The Politics of Language Regimes Open Access
Liu, Amy H. (2009)
Abstract
If language regimes are the rules that delineate which languages can be used when and where--thereby institutionalizing the distribution of linguistic powers--what explains a government's language regime choice? Specifically, under what conditions are linguistic powers concentrated in the hands of the dominant group language, shared across several different languages, and neutralized via a lingua franca? In the dissertation, I argue language regimes are political institutions, and by extension, language regime choice is the product of bargaining between linguistic groups over institutional designs. Employing a Rubenstein bargaining model, I formally demonstrate language regime choice is the product of two components: the second period uncertainty and the socioeconomic hierarchy. I argue we are most likely to see (1) power-concentrating language regimes when the politically non-dominant group is socioeconomically dominant but the likelihood of it coming to power is low; (2) power-neutralizing language regimes under the aforementioned socioeconomic hierarchy conditions but when the likelihood of the non-dominant group coming to power is high; and (3) power-sharing language regimes when the politically dominant group is also the socioeconomically advantaged group.
I test the generated propositions first on a cross-sectional dataset that includes all instances of political independence and democratic transitions between 1945 and 2000. I supplement the statistical analysis with a qualitative study of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to get at (1) not just whether but why there is a correlation between the variables of interest and (2) the degree as opposed to just the type of linguistic distribution.
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION 1
1.1. Rationale 7
1.1.1. Implications: National Cohesion 9
1.1.2. Implications: Economic Development 10
1.2. Languages and Ethnicity 13
1.3. Language Regimes 15
1.4. Plan of Dissertation 19
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Language Planning, Ethnic Conflict, and State-Building 24
2.1. Language Planning and Policy 25
2.2. Ethnic Conflict 28
2.3. State-Building 32
2.4. Political Institutional Choice 36
2.4.1. Effects of Second-Period Uncertainty 36
2.4.2. Effects of Socioeconomic Hierarchy 38
2.5. Conclusion 39
3. ARGUMENT
Theory of Language Regime Choice 41
3.1. The Model 42
3.1.1. Assumptions 42
3.1.2. Outcomes 45
3.1.3. Actors and Sequence of Moves 46
3.1.4. Utilities and Payoffs 50
3.2. Language Regime Accepted Equilibrium 54
3.3. Comparative Statics 57
3.4. Discussion 70
4. EMPIRICAL TEST #1
Statistical Analysis 73
4.1. Shocks and Language Regime Change 74
4.1.1. Dependent Variable: Language Regime Change 75
4.1.2. Independent Variable: Political Shock 77
4.1.3. Control Variables 78
4.1.4. Model Estimator 83
4.1.5. Discussion 83
4.2. Political Shocks and Language Regime Choice 88
4.2.1. Dependent Variable: Language Regime Choice 89
4.2.2. Independent Variables 90
4.2.3. Control Variables 96
4.2.4. Model Estimator 99
4.2.5. Discussion 99
4.2.6. Robustness Check: Linguistic Power Distribution 104
4.3. Implications for Case Studies 107
5. INDONESIA
Unity in Diversity: Power-Sharing and Power-Concentrating with a Lingua Franca 109
5.1. Research Design 111
5.1.1. Case Selection 111
5.1.2. Unit of Analysis 112
5.1.3. Conceptualization: Dominant Group 113
5.1.4. Dependent Variable: Language Regime Choice 114
5.1.5. Independent Variable: Second-Period Uncertainty 115
5.1.6. Independent Variable: Socioeconomic Hierarchy 117
5.2. Indonesia: Overview 118
5.3. Indonesia: 1945-1968 Sukarno Era 120
5.3.1. Bargaining Groups 120
5.3.2. Language Regime 122
5.3.3. Second-Period Uncertainty (Moderate-Low-High) 124
5.3.4. Socioeconomic Hierarchy (Convergent) 127
5.3.5. Discussion 128
5.4. Indonesia: 1967-1998 Suharto Era 133
5.4.1. Bargaining Groups 134
5.4.2. Language Regime 135
5.4.3. Second-Period Uncertainty (High-Low-Moderate) 135
5.4.4. Socioeconomic Hierarchy (Non-Convergent) 136
5.4.5. Discussion 137
5.5. Conclusion 139
6. MALAYSIA
Language Regime Choice under Non-Convergent Socioeconomic Hierarchy 142
6.1. Malaysia: Overview 142
6.2. Malaysia: 1957-1969 Democracy Period 145
6.2.1. Bargaining Groups 145
6.2.2. Language Regime 147
6.2.3. Second-Period Uncertainty (Moderate-Moderate-Moderate) 151
6.2.4. Socioeconomic Hierarchy (Non-Convergent) 155
6.2.5. Discussion 156
6.3. Malaysia: Post-1969 Non-Democracy Period 159
6.3.1. Bargaining Groups 160
6.3.2. Language Regime 161
6.3.3. Second-Period Probabilities (High-Low-Moderate) 164
6.3.4. Socioeconomic Hierarchy (Non-Convergent) 166
6.3.5. Discussion 167
6.4. Conclusion 168
7. SINGAPORE
Power-Neutralizing with Different Linguas Franca 171
7.1. Singapore: Overview 171
7.2. Singapore: 1959-1963 Pre-Merger Period 175
7.2.1. Bargaining Groups 175
7.2.2. Language Regime 176
7.2.3. Second-Period Uncertainty (Low-High-Moderate) 177
7.2.4. Socioeconomic Hierarchy (Convergent) 181
7.2.5. Discussion 181
7.3. Singapore: 1965-1971 Immediate Post-Merger 184
7.3.1. Bargaining Groups 185
7.3.2. Language Regime 187
7.3.3. Second-Period Uncertainty (Moderate-Low-High) 188
7.3.4. Socioeconomic Hierarchy (Convergent) 192
7.3.5. Discussion 192
7.4. Singapore: Post-1971 Post-British Withdrawal 193
7.4.1. Bargaining Groups 193
7.4.2. Language Regime 193
7.4.3. Second-Period Uncertainty (High-Low-Moderate) 195
7.4.4. Socioeconomic Hierarchy (Convergent) 196
7.4.5. Discussion 198
7.5. Conclusion 202
8. CONCLUSION 206
8.1. Theoretical Implication 209
8.2. Methodological Implication 212
8.3. Policy Implication 214
I. REFERENCES 216
II. PROOFS 244
III. DOCUMENTATION
Language Regime Change in Asia 1950-2000 262
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