political and economic networks, it is hard to say whether international support can be better directed to enhance movements' success. Nepstad finds that some international campaigns that have been

designed to help nonviolent revolutions have often worked to the detriment of local resistance efforts.

While working to bridge the gap between studies highlighting strategy and those underlying conditions, comparative and movement-centered (as opposed to campaign focused) analyses often give greater attention to the embeddedness of movements and targeted states in global networks (see also Zunes, Kurtz and Asher 1999). They point to shifts in global economic integration, such as the adoption of IMF structural adjustment agreements, as greatly enhancing the momentum of resisters (ICNC 2009). They even sometimes mention the presence of a prominent nonviolent international organization or two that has worked to steer international sympathies toward nonviolent resisters. A few sociologists have produced informative case studies of how some of these individual INGOs have enhanced opportunities and resources for emerging movements, noting the historical importance of Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, the International Fellowship for Reconciliation, Oxfam, War Resisters International, and Peace Brigades International (see Hopgood 2006; Smith, Pagnucco, and Romeril 1994; Coy 1997; Pagnucco 1997; Pagnucco and McCarthy 1999). But no study has yet systematically examined the role of global non-state organizations in shaping the globalization of nonviolent movements or analyzed the role of nonviolent INGOs in global-local mobilization. Filling in this gap should be of great importance to those of us enmeshed in the field of nonviolent studies because those activists working with nonviolent movement INGOs comprise a significant portion of the critical audience for nonviolent studies- INGO activists frequent our conferences, actively publish in the journals we draw on, and even the purely analytical social science study of nonviolence

has depended on the case and organizational histories of nonviolent activists. Global nonviolent activists have actively contributed to this field with rich, historical descriptions and critical overviews of the role of individual organizations in particular nonviolent movements (cf. Mahoney and Eguren 1997; Deats 2009). And practitioners that work with nonviolent INGOs are careful to critically reflect on their role as international "others" and the potentially negative effects their own interests may have on vulnerable local movements (Clark 2009). In addition to addressing some serious empirical gaps in the scholarly literature on nonviolent resistance, a systematic study of this transnational network of nonviolence organizations therefore has much to offer to reflective practitioners.

Having thus established the importance of the organizational dimensions of global nonviolence in institutionalizing and formally diffusing the repertoire, I now turn to take a closer look at that dimension. I examine global historical data on the development and dynamics of the relationship between these tactical specialist organizations and the countries in which these organizations have established ties to measure their impact on nonviolent movement emergence. I provide a descriptive map of the objectives and particular activities of these organizations and the ways in which their objectives drive the diffusion of nonviolence. And I conduct an in-depth qualitative analysis of these organizations' discourse and project development to understand how they work at diffusion at the nexus of global-local relationships.

5
NONVIOLENT INGOs AND MOVEMENT EMERGENCE

My exploration of the role of INGOs proceeds in several steps. First, I have collected broad demographic data on a core population of nonviolent INGOs from which I describe the contours of the organizational dimension of global nonviolence. I detail how this population has grown in quantity and in the substantive focus of their globalization efforts. I then use counts of INGOs ties to countries to conduct a statistical analysis of the effect of nonviolent INGOs on the emergence of nonviolent movements. I weigh this effect in comparison with other global and local political, economic, and cultural features that may also positively shape global repertoire expansion. I conclude with a two-part in-depth qualitative analysis of the "how" of global nonviolence's spread. That is, I explore how INGOs work to foment positive political processes for nonviolent movements at the country level and concordantly how these efforts generally contribute to the construction of a cultural framework for global nonviolence.

Data on the population of nonviolent INGOs is drawn from the Union of International Associations electronic *Annual Yearbook of International Organizations*, a primary resource for the study of global organizational networks (Smith 2008) and country membership ties in particular (Boli et. al. 2010). This historical database initiated in 1907 has about 40,000 active international governmental and non-governmental organizations in 300 countries and territories and in "every field of human endeavour" that are international in scope, in organization, and/or membership (UIA 2012) and is the most comprehensive international survey of international organizations. The database provides information on historical foundings, aims and objectives, country membership,

and organizational affiliations, key activities, programs, and publications, as well as finances. Securing an entry in the yearbook has become a global networking imperative for major international organizations. Entries are created both through self-submission and upon the surveying efforts of the UIA. All organizations' information is perpetually retained beyond organizations' dissolution.

To construct a database of nonviolent protest INGOs I conducted a keyword search in the UIA digital yearbook for "nonviolent" and "nonviolence", limiting the search to non-governmental organizations and yielding a core of 211 INGOs (founded and active until 2003) categorized as explicitly dedicated to globally diffusing nonviolent protest tactics (listed in Appendix A). The density of this population ranges from 16 in 1948 to 211 in 2003. I limit the database at 2003 because of the lag in reporting new information in the UIA *Yearbook* (that is, any counts after this period would likely be under representative of the real expanse of the population). I began my search with the 2001-2002 *Yearbook* database and have since updated the database using the 2008-2009 *Yearbook*. It is interesting to note that while the earlier effort entailed an extensive search of the search terms in all information categories, the latest version organizes data into a new distinct category of "Nonviolence Organizations", indicating an institutionalization of nonviolence organizations as a distinct organizational type. This new UIA-constructed category assigns organizations to this family based on an indication that organizations engage in "peacebuilding" and "peacemaking", which is not a perfect measure for a nonviolence organization. I had to work through the list to remove organizations that did not engender nonviolent orientations, such as Al Qaeda, which lists itself as a peacemaking INGO (then affirming its tactics to be "violent terrorism"). This list of 211

organizations represents just a core sample of international organizations that employ nonviolent techniques, support and participate in nonviolent networks, and disseminate materials on nonviolence. If I were to comb through the many thousands of other organizations categorized under the rubrics of "peace" or "human rights" I would find many more organizations adhering to the ideals of and promoting global nonviolence (i.e. those that offer formal support to nonviolent INGOs), although diffusing nonviolence is not the central objective of such ancillary organizations. Indeed, the network for support of global nonviolence is vaster than could feasibly be analyzed in this study.

The organizations I examine may incorporate philosophical and principled orientations to nonviolence as a way of life or as a goal in conflict resolution (and in fact the majority of them do[14]) but a necessary condition for inclusion is an explicit commitment to spreading and supporting nonviolent protest. Where they may embrace finer distinctions within this population, passive resistance organizations versus educational foundations, for example, they have been included in my sample because they have deemed the spread of nonviolent protest an important part of their organizational identity that portray in this global networking resource.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Nonviolent INGOs Activities and Objectives

A first step in my analysis of nonviolent INGOs was to code their programs and activities and identify the variety of ways they facilitate the global diffusion of nonviolence. A qualitative examination of the entries of nonviolent INGOs reveals that

[14] Some nonviolent protest scholars have suggested that most movements using nonviolent tactics are not religiously or philosophically motivated. At least among international nonviolent organizations this is not the case. Rather, pragmatically focused nonviolent organizations are exceptional.

nonviolent INGOs aim to distribute new knowledge, skills, and other resources to local movements, while helping them to identify, expand, and take advantage of transnational political opportunities. There are a number of ways in which nonviolent INGOs do this, but their programs and objectives generally fall into four categories (depicted in Figure 13), some of them specializing in one category while most attend to a combination of activities.[15]

Figure 13. Nonviolent INGOs Activities and Objectives



The greatest numbers of nonviolent INGOs, over 80% of those I have studied, work in the *promotion and advocacy* of nonviolence, which encompasses both resistance against violence and nonviolent tactics as a means to claimsmaking and conflict resolution. Promotion and advocacy includes general advocacy among other NGOs, INGOs, and IGOs, encouraging these organizations to support or engage in nonviolent

[15] Thanks to Matthew Chandler for helping me to divide the category of promotion and education into two categories on promotion and campaigns and education and training.

campaigns and draw on nonviolent tactics in their own campaigns, or to support nonviolent country or issue-specific campaigns. An example of a nonviolent INGO that is very active in transnational promotion and advocacy is the International Fellowship for Reconciliation (IFOR). IFOR was established in 1914 by an international group of Christians concerned about the outbreak of a world war. IFOR has since developed a number of global and country-specific campaigns, promoting nonviolence in protest against a host of human rights violations as well as extensive campaigns in support of disarmament and against militarization. Examples of IFOR campaigns range from the 1930s Youth Crusade across Europe to support the Geneva World Disarmament Conference to today's plethora of local country campaigns such as U.S. FOR's Militarism Watch, which supports local movements against U.S. militarism abroad, For Wales' campaign against the use of military drones in local test centers, FOR Zambia's programs on gender sensitization in peacebuilding, and FOR Japan's campaign for natural energy usage.

Many INGOs, over 75% of those I studied, also provide *direct training* and *disseminate educational materials* for training and nonviolent practice. This entails both long-term and temporary projects, which can be general or issue-specific. Nonviolence International's work, for example, has been exemplary in educating and training for nonviolent resistance and conflict resolution. Training efforts have ranged from providing a weekend seminar to formally planning a collective action, to setting up school on constitution-writing in the jungles of the Burmese-Thailand border and implementing a high school curricular focus on the value of nonviolence for thinking about and addressing social problems in Indonesia.

A growing number of INGOs, about 30% of those I have studied, also now work explicitly in *research and development*, collecting and analyzing data on the effectiveness of nonviolent protest in case and comparative studies of social change. The Albert Einstein Institution, founded by Gene Sharp, (one of the early and leading nonviolent studies scholars mentioned in chapter 3), has published and funded many now prominent studies of particular tactics and social and political strategies that lead to successful nonviolent regime transformation. These comparative studies produce insights into which strategies have been most effective and in turn shape the canonical knowledge of nonviolence as it is expounded on and globally disseminated in how-to manuals. Gene Sharp's *From Dictatorship to Democracy* (2008), for example, is one such authoritative, transnational text for devising a nonviolent strategy. The pamphlet outlines sources of regime power, how to identify regime weakness, and how to successfully mobilize against regime weaknesses. It provides a typological breakdown of various methods of strategic nonviolent action. It has been translated into over 33 languages and has had the insurrectionist's honor of being officially banned by several authoritarian regimes.

A smaller population of nonviolent INGOs, about 25% of those I coded, specializes in nonviolent *third-party intervention*, by placing international observers and peacekeepers directly into conflict situations. These volunteers act as witnesses and deterrents to violence and human rights violations and sometimes provide training or networking assistance as well as advocacy on behalf of local movements to local and international authorities on behalf of local nonviolent organizations. Peace Brigades International is one of the most visible examples of third-party intervention. Modeled on the former World Peace Brigade (inspired by the Indian Shanti Sena Army, see Shepard

1987), Peace Brigades International has placed hundreds of volunteers in dozens of conflict situations and has facilitated a broad-based transnational country support and multi-level NGO-INGO-IGO-state lobbying network. The daily activities of PBI field volunteers consist of tasks like accompanying human rights lawyers in Nepal as they go to court to file depositions, interviewing victims of paramilitary violence in Colombia and meeting with state and military officials to advocate on their behalf, or accompanying women's groups in Guatemala on a peace march[16].

Population Growth

Second, I have examined at how the population has grown as a whole. I have examined both the gross number of organizations that have developed over time and how their ties have spread globally. The complete database of nonviolent INGOs includes INGOs founded as far back as 1892[17] as early international pacifist movements had reorganized under the banner of nonviolence and have since remained active in the diffusion of nonviolent protest tactics. INGOs' foundings follow a small but upward trajectory throughout the early era of the international pacifist movement and begin to spike in the post-World War II era, where I will begin my quantitative analysis. Figure 10 displays nonviolent protest INGO foundings since 1948, that is, following Indian independence, a pivotal global event in nonviolent history after which INGOs came to organize under the objectives of spreading nonviolence and ending in 2003. Figure 10 compares these foundings to the foundings of human rights organizations showing that

[16] Patrick Coy's (1997) research gives an in-depth look at PBI activities in Sri Lanka, but I have also conducted a global archival analysis of their activities in a number of countries, including those listed here to be discussed in an in-process manuscript.
[17] The first INGO in the database is the International Peace Bureau, still an active organizer in the international nonviolent protest network.

trends in foundings among both populations are quite similar. Following 1948 the annual number of nonviolent INGO foundings exceeds more than two per year. Much like the general population of INGOs, nonviolent protest INGOs' foundings rise steadily in the 1960s and 1970s and increase sharply in the 1980s and again in the 1990s (see Boli and Thomas 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999)[18]. Figure 10 also shows how the number of foundings of nonviolent INGOs doubles in the institutionalization period from 1980-1989 and spikes again sharply following 1989.

Another way of assessing the growth of international nonviolence institutions has been to document and examine factors shaping differential country ties to these organizations cross-regionally. To assess how country member ties to nonviolent INGOs have changed over the latter half of the twentieth century, a subsample of the top 20 most active organizations was taken from the UIA 2002 and 2009 online databases (listed in Appendix B). I used the databases' relevance ranking, which organizes organizations by the frequency of keywords used in their text, for organizations that list individual country members as well as drawing on my own archival data of organizations most highly networked in the international nonviolence world to select 20 organizations to track country ties. The countries listed are the countries in which individual members reside-the database does not provide counts of how many individual members are from each country. Following the model of other country member studies, (Smith and Weist 2005, Weist and Smith 2007) I tracked how membership ties to particular regions have

[18] Boli and Thomas attribute this trend to several key changes in the post-World War II polity. First, the post-World War era of decolonization was characterized by a shift from increasing IGO activity to a phenomenal increase in INGO activity. Second, the 1970s and 1980s marks a rapid increase in the proliferation of civil society networks and the era of development programs (on this point see Murphy 2006). Finally, the 1980s and 1990s were marked by an increase in the frequency of global civil society events, international conferences and campaigns, particularly in the human rights world (see also Cole 2005).

developed. Because organizations typically update their entries about every five years a count of country ties to each INGO was then taken from UIA annual yearbooks for every fifth year between 1953 and 2003. These data were then interpolated using Excel to provide an annual level analysis of breadth of membership growth.

Figures 12 and 13 depict changes in the global growth of nonviolence INGO membership between 1954 and 2003. Like findings in other organizational studies, there is a clear bias toward membership in the “global north” in the early stages of nonviolent protest INGO development. Early nonviolent protest INGOs garnered greater active participation among Northern and Western members. But, such globalizing intentions began to move south with the greatest spikes in global southern memberships in the 60s, 80s, and 90s, supporting trends noted by Boli and Thomas (1999) on the general population expansion of ties to INGOs.

From 2003 data, regional trends in nonviolent INGO participation show that the breadth of nonviolent protest INGOs ties has grown significantly in poorer African and Latin American countries, the two regions comprising 42% of all global membership. Although European ties remain strong at 21%, (following African ties) North America adds only 3% of global member ties. Just as Weist and Smith (2007) found that European participation in TSMOs more than quadrupled from 1980 to 2000, regional European and North American membership in nonviolent INGOs also more than quadrupled from 1983 to 2003. But African membership grew more than five times in this period and more than 200 times in the fifty years of the expansion of organizational nonviolence on a global scale. Although this is perhaps not surprising given the phenomenal growth in new African nations, this growth in membership places the region poorest in economic

resources and weakest in democracies among core nations in the ties citizens have cultivated with nonviolent INGOs.

These trends are important to both analytical and evaluative understandings of the work of nonviolent INGOs. Contrary to how the general population of transnational SMOs has cultivated the strongest ties among global northerners, countries that have had the longest working democracies and greater resources, nonviolent protest INGOs have been more successful in expanding their networks among countries that have had overall less success with democracy, or are still working to implement a democratic model of statehood. This is perhaps an effect of the general orientation of this population of specialized INGOs, which, with some exceptions, tends to focus on building up resources and capacities of struggling civil societies, rather than focusing on direct diplomacy and advocacy towards states, as many other INGOs tend to work in institutionalized democracies.

Measuring the Effect of Nonviolent INGOs on Movement Emergence

Finally, to assess the strength of these ties in actually driving repertoire diffusion, I have conducted a quantitative assessment of how ties to nonviolent INGOs have been correlated to the rise of nonviolent movements. Although my analysis of the role of INGOs in global nonviolence is in large part exploratory, to structure a quantitative evaluation of INGOs' effect among other variables, I structured my models according to salient theories about why movements emerge. I therefore organize the models to consider the effects of domestic political opportunities and resources, transnational opportunities and resources and the effect of ties to nonviolent INGOs as part of the

global political opportunity structure. To provide an orienting framework around which I structure each of my models, I outline some of the central hypotheses of these literatures here that I will statistically test.

