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European Integration: Winners and Losers across a New Political Divide

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Abstract

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This thesis examines a recent and growing wave of euroskeptic, populist political parties in Western Europe, and an accompanied weakening of mainstream political parties. In the study of party politics, scholars have widely observed that economic shocks provide circumstances under which mainstream and/or incumbent parties are easily punished by voters. However, there is reason to believe that the 2008 financial crisis perhaps ignited a wider process of partisan dealignment, in which voters have become increasingly weary of mainstream and pro-integrationist politics as time has passed. The empirical findings from this study indicate that, in the post-2008 period, parties with strong pro-EU or pro-Integrationist rhetoric are more likely to lose vote share from one election to the next, relative to other parties. A party's anti-EU or anti-integrationist rhetoric offers no predictive value in change in vote share in the post-2008 period. Such findings imply that such a political shift is not rooted in inherent dislike of integration or a wish to reverse it, but in a growing skepticism of globalism and globalist politics.

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INTRODUCTION

This study aims to examine the reasons for a recent and growing wave of political euroskepticism in Western Europe that has challenged both the political order and a standing guard of mainstream political parties, many of which have been leading the political sphere for the entirety of the post-war period. The study aims to assess the explanatory power of several hypotheses for both the success of euroskeptic parties and for the corresponding failure of mainstream parties in the current political era. Most simply: Why and to what extent are mainstream parties failing? Why and to what extent are euroskeptic parties succeeding? Has the issue of European integration become a new political divide?

In the years following 2008, the European political sphere has undergone major changes: many formerly unknown or fringe-status parties have skyrocketed to political relevance in both European and national elections, winning increasing electoral percentages, joining government coalitions, and obtaining an increasing number of parliamentary seats and governmental positions (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2015) : For example, one can simply look to the recent successes of UKIP in the United Kingdom, PODEMOS in Spain, the surging AfD in Germany, and the steady uptick of the FN in France. On the other hand, a significant number of mainstream, institutionalized parties have fallen out of their former influence, oftentimes over the course of a single election cycle. To take just one example, the French Socialist Party fell from 29% of the vote in 2012, to just under 8% of the vote in 2017.¹ What may have first appeared as a pattern of classic economic voting in response to the 2008 economic crisis is perhaps instead an indication of a structural political evolution. Such a political wave has administered strong electoral shocks to the political status quo and to corresponding political

¹ Results as reported from ParlGov

actors. As noted, political parties that dominated national governments within the last decade are either electorally damaged or nearly obsolete. These formally influential parties face strong, legitimate challenge from resurgent (or entirely new) parties and platforms, often vowing for systematic change from status quo policies and from the politics of “there is no alternative,” (TINA politics) as mainstream parties and politicians seem to have become increasingly indistinguishable from one another with respect to integrationist policy (Mudde 2016). This inquiry aims to assess the nature of this political change: Why has populism become so effective in this current political wave? In order to understand such a dynamic, it is helpful to conceptualize the current political situation as something of a political rivalry between populists (those looking to overturn the status quo) and non-populists (those who claim there is “no alternative” to the current political norm and wish to uphold or to advance the status quo of European integration).

On both the left and on the right, populist parties have come to present the European Union and its associated, integrationist organizations as the beacon of corrupt elitism, or simply as the antithesis of a common national interest. Parties such as Spanish PODEMOS, the French National Front, and UKIP in the United Kingdom, among others, have exhibited deep criticism of the political mainstream for its defense (or, at times, perceived defense) of European integration and other globalization-centric institutions. Accordingly, this populist surge has led to something of a new political rift in the European Union, potentially indicative of new or newly salient cleavages between those in favor of greater integration, and those somehow threatened by integration. Accordingly, there has now emerged a political rivalry between new wave populists, critical of European integration, and mainstream “anti-populists,” defensive of the standing

order. The question arises, however, as to why mainstream parties have become so vulnerable to this rise in populism, as this is perhaps not a populist *moment*, but a populist *era* (Mudde 2016).

While populist and euroskeptic voices had certainly been politically present in the years preceding 2008, as one can simply look to local elections in Britain in May 2006 and the presence of the British National Party, alongside the emergence of UKIP at the 2004 European Parliamentary elections, among a multitude of other examples, the years following the crisis display a clear boost in support for fringe and populist voices, with an even stronger surge appearing in 2015. This project seeks to join a body of work dedicated to understanding this recent populist upsurge (Arzheimer 2009; Bélanger and Aarts 2006; van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2000; Ivarsflaten 2008; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002; Mudde 2004; Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017). This project will consider the extent to which European elections have changed in the years following the financial crisis compared to years prior and to further understand the salience of this supposed new cleavage with respect to the issues of globalization and European integration. This project will assess such questions in the contemporary context, analyzing election data from the late 1990s until 2015, contingent upon on the availability of data and the timing of national elections. Specifically, the paper aims to discover whether voters have indeed shifted to populist, euroskeptic parties from mainstream, traditional parties. The influence of populist parties, economic voting theory, austerity voting, and partisan realignment will serve as foundational theories of the inquiry. The study is interested in theory testing: is the current phenomenon a result of austerity politics, economic voting, or an indication of a broader process of partisan de-alignment and re-alignment?

A WORD ON POPULISM

This project is concerned with a conflict between the political status quo, equated with the ideological center, and political challengers, equated with the ideological fringes. While populism is a notoriously slippery concept (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Campani and Lazaridis 2017; Canovan 1981; van Kessel 2015; Mudde 2004; Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017; Taggart 2000), it is at its simplest, a rejection of elitism, bureaucracy, and representative democracy. Further, according to Mudde's (2004) definition, populism is defined by two key attributes: people-centrism and anti-elitism.

Further, note that the term is used to describe a large variety of actors in various political settings, as there is unresolved debate as to whether populism is an ideology or simply a political strategy (van Kessel 2015). As scholarly contribution to the topic of populism has increased in recent years, I am able to draw a few simple generalizations from the recent literature: Broadly, there is agreement that populism subscribes to a Manichean vision of society: one in which the "people" (portrayed as good or of good virtue) are antagonized and/or targeted by some body of "elites," be they cultural, political, economic, and/or societal elites. Note however, that the nature of this elite class, as perceived by the populist or populist group in question, provides indication about the *ideological position* of said populist, to be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. Regardless, it is important to note that populism effectively portrays an image of "the pure people" as a single entity, against an elitist, corrupt enemy, effectively conceptualizing society as being separated into two homogeneous, distinct, and antagonistic groups (Abts and Rummens 2007; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Mudde 2004; Taggart 2000).

Applying such a setup to real-world political actors, several points come to light: In line with the antagonistic view toward elites and elite classes, populists express great skepticism of

bureaucracy and a clear intolerance of institutional proceedings, seeing both as unnecessary obstacles to carrying out the popular will of the people (van Kessel 2015). Perhaps most importantly, populists are concerned with change, and express a clear dissatisfaction with the state in its present form (Steward 1969). It is this sort of messaging that easily draws voters with unresolved grievances or other sentiments of dissatisfaction with the state. Taggart (2000) streamlines political populism into six key themes: 1) Populists as hostile to representative politics, 2) Populists identifying themselves with an idealized heartland within the community they favor, 3) Populism as an ideology lacking core values, 4) Populism as a powerful reaction to a sense of extreme crisis, 5) Populism as containing fundamental dilemmas that make it self-limiting, 6) Populism as a chameleon, adopting the colors of its environment. Ben Stanley (2008) only echoes these concepts, as he streamlines populism and populist parties into four chief attributes: 1) The existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, 2) The antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, 3) The idea of popular sovereignty, 4) The positive valorization of ‘the people’ and denigration of ‘the elite’. Such parameters make populism and euroskepticism easy partners in the same narrative.

Simply, the rise of populism in Western Europe is a reaction to the failure (or perceived failure) of traditional parties to respond to grievances and/or political anxieties associated with phenomena such as economic and cultural globalization, the speed and extent of European integration, and other societal changes generally associated with globalization (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008). Particularly in the Western European context, populism is heavily associated with xenophobic politics and parties of the extreme right, and therefore perceived as a threat to liberal democracy (Mudde 2004; Taggart 2000). Further still, populism is easily regarded as political opportunism which simply exploits the unchecked anxieties of the electorate (Betz

1994). To such an end, Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that populism is inherently incompatible with democracy, stating that the people vs elite dichotomy endorsed by a populist political philosophy is unrealistic and dangerous (Abts and Rummens 2007).

It is important to note, however, the close relationship between populism and democracy, as many authors have noted that populism is perhaps not a danger, but a key feature of modern democracy, able to act as an indicator of wider grievances (Canovan 1981, 1999; Mudde 2004). Many have argued that populism acts as indicator of the “health” of a representative democracy, able to emerge when political elites have strayed too far from the electorate or when parties are no longer aligning according to relevant cleavages (Mény and Surel 2002; Taggart 2000).

POPULISM AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM

Note that populism is heavily associated not with ideological direction, but with ideological extremeness. As established by Rooduijn and Akkerman (2017), there is a clear correlation between “populism” and the extremes of the left-right ideological spectrum. Parties on the fringes are more likely to stake political claims to the protection of the people and populist rejection of the political status quo, while centrist parties operate as something of a standing guard in political space. However, populist rhetoric and style is not *exclusive* to the ideological mainstream, as “soft populist” positions are at times adopted by mainstream parties, typically in reaction to the success of populist electoral challengers (Meijers 2017).

LEFT POPULISM AND RIGHT POPULISM


Much of the literature and popular discourse associates populism with the radical right, citing parties such as the FN in France, the FPÖ in Austria, and the AfD in Germany, among others. However, it is important to note that European populism is alive and well on *both* sides of the political spectrum, as in line with the findings above (Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017). While

the term “populist” can be fleeting, and often subjective, left-wing populist parties such as PODEMOS in Spain, and SYRIZA in Greece are important elements in this narrative. Populist, anti-globalization politics are not a phenomenon exclusive to the radical right, as electoral support for all populists (on the right and on the left) is more or less equal across Europe (March and Rommerskirchen 2012).

Accordingly, the argument that anti-integrationist populism is a phenomenon of the *extremes* of the left-right ideological spectrum is further upheld. The radical right and radical left, though united in euroskepticism, still maintain distinction from one another. The radical left opposes the European Union on the basis of its support for neoliberal policies, including market liberalism and free-market capitalism (March 2011, March 2016). The radical right, on the other hand, opposes the European Union on the basis of national sovereignty and cultural preservation (Mudde 2007). Regardless of reasoning, the two “families” voice strong objection to bureaucratic, supranational institutions such as the European Union, the IMF, and the European Central Bank, albeit for different reasons. The two ideological forms of populism are united in their dislike of the state, government, and/or society in its present form.

