The Effect of Politically Focused Internet Memes on Partisanship and Partisan Interaction Open Access

Herren, Tori Elizabeth (2017)

Permanent URL: https://etd.library.emory.edu/concern/etds/pg15bf64d?locale=pt-BR%2A
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Abstract

Internet memes are a growing method of political participation and commentary online. However, the primary function of a meme lends itself to entertainment, rather than critical thinking and developed political discourse. In an era of increasing political polarization, we question whether the growth of political memes helps or hinders partisan relations. Thus, we utilize the public goods game and the trust game to measure social cooperation and trust in partisans after exposure to politically focused Internet memes. While we find some evidence to support that co-partisan pairings facilitate trust, the ultimate effect of politically focused Internet memes is inconclusive.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

I. Introduction…………………………….……………………………………………........1

II. Literature Review……………………………………………………………………...…4

III. Methods……………………………………………………………………....................15

IV. Results………………………………………………………………………..................25

V. Discussion…………………………………………………………………....................44

VI. References…………………………………………………………………....................48

VII. Appendix…………………………………………………………………......................53

Figure 1. Willy Wonka/Healthcare Meme………………………………………….....................23

Figure 2. Math Lady/Gun Control Meme…………………………………………......................23

Figure 3. Conceited/Climate Change……………………………………………….....................24

Figure 4. Frequency Distribution of Time Lived in the United States………………..................27

Figure 5: Party Distribution in the First Treatment/Second Public Goods Game….....................30

Figure 6: Party Distribution in the Second Treatment/Third Public Goods Game........................30

Figure 7: Party Distribution in the First Treatment/Second Trust Game………….......................37

Figure 8: Party Distribution in the Second Treatment/Third Trust Game………….....................37

Table 1: Party Distribution.............................................................................................................26

Table 2: Summary Statistics of Overall Public Good Contribution in the Public Goods Game...28

Table 3: Summary Statistics of Public Good Contributions in the First Treatment by Party

Groupings.......................................................................................................................................29

Table 4: Summary Statistics of Public Good Contribution in the Second Treatment by Party

Groupings.......................................................................................................................................29

Table 5: Paired t-test Results between Mean Contributions to the Public Good by Party

Grouping........................................................................................................................................31

Table 6: OLS Regressions on Public Good Contribution in Treatment 1 and 2 by Party

Grouping........................................................................................................................................32

Table 7: Summary Statistics of Overall Contribution by Players X in the Trust Game................36

Table 8: Summary Statistics of Player X Contributions in the Second Trust Game by Party

Pairings..........................................................................................................................................38

Table 9: Summary Statistics of Player X Contributions in the Third Trust Game by Party

Pairings..........................................................................................................................................38

Table 10: Between Treatment Differences in Amount Sent by Party Pairing...............................39

Table 11: Individual Regressions for Same Party Partners by Treatment.....................................40

Table 12: Regressions on Amount Sent in the First and Second Treatment by Same Party

Pairings..........................................................................................................................................43

Table 13: Description of Variables................................................................................................53

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