Domestic Conditions

Civil resistance scholars have identified several critical components for nonviolent movement success that mirror general theories about mobilization. These components can be extrapolated into a test of what shapes nonviolent movement emergence specifically. Some crucial domestic conditions hypothesized by conventional movements theories are resources and opportunities. To account for these I first test the effect of urbanization, theorized by collective action scholars as beneficial to the emergence of national collective action repertoires (Tilly 1977). Where decentralized urban centers help to form networks, national coordination is easier among claimsmakers.

> **Hyp 1:** With greater urbanization, nonviolent movement emergence will be more likely.

Resources have also long been considered pivotal to mobilization. Typically a range of material and social resources are counted as having mobilizing potential, but data on the extent of local institutions and the breadth of local civil society ties, for example, is not available at a global level. Therefore, I test the effect of national economic resources as one measure of resource mobilization.

> **Hyp 2:** With greater national economic resources, nonviolent movement emergence will be more likely.

And I incorporate a measure of "communication structures"[19] as a mobilizing resource.

> **Hyp 3:** With more extensive national information systems, nonviolent movement emergence will be more likely.

I also explore the effect of political opportunities in driving nonviolent movement emergence. Political opportunities typically fall into two categories. Positive political opportunities are found in the expansion of formal institutional channels for redressing grievances and are therefore theorized to have a negative effect on mobilization (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Concordantly, negative opportunities can be found in the weakness of governments, often indicated by fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 2003) or in the heightening of repression both of which impel activists to mobilization as there grows a sense of "no other way out" (Meyer and Minkoff 2004).

> **Hyp 4:** With greater access to institutionalized politics, nonviolent movement emergence will be less likely

> **Hyp 5:** With increasing fractionalization, nonviolent movement emergence will be more likely.

And,

> **Hyp 6:** With heightened repression, nonviolent movement emergence will be more likely.

Additionally, I incorporate a measure of "cultural opportunity structures" which I will operationalize with data on percent enrolled in national education. Educational systems have long been considered by world society scholars as one primary conduit for world culture and at the national level educational systems provide a cohering experience for "cognitive liberation".

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[19] Freeman (1999) and Morris (1981) conceptualize these as organizational networks where communication among solidarity networks will be more facile. But they can also constitute national communication by journalists and through the media, for which data is readily available at the global level.

Hyp 7: With increased participation in national education systems, nonviolent movement emergence will be more likely.

Transnational Factors Shaping Resistance

A second group of hypotheses predicts the effects of transnational factors on nonviolent movement emergence. These include the arguments that international economic and political ties (Smith & Wiest, 2005) and the expansion of global civil society networks, specifically the general expansion of IGOs and INGOs (Tsutsui & Wotipka, 2004; Weist & Smith, 2007) will positively shape movement emergence, factors which I postulate to also have shaped the emergence of a transnational nonviolence network.

To provide another dimension of the resource mobilization argument, I will weigh the effects of a country's integration into the world economy, predicted by world systems theorists to positively shape political opportunities for mobilization (Smith 2004).

Hyp 8: With greater integration into the global economy, nonviolent movement emergence will be more likely.

In nonviolent case studies, however, analysts have suggested that entering into contested agreements with global regulatory financial institutions can also have a significantly positive effect on mobilization, as the countries that have experienced hardships under IMF structural adjustment agreements have been driven to mass resistance (ICNC 2009). So I will also test the effect of IMF-structural adjustment agreements as potentially positively shaping nonviolent movement emergence.

Hyp 9: Following agreements to IMF structural adjustment loans, nonviolent movement emergence will be more likely.

I will consider in these models the development of global political opportunities, that is, the impact of democratization as a global process on mobilization, which world society theory would expect to have a positive effect on the emergence of global institutional forms (Schofer and Meyer 2005).

> **Hyp 10:** With the expansion of global democratization, nonviolent movement emergence will be more likely.

And I will weigh the effect of the expansion of intergovernmental organizations as an additional global level opportunity for political mobilization (Schofer and Meyer 2005).

> **Hyp 11:** As the global number of IGOs expand, nonviolent movement emergence will be more likely.

Additionally, I will add in a control variable for the presence of civil war in a country. This data is drawn from the Correlates of War database (2010) from which I coded a dummy variable for the presence of civil wars by year.

The Impact of Ties to INGOs

Finally, I want to directly explore the impact of integration into global civil society networks, and ties to nonviolent INGOs specifically, on the emergence of nonviolent movements. World society theories predict that ties to INGOs will enhance the diffusion of world cultural institutions and practices into nation-states (Boli and Thomas 1997) and they have found these ties to directly correspond to an expanding local culture of human rights and civil society (Cole 2006; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004).

> **Hyp 12:** As the global civil society network expands, nonviolent movement emergence will be more likely.

Finally, I want to directly weigh the impact of ties to nonviolent INGOs. To get a comparative perspective on the effect of their country ties I weigh ties' effects on the emergence of nonviolent movements in a given country. I predict that,

> **Hyp 13a:** As country ties to nonviolent INGOs develop, nonviolent movement emergence will be more likely,

I model the impact of nonviolent INGOs on nonviolent movement emergence- among other global and regional factors- with negative binomial regression. Negative binomial regression is a generalized version of Poisson analysis used to measure the historical relationship among count variables. It is a specialized form of Poisson that attends to historical processes that do not follow a linear progression, such as the emergence of social movements. Where Poisson assumes equality between the mean number of counts and the conditional variance, a normal Poisson analysis can lead to the erroneous assumption that the activity of major movements is independent of the prior years' movement activity (Kim 1999). Periods of "contagion", or the outbreak of large-scale protests, mean spikes in the rates of movement activity. To put it simply, we can reasonably expect movements to break out at any one point in time and continue for some time and then dissolve. With a dependent variable of movement activity, all countries will have large counts of "0" or no activity, with many countries experiencing periodic counts of "1", the presence of nonviolent movement activity. Controlling for this contagion effect is therefore imperative among studies of spikes in social change (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Barron 1992).

The negative binomial regression model adds a parameter that accounts for overdispersion, reflecting the unobserved heterogeneity among observations, by employing the quadratic parameterization,

$$\mu i = \exp(\beta 0 + \beta 1 \chi i1 + \beta 2 \chi i2 + \beta 3 \chi i3 + Ei)$$

where μi, the presence of a nonviolent movement at a particular point in time, is equal to the exponential of the independent variables in addition to an error term (assumed to be uncorrelated with the *x*s) that accounts for a set of period-specific effects (Hilbe 2007; Long and Freese 2006). The full model negative binomial regression model is specified as,

$$P(y_i) = \frac{\Gamma(y_i + \frac{1}{K})}{y_i! \; \Gamma(\frac{1}{K})} \left(\frac{K\mu_i}{1 + K\mu_i}\right)^{y_i} \left(\frac{1}{1 + K\mu_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{K}}$$

where K is the overdispersion parameter and the variance is μi + K(μi)2.

Modeling the Hypotheses

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables derived from a database of nonviolent movements were identified through several sources. Like Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) I drew from extensive bibliographies of major movements[20]. Other primary references include comparative and individual case analyses of major movements (Sharp 2005; Ackerman and Kruegler 1993; Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher 1999; Ackerman and Duvall 2000; Schock

[20] Most notable among them is “People Power and Protest since 1945” (Carter, Clark, and Randle 2006), which categorizes nonviolent anti-colonial movements, rights and democracy movements, resistance against oppression and dictatorship movements, cultural, civil, and political rights movements, social and economic justice movements, and reviews the use of nonviolent action in a range of other major social movements of the twentieth century.

2005; McManus and Schlabach 1991; Stahler-Sholk, Vanden, and Kuecker 2008; George-Williams 2006; ICNC 2009; Nepstad 2011).

My nonviolent movements database indicates an annual count for the time periods in which critically acclaimed nonviolent movements were active in each country. I am explicitly studying the effect of transnational factors on mobilization and, in many cases, this is recorded from early organizing efforts to heightened mass resistance. I have coded a dummy variable for each year that a major nonviolent movement was active. Appendix A lists these movements by year, country, and principal objectives of the movement.

Independent Variables

My domestic level variables also come from the Banks Cross-National Time Series and Polity IV (Gurr, Marshall, and Jaggers 2010) databases. From Polity IV I test positive and negative political opportunities with a measure of democratic process and autocratic repression. The democracy score is based on an 11-point scale constructed through three indicators of "the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders…the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive", and "the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation" (Gurr et al 2010). The scores for autocracy are also based on an 11-point count that indicates the degree to which regimes in power "sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation" (ibid).

From Banks I test the effect of party fractionalization on mobilization, that is, the presence of a major political crisis that might provide an opening for effective resistance

defined by Banks as "any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow". I then draw a measure of national income distribution per capita from Banks to test the effect of monetary resources on mobilization. Although this is an imperfect measure because it assumes growth in resources means increasing access to resources among participants, I have selected data that indicates per capita GDP and which I think should be of some interest in defining what kind of national conditions shape movement emergence. The specific data I drew from the Banks database for GDP per capita is defined as "the value at factor cost of the product, before deduction of provisions for the consumption of fixed capital, attributable to factor services rendered to resident producers of the given country". I test the effect of the circulation of national newspapers as a measure of "national information systems", with Banks data on "national news circulation". The Banks database offers several measures for education and from these I weigh specifically the effect of total primary and secondary school enrollment per capita.

Transnational factors were drawn from the Banks database. I test Banks' measures of % GDP drawn from imports and exports per capita to assess the effect of global economic integration. And I test the effect of the proportion of world trade for each country as a total measure of global economic integration. In my second set of models I add a transnational economic variable measuring participation in IMF structural adjustment agreements drawn from Vreeland (2003), which provides a dummy variable coded for the presence of an IMF agreement by year.

I calculated a global democratization index based on the Polity IV national democracy data. Polity IV scores countries on the degree of democratization from a scale

of 1-10. Following the precedent for identifying “high democratization” (see Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007) I have coded a dummy variable to indicate countries achieving a score of 7 or higher. Likewise, my global democratization variable accounts for the global growth of countries achieving this high level of democratization. And I tested the effects of the global growth of the intergovernmental network as well as the general growth in international NGO networks utilizing data from Schofer and Meyer (2005). This data represents gross counts in the global total of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations by year.

Negative Binomial Results

Results from the models weighing domestic and transnational factors shaping nonviolent movement emergence are reported in Tables 2 and 3. These tables report the raw coefficients. Models 1 and 2 test the predictions based on domestic level factors shaping movement emergence. Hypothesis 1 predicting a positive effect of urbanization was disproven. The percentage of the urbanized population did not show a positive effect on nonviolent movement emergence. Of domestic level factors positively effecting nonviolent mobilization, both resources and positive and negative opportunities (predicted in Hyps 4, 5, and 6) had significant negative effects. With an increase in GDP, nations were less likely to experience a nonviolent movement and the same can be said for the strength of national news circulation. Similarly, political openness (Hyp 4) and repression (Hyp 6) negatively affect the likelihood of nonviolent mobilization, exhibiting a curvilinear effect of political opportunities on mobilization potential. Where there is too much openness or too little, mobilization is unlikely among nonviolent movements. The

opportunity posed by fractionalization among elites (Hyp 5) had, overall, no effect on nonviolent mobilization. The percentage of the proportion enrolled in university education (Hyp 7) also had little effect on mobilization. In most of the models it was a positive effect at mild significance. Surprisingly, national news circulation had a significant but negative effect on mobilization. This is an important finding however, because it challenges us to think more globally in what constitutes positive political opportunities for nonviolent movements. Where movements scholars tend to focus on U.S. or Western cases to formulate theories about political opportunities, a global analysis shows that repressive conditions are more likely to spur movements to widespread protest over the presence of institutionalized channels for claimsmaking.

Of transnational factors shaping nonviolent mobilization global economic integration (Hyps 8 and 9) has a highly significant and positive effect on mobilization. This outcome, reported in models 3 and 4, provides some interesting nuance to the resource mobilization findings in the domestic model. At least, GDP alone cannot tell us about a population's likelihood for nonviolent mobilization, but the percentage of GDP in world trade is a strong significant indicator that nonviolence is more likely. So too is a nation's agreement to global financial stipulations that case analysts have underscored. Global political opportunities are also significant as models 5 and 6 illustrate. Both the global spread of democratization and intergovernmental organization significantly and positively affect the likelihood of nonviolent mobilization. That is, as democracy has become more widespread and international relations among states more diffuse, civil societies throughout the world are more likely to engage in mass mobilization and to do so nonviolently. This finding both verifies and adds new dimension to the finding of

Schofer and Meyer (2005) on the positive effect of the spread of democratization as a global process in driving not only state but also civil society structuration.

The findings of greatest interest to this discussion, however, are reported in Table 3 where I compare the effects of the global expansion of civil society and ties to nonviolent INGOs on nonviolent mobilization. Models 1 and 2 report the effects of national and transnational political opportunities and resources on nonviolent mobilization. In these models positive and negative political opportunities are again highly significant and negatively affect mobilization. The percentage of GDP in world trade and IMF structural adjustment agreements are again shown to positively increase the likelihood of nonviolent movement emergence. And in both models the growth of global civil society networks through the expansion of the general population of INGOs has positively driven nonviolent mobilization, this network providing new global level political opportunities and resources. Models 3 and 4 confirm all of these relationships and show that even more significant to inciting nonviolent mobilization are country ties to nonviolent INGOs. Although the effect is mild, it provides global evidence for thinking more deeply about the international dimension to nonviolent mobilization and the positive impact of the organizational dynamics of the global spread of nonviolence. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of nonviolent INGOs despite the presence of civil war, which is so often assumed to lead to widespread violence. Indeed, this finding should be further explored with comparative data on the emergence of violent movements to parse out the differential effects of ties to nonviolent INGOs on the prevention of large-scale violent movements or insurrections.

Overall these findings help to affirm some qualitatively developed hypotheses with a global-level quantitative comparison and provide some guideposts for how future studies of nonviolent movements should proceed. First, the domestic-level models affirm that nonviolent movements typically occur in the right type of space between political openness and repression and that, at least on a global level, fragmentation among elites has provided little impetus for mobilization. Resources for mobilization are hard to measure when global level data is sparse on civil society dynamics, but we know from these tests that national GDP growth, news circulation, and even higher education are insignificant to explain the conditions under which a movement will mobilize nonviolently. Nonviolent mobilization cannot be understood through a Western movements theory model that assumes institutionalized democracy a positive pathway to large-scale nonviolent resistance. On the contrary, these movements emerge against the presence of civil wars and in defiance of transnational financial assistance. There must be much more to the story of global nonviolence mobilization than a Western movements model can account for.

The transnational models add some complexity to how we think about political opportunities and resources. That is, transnational resources as important for driving national mobilization and opportunities may be perceived in a global community, including state changes modeled by other nations as well as the expanding structure of international relations. For nonviolent scholars these findings confirm insights produced in case studies and provide macro-level incentives for further exploration of how global economic integration leads to mobilization across cases. Since the expansion of global structures such as education, democracy, and international organizations have the most

positive effects on mobilization, it is suggested here that the incorporation of world society variables into the assessment of global political opportunities will add new complexity to the theorization of what makes nonviolence possible and likely.

Finally, the INGO findings affirm my historical conclusion that the organizational expansion of civil society and the decentralization of power among global non-state actors have in fact impelled repertoire expansion in the latter half of the twentieth century. That is, as global civil society has grown the field of contention among national civil societies has also been transformed. The growth of INGOs has created a new supra-civil society structure that provides new opportunities and resources for claimsmaking. And so too have nonviolent INGOs had some success in positively affecting mobilization among local nonviolent movements. These findings also affirm the importance of world culture in driving political mobilization and change as these two general and specialized civil society networks are deeply embedded in proliferating a culture of human rights.

Future quantitative study should work to articulate how this process of world cultural diffusion works through mobilizing networks like the nonviolence movement. It is the qualitative dimension of this process that I turn to in my final organizational analysis chapter where I explore the impact of nonviolent INGOs at two levels: in shaping the local political process for nonviolent mobilization and in expanding the global regime for addressing and solving social problems.

6

NONVIOLENT INGOS AND REPERTOIRE EXPANSION

In this final chapter I take an in-depth look at the work of nonviolent INGOs to expand understanding of how INGOs work in two respects. First, I aim to illuminate the significant relationship between country ties and mobilization illustrated in my statistical models. To do so I have conducted an in-depth study of how one INGO, Peace Brigades International, has shaped the political process in one local field of contention, Guatemala. In this discussion I expand on the conventional domestic political process model by accounting for how INGOs as international actors reshape political process. Then I return to the topic of INGOs as carriers of world culture, as I argued in my historical analysis, and I assess the orientation and activities of a core group of nonviolent INGOs to explain their role in cultural diffusion. I explore nonviolent INGOs' role in expanding the frame of global politics to incorporate new dimensions of civil society, universalize social problems as global problems, and to rationalize the professional development of repertoire diffusion.