While the radical left and radical right are on exact opposite ends of the traditional ideological spectrum, the two represent a rising tide against the political status quo and have consequently formed a two-part populist “bloc,” concentrated at the fringes of the spectrum, placing strong electoral and policy pressure on the mainstream political elite. Both the radical right and radical left aim to challenge the standing political order, incumbent parties, and, interestingly, the European Union. Opposition to the EU is found to concentrate along the fringes of the left-right ideological spectrum (van Elsas, Hakhverdian, and van der Brug 2016). Such a pattern falls in line with horseshoe ideological theory, in which the extremes of the right

and left have more in common with each other, than either does relative to the ideological center, creating a horseshoe shape when mapped in two-dimensional space. As seen in Figure 1, when parties are mapped on an x-y plane according to their left-right ideological positions against their positions against the EU, a horseshoe shape appears.



Both party families (the radical left and radical right) appeal to protecting “the common, good people” against some form of a corrupt elite (van Kessel 2015). It is simply how “elite” and the “good people” are defined that separates radical left from radical right. The populist left often objects to “economic elites,” technocrats benefitting from deregulation and capitalist policies at the expense of the common people or the working class. The populist right, on the other hand, tends to criticize the “elite” (often a mixture of cultural, political, and economic actors) on both cultural and nativist grounds, labeling them, for example, as traitors to the nation or corruptors of the people (Mudde 2007). Further still, Mudde (2013) points out a distinction between “inclusionary” and “exclusionary” varieties of populism. “Inclusionary” populists, often seen in

Latin America (and, by extension, on the populist left) display strong focus on socioeconomic issues, preaching *inclusion* of the poor. “Exclusionary” populists (case selection in Mudde’s study was narrowed to cases of right-wing populists in Europe: the FPÖ in Austria and the FN in France), on the other hand, place primary focus on cultural issues, urging the need to *exclude* aliens and non-nationals (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012).

A WORD ON EUROSKEPTICISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

As the term suggests, “euroskepticism” refers to a skepticism of or opposition toward European integration. Keep in mind, however, that the term is not binary, and can cover a spectrum of political positions and attitudes toward the European Union. Generally, however, euroskepticism refers to an opposition to the existence of the concept of a “European Union,” looking either to reform, exit, or dissolve the European Union in favor of more nationalized policies. As alluded to above, generally, the political left objects to the European Union on the grounds of its capitalist structure, seeing in it an enabler of conservative neoliberalism, while the political right objects to the European Union on the grounds of alleged threats it represents to national sovereignty and culture. Understandably, increased euroskepticism has accompanied the continuation of European Integration, and thus, has more or less increased over time, with the passing of each integrationist measure (Taggart 1998). Perhaps unsurprisingly, euroskepticism is mainly limited to peripheral or fringe parties, which begins the key association of the project, Taggart (1998) aligns Euroskeptic parties with “protest” politics, and by extension, populism. Further, the inherently opaque institutionalism of the European Union makes it a near perfect target for populist parties and leaders (Taggart 2004).

A WORD ON THE POLITICS OF TINA

The politics of “There is no alternative” (TINA) first emerged as a political slogan of British Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher. In particular, the slogan referred both to a capitalist structure and to the need for European Integration (Crowson 2007). Further still, the party was well aware of the need to “sell” Europe to the British electorate, repeatedly preaching the message that there was simply *no alternative* to single market membership. Voters were drawn to the idea by marketing strategies on the part of the Conservative Party, as the prospect was marketed as an avenue by which the United Kingdom would “maintain peace and increase prosperity” (Crowson 2007). However, the concept has grown beyond its origins to refer to a mainstream, pro-status quo, integrationist, capitalist set of policies and political schools of thought. In particular, the term refers to arguments commonly made by mainstream politicians and the notion that a politician’s responsibility to the EU or to IMF outweighs responsibility to voters at the national level (Mudde 2016). Understandably, the politics of TINA becomes an easy and perhaps obvious target of populist parties and politicians.

WINNERS AND LOSERS OF GLOBALIZATION

With respect to societal divides in Europe (which may serve as electoral cleavages for parties), the literature points to a “globalization” divide. In the post-recession context, a new societal cleavage has emerged, separating the “winners” and “losers” of globalization. The categorization is relatively straightforward. Losers of globalization see their life chances, quality of life, and/or overall well-being to be reduced as a consequence of globalization. Winners, on the other hand, see themselves as better off due to globalization. Most importantly, this new categorization of winners and losers does not necessarily align to classic cleavage divisions as outlined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), which are: class, religion-center periphery, and urban-

rural. (Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Teney, Lacewell, and De Wilde 2013). This project seeks to further understand the nature of this new divide.

CLEAVAGES IN EUROPE

Lipset and Rokkan's three cleavages dominated the Western European sphere from the 1920s, well into the 1970s, and in some cases, beyond, leading the authors to describe the Western European political sphere as "frozen." However, the entrance of a new wave of parties in the 1970s, particularly the Greens, led to what Dalton (1996) and Inglehart (1990) refer to as "issue voting." The decline in the impact of traditional cleavages is considered to have been in progress since the end of the Second World War (Givens 2005). Accordingly, one could argue that the recent entrance of populist, euroskeptic parties onto the European political system is yet an additional layer of "issue voting," further eroding the impact and salience of traditional cleavages (Hernández and Kriesi 2016b; Teney, Lacewell, and De Wilde 2013)(Hernández and Kriesi 2016b; Teney, Lacewell, and De Wilde 2013).

THE CASE OF SYRIZA

Initial indications of a political shift first appeared Greece in 2012, with the rise and electoral triumph of SYRIZA, a left-wing populist coalition, which campaigned primarily upon issues of austerity and of European government. Accordingly, the 2012 national election in Greece dismantled a decades-long political status quo. From the 1970s until the start of the 21st century, Greece's center-left socialist party, PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement), combined with its center-right counterpart, ND (New Democracy), collectively won a minimum of 80% of the vote in every national election (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2014). This stable dual-party reign, however, erupted in the years following the 2008 Financial Crisis and near-default of the Greek economy. SYRIZA's 2012 campaign followed a classic populist style, focusing on

two salient issues: the corruption of the political elite, and concerns surrounding EU-imposed austerity, something easily marketed as a “people’s issue.” The campaign, closely associated with party leader Alex Tsipras, merged these issues, marketing EU-integration as in line with the interests of a corrupt international elite, while preaching national anti-austerity measures as the only way to protect the Greek people against an elitist, out-of-touch bureaucracy. Leading to their respective downfalls, PASOK and ND were effectively unable to counter such a message, as voters (with the help of SYRIZA’s political messaging) were able to place economic accountability and elitist failure on the shoulders of the two parties which had, up to this point, dominated the Greek Third Republic (Dinas and Rori 2013). As Greece reached the brink of collapse, and Tsipras’s robust populism increasingly appealed to a growing list of grievances, the combined vote share of ND and PASOK fell below 33 percent in the 2012 national election (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2014).

Accordingly, SYRIZA effectively unseated PASOK from its longtime political prominence. In the years between 1981 and 2009, PASOK won between 38.1% and 48.1% percent of the vote share in national elections. In June 2012, however, PASOK could only claim 12% of the vote share, ousted by SYRIZA’s 36.3% win. It is estimated that PASOK lost 75% of its voters in its 2012 electoral collapse (Eleftheriou 2016). Perhaps more intriguing however, are Greek national election results *following* 2012, as the electoral gap between PASOK and SYRIZA has only widened. Election results from 2016 show SYRIZA at 36% of vote share, and PASOK at 4.68%. This growing discrepancy suggests a clear process of partisan realignment in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis, as left-leaning politics in Greece are now generally aligned with SYRIZA, rather than PASOK. The ND, though electorally damaged, has remained reasonably stable, winning between 18% and 33% since 2009. Note, however, that ND was

better able to avoid an “elitist label” and managed to remain perceived as an ally of the people, as SYRIZA did not directly attack the politics of ND during Tsipras’s 2012 campaign. Further still, SYRIZA, though a far-left party, did not alienate the political right, nor did it alienate populist, people-centric rhetoric. Tsipras was applauded for his “patriotism” by right-wing pundits and found support in far-right social groups for his opposition to the political influence of the elitist, bureaucratic Troika² (Eleftheriou 2016). Such an alliance between the far-right and the far-left offers the suggestion that frustration with European integration and its associated bureaucracy reached a boiling point so as to transcend the left-right ideological divide. Rather, the “fringes” of the political spectrum (the far-left and far-right) are organized against the ideological center, generally consisting of mainstream, catch-all parties in support of EU-integration. As such, political parties appear to position themselves in political space according to “horseshoe” theory: with regard to the issue of the European Union, far-right and far-left parties have more in common with one another than either has to parties at the ideological center or mainstream (van Elsas, et al. 2016).

While this pattern first emerged in Greece (one of the hardest-hit EU member states in the wake of the Great Recession), this political trend has extended into much of the European Union. Interestingly, PASOK is one of several mainstream, center-left European parties to have fallen in the years after 2008. This center-left collapse has only furthered since 2012, and is particularly visible in the cases of France, the Netherlands, and Spain, in which PSOE is still standing, but facing strong electoral challenges from both PP and PODEMOS (Medina 2016). However, mainstream parties separate from the center-left are also losing ground: Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU), while still in control of government, now rules in coalition.

² This term refers to The IMF, The European Union, and The European Central Bank

The project aims to understand why such a trend has appeared, and what attributes have led to the fragility of the center-left, and to the political center at-large.

