The Institutional Dilemma of Globalized Firms Restricted; Files & ToC

Abstract

This project examines the risks and opportunities arising from the institutional environments that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are embedded in. It has two main components. In the first one, I examine how MNEs establish various forms of connections with state actors as a strategy to mitigate political risks and engage in rent-seeking activities. In the second part, I study the impact of the emerging legal regime of transnational anti-corruption enforcement. I show how transnational law enforcement affects the business performance of firms exposed to diverse and often contradictory institutional requirements. As a whole, the dissertation highlights the "double jeopardy" problem faced by globalized firms that operate across jurisdictional boundaries. In countries where judicial constraints over government misconduct is weak, political arrangements between the state and the business provide the latter with cronyist rent-sharing opportunities and a necessary alternative rights protection mechanism. Meanwhile, globalized firms with exposure to developed jurisdictions governed by strong legal institutions, such as that of the U.S., face the risk of transnational enforcement of strong corporate integrity regulations, such as anti-bribery laws. In this project, I argue that transnational anti-corruption enforcement disrupts the informal arrangements made between globally-connected firms and local government officials, especially in markets with high regulatory barriers and expropriation risks. An implication of such institutional dilemma faced by MNEs is that they need to weigh the resources and constraints provided by one institutional environment against those provided under other institutional settings. Globalized firms may need to make trade-offs and adjust their exposures to and liabilities from divergent institutional requirements and expectations.

Table of Contents

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About this Dissertation

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School	Laney Graduate School
Department	Political Science
Degree	Ph.D.
Submission	Dissertation
Language	English
Research Field	Political Science, International Law and Relations Political Science, International Relations Political Science, General
Keyword	transnational corruption government-business relations the rule of law multinational enterprises
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor	Eric Reinhardt, Emory University
Committee Members	Jeffrey Staton, Emory University Miguel Rueda, Emory University Jennifer Gandhi, Emory University Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Northeastern University

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