Data for this analysis was drawn from archival and web sources, interviews, observation, and manuals and literature provided by INGOs. I personally visited and collected data from the archives of Peace Brigades International (PBI) and Nonviolence International (NI) and received several archival documents in the mail from a senior activist at International Fellowship of Reconciliation.

The first case-study analysis is centered solely on the study of PBI archival documents. PBI is a nonviolent intervention force founded in 1981 that currently has over 60 field volunteers placed in one of four countries, Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, and

Nepal. In the past they have also had projects in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, North America, the Balkans, and Haiti. The Guatemala case analysis also relies in part on data from Mahoney and Eguren's (1997) study of PBI that incorporates interviews with dozens of Guatemalan activists and key political players as well as participant observation and archival study.

Data for the comparative analysis of nonviolent INGOs comes from several organizational archival sources and focuses on a handful of prominent nonviolent INGOs. Nonviolence International was also founded in 1981 but acts more as an education and training organization while also funding several big research and tactical development projects. Through a decentralized network of satellite organizations, it has supported numerous movements in the United States, the Middle East, Russia and the New Independent states, the Balkans, Latin America, Northern and West Africa, and Southeast Asia. I also draw on in-depth interviews with experienced organizers about their involvement in Peace Brigades International, Nonviolence International, The International Fellowship for Reconciliation, Christian Peacemaker Teams, War Resisters International, The International Center for Nonviolent Conflict, and Witness for Peace as well as several local NGOs in different countries in which INGOs work.

I. INGOS AND POLITICAL PROCESS

If a country's global ties to INGOs so significantly shape the possibilities and paths for claimsmaking, what then is the particular role that INGOs play? How do INGOs expand the global nonviolence repertoire? To provide a thick description of how an INGO shapes repertoire expansion, I begin with a case analysis of Peace Brigades International in Guatemala.

PBI in Guatemala

Peace Brigades International was founded in 1981 as a next step in international nonviolent peacemaking efforts. Prior international organizational attempts at third-party nonviolent intervention (the broader movement of which was reviewed in chapter 3) directly shaped the conceptualization, development, and implementation of PBI's programs. PBI's organizational predecessor, World Peace Brigades, had been active in the 1960s expanding international support for nonviolent resistance among African independence movements, and mediating conflicts in Bangladesh, along the Indo-China border, and in the brief Cyprus Resettlement Project (see Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber 2000). Partly due to lack of funding and inter-organizational complications, World Peace Brigade fizzled out after only a few years of operation. The veterans of the international peace movement who founded PBI brought decades of knowledge and experience into this new organization which was to improve on earlier accompaniment efforts in several respects. PBI aimed to methodically assess areas of need, formally train, and visibly place international witnesses who would accompany communities through nonviolent efforts at conflict wagering and resolution. It would also aim to better utilize formal diplomatic contacts with states and intergovernmental organizations. Guatemala was its first project country and its first peacemaking team was installed there in March of 1983.

PBI entered Guatemala at the height of an intense political repression against organizers of labor, land, or any iteration of citizen-led human rights. Following its independence, Guatemala had experienced waves of dictatorship and military repression punctuated by two brief stints of democratic activity- in 1944 when peaceful

demonstrations precipitated the election of a democratic leader who introduced a series of social-democratic reforms and in 1966 following another democratic election. From these earlier periods of democratic mobilizing, a nascent structure of civil society organizations was set in place, including labor unions, campesinos, student groups, and an array of social organizations that worked for democracy on various levels (Konefal 2010). But a brutal military regime in the 1970s targeted the elimination of leftist leaders. The 1976 earthquake that claimed 27,000 victims added to the early 1970s political assassination count of 50,000 and left more than 1 million people homeless. Despite this added devastation, the political crackdown continued. In 1981 alone, some 11,000 people were said to be executed for political reasons and this was just the beginning of a new "scorched earth" strategy which blazed through the countryside in search of land seizure and the elimination of organizing efforts. The military state co-opted territories rich in natural resources and killed thousands more that resisted or stood in their way. In 1982 the brutal General Efrain Rios Montt gained power through a military coup (BBC 2012).

It is therefore no wonder that during their assessment of the local civil society in Guatemala, the response to PBI's inquiry into the desire for international support was an exasperated "yes". With little resources and only 4 volunteers (2 of whom were last-minute replacements for the original 2 that dropped out), the team set up a house in Guatemala City. The volunteers were witness to the brutalities -including the gruesome torture and assassination of the people they worked to protect, subject to numerous threats -including the bombing of their house (luckily no one was home at the time), and the project survived a brief banishment from the country. Through the political tumult and on the efforts of dozens of consecutively placed in-country volunteers linked into a

network of thousands of international advocates and supporters, PBI was still able to positively shape the local political process and foster the growth of a mass nonviolent movement. Below I discuss each of the ways PBI shaped political process as we understand it through McAdam's domestic model, while also adding an explanation of how transnational forces shape the relationship of domestic level political processes. And I elaborate on two mechanisms in particular that point to the unique contribution of INGOs: the importance of the tactical knowledge imparted by specialized organizations and the effect of INGOs' international authority in buffering local repression.

a. Indigenous Organizational Strengthening

When PBI arrived in 1983 there simply were no indigenous organizations that had yet survived the violence and the terror to be openly organizing a mass resistance movement. As international witnesses who could provide accompaniment and protection to locals, PBI's presence and involvement with local activists made broad indigenous organizing possible. In some resects this meant giving new political space to groups that were, until their arrival, organizing clandestinely, like labor unions, campesino groups and university students. In their exploratory analysis of the feasibility of the Guatemala project, PBI had in fact already spoken with many underground resisters throughout the country. These resisters communicated that the presence of INGOs could be vital to making organization possible.

> The team was told in various interviews that 'this is certainly the time for such a team to be present in Guatemala,' that 'the next six months could determine whether any real changes will come about in the current structures', that, 'politically speaking, this is the time to struggle, this is the moment,' that 'your presence could be very, very important'. (PBI Report 1982).

Throughout their stay PBI traveled the countryside making contacts with various other organizations and soon offered several series of workshops on organizing, some of them lasting for 6 or 8 sessions at 6 hours a day and covering topics like political negotiation, conflict resolution, and diplomacy, as well as logistical workshops on organizational dynamics and consensus building.

This support to indigenous organizations also meant providing the template for and aiding in the development of new organizations. In their historical account of the PBI Guatemala project, Mahoney and Egueren (1997) detail how PBI encouraged and assisted a frustrated and desperate group of mothers and wives of the disappeared to establish their own advocacy organization.

> I responded, "It seems to me that you have done everything possible, legally, in this situation. You have to understand that we're guests in this country, and we can't organize Guatemalans. But it was our hope that if any group organized, we might be able to help them. Don't you know other people in this same situation?" (Mahoney and Eguren, 1997:18)

Upon being encouraged the authors note how this initial claimant spoke with and recruited others in her situation, and PBI in turn provided some workshops on how to set up an organization and how to make claims on behalf of their missing loved ones. PBI built a particularly close relationship in these early years with the organization that developed under their protection and support, Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM) and was instrumental in making their national and international success as a movement organization possible.

Soon after the project got going, PBI Guatemala's monthly reports were filled with details of appointments with civil society groups all through the country. Meetings with labor unions were frequent, and the reports recount a surge in strikes for which PBI

team members became public supporters (and sometimes active observers). Meetings with church groups were also quite frequent, and soon details of meetings with protesting students, teachers, women's groups like GAM, indigenous and other civil society organizations peppered the project summaries of PBI's main activities in Guatemala. Monthly reports also detail meetings with and advocacy on behalf of student groups, teachers, farmworkers, and other women's groups modeled directly after GAM and based on the training that PBI provided them. Following the big initial GAM march, many strikes, marches, and other forms of protest of which PBI was a part were detailed in PBI reports for years to come.

b. Cognitive Liberatory Support

Second, PBI was instrumental in indigenous organizational strengthening, in part, because PBI provided the critical moral support for all those who had begun to realize that opportunities to act on grievances were imminent. In the classic political process model, cognitive liberation has been a critical mobilization concept that helps to re-theorize the earlier irrational theories about protest. Since the 1970s turn toward studying movements as rationally organized attempts to address long-held grievances (versus earlier "contagion" theories), scholars have emphasized how conditions and events co-mingle to create the right climate for collective organization. Cognitive liberation, the collective realization that success is possible and plausible, occurs at the nexus of collective sentiments and political processes. Major events and the involvement of prominent actors in those events reveal to an aggrieved people the possibility and path for resistance.

In Guatemala, the long years of repression had failed to wipe out the grievances held by various constituencies of civil society, workers, landowners, women's groups, religious, and others. PBI was instrumental in the cognitive liberation process through its presence, its networking, its diplomacy, and its direct education and training programs. By sending Westerners to live among, observe, support, and advocate on behalf of civil Guatemalans, PBI challenged the rhetoric of democratic opening to be realized in the tolerance of the active organizing of civil groups. By communicating with groups throughout the country, PBI not only spread news of its presence and escort and training services but was also able to share news and information on other groups' grievances and plans for action, strengthening the web of solidarity and resources to be mobilized. One example illustrates the kind of vital moral support PBI facilitated.

One of PBI's field volunteers went to El Salvador on a fact-finding mission shortly after her arrival in Guatemala. Having met with a Salvadoran group of relatives of the disappeared, the PBI delegate brought back a recorded message of support for GAM from the Salvadoran COMADRES (Committee of Mothers of the Disappeared and Assassinated) in which the women directly urged GAM onto action and outlined specific steps they should take to be successful.

> You can start, as we started, by making a definitive decision to do something. Don't just think about it: try to make it happen. This drive that you feel to struggle for your children: put it in practice. Try to move forward… One of the first things you should do is visit the government and try to establish yourselves as a legal committee, so your work is not clandestine. That's how we earned our credibility, visiting the Legislative Assembly, the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, even the directors of the National Police and the wardens of the prisons. You visit them so they know that someone is watching, someone is looking out for the disappeared.

> There are so many things you can do! Our committee has taken over the Red Cross, the public parks, churches, embassies, even the Ministry of Justice…In 1980 we won the release of eleven political prisoners. We also forced the improvements in the conditions and feeding of political prisoners in jail…We hold press conferences for both the national and international media…We've gotten support from the churches, and from international groups… (Mahoney and Eguren 1997: 20)

PBI also modeled the behavior that would help movements to cognitively realize the path to liberation as a movement. By frequently meeting with officials at the national and local levels and monitoring the implementation of constitutional amendments, PBI set the precedent that civil resistance would be likely and should be tolerated and could in turn communicate to mobilizing groups their efforts to widen political spaces for organizing. Finally, by providing extensive resources for organizing, PBI shared the cognitive skills needed to bridge the gap between newly enacted (if even only rhetorically so) models for democracy, international support networks and the expectations they carry with them, and the form of local claimsmaking which would be considered effective and legitimate among those channels.

c. Fanning and Bridging Political Opportunities

Movements scholars typically conceive of political opportunities as political events and changes that occur extraneous to the movement. But PBI's work in Guatemala also reveals that INGOs are important at opening opportunities at multiple levels of the political process, both in the wider polity and within the initial mobilizing structure of a movement. The very initiation of the Guatemala project illustrates this effect. Part of the hustle to get folks down there by March of 1983, just months after the international organization's founding meeting, was to hold Rios Montt accountable to his international

declaration that the military siege would end and "a new democratic opening" would begin… in March of 1983. After Rios Montt's declaration, PBI made contacts with numerous civil society leaders in Guatemala and surrounding Central American countries as well as the former Guatemalan president and ambassador to Mexico, the president of the Guatemalan refugee commission in Mexico, the Guatemalan Council of State, the former Bishop of Quiche, and Guatemalan military officials. Again, in its exploratory team report, PBI clearly identified its role as wedging a real opening for organizing between Rios Montt's rhetorical proclamation and the *de facto* repression keeping the resistance movement dormant.

> While formal participation in the electoral process is the least likely option for opposition groups currently underground, it is clear that any relaxation of the current repression of all political action will see a renewed degree of popular activity on a variety of levels: exiles returning to the country, labor union, campesino and student organization, opposition political party registration, and the possible establishment of a new human rights commission within Guatemala independent of both the government and the armed left. At present no human rights group of any kind operates openly within the country. (PBI Report 1982)

During PBI's first project phase in Guatemala (they left in 1999 only to return upon request of civil society groups in 2001), they were constantly working to meet with local officials in the communities where groups were protesting, sometimes religious leaders, sometimes government officials, sometimes military leaders, and even private factory owners whose workers were striking. When students wanted to protest in the capital, PBI would ensure that they received the official permits to do so and that their efforts were not repressed by police. When power changed hands at the national level- be it through elections or one of many coups they were witness to- PBI would meet with national officials to review constitutional changes that should take place to implement

and expand human rights policies. As PBI settled into its role as an international observer force in Guatemala, it would regularly submit reports on the human rights situation to the US State Department, other international watchdog organizations like Amnesty International, and to the UN Special Rapporteur. When PBI pulled out of Guatemala 16 years later, it counted its role as opening political opportunities for such a civil society to flourish as its greatest success.

> Despite this constant repression we have all endured over the years, we have seen how organizations of indigenous, campesinos, unions, women, religious, and even the office of the Human Rights Ombudsmen have grown and advanced, expanding the network of civil society with presence, and interlocutor capacity and great determination in pursuing a strong and lasting peace in Guatemala. (PBI Report 1999)

d. Mobilizing Extraneous Resources

While INGOs bring scarce financial support to often desperate economies, INGOs help local organizations in identifying and effectively mobilizing new financial, social, and political resources. When speaking of resource mobilization it is important to keep in mind that nonviolent INGOs' commitment to impartiality would otherwise limit the acceptability of directly financially investing in organizing groups. But in the early years of the Guatemala project the offer of access to the PBI building as a meeting space and use of its equipment for international telegrams was a critical lifeline to formally integrate GAM into civil society networks beyond giving them the bare necessity of an actual physical location in which they could safely organize. In some cases, the ability to arrange a way out of the country was another valuable resource to a movement whose leaders' lives were often threatened. In other cases, PBI was able to arrange European

and North American speaking tours for local organizers, who could then build up transnational support networks and draw visibility to their causes.

Although these nonmaterial resources PBI offered were invaluable to organizing, they also sometimes facilitated the flow of material resources. At least a handful of monthly project reports from the late 1980s and 1990s note local requests for network access to development organizations that would invest in local civil society groups. Investment in the project also acted as a funnel for different types of resources to the groups PBI worked with. One report notes the granting of over $30,000 to the Guatemalan project by the Canadian International Development Agency, and although I could not find the exact paper trail on how it was spent, it was slated to help local organizations find the resources they needed to publicize their cause internationally. The concerted lobbying PBI did at the United Nations also directed some UN assistance to the Guatemala civil organizations. In addition to receiving a team of researchers, investigators, diplomats, and advocates for the peace process, they received ample assistance in setting up a national human rights Ombudsmen office as well as a series of Truth and Reconciliation committees that aided afflicted peoples in achieving social reparations for the massacres that swept through their communities.

Tying Resources to Opportunities

Importantly, PBI's work in Guatemala challenges how we think about the development of political process as a process embedded in global relationships. PBI's work in Guatemala illustrates that external actors help forge the mobilization of new resources to the opening of new political opportunities. One of the most pivotal political

opportunities for Guatemalan civil society was the international diplomatic pressure placed on the government to negotiate a peace process with civil society groups, which eventually occurred between 1994 and 1996 under the direction of the United Nations (see Jonas 2000). PBI had begun in the early 1980s to publicize the abuses that were occurring under the aegis of the Guatemalan military state. They counted among their first successes the publication of a 1984 New York Times piece on the repression in Guatemala (based on reports they had drafted) that followed even after the "democratic opening" was said to have occurred. They also worked from early on to spread the idea among influential international actors that aid and investment should be linked to the development of a democratic process in Guatemala. Their project reports were circulated among other INGOs like Amnesty International that began to intensify public excoriation of the abuses human rights activists endured, amplifying the international attention Guatemalan conflicts received.

These other INGOs provided instrumental ties to policy makers that had proven sympathetic to the work of peacemakers. From the Friends Committee on National Legislation, for example, PBI was given a list of Congressman (and their contact details) that might support the work of PBI Guatemala. The document's author encouraged PBI to work within a broader INGO network to develop diplomatic pressure that would impose investment sanctions where Guatemalan human rights work continued to experience repression. In Europe, PBI country offices circulated the project bulletins among country members and eventually organized advocates to also petition their governments to place diplomatic and economic pressure on Guatemala. By the late 1980s PBI had gained ECOSOC consultative status at the United Nations and became an

important reference for information leading to the pursuit of the peace process in Guatemala.