THE CASE OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL FRONT

Though SYRIZA and other far-left populists have gained notoriety in recent years, the far-right has, albeit differently, made its own anti-integrationist mark upon the post-2008 European political sphere. Far-right populism is quickly identifiable in France, as Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front (FN) championed right-wing populism in France in 1983-84, when the party first rose to national relevance, winning 11.2 percent of the vote in the European Parliamentary elections. The party, founded in 1972, was first able to escape political marginality in 1984, and has been viewed as a leader of the European far-right since. The FN has won nearly ten percent of the vote (or over) in all national elections since 1986. Unlike SYRIZA in Greece, the FN did not swiftly "un-seat" a mainstream party, but rather, has slowly and steadily crept onto the French political scene over several decades, benefitting from rising ethno nationalism, national security anxieties, and rising frustrations of the working class (Rydgren 2008). This process has developed, however, due to the decline of parties such as the French Communist Party (PCF) and the centrist French Republican Party, leaving an ideological vacuum which the FN has tactfully filled with its ethno-nationalist political messaging. The FN has, remarkably, aligned workers' issues (such as unemployment) with ethno-nationalist issues (such as immigration) via traditional protections of the working class, and promises to uphold a philosophy of "France for the French." As such, the FN, a far-right populist party, has even managed to attract traditional Communist Party voters toward their own party (Perrineau 2017).

LITERATURE REVIEW

ECONOMIC VOTING

Economic voting theory holds that voters react to economic crisis or downturn by punishing incumbents and voting in favor of opposition parties. The theory is rooted in the assumption that rational voters will reward incumbents with votes when the economy is performing well, and punish incumbents when the economy is performing poorly (Fiorina 1978; Key 1966; Kramer 1971; Lewis-Beck 1988). According to this theory, it is not the personal financial situation of the voter that determines the choice to punish or reward the incumbent, but rather, the perceived state of the national economy (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Accordingly, Talving (2017) establishes that, in the post-recession period, incumbent parties in favor of austerity measures were most heavily punished by voters, leaving space for new parties to enter the system, effectively explaining the shock of the Greek 2012 elections. However, to explain political patterns beyond 2012, and beyond the realm of Greek national politics, a deeper analysis is required. The electoral collapse of 2012 does not appear to have been a one-off event in the isolated context of an economic crisis, after which the political balance would have recalibrated. Rather, the Great Recession in Europe may represent a more robust case of economic voting theory. Hernández and Kriesi (2016) argue that the 2008 Financial Crisis and its subsequent fallout does not constitute an “ordinary” event, and thus, the phenomenon requires a long-term analysis. The authors suggest that in contexts such as the Great Recession, economic punishment of incumbents extends further beyond a one-time electoral event. Rather, such a shock facilitated the destabilization of European party systems and thus, catalyzed a long-term party system change in accordance to dealignment and realignment theories (Hernández and Kriesi 2016a)(Hernández and Kriesi 2016a). As such, there is reason to believe that populist

movements have begun to pull disillusioned voters away from mainstream political parties, and toward new cultural grievances, thus igniting a process of partisan dealignment and realignment (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2014).

DE-ALIGNMENT, REALIGNMENT THEORY

At its simplest, the theory of partisan dealignment and realignment consists of a sequence in which traditional partisan ties are eroded (“partisan dealignment”), as once-highly partisan voters drift away from strict loyalty to a single, particular political party. *Partisan realignment*, the second part of the sequence, is defined as a significant shift in the constituencies of parties, usually creating a shift in the electoral strength of parties (Dalton 2006). More simply, dealignment describes the process in which voters gravitate away from their party of choice, or abstain from voting altogether. Realignment describes the process in which voters gravitate toward a new or different party. As allegiance to the new party increases, partisan realignment is strengthened. Traditionally, scholars have associated partisan dealignment with political shocks and crises (van Gent, Mamadouh, and van der Wusten 2013; Hernández and Kriesi 2016a; Talving 2017). While technically correct, as political shocks such as scandals, economic downturns, and times of war can lead voters away from strong partisanship, true partisan dealignment reflects a more complex phenomenon. Dalton (2006) points out that such dealignment trends reflect larger patterns of societal change which are typical of advanced industrial democracies. According to the theory, voters will *dealign* from parties no longer effectively organizing according to contemporary needs and interests, and eventually *realign* with parties able to effectively orient themselves according to new, more salient issues, potentially via a new cleavage (Dalton 2006; Mair 2013). Such a phenomenon further suggests that traditional cleavages are changing in their level of predictive value.

MAINSTREAM PARTIES AS CATCH ALL PARTIES

With respect to how a mainstream party may react to an electoral challenge, the literature brings several points to light. This discussion will proceed under the Downsian spatial model of party competition, which assumes parties are rational actors with the objective of maximizing vote share (Downs 1957). Empirical studies have established that political parties adjust policies in reaction to positional shifts of competitors, or by the electoral gains of a challenger (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009). Adams et al (2006) have established strong differences in policy shift behavior between niche and mainstream parties, particularly in Western Europe. The study concludes that *niche* parties are far more rigid with respect to policy shifts.³ Niche parties are seldom found to adjust policies in response to changes in public opinion, as such, parties are rewarded for policy stability, and tend to lose constituents as a consequence of a policy shift. Mainstream parties, however, typically behaving as catch-all parties, are, according to the theory, are able to shift positions in policy space without paying strong electoral penalties, and thus, are motivated to react to perceived changes in the preferences of the electorate (Adams, et al. 2006).

Assuming that the policy/ideology of a niche party is relatively fixed, a mainstream party may react to the electoral success of a niche party in order to adapt to changing external circumstances. Importantly, Meijers (2017) supports such a theory: electoral success of a euroskeptic challenger can lead to mainstream party positional shifts, assuming the challenger views European integration as a salient electoral issue. That is to say, a mainstream party will adapt a euroskeptic policy (for example, proposed increased regulation of the Schengen area) if the mainstream party perceives the topic of European integration as important to voters, and an

³ In this context, niche parties are defined as those presenting either an extreme ideology, such as a communist or extreme nationalist ideology; or, a non-centrist “niche” ideology, such as the Greens). Such a description easily includes populist, euroskeptic parties.

explanation of fringe party success (Meijers 2017). Further, one may infer that a mainstream party may suffer if it fails to adjust policy in such a situation.

More importantly, however, Meijers argues that mainstream party *ideology* holds additional relevance when determining mainstream vs populist party electoral success: Center-left parties on the political mainstream are most affected by euroskeptic challenger success, as the center-left is more likely to respond to euroskeptic challenger pressure when compared to the center-right. This is perhaps explained by the fact that the baseline level of support for European integration is slightly higher on the center-left when compared to levels of support on the center right. Therefore, center-left parties may have to make greater policy adjustments on European integration in order to sufficiently account for euroskeptic electoral pressure. Further, Meijers argues that that the center-left is affected by pressures on both the far-left and far-right. The center-right, however is only affected by the far-right. The reasoning is that center-left parties are sensitive to both distributional (far-left) and cultural (far-right) anti-EU arguments (Meijers 2017).

THEORY

Pulling from the literature above, I theorize that the current populist wave, and associated weakening of mainstream parties in Europe is due to a process of partisan dealignment and realignment. Further, it is highly possible that this process is not yet complete, and that trends recorded in this study are simply the first part of the dealignment/realignment sequence. Specifically, I hypothesize that voters are presently dealigning from mainstream, centrist parties (those positioned around traditional societal cleavages), and realigning toward parties, both old and new, which have positioned themselves around new societal divisions, namely those related

to the effects of EU integration and globalization. These “new wave” parties are both populist and euroskeptic in nature. According to the theory, such a process accounts for the recent erosion in the support of mainstream parties, namely those on the center-left, as well as for the renewed strength of populism in this current political moment. The theory posits that fringe and radical parties have successfully positioned themselves around a globalist-centric cleavage. This cleavage, generally speaking, divides societies into two groups: “winners” and “losers” of globalization. The theory assumes that voters belong in one of the two categories, and that few-to-zero voters could be considered “neutral” on the issues of globalization and integration, in line with classic populist societal views. Voters will either flock to parties in favor of integration, as this section of the electorate has something to gain (or perceives something to gain) from the continuation of European integration, *or*, toward parties in favor of “localizing” interests, as these voters have perceived stake in preventing and/or reversing European integration. Voters are categorized as either in favor of the globalizing “elite” or the punished “people,” leading to increasingly polarized politics. As noted above, opposition to the European Union may emerge on *both* social and economic grounds, as parties may present cultural opposition to the EU (upon issues of national sovereignty, immigration, and issues such as linguistic policy or the status of non-native residents) alongside economic opposition to the EU (namely the capitalist structure of the European Union, allowing for free movement of capital and labor between member states). Both sources of opposition, however, are rooted in a desire to return to a more localized political order, and can appeal to voters on the “losers” side of this political cleavage.

A WORD ON GLOBALIZATION VS INTEGRATION

While globalization is represented by a variety of policies and outlooks, this division is easily identified by support for the European Union and European integration. Further, the issue of European integration is unique to the region and offers a more specific, specialized exploration of globalization politics in the Western Europe. However, we could expect to see this cleavage extend beyond the issue of the European Union, and toward the topic of internationalism more broadly. We would expect this pattern to hold consistent with respect to EU-integration attitudes *and* globalization attitudes. For example, a “loser of globalization” would be expected to reject both a proposal for increased European Integration (i.e. greater power ceded to Brussels, further deregulation of movement within the Schengen area) *and* proposals in favor of increased globalization (i.e. increased UN participation or further deregulation of international commerce). Populist parties have emerged to respond to such a set of preferences, and are thus able to win voters by presenting a strong set of proposals, ideologies, and outlooks that defend national autonomy in the face of a globalizing world.

Given the argument above, one must consider the opposite set of preferences, those of a perceived “winner of globalization.” These voters are expected to align toward parties in strong support of globalist and European policies, and reject parties with weak or negative attitudes toward the EU. Accordingly, the theory posits that mainstream parties are vulnerable to populism at this moment in time due to their failure to properly align according to the globalization cleavage. This is not to say that *pro-EU* parties are most susceptible to electoral failure: such a statement is easily falsified by cases such as the 2017 Presidential election in France. Emmanuel Macron, a deeply globalist, pro-Europe politician successfully defeated Marine Le Pen, a strongly nationalist euroskeptic, in an electoral challenge. Rather, my theory wishes to shed light on the fact that the 2017 French presidential race was a contest not between “left” and “right”,

but between a French nationalist and a French European. I argue that *EU-neutral* parties are those most likely to fail to find support in an electoral contest, as they fail to align to neither of the dichotomous halves of the populist vs elitist societal structure. However, given the nature of status quo-politics, it is likely that the two groups are asymmetrical in their intensity. It is likely that the status quo of European integration and a globalized economy is associated with weak supporters and strong critics.

