What Affects the Implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs? An Examination of the Conditions Needed for Successful Conditionality Open Access

Abstract

What Affects the Implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs? An Examination of the Conditions Needed for Successful Conditionality
By Linda Wu

Conditionality is an integral component of many foreign aid programs. However, the use of conditionality remains controversial, with both sides fiercely weighing in on its appropriateness, efficacy, and necessity. One facet of this debate is focused on the conditions under which conditionality can be useful. My paper examines this particular question and looks at the relationship between business groups, domestic political conditions, domestic monitoring efforts, and reform implementation. I predict that in domestic environments conducive to domestic monitoring efforts, there should be a high likelihood of successful reform implementation. I look specifically at business groups in the government to lead these monitoring efforts. Using the OLS method, a quantitative analysis of these variables is conducted, followed by an examination of a case study, Malawi. My analysis finds that though domestic monitoring efforts do play a significant role in reform implementation, the link between business groups and their influence on domestic monitoring efforts is not very clear. Moreover, regarding the domestic political conditions, my quantitative analysis finds that the only significant political variable affecting reform implementation is the length of executive tenure. Democracy levels, political instability and ethno-linguistic fractionalization are not found to have a significant effect on reform implementation despite the findings of previous literature that supports this. Using the case study of Malawi, I find that a committed executive was the most important factor in successful reform implementation. Ultimately, my findings are suggestive that conditions conducive to domestic monitoring efforts do have an impact on reform implementation, but they are not conclusive regarding the exact conditions under which conditionality is useful.

Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction...1
Literature Review and Theory...2
Empirics...14
Data...23
Discussion...34
Case Study...37

Historical Overview and Background...37
Project Overviews...38
Predictions and Realities...41

Concluding Remarks...43
Works Cited...44
Appendix...47

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics...24
Table 2 Features of Successful and Unsuccessful Adjustment Operations...25
Table 3 OLS Regressions...27
Graph 1 Scatter Plot of IEG Project Ratings and Number of Establishments...29
Graph 2 Scatter Plot of IEG Project Ratings and Opposition Seat Share...30
Table 4 OLS Regressions...31
Table 5 OLS Regressions...Appendix B
Table 6 OLS Regressions...Appendix C

About this Honors Thesis

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School	Emory College
Department	International Studies
Degree	BA
Submission	Honors Thesis
Language	English
Research Field	Political Science, General
Keyword	Conditionality, Structural Adjustment Programmes, Monitoring
Committee Chair / Thesis Advisor	Gandhi, Jennifer, Emory University
Committee Members	Doner, Richard, Emory University Francis, Andrew, Emory University

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