Thus, we see that PBI as an international actor has come to participate in all of the local dimensions of political process typically theorized as domestic in origin. Beyond transforming the Guatemalan political process on many levels, the case of PBI's work in Guatemala also points to two additional, important mechanisms that can be galvanized by external movement organizations. In national studies of how political process shapes movement emergence we tend to think of political opportunities being opened in the transformation of power to new, sympathetic policy makers or in the fragmentation of power that allows movements to find sympathizers among the antagonism between opponents. We tend to think of resources as pre-existing movement structures, consonant civil organizational networks, and access to funding among their social and political ties. We tend to think of major historical events (domestic events, that is,) as inciting cognitive liberation, people collectively reaching their threshold of tolerance for injustice and the opening of national political opportunities which shines light on the tangible possibility for people-led change. But in societies like Guatemala during the 1980s the political process that would favor mobilization was highly compromised by the devastating poverty and brutal military repression.

I argue that it is therefore imperative to consider how opportunities opened by examining two additional aspects modifying the political process that international NGOs like PBI directly shape. I illustrate how these additional aspects help to expand the classic political process model in Figure 14 which articulates the role of INGOs in local political process. I have added to the classic political process model with my discussion above that

details how as an INGO PBI has directly opened political opportunities, facilitated the mobilization of resources, the development of indigenous organizations, and cognitive liberation. But I argue here that through their international presence and legitimacy as INGOs, PBI was able to directly buffer the repression of a local regime and as tactical specialist organizations PBI diffused nonviolence, instilling new tactical knowledge for positive social change.

e. Buffering Repression

One of first positive effects that PBI had on efforts to mobilize in Guatemala was the ability to buffer the brutality of the military and paramilitary repression of nonviolent organizers. The early work of PBI in Guatemala centered on opening opportunities for human rights organizing to develop and flourish. This potential effect of establishing an international observer presence was clear going into the project,

> Beyond indications of a guarded return to at least an increased level of political activity, the team's interviews almost universally concluded with a suggestion that the presence of an international monitoring team would be important in its capacity to report first hand abuses of political and human rights, that it 'could save some lives' and would be an inhibiting factor in the repression of groups attempting to organize and exercise their rights in the new period. (PBI Report 1982)

And indeed this is the concept driving accompaniment as a tactic of nonviolent resistance. As PBI has so carefully articulated over the years, its principal objective is a general commitment "to make space for peace" to occur, linking the ability of outsiders to buffer repression to the positive opening of political opportunities for insiders to organize.

> The accompaniment that PBI has developed in Guatemala is implemented in accordance with the principles of non-violence, non-interference and

> non-partisanship. We practice physical accompaniment, the lobbying of authorities as well as of the diplomatic community and publish information on the work undertaken by the PBI field team and on relevant aspects of Guatemalan news. Whilst respecting the principle of non-interference in the affairs of the state, we express our concerns about the proper implementation of human rights and on the right to defend such legal standards (PBI Open Letter, 2011).

This insistence that states allow democracy to occur among civil society initiatives works in great part because of the physical placement of international others among organizers who otherwise risk their lives to challenge repressive regimes. Repression is buffered by the authority and the legitimacy of the Northern countries and organizations to which volunteers are directly tied, countries and organizations that hold power to condemn errant states and castigate them with economic or political sanctions. The presence of obvious outsiders stands as a strong reminder that the work of these activists is sanctioned by an international community that values human rights and civil society development. As one 1987 PBI report to the Canadian government details,

> 'A foreigner accompanies me at all times as a means of protection,' says Nineth de Garcia, president of GAM, grade school teacher, and a mother of a four year old daughter. Her husband, a union organizer, was 'disappeared' in 1984. 'The mentality of those who oppress us is that a gringo is worth a lot. According to them, as a Guatemalan, I'm worth less than nothing.' (PBI Diplomatic Letter to Canadian Government, 1984).

This is not to suggest that other formal political forces were not at work in mitigating the long-standing culture of violence that had plagued Central America, but to suggest that what has constituted openings in political opportunities is wider than what has occurred purely at the national level; and it is directly affected by the ability of interested political outsiders to lessen the brutalities closing off mobilizing potential.[21]

[21] It is also important to note that transnational forces can be held culpable for supporting an environment and culture of violence to flourish in the first place, the 1954 CIA-led overthrow of democratically elected Guatemalan president Arbenz being a blaring case in point.

There was already a small flood of international NGOs, for example, that had brought civil society ideals (along with substantial financial assistance) into Guatemala following the 1976 earthquake (Bebbington and Thiele 1993). In the 1980s the U.S. began to tie foreign aid to democracy promotion in the region -however contested its operationalization of democracy might have been (Carothers 1999). Later the meetings initiated at Esquipulas and the second accord which commenced in 1987 grew out of a series of declarations for "global pacification" and democracy in the region (Dunkerly 1994). The Spanish government hosted the first peace talks between the Guatemalan government and rebel forces in Spain in 1987 and later, in 1993, the United Nations began to facilitate a peace accords and truth and reconciliation process between the government, military and paramilitary forces and civil society (USIP 2012). But crucial to add to this history of formal diplomatic and political changes is how civil society groups (and the post-earthquake flood of NGOs should be counted among them) have enhanced democratic structuration from within society where rhetorical affirmation of building a good state stopped short.

f. Instilling Tactical Knowledge

An additional mediating effect instigated by nonviolent INGOs is their role in the diffusion of nonviolence know-how. The transmission of tactical skills and knowledge therefore adds a last crucial dimension to how INGOs shape political process and mobilization. The case of PBI in Guatemala illustrates that the work of instilling new, globally derived tactical knowledge among local populations is pivotal to both the development of cognitive liberation and the endurance of indigenous organizations. In

PBI historian Charles Walker's early overview of the benefits of organizing an international force for nonviolent change, he argues that international activists bring the knowledge and experience from hundreds of mass resistance efforts into each new project (PBI archives, undated). Activists that work for INGOs like PBI, while perhaps lacking knowledge of the particulars of any one local conflict, have developed expertise on how nonviolence works across political and cultural borders. And they have developed a systematic way of harnessing and utilizing transnational capital, that is, the language, networks, and resources that can tie local conflicts into a global arena for resolving social problems and building good societies.

Figure 14. The Role of INGOs in Local Political Process



Above we have considered cognitive liberation as it is typically described as the process whereby activists realize the potential and the path for resistance and proceed to mobilize on their own initiation. But, in the global web of mobilization, the way in which the path to resistance is framed and identified and the potential for resistance occurs through a learning process which entails formal, systematic and informal, but concerted

efforts at diffusion. Tactical knowledge is imparted to movements through projects and trainings, through the model of resistance demonstrated by international others, and through the direct intervention of international and authoritative outsiders. In transnational organizations like PBI, which exemplifies what Walker points to as a carry-over of activist resources from earlier organizations and projects, organizers inject a wealth of cumulative knowledge and experience into the systematic training of international volunteers. These volunteers are trained as trainers who then carry valuable tactical knowledge into the field and share it with the local organizers that they support and accompany. By meeting with government and military authorities, international activists model the methodical steps international authorities expect local civil resisters to employ. By developing and administering workshops and seminars on organizing and decision-making, diplomatic process and international human rights law, and conflict negotiation and peaceful resolution among a range of other tactical topics, international volunteers share perhaps the greatest resource they can offer, knowledge of nonviolence and its mechanisms for success under the right set of conditions. And by intervening to "make space for" civil society organizing of a particular form, international NGOs help to cultivate tactical development in the fields in which they work.

Figuring out how to do this type of formal education was difficult in the early days of the Guatemala project. The team went in with the resolve not to be like the Peace Corps, replicating the Northern model of development through a standardized educational system that may or may not serve the unique needs of the local population, or any other developmental organization that brings in a clear script for the best model of learning and developing. But this proved challenging. In an early reflection on the peace education

they were doing, one activist writes, “It is impossible to carry out a workshop in education without imposing external values and concepts.” The writer then acknowledges that such peace education is a trade-off because the hope is that the international activists are bringing a gift that will help the local activists in their political and social objectives, even if it means a change in claimants’ way of thinking about and addressing their grievances. “We must always be sufficiently humble to question whether the positive aspects of what we offer are sufficient to be worth the risk of the negative”, and that “negative” is to state the relationship of dependence of local claimants on an external advocacy authority and how to make nonviolent peace claims. “We offer services which ostensibly confront inequalities and injustices, while at the same time there will always be a part of our behavior (conscious or unconscious) which will tend to reinforce those same inequalities” (PBI archives document 475).

Ultimately, PBI Guatemala realized that the local groups lacked empowerment because they lacked the tools to effect a change. And they came to terms with the trade-off between imposing external influence on local organizing cultures and the importance of sharing international organizing tools and allowing local groups to hone them to be appropriately used in their local struggle. As one memo reflection of this process details,

> Sharing experience and knowledge in the use of nonviolent methods is an important part of PBI and its teams working in the field. Workshops and other programs may be organized together with local groups and individuals to discover self-confidence and dignity; overcome fear; develop the capacity for communication, dialogue, analysis and methods of mediation, negotiation, and reconciliation. (PBI Field Report, undated)

Nevertheless, this involved some significant re-defining of the experience to be aligned with and informed by global frames for identifying, understanding, and addressing social problems, frames which pointed to nonviolence as the best path for resolution. As an

external authority on how to build democracy and human rights through nonviolence, PBI worked to bridge local efforts to global frames. In a workshop on the connection between Human Rights and Nonviolence, participants communicated that,

> The Human Rights have as their base the construction of peace, liberty, and justice in the world. They were declared with this objective by the United Nations in 1948. They are rights that pertain to the personhood of human beings- they are not given solely for states. The principals, or principal rights, speak of equality and dignity of the person and of peoples, they speak of fighting for self-determination of persons and of peoples. These principles are also foundational to the struggle for nonviolence that has as its objectives self-determination of persons and of peoples. This fight includes a way of life and in its methods, a political form that respects the dignity of opponents and which tries to construct justice through equality of persons and peoples. (PBI archives, 1987).

In this sense the global work of nonviolent INGOs to diffuse acts of nonviolence as a conduit for expanding global consciousness into local civil societies. For Robertson (1992), who pioneered sociological exploration of the process of global social integration, “consciousness” is a vital mechanism through which global expansion and integration occurs. He explained that the more social actors participate in global processes, the more they structure their actions and identities around a global framework. Likewise, the more social actors become embedded in this framework, the more they become conscious of the world as one society. As specialists in tactical repertoire diffusion, nonviolent INGOs spread the framework through which social actors become increasingly positioned in global society while also enhancing their consciousness of that expanded positionality, from the IGOs, states, and militaries they lobby to the local organizations and individuals mobilizing for change on the basis of universalizing concepts. In this sense that INGOs help to expand global consciousness, we must

understand the process of cognitive liberation as also embedded in a process of globalization.

Ultimately, what I find in how PBI has shaped the local political process in Guatemala remains to be applied to other case analyses. As data on the global dimensions of politics and movements becomes more plentiful, I suggest that, as some anthropologists have done, even local level analyses give attention to the global processes in which local change is embedded (Wilk 1995). McAdam's political process model, for example, developed in the study of the U.S. civil rights movement, must be expanded through a global lens to account for non-U.S. cases that are highly embedded n global relationships. To that end, McAdam noted in his preface to the second edition that he had previously failed to mention the international political pressure placed on the U.S. which had to navigate its role as democracy promoter in spite of maintaining legal discrimination at home among a disapproving international audience. This transnational criticism of Jim Crow acted as one of the transnational lenses which amplified and buffered repression of the civil rights movement. But Chabot (2000) more pointedly details the extensive process through which tactical skills and knowledge was imparted by the Indian independence movement to the U.S. civil rights movement over several decades. Knowledge was taught and "learned" he explains, through formally organized visits between Gandhi and consociates and U.S. civil rights activists like John Haynes Homes, W.E.B. DuBois, Howard Thurman and Benjamin Mays. This transmission occurred to other Western countries as well, the touring and tactical promotion efforts of Indian activists inciting trans-national cognitive liberation through speaking tours,

conferences, and the publication of strategic and tactical writings organized by influential INGOs like the International Fellowship for Reconciliation (Scalmer 2011).

A great deal of what INGOs do, therefore, centers on cultural transmission that becomes linked to political mobilization and efforts at social change. In the first historical part of my analysis of the globalization of nonviolence I concluded by arguing that this cultural dimension has been a vital part of the process of global repertoire emergence and expansion and I noted there and in my overview of INGOs how nonviolent organizations have played an active role in institutionalizing these expansion efforts. I conclude my study here by unpacking the substantive activities of these INGOs, bringing the conversation full circle to explain how nonviolent INGOs have helped to proliferate the cultural opportunities for and structures of global nonviolence.

II. INGOS AND WORLD CULTURE

In my qualitative study of nonviolent INGOs, I collected a wealth of thick, descriptive data on how INGOs operate, from the Nonviolence International basement archives to field interviews with activists in Thailand, the Caucuses, Africa, Nepal, and Colombia, to name just a few of their field projects. There is much more that I could say about what compels global activists to dedicate their lives to traveling the world with tools for social change than the space remaining here permits. And there are many rich, details of this important work that I cannot fit into a final assessment of INGOs and the globalization of nonviolence. Rather, I will conclude with one last general discussion of how nonviolent INGOs have acted as carriers of world culture in three dimensions that I argue have been significant to the development of the global repertoire of nonviolence in

world society: 1) the efforts they make at expanding the frame of global politics and at, 2) universalizing social problems, and 3) the ways in which they have professionalized the diffusion of tactics for peace.

Expanding the Frame of Global Politics

In the study of social movements, "frame analysis" has come to comprise a third pillar among the attention given to political opportunities and resource mobilization. Framing, or the development of interpretive packages of meaning, shapes the ways that movements identify, understand, and address the social problems they oppose (Benford and Snow 2000). While frame analysis too often comprises a descriptive identification of the public rhetoric of movements (Benford 1993), frame analysis can also be applied to a deeper cultural assessment of how movements build identity and beliefs and practices. As Gamson explains (1995), framing can be conceptualized as akin to a picture frame that outlines an argument, or it can be conceptualized as akin to a house frame, the central structure around which the house is constructed. This latter approach to framing is compatible with world society theory that views the cultural expansion of globalization as a form of structuration. In identifying how nonviolent INGOs have "expanded the frame" for global political interactions, therefore, I wish to conjure this image of the frame on which a house is built. If the global moral order addressed in Part I constitutes an essential component of the structure of world society, then INGOs become one of the extensions through which the "house" for a global nonviolent movement is constructed.

To talk of how nonviolent INGOs expand the frame for global politics, then, is to discuss the expansion of world culture through the new relationships that nonviolent

INGOs have facilitated new relationships and the ways in which they have infused those relationships with meaning. There are three ways in which I have found nonviolent INGOs to expand the frame of global politics: 1) by creating new, global-local interactions, 2) by organizing these new social worlds around the diffusion of nonviolence and, 3) by dissolving the boundaries that act as barriers to global integration.

One of the primary activities of INGOs like PBI is to engage in, model, and facilitate multilevel lobbying. These lobbying efforts help to integrate the otherwise loosely coupled social circles of intergovernmental bodies, states, militaries, and a variety of local actors around the central objective of INGOs' work, which is to make space for nonviolence. In an interview with a PBI activist in Colombia, she explained the range of duties she had taken on that month. These included not only her regular escort work, but also drafting and submitting a report to the United Nations, to the support network of IGOs with which PBI works, to the various national country groups in Europe and the United States and Canada, and she had conducted meetings with the governor and the military commander in the town in which the project was located. At each step of the way she communicated to all of these parties these multi-level connections she was facilitating- so that the global level officials were aware of her efforts to directly communicate with local level officials and the local level officials were aware that her report from their meeting would be nationally and internationally publicized. As she explained to me, "The idea is that there is pressure coming from different fronts on to the Colombian government so that it feels obligated to protect the organization and the activists that we protect and accompany".

And this type of transnational mobilization is typical of PBI's work in other fields, where the organization inserts itself at the nexus of local conflicts and global conflict resolution efforts to encourage a basic agreement around the concept of nonviolence. Where positive openings to the implementation of nonviolence are achieved, then accolades are given. For example, in PBI Mexico, PBI praises local civil society alliances for building their own "protection mechanism" defense force. But more often the advocacy work involves the shaming of infringements against the right of citizens to protest nonviolently. A look at the rolling "latest news reel" on any PBI project page is filled with such public excoriations. The news from Nepal currently reviews an Asian Legal Rights Centre Human Rights report condemning the Nepalese state for failing to address extra-judicial killings, details United Nations concern over the appointment of a Cabinet Minister alleged to have committed human rights violations, provides a link to an International Crisis Group report that criticizes logical inconsistencies in the new peace process proposal, publicizes an Amnesty International call to respect basic freedoms during the Tibetan holiday season, and reports on the failure of the UN peace mission to break the political deadlock.