According to the theory, globalization (indicated in this context by the opening of global markets, support of supranational governmental bodies, such as the European Union, and a lessened emphasis on national tradition and culture) has created a strong policy division in European societies. While studies have pointed to the globalization levels of countries as indicators of political trends, the focus of the study remains at the party level. Accordingly, I theorize that parties with strong stances (either in favor of or against) with respect to European integration are most electorally resilient, able to maintain or increase vote share from one election to the next. For example, the theory predicts that parties placing strong emphasis on the need to either exit or reform the EU, or, conversely, parties in favor of *further* European integration will reap electoral victories, compared to parties with weaker stances. This theory explains the rise and success of new parties, such as, but not limited to, SYRIZA and En Marche. While the issue and corresponding theory of globalization are in need of broader investigation, the hypothesis will narrow specifically to address more specifically the issue of European Integration in order to confine the study to reasonable bounds and to increase the internal validity of the findings.

HYPOTHESIS ONE: The EU Position Hypothesis

H1: *Party position toward the European Union, European Integration, and wider internationalist outlooks will serve as a predictor of a party's change in vote share between consecutive elections. This predictive power is expected to change over time.*

This hypothesis suggests that a party's stance on European Integration serves as a predictor of electoral performance, and a party's ability to move either up or down in the polls, relative to the prior election. It may be falsifiable in the event that party position toward the European Union either a) fails to serve as a predictive measure in any time period, or b) does not change as a predictive measure between time periods.

HYPOTHESIS TWO: The Issue Salience Hypothesis

H2: *Parties placing strong importance upon the issue of European integration are most electorally successful. This predictive power is expected to increase over time.*

This hypothesis suggests that party's placed *importance* on the issue of European Integration serves as a predictor of electoral performance, and a party's ability to move either up or down in the polls, relative to the prior election. It may be falsifiable in the event that the intensity of a party's stance toward the European Union either a) fails to serve as a predictive measure in any time period, or b) does not change as a predictive measure between time periods.

HYPOTHESIS THREE: The Mainstream Party Failure Hypothesis

H3: *Mainstream parties with static levels of importance placed on the issue of European integration from one election to the next are more likely to lose vote share from the first election to the second. Mainstream parties with static EU saliency levels are most susceptible to electoral failure. The predictive power is expected to increase over time.*

This hypothesis suggests that mainstream parties are most susceptible to electoral failure during elections in which the party's perceived importance of European Union remains static. It may be falsifiable in the event that a) a party's change in attitude toward the European Union has no effect on electoral failure, b) a party's change in attitude toward the European Union is in fact damaging to party performance, or c) the nature of the predictive power of EU-attitude change and change in vote share does not change over time.

HYPOTHESIS FOUR: The Time/Salience Hypothesis

H4: The issue of European Integration has grown more salient, across all parties, with time.

According to the theory that the issue of European integration has grown increasingly important as this process of realignment and dealignment has progressed, hypothesis four suggests that overall salience placed on the topic of the European Union by political parties will increase over time. This hypothesis is falsifiable in the event that a) EU Salience across parties has remained static over time or b) EU Salience has become less salient over time or c) the trend does not apply to all parties.

HYPOTHESIS FIVE: The Euroskeptic Populists Hypothesis

H5: Euroskepticism clusters at the ideological fringes of the left-right spectrum. Pro-integrationist sentiment clusters at the ideological center.

The theory predicts that a party's favoritism toward the European Union is predicted by the party's proximity to the center of left-right ideological spectrum. Parties will increase in euroskeptic tendencies as they are placed further and further from "5" on the left-right spectrum,

moving closer to either “1” (the extreme left), or “10” (the extreme right). This hypothesis is falsifiable in the event that a) There is no correlation between left-right position and level of euroskepticism, or b) the opposite effect is found to be true, parties decrease in euroskepticism as they are placed further from “5” on the left-right spectrum.

DATA AND METHODS

The empirical analysis will shed light on the question of whether the strength and/or direction of party stance with respect to the issue of European integration is a determinant of party electoral performance. The study concerns itself with national, legislative elections in 15 original EU member states dating from 1996-2015, depending on the timing of elections. The study proceeds to conduct linear regressions according to the five hypotheses, listed above.

Hypotheses one, two, and three will be tested in two separate time periods in order to assess if the relationship in question is at all different when comparing elections held prior to 2008, and elections held in years 2008 and after. Time period A will concern elections up to 2007, time period B will concern elections from 2008 and beyond. Note that cases included in hypothesis three are limited to “mainstream” parties, as the hypothesis is concerned exclusively with mainstream party performance.⁴

Hypotheses four and five will be tested with separate case groups. Hypothesis four will be split according to party radicalism, running a linear regression using exclusively parties coded as “radical parties,” and again with parties coded as “mainstream parties.” Hypothesis five is

⁴ The study considers “mainstream parties” to be those coded as neither “radical left” nor “radical right” by the CHES dataset.

split according to party ideology: Cases are divided as “Left-to-Center,” and as “Center-to-Right.”⁵

A WORD ON CASE SELECTION

The study is confined to the original 15 member states of the European Union, so as to confine the study to states which are a) EU member states during all election years studied and b) are not new EU members, as a dynamic or changing EU membership status would create inconsistent attitudes toward the EU and EU membership. States included in the study are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom remains in the study, in spite of “Brexit”- The UK’s eventual exit from the European Union as a result of a 2016 public referendum in which British voters favored exiting the union by 52% to 48% (Archick 2017). Though “Brexit” presents a unique challenge to the European Union, the case of the United Kingdom is still included, as the United Kingdom is technically still an EU member state (as of the completion of this project, April 2018) and holds EU-member status for all cases included in this study. Most importantly, the UK is a clear and robust example of a EU member state with a strong tradition of euroskepticism (Spiering 2015). Though the study is conducted at the party level, rather than at the voter level, the inclusion of the case provides variance to the study and the inclusion of a state with a euroskeptic coalition of voters.

In addition, the study will operate exclusively within the bounds of national, legislative elections. First, such a setup increases robustness of the study as the project concerns data collected from elections conducted under 15 different national electoral systems. Each state

⁵ Left-to-Center parties are categorized as coded from 0-5 on the left/right ideology scale, according to the CHES dataset. Right-to-Center parties are categorized as those coded from 5-10 on the left/right ideology scale, according to the CHES dataset.

included in the project operates under a different degree of presidential and legislative power, federalism, and electoral frequency. Cases include a strong variation in turnout, institutional structure, electoral systems, and electoral thresholds. Second, the study refrains from analyzing EU-level elections as the electoral system used to elect the European Parliament (EP) is 1) more or less uniform across all states, 2) generally lower in turnout, and 3) notoriously seen as a “second-order” election in which citizens are compelled to protest vote, as political consequences are seen as minimal (Reif and Schmitt 1980). There is reason to believe that EP elections are fundamentally different from national elections. Accordingly, the study is limited to national elections.

A WORD ON NATIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS

The term *electoral system* refers to the set of laws rules that structure how votes are cast, and how these votes are converted into an assembly. The scholarly literature has shown that the type of electoral laws and the nature of the party system (i.e. which and how many parties emerge in a given political system) are strongly correlated (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954). The study takes such a fact into consideration, and includes a variety and political systems with a variety of electoral laws, as populist and fringe parties are more or less likely to enter government under different systems. Keep in mind, however, that the study remains focused on “vote share” rather than “seat share,” and is thus more concerned with “votes won” than with the representative consequence of electoral results. The inconsistent “costs” of winning a parliamentary seat do not directly factor into the theory, and provides basis for the decision to limit the focus to vote share, rather than seat share.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE

The dependent variable is measured as the electoral performance of each party in national-level legislative elections. “Electoral performance” will be measured according to “*vote share*”, as reported via ParlGov.⁶ In elections with two rounds, results from the second and final round will be used in the study.

In some cases, *change* in vote is used as the dependent variable. In such cases, “*vote change*” is calculated as the difference in a party’s vote share from the election in question and the election prior. Negative values indicate a drop in vote share from one election to the next, while positive values indicate an increase in vote share from one round to the next.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: PARTY POSITION TOWARD THE EUROPEAN UNION

The independent variable is a national party’s position with respect to European Integration, and internationalism, more broadly. Though the theory often intentionally refers to *globalization* as the salient cleavage, I still regard distinction between the terms “globalization” and “European integration,” and thus, have chosen to limit the study to the issue of European integration. This choice was made for both practical and theoretical reasons. First, The European Union offers a unique “level” of globalization distinct from any other area of the world: European integration is a relatively concrete phenomenon that affects a voter’s daily life in a clear identifiable way. Voters are able to conceptualize the effects of European integration in their daily lives through currency, passports, cell phone data plans, and products available for purchase in grocery stores. The effects of European integration are directly visible to and easily identified by voters in ways that other globalist institutions are not. Further, the notion of a “European Identity” is unique to the issue of European integration, and may only be observed if separated from other aspects of global integration. The topic of European integration is specific

⁶ ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2018)

and measurable, and allows for increased internal validity of the study. However, a measure of “internationalism” is included as an independent variable in order to measure integrationist views more broadly, and to provide an additional level of rigor to the study. Accordingly, the study will focus primarily upon the issue of European Integration, while adding measures for “internationalism” in order to check for robustness and to assure that globalization and European integration attitudes are not entirely distinct. Such a design may help to shed light on the differences in attitudes between a European identity and an internationalized identity, offering potential insights for future studies. Does “European Integration” simply operate as a proxy for “globalization,” or do the two concepts present different challenges to both parties and their constituents? Given the unique nature of the European Union, there is reason to suspect that the two variables may present different levels of saliency in an election. To account for such a possibility, the study will measure the independent variable across six different metrics: two from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES)⁷, and four from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP)⁸.

While both the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) offer reasonable scores for party ideology and positioning with respect to EU integration and internationalism, the study is unable to favor one over the other, and thus, variables from both projects are included. Such a decision offers an additional level of rigor to the study, and allows for measurement of the same phenomenon across different metrics.

⁷ Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova. 2015. “2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey.” Version 2015.1. Available on chesdata.eu. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

⁸ Lehmann, Pola / Matthieß, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Werner, Annika (2017): Manifesto Corpus. Version: 2017a. Berlin: WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey, updated in five waves (1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014) measures the positions and ideologies of national European parties, according to expert surveys. Data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey will be employed to measure both party position toward the European Union and salience of a party's stance toward the European Union. Further, the study will use other CHES measurements of party position and ideology as control variables.

