The Limits of the Energy Weapon: Why Russia Escalated in 2022 in Response to Shifts in Ukraine's Energy Policy Open Access
Greenlee, Reese (Spring 2026)
Abstract
Why did Russia escalate to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, after nearly two decades of relying on indirect forms of pressure? Existing explanations tend to focus on NATO expansion, security concerns, or ideological narratives, but these accounts do not fully explain the timing or the shift in strategy. This paper argues that the answer lies in the changing structure of the Russia–Ukraine energy relationship. For much of the post-Soviet period, Russia relied on energy as a tool of coercion, using gas pricing, supply disruptions, and transit dependence to exert influence over Ukraine without resorting to large-scale violence. However, following the 2014 Crimean invasion, Ukraine began to reorient its energy policy away from Russia and toward European markets and institutions. Over time, these reforms reduced the asymmetrical dependence that had made energy an effective instrument of leverage. By tracing the evolution of Ukraine’s energy policy before and after 2014, this paper shows how changes in institutional design, market structure, and regulatory alignment gradually eroded Russia’s coercive capacity. As the “energy weapon” became less effective, the strategic logic underpinning Russia’s approach shifted. The 2022 invasion is therefore interpreted not simply as a reaction to external threats, but as a substitution of military force for declining economic coercion. More broadly, the paper contributes to the study of energy weaponization by showing how the erosion of asymmetrical interdependence can alter state behavior, pushing coercive actors toward more direct and costly forms of power.
Table of Contents
Introduction -- pg. 1.
From Soviet Integration to Interdependence -- pg. 3.
The Present Study -- pg. 10.
Energy Weaponization Theory -- pg. 11.
Energy Weaponization as Hybrid Power -- pg. 15.
Pre-2014 Energy Policy: ‘Energy Strategy of Ukraine to 2030’ -- pg. 17.
2014 Crimean Invasion and Its Effect on Ukrainian Energy -- pg. 22.
Post-2014 Energy Policy: The 2035 Energy Strategy (2017) -- pg. 29.
The 2022 Invasion and Beyond – Continuity, Acceleration, and Strategic Reorientation -- pg. 36.
Conclusion & Looking Forward -- pg. 44.
Appendix A -- pg. 46.
Bibliography -- pg. 47.
About this Honors Thesis
| School | |
|---|---|
| Department | |
| Degree | |
| Submission | |
| Language |
|
| Research Field | |
| Keyword | |
| Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor | |
| Committee Members |
Primary PDF
| Thumbnail | Title | Date Uploaded | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
The Limits of the Energy Weapon: Why Russia Escalated in 2022 in Response to Shifts in Ukraine's Energy Policy () | 2026-04-14 14:09:57 -0400 |
|
Supplemental Files
| Thumbnail | Title | Date Uploaded | Actions |
|---|