Nonviolent Peaceforce is another organization that facilitates new, global local interactions around the theme of nonviolence. NP was founded in 2002 and is a nonviolent intervention organization that places trained teams of nonviolent civilian peacekeeping forces in an area of conflict to deter violence, provide safe housing for victims, build a communication link for peaceful conflict resolution among opponents, negotiate the return of kidnapped family members, and provide opposing factions a place to negotiate peace. Their general strategy hinges on building up local capacity to interact

with and integrate into global networks that can then alter the local political process from the “bottom-up”. From the strategy page on the NP Sudan project, the organization explains,

> NP is a global leader in the practice of unarmed civilian peacekeeping, with a solid track record of success in conflict zones such as Guatemala, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. The effectiveness of civilian third‐party interventions in reducing and preventing violence has been well documented, but the capacity of local actors in conflict‐affected environments to apply this approach is often limited. In South Sudan, NP and its partners will collaborate to build Sudanese‐led conflict prevention teams consisting of 6‐9 Sudanese nationals supported by 2‐3 international advisors.

The hope is that, at the very least, these expansion efforts bring all of these bodies are together in a conversation about how best to support nonviolence. Whether they totally buy into the repertoire or not (an underlying concern when dealing with targeted states and militaries), targets are asked to orient their activities to support the repertoire’s expansion. These local-to-global linkages are activated in times of crisis to heighten the pressure placed on targets and enhance transnational diplomacy between targets and resisters. For example, another INGO working in Colombia responded to threats placed on their international workers by promising to publicize the atrocities to global audiences.

> We intend to draw the world's attention to the risk that [human rights] advocates face and we intend to turn Barrancabermeja into a city that is the centre of international attention.
> This behaviour against international volunteers in Colombia represents a significant deterioration in the human rights situation.

Admittedly, INGOs cannot force a particular understanding of or value for nonviolence in the hearts of the perpetrators of violence. But they can hold them accountable within a circle of interaction where those violent acts are collectively considered morally reprehensible. This moral expansion of a global nonviolence network in turn causes local

authorities to project their responses to global audiences, as they perceive their actions now under the scrutiny of international others with whom they must also interact for general economic and political exchange.

In the same Colombian conflict, which later resulted in a trial of captured guerillas, the defense's testimony was published in international newspapers and testimony pointed a finger back at the international NGOs for exasperating and manipulating the local conflict to the detriment of the very communities NGOs purported to protect. The defense claimed that "the population was exploited and peace-niks helped the terrorists" (Wall Street Journal 2009). This type of dispute over violence more commonly characterizes debates between INGOs and targets, targets that rarely go on record opposing nonviolence but rather argue over who is culpable for the onset of violence. To point to another example, after the international NGO community was up in arms over the Israeli raid on the Palestine-bound flotilla in 2010 (in which 10 flotilla riders were killed), Prime Minister Netanyahu defended Israeli actions by explaining,

> We succeeded in [separating war materials from humanitarian aid] peacefully with five of the six ships. The sixth ship, the largest, which had hundreds of people on it, not only did not cooperate in this effort peacefully, they deliberately attacked the first soldiers who came on the ship. They were mobbed, they were clubbed, they were beaten, stabbed, there was even a report of gunfire. And our soldiers had to defend themselves, defend their lives, or they would have been killed.

In either testimony, terrorism is delegitimated, and the dispute centers on where the onus for wrong action should rightfully be placed.

In a more explicit instance of the opening of local processes to global authorities, an international "Permanent Peoples'" tribunal was established in Colombia in which civil officials and servants from countries all over the world met in Bogota to pass

judgment on who might have been at fault in the threats, massacres, and general violence experienced by targeted Colombian communities. In the end, the tribunal condemned the Colombian state for a host of human rights violations and crimes against humanity, 43 multinational corporations who were found to be connected to paramilitary organizations, and foreign support for the tools and techniques of the violence, most especially the U.S. Plan Colombia. And yet, following the build-up of international mobilization around human rights abuses in Colombia in the early 1990s, the U.S. State Department has publicly pledged support for "NGOs that are specifically focused on protecting human rights" (State Department 2000).

Not surprisingly, therefore, the authority wielded by nonviolent INGOs is met with mixed reactions. On the one hand, states and other targets pressured by nonviolent INGOs to make space for the repertoire's implementation often make positive public statements of support for human rights work or shirk culpability in having suppressed it. And a fair share of leaders have become active supporters of the movement. On the other hand, the authority of INGOs threatens the sovereignty of how states deal with insurgents. Where INGO involvement is perceived as a threat, INGOs are asked to leave the country, as has happened to PBI in Guatemala and Sri Lanka and to at least one individual activist I interviewed when returning to do nonviolence work in Indonesia. In extreme instances, INGOs are not permitted to enter the country at all. I have spoken with several activists who have mentioned clandestine work to support resistance among diaspora communities and individuals working to build democratic peace movements underground. INGOs give them the barest of resources, training, literature, translations, and network support, all off the record for the safety of those activists. But the hope is

that the seed is planted and- under the right set of conditions- will grow into a civil society movement oriented toward nonviolent organizing and global human rights.

One final, important dimension of how INGOs carry world culture is through the negotiation of political and cultural boundaries that can act as sites of conflict among global local interactions. To create new global social worlds essentially means redrawing social boundaries, the social schema or categories that define right ways of relating in society. Because their work is in part aimed at using international authority to reshape local processes, INGOs have learned the skills of navigating different global, local, political and cultural social worlds.

> Sometimes I wore the peace education in the curriculum hat when I was working with a local peace education organization. I was the project coordinator. But then at other times I wore the local hat and in other times the international hat. And the local organization did the same. Whatever seemed to give them better protection. I also helped to get the Peace Brigades International project started in Indonesia… So then I would tell them [the guerillas] hey- we're not supporting Indonesian nationalism here – leave this program alone. Then I would put the other hat on- and we also have a peace brigades international team coming in here so don't take them out. (Peter, international activist speaking on his work in Burma and Indonesia)

That is, by finding acceptable grounds for entry, this activist helped to expand the frame under which nonviolence could be practiced. Another activist explained to me that he had to start an INGO because with only a local NGO his nonviolence training and education work was hindered by too many obstacles. "In order for people to take you seriously, you must be working as an international body." (Steven, discussing his history in activism in the Caucuses). And yet, just as this activist built up international authority and could draw on his international education and networks to boost his status, he also retained his status as a local; so he held legitimacy in both worlds. He grew up in the country in

which he worked and spoke its and many surrounding countries' languages. This is important because many INGOs' non-local activists struggle with the boundaries that limit the implementation of nonviolence, a repertoire that global activists believe to be ultimately the best form of claimsmaking.

> You know sometimes people would say to us- 'well you're an international organization and that makes you an outsider. What is your interest here?' But that's just a way to detract from the real issues- the real issue over violence and nonviolence. (Simeon, international activist speaking on his work in Burma)

And so the point of entry is crucial to confronting and redrawing boundaries around which nonviolence may be implemented.

The common ground built through religious orientations is one example of how shared frameworks activate new ways for nonviolence to cross cultural and political borders. For example, one activist that I interviewed who worked with Christian Peacemaker Teams in Iraq explained that Human Rights Watch experienced strong resistance to cooperating in their surveys when trying to document human rights abuses after the U.S. invasion. So they approached the CPT team for assistance. When the CPT began to speak with people about their experiences they initially encountered the same reticence to talk openly but it dissolved after some fruitful dialogue with locals. John explained that people often asked,

> "why would you endanger yourself to come here? You know, that's crazy, that's irresponsible to your family"…or they might say, "you know as eight people you're trying to stop the human rights violations committed by the world's most powerful militaries, so it's pointless- just go home."

He then went on to explain to me that being a Christian organization in the Middle East was a big plus. "We had the ability to connect to other people that were identifying themselves with a certain religion." He said,

> I actually felt like we were welcomed more being Christians than we would have been if we had no religious affiliations at all…we worked with several Muslim groups that- they might disagree with our beliefs but they understood where we were coming from. I heard several groups say stuff about the secular human rights groups- Amnesty International, for example- saying, you know, 'we don't understand where they're coming from- why are they doing this?' whereas if we explain that we are doing it because we're Christians they can understand that.

Eventually, some of the groups that requested nonviolent training from CPT formed their own local organizations modeled after the INGO but run entirely by Iraqis, one called "Muslim Peacemaker Team" and another eventually developed called "La Unf" which is the Arabic term for nonviolence. These groups bring together people from all over the country for training and translate and distribute materials on nonviolent resistance and conflict resolution. They also now network with several of the nonviolent INGOs that I studied. This connectedness through religious affiliations may have also positively shaped the ability of IFOR, a Christian reconciliation organization, to go into Iran as no other nonviolent INGO has been able to do, (although IFOR's outward denunciation of U.S. foreign policy toward Iran probably has likely also helped ease the tensions with the Iranian state).

Universalizing Social Problems

Another important way that nonviolent INGOs build roads for world cultural expansion is through the universalization of social problems. Nonviolent INGOs carry world culture in their efforts to universalize the identification and understanding of, and the approach to the world's social problems. And these efforts at universalization firmly situate the work of nonviolent INGOs in the global moral order that sacralizes humanity as one collective and views human rights as the realization of that sacrality.

Universalization is pursued through articulating nonviolence as the only means toward realizing human collectivity, finding unity in the diversity of social and cultural conflicts, and in affirming a universal responsibility for the suffering of others.

At the most general level of promotion and advocacy work, nonviolent INGOs advocate for nonviolence as a superior form of addressing and resolving conflicts. Here nonviolence is pitted against violence as the only effective remedy for conflict and disunity. Nonviolence is construed as the way to realize our common humanity and honor it. As one IFOR reflection on the lessons to be learned from the Philippines struggle notes,

> Our global interconnectness means that there is no longer any localized armed conflict; there is an ever present danger of such conflicts not only in spreading to neighboring countries but drawing in the superpowers as well, as we see in Central America, the Middle East and South Africa today. No one, no matter how young or old, is safe from the scourge of modern warfare. Even the earth, indeed all life, is threatened.
> But there is another way! Ever so slowly we are choosing life, to discover means commensurate with our noble goals and our deepest professions of faith in the sacredness of life.

And in elucidating the link between “nonviolence and human unity”, nonviolent scholars Thomas Weber and Robert J. Burrowes (1991) write,

> According to this line of thought, not only does dehumanisation pave the way for violence, dehumanisation *is* violence. And those who do not believe in a social order based on violence should not be perpetuating it by dehumanising others. Nonviolence, therefore, precludes the concept of an enemy, of relating to another as a thing. To borrow Martin Buber's phrases, nonviolence can be characterised as defining a relationship, even in a conflict situation, in terms of 'I - You' rather than 'I - It'. While the way of violence works as a monologue, the substance of nonviolence is a dialogue: the aim is to convince the other party (while remaining open to being convinced oneself) and to bring them to discover another person like themself, rather than a mere adversary.

> In other words the struggle to overcome violence is important not only in order to achieve justice for the world but also to end violence *per se*. Violence does more than maintain structures of oppression, it also prevents the fulfillment of human potential by blocking one important prerequisite: the honest appreciation of shared humanity.

On a practical level, this general promotion of nonviolence means that INGOs spend a great deal of time translating this theme of working toward the realization of a common humanity into the particulars of their training efforts and field projects. This means finding unity in the many diverse interconnections that are formed between international advocates and those on whose behalf they advocate (much like the above quote of the CPT worker indicates). That is, nonviolent training serves not to obliterate cultural differences but reorganize them under one common category of humanity in need of reconciliation, humanity in need of healing, humanity in need of justice, etc. One NP recent trainee sums up this sentiment, “Nonviolence is like rain which never discriminates between the fields of the Muslims and the Hindus.” (NP Annual Report 2002)

A sea of training materials is available in the world of nonviolence. To give just an example, the office of Nonviolence International contains a small training booklet archive that covers several shelves on an entire wall- and these are just the ones that are most frequently requested and distributed to groups around the world- there must be thousands on this one wall. The content of these materials further illuminates how the global nonviolence movement works to build up a world culture that celebrates a common humanity and a duty to support nonviolence in the interest of that humanity.

There were several early international nonviolence conferences (1950s and on) that addressed training, the pragmatic goals of training, and the underlying philosophical

objectives of that training. One report from the Second International Conference on Peace and Nonviolent Action detailed the "International Declaration on Training in Nonviolence" adopted by participants (among them various nonviolent INGOs). The declaration begins- UN style- by outlining the common problems faced by humanity and the common solution to be found in nonviolence.

> **Realizing** that there is a steady erosion of basic human values like compassion, tolerance, austerity, unselfishness, love, universal responsibility, justice, freedom and environmental ethic which is mainly responsible for the ever-increasing trend of violence manifesting itself in all parts of the world today;
>
> **Believing** that it is our responsibility to discover the ways to avert the imminent catastrophe threatening our existence;
>
> **Recognizing** that nonviolence (ahimsa) has in it a potential to resolve this crisis and it is time we gave serious thought to the question of training people in nonviolent action for social change and universal peace;

The document then goes on to declare that the meaning of nonviolence incorporates a vision of global society as one society which can and should- through nonviolence- achieve harmony and unity.

> The meaning of nonviolence…is a holistic and positive concept encompassing all manifestations of life and society on the Earth. It includes both structural peace and ecological balance. Nonviolence implies active and dynamic love, respect and reverence for all human beings that inhabit this planet, attributes of equality, human dignity, poise, harmony and resistance to tyranny and injustice.
>
> Training in nonviolence is imperative in modern times. If we fail to evolve a viable scientific system to train and orient people in ahimsa, we should be failing in our most important duty to training people in humanity and society.
>
> To train people in nonviolence, we must combine the aspects of both individual and community growth and build an integrated personality with appropriate training of hand, head, and heart which will facilitate the structural and functional excellence of social development. The objective of this training is to enable all peoples to gain an insightful understanding

> of nonviolence and peace and the spiritual values on which they rest, equip them with skills for individual and mass nonviolent action, prepare them for democratic leadership in conflict resolution through nonviolence, and help them develop positive attitudes for harmonious living.

The document further elaborates on the whole social system which will impart nonviolence as a means and a goal for human living. And it affirms that the systematic training and development of a rational education system for nonviolence will be key.

> Education is the most important instrument for training in nonviolence because it shapes and moulds the human mind. Training in peace and nonviolence should be introduced in education both at the formal and informal levels because to bring about an altitudinal transformation.

In trainings led by "principled practitioners" these sentiments form the foundation of what trainers hope to achieve in imparting knowledge and skills to the participants. One of Jean and Hildegard Goss-Mayr's training manuals for trainers of nonviolent action begins by outlining the aims of active nonviolence:

- to confront the participants with the force of a nonviolence that liberates and transforms injustice;
- to help them to discover within themselves this force of life which is already present, to make it grow and deepen;
- to learn methods of nonviolent action and apply them to the actual problems, conflicts and injustices with which participants are confronted.
-

In another pedagogical overview written and distributed by the Goss-Mayrs, they write:

> Nonviolent methods are not used for pragmatic and tactical reasons, but as the consequence of a fundamental ethical attitude, based on respect for the human person, which is to say that the fundamental attitude, the means of struggle and the goal envisaged are inseparable.

In the more nuts-and-bolts training manuals, these sentiments are translated into practical guidelines for action. Actions should honor common humanity and promote the realization of human community even and especially among opponents. These manuals

are pragmatically instructing practitioners how to gain the power to achieve their social and political goals and how to defeat the power of their opponents. But among nonviolence practitioners this process of power struggle is located in a struggle over a particular cultural view of how the good society should work toward cooperation and the instilling of new values for the human community. One manual instructs those responding to personal violence in how to demonstrate the cooperative spirit.

> Seek to befriend your opponent's better nature; even the most brutal and brutalized among us have some spark of decency which the nonviolent defender can reach.
>
> Get your opponent talking and listen to what s/he says. Encourage him/her to talk about what s/he believes, wishes, fears…The listening is more important than what you say- keep the talk going and keep it calm.

Another manual includes a scientific flow chart that leads from cultural beliefs and practices through social structures and institutions through nonviolent action to the construction of a "new society". The manual explains how parallel social institutions based on new moral obligations and beliefs combined with noncooperation with the targeted system of domination will lead to an empowerment of nonviolent resisters to build a better human community and world. Another manual breaks down the positive values that should be embraced to build unity through nonviolence and counter the values of violent opponents, the values that foster disunity. These positive nonviolent values include cooperation, responsibility to others, responsibility to solve problems collectively, honesty, generosity, seeking the common good, and democracy. Another manual sums up the "underlying dynamic of how nonviolence succeeds."