While expert surveys are often criticized for serving as measures of party reputations, rather than party positions, such bias is perhaps beneficial to the study, as voters likely take into account a party's *reputation*, rather than a party's manifesto, when casting votes (Budge 2000). As Budge (2000) argues, reputational scores are ambiguous as to whether a party's behavior is taken into account, and what *elements* of the party (i.e. leadership, membership, specific party spokespeople, etc.) are considered. Such variation likely more accurately reflects the analysis of the electorate, relative to an analysis of a party manifesto. Further, it is likely that such factors have little effect on the accuracy of scoring, as CHES positional scoring has consistently been found to be a reliable source of information on party positioning on European Integration and position on the ideological spectrum (Hooghe et al. 2010). Further, the CHES dataset is included as it includes significantly more data on fringe parties, compared to the CMP dataset, and thus, allows the study to include a more holistic view of the European political sphere, rather than exclusively resting on major or mainstream parties (Meijers 2017).

“POSITION_CHES” refers to the party's overall orientation of the party leadership toward European Integration in “YEAR” (note that “YEAR” describes the year the score was

assigned, rather than the specific election year. Appendix A offers explanation and descriptions with respect to assigning CHES scores to election years). The scores are marked on a 1-7 sliding scale, “1” being strongly opposed to European Integration, “7” being strongly in favor of European Integration. “4” operates as the neutral score.

“EU_SALIENCE_CHES” refers to the relative salience of European integration in the party’s public stance in “YEAR.” Scores are marked according to a 0-10 scale, “0” being, “European integration is of no importance, never mentioned,” and “10” being, “European Integration is the most important issue.”

Comparative Manifestos Project

The Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) is used as the second source of independent variable measure. The CMP project codes policy programs of parties by taking phrases from the policy program and matching these pieces of rhetoric to a policy category (this study is concerned with scores related to “internationalism” and “the European Union”): scores are then calculated as a percentage of these categories as a measure of a party’s policy. The Comparative Manifesto Project was selected as a measure of party positions toward the EU as it provides means for analysis of party stance at each individual election and offers measurements that are likely more precise than those in the CHES dataset. While the CMP data provides *specific* information, it fails to include a party’s history, reputation, and political messaging separate from a manifesto (i.e. campaign materials, speeches, debates, etc.), making it a precise, but potentially narrow measure of party positioning.

Parties produce a manifesto at each national election in order to highlight policy priorities and to convey issue positions to voters. Accordingly, parties must make distinct

decisions in drafting a manifesto. Further, a party may communicate low priority upon an issue by not addressing it in the manifesto, in which case a score of “zero” would be assigned with respect to the category in question. The CMP dataset provides precise measures of party positioning, based purely on the party manifesto, rather than expert opinion. While in some cases perhaps too precise of a measure, the CMP data is included as an important measurement of the independent variable.

“European Integration” scores for individual parties, by election year, will be calculated according scores assigned in the CMP data set as “**Anti_EU_cmp**” and “**Pro_EU_cmp**.” Parties’ stances toward the European union will be based on the scores below, per the party Manifesto Project code book.⁹ Parties with low or no score on either of the metrics will be considered ‘Neutral toward the EU.’ The study proceeds under the assumption that a party cannot simultaneously score highly on metrics per108 and per110, yet still treats them as two separate measurements. This decision is made for two reasons. First, in the event that a party simultaneously scores greater than zero on two related metrics (this does in fact occur in the data set), attempting to “combine” the scores would likely be misleading. Second, it is not unlikely that a party supports certain aspects of European integration, while objecting to others. Guidelines and coding mechanisms from the CMP codebook for each EU metric are included below:

Per108: European Community/Union: Positive

Favourable mentions of the European Community/Union in general. May include the:

- *Desirability of the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member);*
- *Desirability of expanding European Community/Union;*
- *Desirability of increasing ECs/EUs competences;*

⁹ Lehmann, Pola / Matthieß, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Werner, Annika (2017): Manifesto Corpus. Version: 2017a. Berlin: WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

- *Desirability of expanding the competences of the European Parliament*

Per110: European Community/Union: Negative

Negative references to the European Community/Union. May include:

- *Opposition to specific European policies which are preferred by European authorities*
- *Opposition to the net-contribution of a manifesto country to the EU budget*

“Internationalism preference” scores for individual parties, by election year, will be calculated according to scores assigned in the CMP data set as “**Anti_Intl_cmp**” and “**Pro_Intl_cmp**.” Further, the study considers scores of “internationalism preference” under the same logic as scores of “European Integration preference,” simply as a different measure of a party’s attitudes toward an international community, potentially *including* the European community. While internationalism is distinct from the issue of European integration, the inclusion of these variables allows for another layer of rigor, while measuring wider attitudes toward internationalism, beyond European member states and beyond issues of European governments and bodies, such as the European Commission. Guidelines and coding mechanisms from the CMP codebook for each internationalism metric are included below:

Per107: Internationalism: Positive

Need for international cooperation, including cooperation with specific countries other than those coded in 101.¹⁰ May also include references to the:

- *Need for aid to developing countries*
- *Need for world planning of resources*
- *Support for global governance*
- *Need for international courts*
- *Support for the UN or other international organization*

Per109: Internationalism: Negative

Negative references to international cooperation. Favorable mentions of national independence and sovereignty with regard to the manifesto country’s foreign policy, isolation and/or unilateralism as opposed to internationalism.

¹⁰ *Per101* is a coding scheme specific to “Foreign Special Relationships: Positive,” and refers to countries with which the manifesto country has a special relationship.

CONTROL VARIABLES

Unemployment

The study includes harmonized unemployment rates, calculated without seasonal adjustment. Unemployment is included as a control variable in order to account for economic conditions and voter incentive to punish incumbent and/or mainstream parties under circumstances of high unemployment. Harmonized unemployment rates were selected as to include an international standard of unemployment, as to assure that measures across states were taken under the same measurement criteria, as opposed to using different, national measures of unemployment. Unemployment rate is assigned to each national party in each corresponding national election year, using the harmonized unemployment rate from the month of the election. Harmonized Unemployment Rate, total, all persons for (country) as reported by OECD. Note that the study intentionally selects “unemployment” rather than “change in unemployment” in order to consider the overall health of a national economy, rather than to account for specific changes in the economy. Such a decision is made to control for generally strong versus weak economies (for example, to account for the fact that, in 2009, Finland had an unemployment rate of 8.2%, while Spanish unemployment is recorded to have been at 17.8%). Further, it is likely that there is some time lag between a change in unemployment and a voter’s reaction to change in unemployment. To avoid a misrepresentation of this time lag, the study selects “unemployment” as the variable of choice.

GINI coefficient (GINI)

A control for inequality is included as it offers a measure of economic divisions, potentially serving as a proxy for societal division between those finding economic success

under the status quo, and those finding economic grievance under the status quo. GINI coefficient as provided by Eurostat. Note that data is only provided from 2004-2014 and thus the data is only controlled for elections within these bounds.

Party's ideological stance on economic issues (lr_econ)

Left-right economic party ideology as provided by CHES in the corresponding year. A description according to the CHES codebook is included below. Such a measure is included as a control variable in the models to test the strength of the relationship in question when considering the economic policies of the parties in question, as it is not unreasonable to assume that economic policy of a party may affect and/or outweigh a party's EU or internationalist attitudes, or its broader left-right ideological position. In particular, such a control is used to account for differences in economic stances of parties, particularly when considering that euroskeptic parties may hold a strong variety of positions toward the economy. As alluded to in earlier chapters, left-leaning euroskeptic parties tend to oppose the European union on the basis of its capitalist structure (and thus would hold lr_econ scores closer to 0). Such a control accounts for the fact that there is a strong cohort of parties opposed to neo-liberal economic policy included in the broader category of "euroskeptic parties."

***LRECON** = position of the party in **YEAR** in terms of its ideological stance on economic issues. Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.*

0 = extreme left

:

5 = center

:

10 = extreme right

Party's ideological stance on democratic freedoms and rights (Galtan)

Ideology of the party with respect to democratic freedoms and rights as provided by CHES in the corresponding year. A description of the variable and its range according to the CHES codebook is included below. Such a measure is included as a control variable in the models in order to test the strength of the relationship in question considering the ideological stances with respect to rights and freedoms of the party in question. There is strong reason to assume that the ideological stance of a party with respect to democratic rights and freedoms would affect the party's position toward the European Union and increased internationalism, especially when considering supranational institutions, such as international courts. Further still, such a control is used to account for differences in cultural stances of parties, particularly when considering that right-leaning euroskeptic parties generally oppose the European Union on the basis of its natural incompatibility with traditional, national cultures, and the preservation of conservative values. Such a control accounts for the fact that there euroskeptic parties can hold starkly different preferences across this measure.

***GALTAN** = position of a party in **YEAR** in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. "Libertarian" or "post materialist" parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. "Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.*

Coalition Membership (Govt)

The study includes controls for party incumbency, as it voters may react to a party's incumbency status. As established above, there is a possibility that voters may punish incumbent parties in the event of an economic downturn.

RESULTS

Hypothesis One: *Party position toward the European Union, European Integration, and wider internationalist outlooks will serve as a predictor of a party's change in vote share between consecutive elections. This predictive power is expected to change over time.*

As expected according to the theory, EU position operates as a significant, negative predictor of vote share in elections held in 2008 and beyond. However, in elections prior to 2008, a party's position toward the EU plays no significant determining factor in a party's change in vote share from one election to the next. The significance of EU position as a predictor of change in vote share changes over time, and is only significant after 2008.

Results listed in Tables 1-5 clearly demonstrate that in Time Period A (elections before 2008), a party's position toward the European Union and/or internationalism more broadly have no effect on a party's gains or losses between elections. This relationship is tested across five separate measures of the independent variable and in four different models of controls. There is one exception to this finding, as Table 5 shows that a party's stated opposition toward internationalism is a significant, *negative* determinant of change in party vote share in time period A; meaning that voters were in some way repelled by anti-international language. Note, however, that this relationship is weak, and only appears in Model 3. The relationship disappears in the absence of controls *and* when controlling for ideological variables (galtan and lr_econ). The finding is significant only after controlling exclusively for economic variables (unemployment and inequality). As significance is only found in one model, and with only one of five different measures of the independent variable, I remain firm in my conclusion that a party's position toward the European Union and/or internationalism has no effect on change in party vote share in Time Period A.

