Essays on Childcare Regulation, Information, and Markets Restricted; Files Only

Abstract

This dissertation examines how policy and ownership shape childcare supply, quality information, and access in U.S. childcare markets. Chapter 1 studies a 2009 Georgia licensing reform that imposed stricter requirements on family homes. Using a difference-in-differences design with provider openings and labor market outcomes from 2005--2015, I find that tighter requirements reduced family home entry relative to centers and were associated with weaker childcare labor market outcomes, including larger earnings declines in counties with greater pre-policy family home exposure. These results show that quality-oriented regulation can reduce small-provider participation when compliance costs are high.

Chapter 2 evaluates whether families value publicly disclosed childcare quality ratings. Using administrative data from 2015--2023 and a nested logit demand framework, I estimate preferences over price, distance, and quality signals and conduct policy counterfactuals. Rated providers attract meaningfully higher enrollment, and simulations indicate that expanding rating participation among currently unrated providers generates substantially larger consumer surplus gains than improving ratings among already rated providers. Supporting reduced-form evidence suggests that ratings primarily reveal pre-existing quality differences rather than inducing large quality upgrades.

Chapter 3 studies how private equity acquisition reshapes the operations of childcare centers in Georgia. Using provider- and room-level administrative data linked to hand-collected private equity deal records from PitchBook, the chapter documents a systematic reallocation of center resources after acquisition: PE-acquired centers withdraw from Georgia's state-funded Pre-K program while expanding enrollment in private-pay age groups. The probability of operating a Pre-K room falls by more than half, and the decline deepens over time as existing Pre-K contracts expire.

Together, these essays highlight a common policy tension: interventions intended to improve childcare quality and market performance can also reshape provider composition and affordability. Effective policy must pair quality goals with strategies that preserve supply and equitable access.

Disclaimer: The views and findings expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not represent the official position or views of the Georgia Department of Early Care and Learning (DECAL) or any other government agency. This research was conducted independently and any conclusions drawn are the responsibility of the author alone. 

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: The Effects of Stricter Licensing on Residential Childcare Supply in Georgia

 1.1 Introduction

 1.2 Data

  1.2.1 Provider Level Data

  1.2.2 Labor Data

 1.3 Empirical Methodology

  1.3.1 Childcare Openings

  1.3.2 Childcare Jobs and Wages

 1.4 Results

  1.4.1 Childcare Openings

  1.4.2 Childcare Jobs

  1.4.3 Earnings

 1.5 Mechanisms

  1.5.1 Direct Entry Barriers

  1.5.2 Labor Market Reallocation

  1.5.3 Market Concentration and Employer Power

  1.5.4 Access and Informal Substitution

  1.5.5 Geographic and Demographic Heterogeneity

  1.5.6 Quality Effects

 1.6 Discussion and Next Steps

  1.6.1 Policy Implications

  1.6.2 Next Steps

Chapter 2: The Consumer Value of Childcare Quality Ratings

 2.1 Introduction

 2.2 Institutional Background and Data

  2.2.1 QRIS

  2.2.2 Data Sources and Sample Construction

  2.2.3 Descriptive Evidence

 2.3 Model and Empirical Strategy

  2.3.1 Nested Logit Model

  2.3.2 Estimation and Identification

  2.3.3 Counterfactual Simulations

 2.4 Results

  2.4.1 Demand Estimates

  2.4.2 Elasticities and Validation

  2.4.3 Policy Comparisons

 2.5 Why Ratings Have Value

  2.5.1 Provider Selection

  2.5.2 Consumer Response

  2.5.3 Strategic Behavior

 2.6 Policy Implications

 2.7 Conclusion

Chapter 3: Private Equity in Childcare Markets

 3.1 Introduction

 3.2 Literature Review

 3.3 Data and Summary Statistics

  3.3.1 Data Sources

  3.3.2 PE Classification

  3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics

  3.3.4 Market Penetration

 3.4 Empirical Strategy

  3.4.1 Descriptive Comparisons

  3.4.2 Difference-in-Differences

  3.4.3 Identification

  3.4.4 Robustness

 3.5 Results

  3.5.1 Selection into Acquisition

  3.5.2 Event Studies

  3.5.3 Main Results

  3.5.4 Short vs Long Run Effects

  3.5.5 Robustness

 3.6 Conclusion

Appendix A: Chapter 1 Supplement

Appendix B: Chapter 2 Supplement

Appendix C: Chapter 3 Supplement

Bibliography

About this Dissertation

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School	Laney Graduate School
Department	Economics
Degree	Ph.D.
Submission	Dissertation
Language	English
Research Field	Economics, Labor Education, Early Childhood
Keyword	Licensing Private Equity Consumer Preferences Education Policy
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor	Maggie E.C. Jones, McGill University Matthew Grennan, Emory University
Committee Members	Jillian Grennan, Emory University Julie Hotchkiss, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Christopher Hansman, Emory University

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