> One of the fundamental techniques of nonviolence is to create a clear contrast between the values, methods, and motives of the activist group and those of the opponent group.

> Crucially nonviolent campaigns create a situation where people who are part of the opponent group will be most likely to shift their support to the activist group, thus further undermining the opponent group's sources of power.

Even among the more purportedly pragmatic approaches to nonviolence, there is an insistence that nonviolent civil resistance is a rational means to a political objective (and these practitioners refuse to use the term "nonviolence" lest it be associated with philosophical or ethical preferences). At the basis of this means is a moral preference for a method that does not involve killing precisely because such a preference will more likely appeal to a critical mass- involving mass cooperation, essential to the noncooperation that will lead to a break with the targeted regime. This is distinct from the Marxist critical notion of ideology as an opiate of the masses because the strategic nonviolence approach supports nonviolence as a real manifestation of the end of tyranny. On the International Center for Nonviolent Conflict's Frequently Asked Questions page, ICNC explains that a greater power lies in the unification of a people who refuse to consent to tyrannical leaders or the use of force. Power lies in cooperation or noncooperation.

> "Nonviolence" is usually a moral choice. Nonviolent conflict is usually a pragmatic choice. Nonviolent conflict is about power—organizing and applying it to fight for and win rights or other political, economic, or social goals. Many people that have used nonviolent action in the past wanted to advance their rights or interests but chose nonviolent methods either because they saw that violence had been ineffective in the past or because they had no violent weapons at their disposal.
>
> When a nonviolent movement follows a strategy aimed at unifying people, mobilizing them to act, concentrating on achievable objectives, and undermining the loyalties and cooperation of an opponent's key supporters—especially the loyalties of the police and the military—it has

> the potential to wield decisive power. There is nothing passive about using that kind of power. Gandhi called nonviolent action "the greatest and most active force in the world."

In reviewing how major nonviolent movements have overthrown dictators and repression in Chile, South Africa, the Philippines, and Poland, ICNC explains that power was built through popular support alone.

> One of the key reasons why these and other **nonviolent movements** were effective against their brutal adversaries is because they undermined the reliable support that many of the key groups in society—including the state's security forces—had provided to the oppressive regime. Once a **nonviolent movement** is able to do this, a society can become ungovernable for the existing regime, and a transition to new rulers or a new system can begin.

It is therefore not surprising that the introduction to Vaclav Havel's edited volume *The Power of the Powerless*, which elucidates how crucial noncooperation has been to challenging the vast economic and military might of the Soviet Union, was written by sociologist Steven Lukes, who locates power in several types of "behavioral forces" beyond brute coercion.

Another important way that INGOs must make the connection between the goal of nonviolent humanity-building and their advocacy work is to engage international supporters in advocacy efforts for various particular conflicts throughout the world. By advocating on behalf of local activists to international authorities, INGOs argue that "as long as one of us is still oppressed, none of us are free". Much of the work of nonviolent INGOs is founded in the promotion of these various social problems as global problems. INGOs' activists spend a great deal of time speaking to authoritative bodies like the United Nations or the U.S. State Department on the severity of conflict situations throughout the world and they argue for the urgency of global social support. It is often

difficult to track down higher level officials in these organizations for an interview simply because their calendars are so full of speaking engagements at universities and churches, public forums and political debates, for news and radio shows and official diplomatic meetings. And, since the early days of the Indian independence movement, nonviolent INGOs have invested heavily in touring global activists through the West to gain awareness of and support for their struggle.

These tours are still an important global consciousness-raising effort among all of the INGOs I have studied. At any one time there are numerous speaking tours sponsored by nonviolent INGOs. A few notable recent ones from 2012 are PBI's European tour of two leading Mexican human rights lawyers, Palestinian activist Issa Amro's tour to Italy (interrupted by his detainment by INS), Syrian nonviolent activist Jawdat Said's recent six-month U.S. and Canadian speaking tour, South African anti-apartheid activist, Member of Parliament and Gandhi's granddaughter Ela Gandhi's U.S. tour, international activist and trainer George Lakey's European tour, and IFOR's efforts to bring Dr. Wee Teck Young, a Singaporean physician and activist who lives and works in Kabul, Afghanistan to the United States (visa pending).

Finally, with the interconnectedness made possible by the world wide web, INGOs bring conflicts to supporters in real-time through periodic email updates from nonviolent projects around the world. These can be emergency notifications for supporters to lobby an embassy about a peace community in danger in Colombia or a call for a boycott to support Palestinian organizations struggling to build up resources across their highly controlled borders. Many INGOs liberally use Facebook and Twitter to post updates and international supporters can in some small way be connected to struggles

throughout the world. As an advocacy tool this can be really powerful because INGOs also include diplomats and politicians on the mailing lists, making public their international newsfeeds, enhancing the global panopticon-effect often put into place by international watchdogs like INGOs.

Rationalizing Repertoire Diffusion

The last phenomenal dimension of INGOs' role in supporting the global expansion of nonviolence is in the way that they have professionalized their peace-work. Professionalization is treated in sociology as one major form of rationalization, a process that Weber has defined as the increasing organization of social life driven by concerns with efficiency and calculability. Professionalization connotes one slice of the rationalization of social life in the increasing specialization of one particular vocation. Professionalization therefore involves the construction of an industry of social activity around this particular vocation that is comprised of authoritative experts, skilled practitioners, and a variety of participants. In the world of global nonviolence this social world is made up of global leaders and advocates (including individuals and organizations), scholars, trainers, and activists, and the many people that employ, are targeted by, or whose lives are somehow affected by nonviolent action. In the nonviolence movement, professionalization may seem an oxymoron because social movements have traditionally been defined as the informal, non-institutionalized efforts at political change that challenge formal institutionalized channels which have failed or structurally preclude the desired changes. Scholars are increasingly giving attention to the professionalization of various types of social movements. And here I argue that the work

and nature of nonviolent INGOs illustrates how systematized repertoire diffusion has become on a global scale, where a global protest tactics industry has developed to support the diffusion of this particular cultural form to communities in conflict the world over.

One organization that exemplifies this professionalization is the International Center for Nonviolent Conflict. In fact, ICNC is not an INGO but a private international foundation that is highly networked with other major nonviolent INGOs in large part because of its professionalization efforts. ICNC's principal objectives are promotion of nonviolent civil resistance (as they insist on a purely pragmatist orientation to nonviolence), strategic education, and tactical training. In their mission statement they proclaim to

> Disseminate and make globally accessible the knowledge of how movements and campaigns based on the people's participation can use civil resistance to obtain human rights, democracy, and freedom from occupation and liberation from all forms of brutality and tyranny.

ICNC is exemplary as one international organization in this movement because of the vast amount of resources they are able to produce and distribute, including the foundation presidents' own collaborative film and book *A Force More Powerful* and a small list of other documentaries and books that are considered seminal in nonviolent studies.

ICNC takes an active stance in several professional worlds, including academia, journalism, politics and political advocacy, and civil resistance promotion and training. In addition to widely and freely distributing academic studies of nonviolence, ICNC funds nonviolent studies conferences (for scholars like myself!), hosts a publicly available webinar series on nonviolent scholarship, funds and publishes research on case and tactical analysis, actively attends and sends representatives to the political science, sociology, and international studies conferences (where again it widely and freely

distributes its literature), and incorporates this network of nonviolent scholars into its field training for global political advocates, helping to make academic scholarship on nonviolence public. ICNC regularly organizes and publishes news reports on its website of stories that address nonviolent resistance from around the world. Subscribers can receive a bi-weekly update on this news in the email inbox. And ICNC invites journalists from around the world to participate in its civil resistance strategy and tactics training. In its efforts to educate activists and organizers it provides an impressive array of resources, including case analyses of twenty-eight major nonviolent campaigns, 23 webinars, 30 other educational transcripts, 33 academic presentations, 2 collections of syllabi, 12 videotaped interviews with activists of major movements throughout the world, 42 books, 72 articles, 38 tactical manuals and pamphlets including Gene Sharp's *Dictatorship to Democracy* in 22 different languages, *A Force More Powerful* in 14 different languages, 10 different translations of the Otpor documentary *Bringing Down a Dictator*, 3 other popular documentary films on major nonviolent movements, 2 nonviolent resistance tactics video games, and 112 other strategic and tactical resources.

If an activist wants to partake in ICNC's expert education and training programs, they can select from a number of online courses and intensive training seminars and workshops. The capstone of these workshops is the summer course offered at the Fletcher Institute at Tufts University, which international professionals, journalists, campaign organizers, policy analysts, scholars, and educators from all over the world are invited (and those in new or struggling democracies highly encouraged) to hear prominent nonviolent activists share their experiences. Additionally and importantly, participants are trained by top scholars in the pragmatic dimensions of nonviolent mobilization. For

example, 2011's course roster included lectures on: The Dynamics of Civil Resistance, Forming a Movement, Sustaining a Movement, Nonviolent Struggle and 'Radical Flanks', The 1987 Palestinian Intifada, Backfire and Security Divisions, Transitions and Negotiations, Skills for Success in Civil Resistance, Third Party Actors and Transnationals, Citizen Journalism and Movement Media, Conventional Media and Civil Resistance, Civil Resistance and Extreme Violence, and the Role of Sacred Beliefs and Nonviolence.

All this is to illustrate the highly systematized way in which an international organization can fashion a small cottage industry around promoting a particular repertoire of protest tactics. ICNC as a case study also makes the efficiency and calculability of the rationalization of repertoire diffusion highly apparent (especially when compared to some of the more principled organizations). But as they note on their organizational identity page, they are but one among a "global movement" constellation of other NGOs, foundations, research institutions, and educational institutions that work to make the global expansion of justice and self-rule possible through nonviolent resistance. You can see this on their resource page and in the resources of other institutions with which they work quite closely.

ICNC is also exceptional in the form of rationality which it promotes. Perhaps the most basic point of Weber's writing on rationalization is to provide an expository sociological analysis of capitalism and bureaucracy in modern life. In this he explained that the "value rationality" of early Protestant beliefs was implanted into a capitalist system that soon took on a life of its own. The meaning of the "calling" and "predestination" as intrinsically manifest in capitalist productivity eventually became

decoupled from the action and an "instrumental rationality" of calculable efficiency arose. So embedded has this latter form of rationality become in the institutions that govern our modern social life that we are without the means or capacity to escape its "iron cage". So this promoting of nonviolent civil resistance as a system of claimsmaking with the potential to be highly calculable and efficient through professionalization clearly places this form of repertoire diffusion under the category of instrumental rationality. It is a type of rationality that we can trace back to Gene Sharp's efforts to remove the ethics from Gandhi's political strategy and formulate it into a generalizable form which can be reproduced and diffused globally to affect a coherent and large-scale system of rational, political change. But as a global movement, even the more instrumental forms do not attempt to disentangle values from approach and does not therefore entirely mirror the pure form of instrumental rationality Weber pointed to. Rather, pragmatist nonviolent activists and organizations represent one attempt at constructing a world cultural form of nonviolence that promotes at once liberty and freedom from tyranny as well as the freedom to engage in, but not impose upon others, ethical or religious formulations of these core values. There are therefore both secular and religious formulations deriving from the sacred order upon which global nonviolence has been founded.

And this is apparent also in the way that pragmatists have had to come to terms with the role of the sacred, which comes up in movements over and over again. Instrumentally rational approaches to global nonviolence diffusion compartmentalize the religious meaning often associated with modes of action into an instrumental strategic and tactical category. For example, one now globally popular manual for nonviolent

resistance building is the CANVAS (Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies) Core Curriculum Guide to Effective Nonviolent Struggle. The guide was written by five active leaders of the student democratic organization that challenged and has been credited with bringing down Slobodan Milosevic, former president of Serbia and Yugoslavia, charged with leading the Bosnian genocide among a host of other war crimes and human rights violations. Following the group's international acclaim they formed a rationally organized international effort to spread its strategy and tactics to other movements, most notably the Egyptian democracy movement. CANVAS' tactical workbook, which has been signed by 22 strategic curricular experts from movements in 18 different countries, reads much like a how-to-start-your-own-business manual- downloadable for free in English and Farsi- with an aesthetically designed interactive website that plots the "Global Arena for Nonviolent Struggle". The accompanying website provides extensive resources under its "battlefield" and "weaponry" tabs, including a list of international organizations that may help a movement. The book helps activists to deconstruct the power structure in their society (complete with a worksheet table to list all the major institutions holding power). In doing so it lists "organized religion" among "pillars of regime support" and then guides readers through the rational construction of a concerted nonviolent effort to target and demobilize these power structures. And part of this process involves gaining the buy-in of religious sentiments. More general efforts targeting cultural sentiments are found in the ways rational tactical manuals target the moral compass of a population as one way in which resisters can challenge regime legitimacy. This may be seen in Sharp's now classical *Dictatorship to Democracy* manual (among many others) which targets the "moral duty" citizens may

feel to follow the regime- a social structure that must be challenged if anti-regime mobilization is to be successful.

Repertoire rationality is both infused with values- to varying degrees- and increasingly instrumental. To efficiently and effectively diffuse the repertoire INGOs have systematized diffusion; they follow extensively systematic approaches to the way they enter conflict zones or respond to an invitation to support local movements. This begins- almost universally among the INGOs I have studied- with a period of exploratory study in which expert practitioners get to know the country's history, politics, culture, and the extent and nature of the current conflict. They look at the movement's available resources, local, national, and international, and they assess the likelihood of success that their involvement may offer. And this assessment is based on the systematic study of the components of regime vulnerability to international diplomacy and the other types of resources that INGOs offer from which a movement would benefit. Along with the nuts-and-bolts tasks of figuring out where financial and human resources for this project would originate, this exploratory process often takes several years.

At the heart of assessment is a rational analysis of the challenges and openings for the diffusion of nonviolence into the conflict. One exploratory report from an early visit to Indonesia, for example, outlines the "myths" collected in the INGO's critical study. These included thirteen general myths about the situation and the prospects for change, seven myths about Islam and the "ethics of struggle as they relate to Aceh today", and ten myths held by the regime about the extent of their power. The myths were then deconstructed into a critical assessment of how best to impart nonviolence knowledge and skills to directly counter each of these myths. These countering ideas considered the

potential for international allies, the need for nonviolent training, and the available local resources that could aid the build-up of a mass nonviolent movement. In another report on a nonviolent training school in Burma, the trainer, renowned scholar and activist George Lakey, begins by asking, “Question: How do you teach nonviolence to soldiers in a guerilla encampment in the Burmese jungle? Answer: Carefully.” From his playful introduction follows a systematic explanation of the highly formalized and rationalized attempt he and his colleague undertook to train students hiding out in the jungle, hoping to avoid decapitation by a highly repressive military regime and build up the basis of a democratic movement. This involved working to make other global successful cases relevant to the unique situation following the repression of the 1988 uprising. It involved convincing them of the importance of long-term strategic building and systematic training in the tried-and-true techniques of the global nonviolence network. And it involved some demonstrative envisioning of how the movement would lead to a real and lasting democracy through the instruction of how to ensure fair elections and engage in democratic constitution writing. Ultimately it involved satiating the students’ “hunger for analytic skills and understanding”, and noting this great need Lakey urged readers to invest in “global training centers where future and present leaders can learn strategies for nonviolent and democratic change.”

This brief report summarizes just one of a long chain of trainings, workshops, and meetings with global experts in the borderlands of the Burmese jungle over the late 1980s and into the early 2000s. Typically, projects do not occur so clandestinely or at such great risk, but under the open aegis of the authority of international diplomacy. In this latter, more common scenario for nonviolent INGOs, formal rationality takes on a more

institutionalized form that locks INGOs' work into a general system of nonviolence diffusion. Once an INGO decides to "go in" or formally initiate diffusion, a systematic plan is devised that clearly outlines the organization's role- in relation to the organization's mission statement and general objectives- and how it will be particularly implemented in the field project. And thus a systematic diffusion of the nonviolence framework, knowledge, capacities, and skills ensues. The project is periodically assessed and evaluative reports are frequently submitted and through reports the project's progress is monitored and evaluated by an international committee or some formally organized group of critical peers. When goals have been reached or a significant change in the local political climate occurs, another systematic assessment is initiated to determine the appropriateness of continuing or closing the project. In this sense the global diffusion of nonviolence has become a highly rationalized way to pursue the expansion of world society, the universalization of global social problems, and the professionalization of a repertoire.