Results listed in Table 6, however, demonstrate that a party's position toward the European Union and international integration *is* a significant determinant of the change in party vote share in Time Period B (elections held in 2008 and beyond). Table 6 displays results of a linear regression, testing change in party vote share against the party's EU favoritism score, as determined in the CHES dataset. Both before and after controlling for economic and ideological factors, a party's favoritism toward the European Union operates as a significant, negative predictor of change in vote share between elections. That is to say that in Time Period B, as a party's overall EU favoritism increases, its change in vote share decreases. Voters are in some way repelled by increased EU favoritism. This finding is significant both before and after controlling for economic and ideological factors.

Results listed in Tables 7 and 8 provide further nuance to the finding above, as the regressions summarized use CMP scores, rather than CHES scores, as measures of the independent variable. The findings in Table 7 correspond neatly to the findings in Table 6: A party's favoritism toward the European Union is a significant, negative determinant of change in vote share. As a party's favoritism toward the European Union increases, its change in vote share falls. As in line with the results in Table 6, voters are in some way repelled by favoritism toward the European Union. This finding is significant both before and after controlling for economic and ideological factors.

A party's euroskepticism, however, is entirely insignificant as a predictor of change in vote share in Time Period B. Voters are neither drawn toward nor repelled by euroskeptic politics in Time Period B. This results remains insignificant both before and after controlling for economic and ideological factors. Results are displayed in Table 8.

Lastly, the results show that party attitudes toward internationalism are significant predictors of change in vote share in Time Period B. Pro-internationalism is a significant, negative predictor of change in vote share: voters are in some way repelled by openly pro-integrationist language. This finding is significant both before and after controlling for economic and ideological factors, but not after controlling for both, as indicated in Table 9. The relationship is reasonably strong, but not as resilient as other relationships tested in the hypothesis. Anti-internationalism, in line with the above findings, operates as a positive, significant predictor of party vote change in Time Period B. As a party is increasingly skeptical of internationalism and international integration, change in party vote share decreases. This finding is reasonably significant, but the relationship disappears after controlling exclusively for economic factors, as displayed in Table 10.

In sum, the results show that euroskepticism increases as a party moves away from the ideological center, though this relationship is shown to be stronger when observing parties moving from the center toward the extreme right, relative to parties moving from the center toward the extreme left.¹¹

Hypothesis Two: Parties placing strong importance upon the issue of European integration are most electorally successful. This predictive power is expected to increase over time.

The regression models show no significant relationship between EU salience and vote share, in either time period. A party's placed salience upon the issue of European Integration

¹¹ Note however that results are insignificant after controlling for PR electoral systems. This is likely due to the size of the sample, as the UK and France are the only two cases that do not use a PR system, and also two of the wealthiest and most diplomatically influential. Further research can and should investigate the role of electoral systems on mainstream party vote loss.

does not affect the party's change in vote share from one election to the next, nor did this finding change as a result of the 2008 economic crash. Results are displayed in Table 11 and Table 12.

Hypothesis Three: Mainstream parties with static levels of importance placed on the issue of European integration from one election to the next are more likely to lose vote share from the first election to the second. Mainstream parties with static EU saliency levels are most susceptible to electoral failure. The predictive power is expected to increase over time.

The results in Tables 13 and 14 show a weakly significant relationship between EU issue salience and mainstream party performance between elections. Further, note with interest that this relationship is nearly identical in Time Periods A and B. Mainstream parties reap electoral benefit from one election to the next after placing an increased salience on the issue of European integration. The significance of this finding, however, disappears after controlling for economic and or ideological factors, as well as for party membership in the ruling coalition. The relationship is entirely unaffected by the events of the 2008 financial crisis.

Hypothesis Four: The issue of European Integration has grown more salient, across all parties, with time.

The models shown in Table 15 display a significant relationship between year and radical party EU issue salience.¹² As time has passed, radical parties have placed increasing levels of salience upon the issue of European integration. Note however, that this relationship falls apart

¹² “Radical Parties” are considered those labeled as “radical left” or “radical right” according to the CHES dataset. “Mainstream Parties” are those labeled as neither “radical left” nor “radical right” according to the CHES dataset. Such a decision was made in order to avoid a potential failure or inconsistency via a different classification of populism. The study makes this decision with full understanding that such a classification is not the only viable option. Future studies can and should consider additional and/or alternative classifications of “populist” and “non-populist.”

after controlling for economic factors. Such a fact leads to the suspicion that there is potentially a strong difference between radical parties in Southern Europe and radical parties in Northern Europe, as economic factors including those controlled for (unemployment and inequality) are deeply different between the two regions.

Time has no significance predictive value on mainstream party EU issue salience, as shown in Table 16.

Hypothesis Five: *Euroskepticism clusters at the ideological fringes of the left-right spectrum.*

Pro-integrationist sentiment clusters at the ideological center.

The results shown in Tables 17 – 26 overwhelmingly support the hypothesis that euroskepticism and anti-internationalism cluster at the extremes of the left-right ideological spectrum, while favoritism toward European and international integration concentrates at the ideological center. This finding is supported across five different measures of the independent variable. Note with interest, however, that this relationship is stronger on the right side of the ideological spectrum, relative to the left. This hypothesis proceeds according to the assumption that populism is found along the ideological fringes of the left-right ideological spectrum, in accordance with the findings of Rooduijn and Akkerman (2017).

Run against every measure of EU/Internationalist preference, the finding with center-to-right parties is the same: As party is scored further from the ideological center (5), and closer to the right-extreme (10), the party's European/Internationalist preference decreases: The CHES score, Pro_EU score, and Pro_Intl scores all decrease, while the Anti_EU and Anti_Intl scores

are observed to increase. These findings remain significant, with or without ideological and/or economic controls, and after controlling for party membership in the governing coalition.¹³

With respect to left-to-center parties, the findings remain in line with the theory, though do not hold with all measures of the independent variable, as seen with center-to-right parties. First, note with interest that there are no significant findings with respect to a party's position on the left-to-center ideological scale and the party's expressed support of internationalism, as measured by the CMP dataset.¹⁴ There is no relationship between left-to-center ideology and party favoritism of internationalism. However, the four other measures of the variable provide results as expected, with varying resilience to controls.

With respect to *disfavor* of internationalism, left-to-center ideological positioning is a negative predictor of anti-internationalism, as measured by the CMP dataset. As a party moves further from the extreme left, toward the ideological center, the party's anti-international rhetoric is seen to decrease, as in line with the theory. The findings remain significant after controlling for governing coalition membership, and for economic factors. However, the significance of the predictive relationship falls apart after controlling for ideological factors, both alone and in conjunction with the economic and coalition membership controls. Such a finding suggests that there is some ideological rift among parties scored at center or to the left of center with respect to anti-internationalism.

Left-to-center ideological positioning is a positive indicator of a party's favoritism toward the European Union, as measured by the CMP dataset. As a party moves closer to the ideological center, the party's EU favoritism is seen to increase. The relationship is significant

¹³ See Tables 18, 20, 22, 24, and 26 for summarized regression results

¹⁴ See Table 23

when no control variables are included. However, the significance is proven to be quite weak, as the predictive relationship between left-to-center ideology and EU favoritism disappears after controlling for economic and/or ideological factors as well as for governing coalition membership.¹⁵

That said, the theory remains strong when measuring the independent variable according to overall EU position and according to anti-EU attitudes. Left-to-center ideological positioning operates as a significant, positive predictor of overall EU position of a political party. As a party moves further from the extreme left, and toward the ideological center, overall EU position increases to a more favorable score. This finding is significant across all models and controls.¹⁶ Lastly, as expected according to the theory, left-to-center ideological positioning is a significant and negative indicator of a party's anti-EU attitudes, as measured by the CMP dataset. As a left-to-center party moves closer to the ideological center, the party's anti-EU attitudes are seen to decrease. This finding remains significant across all models and controls.¹⁷

DISCUSSION

The results above imply that EU position has in fact become a significant predictor of change in vote share for parties in the post-2008 period, as voters seem in some way repelled by certain degrees of EU-favoritism. Upon closer inspection, however, a clearer picture comes to light: it is not that voters are drawn to euroskepticism, but rather that they are repelled by outright and/or noticeably enthusiastic support for the European Union and integration more widely. This offers the potential for further study, as perhaps focus should be centered upon the

¹⁵ See Table 19

¹⁶ See Table 17

¹⁷ See Table 21

electoral losses of EU-supportive parties, rather than the electoral gains of euroskeptic parties. Perhaps it is not that euroskeptic parties are not inherently *taking* voters from mainstream parties (under a process of realignment), but that pro-integrationist parties are simply *losing* voters (under a process of dealignment), and consequently leaving more electoral space for euroskeptic parties to fill.

Further, the study found little importance relative to the *salience* of the issue of the European union, perhaps suggesting that it is not the airtime or attention devoted to party's given platform with respect to integration, but simply the platform itself. The change in salience placed upon the issue of the European Union did not function as a predictor of loss in vote share, in either time period, suggesting that it is perhaps the position taken by mainstream parties resulting in loss of vote share. This finding stands in spite of the fact that radical parties have been found to place greater salience on the issue of the European Union over time.

Finally, the results display strong evidence to support the claim that euroskepticism is a phenomenon of the ideological fringes, and that support for European and wider integration clusters at the ideological center. This finding is in line both with horseshoe and wider populist theories, which support the notion that the political fringes have more in common with each other than either does to the center, which is often painted as an opaque, institutional elite.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The results of the study leave much room for further investigation. Further, the bounds of the study were limited, as recent and eventful elections were excluded from the study due to

unavailability of ideological scoring data¹⁸. Accordingly, there is much to be discovered as the next several years of national elections and data publication unfold. There is potential for the formal exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union to serve as an additional political and/or economic shock to the European Union and wider euro-area, though the consequences of such an event can only be speculated.

More specifically, there is more to be uncovered with respect to voter attitudes toward pro-integrationist parties, as there is a possibility that falling levels of EU-favoritism are not the result of rising euroskepticism (though it may certainly appear that way at first glance), but rather an increasing distrust or wider de-alignment from pro-Europe attitudes. Such a theory deserves testing under specific and rigorous measures, as well as consideration of the fact that there remain clear and resilient pro-EU strongholds in European political space. This begs the question: if voters are in fact de-aligning from parties with pro-EU platforms, *which* voters are doing so? The continued electoral success of pro-European figures does not paint a picture of a total political abandonment of European Integration, but rather, a political *shift*.

Accordingly, future studies could investigate this further with respect to party ideology, as a study distinguishing between Conservative and Christian Democratic party performance, rather than analyzing all center-to-right parties as a single category. Initial controls for `lr_econ` and `galtan` in this study point to such a possibility.

