The Work Disinformation Cannot Do: Russian Hybrid Interference and Democratic Erosion in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine Restricted; Files Only

Abstract

This thesis examines Russian interference operations through a comparative analysis of three case studies: Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine. It traces the development of Russia’s toolkit from its first large-scale use during the 2007 Bronze Soldier crisis in Estonia, through its integration with conventional forces for the 2008 war in Georgia and the subsequent decade of gradual economic and political capture, to its most extensive and, in some respects, self-defeating application in Ukraine.

The central argument is that the effectiveness of Russian interference depends less on the content of narratives than on underlying structural vulnerabilities that render states and societies susceptible to them in the first place. These vulnerabilities include unresolved territorial conflicts, ethnic divisions, energy dependence, and weakened democratic institutions that would otherwise enable resistance.

The comparative analysis demonstrates that resilience to Russian interference is institutional rather than informational. Estonia’s post-2007 investments in civic integration and democratic governance produced a highly-resilient society. In contrast, Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia and democratic backsliding created enduring vulnerabilities despite a popular pro-Western public opinion. Ukraine illustrates both dynamics: before 2022, internal divisions and governance weaknesses facilitated interference, whereas after 2022, national consolidation and strengthened state capacity significantly strengthened its resistance.

Table of Contents

Introduction ..... 1

Case Studies ..... 2

Methodology ..... 3

Thesis Statement ..... 5

Estonia ..... 7

Historical and Demographic Background ..... 8

The Bronze Soldier Crisis ..... 11

The 2007 Cyberattacks ..... 14

The Information Environment ..... 17

Soft Power and the Compatriot Doctrine ..... 20

Integration and Other Institutional Responses ..... 22

Implications ..... 25

Georgia ..... 28

Strategic Position and Russian Leverage ..... 30

The Frozen Conflict ..... 32

The 2008 War ..... 34

Russian Information Operations ..... 37

The Georgian Dream Government ..... 40

The Foreign Agents Law and the 2024 Election ..... 43

Effects on Democratic Institutions ..... 47

Implications ..... 49

Ukraine ..... 52

“Ukraine Is Not a Real Country” ..... 54

The Euromaidan Revolution ..... 56

The 2014 Occupation ..... 58

Energy and Structural Dependency ..... 61

The 2022–Ongoing War ..... 63

Ukrainian Information Operations ..... 66

Wartime Democratic Consolidation ..... 68

Implications ..... 70

Conclusion ..... 73

Bibliography ..... 77

Appendix ..... 89

About this Honors Thesis

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School	Emory College
Department	Russian and East European Studies
Degree	B.A.
Submission	Honors Thesis
Language	English
Research Field	East European Studies Baltic Studies Slavic Studies
Keyword	Georgia Disinformation Ukraine Russia Estonia
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor	Matthew Payne, Emory University
Committee Members	Raymond De Luca, Emory University Hubert Tworzecki, Emory University

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