The Politics of Naming and Shaming Open Access

Park, Baekkwan (2015)

Permanent URL: https://etd.library.emory.edu/concern/etds/pc289j823?locale=en
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Abstract

This dissertation focuses on two empirical patterns of HRO advocacy. Why are some states frequently shamed for human rights violations despite having reasonable human rights records while many states are rarely criticized despite being serious violators? Why are states shamed differently by different HROs for precisely the same human rights violations? The process by which HROs collect information is critical to understanding these patterns. HROs that largely rely on third parties to generate information tend to focus on states with relatively good records; and, they shame these states severely. In contrast, HROs that directly engage states tend to focus on the worst human rights violators but they are less likely to harshly criticize these states. HROs that indirectly monitor via third parties receive a relatively large amount of information from states in which there is a well-organized civil society prepared and willing to expose violations, and these states generally have reasonable human rights records. HROs that directly engage states focus on serious abuses; however, in order to gain access, HROs are more likely to negotiate the information that they will release publicly. I conclude my dissertation by explaining why HROs choose particular information collection strategies, focusing on variation in the material costs of investigative missions and the political costs of potentially risking an image of impartiality. To evaluate the empirical implications of my argument, I have compiled a comprehensive dataset on the shaming behavior of over 90 HROs. Utilizing text analysis techniques based on NLP, I have examined and processed nearly 40,000 reports. I find that by choosing an indirect approach, HROs tend to have far more information about abuses in places with strong civil societies and they are likely to both over-report on states with generally good records and under-report on states with relatively bad records. These HROs criticize states harshly and they do not withhold information. HROs that directly engage states; however, tend to focus on states with the worst human rights conditions, but they are less likely to criticize states harshly.

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