Further, the study establishes that the *salience* of the issue of European integration is tangential to this narrative. There is room for further research to understand more precisely the nature and consequences of various *positions* toward European integration.

¹⁸ For example, complete data is not yet available concerning recent 2017 elections in both France and Germany, though these elections likely provide an important continuation of the narrative presented in this paper and should be included in future research.

Lastly, as the study was limited to a bloc-analysis of 15 EU member states, there is room both to expand the study to include a wider sample of cases, and to group countries by region or by political institutional structure, as there is obvious and inherent difference between the regional-national politics of Northwestern and Southwestern Europe.

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TABLE 1: Hypothesis one, Time Period A, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		1.177	0.686		1.03	0.880		4.134	0.202		4.477	0.311
Party Position Toward EU	0.039	0.225	0.497	-0.014	0.170	0.884	0.125	0.255	0.219	0.062	0.336	0.637
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.026	0.15	0.756				-0.175	0.275	0.263
Stance on Economy				0.056	0.161	0.502				0.079	0.320	0.634
Unemployment							-0.020	0.202	0.861	-0.016	0.214	0.894
Inequality (GINI)							0.101	0.141	0.385	0.116	0.149	0.330
Adjusted R-square			-0.002			-0.009			-0.007			-0.013
N			303			293			100			96

TABLE 2: Hypothesis one, Time Period A, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		0.384	0.787		0.771	0.652		4.257	0.532		4.802	0.528
Party's Pro-EU score (cmp)	0.007	0.119	0.913	-0.003	0.129	0.964	0.124	0.285	0.269	0.096	0.306	0.416
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.018	0.152	0.822				-0.198	0.270	0.173
Stance on Economy				0.048	0.159	0.548				0.091	0.290	0.526
Unemployment							0.033	0.232	0.803	0.010	0.255	0.938
Inequality (GINI)							0.034	0.164	0.799	0.075	0.177	0.589
Adjusted R-square			-0.004			-0.010			-0.015			-0.015
N			275			262			90			84

TABLE 3: Hypothesis one, Time Period A, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		0.286	0.881		0.741	0.663		4.28	0.716		5.009	0.778
Party's Anti-EU score (cmp)	-0.017	0.092	0.776	-0.013	0.142	0.848	-0.192	0.225	0.076	-0.161	0.268	0.209
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.013	0.155	0.870				-0.138	0.910	0.376
Stance on Economy				0.042	0.164	0.607				0.021	0.318	0.896
Unemployment							0.005	0.225	0.966	-0.006	0.248	0.966
Inequality (GINI)							0.039	0.158	0.757	0.063	0.175	0.644
Adjusted R-square			-0.003			-0.010			0.008			-0.003
N			262			262			90			84

TABLE 4: Hypothesis one, Time Period A, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		0.429	0.846		0.938	0.907		4.373	0.545		4.845	0.619
Party's Pro-Intl Score (cmp)	-0.028	0.118	0.641	-0.027	0.138	0.679	-0.055	0.208	0.624	-0.132	0.259	0.265
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.026	0.155	0.748				-0.263	0.272	0.073
Stance on Economy				0.046	0.156	0.551				0.115	0.286	0.417
Unemployment							-0.011	0.233	0.932	-0.051	0.257	0.708
Inequality (GINI)							0.072	0.159	0.578	0.122	0.171	0.359
Adjusted R-square			-0.003			-0.009			-0.026			-0.007
N			275			262			90			84

TABLE 5: Hypothesis one, Time Period A, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		0.275	0.896		0.725	0.662		4.152	0.49		4.747	0.587
Party's Anti-Intl Score (cmp)	-0.032	0.204	0.600	-0.024	0.227	0.716	-0.231	0.705	0.030 *	-0.206	0.851	0.106
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.010	0.155	0.905				-0.099	0.297	0.534
Stance on Economy				0.038	0.163	0.641				-0.002	0.314	0.992
Unemployment							-0.004	0.223	0.971	-0.012	0.246	0.929
Inequality (GINI)							0.007	0.155	0.539	0.091	0.169	0.487
Adjusted R-square			-0.003			-0.010			0.026			0.011
N			275			262			90			84

TABLE 6: Hypothesis one, Time Period B, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		1.223	0.004		1.7	0.004		4.828	0.277		4.966	0.226
Party Position Toward EU	-0.220	0.238	0.002 **	-0.323	0.289	0.000 **	-0.199	0.242	0.006 **	-0.313	0.297	0.000 **
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.190	0.230	0.056				-0.208	0.232	0.040
Stance on Economy				0.190	0.244	0.050				0.195	0.252	0.054
Unemployment							-0.002	0.106	0.980	0.004	0.105	0.968
Inequality (GINI)							-0.036	0.167	0.696	-0.020	0.167	0.829
Adjusted R-square			0.043			0.056			0.026			0.040
N			195			195			190			190

TABLE 7: Hypothesis one, Time Period B, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		0.590	0.198		1.263	0.449		5.362	0.659		5.752	0.660
Party's Pro-EU score (cmp)	-0.182	0.200	0.019 *	-0.197	0.214	0.016 *	-0.178	0.204	0.025 *	-0.193	0.220	0.023 *
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.073	0.225	0.434				-0.084	0.229	0.377
Stance on Economy				0.054	0.254	0.562				0.044	0.262	0.646
Unemployment							0.001	0.116	0.995	-0.002	0.120	0.983
Inequality (GINI)							-0.030	0.194	0.775	-0.024	0.202	0.822
Adjusted R-square			0.027			0.018			0.015			0.006
N			167			162			163			158

TABLE 8: Hypothesis one, Time Period B, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		0.504	0.495		1.232	0.994		5.444	0.626		5.823	0.558
Party's Anti_EU score (cmp)	0.109	0.165	0.162	0.131	0.180	0.121	0.063	0.186	0.425	0.081	0.204	0.350
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.073	0.236	0.458				-0.065	0.241	0.512
Stance on Economy				0.753	0.255	0.753				0.011	0.267	0.908
Unemployment							0.019	0.117	0.857	0.019	0.121	0.862
Inequality (GINI)							-0.055	0.195	0.600	-0.058	0.203	0.588
Adjusted R-square			0.006			-0.003			-0.013			-0.023
N			167			161			163			158

TABLE 9: Hypothesis one, Time Period B, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		0.750	0.137		1.374	0.311		5.443	0.383		5.804	0.359
Party's Pro-Intl Score (cmp)	-0.160	0.269	0.039 *	-0.158	0.280	0.045 *	-0.160	0.274	0.043 *	-0.157	0.286	0.053
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.026	0.220	0.777				-0.037	0.224	0.691
Stance on Economy				0.972	0.248	0.972				-0.011	0.254	0.903
Unemployment							0.013	0.116	0.898	0.010	0.120	0.928
GINI							-0.067	0.193	0.521	-0.066	0.201	0.539
Adjusted R-square			0.020			0.007			0.028			-0.003
N			167			162			163			158

TABLE 10: Hypothesis one, Time Period B, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		0.501	0.372		1.22	0.957		5.403	0.678		5.765	0.608
Party's Anti-Intl Score (cmp)	0.155	0.823	0.045 *	0.185	0.913	0.028 *	0.141	0.884	0.075	0.171	0.936	0.047 *
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.095	0.2324	0.331				-0.100	0.238	0.310
Stance on Economy				0.036	0.252	0.698				0.024	0.259	0.801
Unemployment							0.028	0.116	0.790	0.027	0.120	0.801
GINI							-0.052	0.193	0.614	-0.052	0.201	0.629
Adjusted R-square			0.018			0.012			0.003			-0.002
N			167			162			163			158

TABLE 11: Hypothesis two, Time period A, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)		1.647	0.775		1.171	0.664		5.828	0.252		5.828	0.275
Party's EU Saliense Score (CHES)	0.028	0.278	0.649	0.005	0.179	0.934	0.074	0.397	0.575	0.051	0.407	0.705
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.003	0.148	0.967				-0.254	0.339	0.147
Stance on Economy				0.038	0.159	0.641				0.166	0.42	0.401
Coalition Membership							-0.091	1.754	0.489	-0.104	2.006	0.489
Unemployment							0.012	0.275	0.933	0.018	0.275	0.901
Inequality (GINI)							0.117	0.117	0.417	0.14	0.192	0.337
Adjusted R-square			-0.003			-0.010			-0.036			-0.033
N			271			261			64			64

TABLE 12: Hypothesis two, Time period B, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)		1.529	0.979		1.636	0.923		4.413	0.738		5.828	0.275
Party's EU Saliense Score (CHES)	0.003	0.254	0.966	0.000	0.261	0.996	0.002	0.265	0.976	0.051	0.407	0.705
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				0.001	0.181	0.988				-0.254	0.339	0.147
Stance on Economy				0.014	0.195	0.861				0.166	0.42	0.401
Coalition Membership							-0.007	0.889	0.920	-0.104	2.006	0.489
Unemployment							-0.021	0.099	0.808	0.018	0.275	0.901
Inequality (GINI)							-0.023	0.159	0.801	0.14	0.192	0.337
Adjusted R-square			-0.005			-0.013			-0.017			-0.033
N			223			223			218			64

TABLE 13: Hypothesis three, Time period A, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		0.568	0.682		1.167	0.265		3.992	0.784		4.753	0.668
Change in Party's EU Salience Score (CHES)	0.148	0.366	0.027 *	0.125	0.254	0.066	0.131	0.270	0.079	0.122	0.340	0.131
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.046	0.210	0.569				-0.186	0.260	0.059
Stance on Economy				0.078	0.245	0.340				0.064	0.300	0.523
Unemployment							-0.168	0.106	0.053	-0.257	0.141	0.006
Inequality (GINI)							-0.005	0.138	0.957	0.009	0.164	0.921
Coalition Membership							0.064	0.877	0.393	0.158	1.082	0.065
Adjusted R-square			0.017			0.005			0.023			0.079
N			223			217			184			146

TABLE 14: Hypothesis three, Time period B, DV: Change in vote

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)	-0.296	0.568	0.604		1.169	0.261		0.3957	0.774		4.753	0.668
Change in Party's EU Salience Score (CHES)	0.823	0.366	0.026 *	0.128	0.254	0.061	0.131	0.269	0.078	0.122	0.340	0.131
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.059	0.210	0.472				-0.186	0.260	0.059
Stance on Economy				0.082	0.245	0.315				0.064	0.300	0.523
Unemployment							-0.168	0.106	0.053	-0.257	0.141	0.006
Inequality (GINI)							-0.005	0.137	0.949	0.009	0.164	0.921
Coalition Membership							0.063	0.872	0.394	0.158	1.082	0.065
Adjusted R-square			0.018			0.007			0.024			0.079
N			223			217			185			146