CONCLUSION: REPERTOIRE AND RATIONALIZATION

A historical view of the development of global nonviolence brings to light the fact that this process is still quite new and the movement still young. Many of the recent cases discussed here, Guatemala, Colombia, Burma, Indonesia, Nepal, Palestine, Sudan, and others, are far from resolved and the movements struggle, even with the aid of nonviolent INGOs, to maintain momentum- at the local level and in garnering a critical threshold of international support. There are many new cases currently under exploration and many new movements mobilizing to gain greater support and resources from nonviolent INGOs. There are many new projects floating around in the minds and hearts of INGO visionaries- any one interview exposes a long list, ideas yet to be realized on a global scale. And there is a long list of upcoming events, conferences, and projects through which the broader network is working to continue to define and operationalize their objectives as a global movement for the diffusion of nonviolence. There are many new organizations, still a seed in the minds of transnational activists that have yet to formalize.

The global rationalization of nonviolence, therefore, is still in its early stages, especially when thinking about the historical hindsight Weber was working with as an early rationalization theorist. Here I close my first examination of this global rationalizing movement by considering more deeply the meaning of rationalization in the globalization of nonviolence, outlining the major theoretical and empirical contributions from my research, and then suggesting some paths for the development of future study.

The Means, the End, and the Meaning

Weber's objectives in developing a theory of rationalization were several. Like the other founding fathers of sociological theory, he wanted to articulate the course and dynamics of modern life as he understood it to be distinctly different than the pre-industrial era. He wanted to address the role and changes to religious practice that have driven and accompanied modernity. And he wanted to explain the role and outcomes of the scientific vocation in this modernizing process. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber narrates the epic production of modern man from an era of religious dominance (and dependence when looking at the individual) to an era of methodical individualism organized under the banner of capitalism. Describing rationalization for Weber, though, also meant, quite literally, describing its dynamics as characterized by increasing concerns for efficiency and calculability. And, it meant identifying the empirical effect of this system on the organization of social life. This outcome is understood with Weber's infamous imagery of the "iron cage", in which the process of rationalizing takes on such its own social structure that it precludes the possibility for individuals to break free of the confines of that structure.

From Weber's theory there are some basic concepts that help to understand how and why nonviolence has developed the way that it has and INGOs' role in this process. First, the global repertoire has experienced systematization, and with increasing calculability and efficiency, nonviolence is devised as a repertoire that can be effectively inserted into a wide range of situations. Nonviolence has also come to occupy a unique niche among vocations in conflict resolution, and the global nonviolence industry has

become increasingly specialized within this niche to provide expert knowledge on implementing different types of nonviolence under different categories of conflict. There is also one branch of the repertoire that has insisted on the separation of pragmatic nonviolence from principled frameworks, arguing that nonviolence is effective because it has become so highly calculable and efficiently devised as a claimsmaking approach, resembling a "disenchantment" process that Weber describes in *Science as a Vocation*. But in reviewing this pragmatist stance I have also pointed to the cultural foundation and the moral objectives that drives the work to end all forms of tyranny, a framework shared by both principled and pragmatist approaches to global nonviolence. Here is one important point of departure my analysis takes from documenting the dynamics of systematization inherent in the rationalization of the nonviolence repertoire and the instrumental nature of its calculability.

The global nonviolence movement is unique among movements because its goal is not to realize any one particular social change but to instantiate nonviolence, the process of social change itself. As A.J. Muste communicates in the quote opening my discussion, (Muste was a prominent and early global nonviolence activist), nonviolence is not merely the means to an end; it is synonymous with the end of peace, "peace is the way." In this sense the movement to institutionalize the means is also a movement that holds as its end the institutionalization of those means. In addressing the question of the relationship between the means and the end in the nonviolence repertoire, Weber and Burrowes (1991) write that,

> Gandhi maintained that "The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree: and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree" (Gandhi, 1961, p. 10). He added that "They say "Means are after all means." I would say,

> "means are after all everything." As the means so the ends. There is no wall of separation between means and ends" (*Young India*, 17 July, 1924), and, "if one takes care of the means, the end will take care of itself" (*Harijan*, 11 February, 1939).

The professionalization and the rationalization of nonviolence exhibits an incredible amount of time and investment in the structuration of the means to the best form of social change, a means theorized to be an essential expression of the end, the means has become the end in the nonviolence movement.

Boli's theorization of virtue and virtuosity, with which I set the stage for theorizing the cultural dimensions of the historical emergence of global nonviolence, builds on the Weberian idea of rationalization while injecting the theory with a more explicit cultural thrust. Boli emphasizes that in the global moral order, an ontology drives the form of calculated methods for social change. Virtue and virtuosity derive from a rationalized process of celebrating sacred entities that lie at the heart of the global moral order, like the individual, the state, the collective and others. Thus, my analysis of the rationalization of nonviolence builds on and affirms much of Boli's rationalization theory as I describe nonviolence actors' and INGOs' work to celebrate and sacralize the sacred human community. I argue that the moral objectives underlying nonviolence impel actors of various types to virtuously work for the healing of the divisions in this human community, to repair infractions to its sacred center- the bond among humanity. I have given ample empirical evidence that exemplify the ways in which nonviolence is conceptualized to honor even the perpetrators of violence- because they cannot simply be removed from the human community to ensure its reconciliation; rather, conceived of as a crucial part of that community, their participation in nonviolence is just as essential as

that of the claimsmakers. And here is the crux of where my theorizing departs from Boli's in its specificity of the ontology underlying nonviolence.

Much of the foundation leading up to Boli's discussion of how virtue and virtuosity are rationalized in systems of certification is based on a foundational tenet of world polity theory outlined in Meyer, Boli, and Thomas'(1987) seminal introduction to world polity theory entitled, "Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account". Boli (2003) encapsulates the core of this argument in his virtue and virtuosity piece, explaining that there is both an ontological construction and a deeply cultural celebration of individuals intrinsic to the process of constructing world society as we know it- in individual-enhancing rights and institutions- and it is this ontology that comprises the sacred moral core of the world order on which virtue and virtuosity is built.

At the most general level, world polity theorists conceive of culture as a structurating force in global society. "Culture has both an ontological aspect, assigning reality to actors and action, to means and ends; and it has a significatory aspect, endowing actor and action, means and ends with meaning and legitimacy" (Boli et al. 1987:21).

Meyer and colleagues argue that the very actors and organization of world society rests on a deeply cultural, ontological core. Therefore, neither the actors nor the form of organization should be taken as a given- they are socially constructed. From that socially constructed reality of actors stems socially constructed actions- corresponding to those actors- and socially constructed meanings-assigned to those actions and actors. Meyer and colleagues (1987) posit that this is a valuable insight that world polity theory adds to neo-institutional theory more broadly, that "the ontological status of the individual is a

social construction" (14). This idea of actor construction provides a lifeline to the causal structure of world society because actor construction is directly linked to action construction and reification which feeds into processes of legitimation and institutionalization and ultimately more formal aspects of politics and political interaction.

Then, as Meyer and colleagues go on to specify ontology and rationalization in the Western account, they aim to describe the particular form of ontology and rationalization process underlying the proliferation of Western-in-origin global institutions and relations phenomenal to the late twentieth century. In *Institutional Structure* (1987) they address the authority of the modern nation-state, the expansion of human rights, educational systems, welfare reform, the individual self and the life course, women's and children's rights specifically, and comparative movements in the study of collective action. In many of these chapters the empirical realm closely fits with the specification of the theory of the reified individual in the Western account. That is, in his study of world constitutions Boli found that from 1870 to 1970 "the number of citizen rights linking the individual to the state and requiring state action had greatly expanded, and the explicit duties imposed on the state by the individual were much more numerous" (72). Ramirez and Boli found that world institutions for education have rapidly expanded because national education systems are structured by a common ideological order of state and individual "integrated within the ideology of citizenship, in which the individual is seen as both a contributor to the national development project…and as a beneficiary of state organization action" (154). And Meyer found that modern attempts at constructing the ideal "life course" were rooted in two reinforcing reflections of highly

institutionalized individualism: "the self as the center of sovereign and responsible motives and perceptions- the ultimate subject and object of rationalized society" and "the person as a member of rationalized society, carrying a legitimate resume over time" (242).

While I have theorized my study of global nonviolence to strongly support the deeply cultural thrust of world culture theory and even the significance of the ontological construction of the sacred collective driving the alliteration of the nonviolence repertoire, the many data examples I have cited throughout this study do not exemplify the strong reification of the sacred individual as it is specified in the Western institutions Meyer and colleagues (and a coterie of world polity studies) have scrutinized. Rather, example after example my data shows that what are sacralized in the development of nonviolence are the bonds among individuals that form a common global humanity.

Before explaining this point further I wish to clarify two conditions under which I make this argument. First, like Meyer and colleagues I also want to be clear that I do not argue for a world without a group of people in it. Rather, I join them in problematizing a category of actors as socially constructed (1987:15), that is the concept of one humanity impelling people to conceive of themselves as members of a human community, whole only when united within that community, even and especially in the face of great internal conflicts among community members. As one touchstone book of the global nonviolent movement is entitled, *We Are All Part of One Another* (Meyerding 1984).

And second, this is not to refute the general spirit of the theory of ontology and rationalization, but, after systematically analyzing a wide body of nonviolence discourse, my aim is to detail a new empirical dimension of the global moral order. In introducing

Ramirez's summary of how collective action theories have also experienced increasing but in many ways divergent forms of rationalization, Thomas and colleagues explain that,

> It has been emphasized that the description of this ontology at the general level of an evolving world polity and as a coherent institutional order does not preclude contradictions and conflict. Dialectical contradictions are inherent in a rationalized ontology (e.g., between the individual and the state, liberty and equality, impersonality and individual value) (1987:279).

What I argue at closing therefore is that the global nonviolence movement represents a different iteration of the individual driving efforts at globalization, one that can contradict other iterations but which also interacts with them and alongside them nonetheless. As Thomas and colleagues go on to explain, because of these contradictions, we should expect decoupling between the meaning and form of global institutions. The specification of the order among social organizations and regimes will vary greatly, and so too will the specification of nonviolence across communities and actors that adopt it as a guiding claimsmaking repertoire. Its distinct view of the individual as an integral part of the human community does not cancel out the other form of the sovereign individual articulated in the Western cultural account, or the individual-as-a-little-god argument that runs through world polity theorizing. In fact as nonviolence has become so rationalized, so diffuse, and so authoritative a repertoire to be used solely as a pragmatic means to realizing new forms of human rights, than nonviolence must quite frequently lead to new forms of social construction that enact other Western ontological forms, such as expanding Western educational opportunities or human rights. That is to argue that although the means may be the end among nonviolent visionaries and movers and both of these based on an ontological sacralization of the human community, the means must

surely be decoupled from its initially formulated meaning in many incidences of its global implementation, and highly so depending on the context.

General and Specific Findings Summarized

Much of what I have found in this study, therefore, follows from the general arguments outlined by my theoretical forbears. Where my findings challenge some of these founding ideas is in the specification of those theories as they apply to the particular empirical realm of the globalization of nonviolence. In his now classic methodological treatise on theory construction, Arthur Stinchcome (1968) explains that rigorous theory testing and expansion must clearly explicate the level from which theoretical concepts are derived and the level in which those concepts are applied into new empirical analytical domains. He writes, “many of the exchanges of criticisms, though apparently about whether or not some particular theory is true, are actually conflicts over levels of generality” (47) and goes on to explain how theorists often “refute” other theories’ specifics without adequately weighing the general logics in which those specifics are embedded. Thus, I wish to close by clearly outlining my main findings and contributions to the studies of repertoire emergence, global repertoires, and the rationalization of global nonviolence distinguishing among the general arguments I have affirmed and the specific arguments developed in the study of global nonviolence.

First, I have argued with Tilly and others that structural changes in the polity matter in shaping the emergence of broad claimsmaking routines. But I add to this nationally-oriented collective action studies literature the insight that repertoires develop outside of the national contexts in which they may be practiced. A world society conjures

global ways of thinking about and practicing resistance. This does not negate the distinctions to be found within national iterations of global repertoires but gives greater attention to the trans-national origins of how claimsmaking forms have emerged and developed over the long twentieth century. And in the global nonviolence movement, nonviolence has been global in conceptualization, scope, organization, diffusion, and implementation, from the early discursive exploration of a universal form of conflict development and resolution, to the systematic devising of a general method for making universal claims, to the institutionalization of nonviolence as the high road to world peace as honored by formal international authorities and among informal civil societies throughout the world.

A second contribution of my historical research is the exploration of the deeply cultural dimension of repertoire emergence in world society. I have tried to bring to light how my cultural analysis complements some of the empirical details that undergird collective action theories. But collective action theory has not yet given explicit attention to culture as a motivating force behind structural transformations or as driving the agentive "interests" of the claimsmakers that devise new claimsmaking routines. And a purely structural argument of political opportunities and resources is insufficient when explaining why nonviolence has evolved as a global repertoire for the twentieth century. In my global framework for repertoire emergence, I place the cultural foundations of world society at center stage in driving the unique form of the twentieth century global political system, the unchallenged legitimacy of states as a governing unit, the decentralized nature of global political authority among states and non-state actors, the increasingly deliberate rational organization of global civil society and the theorization,

empowerment, and organization of civil society on a global scale. And I have brought to light the importance of the sacred, a common framework driving the proliferation of world cultural forms like nonviolence. I have explained how the nonviolence repertoire has encompassed best practices for identifying and addressing infractions against the sacrality of humanity and for remedying the incursions against human rights caused by cultures of violence. And in my case study of INGOs' role in this process I emphasize the need for thinking about their consciousness raising efforts as a crucial mode of global expansion.

In the second part of my analysis which focuses closely on the role of INGOs I provide ample data on a new specialist population of global social movement actors. I explain how this population has grown as a whole, mirroring the demographics of and working alongside the general population of INGOs. But I have also shown how they have gained wider support among peripheral world regions than conventional transnational movement organizations. I have outlined their major programmatic foci and the substantive quality of their work. And I have detailed the importance of ties to these organizations in shaping nonviolent movements throughout the world.

My qualitative analysis of these organizations challenges some of the conventional assumptions of social movements theory. First, the global organizations I study, poised to support civil society populations but networked with other global and national level authorities, help to bridge world cultural construction among formal and informal populations of global actors. And they directly participate in and shape national political processes. The case of PBI in Guatemala shows that where political processes unfold in a national theater, they are also embedded in and conditioned by trans-national

relationships. INGOs transform political processes by buffering repression, instilling new tactical fluencies and thereby enhancing all other aspects of political process that positively lead to mobilization: the opening of opportunities, the acquisition of resources, the strengthening of indigenous organizations, and cognitive liberation, again, shaped by the global consciousness INGOs help to foment.

I have drawn on qualitative data from a core of prominent nonviolent INGOs to explicate how they carry and spread world culture through their systematic activities as nonviolent activists. I have identified several ways in which INGOs have expanded the frame for political interaction. By bringing local claimsmakers and multi-level authorities together in a conversation about nonviolence, INGOs create new global-local interactions. By facilitating the buildup of local movements dedicated to nonviolence, INGOs organize new social worlds based on the nonviolence repertoire. And by employing various modes of diffusion for nonviolence, INGOs help to break down other boundaries to global integration.

Additionally, nonviolent INGOs work in universalizing social problems. Because the nonviolence repertoire is one means for resolving problems, INGOs spend a great deal of their efforts to articulate new ways of identifying and understanding (as well as promoting the best way to addressing) social problems, problems they argue are global social problems. This involves an insistence on perceiving the human community as one world community. And it entails viewing all members of this world society as world citizens, who are obligated to address all problems experienced within this human community.

Finally, INGOs have become authoritative experts in an industry of social change through the systematization of repertoire research, development, promotion, and training as well as through their own efforts to professionalize this process. By systematically analyzing local conflicts and the global field of resources and opportunities, INGOs offer support in a highly organized and instrumental fashion- even as that support entails building up moral sentiments. That is, INGOs engage in a deeply cultural process of rationalization founded on an ontology of actorhood and corresponding means for action. But this ontology differs slightly, at least in its formulation among movement visionaries, trainers, and activists, from the Western ontology of the individual outlined by Meyer and colleagues, although the two seem to be dialectically related and empirical mutually supporting through the buildup of a human rights movement that engages in and relies on the global nonviolence repertoire.

Expanding the Study

Much remains to be said about INGOs and the globalization of nonviolence. I began with some scope conditions that limited my study to concerns of emergence and development only. This means that much more can be said from the data I have collected about the impact of the movement on the implementation and outcomes of nonviolent resistance. I suggest that future study pay greater attention to the historical development of nonviolence and how the process of institutionalization has shaped both adoption and implementation of the repertoire. As some movements studies have shown institutionalized environments to stifle the impact of social movements, this effect may be found when historically examining the global spread of nonviolence.

