The Effect of Prices and Political Unity on the Efficacy of Inter-state Gas Bargaining Open Access

Abstract

While a great deal of research has gone into the determinants of inter-state bargaining efficacy, current
explanations often fail to predict the success of a bargaining episode. To fill the theoretical gap, two
elements need to be considered. Often, asymmetrical interdependence is thought of as a source of
bargaining power. But, the nature of the good that creates the asymmetrical interdependence has not been
examined. I test whether the price of the good affects bargaining power. Additionally, I test the relevance
of the separation of purpose literature in the context of inter-state bargaining. Does the level of domestic
political unity in the target state affect bargaining outcomes? The findings suggest that the price of the
good leveraged in an instance of inter-state bargaining and the level of domestic political unity affect the
bargaining result. As the price of the leveraged good rises, bargaining power increases. And, higher levels
of domestic unity in the target state increase the sender state's bargaining efficacy. I also use the findings
to develop a framework to explain the efficacy of Russia's post-2000 inter-state gas bargaining with energy
dependent CIS members.

Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. THEORY 2
a. Russian political motives 2
b. Gas 4
c. International trade 7
d. International bargaining 9
e. Domestic politics 14
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 20
a. Why Russia? 24
b. Measuring the Explanatory Variables 28
c. Measuring the Dependent Variable 30
d. Control Variables 32
e. Difficulties 35

4. CASE STUDIES 36
a. Russia-Ukraine 2005-6 37
b. Russia-Ukraine 2007-8 41
c. Russia-Ukraine 2008-9 45
d. Russia-Belarus 2003-4 49
e. Russia-Belarus 2006-7 52

5. CONCLUSION 55
6. APPENDIX 59

About this Honors Thesis

Rights statement

• Permission granted by the author to include this thesis or dissertation in this repository. All rights reserved by the author. Please contact the author for information regarding the reproduction and use of this thesis or dissertation.

School	Emory College
Department	Political Science
Degree	BA
Submission	Honors Thesis
Language	English
Research Field	Political Science, International Law and Relations Political Science, General
Keyword	Russia Bargaining Gas
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor	Remington, Thomas F, Emory University
Committee Members	Reinhardt, Eric, Emory University Wade, Melissa M, Emory University

Last modified

Primary PDF

Thumbnail	Title	Date Uploaded	Actions
	The Effect of Prices and Political Unity on the Efficacy of Inter-state Gas Bargaining ()	2018-08-28 10:55:53 -0400	Press to Select an action Download

Supplemental Files

Thumbnail	Title	Date Uploaded	Actions