TABLE 15: Hypothesis four, Cases: Radical Parties, DV: EU Salienc

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		50.586	0.008		50.721	0.001		125.456	0.404		117.025	0.397
Year	0.237	0.025	0.006 **	0.281	0.025	0.001 **	0.105	0.062	0.386	0.098	0.058	0.386
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				0.124	0.074	0.358				0.357	0.083	0.036
Stance on Economy				0.15	0.084	0.272				0.039	0.106	0.819
Unemployment										-0.263	0.046	0.078
Inequality (GINI)										0.199	0.064	0.154
Adjusted R-square			0.049			0.109			0.005			0.135
N			136			133			83			83

TABLE 16: Hypothesis four, Cases: Mainstream Parties, DV: EU Salienc

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig	Beta	Std. Error	Sig
(Constant)		27.335	0.822		27.742	0.723		66.015	0.581		71.374	0.527
Year	0.021	0.014	0.665	-0.008	0.014	0.873	-0.035	0.033	0.613	-0.043	0.035	0.544
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.179	0.042	0.003				-0.208	0.054	0.009
Stance on Economy				0.203	0.049	0.001				0.239	0.063	0.003
Unemployment										0.053	0.029	0.531
Inequality (GINI)										0.158	0.036	0.043
Adjusted R-square			-0.002			0.026			0.035			0.065
N			422			412			239			234

TABLE 17: Hypothesis five, Cases: Left-to-Center Parties, DV: EU position_CHES

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)		0.190	0.000	0.203	0.000	**	0.999	0.097		0.915	0.026	
Party's Left/Right Position (CHES)	0.686	0.058	0.000 **	0.441	0.146	0.000 **	0.585	0.077	0.000 **	0.289	0.168	0.037 *
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.218	0.047	0.000 **				-0.248	0.055	0.000 **
Stance on Economy				0.338	0.116	0.002 **				0.432	0.138	0.002 **
Coalition Membership							0.192	0.274	0.003 **	0.149	0.253	0.011 *
Unemployment							-0.029	0.023	0.679	-0.038	0.021	0.548
Inequality (GINI)							0.057	0.034	0.410	0.068	0.031	0.280
Adjusted R-square			0.469			0.531			0.453			0.545
N			276			272			163			163

TABLE 18: Hypothesis five, Cases: Center-to-Right Parties, DV: EU position_CHES

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)		0.481	0.000	0.519	0.000		1.249	0.000		1.195	0.000	
Party's Left/Right Position (CHES)	-0.608	0.068	0.000 **	-0.583	0.085	0.000 **	-0.539	0.084	0.000 **	-0.503	0.100	0.000 **
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.248	0.049	0.000 **				-0.218	0.058	0.001 **
Stance on Economy				0.240	0.073	0.000 **				0.214	0.084	0.000 **
Coalition Membership							0.389	0.24	0.000 **	0.299	0.229	0.000 **
Unemployment							0.127	0.029	0.064	0.099	0.027	0.117
Inequality (GINI)							0.013	0.039	0.851	0.081	0.037	0.215
Adjusted R-square			0.367			0.499			0.483			0.570
N			300			291			165			165

TABLE 19: Hypothesis five, Cases: Left-to-Center Parties, DV: Pro_EU_cmp

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)		0.402	0.119	0.462	0.033		1.86	0.064		1.851	0.078	
Party's Left/Right Position (CHES)	0.252	0.124	0.000 **	-0.252	0.343	0.159	0.128	0.155	0.167	-0.332	0.368	0.133
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.017	0.100	0.795				-0.016	0.114	0.851
Stance on Economy				0.555	0.280	0.002				0.521	0.307	0.019
Coalition Membership							0.246	0.488	0.008	0.205	0.49	0.028
Unemployment							-0.168	0.046	0.104	-0.168	0.045	0.100
Inequality (GINI)							0.254	0.064	0.015	0.259	0.063	0.012
Adjusted R-square			0.059			0.098			0.216			0.153
N			224			220			125			125

TABLE 20: Hypothesis five, Cases: Center-to-Right Parties, DV: EU Pro_EU_cmp

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)		0.823	0.000	0.971	0.000		2.239	0.052		2.287	0.000	
Party's Left/Right Position (CHES)	-0.328	0.118	0.000 **	-0.333	0.152	0.000 **	-0.316	0.154	0.000 **	-0.238	0.185	0.017 *
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.119	0.084	0.102				-0.196	0.103	0.047 *
Stance on Economy				0.101	0.101	0.157				0.007	0.154	0.938
Coalition Membership							0.047	0.394	0.570	0.015	0.407	0.866
Unemployment							-0.065	0.047	0.527	-0.091	0.047	0.375
Inequality (GINI)							0.092	0.092	0.369	0.147	0.068	0.162
Adjusted R-square			0.104			0.136			0.088			0.106
N			250			242			137			137

TABLE 21: Hypothesis five, Cases: Left-to-Center Parties, DV: Anti_EU_cmp

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)		0.354	0.000	0.394	0.000		1.7774	0.217		1.736	0.415	
Party's Left/Right Position (CHES)	-0.438	0.109	0.000 **	-0.525	0.293	0.002 **	-0.406	0.147	0.000 **	-0.498	0.345	0.016 *
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				0.233	0.086	0.000 **				0.255	0.107	0.002 **
Stance on Economy				0.036	0.239	0.826				0.006	0.287	0.976
Coalition Membership							-0.004	0.466	0.963	0.016	0.46	0.853
Unemployment							0.259	0.044	0.009 **	0.261	0.042	0.006 **
Inequality (GINI)							-0.019	0.061	0.849	-0.009	0.06	0.927
Adjusted R-square			0.188			0.222			0.217			0.265
N			224			220			125			125

TABLE 22: Hypothesis five, Cases: Center-to-Right Parties, DV: Anti_EU_cmp

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)		1.200	0.001	1.078	0.010		2.567	0.812		2.511	0.218	
Party's Left/Right Position (CHES)	0.276	0.172	0.000 **	0.399	0.169	0.000 **	0.293	0.177	0.000 **	0.317	0.203	0.001 **
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				0.082	0.093	0.247				0.133	0.113	0.136
Stance on Economy				-0.217	0.143	0.002 **				-0.262	0.169	0.002 **
Coalition Membership							-0.27	0.452	0.001 **	-0.179	0.447	0.022 *
Unemployment							-0.128	0.054	0.184	-0.125	0.052	0.176
Inequality (GINI)							-0.118	0.075	0.223	-0.149	0.074	0.118
Adjusted R-square			0.072			0.167			0.188			0.269
N			250			242			137			137

TABLE 23: Hypothesis five, Cases: Left-to-Center Parties, DV: Pro_Intl_cmp

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)		0.397	0.000	0.463	0.000		1.941	0.176		1.944	0.138	
Party's Left/Right Position (CHES)	0.060	0.123	0.368	-0.207	0.344	0.266	0.151	0.161	0.123	-0.237	0.387	0.311
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.111	0.101	0.113				-0.050	0.120	0.594
Stance on Economy				0.320	0.281	0.081				0.454	0.322	0.054
Coalition Membership							-0.037	0.510	0.708	-0.075	0.515	0.446
Unemployment							-0.181	0.048	0.009	-0.181	0.047	0.096
Inequality (GINI)							0.007	0.067	0.951	0.010	0.067	0.927
Adjusted R-square			-0.001			0.019			0.022			0.040
N			224			220			125			125

TABLE 24: Hypothesis five, Cases: Center-to-Right Parties, DV: Pro_Intl_cmp

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)		0.706	0.000	0.790	0.000		1.774	0.002		1.839	0.001	
Party's Left/Right Position (CHES)	-0.252	0.101	0.000 **	-0.221	0.124	0.007 **	-0.236	0.122	0.006 *	-0.242	0.148	0.020 *
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				-0.021	0.068	0.785				0.051	0.083	0.619
Stance on Economy				-0.022	0.104	0.768				-0.049	0.124	0.614
Coalition Membership							0.018	0.312	0.835	0.039	0.328	0.664
Unemployment							-0.096	0.037	0.355	-0.092	0.038	0.384
Inequality (GINI)							-0.060	0.052	0.568	-0.073	0.054	0.505
Adjusted R-square			0.060			0.046			0.046			0.037
N			250			242			137			137

TABLE 25: Hypothesis five, Cases: Left-to-Center Parties, DV: Anti_Intl_cmp

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)		0.237	0.000		0.274	0.012		0.415	0.719		0.420	0.854
Party's Left/Right Position (CHES)	-0.222	0.073	0.001 **	-0.342	0.203	0.059	-0.293	0.035	0.003 **	-0.397	0.084	0.087
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				0.214	0.059	0.002				0.116	0.026	0.210
Stance on Economy				0.072	0.166	0.687				0.074	0.07	0.750
Coalition Membership							-0.024	0.109	0.799	-0.021	0.111	0.832
Unemployment							-0.140	0.010	0.189	-0.139	0.01	0.194
Inequality (GINI)							0.102	0.014	0.337	0.107	0.014	0.314
Adjusted R-square			0.045			0.077			0.069			0.066
N			224			220			125			125

TABLE 26: Hypothesis five, Cases: Center-to-Right Parties, DV: Anti_Intl_cmp

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.	Beta	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)		0.267	0.000		0.278	0.071		0.653	0.170		0.609	0.911
Party's Left/Right Position (CHES)	0.316	0.038	0.000 **	0.430	0.044	0.000 **	0.411	0.045	0.000 **	0.464	0.049	0.000 **
Stance on Democratic Freedoms				0.085	0.024	0.215				0.134	0.027	0.109
Stance on Economy				-0.33	0.037	0.000 **				-0.359	0.041	0.000 **
Coalition Membership							-0.214	0.115	0.006 **	-0.097	0.108	0.184
Unemployment							-0.042	0.014	0.660	-0.044	0.013	0.609
Inequality (GINI)							-0.051	0.019	0.593	-0.080	0.018	0.371
Adjusted R-square			0.096			0.219			0.211			0.354
N			250			242			137			137