Scholars should give greater attention to the role and impact of nonviolent INGOs specifically. My statistical analysis has affirmed some trends identified in case studies as impactful on a global level and has revealed new global-level trends that remain to be investigated in case studies. But future statistical analysis should further explore the differential effect of nonviolent INGOs on violent movements and insurrections as well as the impact of other global civil society structures in which nonviolent INGOS work. Regional analyses would also help to parse out some of the differential effects of global level processes and tell us a bit more about how different levels of global integration condition the potential for nonviolent mobilization as well as the ability of nonviolent INGOs to shape those effects.

In further exploration of the qualitative dimension of INGOs work in spreading and rationalizing the diffusion of world culture, study may proceed in a number of ways. Certainly, more case comparison can help to elaborate the transnational dimensions shaping local level political processes. The McAdam political process model, developed primarily through the study of the U.S. Civil Rights movement, has set the paradigm for U.S. social movements study and has gone almost entirely unchallenged since its introduction in the early 1980s. But much can be said both about how this model differs when applied outside the U.S. context as well as the common elements shared among U.S. and non-U.S. polities that favor or hamper the prospects for mass mobilization. The relationship of INGOs to other global and local authorities can be more closely scrutinized, examining the constraint imposed by differential access to local and global resources and how and under what conditions INGOs connect to different types of local civil society actors.

Finally, much more also remains to be explored in the topic of INGOs and world cultural diffusion. Gaining the perspective of local organizations and groups that work with INGOs will add an illuminating new dimension to understanding the challenges and impact of diffusion efforts, how INGOs expand the frame and the universal construction of global social problems, as well as how consciousness acts as an active mechanism for the expansion of world society. Much also remains to be explored in the process of rationalization among nonviolence professionalization efforts. How rationality is comprised under different conditions and how values continue to drive instrumental forms of rational action are two topics that should produce fruitful empirics and theorizing. And there is much to explore in how the process of rationalization unfolds under different conditions and in different contexts. I raised the point in my brief case study that global consciousness is crucial to cognitive liberation. And I briefly mentioned the role of religious affinities in helping activists to traverse other cultural boundaries. Future studies of nonviolence diffusion or even just global movements more generally, should pay closer attention to the different conduits for consciousness expansion and how rationalization shapes the effectiveness and outcomes of these pathways.

Appendix A.

Repertoire Emergence Predictions Summarized

Collective Action Theory

P1: The organization of power in the polity drives a) the organization of claims, b) the form in which organized claims diffuse c) and the content of claimsmaking routines.

P2: The use of the repertoire constrains further repertoire development.

World Society Theory

P3: Global expansion of a world polity will drive the development of global political forms.

P4: The content of global repertoires will become more deliberately organized around the decentralized state-system.

P5: The substance of repertoire development will be driven by the substantive ideals legitimate among world polity authorities.

P6: The sacralization of a collective humanity will lead to greater institutionalization of a nonviolence repertoire.

P7: As global interdependence makes political actors more conscious of their global embeddedness, nonviolence will globalize.

Nonviolent Studies Theories

P8: The greater the moral commitment to the repertoire, the more the nonviolence movement will globalize.

P9: The more effective nonviolence tactics are proven, the more the movement will globalize.

Appendix B. Prominent Nonviolent Movements, 1948-2003

Country	Years	Objective
Afghanistan	1992	
Albania	1989-1990	independence
Algeria	1991-1992	anti-corruption/autocracy
Argentina	1977-1997	anti-corruption/human rights
Australia	1965	anti-conscription
Hungary	1987-1989	independence
Bolivia	1977-1982	anti-corruption/human rights
Bolivia	2003-2005	anti-corruption
Bosnia	1996-2000	human rights/anti-corruption
Brazil	1958-1973	anti-corruption
Brazil	1980	anti-corruption
Brazil	1987	anti-corruption
Bulgaria	1986-1990	independence
Burma	1962	democracy
Burma	1969	democracy
Burma	1987-1990	democracy
Burundi	1993	anti-corruption/human rights
Burundi	2000	anti-corruption/human rights
Cambodia	2000	anti-corruption/human rights
Canada	1980-1982	anti-corruption
Canada	2007	anti-corruption
Chad	2005	anti-corruption
Chile	1978-1989	anti-corruption/human rights
China	1987-1989	anti-corruption/democracy
Taiwan	1996-2006	democracy
Colombia	1990-2008	anti-corruption/human rights
Cuba	1957	anti-corruption
Czechoslovakia	1968-1969	anti-occupation
Czechoslovakia	1989	independence
Benin	1989	anti-corruption/democracy
Ecuador	1997-2008	anti-corruption

Estonia	1991	independence
France	1968	anti-corruption
France	2004	anti-corruption
Gambia	1970-2008	anti-corruption/democracy
Georgia	2003-2007	anti-corruption/democracy
Germany	1972-1985	anti-corruption/democracy
Germany	1989	independence
West Germany	1980-1989	independence
Ghana	1957	independence
Greece	1974	democracy
Guatemala	1986-2008	anti-corruption/human rights
Guinea	1958-1962	anti-corruption/democracy
Haiti	1985	anti-corruption
Honduras	1954-1962	anti-corruption
Honduras	1974-1975	anti-corruption
Honduras	1980	anti-corruption
Iceland	1975	civil rights
Indonesia	1965-1966	anti-corruption/human rights
Indonesia	1969-2008	anti-corruption/human rights
Iran	1977-1979	anti-corruption
Iraq	2003-2008	anti-occupation/anti-corruption
Israel	1982	anti-corruption/human rights
Israel	1997-2008	anti-corruption/human rights
Italy	1995	anti-corruption
Japan	1952-1955	anti-corruption
Japan	1960	anti-corruption
Kenya	1982-2005	anti-corruption/human rights
Korea	1960-1969	anti-corruption
Korea	1987-1991	democracy
Korea	2003	anti-corruption
Latvia	1991	independence
Lebanon	2005	democracy
Liberia	1989-2002	human rights/anti-corruption
Lithuania	1991-1992	independence
Madagascar	1989-	anti-corruption/democracy

	2002	
Malawi	1992	anti-corruption
Mali	1980-1991	anti-corruption/democracy
Mexico	1968	anti-corruption
Mexico	1995-2008	anti-corruption
Mongolia	1989-1990	anti-corruption/democracy
Morocco	1975-2008	anti-occupation
Nepal	1990-1992	anti-corruption/democracy
Nepal	2003	anti-corruption/democracy
Nigeria	1980-2008	anti-corruption/human rights
Pakistan	1983-1988	anti-corruption/human rights
Bangladesh	1989-1990	anti-corruption/democracy
Palestine	1994-2008	anti-occupation
Panama	1987-1989	anti-corruption
Peru	2006-2008	anti-corruption
Philippines	1983-1986	anti-corruption/democracy
Philippines	2002	anti-corruption
Poland	1970	anti-corruption
Poland	1980-1989	independence
Portugal	1974	anti-corruption
Romania	1977-1989	anti-corruption/human rights
Russia	1991	anti-corruption/human rights
Senegal	1980-2008	anti-corruption
Sierra Leone	1992-1997	anti-corruption/human rights
Somalia	2000	anti-corruption/human rights
South Africa	1946-1960	civil rights
South Africa	1984-1994	civil rights
Spain	1974-1979	anti-corruption
Spain	2001-2003	anti-corruption
Sudan	1964-1985	anti-occupation/democracy/human rights
Sudan	2004-2008	anti-occupation/democracy/human rights
Tanganyika	1961	independence
Thailand	1992	anti-corruption

Uganda	1989	anti-corruption
Uganda	2002-2008	anti-corruption
Ukraine	2004	anti-corruption
Egypt	2008	anti-corruption/democracy
United Kingdom	1980-1982	anti-corruption
United Kingdom	1996	anti-corruption
United Kingdom	2000-2002	anti-corruption
Ireland	1970-1979	civil rights
Zimbabwe	2000-2008	anti-corruption/democracy/human rights
Tonga	2005	anti-corruption
United States	1955-1969	civil rights/anti-occupation
United States	1979-1981	anti-corruption
United States	1999-2008	anti-corruption/anti-occupation
Burkina Faso	1996-1998	anti-corruption/human rights
Uruguay	1981-1989	anti-corruption/democracy
Venezuela	2007	anti-corruption
Vietnam	1955-1965	anti-occupation/anti-violence
Yugoslavia	1970-1971	anti-corruption
Yugoslavia	1989-1990	anti-corruption/independence

Appendix C. INGOs Categorized by Commitment to Nonviolent Protest Support, Union of International Associations Database, 2001-2002, 2008-2009

Abolition 2000
Abolition of Nuclear War
Abolition of Nuclear Weapons- Stop Essais
Action Coalition for Global Change
Aland Islands Peace Institute
Albert Einstein Institution
Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation
Alliance for Peacebuilding
Alternatives to Violence Project International
Amnesty International European Union Association
Andean Action
Anglican Pacifist Fellowship
Anuvrat Global Organization
Asia Pacific Center for Peace and Justice
Asia Pacific Peace Research Association
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development
Asian Women's Human Rights Council
Atrium Society
Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution
Balkan Peace Team International
Baptist Peace Fellowship of North America
Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management
Buddhist Peace Fellowship
Canadian Friends Service Committee
Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee
Canadian Voice of Women for Peace
Center for Global Nonviolence, Honolulu
Center for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution
Center for International Conflict Resolution
Center for International Development and Conflict Management
Center for Peacebuilding
Center of Research and Action for Peace
Center for Nonviolent Action, Jerusalem
Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management
Centre for International Peacebuilding
Centre for Peace Studies, Tromsø
Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights, Osijek
Centre for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, Oslo
Centre mennonite d'etudes et de rencontre
Children as the Peacemakers
Children's International Summer Villages
Christian Peacemaker Teams
Coalition for the International Criminal Court

Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
Coexistence International
Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America
Conciliation Resources
Conflict Management Group
Conscience - the Peace Tax Campaign
Copper County Peace Alliance
Council for a Livable World
Cultural Survival
EarthAction Network
End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes
Episcopal Peace Fellowship
Equipo Nizkor
EUCOMmunity
EUROFOR
European Centre for Conflict Prevention
European Conference on Peacemaking and Conference Resolution
European Network for Civil Peace Services
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation
European Youth Forest Action Network
Federation of Young European Greens
Fellowship of Reconciliation Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean
Foundations for Peace
Foundation for the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World
Free Vietnam Alliance
Friends Peace Teams
Fund for Nonviolence
Gaston Z Ortigas Peace Institute
German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management
Global Ethic Foundation
Global Exchange
Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
Global Peace Services USA
Grace Contrino Abrams Peace Education Foundation
Hague Appeal for Peace
Heinrich Boll Foundation
Human Rights and Democracy Network
Human Rights Internet
Human Rights Watch
Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy
Institute for Peace Work and Nonviolent Settlement of Conflict
Institute for Policy Studies, Washington DC
Institute of World Affairs

International Alert
International Association of Peace Foundations
International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
International Campaign to Ban Landmines
International Center for Transitional Justice
International Center on Nonviolent Conflict
International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development
International Christian Peace Service
International Committee for the Peace Council
International Conflict Resolution Centre, Parkville (ICRC)
International Federation of Resistance Movements
International Federation for Peace and Conciliation
International Fellowship of Reconciliation
International Holistic Tourism Education Centre
International Human Rights Association, India
International Institute of Peace Studies and Global Philosophy
International Nonviolence Training Fund
International Nonviolent Initiatives
International Peace Academy
International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace)
International Peace Bureau
International Peace Research Association
International Programme on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity
International Research/Study Team on Nonviolent Large Systems Change
International Resource Group for the Horn of Africa
International Rivers Network
International Service for Peace
International Solidarity Movement
International University for People's Institution for Peace
International Women's Peace Service
Isis Women's International Cross Cultural Exchange
Islamic and Interfaith Middle Eastern Peace Studies Association
Jewish Peace Fellowship
Karuna Center for Peacebuilding
Latin American Council for Peace Research
Latin American Association for Human Rights
Latin American Peace and Justice Service
Life and Peace Institute
Mahatma M.K. Gandhi Foundation for Non-Violent Peace
Mano River Women' Peace Network
Mennonite Central Committee
Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy
Milarepa Fund
MindFreedom International
Movement for a Nonviolent Alternative
Muslim Peace Fellowship

National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution
National Peace Foundation
New Call to Peacemaking
New Foundations for Peace
No Peace Without Justice International
Nonviolence International South East Asia Programme
Nonviolence International
Nonviolence International New Independent States
Nonviolent Peaceforce
Nonviolent Radical Party
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
NPI Africa
Organization for Defending Victims of Violence
Pacific Peacebuilding Initiatives
Pan-African Reconciliation Council
Partners for Democratic Change
Pathways To Peace
Pax Christi - International Catholic Peace Movement
Peace Development Fund
Peace 2000 Institute
Peace 2000 Network
Peace Boat
Peace Brigades International
Peace Dividend Trust
Peace Education Commission
Peace House
Peace Information Centre. Bangkok
PeaceJam Foundation
Peacemaker Circle International
Peaceweb
Peaceworkers
Peoples' Global Action Against Free Trade and the WTO
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts
Project Ploughshares
Quaker Council for European Affairs
Quaker Peace and Social Witness
Regional Unit for Social and Human Sciences in Latin America and the Caribbean
Research Institute on the Non-Violent Resolution of Conflicts
Saferworld
Sarvodaya International Trust
Search for Common Ground
SERPAJ-EUROPA
SERVAS International
Service civil international
Social Watch

South Asian Forum for Human Rights
Strategic Pastoral Action Network
Swisspeace
The Practice Institute
Toledo International Centre for Peace
Topeka Center for Peace and Justice
Transcend: A Peace and Development Network
Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research
Transnational Radical Party
United Nations of Youth
United Religions Initiative
United States of Europe and America
University for Peace
University of Peace, Namur
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
US SERVAS
War Resisters League
War Resisters' International
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
Witness for Peace
Women for Mutual Security
Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
World Association for the School as an Instrument of Peace
World Court Project
World Futures Studies Federation
World Organization against Torture
World Organisation of Democracy and of Democracies
World Peace Brigade
World Peacemakers
World without War Council Midwest
York Peace Centre - York
ZaMir Transnational Net
Zen Peacemaker Circle Europe
Zen Peacemaker Circle

Appendix D. Top 20 Nonviolent INGOs with Country Membership Ties Listed by UIA Annual Yearbook Relevance Ranking

Amnesty International
Center for Global Nonviolence
Earth Action Network
Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network
International Fellowship of Reconciliation
Nonviolent Peaceforce
War Resisters International
Peace Brigade International
Latin American Peace and Justice Service
World Organization Against Torture
International Peace Bureau
Latin American Association for Human Rights
International Coalition for Justice and Peace - ICJ Peace
International Helsinki Federation, Nonviolent Radical Party
International Nonviolence Training Fund
Nonviolent Radical Party
South Asian Human Rights documentation centre
People's Movement for Human Rights Learning
International Society for Human Rights
Inter-African Union of Human Rights

Table 2. National and Transnational Precursors to Nonviolent Movements

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Political Openness	-.009***				
	(.002)				
Political Fragmentation	.017	.016	.027	.079	.182**
	(.074)	(.074)	(.076)	(.074)	(.080)
Political Repression		-.007**			
		(.002)			
Education	.920e-03*	.615e-03	.001*	-.531e-04	-.001*
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)
National News Circulation	-.127e-03**	-.127e-03**	-.968e-05*	-.908e-05*	-.746e-05
	(.000)	(0.09)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
National Economic Growth	-.856e-04**	-.896e-04*			
	(.000)	(.000)			
World trade as %GDP			.963e-05***	.121e-04***	
			(.000)	(.000)	
IMF Agreement				.821***	
				(.099)	
Global Democratization				.028***	
				(.004)	
Growth of IGOs					.007***
					(.001)
aplha	1.22e-15	1.22e-15	1.53e-15	6.03e-30	6.03e-30
Constant	-2.585***	-2.483***	-2.963***	-3.683***	-4.475***
	(.083)	(.082)	(.081)	(.000)	(.217)

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses

Table 3. National and Transnational Precursors to Nonviolent Movements

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Political Openness	-.007*** (.002)		-.008*** (.002)	
Political Repression		-.005* (.002)		-.005* (.002)
Presence of Civil War	.246 (.144)		.379** (.145)	.379** (.145)
Education	7.27e-06 (.000)	-.245e-02 (.001)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)
National Economic Growth			-.702e-05* (.000)	-.734e-05* (.000)
World trade as %GDP	.110e-02*** (.000)	.108e-02***	.606e-04** (.000)	.606e-04** (.000)
IMF Agreement	.641*** (.098)		.631*** (.098)	
Growth of INGOs	.251e-03*** (.000)	.256e-03*** (.000)		
Ties to NV INGOs			.072* (.036)	.072* (.036)
aplha				
Constant				

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses

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