Defending David Cannon; Unpacking the Unfairness of Plea Bargains through Bargaining Theory Open Access

Abstract

This thesis investigates the fairness of plea bargaining in the United States by applying bargaining theory from political science to analyze the legal structures and power dynamics that shape the process. Plea bargaining has become the dominant method of resolving criminal cases, accounting for over 95% of convictions, but it remains a highly contested practice. Certain legal scholars argue that it promotes efficiency and reduces trial burdens, but critics claim that plea bargaining enables coercion and undermines due process. This conflict led to my research question: is plea bargaining in the United States unfair, and if so, what legal mechanisms contribute to this imbalance? Using legal analysis, political science theory, and history, this thesis unpacks the concept of information asymmetry to explain how prosecutors exert disproportionate influence over defendants. The analysis focuses on two legal mechanisms: discovery rules and charge bargaining. It also examines how coercive tactics, including inflated charges and trial penalties, distort defendants’ perception of their options, often leading even innocent individuals to plead guilty. The result suggests that plea bargaining functions more as a strategic tool used by the state and less as a tactic to induce fair negotiation. The conclusion reflects on the systemic consequences of this imbalance and poses critical questions about the viability of criminal prosecution. 

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Introduction.....................................................................................................1

Chapter 1........................................................................................................8

1.1: The Early Years..........................................................................................................8

1.2: The Early Emergence and Legitimization of Plea Bargains......................................12

1.3: Prohibition, Corruption, and Legal Complexity...................................................13

1.4: Enter the Supreme Court..............................................................................14

1.5: Where Are We Now?.............................................................................................................18

Chapter 2.......................................................................................................21

2.1: Explaining Information Asymmetry..................................................................21

2.2: Discovery................................................................................................26

2.3: Charge Bargaining......................................................................................31

Chapter 3.....................................................................................................35

3.1: Coercion.................................................................................................35

3.2: Dilemma of Defense Attorneys......................................................................37

3.3: The West Memphis Three: A Case Study of Innocent People Pleading Guilty...............43

3.4: Separating Crime and Punishment....................................................................47

3.5: The Struggle of Defendants...........................................................................49

3.6: Disputes over Asymmetry................................................................................51

Conclusion.....................................................................................................55

4.1: The Effects...............................................................................................56

4.2: A Way Out: Plea Bargaining as a Collective Action Problem...................................59

4.3: A Positive Note.........................................................................................61

4.4: We Have So Much Work to Do......................................................................61

Bibliography...................................................................................................63 

About this Honors Thesis

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School	Emory College
Department	American Studies
Degree	B.A.
Submission	Honors Thesis
Language	English
Research Field	Law Political Science, General History, General
Keyword	Plea Bargains Criminal Law
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor	Risjord, Mark, Emory University
Committee Members	Ozawa-de Silva, Brendan, Emory University Baker, Matthew, Emory University

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